Seferia (Merged)

Seferia (Merged)

Mishnah Berakhot

Chapter 1

The beginning of tractate Berakhot, the first tractate in the first of the six orders of Mishna, opens with a discussion of the recitation of Shema, as the recitation of Shema encompasses an acceptance of the yoke of Heaven and of the mitzvot, and as such, forms the basis for all subsequent teachings. The Mishna opens with the laws regarding the appropriate time to recite Shema : From when, that is, from what time, does one recite Shema in the evening? From the time when the priests enter to partake of their teruma. Until when does the time for the recitation of the evening Shema extend? Until the end of the first watch. The term used in the Torah (Deuteronomy 6:7) to indicate the time for the recitation of the evening Shema is beshokhbekha, when you lie down, which refers to the time in which individuals go to sleep. Therefore, the time for the recitation of Shema is the first portion of the night, when individuals typically prepare for sleep. That is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Rabbis say: The time for the recitation of the evening Shema is until midnight. Rabban Gamliel says: One may recite Shema until dawn, indicating that beshokhbekha is to be understood as a reference to the entire time people sleep in their beds, the whole night. The mishna relates that Rabban Gamliel practiced in accordance with his ruling. There was an incident where Rabban Gamliel’s sons returned very late from a wedding hall. They said to him, as they had been preoccupied with celebrating with the groom and bride: We did not recite Shema. He said to them: If the dawn has not yet arrived, you are obligated to recite Shema. Since Rabban Gamliel’s opinion disagreed with that of the Rabbis, he explained to his sons that the Rabbis actually agree with him, and that it is not only with regard to the halakha of the recitation of Shema, but rather, wherever the Sages say until midnight, the mitzva may be performed until dawn. Rabban Gamliel cites several cases in support of his claim, such as the burning of fats and limbs on the altar. Due to the quantity of offerings each day, the priests were often unable to complete the burning of all of the fats and limbs, so they continued to be burned into the night, as it is written: “This is the law of the burnt offering: The burnt offering shall remain upon the pyre on the altar all night until morning, while the fire on the altar burns it” (Leviticus 6:2). And, with regard to all sacrifices, such as the sin-offerings and the guilt-offerings that are eaten for one day and night; although the Sages state that they may be eaten only until midnight, by Torah law they may be eaten until dawn. This is in accordance with the verse: “On the day on which it is offered must you eat. Do not leave it until the morning” (Leviticus 7:15). If so, why did the Sages say that they may be eaten only until midnight? This is in order to distance a person from transgression, as if one believes that he has until dawn to perform the mitzva, he might be negligent and postpone it until the opportunity to perform the mitzva has passed.

From when does one recite Shema in the morning? From when a person can distinguish between sky-blue [ tekhelet ] and white. Rabbi Eliezer says: From when one can distinguish between sky-blue and leek-green. And one must finish reciting Shema until the end of the period when you rise, i.e., sunrise, when the sun begins to shine. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One may recite the morning Shema until three hours of the day, which this is still considered when you rise, as that is the habit of kings to rise from their sleep at three hours of the day. While there is a set time frame for the recitation of Shema, one who recites Shema from that time onward loses nothing. Although he does not fulfill the mitzva of reciting of Shema at its appointed time, he is nevertheless considered like one who reads the Torah, and is rewarded accordingly.

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed the proper way to recite Shema. Beit Shammai say: One should recite Shema in the manner indicated in the text of Shema itself. Therefore, in the evening every person must recline on his side and recite Shema, in fulfillment of the verse: “When you lie down,” and in the morning he must stand and recite Shema, in fulfillment of the verse: When you rise, as it is stated: “When you lie down, and when you rise.” And Beit Hillel say: Every person recites Shema as he is, and he may do so in whatever position is most comfortable for him, both day and night, as it is stated: “And when you walk along the way,” when one is neither standing nor reclining ( Me’iri ). If so, according to Beit Hillel, why was it stated: “When you lie down, and when you rise”? This is merely to denote time; at the time when people lie down and the time when people rise. With regard to this halakha, Rabbi Tarfon said: Once, I was coming on the road when I stopped and reclined to recite Shema in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai. Although Rabbi Tarfon was a disciple of Beit Hillel, he thought that fulfilling the mitzva in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai would be a more meticulous fulfillment of the mitzva, acceptable to all opinions. Yet in so doing, I endangered myself due to the highwaymen [ listim ] who accost travelers. The Sages said to him: You deserved to be in a position where you were liable to pay with your life, as you transgressed the statement of Beit Hillel. This statement will be explained in the Gemara.

From the laws of the recitation of Shema itself, the mishna proceeds to discuss the blessings recited in conjunction with Shema. Here, the order is established: In the morning when reciting Shema, one recites two blessings beforehand, the first on the radiant lights and the second the blessing on the love of Torah, and one thereafter, which begins with: True and Firm [ emet veyatziv ]. And in the evening one recites two blessings beforehand, on the radiant lights and on the love of God, and two thereafter, the blessing of redemption: True and Faithful [ emet ve’emuna ], and the blessing: Help us lie down. With regard to the blessing: True and Faithful, whether one recites it in its long formula and whether one recites it in its short formula, he fulfills his obligation ( Tosafot ). However, the general principle is: Where the Sages said to recite a long blessing, one may not shorten it, and so too, wherever they said to recite a short blessing, one may not lengthen it. Where the Sages said that a blessing must conclude with a second blessing at the end, he may not fail to conclude with that blessing. Similarly, if the Sages said that a blessing must not conclude with a second blessing, one may not conclude with a blessing.

It is a mitzva by Torah law to mention the exodus from Egypt at night, but some held that this mitzva was, like phylacteries or ritual fringes, fulfilled only during the day and not at night. For this reason it was decided: The exodus from Egypt is mentioned at night, adjacent to the recitation of Shema. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said: I am approximately seventy years old, and although I have long held this opinion, I was never privileged to prevail ( Me’iri ) and prove that there is a biblical obligation to fulfill the accepted custom (Ra’avad) and have the exodus from Egypt mentioned at night, until Ben Zoma interpreted it homiletically and proved it obligatory. Ben Zoma derived it as it is stated: “That you may remember the day you went out of the land of Egypt all the days of your life” (Deuteronomy 16:3). The days of your life, refers to daytime alone; however, the addition of the word all, as it is stated: All the days of your life, comes to add nights as well. And the Rabbis, who posit that there is no biblical obligation to mention the exodus from Egypt at night, explain the word, all, differently and say: The days of your life, refers to the days in this world, all is added to include the days of the Messiah.

Chapter 2

The first question discussed in the mishna is the question of intent. One who was reading the sections of the Torah which comprise Shema, and the time for the recitation of the morning or evening Shema arrived, if he focused his heart, he fulfilled his obligation and need not repeat Shema in order to fulfill his obligation. This is true even if he failed to recite the requisite blessings (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). Ab initio, one may not interrupt the recitation of Shema. The tanna’im, however, disagree over how strict one must be in this regard. They distinguish between interruptions between paragraphs and interruptions within each paragraph. At the breaks between paragraphs, one may greet an individual due to the respect that he is obligated to show him, and one may respond to another’s greeting due to respect. And in the middle of each paragraph one may greet an individual due to the fear that the individual may harm him if he fails do so ( Me’iri ) and one may respond to another’s greeting due to fear. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: There is a distinction between greeting someone and responding to his greeting. In the middle of each paragraph, one may greet another due to fear and respond due to respect. In the breaks between paragraphs, one may greet another due to respect and respond with a greeting to any person who greets him, whether or not he is obligated to show him respect.

As for what constitutes a paragraph, these are the breaks between the paragraphs: Between the first blessing and the second, between the second and Shema, between Shema and the second paragraph: If you indeed heed My commandments [ VeHaya im Shamoa ], between VeHaya im Shamoa and the third paragraph: And the Lord spoke [ VaYomer ] and between VaYomer and True and Firm [ emet veyatziv ], the blessing that follows Shema. The Rabbis held that each blessing and each paragraph of Shema constitutes its own entity, and treat interruptions between them as between the paragraphs. Rabbi Yehuda, however, says: Between VaYomer and emet veyatziv, which begins the blessing that follows Shema, one may not interrupt at all. According to Rabbi Yehuda, these must be recited consecutively. Since the paragraphs of Shema are not adjacent to one another in the Torah, and they are not recited in the order in which they appear, the mishna explains their placement. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said: Why, in the mitzva of the recitation of Shema, did the portion of Shema precede that of VeHaya im Shamoa? This is so that one will first accept upon himself the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven, the awareness of God and God’s unity, and only then accept upon himself the yoke of the mitzvot, which appears in the paragraph of VeHaya im Shamoa. Why did VeHaya im Shamoa precede VaYomer? Because the paragraph of VeHaya im Shamoa is practiced both by day and by night, while VaYomer, which discusses the mitzva of ritual fringes, is only practiced during the day.

One who recites Shema and did not recite in a manner audible to his own ear, either because he read inaudibly or because he is deaf, fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Yosei says: He did not fulfill his obligation. One who recited Shema and was not sufficiently precise in his enunciation of its letters, Rabbi Yosei says: He fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Yehuda says: He did not fulfill his obligation. One who recited Shema out of order, meaning he did not read the verses sequentially, he did not fulfill his obligation. One who recited and erred, should return to the place in Shema that he erred.

The primary issue in this mishna is the requisite degree of concentration when reciting Shema. Laborers engaged in their work may recite Shema while standing atop the tree or atop the course of stones in a wall under construction, which they are not permitted to do for the Amida prayer, which requires intent of the heart.

The mishna continues: A groom is exempt from the recitation of Shema on the first night of his marriage, which was generally Wednesday night, until Saturday night, if he has not taken action and consummated the marriage, as he is preoccupied by concerns related to consummation of the marriage. The mishna relates that there was an incident where Rabban Gamliel married a woman and recited Shema even the first night. His students said to him: Didn’t our teacher teach us that a groom is exempt from the recitation of Shema? He answered them: Nevertheless, I am not listening to you to refrain from reciting Shema, and in so doing preclude myself from the acceptance of the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven, for even one moment.

The mishna relates another episode portraying unusual conduct by Rabban Gamliel. He bathed on the first night after his wife died. His students said to him: Have you not taught us, our teacher, that a mourner is prohibited to bathe? He answered them: I am not like other people, I am delicate [ istenis ]. For me, not bathing causes actual physical distress, and even a mourner need not suffer physical distress as part of his mourning.

Another exceptional incident is related: And when his slave, Tavi, died, Rabban Gamliel accepted condolences for his death as one would for a close family member. His students said to him: Have you not taught us, our teacher, that one does not accept condolences for the death of slaves? Rabban Gamliel said to his students: My slave, Tavi, is not like all the rest of the slaves, he was virtuous and it is appropriate to accord him the same respect accorded to a family member.

With regard to the recitation of Shema on one’s wedding night, the Sages said that if, despite his exemption, a groom wishes to recite Shema on the first night, he may do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not everyone who wishes to assume the reputation of a God-fearing person may assume it, and consequently, not everyone who wishes to recite Shema on his wedding night may do so.

Chapter 3

One whose deceased relative is laid out unburied before him is exempt from the recitation of Shema, from the Amida prayer, and from the mitzva to don phylacteries, as well as all positive mitzvot mentioned in the Torah, until the deceased has been buried. With regard to the pallbearers and their replacements and the replacements of their replacements, those located before the bier who have not yet carried the deceased and those located after the bier. Those who are needed to carry the bier are exempt from reciting Shema ; while those who are not needed to carry the bier, are obligated to recite Shema. However, both these and those are exempt from reciting the Amida prayer, since they are preoccupied and are unable to focus and pray with the appropriate intent.

After they buried the deceased and returned, if they have sufficient time to begin to recite Shema and conclude before they arrive at the row, formed by those who attended the burial, through which the bereaved family will pass in order to receive consolation, they should begin. If they do not have sufficient time to conclude reciting the entire Shema, then they should not begin. And those standing in the row, those in the interior row, directly before whom the mourners will pass and who will console them, are exempt from reciting Shema, while those in the exterior row, who stand there only to show their respect, are obligated to recite Shema.

Women, slaves and minors are exempt from the recitation of Shema and from phylacteries, but are obligated in prayer, mezuza and Grace after Meals.

Ezra the Scribe decreed that one who is ritually impure because of a seminal emission may not engage in matters of Torah until he has immersed in a ritual bath and purified himself. This halakha was accepted over the course of many generations; however, many disputes arose with regard to the Torah matters to which it applies. Regarding this, the mishna says: If the time for the recitation of Shema arrived and one is impure due to a seminal emission, he may contemplate Shema in his heart, but neither recites the blessings preceding Shema, nor the blessings following it. Over food which, after partaking, one is obligated by Torah law to recite a blessing, one recites a blessing afterward, but one does not recite a blessing beforehand, because the blessing recited prior to eating is a requirement by rabbinic law. And in all of these instances Rabbi Yehuda says: He recites a blessing beforehand and thereafter in both the case of Shema and in the case of food.

This mishna contains various statements with regard to individuals with different types of ritual impurity as well as the need to distance oneself from filth and impurity. One who was standing in prayer and he recalled that he experienced a seminal emission, and according to this opinion he is prohibited from praying, should not interrupt his prayer, rather he should abridge each individual blessing. They stated a general principle: One who descended to immerse himself, if he is able to ascend, cover himself with a garment, and recite the morning Shema before sunrise, he should ascend, cover himself, and recite Shema, and if not, he should cover himself in the water and recite Shema there. He may not, however, cover himself in either foul water, or water in which flax was soaked, until he pours other water into it. And in general, how far must one distance himself from urine and feces in order to recite Shema? At least four cubits.

Continuing the earlier discussion of the halakhot of immersion for Torah study and prayer for one who experienced a seminal emission, the mishna discusses a case where individuals who were already impure with a severe form of ritual impurity are exposed to the impurity of a seminal emission as well. They are required to immerse themselves and purify themselves of the impurity of the seminal emission even though they remain impure due to the more severe impurity. Consequently, even a zav, whose impurity lasts at least seven days, who experienced a seminal emission, for which, were he not a zav, he would be impure for only one day; a menstruating woman who discharged semen, despite the fact that she is already impure with a severe impurity unaffected by her immersion; and a woman who engaged in conjugal relations with her husband and later saw menstrual blood, all require immersion. And Rabbi Yehuda exempts them from immersion.

Chapter 4

This mishna determines the times beyond which the different prayers may not be recited. According to the Rabbis, the morning prayer may be recited until noon. Rabbi Yehuda says: It may be recited only until four hours after sunrise. According to the Rabbis, the afternoon prayer may be recited until the evening. Rabbi Yehuda says: It may be recited only until the midpoint of the afternoon [ pelag haminḥa ], i.e., the midpoint of the period that begins with the sacrifice of the daily afternoon offering and ends at nightfall, which is the end of the afternoon. The evening prayer may be recited throughout the night and is not fixed to a specific hour. According to the Rabbis, the additional prayer may be recited all day. Rabbi Yehuda says: It may be recited only until seven hours after sunrise.

In addition to the halakhot relating to the fixed prayers, the Gemara relates: Rabbi Neḥunya ben Hakana would recite a brief prayer upon his entrance into the study hall and upon his exit. They said to him: The study hall is not a dangerous place that would warrant a prayer when entering and exiting, so what room is there for this prayer? He said to them: Upon my entrance, I pray that no mishap will transpire caused by me in the study hall. And upon my exit, I give thanks for my portion.

The mishna cites a dispute with regard to the obligation to recite the Amida prayer, also known as Shemoneh Esreh, the prayer of eighteen blessings, or simply as tefilla, prayer. Rabban Gamliel says: Each and every day a person recites the prayer of eighteen blessings. Rabbi Yehoshua says: A short prayer is sufficient, and one only recites an abridged version of the prayer of eighteen blessings. Rabbi Akiva says an intermediate opinion: If he is fluent in his prayer, he recites the prayer of eighteen blessings, and if not, he need only recite an abridged version of the prayer of eighteen blessings.

Rabbi Eliezer says: One whose prayer is fixed, his prayer is not supplication and is flawed. The Gemara will clarify the halakhic implications of this flaw. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One who cannot recite a complete prayer because he is walking in a place of danger, recites a brief prayer and says: Redeem, Lord, Your people, the remnant of Israel, at every transition [ parashat ha’ibur ], the meaning of which will be discussed in the Gemara. May their needs be before You. Blessed are You, Lord, Who listens to prayer.

While praying, one must face toward the direction of the Holy Temple. One who was riding on a donkey should dismount and pray calmly. If he is unable to dismount, he should turn his face toward the direction of the Temple. If he is unable to turn his face, it is sufficient that he focus his heart opposite the Holy of Holies.

Similarly, one who was traveling in a ship or on a wagon or on a raft [ asda ] and is unable to turn and face in the direction of Jerusalem, should focus his heart opposite the Holy of Holies.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: The additional prayer is only recited in a city where there is a quorum of ten [ ḥever ir ]. The Rabbis say: One may recite the additional prayer with a ḥever ir or without a ḥever ir. Rabbi Yehuda says another opinion in his name, the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya: Any place where there is a ḥever ir, an individual is completely exempt from reciting the additional prayer.

Chapter 5

One may only stand and begin to pray from an approach of gravity and submission. There is a tradition that the early generations of pious men would wait one hour, in order to reach the solemn frame of mind appropriate for prayer, and then pray, so that they would focus their hearts toward their Father in Heaven. Standing in prayer is standing before God and, as such, even if the king greets him, he should not respond to him; and even if a snake is wrapped on his heel, he should not interrupt his prayer.

This mishna speaks of additions to the standard formula of the Amida prayer and the blessings in which they are incorporated. One mentions the might of the rains and recites: He makes the wind blow and the rain fall, in the second blessing of the Amida prayer, the blessing of the revival of the dead. And the request for rain: And grant dew and rain as a blessing, in the ninth blessing of the Amida prayer, the blessing of the years. And the prayer of distinction [ havdala ], between the holy and the profane recited in the evening prayer following Shabbat and festivals, in the fourth blessing of the Amida prayer: Who graciously grants knowledge. Rabbi Akiva says: Havdala is recited as an independent fourth blessing. Rabbi Eliezer says that it is recited in the seventeenth blessing of the Amida prayer, the blessing of thanksgiving.

Concluding the laws of prayer in this tractate, the mishna raises several prayer-related matters. This mishna speaks of certain innovations in the prayer formula that warrant the silencing of a communal prayer leader who attempts to introduce them in his prayers, as their content tends toward heresy. One who recites in his supplication: Just as Your mercy is extended to a bird’s nest, as You have commanded us to send away the mother before taking her chicks or eggs (Deuteronomy 22:6–7), so too extend Your mercy to us; and one who recites: May Your name be mentioned with the good or one who recites: We give thanks, we give thanks twice, they silence him. This mishna and the next one deal with the communal prayer leader. (If one says: “May the good bless You,” this is a path of heresy.) One who is passing before the ark, as prayer leader, and erred, another should immediately pass in his place, and at that moment, this replacement should not refuse in the interest of courtesy. The Amida prayer was interrupted and he should replace him as quickly as possible. From where does the replacement commence? From the beginning of the blessing in which the former had erred.

In order to prevent the prayer leader from erring in his prayer, it was said that one who passes before the ark should not respond amen after the blessing of the priests, because of potential confusion. Since the mishna is describing a situation in which he was praying without a prayer book, responding amen would interrupt the order of the prayer and potentially lead him to begin a different blessing. For this reason, even if there is no priest other than the communal prayer leader, he does not lift his hands to bless the people, lest he become confused. And, however, if he is certain that he can lift his hands and resume his prayer without becoming confused, he is permitted to recite the blessing.

Concluding its discussion of the halakhot of prayer, the mishna discusses less practical aspects of prayer. One who prays and realizes that he erred in his prayer, it is a bad omen for him; it indicates to him that his prayer was not accepted. And if he who erred is the communal prayer leader, it is a bad omen for those who sent him, because a person’s agent has legal status equivalent to his own. On a similar note, they said about Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa that he would pray on behalf of the sick and immediately after his prayer he would say: This one shall recover from his illness and live and this one shall die. When they said to him: From where do you know? He said to them: If my prayer is fluent in my mouth as I recite it and there are no errors, I know that my prayer is accepted. And if not, I know that my prayer is rejected.

Chapter 6

This mishna discusses the blessings recited over various foods. How does one recite a blessing over fruits? Over different fruits that grow on a tree one recites: Who creates fruit of the tree, with the exception of wine. Although wine is produced from fruit of the tree, due to its significance, its blessing differs from other fruits of the tree. Over wine one recites: Who creates fruit of the vine. Over fruits that grow from the earth, one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, with the exception of bread. Bread, too, is significant and its blessing differs from other fruits of the ground, as over bread one recites: Who brings forth bread from the earth. Over herbs and leafy vegetables one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground. Rabbi Yehuda says that there is room to distinguish between fruits that grow from the earth, herbs, and leafy vegetables. Although they are all fruit of the ground, since they have different qualities, the blessing on the latter is: Who creates various kinds of herbs.

This mishna discusses how, after the fact, a more general blessing exempts one from the obligation to recite a more specific one. One who recited: Who creates fruit of the ground, over fruit of the tree, fulfilled his obligation. One who recited: Who creates fruit of the tree, over fruits of the earth, did not fulfill his obligation. And over all food items, one who recited: By whose word all things came to be, fulfilled his obligation.

And over a food item whose growth is not from the ground, one recites: By whose word all things came to be. And over vinegar, wine that fermented and spoiled, and over novelot, dates that spoiled, and over locusts, one recites: By whose word all things came to be. So too, over milk, and over cheese, and over eggs, one recites: By whose word all things came to be. Rabbi Yehuda says: Over any food item that is a type resulting from a curse, one does not recite a blessing over it at all. None of the items listed exist under normal conditions, and they come about as the result of a curse.

On a different note: If there were many types of food before him, over which food should he recite a blessing first? Rabbi Yehuda says: If there is one of the seven species for which Eretz Yisrael was praised among them, he recites the first blessing over it. And the Rabbis say: He recites a blessing over whichever of them he wants.

This mishna explains those cases and those circumstances in which blessings recited over particular foods exempt other foods at the meal from the requirement to recite a blessing over them. One who recited a blessing over the wine that one drank before the meal, with that blessing he exempted the wine that he drinks after the meal. Similarly, one who recited a blessing over the appetizers that one ate before the meal, with that blessing he exempted the appetizers that he eats after the meal. One who recited a blessing over the bread exempted the appetizers, as they are considered secondary to the bread. However, one who recited a blessing over the appetizers did not exempt the bread. Beit Shammai say: The blessing recited over the appetizers did not exempt even a cooked dish that he eats during the meal.

An additional halakha is cited: If several people were sitting to eat not in the framework of a joint meal, each recites a blessing for himself. If they were reclined on divans to eat, which renders it a joint meal, one recites a blessing on behalf of them all. Additionally: If wine came before them during the meal, each and every diner recites a blessing over the wine for himself. If the wine came after the meal, one recites a blessing on behalf of them all. And he, who recited the blessing over the wine, also says the blessing over the incense [ mugmar ], although they only bring the incense to the diners after the meal.

If they brought salted food before him to eat first and bread with it, he recites a blessing over the salted food and thereby exempts the bread, because the salted food is primary while the bread is secondary to it. This is the principle: Any food that is primary and a secondary food is with it, one recites a blessing over the primary and, in so doing, exempts the secondary from its own blessing.

One who ate from the fruit for which Eretz Yisrael was praised, grapes and figs and pomegranates, recites the three blessings of Grace after Meals, as he would after eating bread; this is the statement of Rabban Gamliel. And the Rabbis say: One need only recite one blessing abridged from the three blessings of Grace after Meals. Rabbi Akiva says: The three blessings of Grace after Meals are not restricted to bread; rather, even if one ate boiled vegetables, but it is his primary sustenance, he recites the three blessings of Grace after Meals. Additionally: One who drinks water to quench his thirst recites: By whose word all things came to be. Rabbi Tarfon says: He recites: Who creates the many forms of life and their needs.

Chapter 7

This mishna sets out the essential halakhot pertaining to the invitation to recite Grace after Meals after a joint meal [ zimmun ]: Three people who ate as one are required to form a zimmun and recite Grace after Meals. If, among the diners, one ate doubtfully tithed produce [ demai ], and first tithe from which its teruma was already taken, or second tithe, and consecrated food that were redeemed and therefore permitted to be eaten; and even the waiter who served the meal to the diners and who ate at least an olive-bulk from the meal, and the Samaritan [ Kuti ] who ate with two others at a meal; each of these people is included among the three to obligate those with whom they ate in a zimmun. However, one who ate untithed produce [ tevel ], and first tithe from which its teruma was not separated, and second tithe, and consecrated food that were not redeemed, and the waiter who did not eat an olive-bulk, and the gentile who ate with two Jews, none of these people is included among the three to obligate those with whom they ate in a zimmun.

Women, slaves, and minors do not obligate those with whom they ate in a zimmun. How much must one eat to obligate those with whom he ate in a zimmun? An olive-bulk of food suffices to obligate those with whom they ate in a zimmun. Rabbi Yehuda says: An egg-bulk is the minimum measure to obligate those with whom they ate in a zimmun.

The mishna delineates distinctions in the halakhot of the zimmun blessing, based on the number of people present. How does one recite the zimmun? In a group of three people, the one reciting the zimmun says: Let us bless the One from Whose food we have eaten. In a group of three people and him, the one reciting the zimmun says: Bless the One from Whose food we have eaten, as even without him there are enough people to recite the zimmun. With the increase in the number of participants, the blessing is more complex. In a group of ten people, the one reciting the zimmun says: Let us bless our God. In a group of ten people and him, the one reciting the zimmun says: Bless our God. This formula is recited both in a group of ten and in a group of one hundred thousand. In a group of one hundred people, the one reciting the zimmun says: Let us bless the Lord our God. In a group of one hundred people and him, the one reciting the zimmun says: Bless the Lord our God. In a group of one thousand people, the one reciting the zimmun says: Let us bless the Lord our God, the God of Israel. In a group of one thousand people and him, he says: Bless the Lord our God, the God of Israel. In a group of ten thousand people, the one reciting the zimmun says: Let us bless the Lord our God, the God of Israel, the God of Hosts, Who sits upon the cherubs, for the food that we have eaten. In a group of ten thousand people and him, the one reciting the zimmun says: Bless the Lord our God, the God of Israel, the God of Hosts, Who sits upon the cherubs, for the food that we have eaten. The principle is that just as he recites the blessing, so too those present recite in response: Blessed be the Lord our God, the God of Israel, the God of Hosts, Who sits upon the cherubs, for the food that we have eaten. On a similar note, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: According to the size of the crowd, they recite the blessing, as it is stated: “Bless you God in full assemblies, even the Lord, you who are from the fountain of Israel” (Psalms 68:27). Rabbi Akiva said that there are no distinctions based on the size of the crowd: What do we find in the synagogue? Both when there are many and when there are few, as long as there is a quorum of ten, the prayer leader says: Bless [ barekhu ] the Lord. Rabbi Yishmael said that in the synagogue, one recites: Bless the Lord the blessed One.

Three people who ate as one are not permitted to divide and recite Grace after Meals individually; rather, they recite the zimmun together. And the same is true of four who ate together, and the same is true of five. However, a group of six, up to but not including ten people who ate as one, may divide into two groups, each reciting its own zimmun. And a group of ten may not divide into two groups until there are twenty people present. The general principle is that a group may not divide unless the smaller groups will be able to recite the same zimmun formula that the whole group would have recited.

The mishna states a halakha with regard to two groups joining together: Two groups that were eating in one house, when some members of each group can see each other, they may combine to form a zimmun. And if not, these recite a zimmun for themselves and those recite a zimmun for themselves. The mishna also speaks of the blessing over wine: One does not recite a blessing over wine until he adds water to it, that is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Undiluted wine is too strong to drink and a blessing is inappropriate. And the Rabbis say: Since it is possible to drink undiluted wine, one recites a blessing over it.

Chapter 8

These are the matters of dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to the halakhot of a meal: One dispute concerns the order of blessings in kiddush. Beit Shammai say: When one recites kiddush over wine, one recites a blessing over the sanctification of the day and recites a blessing over the wine thereafter. And Beit Hillel say: One recites a blessing over the wine and recites a blessing over the day thereafter.

Similarly, Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai disagree with regard to drinking wine before a meal. Beit Shammai say: One washes his hands and mixes water with the wine in the cup thereafter, and Beit Hillel say: One mixes water with the wine in the cup and only washes his hands thereafter. The basis of this particular dispute is with regard to the laws of ritual purity, as the Gemara will explain below.

Also with regard to the laws of ritual purity, Beit Shammai say: After washing, one dries his hands with a cloth and places it on the table. And Beit Hillel say: One places it on the cushion upon which he is sitting.

Similarly, Beit Shammai say: One sweeps the area of the house where the meal took place and he washes his hands with the final waters before Grace after Meals thereafter. And Beit Hillel say: One washes his hands and sweeps the house thereafter.

Just as they dispute the order of the blessings in kiddush, they dispute the order of the blessings in havdala. If a meal continued until the conclusion of Shabbat, Beit Shammai say: One recites the blessing over the candle, then the Grace after Meals blessing, then the blessing over the spices, and finally the blessing of havdala. And Beit Hillel say: The order is candle, spices, Grace after Meals, and havdala. With regard to the blessing over the candle, Beit Shammai say: Who created [ bara ] the light of fire. And Beit Hillel say: Who creates [ boreh ] the lights of fire.

One may neither recite a blessing over the candle nor over the spices of gentiles, nor over the candle nor the spices designated to pay respects to the dead, nor over the candle nor the spices of idolatry. The mishna cites another halakha with regard to the blessing over the candle: And one does not recite the blessing over the candle until he derives benefit from its light.

The mishna cites an additional dispute: One who ate and forgot and did not recite a blessing; Beit Shammai say: He returns to the place where he ate and recites the blessing. Beit Hillel say: That is unnecessary. He recites the blessing at the place where he remembered. Both agree, however, that there is a limit with regard to how long after eating one may recite Grace after Meals. And until when does he recite the blessing? Until the food is digested in his intestines.

Wine came before the diners after the meal; if only that cup of wine is there, Beit Shammai say: One recites a blessing over the wine and recites a blessing over the food, Grace after Meals, thereafter. And Beit Hillel say: One recites a blessing over the food and recites a blessing over the wine thereafter. And one answers amen after a Jew who recites a blessing even if he did not hear the entire blessing, and one does not answer amen after a Samaritan [ Kuti ] who recites a blessing until he hears the whole blessing in its entirety, as perhaps the Kuti introduced an element inconsistent with the Jewish faith in that section of the blessing that he did not hear.

Chapter 9

This mishna, which includes all of this chapter’s mishnayot, contains a series of blessings and halakhot that are not recited at specific times, but rather in response to various experiences and events. MISHNA: One who sees a place where miracles occurred on Israel’s behalf recites: Blessed…Who performed miracles for our forefathers in this place. One who sees a place from which idolatry was eradicated recites: Blessed…Who eradicated idolatry from our land.

One who sees conspicuous natural occurrences recites a blessing. For zikin and zeva’ot, which the Gemara will discuss below, for lightning, thunder, and gale force winds, manifestations of the power of the Creator, one recites: Blessed…Whose strength and power fill the world. For extraordinary (Rambam) mountains, hills, seas, rivers, and deserts, one recites: Blessed…Author of creation. Consistent with his opinion that a separate blessing should be instituted for each individual species, Rabbi Yehuda says: One who sees the great sea recites a special blessing: Blessed…Who made the great sea. As with all blessings of this type, one only recites it when he sees the sea intermittently, not on a regular basis. For rain and other good tidings, one recites the special blessing: Blessed…Who is good and Who does good. Even for bad tidings, one recites a special blessing: Blessed…the true Judge.

Similarly, when one built a new house or purchased new vessels, he recites: Blessed…Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. The mishna articulates a general principle: One recites a blessing for the bad that befalls him just as he does for the good. In other words, one recites the appropriate blessing for the trouble that he is experiencing at present despite the fact that it may conceal some positive element in the future. Similarly, one must recite a blessing for the good that befalls him just as for the bad. The mishna states: And one who cries out over the past in an attempt to change that which has already occurred, it is a vain prayer. For example, one whose wife was pregnant and he says: May it be God’s will that my wife will give birth to a male child, it is a vain prayer. Or one who was walking on the path home and he heard the sound of a scream in the city, and he says: May it be God’s will that this scream will not be from my house, it is a vain prayer. In both cases, the event already occurred.

The Sages also said: One who enters a large city, the Gemara explains below that this is in a case where entering the city is dangerous, recites two prayers: One upon his entrance, that he may enter in peace, and one upon his exit, that he may leave in peace. Ben Azzai says: He recites four prayers, two upon his entrance and two upon his exit. In addition to praying that he may enter and depart in peace, he gives thanks for the past and cries out in prayer for the future.

The mishna articulates a general principle: One is obligated to recite a blessing for the bad that befalls him just as he recites a blessing for the good that befalls him, as it is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5). The mishna explains this verse as follows: “ With all your heart” means with your two inclinations, with your good inclination and your evil inclination, both of which must be subjugated to the love of God. “With all your soul” means even if God takes your soul. “And with all your might” means with all your money, as money is referred to in the Bible as might. Alternatively, it may be explained that “ with all your might” means with every measure that He metes out to you; whether it is good or troublesome, thank Him. The mishna teaches several Temple-related halakhot. One may not act irreverently or conduct himself flippantly opposite the eastern gate of the Temple Mount, which is aligned opposite the Holy of Holies. In deference to the Temple, one may not enter the Temple Mount with his staff, his shoes, his money belt [ punda ], or even the dust on his feet. One may not make the Temple a shortcut to pass through it, and through an a fortiori inference, all the more so one may not spit on the Temple Mount. The mishna relates: At the conclusion of all blessings recited in the Temple, those reciting the blessing would say: Blessed are You Lord, God of Israel, until everlasting [ haolam ], the world. But when the Sadducees strayed and declared that there is but one world and there is no World-to-Come, the Sages instituted that at the conclusion of the blessing one recites: From everlasting [ haolam ] to everlasting [ haolam ]. The Sages also instituted that one should greet another in the name of God, i.e., one should mention God’s name in his greeting, as it is stated: “And presently Boaz came from Bethlehem and said to the harvesters, The Lord is with you, and they said to him, May the Lord bless you” (Ruth 2:4). And it says: “And the angel of God appeared to him and said to him, God is with you, mighty man of valor” (Judges 6:12). And it says: “And despise not your mother when she is old” (Proverbs 23:22), i.e., one must not neglect customs which he inherits. And lest you say that mentioning God’s name is prohibited, it says: “It is time to work for the Lord; they have made void Your Torah” (Psalms 119:126), i.e., it is occasionally necessary to negate biblical precepts in order to perform God’s will, and greeting another is certainly God’s will. Rabbi Natan says another interpretation of the verse: “Make void Your Torah” because “it is the time to work for the Lord,” i.e., occasionally it is necessary to negate biblical precepts in order to bolster the Torah.

Mishnah Peah

Chapter 1

These are the things that have no definite quantity: The corners [of the field]. First-fruits; [The offerings brought] on appearing [at the Temple on the three pilgrimage festivals]. The performance of righteous deeds; And the study of the torah. The following are the things for which a man enjoys the fruits in this world while the principal remains for him in the world to come: Honoring one’s father and mother; The performance of righteous deeds; And the making of peace between a person and his friend; And the study of the torah is equal to them all.

They should not leave peah of less than one-sixtieth [of the field]. But even though they said, “there is no measure for peah,” everything depends upon the size of the field, the number of poor people, and the extent of the yield.

They may give peah at either at the beginning of the [reaping of the] field or at the middle of it. Rabbi Shimon says: as long as he gives at the end according to the set amount. Rabbi Judah says: if he leave, one stalk, he can rely on this as [fulfilling the law of] peah; and if he did not, then he only gives as ownerless property.

They said a general principle concerning peah: whatever is food, and is looked after, and grows from the land, and is harvested all at the same time, and is brought in for storage, is subject to the law of pe'ah. Grain and beans are in this category.

Among trees: the sumac, the carob, the nut, the almond, the grapevine, the pomegranate, the olive and the palm are subject to peah.

He may always give peah and be exempt from giving tithes until he makes a stack. One who gives [to the poor] as ownerless [produce] and be exempt from giving tithes until he makes a stack. He may feed cattle, wild animals and birds and be exempt from giving tithes until he makes a stack. He may take from the threshing floor and use it as seed and be exempt from giving tithes until he makes a stack, the words of Rabbi Akiva. A priest or Levite who purchase [grain of] a threshing floor, the tithes are theirs unless [the owner] has already made a stack. One who dedicated [his crop] and redeems it [afterwards] is obligated to give tithes until the Temple treasurer has made a stack.

Chapter 2

The following divide a field for peah: a stream, a pool, a private road, a public road, a public path, a private path in constant use in summer and the rainy season, fallow land, a plowed field and a different seed. One who harvested for animal fodder, [the plot] serves divides, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: it does not stop for peah unless it is plowed.

A water channel that makes harvesting [on one side] impossible [while standing on the other side], Rabbi Judah says: it divides. But all of the hills that can be tilled with a hoe, even though cattle cannot pass over it in with their equipment, [is regarded as part of the field] he gives one peah from it all.

All of these divide in the case of a field [planted] with seeds, but in the case of trees nothing divides except a fence. Should the branches intertwine [on top of the fence], then it does not divide and he gives one peah for the whole field.

As for carob trees, [they are not divided] as long as they see one another. Rabban Gamaliel said: we had this custom in the house of my father. We would give separate peah from the olive trees in each direction and [one peah] for all the carob trees that saw one another. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok said in his name: also for the carob trees they had in the whole city [they only gave one peah].

He who plants his field with one kind of seed, even though he makes up of it two threshing-floors, he gives only one peah [for the lot]. If he plants it of two kinds, even though he makes up of it one threshing-floor, he must give two peahs. One who plants his field with two species of wheat: If he makes up of it one threshing-floor, he gives only one peah; But if two threshing-floors, he gives two peahs.

It happened that Rabbi Shimon of Mitzpah planted his field [with two different kinds] and came before Rabban Gamaliel. They both went up to the Chamber of Hewn Stone and asked [about the law]. Nahum the scribe said: I have a tradition from Rabbi Meyasha, who received it from Abba, who received it from the pairs [of sages], who received it from the prophets, a halakhah of Moses from Sinai, that one who plants his field with two species of wheat, if he makes up of it one threshing-floor, he gives only one peah, but if two threshing-floors, he gives two peahs.

A field harvested by gentiles, or harvested by robbers, or which ants have bitten [the stalks at the roots], or which wind and cattle have broken down, is exempt from peah. If [the owner] harvested half of it and robbers harvested half, it is exempt from peah, for the obligation of peah is in the standing grain.

If robbers harvested half and the owner the other half, he gives peah from what he has harvested. If he harvested half and sold the other half, then the purchaser must give peah for the whole. If he harvested half and dedicated the other half, then he who redeems it from the Temple treasurer must give peah for the whole.

Chapter 3

Plots of grain between olive trees: Bet Shammai say: peah from each and every plot. But Bet Hillel says: one peah for them all. And they agree that if the ends of the rows enter one into the other, he gives one peah for them all.

One who gives his field a striped appearance and leaves behind moist stalks: Rabbi Akiva says: he gives peah from each and every stripe. But the sages say: from one stripe for the whole field. The sages agree with Rabbi Akiba that one who sows dill or mustard in three places must give peah from each place.

One who clears [his field] of fresh onions for the market and leaves the dry ones [in the ground] for the [time of the] threshing floor, must give peah from these on their own and these on their own. The same applies to beans and to a vineyard. If he, however, he only thins it out, then he gives [peah] from the remainder according to the quantity of that which he left. But if he clears [three from one place] at one time, he gives from the remainder according to the entire quantity.

Onions grown for their seed are liable for peah. But Rabbi Yose exempts them. Plots of onions [growing] between vegetables: Rabbi Yose says: peah must be given from each [plot]. But the sages say: from one [plot] for all.

[Two] brothers who divided [an inheritance] must give [two] peahs. If they afterwards again become partners they give one peah. Two who purchase a tree, they give one peah. If one buys the northern section [of the tree] and the other the southern section, each must give peah separately. One who sells young saplings in his field, [the one who purchases] must give peah from each sapling. Rabbi Judah said: When is this so? When the owner of the field left nothing [for himself]. But if he did leave something [for himself], he gives one peah for the whole.

Rabbi Eliezer says: a piece of ground [large enough to plant] one fourth of a kav is liable for peah. Rabbi Joshua says: it must [be large enough] to grow two seahs. Rabbi Tarfon says: it must be six by six handbreadths. R. Judah ben Batera says: [it must be large enough] for a sickle to cut at least two handfuls and the halakhah is according to his words. Rabbi Akiva says: any size of land is liable for peah and for first-fruits, and [is sufficient] for the writing of the prozbul, and also to acquire through it movable property by money, by deed, or by a claim based on undisturbed possession.

One who is about to die who assigns his property in writing [to another]: If he retains any land [for himself] however small, he renders his gift valid. But if he retains no land whatsoever, his gift is not valid. One who assigns in writing his property to his children, and he assigns to his wife in writing any plot of land, however small, she lost her ketubah. Rabbi Yose says: if she accepted [such an assignment] even though he did not assign it to her in writing she lost her ketubah.

One who assigns in writing his possessions to his slave, [the slave] thereby goes free. If he reserved for himself any land, however small, he does not become free. Rabbi Shimon says: he always becomes free, unless [the master] says: “Behold, all my goods are given to so-and-so my slave, with the exception of one ten-thousandth part of them.”

Chapter 4

Peah is given from [the crop] while it is still connected with the soil. But in the case of hanging vine-branches and the date-palm, the owner brings down [the fruit] and distributes it among the poor. Rabbi Shimon says: the same applies to smooth nut trees. Even if ninety-nine [of the poor] say [to the owner] to distribute it and one says to leave it in the field, this latter is listened to, since he spoke in accordance with the halakhah.

With hanging vine-branches and date-palm trees it is not so; even if ninety-nine [of the poor] say [to the owner] to leave it in the field and one says to distribute it, this latter is listened to, since he spoke in accordance with the halakhah.

If [a poor man] took some of the peah [already collected] and threw it onto the remainder [not yet collected], he gets none of it. If he fell down upon it, or spread his cloak over it, they take the peah away from him. The same applies to gleanings and the forgotten sheaf.

[The poor] may not harvest peah with scythes or tear it out [of the ground] with spades, so that they might not strike one another [with these implements].

There are three times a day [the poor] make a search [in the field for peah]: morning, noon, and sunset. Rabban Gamaliel says: these [times] were only set lest they reduce them. Rabbi Akiva says: these were set lest they add to them. [The men] of Bet Namer used to have the poor harvest [the peah] with the aid of a rope, and they left peah at the end of each furrow.

A non-Jew who harvested his field and then converted, he is exempt from [leaving] gleanings, the forgotten sheaf and peah. Rabbi Judah makes him liable to leave the forgotten sheaf, since he becomes liable for the forgotten sheaf at the time of their binding.

One who dedicated standing grain [to the Temple] and then redeemed it while it was still standing grain, he is liable [to give the agricultural gifts to the poor]. [If he dedicated] sheaves and redeemed them while they were still sheaves, he is liable. [If he dedicated] standing grain and redeemed it [when it was already in] sheaves, he is exempt, since at the time when it became liable it was exempt.

Similarly one who dedicates his produce prior to the stage when they are subject to tithes and then redeemed them, they are liable [to be tithed]. If [he dedicated them] when they had already become subject to tithes and then redeemed them, they are liable [to be tithed]. If he dedicated them before they had ripened, and they became ripe while in the possession of the [Temple] treasurer, and he then redeemed them, they are exempt, since at the time when they would have been liable, they were exempt.

One who collected peah and said, “This is for so-and-so a poor man:” Rabbi Eliezer says: he has thus acquired it for him. The sages say: he must give it to the first poor man he finds. Gleanings, the forgotten sheaf and the peah of non-Jews are subject to tithes, unless he [the non-Jew] had declared them ownerless.

What are gleanings? That which falls down at the time of harvesting. If while he was harvesting, he harvested a handful, or plucked a fistful, and then a thorn pricked him, and what he had in his hand fell to the ground, it still belongs to the owner. [That which drops from] inside the hand or the sickle [belongs] to the poor, but [that which falls from] the back of the hand or the sickle [belongs] to the owner. [That which falls from] the top of the hand or sickle: Rabbi Ishmael says: to the poor; But Rabbi Akiva says: to the owner.

[Grain found in] ant holes where the stalks are still standing, behold it still belongs to the owner. After the harvesters [had passed over them], those found in the top parts [of the ant holes belong] to the poor, but [those found] on the bottom parts [belong] to the owner. Rabbi Meir says: it all belongs to the poor, for gleanings about which there is any doubt are regarded as gleanings.

Chapter 5

If a pile of grain was stacked [on part of a field] from which gleanings had not yet been collected, whatever touches the ground belongs to the poor. If the wind scattered the sheaves, they estimate the amount of gleanings the field would have yielded and they give that to the poor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: he must give to the poor the amount that would fall.

The top of a single ear of grain [that remained] after the harvesting and its top touches the standing stalk: If it can be cut with the stalk, it belongs to the owner; But if not, it belongs to the poor. If an ear of grain of gleanings that became mixed up with a stack of grain, [the owner] must tithe one ear of grain and give it to him [the poor]. Rabbi Eliezer says: how can this poor man give in exchange something that had not yet become his? Rather, [the owner] must transfer to the poor man the ownership of the whole stack and then tithe one ear of grain and give it to him.

They should not [irrigate a field] with a water wheel, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages permit it, because it is still possible [for the poor to get their gleanings].

A property owner who was passing from place to place and need to take gleanings, the forgotten sheaf, peah or the poor man’s tithe, he may take them, and when he returns home, he must pay [for the amount gathere], the words of Rabbi Eliezer. The sages say: he was a poor man at that time [and so he need not make restitution].

One who exchanges with the poor, [what they give in exchange] for his is exempt [from tithes] but what [he gives in exchange] for that of the poor is subject [to tithes]. Two who received a field as sharecroppers, this one may give to the other his share of the poor man’s tithe and this one may give to the other his share of the poor man’s tithe. One who receives a field in order to harvest it, he is forbidden to take gleanings, the forgotten sheaf, peah or the poor man’s tithe. Rabbi Judah said: When is this so? When he receives it [in order to pay the owner] a half, third or quarter [of the crop]. But [if the owner] had said to him: “A third of that which you harvest belongs to you,” then he may take gleanings, the forgotten sheaf and peah, but not the poor man’s tithe.

One who sells, the seller is permitted [to take the agricultural gifts] and the purchaser is forbidden. One may not hire a worker on the condition that the son [of the worker] should gather the gleanings after him. One who does not allow the poor to gather, or one who allows one but not another, or one who helps one of them [to gather] behold he is a robber of the poor. Concerning him it is said: “Do not remove the landmark of those that come up (olim)” (Proverbs 22:28).

A sheaf which the workers forgot but not the land owner, or which the land owner forgot but not the workers; or [a sheaf] which the poor stood in front of [and blocked its view], or they covered it up with stubble, it is not considered a forgotten sheaf.

One who binds sheaves into stack covers, stack bases, round stacks or regular stacks, he is not subject to the law of the forgotten sheaf [while binding]. [When bringing them afterwards] to the threshing-floor, he is subject to the law of the forgotten sheaf. One who piles up the sheaves to make a stack, he is subject to the law of the forgotten sheaf. [When bringing them afterwards] to the threshing-floor, he is not subject to the law of the forgotten sheaf. This is the general rule: whoever makes the sheaves at the place which is the end of the work is subject to the law of the forgotten sheaf, [and afterwards when he takes] them to the threshing-floor, he is not subject to the law of the forgotten sheaf. However, [one who piles up the sheaves] at a place which is not the end of the work, is not subject to the law of the forgotten sheaf; [and afterwards when he takes] them to the threshing-floor, he is subject to the law of the forgotten sheaf.

Chapter 6

Bet Shammai says: [That which is] made ownerless only in regard to the poor is indeed ownerless. But Bet Hillel says: it is not ownerless unless ownership is renounced even for the rich, as in the case of the sabbatical year. [If] all of the sheaves in a field are a kav each, and one is four kavs and that one is forgotten: Bet Shammai says: it is not considered forgotten. But Bet Hillel says: it is considered forgotten.

A sheaf left near a stone fence, or near a stack [of grain] or near oxen, or near equipment: Bet Shammai says: it is not considered “forgotten”; Bet Hillel says: it is considered “forgotten.”

[With regard to sheaves forgotten] at the end of the row, the sheaf lying across from it proves [that the first sheaf has not been forgotten.] [As for] a sheaf that [the owner] took to bring it to the city and forgot it, all agree that it is not considered a “forgotten sheaf.”

These are to be considered ends of the rows:If two men begin [to gather] from the middle of the row, one facing north and the other south and they forget [some sheaves] in front of them and behind them, those left in front of them are “forgotten,” but those left behind them are not “forgotten.” If an individual begins from the end of the row and he forgets [some sheaves] in front of him and behind him, those in front of him are not “forgotten”, whereas those behind him are “forgotten,” for this comes under the category of “you shall not go back [to retrieve it].” This is the general rule: anything that can be said to fall under the law “you shall not go back” is considered “forgotten,” but that to which the principle of “you shall not go back” cannot be applied is not considered “forgotten.”

Two sheaves [left lying together] are “forgotten,” but three are not “forgotten.” Two bundles of olives or carobs are “forgotten” but three are not “forgotten.” Two flax-stalks are “forgotten”, but three are not “forgotten”. Two grapes are considered “grape gleanings,” but three are not “grape gleanings.” Two ears of grain are deemed “gleanings,” but three are not gleanings.” All these [rulings] are according to Bet Hillel. And concerning them all Bet Shammai says that three [that are left] belong to the poor, and four belong to the owner.

A sheaf that has two seahs and he forgot it it is not considered “forgotten.” Two sheaves that together comprise two seahs: Rabban Gamaliel says: they belong to the owner; But the sages say: they belong to the poor. Rabban Gamaliel said: “Are the rights of the owner strengthened or weakened according to the greater number of the sheaves?” They replied, “His rights are strengthened.” He said to them: “If in a case of one sheaf of two seahs it is not deemed “forgotten,” then how much more should be the case of two sheaves that together contain two seahs?” They replied: “No. If you argue in the case of one sheaf it is because it is large enough to be considered a stack. Are you going to argue likewise in the case of two sheaves which are like bundles?”

A standing stalk of grain that contains two seahs and he forgot it, it is not considered “forgotten.” If it does not contain two seahs now, but is fit to yield two seahs, even if it was of an inferior kind of barley, it is regarded as full barley [grains].

A standing stalk of grain can save a sheaf and another standing stalk [from being regarded as “forgotten”]. A sheaf cannot save either another sheaf or a standing stalk. What is the standing stalk of grain that can save a sheaf? Anything which has not been forgotten, even though it is a single stalk.

A seah of plucked grain and a seah of unplucked grain, and also trees; and garlic and to onions do not combine to count as two seahs, but rather they must be left to the poor. Rabbi Yose says: if anything that belongs to the poor comes in between them, the two are not combined together; otherwise, they do combine.

Grain used for fodder or [stalks] used for binding sheaves, and also garlic-stalks used for tying other bunches, or tied bunches of garlic and onions they [all are not subject to the laws of] forgotten. Anything stored in the ground like arum, garlic and onions: Rabbi Judah says: they do not subject to the laws of “forgotten”; But the sages say: they are subject to the laws of “forgotten.”

One who harvests by night and binds sheaves [by night] or one who is blind [that which he leaves] is subject to the law of the “forgotten.” If he intends to remove large leaves first, then the law of “forgotten” does not apply. If he said: “Behold, I am reaping on the condition that I take afterwards that which I have forgotten,” the law of “forgotten” still applies.

Chapter 7

An olive tree that has a name in the field, such as the olive tree of Netofah in its time, and he forgot it, it is not deemed “forgotten.” To what does this apply? [Only to a tree distinguished] by its name, produce, or position. “By its name:” if it were a shifkhoni or beshani. “By its produce:” if it yields large quantities. “By its position:” if it stands at the side of the winepress or near the gap in the fence. Other kinds of olive trees: two are deemed “forgotten”, but three are not deemed “forgotten.” Rabbi Yose says: there is no law of “forgotten” for olive trees.

An olive tree found standing between three rows [of olive trees] which have two plots separating them, and he forgot it, it is not deemed, “forgotten.” An olive tree containing two seahs and he forgot it, it is not deemed forgotten. To what does this apply? Only when he [the owner] had not yet begun [to harvest the tree], but if he had begun, even if it were like the olive tree of Netofah in its time, and he forgot it, it is deemed forgotten. As long as the owner has some of the olives belonging to him at the foot of the tree, he has [possession] of those on top of the tree. Rabbi Meir says: [forgotten applies only] after [those with] the beating-rod have gone.

What is peret? [Grapes] which fall down during the harvesting. If while he was harvesting [the grapes], he cut off an entire cluster by its stalk, and it got tangled up in the [grape] leaves, and then it fell from his hand to the ground and the single berries were separated, it belongs to the owner. One who places a basket under the vine when he is harvesting [the grapes], behold he is a robber of the poor. Concerning him it is said: “Do not remove the landmark of those that come up (olim)” (Proverbs 22:28).

What constitutes a defective cluster (olelet) of grapes? Any [cluster] which has neither a shoulder [a wide upper part] nor a pendant [a cone-shaped lower part]. If it has a shoulder or a pendant, it belongs to the owner. If there is a doubt, it belongs to the poor. A defective cluster on the joint of a vine [where a normal cluster hangs from the vine], if it can be cut off with the cluster, it belongs to the owner; but if it can not, it belongs to the poor. A single grape: Rabbi Judah says: It is deemed a whole cluster, But the sages say: It is deemed a defective cluster.

One who is thinning out vines, just as he may thin out in that which belongs to him, so too he may thin out in that which belongs to the poor, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: in that which belongs to him, he is permitted, but he is not permitted in that which belongs to the poor.

[The grapes of] a vineyard in its fourth year:Bet Shammai says: the laws of the added fifth and removal do not apply to them; But Bet Hillel says: they do. Bet Shammai says: the laws of peret and the defective clusters apply to them, and the poor can redeem the grapes for themselves. But Bet Hillel says: all [of them] go to the wine-press.

A vineyard which consists entirely of defective clusters: Rabbi Eliezer says: it belongs to the owner. Rabbi Akiva says: to the poor. Rabbi Eliezer: “When you harvest the grapes of your vineyard, do not take the defective clusters” (Deuteronomy 24:21). If there is no grape harvesting, how can there be “defective clusters”? Rabbi Akiva said to him: “And from your vineyard do not take the defective clusters” (Leviticus 19:10) even if it consists entirely of defective clusters. If that is so, why is it said: “When you harvest the grapes of your vineyard, do not take the defective clusters”? [This teaches that] the poor have no right to claim the defective clusters before the harvest.

One who dedicates his entire vineyard [to the Temple] before the “defective clusters” were recognizable, the “defective clusters” do not belong to the poor. After the defective clusters were recognizable, then they do belong to the poor. Rabbi Yose says: [the poor] must give the value of their improved growth to the Temple. What is deemed “forgotten” in the case of a trellis [a lattice for supporting plants]? Anything that one can no longer stretch his hand and take it. And in the case of ground-trained vines? From the time [the gatherers] pass by it.

Chapter 8

From when are all people permitted to take gleanings, [forgotten sheaves and peah]? After the old ones of the poor have gone. And in the case of peret and defective clusters? After the poor have gone into the vineyard and come back again. And in the case of the olive trees? After the descent of the second rainfall. Rabbi Judah said: But aren’t there those who do not harvest their olives until after the second rainfall?” Rather, once the poor man has gone out [to gather the agricultural gifts taken from olive trees] and cannot bring back with him [more than the value of] four issars.

They [amei haaretz] are to be believed concerning gleanings, the forgotten sheaf and peah during their [harvest] season, and concerning the poor man’s tithe during its whole year. A Levite is always to be trusted. They are only believed in those things which men are accustomed to give them.

They are trusted concerning wheat, but they are not trusted when it is flour or bread. They are trusted concerning rice in its husk, but they are not trusted when it is either raw or cooked. They are trusted concerning beans but they are not trusted when they have been pounded, neither raw nor cooked. They are trusted when concerning oil, to declare that it is from the poor person’s tithe, but they are not trusted over [oil] when they claim that it is from the olives [left on the] top [of the tree.]

They are trusted concerning raw vegetables, but they are not trusted concerning are cooked ones, unless he has only a little bit, for so it was the custom of a householder to take out of his stew-pot [and give a little to the poor].

They may not give to the poor from the threshing-floor less than a half-kav of wheat or a kav of barley. R. Meir says: [only] half a kav [of barley]. [They must give] a kav and a half of spelt, a kav of dried figs or a maneh of pressed figs. Rabbi Akiva says: half a maneh. [They must give] half a log of wine. Rabbi Akiva says: a quarter. [They must give] a quarter [log] of oil. Rabbi Akiva says: an eighth. As for other kinds of produce: Abba Shaul says, [they must give enough] so that he can sell it and buy food enough for two meals.

This measure was stated for the priest, Levite and Israelite alike. If he was saving some [to give to his poor relatives], he can retain half and give the other half away. If he has only a small amount, then he must place it before them and they then divide it among themselves.

They may not give a poor person wandering from place to place less than a loaf worth a pundion at a time when four seahs [of wheat cost] one sela. If he spends the night [at a place], they must give him the cost of what he needs for the night. If he stays over Shabbat they must give him enough food for three meals. He who has the money for two meals, he may not take anything from the charity dish. And if he has enough money for fourteen meals, he may not take any support from the communal fund. The communal fund is collected by two and distributed by three people.

One who possesses two hundred zuz, may not take gleanings” the forgotten sheaf, peah or the poor man’s tithe. If he possesses two hundred minus one denar, then even if a thousand [men] each give him at the same time, he may accept. If he had [two hundred zuz] mortgaged to a creditor or to his wife’s ketubah, he may take. They do not force him to sell his house or his tools.

One who has fifty zuz and he is using them for his business, he must not take. And anyone who does not need to take [charity] and yet takes, will not depart from this world before he actually needs [charity] from others. And anyone who needs to take and does not take, will not die of old age until he supports others with his own money. Concerning him the verse says: “Blessed is the man who trusts in the Lord and whose hope is the Lord” (Jeremiah 17:7). And so too a judge who judges in truth according to its truth. And anyone who is not lame or blind but pretends to be as one of these, he will not die of old age before he actually becomes one of these, as it is said, “He who searches for evil, it shall come upon him” (Proverbs 11:27) and it is also said: “Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue" (Deuteronomy 16:20). And any judge who accepts a bribe or who perverts justice will not die in old age before his eyes have become dim, as it is said: “And you shall not accept a bribe, for a bribe blinds the eyes of those who have sight. (Exodus 23:8)”

Mishnah Demai

Chapter 1

The [following] are treated leniently in regard to [the rules of] demai: unripe figs, wild jujuba, azarolus, wild white figs, young sycamore figs, fallen dates, fennel and capers. In Judea also sumac, Judean vinegar, and coriander. Rabbi Judah says: all unripe figs are exempt, except for those from a tree that bears fruit twice a year. All wild jujuba are exempt, except the wild jujuba of Shikmonah. All young sycamore figs are exempt, except those that have been scarified.

The [second tithe of] demai is not subject to [the rules of adding a] fifth. It has no mandated time of removal. It may be eaten by an onen. It may be brought into Jerusalem and taken out again. They may allow a small amount to be lost on the road. One may give it to an am haaretz and consume its equivalent in Jerusalem. [Second tithe money of demai] may be redeemed silver [coins] for [other] silver [coins], copper [coins] for [other] copper [coins], silver for copper, and copper for produce, provided that the produce is again redeemed for money, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the produce itself must be brought up and eaten in Jerusalem.

If a man bought [grain from an am haaretz] to be used for seed or for animal [feed], flour for hides, oil for a lamp, or oil for greasing utensils, it is exempt from [the rules of] demai. [Produce grown] beyond Cheziv and north is exempt from [the rules of] demai. The hallah of an am haaretz, produce mixed with terumah, produce bought with second tithe money, and the leftovers of minhah offerings are exempt from [the rules of] demai. Oil spiced [with spices from an am haaretz]: Bet Shammai makes it liable [to the rules of demai]. But Bet Hillel exempts it.

Demai may be used to make an eruv, and to make an [alley] partnership, and they recite a blessing over it, and they make an invitation [to recite Birkat Hamazon] over it, and one may separate [tithes] from it even when one is naked, or when it is twilight [on the eve of Shabbat]. And if he took out second tithe from it before the first tithe, it doesn’t matter. The oil with which the weaver greases his fingers is liable to [the rules of] demai, but [the oil] which the wool-comber puts on the wool is exempt from [the rules of] demai.

Chapter 2

The following things must be tithed as demai in all places: pressed figs, dates, carobs, rice, and cumin. As to rice from outside the land [of Israel], whoever uses it is exempt from tithing it.

One who accepts upon himself to be trustworthy (ne’eman), must tithe whatever he eats and whatever he sells and whatever he buys, and he may not be the guest of an am haaretz. Rabbi Judah says: even one who is the guest of an am haaretz can still be considered trustworthy. They said to him: He is not trustworthy in respect of himself! How can he be considered trustworthy in respect of others?

One who takes upon himself to become a “chaver” may not sell to an am haaretz either moist or dry [produce], nor may he buy from him moist [produce], nor may he be the guest of an am haaretz, nor may he host an am haaretz as a guest while [the am haaretz] is wearing his own garment. Rabbi Judah says: he may not also raise small animals, nor may make a lot of vows or merriment, nor may he defile himself by contact with the dead. Rather he should be an attendant at the house of study. They said to him: these [requirements] do not come within the general rule [of being a chaver].

Bakers the sages did not obligate them to separate [from demai produce] any more than suffices for terumat maaser and for hallah. Grocers may not sell demai [produce]. All [merchants] who supply in large quantities may sell demai. Who are those who supply in large quantities? Those such as wholesalers and grain-sellers.

Rabbi Meir says: [if produce] which is usually measured out [for sale] in a large [quantity] was measured out in a small [quantity], the small quantity is treated as if it was a large [quantity]. If [produce] which is usually measured out for sale in a small [quantity] was measured out in a large [quantity], the large [quantity] is treated as if it was a small [quantity]. What is considered a large quantity? For dry [produce] three kavs, and for liquids, the value of one dinar. Rabbi Yose says: baskets of figs, baskets of grapes, and bushels of vegetables when he sells them in lumps, they are exempt [from the rules of demai].

Chapter 3

They may feed demai to the poor and to guests (alt. passing troops). Rabban Gamaliel used to feed demai to his workmen. [As for] charity collectors: Bet Shammai says: they should give tithed [produce] to one who doesn’t tithe, and untithed [produce] to one who does tithe. In this way it will turn out that every one will eat [produce] that has been fixed (tithed). But the sages say: they may collect indiscriminately and distribute indiscriminately. And one who wishes to fix [his produce by tithing it], let him fix it.

One who wants to cut off leaves of vegetables in order to lighten his burden, he may not throw them down until he has [first] tithed them. One who takes vegetables from the market [with the intention of buying them], and then decides to put them back, he should not put them back until he has [first] tithed them, for nothing is missing [after they are tithed] except for their quantity. But if he was standing [there and deciding what to] buy and then saw another load of better quality, he may put them back [untithed], since he had not yet drawn them into his possession.

If one finds produce on the road and picks it up in order to eat it, and then decides to hide it, he may not hide it unless he has [first] tithed it. But if from the outset he picked it up only in order to guard it against being destroyed, he is exempt [from tithing it]. Any produce which one may not sell [in the condition of] demai, he may not send it [as a gift] to his friend [in the condition of] demai. Rabbi Yose permits [one to send as a gift produce] that is certainly untithed, on condition that he makes the matter known to the recipient.

One who takes his wheat to a Samaritan miller or to an am haaretz miller, [the wheat when ground] retains its former status in respect of tithes and the law of seventh year produce. [But if he carried it] to a Gentile miller, [the wheat when ground has the status of] demai. One who deposited his produce with a Samaritan or am haaretz, [the produce] retains its former status in respect of tithes and the law of seventh year produce. [But if he left it] with a Gentile, it is like the produce of the Gentile. Rabbi Shimon says: [it becomes] demai.

One who gives [produce] to an innkeeper [to prepare it for food], he must tithe what he gives to her and what he takes back from her, because she is suspected of exchanging it [with her own produce]. Rabbi Yose said: we are not responsible for deceivers. Rather, he must tithe only that which he takes from her.

One who gives [produce] to his mother-in-law [to prepare it], he must tithe what he gives to her and what he takes back from her, because she is suspected of changing any [food] which has spoiled. Rabbi Judah said: she desires the welfare of her daughter and is ashamed [of serving spoiled food] to her son-in-law. Rabbi Judah agrees [with the other sages] that if one gives his mother-in-law seventh year produce, she is not suspected of changing it and giving her daughter to eat of seventh year produce.

Chapter 4

One who buys produce from someone who is not trustworthy in respect of tithes, and he forgot to tithe it, and he asked [the seller] on Shabbat [if they were tithed], he may eat based on his word. At nightfall of Shabbat, he may not eat of it unless he had first tithed it. If he could not find the seller, and another person who was not trustworthy in respect of tithes said to him “they are tithed,” he may eat of it at his word. At nightfall of Shabbat, he may not eat of it unless he had first tithed it. Terumat maaser of demai which had become mixed up again [with the produce] from which it had been taken: Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even on a week day he may ask the seller and eat based on his word.

One who vowed [that his friend could not benefit from him] unless he eats with him, and the friend does not trust him in respect of tithes, he may eat with him on the first Shabbat even though he does not trust him in respect of tithes, provided that his friend said to him that the food had been tithed. But on the second week, even though he had vowed that he would not benefit from him, he may not eat with him unless he first tithed [the produce].

Rabbi Eliezer says: a man need not designate the poor man’s tithe of demai. But the sages say: he must designate it, but he need not separate.

One who had designated the terumat maaser of demai, or the poor man’s tithe of produce that had certainly not been tithed, he should not separate them on Shabbat. But if the priest or the poor man regularly ate with him, they may come and eat provided that he informs them.

One who says to another who is not trustworthy in respect of tithes: “Buy [produce] for me from one who is trustworthy or from one who gives tithes,” [the messenger] may not be trusted. “Buy it for me from so-and-so,” he is to be trusted. If he went to buy it from him [and then came back] and said: “I did not find him, so I bought for you from another man who is trustworthy,” he may not be trusted.

One enters a city and doesn’t know anyone. He says: “Who here is trustworthy? Who gives tithes here?” One person one responds: “I am.” He may not be trusted. [But if] he replied: “So-and-so is trustworthy,” he may be trusted. He went to buy from so-and-so, and he asked him: “Who here sells aged produce?” and so-and-so replied: “He sent you to me,” though they appear to be repaying each other, they may be trusted.

If donkey-drivers entered a city and one of them declared: “My produce is new but my friend’s produce is old,” or, “My produce has not been tithed but my friend’s produce has been tithed,” they may not be trusted. Rabbi Judah says: they may be trusted.

Chapter 5

One who buys bread from a baker how should he tithe? He should take sufficient for the terumat maaser and for hallah and say: “A hundredth part of what is here shall be tithe on this side, and what is nearest to it shall be the rest of the tithe. That which I made tithe will become terumat maaser for the rest, the remainder will be hallah, and the second tithe tithe is to the north or to the south of it and that will be exchanged for money.”

One who wishes to separate terumah and the terumat maaser together:He should take one thirty third and say: One hundredth part of what is here, on this side is non-sacred produce (hullin), and the rest shall be terumah for the whole. And the one hundred parts of non-sacred produce which is here on this side shall be tithe, and the rest that is next to it is tithe. That which I made tithe shall become the terumat maaser for it. The remainder will be hallah, and the second tithe tithe is to the north or to the south of it and that will be exchanged for money.”

One who bought [bread] from a baker, he may give tithe from hot bread for cold bread or from cold bread for hot bread, even when they are of various moulds, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah prohibits it, because I say that yesterday’s wheat was bought from one man and today’s wheat from another man. Rabbi Shimon prohibits it in the case of terumat maaser, but permits it in the case of hallah.

If one bought from a bread seller he must tithe every mould [separately], the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: he may give tithes from one mould for all the others. But Rabbi Judah agrees that one who bought from a monopolist he must tithe every mould [separately].

One who buys from a poor man, and similarly a poor man to whom they given slices of bread or pieces of fig-cake, he must tithe every piece. But in the case of dates and dried figs he may mix them together and take [the tithes from the mixture]. Rabbi Judah said: When is this so? When the amount [of dates or dried figs] given to the poor man was large; but when the amount was small, he must tithe each separately.

One who buys from a wholesaler, and then buys from him again, he may not give tithes from the one [purchase] for the other, even when both came from the same basket and even from the same kind. But the wholesale merchant may be trusted if he says that both came from the same one.

One who buys from a field owner, and then buys from him again, he may give tithes from the one [purchase] for the other, even when [the purchases come] from two baskets and even from two towns. A field owner who was selling vegetables in the market: when he brings them from his garden, he may tithe from one for all; But [if he brings them] from other gardens, he must tithe each lot separately.

One who buys untithed produce from two places, he may tithe from one lot for the other. Although they have said one may not sell untithed produce except in the case of necessity.

They may give tithes from produce from a Jew for produce [bought] from a Gentile, from produce [bought] from a Gentile for produce from a Jew, from produce [bought] from a Jew for produce [bought] from Samaritans, and from produce [bought] from Samaritans for produce [bought] from [other] Samaritans. Rabbi Eliezer prohibits [tithing] from produce [bought] from Samaritans for produce [bought] from [other] Samaritans.

A perforated pot is considered like land. If one gave terumah from [produce grown in] the soil for [produce grown in] a perforated pot, or from [produce grown in] a perforated pot for [produce grown in] the soil, his terumah is terumah. [If he gave terumah] from [produce grown in] a pot that was not perforated for [produce grown in] a pot that was perforated, [it is] terumah, but he must go back and give terumah again. [If he gave terumah] from [produce grown in] a perforated pot for [produce grown in] a pot which was not perforated, [it is] terumah, but it may not be eaten until he first gives terumah and tithes for it.

If one gave terumah from [produce of] demai for [other produce of] demai, or from [produce of] demai for [produce] which was certainly untithed, [this becomes] terumah, but he must give terumah over again. [If he gave terumah] from [produce] which was certainly untithed for [produce of] demai, [this becomes] terumah, but it may not be eaten until he first gives terumah and tithes for it.

Chapter 6

One who has received a field from a Jew, or from a Gentile, or from a Samaritan [for a share in the produce], he divvies up the produce in front of them [without first separating tithes]. One who has hired a field from a Jew [for a fixed amount from the produce], he first gives terumah [from the rental] and then gives it to him (the field owner). Rabbi Judah said: When is this so? When he pays him [the rental with produce] of the same field and of the same kind; but when he pays him with the produce of another field or of another kind, he must [also] tithe [the rental first] and then give it to him.

One who has hired a field from a Gentile [for a fixed amount from the produce], he first gives tithes [from the rental] and then gives it to him (the field owner). Rabbi Judah says: even if one rented from a Gentile a field which had formerly belonged to his fathers [for a share in the produce], he first gives tithes and then gives it to him.

A priest or a Levite who rented a field from an Israelite [for a share in the produce], just as they divide the non-sacred produce, so they divide the terumah. Rabbi Eliezer says: the tithes belong to them (the tenants), for they entered the field with this expectation.

If an Israelite rented a field from a priest or from a Levite [for a share in the produce] the tithes belong to the owners [of the field]. Rabbi Ishmael says: if a city dweller [from outside of Jerusalem] rented a field from a Jerusalemite, the second tithe belongs to the inhabitant of Jerusalem. But the sages say: the city dweller may go up and eat the second tithe in Jerusalem.

[An Israelite] who rents olive trees [from a priest or a Levite] for [a share in the] oil: just as they divide the non-sacred produce, so they divide the terumah. Rabbi Judah says: an Israelite who rented [olive trees] from a priest or a levite for the oil for a share of half the profit, the tithes belong to the owner.

Bet Shammai says: a man may sell his olives only to a “chaver (an ‘associate’).” But Bet Hillel says: [one may sell them] even to one who only] tithes. And the pious among Bet Hillel used to act in accordance with the words of Bet Shammai.

Two gathered [the fruit of] their vineyards into one winepress, one of whom tithes and the other does not tithe the one who tithes may tithe his own share and his share wherever it may be.

Two men who rented a field [for a share in the produce], or inherited [a field], or became partners in it: the one [who tithes] may say to the other [who does not tithe], “You take the wheat which is in this place and I will take the wheat which is in that place.” Or, “You take the wine which is in this place and I will take the wine which is in that place.” But he may not say to him: “You take the wheat and I will take the barley,” or, “You take the wine and I will take the oil.”

A chaver (rabbinic associate) and an am haaretz who inherited [the property of] their father who was an am haaretz, he (the chaver) may say to him (the am haaretz): “You take the wheat which is in this place and I will take the wheat which is in that place.” Or, “You take the wine which is in this place and I will take the wine which is in that place.” But he may not say to him: “You take the wheat and I will take the barley,” or, “You take the wine and I will take the oil,” or: “You take the moist produce and I will take the dry produce.”

A convert and a gentile who inherited [the property of] their father, a gentile: he (the convert) can say [to his brother the gentile]: “You take the idols and I will take the money,” or: “You take the wine and I will take the produce.” But from the time [that any part of the inheritance] came into the possession of the convert, he is forbidden [to say so].

One who sells produce in Syria and declared “It was grown in the land of Israel,” the purchaser must tithe it. [But if he also said], “It has been tithed,” he may be trusted, because the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permitted. [If he said: The produce is] from my own field,” the purchaser must tithe it. [But if he added:] “It has already been tithed,” he may be trusted, because the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permitted. If it was known that he had a field in Syria, the purchaser must tithe it.

If an am haaretz said to a chaver, “Buy me a bundle of vegetables,” or: “Buy me a loaf of bread,” the chaver may buy it without checking [whether it had been tithed], and he is exempt [from tithing it]. But if the chaver said: “This one I am buying for myself and this one for my friend,” and they got mixed up, he must tithe [them both], even if there were one hundred [for the am haaretz.]

Chapter 7

One who invites his friend [before Shabbat] to eat with him [on Shabbat], and [his friend] does not trust him in respect of tithes, [the friend] may say on the eve of Shabbat, “What I will set apart tomorrow, behold it shall be tithe, and what is nearest to it shall be the rest of the tithe. That which I made tithe will become the terumah of the tithe for the whole, and the second tithe is to the north or to the south and it shall be exchanged for money.”

They pour him a cup [of wine on the sabbath], he says: “What I will leave at the bottom of the cup shall be tithe, and what is nearest to it shall be the rest of the tithe. That which I made tithe shall become terumat maaser for the whole, and second tithe is at the mouth of the cup, and it is exchanged for money.

A worker who does not trust his employer [in respect of tithes], may take one dried fig and say: “This one and the nine which come after it shall become tithe for the ninety which I shall eat. This one shall become the terumat maaser for them, and the last ones shall be second tithe which shall be exchanged for money.” And he must put aside one dried fig. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: he does not put one aside, because this reduce the work for his employer. Rabbi Yose says: he does not put one aside, because this is a court stipulation [imposed upon the employer].

One who buys wine among Samaritans, he may say: “Two logs which I shall set apart shall be terumah, ten logs tithe, and nine logs second tithe.” He may then pour the wine and drink it.

He had figs of tevel in his house, and he is in the house of study or in the field: he may say: “The two figs which I shall set apart shall be terumah, ten figs shall be first tithe, and nine figs second tithe.” If the figs were demai, he may say: “Whatever I shall separate tomorrow will be tithe, and the rest of the tithe is adjacent to it. That which I made tithe will become terumat maaser for the whole, and the second tithe is to the north or to the south and it shall be exchanged for money.”

There were before him two baskets full of tevel, and he said: “Let the tithes of this [basket] be in that [basket],” the first [basket] is tithed. [If he said:] “Let the tithes of this [basket] be in that [basket], and the tithes of that [basket] in this [basket],” the first basket is tithed [whereas the second is not]. [If he said:] “Let the tithes be so that the tithes of each basket be in the other,” he has designated [the tithes of either basket].

One hundred [parts of] tevel which [were mixed with] a hundred [parts of] common produce, one must take out a hundred and one [parts]. One hundred [parts of] tevel which [were mixed with] a hundred [parts of first] tithe, one must take out a hundred and one [parts]. One hundred [parts of] common produce from which tithes had been separated [were mixed with] a hundred [parts of] tithe, one must take out a hundred and ten [parts]. One hundred [parts of] tevel [were mixed with] ninety [parts of] tithe, or ninety [parts of] tevel [were mixed with] eighty [parts of] tithe, he has not lost anything. This is the general rule: whenever the tevel is the greater [portion of the mixture] he has not lost anything.

One who had ten rows each containing ten jugs of wine, and said: “One exterior row shall be tithe,” and it is not known which row [he meant], he must take two jugs [each from the ends of] a diagonal line. [If he had said:] “One half of one exterior row shall be tithe” and it is not known which half row [he meant], he must take four jugs from the four corners. [If he had said:] “One row shall be tithe,” and it is not known which row [he meant], he must take one [whole] row in a diagonal line. [If he had said:] “Half of one row shall be tithe,” and it is not known which half row [he meant], he must take two rows in a diagonal line. [If he had said:] “One jug shall be tithe,” and it is not known which jug [he meant],he must take from every jug.

Mishnah Kilayim

Chapter 1

Wheat and zunin do not constitute kilayim one with the other. Barley and oats, spelt and rye, or beans and sapir (a type of bean), or purkdan and tofah (two similar types of beans), or white beans and kidney beans, do not constitute kilayim one with the other.

Cucumbers and melons do not constitute kilayim one with the other. Rabbi Judah said they do constitute kilayim. Lettuce and wild lettuce, endives and wild endives, leek and wild leek, coriander and wild coriander, or mustard and Egyptian mustard, Egyptian gourd and the bitter gourd, or Egyptian beans and carob shaped beans do not constitute kilayim one with the other.

Turnips and the cabbage turnip, cabbage and cauliflower, beet and rumex do not constitute kilayim one with the other. Rabbi Akiva added: garlic and small wild garlic, onion and small wild onion, lupine and wild lupine do not constitute kilayim one with the other.

As for trees: the pear and the crustumenian pear, the medlar and azarolus, do not constitute kilayim one with the other. The apple and the crab-apple, or the peach and almond, or the jujube and rimin, even though they are similar one to the other, they nevertheless constitute kilayim one with the other.

The radish and the cabbage turnip, mustard and charlock mustard, Greek gourd with Egyptian gourd or [Greek gourd] with bitter gourd, even though they are similar one to the other, are nevertheless kilayim one with the other.

A wolf and a dog, a wild dog and a fox, a goat and a deer, a gazelle and a ewe-lamb, a horse and a mule, or a mule and a donkey, a donkey and a wild donkey, even though they are similar one to the other, constitute nevertheless, kilayim one with the other.

They may not graft from one tree to another, or from one vegetable to another, or from a tree to a vegetable, or from a vegetable to a tree. Rabbi Judah permits it from a vegetable to a tree.

They may not plant vegetables in a trunk of a sycamore tree. They may not graft rue on white cassia, since that is [grafting] a vegetable on a tree. They may not plant a young fig-shoot in sea squill so that it might provide shade for it. They may not insert a vine branch into a melon, in order that the latter might shoot its moisture to the former, since that is [grafting] a tree on a vegetable. They may not place gourd seed into anchusa for the purpose of preserving it (the gourd seed), since that is [grafting] a vegetable on another vegetable.

One who buries turnips or radishes beneath a vine, if some of their leaves are uncovered, he need not have fear [of having transgressed] kilayim, or the sabbatical year, or tithes and they may also be pulled up on Shabbat. One who plants a [grain of] wheat and [a grain of] barley at one time, behold this is kilayim. Rabbi Judah says: it is not kilayim unless there are two grains of wheat and two grains of barley, or one grain of wheat and two grains of barley, or a grain of wheat, a grain of barley and a grain of spelt.

Chapter 2

Any seah which contains a quarter [of a kav] of a different species, one should reduce [its proportion of the latter] Rabbi Yose says: one should pick [it all out]. Whether it consists of one species or of two species. Rabbi Shimon says: they said this only if it consists of one species. But the sages say: anything which is kilayim, in a seah [it adds up] in making up the quarter.

To what does this refer? To [an mixture of] grain [occurring] with [different] grain, or pulse with [different] pulse, to grain with pulse, and to pulse with grain. However they stated: Seeds from a garden which are not eaten, they add up [with other seeds to form an amount sufficient to prohibit the sowing of a seah] when there is 1/24 of the quantity [of such seed] that is necessary to sow a bet seah. Rabbi Shimon says: just as they ruled to be stringent so too they ruled to be lenient flax [mixed in with] produce, combines when there is 1/24 of the quantity [of such seed] that is necessary to sow a bet seah.

If one’s field was sown with wheat, and he changed his mind and decided to sow it with barley, he must wait until it [the wheat] rots. He turns [the soil] and then he may sow [the barley], if it [the wheat] had already grown. He should not say: “I shall [first] sow [the barley] and, then turn [the soil]” rather he must first turn [the soil] and then sow. How much must he plow [when overturning the soil]? Like the furrows [that are plowed after the [first] rainy season. Abba Shaul says: [one should plow] so that one does not leave [unplowed] as much [ground] as holds a quarter [kav] to a bet seah.

[His field was] sown [with grain, or pulse, or garden-seed], and he changed his mind and decided to plant it [with vines], he may not say: “First I shall plant [the vines] and then turn [the soil],” but he must [first] turn [the soil] and then he may plant [the vines]. [If it was] ‘planted’ [with vines] and he changed his mind and decided to seed [with grain, pulse or garden-seed], he may not say: “First I shall sow [the grain etc.] and then I uproot [the vines],” but he must [first] uproot [the vines] and then he may sow [the grain etc.] If he wants, he may cut down [the vines] to less than a handbreadth [above ground], and then he may sow [the grain] and later, he uproots [the vines].

His field was sown cumin or with arum, he must not sow on top of them, since they produce crops only after three years. [A field of] grain among which sprang up some aftergrowth woad, alternatively an area of threshing-floors in which many species sprang up, alternatively [a field of] clover among which grew up a number of species of herbs, he is not obliged to weed them out. But if he weeded or cut down the weeds, they say to him: “Uproot it all, except for one species.”

One who wants to lay out his field in long straight rows each sown with a different species:Bet Shammai says: three furrows of newly broken land. But Bet Hillel says: the width of a Sharon yoke. And the words of these are close to the words of these.

If the point of an angle of a wheat [field] overlaps into a barley [field], it is permitted because it looks like the end of his field. If his [field] is of wheat, and his neighbor’s is of another species, he may sow [next to the border] some of the same species [as that of his neighbor]. If his field was of wheat and that of his neighbor’s was of wheat, he may sow next to him a row of flax, but not a row of any other species. Rabbi Shimon says: it is all the same whether he sows flax or any other species. Rabbi Yose said: even in the middle of one's field it is permitted to check one’s field with a row of flax.

They may not sow mustard or safflower close to a field of grain, but they may sow mustard or safflower close to a vegetable field. And they may sow close to fallow land or to plowed land, or to a wall made with loose stones, or to a path, or to a fence ten handbreadths high, or to a trench ten [handbreadths] deep and four wide, or to a tree forming a tent over the ground, or to a rock ten [handbreadths] high and four wide.

One who wishes to make his field into square plots [each sown] with a different species, he should divide it into twenty-four square plots for a bet seah, a square plot per bet rova, and he may then sow in each whatever species he wants. If there is one square plot or two [inside his field], he may sow them with mustard, but if there are three he may not sow them with mustard, since it looks like a field of mustard, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: nine square plots are permitted, ten are forbidden. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: even though the whole of his field is a bet-kor, he may not make within it more than one square plot.

Whatever there is within a bet rova [which separates different species] is included in the area of a bet rova: the space which vine roots consume, a grave, a rock, [all] count in the measure of a bet rova. [One who wants to sow one type of] grain [in a field of another type] of grain the measure is a bet rova. Vegetables within [a field of other] vegetables the measure is six handbreadths. Vegetables within [a field of] grain, or grain within [a field of] vegetables the measure is a bet rova. Rabbi Eliezer says: vegetables in [a field of] grain the measure is six handbreadths.

Stalks of grain which are leaning over other stalks of grain, or vegetable [plants] on other [] vegetable plants, or stalks of grain over vegetables plants or vegetable plants over stalks of grain, all this is permitted, except in the case of the Greek gourd. Rabbi Meir says: also in the case of the cucumber or Egyptian beans. But I recognize their words [as more acceptable] than mine.

Chapter 3

A furrow of vegetables measuring six handbreadths by six handbreadths: it is permitted to sow in it five [different] types of seeds--four [species], one on [each of] the four sides of the bed, and one in the middle. If it had a border one handbreadth high, one may sow in it thirteen [different species] three on every border, and one in the middle. It is prohibited to plant a turnip head in the border since that would fill it [completely]. Rabbi Judah said: [it is permitted to sow] six [species] in the middle.

They may not sow different species of seeds in one bed, but they may sow different species of vegetables in one bed. Mustard and small polished peas are a species of seed; large peas are a species of vegetable. If a border was originally a handbreadth high and then it fell in height, it remains valid, since it was valid at the beginning. A furrow or water channel which are a handbreadth deep, it is permitted to sow three different species of vegetables, one on one side, one on the other side, and one in the middle.

If the point of an angle of a vegetable field overlaps into a field of another vegetable, it is permitted because it looks like the end of his field. His field was sown with a certain vegetable and he wants to plant in it a row of another vegetable: Rabbi Ishmael says: [he may do so] as long as a furrow runs through from one end of the field to the other. Rabbi Akiva says: [as long as] it is six handbreadths long and fully as wide. Rabbi Judah says: [as long as] the width is the full width of a footstep.

Planting two rows of cucumbers, two rows of gourds, and two rows of Egyptian beans is permitted. [But planting] one row of cucumbers, one row of gourds and one row of egyptian beans is prohibited. [Planting] one row of cucumbers, one row of gourds, one row of Egyptian beans and [again] one row of cucumbers: Rabbi Eliezer permits, But the sages forbid.

One may plant a cucumber and a gourd in one hole, as long as this [species] inclines in one direction, and the other [species] in the opposite direction. And he should tip the leaves of one [species] one way, and the other the opposite way, since all that the sages prohibited [in matters of kilayim] they only decreed because of appearance.

His field was sown with onions, and he wishes to plant in it rows of gourds:Rabbi Ishmael says: he pulls up two rows [of onions] and plants [in the cleared space] one row [of gourds], then he leaves onions over a space of two rows, pulls up two rows [of onions] and plants [in the cleared space] one row [of gourds, and so on]. Rabbi Akiva says: he pulls up two rows [of onions], plants [in the cleared space] two rows [of gourds], then he leaves onions over a space of two rows, pulls up two rows [of onions], and plants two rows [of gourds; and so on]. The sages say: if between one row [of gourds] and the next there are not twelve cubits, one may not allow that which is sown in the intervening space to remain.

A gourd [sown] among a [different] vegetable [must be separated by as much] as any other vegetable. [A gourd sown] among grain he must give it [a separating space of] a bet rova. If his field was sown with grain, and he wishes to plant within it a row of gourds, he must give [the gourds] six handbreadths for them to be worked. And if [the row of gourds] overgrows [into the border] he must pull up that which is within it. Rabbi Yose says: he must give [the gourds] four cubits for them to be worked. They said to him: Do you rule more stringently with regard to this than with regard to a vine? He said to them: We find that [the gourd] is treated more stringently than a vine, since for a single vine he must give six handbreadths for it to be worked, but for a single gourd a bet rova. Rabbi Meir said in the name of Rabbi Ishmael: if there are as many as three gourds in a bet seah, he may not bring [another] seed into the bet seah. Rabbi Yose ben Hahotef Ephrati said in the name of Rabbi Ishmael: if there are as many as three gourds in a bet kor, one may not bring [another] seed into the bet kor.

Chapter 4

A karahat [a bare patch] within a vineyard: Bet Shammai says: [it must measure] twenty-four cubits [by twenty-four cubits]. But Bet Hillel says: sixteen cubits. A mehol [an unsown belt of ground between a planted area and a fence] of a vineyard: Bet Shammai says: [it must measure] sixteen cubits. But Bet Hillel says: twelve cubits. What is a karahat of a vineyard? A vineyard which has been cleared [of vines] in its middle. If there are less than sixteen cubits, then one may not bring seed into it. If it is sixteen cubits, they leave a space in which to work [the vineyard] and they may sow the rest.

What is a mehol in a vineyard? [The space] between the vineyard and a fence. If there are less than twelve cubits, then one may not bring seed into it. If there are twelve cubits, they leave a space in which to work [the vineyard] and they may sow the rest.

Rabbi Judah says: this is nothing but the fence of the vineyard fence. What then is a mehol of a vineyard? [A space] between two vineyards. What is considered a fence? One that is ten handbreadths high. And what is considered a trench? One ten handbreadths deep and four wide.

A partition of reeds: if between one reed and another there are less than three handbreadths, [the space] through which a kid (young goat) could enter, it counts as a [legally effective] partition. A [stone] fence which has been broken through up to [the length of] ten cubits, [the breach] is [regarded] as a doorway; more than that, opposite the breach it is prohibited [to sow seeds]. If there were many breaches in the fence, if that which remains standing exceeds that which is broken through, it is permitted [to sow there]. But if the breached sections exceed those which remain standing, it is forbidden [to sow opposite the breaches.]

One who has planted a row of [at least] five vines: Bet Shammai says: these constitute a vineyard. But Bet Hillel says: they do not constitute a vineyard unless there are two rows. Consequently, one who sows four cubits within the vineyard: Beth Shammai says: he has sanctified one row [of the vineyard, and created kilayim]. But Bet Hillel says: he has sanctified two rows.

One who plants two [vines] opposite two [other vines], and one [other vine] forming a “tail” behold this is a vineyard. Two [vines] opposite two [other vines], and one [other vine] in between, or two opposite two, and one in the middle, these are not a vineyard until there are two opposite two with one [other] forming a tail.

One who has planted one row [of vines] on his own [land] and another row on his neighbor's [land], and there is a private road or a public road in the middle, or a fence lower than ten handbreadths, these [two rows] combine. If there is a fence higher than ten handbreadths they do not combine. Rabbi Judah says: If he intertwines them [the rows of vines] above [the fence] they do combine.

One who has planted two rows [of vines] if there are not eight cubits between them, he may not bring seed there [in the space between the two rows]. If there are three [rows] if there are not between one row and its companion sixteen cubits he may not bring seed there. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said in the name of Hananya ben Hakinai: even if the middle row was laid waste and there is not between one row and its companion row sixteen cubits, he may not bring seed there, but if he had planted them [two rows] at the outset, it is permitted [to sow between them] if they are eight cubits [apart].

One who plants his vineyard sixteen cubits, sixteen cubits [separating each row], he may bring seed there. Rabbi Judah said: It happened at Tsalmon that a man planted his vineyard on [a plan of] sixteen cubits, sixteen cubits [separating each row]. [One year] he would turn the tips of the vine branches of two [adjacent rows] towards one place, and sow the furrow [in between], and the following year he would turn the tips of the vine branches in the opposite direction, and sow the land which had been left untilled [the preceding year]. The matter came before the sages, and they declared it permitted. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon say: even one who has planted his vineyard with eight cubits [between every two rows], this is permitted.

Chapter 5

A vineyard that has been [partly] ruined: if it is still possible to harvest ten vines within a bet seah, and they are planted according to halakhah, behold this is called a “poor vineyard.” A vineyard planted in a mixed-up manner, if there remains an alignment of [one line of] two parallel [vines] opposite [a line of] three [vines], it constitutes a vineyard, but if not it is not a vineyard. Rabbi Meir says: since it is in appearance like a vineyard [in general], it is a vineyard.

A vineyard that has been planted with less than four cubits [in between rows of vines]: Rabbi Shimon says: this is not a vineyard. But the sages say: it is a vineyard, and we look at the middle [rows] as if they were 

A trench passing through a vineyard, ten [handbreadths] deep and four wide: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if it runs right through from the beginning of the vineyard to the end, it looks like it is in between two [separately owned] vineyards, and it is permitted to sow in it. But if it is not, it is [regarded] as [if it were part of] a winepress. And as for a winepress in a vineyard, and [the winepress] is ten [handbreadths] deep and four wide: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is permitted to sow in it. But the sages prohibit. A watchman’s mound in a vineyard, ten handbreadths high and four wide: it is permitted to sow in it. But if the ends of the vine-branches become intertwined over it, it is forbidden.

A vine planted in a winepress or in a depression [in the ground], they leave it room to work on it, and one may sow on the rest. Rabbi Yose says: if there are not four cubits there, one may not bring seed there. As for a house that is within a vineyard, it is permitted to sow there.

One who plants a vegetable or leaves it to remain in a vineyard, he renders prohibited [as kilayim] forty-five vines. When is this so? When they were planted with either four or five [cubits between rows]. If they were planted with either six or seven [cubits between rows] he renders prohibited as kilayim [the vines within an area of] sixteen cubits in every direction, in the form of a circle, not of a square.

One who sees a vegetable in a vineyard, and said: “When I reach it I will pluck it,” it is permitted. [But if he says:] “When I come back I will pluck it,” if [the vegetable] has [in the meantime] increased by a two-hundredth, it is forbidden.

If he was passing through a vineyard, and seeds fell from him, or [seeds] went [into the field] with manure, or with [irrigation] water, or if he was [in a grain field] scattering seed and the wind blew some behind him [into a vineyard], everything is permitted. If the wind blew the seed in front of him [into a vineyard], Rabbi Akiba says: If it has produced small shoots, he must turn the soil. If it has reached the stage of green ears, he must beat them out. If it has grown into grain, it must be burnt.

One who allows thorns to remain growing in a vineyard: Rabbi Eliezer says: he [thereby] prohibits [the vineyard]. But the sages say: he does not prohibit except if it something that is generally allowed to grow. Iris, ivy, and the king’s lily, and all manner of seeds are not kilayim in a vineyard. [As for] hemp: Rabbi Tarfon said: it is not kilayim, But the sages say it is kilayim. Artichokes are kilayim in a vineyard.

Chapter 6

What is an aris (an espalier) [which is regarded as a vineyard]? One who has planted a [single] row consisting of five vines beside a fence ten handbreadths high, or beside a trench ten handbreadths deep and four wide, they leave a space of four cubits in which to work it. Bet Shammai says: they measure the four cubits from the body of the vine to the field; But Bet Hillel says: from the fence to the field. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: all who say so are mistaken! Rather, if there are four cubits from the body of the vines to the fence, they leave a space in which to work it and they may sow the rest. And how much is the space in which work to work a vine? Six handbreadths in every direction. Rabbi Akiva says: three.

An aris which projects from a terrace: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if a person standing on [level] ground is able to harvest all of it, [such an aris] prohibits [sowing seed in] four cubits of the field, but if [he is] not [able to do so], it prohibits [sowing seed] only [in] the [soil] which is directly below it. Rabbi Eliezer says: even one who has planted one [row of vines] on the ground, and one on a terrace, then if it is ten handbreadths above the [level] ground, one does not combine with the other; if it is not [ten handbreadths high] then one does combine with the other.

One who suspends vines over papyrus-ropes [of a trellis], he may not bring seed beneath the remainder [of the trellis]. However, if he did so, he has not caused them to be prohibited. If new [tendrils] spread [over the remainder], that [which was sown under the remainder] is forbidden. Similarly, when one hangs vines over some part of a non-fruit-bearing tree.

One who suspends [branches of] a vine on part of [the branches of] a fruit tree, it is permitted to bring seed beneath the remainder. If new [tendrils] spread [over the remainder], he must turn them back. It happened that Rabbi Joshua went to Rabbi Ishmael in Kefar Aziz, and the latter showed him a vine [with its branches] suspended on part of [the branches of] a fig tree. He [Rabbi Yishmael] asked him [Rabbi Joshua]: “May I bring seed beneath the remainder?” He answered him: “It is permitted.” He took him to Bet Hamaganyah and he showed him a vine [whose branches were] suspended on part of a beam belonging to the trunk of a sycamore, which had many beams. He [Rabbi Joshua] said to him [Rabbi Yishmael]: beneath this beam it is prohibited [to sow] but beneath the remainder it is permitted.

What is a serak (non-fruit bearing) tree?Any tree which does not yield fruit. Rabbi Meir says: all trees are serak, except the olive and the fig tree. Rabbi Yose says: all trees that are not planted in whole fields, are serak trees.

Gaps in an aris must be eight cubits and somewhat more [in order to be able to sow seeds in the gaps]. [In the case of] all measurements that the sages said in connection with a vineyard, there is no ‘and somewhat more’, except in the case of gaps in an aris. The following count as gaps in an aris: if an aris was razed in its middle and five vines remained on one side and five vines on the other side. Then if the gap is [only] eight cubits, one may not bring seed there. [But if the gap is] eight cubits and somewhat more, they give [the vines] space to work them, and he may sow the rest.

An aris which turns away from a wall where it forms an angle, and comes to an end, they give it space to work it and they may sow the rest. Rabbi Yose says: if there are not four cubits there, one may not bring seed there.

Canes which protrude from the aris and one is too concerned for them to cut them short, it is permitted to sow directly beneath them. If he made them [long] so that the new [growth] might spread along them, it is forbidden [two sow underneath].

A blossom which protruded from the aris, it is regarded as if a plumb line were suspended from it, directly beneath it, it is prohibited [to sow]. Similarly, in the case of [a blossom protruding from] a hanging branch [of a single vine.] One who has stretched a vine-shoot from tree to tree, it is forbidden to sow beneath it. If he made an extension [to the vine] by means of rope or reed, it is permitted under the extension. If he made the extension so that the new [growth] might spread along it, it is forbidden.

Chapter 7

If one has bent a vine into the ground [and then brought it back up elsewhere], then if there is not soil over it to the height of three handbreadths, he may not sow seed above it, even if he bent [and conducted it underground] through a gourd or through a pipe. If he bent it [and conducted] it through rocky soil, then even if there is not soil over it to the height of three handbreadths, it is permitted to sow seed above it. As for a knee-like vine [formed by burying and conducting it underground], they don’t measure [for how much space to work it] except from its second root.

One who has bent [and conducted underground] three vines, and their [original] stems are visible, Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok says: if there is between them from four to eight cubits, they combine, if not, they do not combine. A vine which has dried up, it is forbidden [to sow near it], but it does not prohibit [the seed as kilayim]. Rabbi Meir said: the same applies to a cotton plant, it is forbidden [to sow near it], but it does not prohibit [the seed as kilayim]. Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said in his name: above the vine too, it is forbidden [to sow near it], but it does not prohibit [the seed as kilayim].

The following are forbidden, but they do not prohibit [the seed sown there]:The remainder of a [legally inadequate] empty patch (karahat) of a vineyard. The remainder of a [legally inadequate] mehol of a vineyard. The remainder of a [legally inadequate] aris-gap. The [ground under the] remainder of papyrus-ropes [of a trellis]. But [the ground] beneath a vine, and within the place left to work a vine, and the [ground within] four cubits of a vineyard, these do prohibit the [seed sown there].

One who causes his vine to overhang his fellow’s grain, behold he has caused the grain to be prohibited and he is responsible for it. Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say: a person does not prohibit [as kilayim] that which is not his own.

Rabbi Yose said: It happened that a man sowed [seed in] his vineyard in the sabbatical year, and the matter came before Rabbi Akiva, who said: a person does not prohibit [as kilayim] that which is not his own.

If a forceful occupier (anas) has sown seed in a vineyard, and it went out of his possession [and reverted to the rightful owner], he (the original owner) should cut it down, even during hol hamoed. Up to what amount should he pay the workers? Up to a third. If [they demand] more than this, he should cut it in his usual way even if he has to keep cutting after the festival. At what point is he considered a forceful occupier (anas)? From the [the name of the original owner] has sunk [into oblivion].

If wind has blown vines [so that they hang over] grain, one should immediately fence them apart. If an unforeseeable event occurred to him, it [the grain] is permitted. If grain is bent [and the ears reach] beneath a vine, similarly in the case of vegetables, one should turn them back, and it does not prohibit [as kilayim]. From what stage does grain prohibit kilayim? From the time it has struck root. And grapes? From the time they become as large as white beans. Grain which has become completely dried out, and grapes which have fully ripened no longer prohibit as kilayim.

[Seed sown in a] perforated flowerpot, prohibits [as kilayim] in a vineyard. [In] one not perforated, does not prohibit [as kilayim]. Rabbi Shimon says: both are forbidden but neither prohibits. One who carries a perforated flowerpot through a vineyard, if [that which is sown in it] grows a two-hundredth part, it is forbidden.

Chapter 8

Kilayim of the vineyard: it is forbidden both to sow and to allow to grow, and it is forbidden to derive benefit from them. Kilayim of seeds: it is forbidden both to sow and to allow to grow, but it is permitted to eat them, and all the more so to derive benefit from them. Kilayim of clothing: is permitted in all respects, except that it is forbidden to wear them. Kilayim of beasts: it is permitted to raise and to keep, and it is only prohibited to cross-breed them. Kilayim of beasts: these one are prohibited with these.

A beast (behemah) with a beast [of another species]; a wild animal (hayyah) with a wild animal [of another species]; a behemah with a hayyah; a hayyah with a behemah; an unclean beast with an unclean beast [of another species]; a clean beast with a clean beast [of another species]; or an unclean beast with a clean beast; or a clean beast with an unclean beast; they are forbidden for plowing, and [it is forbidden] to pull them or lead them [tied together].

The person driving [the two different animals yoked together] receives the forty [lashes]. And the person sitting in the wagon receives the forty [lashes]. But Rabbi Meir exempts [the latter]. [The tying of] a third [animal different from the two already harnessed to a wagon] to the straps [of those animals] is prohibited.

They may not tie a horse neither to the sides of a wagon [drawn by oxen] nor behind the wagon, nor [may they tie] a Libyan donkey to [a wagon drawn by] camels. Rabbi Judah says: all [mules] born from horses, even though their father is a donkey, are permitted one with another. Likewise [mules] born from donkey, even though their father is a horse, are permitted one with another. But [mules] born from a horse with [mules] born from donkeys are prohibited one with another.

Mules of uncertain parentage are forbidden [one with another,] And a ramakh is permitted. Wild man-like creatures are [in the category of] hayyah. Rabbi Yose says: they cause impurity in a tent like a human being. The hedgehog and the bush-mole are [in the category of] hayyah. The bush-mole: Rabbi Yose says in the name of Bet Shammai: an olive's size [of its carcass] renders a person carrying it unclean, and a lentil’s size [of its carcass] renders a person touching it unclean.

The wild ox [it is in the category of] behemah. But Rabbi Yose says: [it is in the category] of hayyah. The dog [it is in the category of] hayyah. But Rabbi Yose says: [it is in the category] of behemah. The pig [it is in the category of] behemah. The wild donkey [it is in the category of] hayyah. The elephant and the monkey [they are in the category of] hayyah. A human being is permitted to draw, plow, or lead with any of them.

Chapter 9

Nothing is forbidden on account of kilayim except [a mixture of] wool and linen. No [clothing material] is subject to uncleanness by scale disease except wool or linen. Priests do not wear any materials to serve in the Temple except for wool and linen. Camel’s wool with sheep’s wool, that have been mixed together: if the greater part is camel’s wool, it is permitted [to mix it with linen], but if the greater part is sheep’s wool, it is forbidden; if it is half and half, it is forbidden. The same applies to hemp and linen mixed together.

Silk and floss-silk do not come under the prohibition of kilayim, but are prohibited on account of appearance. Mattresses and pillows do not come under the prohibition of kilayim, as long as his flesh does not come into [immediate] contact with them. There is no [permissibility for the] temporary [wearing] of kilayim. Neither may one wear kilayim even on top of ten [garments], even for the purpose of evading taxes.

Hand towels, scroll covers, and bath towels do not come under the prohibition of kilayim. Rabbi Elazar prohibits. Barbers’ covers are subject to the prohibition of kilayim.

Shrouds for the dead, and the packsaddle of a donkey are not subject to the law of kilayim. One may not [however] place a packsaddle [made of kilayim] on one’s shoulder even for the purpose of carrying dung out on it.

Sellers of clothes may sell [clothes made of kilayim] in accordance with their custom, as long as they do have not the intention in the sun, [to protect themselves] from the sun, or in the rain [to protect themselves] from the rain. The scrupulous hang [such materials or garments] on a stick over their backs.

Tailors may sew [materials which are kilayim] in their usual way, as long as they do have not the intention in the sun, [to protect themselves] from the sun, or in the rain [to protect themselves] from the rain. The scrupulous sew [such materials as they are laid] on the ground.

The Birrus blanket or Brindisian blanket, or Dalmatian cloth, or felt shoes, may not be worn until one has examined them. Rabbi Yose says: ones that come from the coast or from lands beyond the sea, do not require examination, since the presumption with regard to them is [that they are sewn] with hemp. Felt-lined shoes are not subject to the laws of kilayim.

Only that which is spun or woven is forbidden under the law of kilayim, as it says, “You shall not wear shatnez” (Deuteronomy 22:1, that which is shua (combed) tavui (spun) and nuz (woven). Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: [the word shaatnez means that] he [the transgressor] is perverted (naloz) and causes his father in heaven to avert himself [from him].

Felted materials [can be] prohibited because of kilayim, since they are combed. It is prohibited to attach a string of wool to linen material, since this resembles weaving. Rabbi Yose says: it is forbidden to use cords of purple [wool to tie round a loose linen garment], since before he ties it, he stitches it on. One may not tie a strip of woolen material with one of linen material for the purpose of girdling one’s loins, even if there is a leather strap between the two.

Weaver’s mark’s or launderer’s marks [can be] prohibited because of kilayim. One who sticks one thread [through material], this does not constitute a connection, nor does [the prohibition of] kilayim apply and one who unties [such a connection] on Shabbat is exempt. If one made its two ends come out on the same side [of the material], this constitutes a connection, and it comes under the prohibition of kilayim, and one who unties such a connection on Shabbat is liable. Rabbi Judah said: [the prohibition does not apply] until one has made three stitches. A sack and a basket [one having a strip of woolen material attached to it, and the other a strip of linen] combine to form kilayim.

Mishnah Sheviit

Chapter 1

Until when may they plow an orchard in the sixth year? Bet Shammai say: as long as such work will benefit the fruit. And Bet Hillel says: till Atzeret (Shavuot). The views of this [school] are close to those of the other.

What constitutes an orchard? Any field in which there are at least three trees for every bet seah. If each tree is capable of yielding a cake of pressed figs, the size of sixty in the Italian maneh, then the entire bet seah may be plowed for their sake. If less than this amount, they may only plow the area that is occupied by the gatherer when his basket is placed behind him.

Whether they are fruit-bearing trees or non-fruit-bearing trees, we treat them as if they were fig-trees. If they are capable of yielding a cake of pressed figs, the size of sixty in the Italian maneh, then the entire bet seah may be plowed for their sake. If less than this amount, they may plow them only for their own needs.

If one of the trees was capable of bearing a cake of dried figs [weighing sixty manehs], and the other two unable; or, if two could do so, but one cannot, then they may plow them only for their own needs. [This is the rule if the number of trees is] from three to nine, but if there were ten trees or more, whether they produce [the requisite amount of fruit or not] the whole bet seah may be plowed on their account. As it says: “In plowing and in harvesting, you shall rest” (Ex 34:21). It was unnecessary to state plowing and harvesting in the seventh year, rather [what it means is] the plowing of the year preceding which encroaches on the sabbatical year, and the harvest of the seventh year which extends into the year after. Rabbi Ishmael says: just as plowing is an optional act, so harvesting [referred to in the verse] is optional, thus excluding the harvesting of the omer [which is obligatory].

Three trees belonging to three persons, they join together and they may plow the entire bet seah on their account. What space should there be between them? Rabban Gamaliel says: sufficient for the driver of the herd to pass through with his implements.

If ten saplings are scattered over the entire area of a bet seah, they may plow the whole bet seah, even until Rosh Hashanah. But if they were arranged in a row or they were surrounded by a fence, they may plow them only for their own needs.

Saplings and gourds are counted together within space of a bet seah. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: if there are ten gourds in the bet seah they may plow the whole bet seah until Rosh Hashanah.

Up until when are they called saplings? Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: until they are permitted for common use. But Rabbi Joshua says: until they are seven years old. Rabbi Akiba says: [the word] sapling, [it goes] according to its name. A tree which had been cut down and then produced fresh shoots: if one handbreadth or less, they are regarded as saplings, if more than a handbreadth they are regarded as trees, the words of Rabbi Shimon.

Chapter 2

Until when may they plow a white field in the sixth year? Until the moisture has dried up in the soil, or as long as men still plow in order to plant cucumbers and gourds. Rabbi Shimon said: in that case you are placing the law in the hands of each man! Rather in the case of a white field until Pesah, and in the case of an orchard until Atzeret (Shavuot).

They may manure and hoe cucumbers and gourds until Rosh Hashanah. So too with regard to irrigated fields. They may remove flaws from trees, strip off leaves, cover roots with earth, and fumigate the plants until Rosh Hashanah. Rabbi Shimon says: one may also remove leaves from a grape cluster even in the seventh year itself.

They may clear away stones until Rosh Hashanah. They may trim, prune and remove [excess parts of the tree] until Rosh Hashanah. Rabbi Joshua says: just as one may trim and remove in the fifth year so too may one perform this work in the sixth year. Rabbi Shimon says: as long as I may legally tend the tree itself, I may remove [excess parts of it].

They may besmear saplings, wrap them around, and trim them, and they may make for them shelters and water them until Rosh Hashanah. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says: he may even water the foliage on the sabbatical year, but not the roots.

They may oil unripe figs and pierce them until Rosh Hashanah. Unripe figs of the sixth year which have [remained on the tree] until the seventh year, or of the seventh year which have remained on the tree until the eighth year, they may not oil them or pierce them. Rabbi Judah says: In a place where it was the custom to oil, one may not oil them, since that would be considered work; but in a place where it was not the custom to oil, they may oil them. Rabbi Shimon permitted in connection with the tree, because he is permitted to do all work for the tree.

They may not plant or sink [vine-shoots], or graft in the sixth year within thirty days of Rosh Hashanah. If he has planted or sank or grafted, he must uproot. Rabbi Judah says: any grafting that has not taken root within three days will never do so. Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say: two weeks.

Rice, millet, poppy and sesame that had taken root before Rosh Hashanah must be tithed according to the previous year, and are permissible in the seventh year. If they did not then they are forbidden in the seventh year, and are tithed according to the year following.

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Egyptian beans which he sowed for seed only, are like them. Rabbi Shimon says: large beans, are [also] like them. But Rabbi Elazar says: large beans, if they began to form pods before Rosh Hashanah.

Seedless onions and Egyptian beans from which he withheld water for thirty days prior to Rosh Hashanah are tithed with the preceding year, and are permitted in the seventh year. And if not, they are forbidden in the seventh, and are tithed according to the following year. And [seedless onions and Egyptian beans grown in a] rain-irrigated field from which two periods of rain have been withheld, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: three.

Gourds which he had kept [in the ground] for seed: if they had hardened before Rosh Hashanah and had become unfit for human food, they may be kept during the seventh year; otherwise, they must not be kept in the seventh year. Their buds are forbidden in the seventh year. They may irrigate the soil of a white field (a grain field), the words of Rabbi Shimon. But Rabbi Elazar ben Jacob prohibits. They may soak the rice in the sabbatical year. Rabbi Shimon says: but they may not be trim [the rice].

Chapter 3

From when may they bring out manure to the dung-heaps?From when the workers have ceased to work, the words of Rabbi Meir. But Rabbi Judah says: until the sweetness [of the manure] has dried up. Rabbi Yose says: until [the dung dries] into knots.

How much manure may they take out and make into dung-heaps? Three dung-heaps for every bet seah, [each consisting of] ten baskets [of foliage] of a letekh each. They may add to the number of baskets, but not to the number of heaps. Rabbi Shimon says: also to the number of heaps.

A man may deposit in his field three dung-heaps for every bet seah [and even] more, the words of Rabbi Shimon. The sages forbid unless he [deposits them] three [handbreadths] below or trhee handbreadths above. A man may pile up all the manure into one [large] store. Rabbi Meir forbids unless he [deposits them] three [handbreadths] below or trhee handbreadths above. If he had just a little, he may constantly add to it. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah forbids unless he [deposits them] three [handbreadths] below or trhee handbreadths above or until he places them on a rock.

One who uses his field as a pen for cattle, he [first] makes an enclosure for every two bet se'ahs. He then uproots three sides, and leaves the middle side. It turns out that he has made a pen of four seahs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: one of eight seahs. If his entire field is only four seahs in area, he must allow a portion of it to remain [unenclosed] for appearance's sake. And he may take the dung out from the enclosure, and spread across his field in the manner of those who fertilize their fields.

A man may not open a stone quarry within his field for the first time, unless there are in it three layers, each three [cubits long], three wide and three high, for a total of twenty-seven stones.

A wall that consists of ten stones, each a load for two men, may be removed, [if] the measurement of this wall is [at least] ten handbreadths high. Less than that he quarries it and he may lower it to within one handbreadth of the ground. When is this so? From his own field, but from that of another, he may remove whatever he wishes. When is this so? When he did not begin [to remove the stones] in the sixth year, but if he began in the sixth year, he may remove whatever he wishes.

Stones which the plow has turned up, or which had been covered and became uncovered, if there are among them at least two, [each] the load of two men, they may be removed. One who removes stones from his field, he removes the top layers, but he leave those touching the ground. And likewise a heap of pebbles, or a pile of stones; he may remove the top layers but must leave those touching the ground. If, however, there is beneath them rocky soil or stubble, they may be removed.

They may not build steps leading to ravines in the sixth year after the rains have stopped, for this would be improving the fields for the seventh year. But he may build in the seventh year itself, after the rains have stopped, for this would be a improving the fields for the eighth year. He may not block them [the steps] with earth, but he may make an embankment. Any stone which he can stick out his hand and pick up, may be removed.

Shoulder-stones may be removed from any place. And the contractor may bring them from anywhere. Which are shoulder-stones? Any one that cannot be picked up with one hand, the words of Rabbi Meir. But Rabbi Yose says: the name is to be taken literally; those that are carried on a man’s shoulder, either two or three at a time.

One who makes a fence between his own property and the public domain, he is allowed to dig down to rock level. What should he do with the soil? He piles it up in the public domain, and then restores it, the words of Rabbi Joshua. Rabbi Akiva says: just as no damage may be done to a public domain, so one may not repair it. Then what should he do with the soil? He heaps it up in his own field in the manner of those who bring out dung [for manure]. Similarly when one digs a cistern, a trench or a cave.

Chapter 4

At first they said: a man may gather wood, stones and grasses from his field, just as he was allowed to do from the field of his fellow, the large ones. When the transgressors increased, they decreed that this one may gather from this one’s field and this one may gather from this one’s field, but not as a [mutual] favor. It doesn’t need to be said that no stipulation can be made for food.

A field from which thorns had been removed may be sown in the eighth year. But if it had been improved upon, or cattle had been allowed to live upon it, it may not be sown in the eighth year. A field which had been improved upon in the seventh year: Bet Shammai says: they may not eat its produce in the seventh year, But Bet Hillel says: they may eat. Bet Shammai says: they may not eat produce of the sabbatical year with an expression of thanks. But Bet Hillel says: they may eat [sabbatical year produce] with an expression for thanks and without an expression of thanks. Rabbi Judah says: the statements must be reversed, for this is one of the instances where Bet Shammai is lenient and Bet Hillel is stringent.

They may rent newly plowed land from a Gentile in the seventh year, but not from an Israelite. And they may encourage Gentiles during the seventh year, but not Israelites. They may exchange greetings with them because of the ways of peace.

One who thins out his olive-trees [in the seventh year]: Bet Shammai says: he cuts them down to the ground. Bet Hillel says: he may completely uproot them. They agree that if one levels his field, he can only cut them down to the ground. What is considered “thinning out”? One or two plants. And what is considered “leveling”? Three plants next to each other. This applies to his own property only, but from the property of another, even he that levels may uproot.

One who cuts down branches of an olive tree, he may not cover up [the stump] with earth, but he may cover it with stones or straw. One who cuts down branches of a sycamore tree, he may not cover up [the stump] with earth, but he may cover it with stones or straw. One may not cut down from a virgin sycamore in the seventh year, for this would constitute actual labor. Rabbi Judah says: in its usual manner, it is forbidden. Rather he either cuts it ten handbreadths above [the soil], or he cuts it down to ground level.

One who trims grape vines, or cuts reeds: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: he must leave [uncut at least] one handbreadth. But Rabbi Akiba says: he may cut them in the usual manner, with the axe, sickle or saw, or with whatever he pleases. A tree that had split may be tied up in the seventh year, not that it may heal, but only that it should not widen.

From when may one begin to eat of the fruit of the trees in the seventh year? With unripe figs as soon as they assume a rosy appearance, one may eat them in the field with his bread. Once they have begun to ripen, he may take them home. And similarly in the other years of the sabbatical cycle [when this latter stage has been reached] they are subject to tithes.

Unripe grapes: as soon as they contain juice he may eat them with bread in the field. When they have begun to ripen, he may take them home. And similarly in the other years of the sabbatical cycle [when they have reached this latter stage] they are subject to tithes.

Olives, as soon as they can produce a quarter log [of oil] for each se'ah, they may be split and eaten in a field. When they produce a half-log, then he may crush them in a field and use their oil. When they have reached a third [of their overall potential], they may be crushed in the field and brought home. And similarly in the other years of the sabbatical cycle [when they have reached this latter stage] they are subject to tithes. With all other fruit of trees [the season when they become due to be tithed] is the season when they are permitted in the seventh year.

From when may they no longer cut down trees in the seventh year? Bet Shammai says: every tree, after it has produced [fruit]. Bet Hillel says: carob trees after [the carobs] begin to droop, vines after the berries begin to be moist, olive-trees after they had blossomed, any other tree after it has produced [fruit]. And any tree as soon as it reaches the season for tithes it may be cut down. How much should be on an olive tree such that it may not be cut down? A quarter [kav]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: all depends on the olive-tree.

Chapter 5

White figs: their “sheviit” is in the second year [of the sabbatical year], since they ripen once in three years. Rabbi Judah says: Persian figs, their “sheviit” is in the year following the seventh year, since they ripen once in two years. Thereupon they said to him: this was said only of the species of white figs.

One who buries luf (a type of onion) in the soil during the sabbatical year: Rabbi Meir says: it must be not less than two seahs in quantity, three handbreadths in height, and covered with earth one handbreadth deep. The sages say: it must be not less than four kabs in quantity, one handbreadth high, and covered with earth one handbreadth deep. And he should bury it in a place where people walk.

Luf which has remained [in the ground until] after the passing of the seventh year: Rabbi Eliezer says: if the poor had gathered its leaves, then they have gathered. If not, then an account must be made with the poor. Rabbi Joshua says: if the poor had gathered its leaves, then they have gathered. If not, the poor have no account with him (the field owner).

Luf of the sixth year that has entered the seventh year, similarly summer onions and puah (madder) grown in good soil: Bet Shammai says: they must be uprooted with wooden rakes. Bet Hillel says: [even] with metal rakes. They agree in the case of puah with strong roots, that they may be uprooted with metal spades.

From when may one buy luf after the seventh year? Rabbi Judah says: immediately. But the sages say: [only] after the new crop has appeared.

These are the implements which a craftsman may not sell in the seventh year:A plow and all its [accompanying] implements, a yoke, a winnowing-fan, and a pickax. But he may sell a sickle used by hand, a scythe, and a cart with all its implements. This is the general principle: any tools designed for work involving a transgression [in the seventh year] is prohibited; but if for a forbidden and a permissible purpose, it may be [sold].

The potter may sell five oil-jars and fifteen wine-jars, for this is the usual amount one collects from ownerless produce. But if he brought more, it is still permitted. He may also sell [more jars] to Gentiles in the land of Israel and to Jews outside of the land.

Bet Shammai says: one must not sell him a plowing cow in the seventh year. But Bet Hillel permits, since he may slaughter it. One may sell him produce even at sowing time. And one may lend him a seah measure, even though he knows that he has a threshing-floor. One may exchange coins for him, even though he knows that he has workers. But all these things, if he expresses [that they will be used for unlawful purposes], then they are forbidden.

A woman may lend to her neighbor who is suspect of transgressing the laws of the sabbatical year, a sifter, a sieve, a hand-mill, or an oven. But she may not sift or grind with her. The wife of a haver may lend to the wife of an am haaretz a sifter and a sieve and may even sift, grind, or sift flour with her. But once she poured water [over the flour], she may not touch [it] with her, for one may not aid those who commit a transgression. And all these things were only allowed in the interests of peace. They may offer encouragement to Gentiles during the sabbatical year, but not to Jews. In the interests of peace, one may also offer greetings to Gentiles.

Chapter 6

[The land of Israel is divided into] three territories with regard to the sabbatical law.[Any produce grown in land] that was occupied by those who came up from Babylon, namely from Eretz Israel as far as Chezib, may not be eaten, nor [may its soil] be cultivated. [Any produce grown in land] that was occupied by those who came up from Egypt, namely from Chezib to the river, and until Amonah, may be eaten, but [its soil] may not be cultivated. From the river till Amonah and inwards, [produce] may be eaten and [the soil] cultivated.

In Syria, one may perform work on produce that has been detached, but not on produced attached [to the soil]. They may thresh, winnow, and tread [the grapes], or make [the grain] into sheaves, but they may not harvest [the crops], nor cut the grapes, nor harvest the olives. Rabbi Akiva said this principle: the kind of work that is permitted in Eretz Israel may also be done in Syria.

Onions on which rain fell and which had sprouted, if their leaves had turned black, they are forbidden; if they had become green they are permitted. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: if they can be plucked out by their leaves, they are forbidden. In the year after the sabbatical year, the like of these are permitted.

When may one buy vegetables at the outgoing of the sabbatical year [without fear that they are sabbatical produce]?When enough time has passed for similar [vegetables] to grow. Where produce ripens quickly, even that which is late in ripening is also permissible. Rabbi used to allow the buying of vegetables immediately after the sabbatical year was over.

One may not take oil [of terumah] that had to be burned, nor produce of the seventh year, from the land [of Israel] to other countries. Rabbi Shimon said: I have heard it expressly stated that they may be exported to Syria, but not to any other country outside the land.

They may not import terumah from outside the land of Israel into Israel. Rabbi Shimon said: I have heard it expressly stated that they may be bring from Syria, but not from any other country outside the land.

Chapter 7

They said an important general principle with regard to the sabbatical year: anything that is food for man or beast, or a species [of plants] used for dyeing, and cannot be left growing in the soil, the law of the sabbatical year is applied both to it and to its money substitute and the law of removal applies both to it and to its money substitute. Which are they? The leaves of the wild luf, the leaf of ceterach, endives, leeks, portulaca, and netz hahalav. What is the food for cattle? Thorns and thistles. What is species of dyeing matter? Aftergrowths of woad and madder. The law of the seventh year applies both to them and to their money-substitutes and the law of removal applies both to them and to their money substitute.

And they said yet another general principle: Anything that is food for man or beast, or is used for dyeing, but can be left in the soil, the law of the sabbatical year applies both to it and to its money substitute but the law of removal does not apply to it or to its money substitute. Which are these? The root of wild luf, the root of ceterach, scolopendrium, the root of netz hahalav and buchreyah. What is the species of dyeing matter? Puah (madder) and reseda. The law of the sabbatical year applies both to them and to their money substitute but the law of removal does not apply to them or to their money substitute. Rabbi Meir says: their money substitutes must be removed by Rosh Hashanah. They said to him: since this law does not apply to the plants themselves, all the more so it does not apply to their money-substitute.

The peels and the blossom of the pomegranate, the nutshells, and fruit seeds the laws of sabbatical produce apply to them and to their money substitutes. The dyer may use them for himself, but he may not dye with them for a wage, since one may not engage in business with seventh year produce, or with first-born animals, or with terumah, or with nevelah, or with trefah, or with reptiles or with creeping things. One should not buy field-vegetables and sell them in the market. But he may gather them and have his son sell them on his behalf. If he gathered them for his own use, and some remains over, he may sell them.

If one buys a first-born animal for his son’s [wedding] feast, or for a festival, and then decides that he has no need for it, he may sell it. Trappers of wild animals, birds and fishes, who chanced upon unclean species, may sell them. Rabbi Judah says: also a man who happened to chance one upon by accident may buy or sell, provided that he does not make this into his regular profession. But the sages prohibit.

The lulavim of hawthorn trees and carobs the laws of sheviit apply to them and to their money substitutes, the law of removal applies to them and to their money substitutes. The lulavim of the terebinth, the pistachio tree and the white thorn, the laws of sheviit apply to them and to their money substitutes, but the law of removal does not apply to them and to their money substitutes. But as for the leaves the law of removal applies, since they fall from their stem.

The rose, henna, balsam, the lotus tree the laws of sheviit apply to them and to their money substitutes. Rabbi Shimon says: sheviit does not apply to the balsam, since it is not a fruit.

If a new rose has been preserved in old oil, the rose may be taken out. But if an old rose was preserved in new oil, it is subject to the law of removal. New carobs preserved in old wine, or old carobs in new wine, are subject to the law of removal. This is the general principle: Any thing that imparts taste, he must remove it if it is one kind mixed with a different kind. But if it is mixed with the identical kind, then [the whole is subject to removal] even if only the smallest quantity exists. Sabbatical year produce renders similar kinds prohibited even [if it exists] in the smallest quantity. But if of different species only when it imparts taste.

Chapter 8

They said an important general principle with regard to the sabbatical year: Anything that is usually designated as food for humans, one may not make a poultice of it for a person. And there is no need to say [that he may not make a poultice of it] for a beast. Anything that is not usually designated as for food for humans may be used as a poultice for a person, but not for cattle. And anything not usually designated either for humans or for animals, but now he thought to use it as food for either a person or an animal, we impose upon it the stringent laws applying both to people and beasts. If he thought to use it as wood [for a fire], behold it is treated as wood [and the laws of sheviit do not apply]; for example, savory, hyssop, or thyme.

Sabbatical year produce may be used for food, drink and for anointing. That which is usually eaten can be used for food only; that which is usually used for anointing can be used only for anointing, and that which is usually used for drinking can be used for drink only. One may not anoint with wine and vinegar, but he may anoint with oil. So too with terumah and second tithe. Greater leniency was applied to [oil of] the seventh year, since it can be used for lamp-kindling.

Produce of the seventh year may not be sold by measure, weight or number. Neither may figs [be sold] by number, nor vegetables by weight. Bet Shammai says: they may not be sold, even in bundles. But Bet Hillel says: that which is usually tied in bundles [to bring] to the house may even be tied into bundles for the market, such as leeks and netz hahalav.

If one says to a worker: “Take this issar and gather vegetables for me today,” his payment is permitted. [But if he said:] “In return for this [issar], gather vegetables for me today,” then his payment is forbidden. If one bought a loaf from a baker worth a pondion [and said:] “When I have gathered vegetables from the field, I will bring them to you,” this is permitted. If he bought it from him without any explanation, he may not pay him his debt with the value of seventh year produce, for no debt can be paid with the value of seventh year produce.

They may not pay [sheviit proceeds to] a well-digger, an attendant at a public bath, a barber, or a sailor. But he may give them to well-digger so that the well-digger will provide him with drink. To all of them he may give it as a gift.

Sabbatical figs may not be cut in the muktzeh, but he may cut them in an open place. Grapes may not be trodden in the wine-press, but they may be trodden in a kneading-trough. Olives may not be prepared in an olive-press or in a small olive-press, but he may crush them and bring them into a small olive-press in the field. Rabbi Shimon says: they may even be crushed in the [larger] olive-press, and then he brings them into the smaller press.

One may not cook sheviit vegetables in oil of terumah lest they become invalidated. But Rabbi Shimon permits it. The last thing exchanged is always subject to the sabbatical law, and the produce itself remains forbidden.

One might not buy slaves, land, or an unclean beast with sheviit money. If he did buy he must [buy and] eat [food] for their equivalent. One may not bring the bird-offerings of a zav or a zavah, or of a woman after childbirth with sheviit money. If he did bring he must [buy and] eat [food] for their equivalent. One may not anoint vessels with oil of seventh year produce. If he did annoint he must [buy and] eat [food] for their equivalent.

A hide which they oiled with seventh year oil: Rabbi Eliezer says: it must be burnt; But the sages say: he must [buy and] eat [food] for its equivalent. They said in front of Rabbi Akiba: Rabbi Eliezer used to say, A hide which they smeared with seventh year oil must be burnt. He replied: Silence! I won’t tell you what Rabbi Eliezer actually said in this connection.

They also said in front of him: Rabbi Eliezer use to say: “Whoever eats bread [baked] by Samaritans is like one who eats the flesh of a pig.” He replied: Silence! I won’t tell you what Rabbi Eliezer actually said in this connection.

A bath heated with straw or stubble of the seventh year, it is permitted to wash in it. But if he is an important man, he should not wash in it.

Chapter 9

Rue, goosefoot, purslane, hill coriander, celery, and meadow-berries, are exempt from tithes. And they may be purchased from anyone during the sabbatical year, since such produce is not usually stored. Rabbi Judah says: aftergrowths of mustard are permitted, since transgressors are not suspected concerning them. Rabbi Shimon says: all aftergrowths are permitted, with the exception of the aftergrowths of cabbage, since such cannot be placed within the category of field-vegetables. But the sages say: all aftergrowths are forbidden.

There are three territories in respect to the law of removal [of sheviit produce]: [these are]: Judea, Transjordan, and Galilee, and there are three territories in each one. Upper Galilee, lower Galilee, and the valley. From Kefar Hananiah upwards, the region where sycamores do not grow, is Upper Galilee. From Kefar Hananiah downwards, where the sycamores do grow, is Lower Galilee. The borders of Tiberias are the valley. Those of Judea are: the mountain region, the plains [of the south], and the valley. The plains of Lod are like the plains of the south, and its mountain region is like the king's hill-country. From Bet Horon to the sea is considered as one land.

Why did they speak of three territories? So that they may eat in each country until the last of the seventh year produce in that country is ended. Rabbi Shimon says: they have spoken of three countries only in the case of Judea, but all other territories are to be regarded as King’s mountain (Har Hamelekh). And all other territories are the same with regard to the olive and date.

One may eat by virtue of similar produce regarded as ownerless [still found in the fields], but not when it was stored [and declared ownerless]. Rabbi Yose permits even when it was stored [and then declared ownerless]. One may continue to eat by virtue of the poor grains [that grow between the grass], or by virtue of the trees that yield bi-annually, but one must not eat by virtue of winter-grapes. Rabbi Judah permits provided they began to ripen before the summer [of the seventh year] had ended.

One who preserved three kinds of vegetables in one jar: Rabbi Eliezer says they may be eaten only so long as the first still remains [in the field]. But Rabbi Joshua says: even so long as the last remains. Rabban Gamaliel says: when the like kind is no longer to be found in the field, the same kind in the jar must be removed, [and the halachah agrees with him.] Rabbi Shimon says: all vegetables are regarded as one [kind] in respect of the law of removal. Purslane may be eaten until there is no more wild purslane in the valley of Bet Netopha.

If one gathered moist herbs, he may eat them until the sweet [herbs in the field] have dried up. And if he gathered dry [herbs], [he may eat them] until the second rainfall. Leaves of reeds and of leaves of the vine [may be eaten] until they fall from the stems. But if he gathered them dry, they may be eaten until the second rainfall. Rabbi Akiba says: in all these cases, [they may be eaten] until the second rainfall.

Similarly, if one rents a house to someone “until the rains,” he means until the second rainfall. Or if one had vowed not to derive any benefit from his friend “until the rains” [he is prohibited] until the second rainfall. Until when may the poor enter the orchards? Until the second rainfall. And when may one begin to enjoy or burn the straw and stubble of sabbatical produce? After the second rainfall.

If one had sabbatical produce [at home] and the time of removal had come, he may give out food for three meals to every one. Rabbi Judah says: the poor may eat from it even after the removal, but not the rich. But Rabbi Yose says: both the poor and the rich may eat after the removal.

If one had inherited seventh year produce or had received them as a gift: Rabbi Eliezer says: they must be given to anyone who eats them. But the sages say: the sinner must not benefit, rather it should be sold to anyone who eats it, and its price divided among everyone. If one eats dough of seventh year [produce] before the hallah was taken from it, he has incurred thereby the death penalty [at the hands of heaven].

Chapter 10

The sabbatical year cancels a debt written in a document or one not written in a document. A debt to a shop is not cancelled, but if it had been converted into the form of a loan, then it is cancelled. Rabbi Judah says: the former debt is always cancelled. A wage-debt to a worker is not cancelled, but if it had been converted into a loan it is cancelled. Rabbi Yose says: the [payment for] any work that must cease with the seventh year, is cancelled, but if it need not cease with the seventh year, then it is not cancelled.

One who slaughters a cow and divides it up on Rosh Hashanah [at the end of the seventh year]: If the month had been intercalated, [the debt] is remitted. But if it had not been intercalated, it is not remitted. [Fines for] rape, for seduction, for defamation, and all other obligations arising from legal procedure, are not remitted. One who loans and takes a pledge, and one who hands over his debt documents to a court, [these debts] are not remitted.

[A loan secured by] a prozbul is not cancelled. This was one of the things enacted by Hillel the elder; for when he observed people refraining from lending to one another, and thus transgressing what is written in the Torah, “Beware, lest you harbor the base thought, [‘The seventh year, the year of remission, is approaching,’ so that you are mean to your needy kinsman and give him nothing.” Hillel enacted the prozbul.

This is the formula of the prozbul: “I turn over to you, so-and-so, judges of such and such a place, that any debt that I may have outstanding, I shall collect it whenever I desire.” And the judges sign below, or the witnesses.

A pre-dated prozbul is valid, but a post-dated one, is invalid. Pre-dated loan documents [of loans] are invalid, but post-dated one valid. If one borrows from five persons, then he writes a separate prozbul for each [creditor]. But if five borrow from the same person, then he writes only one prozbul for them all.

A prozbul is written only for [a debt secured by] land. But if [the debtor] has none, then [the creditor] can give him title to a share, however small, of his own field. If he had land in pledge in a city, a prozbul can be written on it. Rabbi Hutzpit says: a prozbul may be written for a man on the security of his wife's property, or for an orphan on the security of property belonging to his guardian.

A bee-hive:Rabbi Eliezer says: Behold, it is like land and a prozbul may be written [using it as security] and it is not susceptible to uncleanness while it remains in its place, and one who takes honey from it on Shabbat is liable. But the sages say: it is not like land, a prozbul may not be written [using it as security], it is susceptible to uncleanness while in its place, and one who takes honey from it on Shabbat is exempt.

One who returns a debt [after] the seventh year, the [creditor] must say to [the debtor]: “I remit it.” But [the debtor] should say: “Even so [I will repay it].” [The creditor] may then accept it from him, because it says: “And this is the word of the release” (Deuteronomy 15:2). Similarly, when [an accidental] killer has been exiled to a city of refuge, and the citizens want to honor him, he must say to them: “I am a murderer.” If they say: “Even so, [we want to honor you], then he may accept [the honor] from them, because it says: “And this is the word of the murderer” (Deuteronomy 19:4).

One who repays his debts after the seventh year, the sages are pleased with him. One who borrows from a convert whose sons had converted with him, the debt need not be repaid to his sons, but if he returns it the sages are pleased with him. All movable property can be acquired [only] by the act of drawing, but whoever fulfills his word, the sages are well pleased with him.

Mishnah Terumot

Chapter 1

Five may not give terumah, and if they do so, their terumah is not considered terumah:A heresh (deaf-mute); an imbecile, a minor, And the one who gives terumah from that which is not his own. If a non-Jew gave terumah from that which belongs to an Israelite, even if it was with his permission, his terumah is not terumah.

A “heresh”, who speaks but cannot hear, may not give terumah, but if he does so, his terumah is terumah. The “heresh” of whom the sages generally speak is one who neither hears nor speaks.

A minor who has not yet produced two [pubic] hairs: Rabbi Judah says: his terumah is terumah. Rabbi Yose says: if he has not arrived at the age when his vows are valid, his terumah is not terumah, but if he has arrived at an age where his vows are valid, his terumah is terumah.

They should not take terumah from olives for oil, or from grapes for wine. If one did: Bet Shammai says: there is terumah in [the olives or grapes] themselves. But Bet Hillel says: the terumah is not terumah.

They do not take terumah from ‘gleanings’, from ‘the forgotten sheaf’, from peah or from ownerless produce. [Neither is it taken] from first tithe from which terumah had already been taken, nor from second tithe and dedicated produce that had been redeemed. [Nor is it taken] from that which is subject [to terumah] for that which is exempt [from terumah], nor from that which is exempt for that which is subject. Nor from produce already plucked [from the soil] for that attached to it, nor from that attached [to the soil] for that already plucked. Nor from new produce for old, nor from old for new. Nor from produce from the land of Israel for produce grown outside the land, nor from that grown out of the land for that grown in the land. [In all these cases] if they did take terumah, their terumah is not terumah.

Five may not give terumah, but if they do, their terumah is terumah.A mute person; A drunken person; One who is naked; A blind person; Or one who has had a seminal emission. They may not give terumah, but if they do their terumah is valid.

They may not give terumah according to measure, or weight, or number, but one may give it from that which has already been measured, weighed or counted. They may not give terumah in a basket or a hamper of a measured capacity, but one may give in it when it is a half or a third filled. He may not give a half of seah in a seah measuring vessel, for this half constitutes a known measure.

They may not give terumah from oil for crushed olives nor may [they give terumah from] wine for trodden grapes. If he did so, his terumah is terumah, but he must give terumah again. The first terumah renders on its own [produce into which it falls] “doubtful terumah” and is subject to the added fifth, but not the second.

They may give terumah from oil for pickled olives, or from wine for grapes made into raisins. Behold, he gave terumah from oil for olives intended for eating, or from [other] olives for olives intended for eating, or for wine for grapes intended for eating, of from [other] grapes for grapes intended for eating, and he decided afterwards to press them, he need not give terumah again.

They may not take terumah from produce whose processing has been completed for produce whose processing has not been completed, or from produce whose processing has not been completed for produce whose processing has been completed or from produce whose processing has not been completed for other produce whose processing has not been completed. If they did take terumah, their terumah is terumah.

Chapter 2

They may not give terumah from pure [produce] for impure [produce], but if they did give, the terumah is terumah. In truth they said: If a cake of pressed figs had become partly defiled, one may give terumah from the clean part for that part which had become defiled. The same applies to a bunch of vegetables, or a stack of grain. If there were two cakes [of figs], two bunches [of vegetables], two stacks [of grain], one pure and one impure, one should not give terumah from one for the other. Rabbi Eliezer says: one can give terumah from that which is pure for that which is impure.

They may not give terumah from impure [produce] for that which is pure. If he did give: If unwittingly, the terumah is valid; If intentionally he has done nothing. So too, if a Levite had [unclean] tithe [from which terumah] had not been given, and he gave terumah from this, if unwittingly, the terumah is valid, if intentionally he has done nothing. Rabbi Judah says: if he knew of it at the outset, even if done in error, he has done nothing.

One who immerses [unclean] vessels on Shabbat: If unwittingly, he may use them. But if intentionally, he may not use them. One who separates tithes, or cooks on Shabbat: If unwittingly, he may eat it. But if intentionally, he may not eat it. One who plants on Shabbat: If unwittingly, he may keep the tree. But if intentionally, he must uproot it. But if during the sabbatical year, whether [it was planted] unwittingly or intentionally he must uproot it.

They may not give terumah from one kind for another kind, and if he did give, the terumah is not terumah. All kinds of wheat count as one. All kinds of fresh figs, dried figs and fig cakes count as one, and he may take terumah from one for the other. Wherever there is a priest, one must give terumah from the very best, and where there is no priest, one must give terumah from that which lasts longest. Rabbi Judah says: he should always give only from the very best.

They should give terumah of a whole small onion, and not of half of a large onion. Rabbi Judah says: not so, rather half of a large onion. So too, Rabbi Judah says: they give terumah from town onions for those from the village, but not from village onions for those from the town, since these are the food of its principal citizens.

They may give terumah from olives [to be used] for oil for those to be preserved, but not from olives due to be preserved for olives [to be used] for oil. [They may give] from unboiled wine for boiled wine, but not from boiled wine for unboiled wine. This is the general rule: any two things which together are kilayim (mixed species) he should not give terumah from one for the other, even if one is superior and the other inferior. But if they are not kilayim, then one may give terumah from the superior for that which is inferior, but not from the inferior for that which is superior. If one does give terumah from the inferior for that which is superior, his terumah is terumah, except for zunin given for wheat, since these (zunin) are not food. Cucumbers and melon count are one kind. Rabbi Judah says: two kinds.

Chapter 3

If one gave a cucumber as terumah and it was found to be bitter, a melon and it was found to be rotten, it is considered terumah, but he must again give terumah. If one gave a jar of wine as terumah and it was found to be vinegar: If prior to his act he knew that it was vinegar, the terumah is not valid; But if it had turned sour after he had given it as terumah, behold it is terumah. In case of doubt, it is terumah but he must again give terumah. The first terumah does not render on its own [produce into which it falls] “doubtful terumah” and it is not subject to the added fifth, and so the second.

If one of them falls into non-sacred produce, it does not make [the mixture] medumma [a mixture into which terumah has fallen]. If the second of them falls [then] into another place, it also does not make it medumma. But if both fall into one place, they do make it medumma, according to the size of the smaller of the two.

[Two] partners who took terumah, the one after the other:Rabbi Akiva says: the terumah of them both is terumah. But the sages say: the terumah of the first is terumah. Rabbi Yose says: if the first gave the prescribed amount, the terumah of the second is not terumah, but if the first did not give the prescribed amount, the terumah of the second is terumah.

To what does this apply? Only if one did not confer with the other, but if one allows a member of his household, or his slave or female slave to give terumah for him, this terumah is terumah. If he annulled [this permission]: If he annulled it before the taking of the terumah, the terumah is not terumah; But if he annulled it after the terumah had been taken, the terumah is terumah. Workers have no permission to give terumah, except for those who tread [grapes] for they defile the winepress immediately.

If one says: “The terumah of this pile is within it,” or, “its tithes are within it,” or, “the terumah of tithe [terumat maaser] is within it:” Rabbi Shimon says: he has thereby designated it. But the sages say: not unless he said, “It is in the north or south of it.” Rabbi Elazar Hisma says: one who says, “The terumah of this pile is taken from it for it,” he has thereby designated it. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: one who says, “The tenth part of this tithe is terumah of tithe for that pile,” he has thereby designated it.

He who gives terumah before first-fruits, or first tithe before terumah, or second tithe before first tithe, although he transgresses a negative commandment, that which he has done is done, for it is said: “You shall not delaying the skimming of the first yield of your vats” (Exodus 22:28).

From where do we derive that first-fruits must precede terumah, seeing that this one is called “terumah” and “the first” and the other is [also] called “terumah” and “the first”? Rather first-fruits take precedence since they are the first fruits of all produce. And terumah comes before the first tithe also because it is called “first.” And first tithe [precedes second tithe,] because it includes that which is called “first.”

He who intends saying ‘terumah’ and says ‘tithe’, or ‘tithe’ and says ‘terumah’; ‘Burnt-offering’ and he says ‘peace-offering’, or ‘peace-offering’ and he says ‘burnt-offering’; ‘[I vow] that I will not enter this house,’ and says ‘that house’, ‘That I will not derive any benefit from this [man],’ and says ‘from that [man],’ he has said nothing until his heart and mind are at one.

Terumah given by a non-Jew or a Samaritan is terumah and their tithes are tithes and their dedications [to the Temple] are dedications. Rabbi Judah says: the law of the vineyard in the fourth year is not applicable to a non-Jew. But the sages say: it is. The terumah of a non-Jew renders [produce into which it falls] medumma and [one who eats it unwittingly] is obligated [to pay back an extra] fifth. But Rabbi Shimon exempts it.

Chapter 4

One who sets aside only part of terumah and tithes, may take terumah from that [heap], but he may not take terumah from it for other produce. Rabbi Meir says: he can also take terumah and tithes for produce elsewhere.

If one had his produce in a storehouse, and he gave a seah to a Levite and a seah to a poor person, he may set aside another eight seahs and eat them, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: he may only set aside according to proportion.

The amount of terumah: A generous amount: one fortieth. Beth Shammai say: one thirtieth. The average amount: one fiftieth. A stingy amount: one sixtieth. If he gave terumah and discovered that it was only one sixtieth, his terumah is valid and he need not give again. If he does go back and add to it, [the extra amount] is liable to tithes. If he found that it was only one sixty-first it is valid, but he must give terumah again according to his established practice, in measure, weight or number. Rabbi Judah says: even if it be not from produce close by.

One who says to his messenger: “Go and give terumah [for me],” he should give terumah in accordance with the mind of the owner. If he does not know the mind of the owner, he gives according to the average amount one fiftieth. If he gave ten parts less or more, the terumah is terumah. If, however, his intention was to add even one part more, his terumah is not terumah.

One who wishes to give more terumah:Rabbi Eliezer says: he may give up to a tenth part, as in the case of heave-offering of tithe. [If he gave] more than this [measure] he must make it terumah of tithe for other produce. Rabbi Ishmael says: half non-sacred produce and half terumah. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiba say: as long as he retains a part as non-sacred produce.

On three occasions they measure the contents of the basket: At the full time of the first ripe fruits, and of the late summer fruits, and in the middle of the summer. He who counts [the fruit] is praiseworthy, he who measures it is more praiseworthy, and he who weighs them is most praiseworthy of all.

Rabbi Eliezer says: terumah can be taken out [if it falls into] a hundred and one parts. Rabbi Joshua says: in a hundred and more, and this “more” has no definite measure. Rabbi Yose ben Meshullam says: this ‘more’ must be a kav to a hundred seahs, a sixth [of the seah] which renders the whole as medumma.

Rabbi Joshua says: black figs can bring up white ones, and white ones can bring up black ones. In the case of cakes of figs, the large can bring up the small, and the small can bring up the large. Round cakes of figs can bring up square cakes, and square cakes can bring up round ones. Rabbi Eliezer prohibits this. Rabbi Akiba says: if the kind which fell in is known, then the one kind cannot bring up the other kind, but if the kind is not known, the one kind can bring up the other.

How so? If there were fifty black figs and fifty white fig, and a black fig fell in, the black figs are forbidden, but the white figs are permitted; and if a white fig fell in them, the white figs are forbidden and the black figs are permitted. If it is unknown which kind fell in, then each kind helps to bring up the other. In this case, Rabbi Eliezer is stringent and Rabbi Joshua is lenient.

But in this, Rabbi Eliezer is more lenient and Rabbi Joshua more stringent. One was pressing a litra of dried figs [of terumah] into a jar and he didn’t know which: Rabbi Eliezer says: they are to be regarded as if they were separated, so that those below can bring up those above. Rabbi Joshua says: it cannot be brought up unless there are a hundred jars.

A seah of terumah which fell on top of a pile and he skimmed it off: Rabbi Eliezer says: if in that which he skimmed off there are hundred seahs, it can be taken out [through a ratio of] one hundred to one. But Rabbi Joshua says: it cannot be brought up. A seah of terumah which fell on top of a pile, he must skim it off. If so, why did they say that terumah can be taken up in one hundred and one parts? [Only] if it is not known whether it has become mixed up or where it has fallen.

Two baskets or two piles and a seah of terumah fell on top of one of them and it is not known into which it had fallen, they bring up the terumah in the other. Rabbi Shimon says: even if they are in two cities, they bring up the terumah in the other.

Rabbi Yose said: A case once came before Rabbi Akiva concerning fifty bundles of vegetables into which a bundle of the same size had fallen, half of which was terumah. And I said in front of him, that it can be brought up, not because terumah can be brought up in fifty-one, but because there were one hundred and two halves there.

Chapter 5

If a seah of unclean terumah fell into less than a hundred seahs of hullin, or first tithe, or second tithe, or dedicated property, whether these were unclean or clean, they must all be left to rot. If the seah [of terumah] was clean, [the mixture] must be sold to priests at the price of terumah, excluding the value of that seah itself. If it fell into first tithe, he should declare terumah of tithe. And if it fell into second tithe or dedicated property, they must be redeemed. If the hullin was unclean, it may be eaten in small quantities, or roasted, or kneaded with fruit juice, or divided into pieces of dough so that the size of one egg be not in any one place.

A seah of unclean terumah which fell into a hundred of clean hullin:Rabbi Eliezer says: [a seah] must be taken out and burnt, for I say that the seah taken out is the one that fell in. But the sages say: it may be taken out and eaten in small quantities, or roasted, or kneaded with fruit juice, or divided into pieces of dough so that the size of one egg be not in any one place.

A seah of clean terumah fell into a hundred of unclean hullin, it may be eaten in small quantities, or roasted, or kneaded with fruit juice, or divided into pieces of dough so that the size of one egg be not in any one place.

A seah of unclean terumah that falls into one hundred seahs of clean terumah: Bet Shammai prohibits, But Bet Hillel permits. Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: since clean [terumah] is forbidden to non-priests and unclean [terumah is forbidden] to priests, then just as clean [terumah] is brought up, so too unclean [terumah] can be brought up. Bet Shammai answered them: No! If hullin which is treated more leniently [in that it is permitted to non-priests] allows us to bring up clean [terumah that falls into it], does terumah [which is more stringent in that it is forbidden to non-priests] also allow us to bring up that which is unclean? After [Bet Shammai] had agreed [with Bet Hillel], Rabbi Eliezer said: it should be taken out and burned. But the sages say: it is gone, on account of its being a tiny [portion of the whole mixture].

A seah of terumah that fell into a hundred [of hullin], and he lifted it out and fell into [hullin] elsewhere:Rabbi Eliezer says: it renders medumma as though it were certainly terumah. But the sages say: it is rendered medumma only according to proportion.

A seah of terumah which fell into less than a hundred [of hullin], and rendered the whole medumma, and part of this mixture fell afterwards into another place: Rabbi Eliezer says: it renders again medumma as if certain terumah [had fallen in]. But the sages say: the [first] mixture renders medumma only according to the proportion. [Similarly], that which is leavened [with terumah] renders other dough leavened [as with terumah] only according to the proportion. And drawn water disqualifies a ritual bath also only according to the proportion.

If a seah of terumah fell into a hundred [of hullin] and he lifted [a seah] out, and then another fell in, and he lifted another out and another fell in, the pile is permissible as long as the amount of terumah does not exceed that of the hullin.

If a seah of terumah fell into a hundred [of hullin], and before he could take it out, another fell in, the whole becomes forbidden. Rabbi Shimon permits it.

If a seah of terumah fell into a hundred [of hullin], and they were ground together and reduced in bulk, just as the hullin was reduced so too the terumah was reduced, and it is permitted. If a seah of terumah fell into less than a hundred [of hullin] and they were ground together and increased in bulk, just as the hullin became more, so too the terumah became more, and it is forbidden. If it is known that the kernels of hullin were better than the terumah, it is permitted. If a seah of terumah fell into less than a hundred [of hullin], and more hullin fell in afterwards, if it was accidental it is permissible, but if intentional it is forbidden.

Chapter 6

One who eats terumah unwittingly must repay its value plus a fifth, whether he eats it or drinks it, or anoints himself with it, or whether the terumah is clean or unclean. [If he eats the added fifth] he must pay its fifth, and a fifth of that fifth. He may not repay with terumah, but rather with tithed hullin, which becomes terumah. And whatever may be repaid in its place also becomes terumah and if the priest wishes to forego [the fine], he cannot do so.

A daughter of an Israelite ate terumah and afterwards married a priest:If the terumah she ate had not yet been acquired by another priest she can repay to herself the value and the fifth. But if a priest had already acquired the terumah she had eaten, she must repay the value to the owners, but [she can repay] the fifth to herself, because they said that he who eats terumah unwittingly, pays the value to the owners and the fifth to whoever he wants.

If one gives his workmen or his guests terumah to eat he must repay the principal and they must pay the fifth, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: they must pay both the value and the fifth, and he must pay them for the price of their meal.

If one stole terumah but did not eat it, he must return double-payment at the price of terumah. If he ate it, he must pay twice the value plus a fifth, one principal value and a fifth at the price of hullin, and the other principal at the price of terumah. If one stole terumah of dedicated property and ate it, he must repay two fifths and the principal value, for the laws of double-payment do not apply to dedicated property.

They may not make repayment from gleanings, from forgotten sheaf, from peah or ownerless property. Nor from first tithe from which terumah has been taken, nor from second tithe or dedicated produce which have been redeemed, because one dedicated thing (kadosh) cannot be used to redeem another dedicated thing (kadosh), the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages permit [payment] with these.

Rabbi Eliezer says: they may make repayment from one kind for another, provided that it is from a superior kind for an inferior kind. Rabbi Akiva says: they may make repayment only from the same kind. Hence if a man ate cucumbers grown a year before the seventh year, he must wait for those grown after the termination of the seventh year and repay with them. The same source which causes Rabbi Eliezer to be lenient causes Rabbi Akiva to be stringent, for it says: “And he shall give the priest the holy thing (hakadesh)” (Leviticus 22:14), [implying,] whatever is liable to become “kodesh,” the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But Rabbi Akiva says: “And he shall give the priest the holy thing (kodesh),” [implying] the same kind of holy thing which he ate.

Chapter 7

One who eats terumah intentionally must repay its value, but not the fifth. And the repayment remains hullin, therefore, if the priest wishes to forgive the repayment, he may.

If the daughter of a priest married an Israelite and afterwards ate terumah, she must repay the value but not the fifth, and her death-penalty [for adultery] is by burning. If she married any of those disqualified [from marrying her], she must pay back both the value and the fifth, and her death-penalty [for adultery] is by strangling, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: in either case, she repays the value but not the fifth, and the death penalty is by burning.

One who feeds [terumah] to his small children, or to his slaves whether they are of majority age or minors, or one who eats terumah from outside the land, or less than an olive’s bulk of terumah, must repay the value, but not the fifth; and the repayment remains hullin. Therefore, if the priest wishes to forgive the repayment, he may.

This is the general principle: whenever one has to repay both the value and the fifth, the repayment becomes terumah, and if the priest desires to forgive the repayment, he cannot forgive. But whenever one has to repay the value only and not the fifth, the repayment remains hullin (non-sacred produce), and if the priest wishes to forgive the repayment, he can.

If there were two baskets, one of terumah and one of hullin, and a seah of terumah fell into one of them, but it is not known into which, behold I can assume that it had fallen into that of the terumah. [Two baskets] and it is not known which was of terumah and which of hullin, and he eats from one of them, he is exempt, and the second basket is treated as terumah and subject to the laws of hallah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But Rabbi Yose exempts it. If another person eats from the second basket he is exempt. If one man ate of both, he must repay the value of the smaller of the two.

If one of these [baskets] fell into hullin, it does not render it medumma (doubtful terumah), but the second is treated as terumah and subject to the law of hallah, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose exempts it. If the second falls elsewhere [into hullin] it does not render it medumma. If both of them fall into one place, they render it medumma according to [the proportion] of the smaller of the two.

If he used one of these [baskets] as seed, he is exempt, and the second is treated as if it were terumah and subject to the law of hallah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But Rabbi Yose exempts it. If another person uses the second as seed, then he is exempt. If one man uses both as seed, if it is of a kind whose seed disintegrates [in the ground] it is permissible, but if it is of the kind whose seed does not disintegrate it is prohibited.

Chapter 8

If a woman was eating terumah, and they came and said to her, “Your husband is dead”, or “He divorced you.” Or, if a slave was eating terumah, and they came and said to him: “Your master is dead”, or “He sold you to an Israelite”, or “He gave you away as a gift”, or “He emancipated you.” So too, if a priest was eating terumah and it became known that he was the son of a divorced woman or a halutzah (a woman released from levirate marriage): Rabbi Eliezer says: they must repay both the value and the fifth. But Rabbi Joshua exempts them [from the added fifth]. If [a priest] was standing and sacrificing on the altar and it became known that he was the son of a divorced woman or a halutzah: Rabbi Eliezer says: all the sacrifices he had offered on the altar are disqualified. But Rabbi Joshua pronounces them valid. If it, however, it became known that he possessed a blemish, his service is disqualified.

In all the above cases, if terumah was still in their mouth: Rabbi Eliezer says: they may swallow it. But Rabbi Joshua says: they must spit it out. [If it was said to him], “Your have become unclean”, or “the terumah has become unclean”, Rabbi Eliezer says: he may swallow it. But Rabbi Joshua says: he must spit it out. [If it was said to him], “You were unclean” or “the terumah was unclean”, or it became known that [the food he was eating] was untithed, or that it was first tithe from which terumah had not yet been taken, or second tithe or dedicated produce that had not been redeemed, or if he tasted the taste of a bug in his mouth, he must spit it out.

If he was eating a bunch of grapes, and he entered from the garden into the courtyard: Rabbi Eliezer says: he may finish eating. But Rabbi Joshua says: he may not finish. If dusk set in at the eve of Shabbat: Rabbi Eliezer says: he may finish eating. But Rabbi Joshua says: he may not finish.

If wine of terumah was left uncovered, it must be poured out, and there is no need to say this in the case of hullin. Three kinds of liquids are forbidden if they were left uncovered: water, wine and milk, but all other drinks are permitted. How long do they remain uncovered for them to become prohibited? The time it takes the snake to creep out from a place near by and drink.

The amount of water that is uncovered: enough to negate the poison. Rabbi Yose says: in vessels [it is forbidden] whatever the quantity, but for water on the ground, it must be forty se'ahs.

Figs, grapes, cucumbers, pumpkins, melons or watermelons that have bite marks, even if they are in a jar, both large or small, both plucked or still attached to the soil, they are forbidden as long as there is juice in them. [An animal] bitten by a snake is forbidden on account of the danger to life.

A wine-filter [used as a cover] does not prevent [the wine from becoming] forbidden by being uncovered. But Rabbi Nehemiah permits it.

A jar of terumah which may have become impure:Rabbi Eliezer says: if it had been deposited in an exposed place, he must now place it in a hidden place; and if it had formerly been uncovered, it must now be covered. But Rabbi Joshua says: if it had been in a hidden place, he must now place it in an exposed place; and if it had formerly been covered up, he must now uncover it. Rabban Gamaliel says: let him not do anything new to it.

A jar [of terumah] was broken in the upper part of the wine-press, and the lower part was unclean: Both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua agree that if one can save at least a reviit of it in cleanness he should save it. But if not: Rabbi Eliezer says: let it flow down and become unclean of its own accord, and let him not make it unclean with his own hands.

Similarly a jar of [terumah] oil which spilled: Both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua agree that if he can save at least a reviit in purity he should save it; But if not: Rabbi Eliezer says: let it flow down and be swallowed up by the ground, and let him not make it unclean with his own hands.

Concerning both cases Rabbi Joshua said: This is not the kind of terumah over which I am cautioned lest I defile it, but rather to eat of it and not to defile it. If one was passing from place to place with loaves of terumah in his hand and a Gentile said to him: “Give me one of these and I will make it unclean; for if not, I will defile them all,” let him defile them all, and not give him deliberately one to defile, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But Rabbi Joshua says: he should place one of them on a rock.

Similarly, if gentiles say to women, “Give us one of you that we may defile her, and if not, we will defile you all”, then let them all be defiled rather than hand over to them one soul from Israel.

Chapter 9

He who plants terumah, if unwittingly, may overturn it, but if intentionally, he must allow it to remain. If it had already grown a third of its full size, whether he had planted it unwittingly or intentionally, he must allow it to remain. But in the case of flax, even when planted intentionally he must overturn it.

And it is subject to gleanings, the forgotten sheaf and peah. Poor Israelites and poor priests may glean them, but the poor Israelites must sell theirs to priests for the price of terumah and the money becomes theirs. Rabbi Tarfon says: only poor priests may glean them, lest [the others] forget and put it into their mouths. Rabbi Akiva said to him: if that be so, then only those who are clean should be allowed to glean.

And it is also subject to tithes and poor man’s tithe. Both Israelites and priests that are poor may accept them, but the poor Israelites must sell that which is theirs to the priest for the price of terumah and the money belongs to them. He who beats the grain with sticks [instead of threashing with an animal] is to be praised. But he who threshes it [by having an animal walk on it] what should he do? He must suspend baskets from the neck of the animal and place in them from the same kind, with the result that he will neither muzzle the animal nor feed it terumah.

What grows from terumah is terumah, but that which grows from growths [of terumah] is hullin. As for untithed produce, first tithe, after-growths from the sabbatical year, terumah grown outside the land, mixtures of hullin with terumah (medumma) and first-fruits what grows from them is hullin. What grows from dedicated produce and second tithe is hullin and it is to be redeemed [at its value] at the time when it was sown.

If a hundred rows were planted with terumah seeds and one with hullin, they all are permitted, if they are of a kind whose seed disintegrates in the soil. But if they are of a kind whose seed does not disintegrate in the soil, then even if there be a hundred [rows] of hullin and one of terumah, they all are prohibited.

As for untithed produce, what grows from it is permissible if of a kind whose seed disintegrates [in the soil]. But if of a kind whose seed does not disintegrate, then even what grows from plants which grew out of it are forbidden. Which is the kind whose seed does not disintegrate? Like luf, garlic and onions. Rabbi Judah says: garlic is like barley.

He who weeds allium plants (whose seeds do not disintegrate) for a Gentile, even though the produce is untithed he eat from them in a casual fashion. Saplings of terumah which had become unclean and were re-planted, become clean from their uncleanness. But they must not be eaten until the edible part [of the stalk] has been lopped off. Rabbi Judah says: he must [before eating] lop off a second time that which grew on the edible part.

Chapter 10

An onion [of terumah] was placed into lentils:If the onion was whole, it is permissible; But if [the onion] had been cut up, [it is forbidden if it] imparts a flavor. In the case of other dishes, whether the onion is whole or cut up [it is forbidden] if it imparts a flavor. Rabbi Judah permits it in the case of mashed fish, because it is used only to remove the unpleasant flavor.

If an apple [of terumah] was chopped and placed into dough [of hullin] so that it leavened it, [the dough] is forbidden. If barley [of terumah] fell into a cistern of water, though [the barley] stinks up the water, the water is permissible.

One who removes warm bread from an oven and places it over an open barrel of terumah wine:Rabbi Meir says: it is forbidden. Rabbi Judah permits it. Rabbi Yose permits the bread of wheat but not of barley, because barley absorbs.

If an oven was heated with cumin of terumah and bread was baked in it, the bread is permitted, for there is no taste of cumin, just the smell of cumin.

Fenugreek which fell into a vat of wine:If it was terumah or second tithe and there is in the seed alone without the stalk sufficient to impart a flavor [it is forbidden]. But if it was seventh year produce or mixed seeds in vineyards, or dedicated produce, [it is forbidden] if in both seed and stalk there is sufficient to impart a flavor.

If one had bunches of fenugreek of mixed seeds of the vineyard, they must be burned. If he had bunches of fenugreek of untithed produce, he must beat them and calculate the amount of seed within them and set aside [terumah] from the seed, but he need not separate terumah from the stalks. But if he did set aside [the terumah from the stalks before he beat the bunches] he must not say: “I will beat out [the seed] and take the stalks and give only the seed” but he must give the stalks together with the seed.

Olives of hullin which were pickled together with olives of terumah, whether it was a case where crushed [olives] of hullin [which were pickled together] with crushed [olives] of terumah, or crushed [olives] of hullin with whole [olives] of terumah, or with juice of terumah, they are forbidden. But if whole [olives] of hullin were pickled with crushed [olives] of terumah, they are permitted.

Unclean fish which was pickled with clean fish:If the jug contains two seahs and the unclean fish weighs ten zuz in Judean measure, which is five selas in Galilean measure, the brine is forbidden. Rabbi Judah says: it needs be a quarter [of a log] in two seahs. Rabbi Yose says: one-sixteenth of it.

If unclean locusts were pickled together with clean ones, they do not make the brine forbidden. Rabbi Zadok testified that the brine of unclean locusts is clean.

[Vegetables] pickled together are permitted, except [when pickled] with allium (onions, garlic, leeks). Allim of hullin [pickled] with allium of terumah, or other vegetables of hullin with leeks of terumah are forbidden. But allium of hullin with vegetables of terumah are permitted.

Rabbi Yose says: Anything stewed with [terumah] beets becomes forbidden, because they impart a flavor. Rabbi Shimon says: cabbage from a field artificially irrigated [that is stewed] with [terumah] cabbage from a field watered by rain, is forbidden because it absorbs. Rabbi Akiba says: all things cooked together are permitted, except those with meat. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: liver renders other things forbidden, but does not become forbidden, because it gives off [flavor] but does not absorb.

If an egg is boiled with forbidden spices even its yolk is forbidden, because it absorbs. The water in which terumah has been stewed or pickled is forbidden to non-priests.

Chapter 11

One must not put a cake of pressed [terumah] figs or dried [terumah] figs into fish-brine, since it spoils them. But one may place [terumah] wine into fish brine. One must not perfume the oil, But one may put honey and pepper into wine. One may not boil terumah wine, because it decreases it. Rabbi Judah permits this, because it improves it.

[A non-priest drank] honey of dates, wine of apples, vinegar from winter grapes, and all other kinds of fruit juice of terumah: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to repay their value and the fifth; But Rabbi Joshua exempts from the fifth. Rabbi Eliezer declares [these] susceptible to uncleanness as liquids. Rabbi Joshua says: the sages have not enumerated seven liquids as those that count spices, but rather they stated: seven liquids make things susceptible to uncleaness, whereas all other liquids do not make susceptible.

One must not make dates into honey, apples into wine, winter-grapes into vinegar, or change any other kind of fruit that is terumah or second tithe from their natural state, except olives and grapes. One does not receive forty lashes on account of orlah except with that which comes from olives and grapes. Liquids cannot be brought as first fruits, except with that which comes from olives and grapes. And no fruit juice is susceptible to uncleanness as liquids except with that which comes from olives and grapes. And nothing [that is derived from fruit] can be offered on the altar except with that which comes from olives and grapes.

The stems of fresh figs and dried figs, klisim and carobs of terumah are forbidden to non-priests.

Seeds of terumah [fruit]: When he gathers them in, they are prohibited. But if he throws them away, they are permitted. Similarly, the bones of holy things: When he gathers them in, they are prohibited. But if he throws them away, they are permitted. Coarse bran is permitted. Fine bran of new wheat is forbidden, and old wheat permitted. One may act with regard to terumah as one does with hullin. One who sifts a kav or two [of fine flour] from a seah of wheat, must not leave the rest to ruin, but rather he should put it in a hidden place.

If a store-chamber was cleared of terumah wheat, they do not need to force him to sit down and collect each grain, but rather he may sweep it all up in his usual manner and then deposit hullin in it.

Similarly, if a jar of oil is upset, they do not need to force him to sit down and scoop it up [with his fingers], but he may deal with it as he would in a case of hullin.

One who pours from jar to jar and three drops drip, he may place in it hullin. But if he inclined the jar [on its side] in order to drain it, it is terumah. How much terumat maaser of demai must there be for him to take it to the priest? One eighth of an eighth [of a log].

Vetches of terumah may be given to cattle, to wild beasts or fowls. If an Israelite hired a cow from a priest, he may give it vetches of terumah to eat. But if a priest hired a cow from an Israelite, even though the responsibility of feeding it is his, he must not feed it with vetches of terumah. If an Israelite undertakes the care of a cow from a priest, he must not feed it with vetches of terumah. But if a priest undertakes the care of a cow from an Israelite, he may feed it on vetches of terumah.

One may burn terumah oil that has to be burnt in synagogues, houses of study, dark alleys, and for sick people with permission of the priest. If the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest regularly goes to her father's house, her father may burn [such oil] with her permission. One may also burn [such oil] in a house of celebration but not in a house of mourning, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says: in the house of mourning, but not in a house of celebration. Rabbi Meir forbids it in both places. But Rabbi Shimon permits it in both places.

Mishnah Maasrot

Chapter 1

They said a general principle concerning tithes: whatever is food, and is looked after, and grows from the land, is liable for tithes. And they have further stated another general principle [concerning tithes]: whatever is considered food both at the beginning and at the conclusion [of its growth] even though he holds on to it in order to increase the quantity of food, is liable [to tithe] whether [it is harvested] in its earlier or later stages. But whatever is not considered food in the earlier stages [of its growth] but only in its later stages, is not liable [to tithe] until it can be considered food.

When do fruits become liable for tithes?Figs from the time they begin to ripe. Grapes and wild grapes in the early stages of ripening. Sumac and mulberries after they become red; [similarly] all red fruits, after they become red. Pomegranates, when the insides become soft. Dates when they begin to swell. Peaches when [red] veins begin to show. Walnuts when the nuts are separate from the shell. Rabbi Judah says: walnuts and almonds, after their inner skins have been formed.

Carobs [are liable to] tithes after they form dark spots; similarly all black fruits after they form dark spots. Pears and crustumenian pears, quinces, and medlars [are liable to tithes] after their surface begins to grow smooth; similarly all white fruits, after their surface begins to grow smooth. Fenugreek [is liable to tithe] when the seeds [can be planted and] will grow. Grain and olives after they are one-third ripe.

With regard to when vegetables [are liable to tithes]:Cucumbers, gourds, water-melons, cucumber-melons, apples and etrogs are liable [for tithes], whether gathered in the earlier or later stages of ripening. Rabbi Shimon exempts the etrog in the earlier stages. The condition in which bitter almonds are liable [to tithes] is exempt in the case of sweet almonds, and the condition in which sweet almonds are liable [to tithe] is exempt in the case of bitter almonds.

What is considered a “threshing floor” for tithes [i.e. when does produce become liable for tithes]?Cucumbers and gourds [are liable for tithes] once he removes their fuzz. And if he doesn’t remove it, once he makes a pile. Melons once he removes the fuzz with hot water. And if they he does not remove the fuzz, once he stores them in the muktzeh. Vegetables which are tied in bundles, from the time he ties them up in bundles. If he does not tie them up in bundles, until he fills the vessel with them. And if he does not fill the vessel, after he has gathered all that he wishes to gather. [Produce which is packed in] a basket [is liable for tithes] after he has covered it. If he is not going to cover it, until he fills the vessel with them. And if he does not fill the vessel, after he has gathered all that he wishes to gather. When does this apply? When one brings [the produce] to the market. But when he brings it to his own house, he may make a chance meal of it, until he reaches his house.

Dried pomegranate seeds, raisins and carobs, [are liable for tithes] after he has made a pile. Onions, once he removes the onion seeds. If he does not remove the onion seeds, after he makes a pile. Grain, once he smoothes out the pile. If he does not smooth the pile, after he makes a pile. Pulse, after he has sifted it. If he does not sift, after he smoothes out a pile. Even after he has smoothed out the pile, he may [without tithing] take from the broken ears, from the sides of the piles, and from that which is mixed in with the chaff, and eat.

Wine [is liable for tithes] after it has been skimmed [in the lower part of the winepress]. Even though it has been skimmed, he may take from the upper winepress, or from the duct, and drink [without taking out tithe]. Oil [is liable for tithes] after it has gone down into the trough. But even after it has gone down into the trough he may still take oil from the pressing bale, or from the press beam, or from the boards between the press [without tithing,] And he may put such oil on a cake, or large plate. But he should not put the oil in a dish or stewpot, while they are boiling. Rabbi Judah says: he may put it into anything except that which contains vinegar or brine.

A cake of pressed figs [is liable for tithes] from the moment it has been smoothed out [with fruit juice]. They may smooth them out with [the juice of] untithed figs or grapes. Rabbi Judah forbids this. If one smoothed with grapes, it is not susceptible to uncleanness. Rabbi Judah says it is susceptible. Dried figs [are liable to tithe] after they have been pressed [into a jar]. And [figs] stored in a bin [are liable to tithe] after they have been pressed. If one was pressing [the figs] into a jar, or pressing them in a storage bin, and the jar was broken or the storage bin opened, he may not make a chance meal of them. Rabbi Yose permits this.

Chapter 2

If one was passing through the street, and said “Take for yourself from my figs,” one may eat them and be exempt from tithes. Therefore if they brought them into their houses, they must separate [tithes and terumah] as if they were certainly untithed. [If he said], “Take and bring it into your houses,” they may not make a chance meal of them. Therefore if they brought them into their houses, they need tithe them only as demai.

If they were sitting at the gate or a shop, and one said [to them], “Take for yourselves figs,” they may eat and be exempt from tithes, but the owner of the gate, or the owner of the shop, is liable [to give tithe]. Rabbi Judah exempts him unless he turns his face or changes the place where he was sitting [and selling].

One who brings produce from the Galilee to Judea, or if he goes up to Jerusalem, he may eat of them until he arrives at the place to which he intends to go, and the same is true when he returns. Rabbi Meir says: [he may eat] until he reaches the place where he intends to rest [on Shabbat]. But peddlers who travel from town to town may eat until they reach the place where they intend to stay over night. Rabbi Judah says: the first house [he reaches] is his house.

Produce from which he separated terumah before its work was finished: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is forbidden to make a chance meal of it, But the sages permit it except when it is a basket of figs. A basket of figs from which one separated terumah: Rabbi Shimon permits it. But the sages forbid it.

One who says to his friend: “Here is this issar, give me five figs for it”, he may not eat of [them] until he has tithed them, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if he ate them one by one, he is exempt, but if he gathered them [to eat them] together, he is liable [to tithe.] Rabbi Judah said: it happened in a rose-garden in Jerusalem that there were figs being sold three or four for an issar, and neither terumah nor tithe was ever given from it.

One who says to his friend: “Here is an issar for ten figs which I choose for myself,” he may choose them and eat [one at a time without tithing]. [If he said] “For a cluster of grapes which I choose for myself,” he may pick grapes from the cluster and eat. [If he said], “For a pomegranate which I choose for myself,” he may take apart [the pomegranate] and eat [it one piece at a time]. [If he said] “For a watermelon, which I choose for myself,” he may slice and eat [it one piece at a time]. But if he said “For these twenty figs,” or “For these two clusters,” or “For these two water-melons,” he may eat them in his usual way and be exempt [from tithe], because he bought them while they were still attached to the ground.

One who has hired a worker to help him harvest figs, and he [the worker] said to him “On condition that I may eat the figs,” he may eat them and he is exempt [from tithing]. [If he said,] “On condition that I and my son may eat,” or “that my son may eat of them in lieu of my receiving a wage,” he may eat and he is exempt [from tithing], but his son may eat but he is liable [for tithes]. [If he said,] “On condition that I may eat of them during the time of the fig harvest, and after the fig harvest,” during the time of the fig harvest he may eat and he is exempt [from tithing], but if he eats after the fig harvest he is liable, since he does not eat of them in the manner mandated by the Torah. This is the general rule: one who eats in a manner mandated by the Torah is exempt [from tithes], and one who does not eat in the manner mandated by the Torah is liable.

If a man is working [as a hired worker] among cooking figs, he may not eat of white figs, and if among white figs, he may not eat of cooking figs, but he may restrain himself until he reaches the place where there are the better figs, and then he may eat. If a man exchanges with his friend either [figs] for eating for [figs] for eating, or [figs] to be dried for figs [to be dried], of figs [for eating] for figs [to be dried], then he is liable to give tithes. Rabbi Judah says: one who exchanges [figs] for [other figs for eating] is liable, but [if for figs] for drying he is exempt.

Chapter 3

One who was taking figs through his courtyard to be dried, his children and the other members of his household may eat [of them] and they are exempt [from tithes]. The workers [who work] with him may eat and be exempt so long as he is not obliged to provide for them. If however, he is obligated to provide for them they may not eat.

One who brought his workers into the field, when he is not obligated to provide for them, they may eat and be exempt from tithes. If, however, he is obligated to provide for them they may eat of the figs one at a time, but not from the basket, nor from the large basket, nor from the storage yard.

One who hired a worker to work with olives and he said to him, “On condition that I may eat the olives,” he may eat of them one at a time and be exempt [from tithes]. If, however, he gathered several together he is liable [for tithes]. [If he had been hired] to weed out onions, and he said to him, “On condition that I may eat the vegetables,” he may pluck leaf by leaf, and eat [without tithing]. If, however, he gathered several together, he is liable [for tithes].

If one found cut figs on the road, or even beside a field [where cut figs] have been spread [to dry], and similarly, if a fig tree overhangs the road, and he found figs beneath it, they are allowed [with regard to the laws] of robbery, and they are exempt from tithe. But if they were olives and carobs, they are liable. If one found dried figs, then if the majority of people had already trodden [their figs], he must tithe [them], but if not he is exempt. If one found slices of fig-cake he is liable [to tithe] since it is obvious they come from something whose processing had been fully completed. With carobs, if they had not yet been on the top of the roof, he may take some down for his animals and be exempt [from tithe] since he returns that which is left over.

Which courtyard is it which makes [the produce] liable to tithe? Rabbi Ishmael says: the Tyrian yard for the vessels are protected therein. Rabbi Akiva says: any courtyard which one person may open and another may shut is exempt. Rabbi Nehemiah says: any courtyard in which a man is not ashamed to eat is liable. Rabbi Yose says: any courtyard into which a person may enter and no one says to him, “what are you looking for” is exempt. Rabbi Judah says: if there are two courtyards one within the other, the inner one makes liable and the outer one is exempt.

Roofs do not render [produce] liable, even though they belong to a courtyard which renders it liable. A gate house, portico, or balcony, are like the courtyard [to which it belongs]; if [the courtyard] makes the [produce] liable [for tithes] so do they, and if it does not, they do not.

Cone-shaped huts, watchtowers, and sheds in the field do not render [produce] liable. A sukkah-hut like those used in Ginnosar, even though it contains millstones and poultry, does not render [produce] liable. As for the potter’s sukkah-hut, the inner part renders [produce] liable and the outer part does not. Rabbi Yose says: anything which is not both a sunny season and rainy season dwelling does not render [produce] liable [to tithes]. A sukkah used on the Festival [of Sukkot]: Rabbi Judah says: this renders [produce] liable [for tithes] But the sages exempt.

A fig tree which stands in a courtyard: one may eat the figs from it one at a time and be exempt [from tithes], but if he gathered some together he is liable. Rabbi Shimon says: if he has [one in his right hand and one in his left hand and one in his mouth, he is exempt. If he ascended to the top [of it], he may fill his bosom and eat.

A vine which was planted in a courtyard: one may take a whole cluster [and eat it without tithing]. Similarly with a pomegranate, or a melon, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: he can pick single berries from the cluster, or split the pomegranate into slices, or cut slices of melon [and eat without tithing]. Coriander which was sown in a courtyard: one may pluck leaf by leaf and eat [without tithing], but if he ate them together he is liable [for tithes]. Savory and hyssop, and thyme which are in the courtyard, if they are kept watch over, they are liable for tithe.

A fig tree which stands in a courtyard, and hangs over into a garden: one may eat in his customary fashion and be exempt [from tithes]. If it stands in the garden and hangs over into the courtyard, one may eat [the figs] one at a time and be exempt, but if he gathers them together, he is liable [for tithes]. If it stands in the land [of Israel] and hangs over [into the territory] outside the land, or if it stands outside the land, and hangs over into the land, [in all these cases the law is] decided according to the position of the root. And as regards houses in walled cities, everything is decided according to the position of the root. But as regards cities of refuge, everything is decided [also] according to the location of the branches. And in what concerns Jerusalem, everything is decided by the location of the branches.

Chapter 4

If he pickled, stewed, or salted [produce], he is liable [to give tithes]. If he stored [produce] in the ground [in order to warm it up] he is exempt. If he dipped it [while yet] in the field, he is exempt. If he split olives so that the bitter taste may come out of them, he is exempt. If he squeezed olives against his skin, he is exempt. If he squeezed them and put [the oil] into his hand, he is liable. One who makes a viscous liquid [from grapes or olives] in order to put it in a dish is exempt. But if to put it in an [empty] pot, he is liable for it is like a small vat.

Children who have hidden figs [in the field] for Shabbat and they forgot to tithe them, they must not be eaten after Shabbat until they have been tithed. In the case of a basket of fruits for Shabbat: Bet Shammai exempt it from tithes; But Bet Hillel makes it liable. Rabbi Judah says: even one who has gathered a basket of fruit to send as a present to his friend, must not eat of them, until they have been tithed.

One who took olives from a vat may dip them one at a time in salt, and eat them. But if he salted them, and put them in front of him, he is liable [for tithes]. Rabbi Eliezer said: from a pure vat he is liable but from an impure [vat] he is exempt because can put back the leftovers.

One may drink [wine] out of the winepress, whether [it is mixed] with hot or cold water, and be exempt [from tithes], the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Eliezer bar Zadok says he is liable. But the sages say: with hot water he is liable [to tithe] but with cold water, he is exempt.

One who husks barley may husk one at a time and eat [without tithing], but if he husked and put them into his hand, he is liable [to tithe]. One who rubs [ears of] wheat may blow out [the chaff of the wheat] from hand to hand and eat, but if he blows and puts the grain in his lap he is liable. Coriander which was sown for the sake of the seed, the plant is exempt [from tithes]. If he sowed it for the sake of the plant then both the seed and the plant must be tithed. Rabbi Eliezer said: as for dill, tithe must be given from the seed and the plant, and the pods. But the sages say: only in the case of cress and eruca are both the seeds and plant tithed.

Rabban Gamaliel says: shoots of fenugreek, of mustard, and of white beans are liable [to tithe]. Rabbi Eliezer says: as for the caper bush, tithes must be given from the shoots, the berries and the blossoms. Rabbi Akiba says: only the berries are tithed since they [alone] count as fruit.

Chapter 5

One who uproots saplings from of his own [property] and plants them [elsewhere] within his own [property] is exempt [from tithes]. If he bought [saplings] attached to the ground, he is exempt. If he gathered them in order to send them to his fellow, he is exempt. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said: if similar ones were being sold in the market, behold they are liable [for tithes].

One who uproots turnips and radishes from within his own [property] and plants [them elsewhere] within his own [property] for the purpose of seed, he is liable to tithe, since this is [equivalent to] their threshing floor. If onions take root in an upper story they become clean from any impurity. If some debris fell upon them and they are uncovered, they are regarded as though they were planted in the field.

One may not sell produce after the season for tithing has arrived to one who is not trusted concerning tithes. Nor in the sabbatical year [may one sell sabbatical year produce] to one suspected of [transgressing] the sabbatical year. If only [some] produce ripened, he takes the ripe ones and may sell the remainder.

One may not sell his straw, nor his olive peat, or his grape pulp to one who is not to be trusted in [with respect to] tithes, for him to extract the juice from them. If he did extract the juice he is liable for tithes, but is exempt from terumah, because when one separates terumah he has in mind the fragments which [is] by the sides, and that which is inside the straw.

One who buys a field of vegetables in Syria: If before the season for tithing arrived, then he is liable to tithe. If after the season for tithing he is exempt, and he may go on gathering in his usual manner. Rabbi Judah says: he may even hire workers and gather. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: When does this apply? If he has bought the land. But if, he has not bought the land, even before the season for tithing arrived he is exempt. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] says: he must also tithe according to calculation.

One who makes grape-skin wine, and he put water on by measure, and he finds [afterwards] the same quantity, he is exempt from tithe. Rabbi Judah makes him liable. If he found more than the measure, he must give [tithe] for it from another place, in proportion.

Anthills which have remained the whole night near a pile of grain which was liable to tithe, [the grain found in them] is liable, since it is obvious that they [the ants] have been dragging away the whole night from something [of which the work] had been completed.

Garlic from Balbeck, onions from Rikpa, Cicilician beans and Egyptians lentils, and Rabbi Meir says qirqas, and Rabbi Yose says qotnym are exempt from tithes and may be brought from any man in the seventh year. The seeds of upper arum pods, the seeds of leeks, the seeds of onions, the seeds of turnips and radishes, and other seeds of garden produce which are not eaten, are exempt from tithes, and may be bought from any man in the seventh year; and even though the plants from they grew were terumah, they may still be eaten [by non-priests].

Mishnah Maaser Sheni

Chapter 1

Second tithe: one may not sell it, use it as a pledge, exchange it, or use it as a weight. One may not say to his friend [even] in Jerusalem: “Here is [second tithe] wine, give me [in exchange] oil, and the same with all other produce. But people may give it to one another as a free gift.

Tithe of cattle: one may not sell it when it is unblemished and alive, and when it is blemished [one may not sell it] neither alive nor slaughtered, nor may one betroth a woman with it. A first-born animal: one may sell it when it is unblemished and alive, and when blemished [one may sell it] both alive and slaughtered, and one may betroth a wife with it. One may not redeem second tithe with unstamped coins, nor with coins which are not current, nor for money which is not in one's possession.

One who bought a domesticated animal for a shelamim offering or a wild animal for non-sacrificial eating, the hide becomes hullin [non-sacred], even though the value of the hide exceeds the value of the flesh. Sealed jars of wine [which were bought] in a place where they were usually sold sealed, the jars are hullin. Walnuts and almonds, their shells become hullin. Grape-skin wine: before it has fermented it cannot be bought with second tithe money, but after it has fermented it may be bought with second tithe money.

One who bought a wild animal for a shelamim offering or a domesticated beast for non-sacrificial eating, the hide does not become hullin. Open or sealed jars of wine [which were bought] in a place where they are usually sold open, the jars do not become hullin. Baskets of olives or baskets of grapes [bought] together with the vessel, the value of the vessel does not become hullin.

One who bought water or salt, or produce still joined to the soil, or produce which cannot reach Jerusalem, he has not purchased maaser [sheni]. One who bought produce unwittingly, the money must be restored to its former place. But if intentionally, the produce must be taken up and be consumed in the [holy] place, and when there is no Temple, it must be left to rot.

One who bought a domesticated animal unwittingly, the money must be restored to its former place. Intentionally, it must be taken up and eaten in the [holy] place. And when there is no Temple, it must be buried together with its hide.

One may not buy male slaves or female slaves, land, or unclean animals with maaser sheni money. And if he did buy [one of these], its value must be consumed [as maaser sheni in Jerusalem]. One may not bring bird-offerings of a zav or zavah, or bird-offerings of women after child-birth, or sin-offerings, or guilt-offerings, from maaser sheni money. And if he did buy [one of these], their value must be consumed [as maaser sheni in Jerusalem]. This is the general rule: whatever [is bought] out of maaser sheni money which cannot be used for eating or drinking or anointing, its value must be consumed [as maaser sheni in Jerusalem].

Chapter 2

Second tithe is set apart for eating, for drinking and for anointing; for eating what is usually eaten, for drinking what is usually drunk, and for anointing what is usually used for anointing. One may not anoint oneself with wine or with vinegar, but one may anoint oneself with oil. One may not spice oil of second tithe, nor may one buy spiced oil with second tithe money. But one may spice wine. If honey or spices fell into wine and improved its value, the improved value [is divided] according to the proportion. If fish was cooked with leek of second tithe and it improved in value, the improved value [is divided] according to the proportion. If dough of second tithe was baked and it improved in value, the whole improved value is second [tithe]. This is the general rule: whenever the improvement is recognizable the improved value [is divided] according to the proportion, but whenever the improved value is not recognizable the improved value belongs to the second [tithe].

Rabbi Shimon says: one may not anoint oneself with oil of second tithe in Jerusalem. But the sages allow it. They said to Rabbi Shimon: if a lenient ruling has been adopted in the case of terumah which is a grave matter, should we not also adopt a lenient ruling in the case of second tithe which is a light matter? He said to them: No; a lenient ruling has been adopted in the case of terumah though it is a grave matter, because in terumah we have adopted a lenient ruling also with regard to vetches and fenugreek, but how can we adopt a lenient ruling in the case of second tithe though it is a light matter, when we have not adopted a lenient ruling in second tithe with regard to vetches and fenugreek?

Fenugreek of second tithe may be eaten when it is still tender. Fenugreek of terumah: Bet Shammai says: whatever is done with it must be done in a state of purity, except when it is used for cleansing the head. But Bet Hillel says: whatever is done with it may be done in a state of impurity, except soaking it in water.

Vetches of second tithe may be eaten when still tender. And they may be brought into Jerusalem and taken out again. If they became unclean: Rabbi Tarfon says: they must be divided among pieces of dough. But the sages say: they may be redeemed. [Vetches] of terumah: Bet Shammai says: they must be soaked and rubbed in a state of purity, but may be given as food [to an animal] in a state of impurity. Bet Hillel says: they must be soaked [only] in a state of purity, but they may be rubbed and given as food [to an animal] in a state of impurity. Shammai says: they must be eaten dry [only]. Rabbi Akiba says: whatever is done with them may be done in a state of impurity.

Hullin coins and second tithe coins which were scattered together: whatever is picked up [one at a time] belongs to second tithe until the sum is completed, and the remainder is hullin. If they were so mixed up as to be taken up by the handful, [they are divided] according to the proportion. This is the general rule: what is picked up [one at a time] must be first given to second tithe, but [what is picked up] mixed [quantity is divided] according to the proportion.

A sela of maaser sheni which was mixed up with a sela of hullin, one may bring copper coins for the sela and say: “Let the sela of maaser sheni wherever it may be, be exchanged for these coins.” Then he must select the better of the two selas, and change [again] the copper coins for it. For they have said: one may change silver for copper [only] in case of necessity, and not to leave it so but to change it again for silver.

Bet Shammai says: one may not turn his selas into gold dinars. But Bet Hillel permits it. Rabbi Akiva said: For Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua I turned silver into gold dinars.

One who changes copper coins of second tithe for a sela: Bet Shammai says: he may change copper coins for a whole sela. But Bet Hillel says: a shekel of silver and a shekel’s worth of copper coins [can be exchanged for the sela]. Rabbi Meir says: one may not exchange silver and produce for silver. But the sages allow it.

One who exchanges a sela of second tithe in Jerusalem:Bet Shammai says: he may exchange the whole sela for copper coins. Bet Hillel says: a shekel of silver and a shekel’s worth of copper coins [can be exchanged for the sela]. Those discussing before the sages say: silver for three dinars and copper coins for one denar. Rabbi Akiva says: silver for three denars and copper coins for a fourth [of the fourth denar]. Rabbi Tarfon says: four aspers in silver. Shammai says: he must leave it in a shop and eat as much as it is worth.

If one had some of his sons pure and some impure, he may put down a sela and say: “What the pure drink, this sela will be redeemed for it.” In this way the pure and the impure may drink from one jar.

Chapter 3

One should not say to his friend: “Carry up this [second tithe] produce to Jerusalem that in order to divide it.” Rather he should say to him, “Carry it up that so that we may eat and drink of it in Jerusalem.” But people may give it to one another as a free gift.

One may not buy terumah with maaser sheni money, because this reduces the number of those who can eat it. But Rabbi Shimon permits it. Rabbi Shimon said to them: If the law is lenient in the case of wellbeing offerings, though they may become unfit or a remnant or unclean, why should it not also be lenient with regard to terumah? But they said to him: The law was lenient in the case of wellbeing offerings, because they are permitted to non-priests, but should we therefore be lenient with regard to terumah, which is forbidden to non-priests?

One who has [second tithe] money in Jerusalem and he needs [to spend] it, and his friend had [non-sacred] produce, he may say to his friend: “Let this money be exchanged for your produce.” It turns out that the one [must] eat his produce in purity and the other may do what he needs with his money. But he may not say thus to an am haaretz except when [the money was] from [second tithe of] demai.

If [one had hullin] produce in Jerusalem and [second tithe money] in the provinces, he may say: “Let that money be exchanged for this produce.” If [he had second tithe] money in Jerusalem and [hullin] produce in the provinces, he may say: “Let this money be exchanged for that produce,” as long as he will carry that produce and eat it in Jerusalem.

[Second tithe] money may be brought into Jerusalem and taken out again, but [second tithe] produce may only be brought in, but not taken out again. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: produce also may be brought in and be taken out again.

Produce whose processing was completed and it passed through Jerusalem, its second tithe must be brought back and eaten in Jerusalem. If its processing had not been completed, [such as] baskets of grapes [that were going] to the wine-press or baskets of figs [that were going] to the drying-place: Bet Shammai says: its second tithe must be brought back and be eaten in Jerusalem. But Bet Hillel says: it may be redeemed and eaten anywhere. Rabbi Shimon ben Judah says in the name of Rabbi Yose: Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel did not disagree concerning produce whose processing had not been completed that its second tithe may be redeemed and be eaten anywhere. What did they disagree about? About produce whose processing was completed. Bet Shammai says that its second tithe must be brought back and be eaten in Jerusalem. And Bet Hillel says that it may be redeemed and be eaten anywhere. [The second tithe of] demai may [always] be brought in and taken out again and be redeemed.

A tree which stood within [Jerusalem] and was bending outwards, or if it stood outside [Jerusalem] and was bending inwards, what is opposite the wall and inwards is deemed as being within, and what is opposite the wall and outwards is deemed as being outside. Olive-presses which have their entrance within and their inner space outside, or which have their entrance outside and their inner space within: Bet Shammai says: the whole is deemed as being within. But Bet Hillel says: what is opposite the wall and inwards is deemed as being within, and what is opposite the wall and outwards is deemed as being outside.

The chambers [of the Temple] which were built on holy ground but were open towards common ground: their interior was deemed common and their roofs were deemed holy. Those which were built on common ground but were open towards holy ground: their interior was deemed holy and their roofs were deemed common. Those which were built both on holy and on common ground and were open both towards holy and common ground: the interior and the roofs that were on holy ground and inwards were deemed holy, but [the interior and roofs] on common ground and outwards were deemed common.

Second tithe which was brought into Jerusalem and became unclean, whether it became unclean by a principal defilement or by a secondary defilement, whether it became unclean within [Jerusalem] or outside:Bet Shammai says: it must all be redeemed and be eaten within except that which became unclean by a principal defilement outside. But Bet Hillel says: it must all be redeemed and may be eaten outside except that which became unclean by a secondary defilement within.

If that which was bought with maaser sheni money became unclean, it should be redeemed. R. Judah says: it must be buried. They said to Rabbi Judah: if maaser sheni itself when it became unclean may be redeemed, should not also that which is bought with maaser sheni money be redeemed when it became unclean? He said to them: No! If you say this of maaser sheni itself, it is because it may be redeemed also when pure at a distance from the [holy] place. But how can you say this of that which is bought with maaser sheni money, seeing that it cannot be redeemed when clean at a distance from the [holy] place.

If a deer which had been bought with maaser sheni money died, it must be buried together with its hide. Rabbi Shimon says: it may be redeemed. If it was bought alive and slaughtered and it then became unclean, it may be redeemed. Rabbi Yose says: it must be buried. If it was bought slaughtered and it became unclean, behold it is like produce.

One who lends jars for maaser sheni [wine], even if they were corked, they do not acquire [the sanctity of] maaser sheni. If wine was poured into them without specifying [that it was for sale] they do not acquire [the sanctity of] maaser sheni before they are corked, but after they are corked they acquire [the sanctity of] maaser sheni. Before they are corked they are neutralized in a hundred and one, but after they are corked they sanctify any quantity. Before they are corked terumah may be taken from one jar for all the others, but after they are corked terumah must be taken from each jar separately.

Bet Shammai says: the jars must be opened and emptied into the wine-press. Bet Hillel says: they must be opened but need not be emptied. When does this apply? In a place where they are usually sold closed, but in a place where they are usually sold open, the jar does not revert to hullin. If, however, he wishes to be stringent upon himself and to sell [only] by measure, the jar reverts hullin. Rabbi Shimon says: also when one says to his friend, “This jar [of wine] I am selling to you from its jar, the jar reverts to hullin.

Chapter 4

One who carries produce of maaser sheni from a place where it is expensive to a place where it is cheap, or from a place where it is cheap to a place where it is expensive, he redeems it according to the market price of the place [where he redeems it]. One who brings produce from the threshing-floor into the city, or jars of wine from the wine-press into the city, the increase in the price belongs to maaser sheni and the expenses [must be covered] from his household.

Maaser sheni may be redeemed at the lower market price: At the price at which the shopkeeper buys and not at which he sells. At the price at which the money-changer takes small change and not at the price at which he gives small change. Maaser sheni may not be redeemed in an estimated lump. If its value is known, it may be redeemed according to the evaluation of one. But if its value is not known, it must be redeemed according to the evaluation of three, as for instance in the case of wine which has formed a film, or produce which has begun to rot, or coins which have become rusty.

If the owner says, “With a sela [I will redeem this maaser sheni] and another person says “With a sela,” the owner has the first right, because he must add a fifth. If the owner says “With a sela” and another person says “With a sela and an issar,” the one who offered a sela and an issar has the first right, because he added to the principal. When one redeems his maaser sheni he must add a fifth, whether it is his own or it was given him as a gift.

One may act in a deceptive manner when it comes to maaser sheni. How so? A man may say to his grown-up son or daughter, or to his Hebrew slave or female slave, “Take this money and redeem this maaser sheni for yourself.” But he may not say so to his son or daughter who are minors or to his Canaanite slave or female slave, because their hand is as his own hand.

One who was standing at the threshing-floor and didn’t have any coins may say to his friend: “Behold, this produce is given to you as a gift,” and then he may say again, “Behold, let this produce be exchanged for money which I have in the house.”

If one took possession from the owner of maaser sheni for a sela, but before he had time to redeem it, it stood at the price of two selas, he may give him one sela and make a profit of one sela and the maaser sheni remains his. If he took possession from the owner of maaser sheni for two selas, but before he had time to redeem it, it stood at the price of one sela, he may give him one sela out of hullin [money] and one sela of his maaser sheni money. If the owner was an am haaretz, he should give him out of [maaser sheni of] demai.

If one redeemed maaser sheni but did not call it by its name: Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient. But Rabbi Judah says: he must name it explicitly. If a man was speaking to a woman concerning her divorce or her betrothal, and gave her a get or betrothal money but did not state explicitly [what he was doing]: Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient. But Rabbi Judah says: he must say it explicitly.

One who sets aside an issar [for the redemption of maaser sheni] and on its account he ate [the value of] half [an issar of maaser sheni] and then went to another place where [the issar] was worth a pondion, he may eat of [maaser sheni the value of] another issar. One who sets aside a pundion [for the redemption of maaser sheni] and on its account he ate [the value of] half [a pundion of maaser sheni] and then went to another place where [the pundion] was worth an issar, he may eat [maaser sheni the value of] another half [an issar]. One who sets aside an issar of maaser sheni [money] he should eat on its account eleven parts of the value of an issar, or [he should eat an additional] one hundredth of an issar. Bet Shammai say: in both cases one tenth part [of an issar]. But Bet Hillel says: in the case of certain [maaser sheni] an eleventh part, in the case of demai a tenth part.

Any money found is considered hullin, even gold dinars with silver and with copper coins. If a potsherd was found with the money on which was written “tithe” this is considered maaser sheni [money].

One who finds a vessel one which was written “korban:” Rabbi Judah says: if it was of clay, it is itself hullin and what is in it is a korban (holy). But if it was of metal it is itself korban and what is in it is hullin. They said to him: it is not the custom of people to put what is common into what is korban.

One who finds a vessel on which was written a kof, it is korban. If a mem, it is maaser. If a dalet, it is demai. If a tet, it is tevel (untithed produced). If a tav, it is terumah. For in the time of danger people would write a tav for terumah. Rabbi Yose says: they may all stand for the names of people. Rabbi Yose said: even if he finds a jar which was full of produce and on it was written ‘terumah’ it may yet be considered hullin, because I can say that last year it was full of produce of terumah and was afterwards emptied.

One who says to his son, “There is maaser sheni [produce] in this corner,” but the son found [produce] in another corner, this may be considered hullin. [If the father said] there was there a hundred [of maaser sheni] and the son found two hundred, the remainder is hullin. [If the father said there were there] two hundred and the son found one hundred, it is all maaser sheni.

Chapter 5

A vineyard in its fourth year, they mark it with clods of earth, and of orlah with potter's clay, and graves with lime which is dissolved and poured on. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: When does this apply? In the seventh year. The conscientious used to put down money and say: any fruit gathered from this vineyard may be exchanged for this money.

[The produce of] a vineyard in its fourth year was brought up to Jerusalem within a distance of one day’s journey on each side. And what is the border [of a day’s journey on each side]? Eilat to the south, Akrabat on the north, Lod to the west, and the Jordan [river] to the east. When produce increased, it was decreed that it can be redeemed even if the vineyard was close to the wall. And there was a stipulation on this matter, that whenever it was so desired, the arrangement would be restored as it had been before. Rabbi Yose says: this was the stipulation after the Temple was destroyed, and the stipulation was that when the Temple should be rebuilt the arrangement would be restored as it had been before.

[The grapes of] a vineyard in its fourth year:Bet Shammai says: the laws of the added fifth and removal do not apply to them; But Bet Hillel says: they do. Bet Shammai says: the laws of peret and the defective clusters apply to them, and the poor can redeem the grapes for themselves. But Bet Hillel says: all [of them] go to the wine-press.

How does one redeem the fruit of a plant in its fourth year? The owner puts down a basket in the presence of three [people] and says: “How many such baskets would a man wish to redeem for himself for a sela on condition that the costs [to produce the fruit] shall be on his house? And then he puts down the money and says: “Whatever shall be picked from this plant may it be exchanged for this money at the price of so many baskets for a sela.”

But in the seventh year he must redeem it for its full value. If [in other years] it had all been made ownerless property, the person [who redeems it] can only claim the cost of picking it. One who redeems his own plant in its fourth year, he must add a fifth of its value, whether the fruit was his own or was given him as a gift.

On the eve of the first [others read “last”] festival-day of Pesah in the fourth and in the seventh [years of the sabbatical cycle] the removal was performed. Terumah and the terumah of tithe were given to their owners, the first tithe was given to its owner, the tithe of the poor to its owner, and maaser sheni and first-fruits were removed in every place. Rabbi Shimon says: first-fruits were given to the priests like terumah. As for a cooked dish [with maaser sheni in it]: Bet Shammai says: it must be removed. But Bet Hillel say: lo, it may be considered as already removed.

One who had produce at this time and the time of removal arrived:Bet Shammai says: he must exchange it for money. But Bet Hillel says: it is all the same whether it becomes money or it remains fruit.

Rabbi Judah said: in early times they used to send to householders in the provinces [saying:] “Hasten to set right your produce before the time of removal arrives,” until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that all produce which has not reached the time of tithing is exempt from the removal.

One whose produce was far away from him, he must call it by name. Once it happened that Rabban Gamaliel and the elders were traveling by ship, and Rabban Gamaliel said: “The tithe which I shall measure out in the future is given to Joshua, and the place which it is in is leased to him. The other tithe which I shall measure out in the future is given to Akiva ben Joseph that he may hold it for the poor, and the place which it is in is leased to him.” Rabbi Joshua said: “The tithe [taken from terumah] which I shall measure out is given to Elazar ben Azariah, and the place which it is in is leased to him,” and they each received rent one from another.

At minhah on the last festival day they would make the confession. How was the confession made? “I have cleared out the holy portion from the house” this refers to maaser sheni and the fruit of plants in their fourth year. “I have given them to the Levite” this refers to the tithe of the levites. “And also I have given them” this refers to terumah and the terumah of tithe. “To the stranger, to the orphans, and to the widow” this refers to the tithe of the poor, gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of the field, even though these do not prevent [one from making] the confession. “Out of the house” this refers to hallah.

“According to all Your commandments which You have commanded me,” thus, if he took out maaser sheni before the first tithe he cannot make the confession. “I have not transgressed any of Your commandments” I have not set apart [tithes] from one kind for a different kind, nor from plucked [produce] for [produce still] joined [to the soil], nor from new [produce] for old [produce], nor from old [produce] for new. “Neither have I forgotten” I have not forgotten to bless You, nor to make mention of Your name over it.

“I have not eaten from it in my mourning” thus, if he had eaten it in his mourning (aninut), he cannot make the confession. “Neither have I removed any of it when unclean” thus, if he had removed it in uncleanness he cannot make the confession. “And I have not given any of it to the dead” I have not used any of it for a coffin or shrouds for the dead, and I have not given any of it to other mourners. “I have listened to the voice of the Lord my God” I have brought it to the chosen house. “I have done just as you commanded me I have rejoiced and made others rejoice.

“Look down from Your holy abode, from heaven” We have done what You decreed upon us, You too do what You have promised us. “Look down from Your holy abode, from heaven, and bless Your people Israel” with sons and daughters. “And the land which You have given us” with dew and rain and with offspring of cattle. “As You swore to our fathers, a land flowing with milk and honey” that You may give a good taste to the produce.

From here they said that Israelites and mamzerim may make the confession, but not converts, nor freed slaves, since they have no inheritance in the land. Rabbi Meir says: neither do priests and Levites since they did not take a share of the land. Rabbi Yose says: they have the Levitical cities.

Yohanan the high priest stopped [the recitation] of the confession of the tithes. He also abolished the “wakers” and the “strikers.” Until his days the hammer used to beat in Jerusalem. And in his days one did not have to ask about demai.

Mishnah Challah

Chapter 1

Five species [of grains] are subject to [the law of] hallah: wheat, barley, spelt, oats and rye. These are subject to hallah, and [dough made from different types of these grains] are accounted together one with another [as one quantity]. And their “new” [harvest] is prohibited prior to Pesah, and [they are subject] to [the prohibition of] reaping prior to the Omer. If they took root prior to the Omer, the omer permits them. If not, they are prohibited until the next Omer has come.

If one has eaten of [these five] on Pesah an olive-size piece of matzah, he has fulfilled his obligation. [If he ate on Pesah] an olive-size of piece of hametz [made of these grains], he is liable for karet. If one of these [grains, having become leavened,] became mixed with any other species, one must remove it on Pesah. If one has vowed [to abstain] from [consuming] bread and tevuah (produce), he is prohibited from consuming these [five species] the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: if one has vowed [to abstain] from [consuming] dagan, is prohibited only from [consuming] these [species] only. They are subject to hallah and tithes.

The following are subject to hallah, but exempt from tithes: gleanings, from the forgotten sheaf, from peah or from ownerless produce and the first tithe from which terumah has been removed, second tithe and consecrated [produce] which has been redeemed, and that which remains over from the omer, and grain which has not grown one-third [ripe]. Rabbi Eliezer says: grain which has not grown one-third [ripe] is exempt [also] from hallah.

The following are liable for tithes, but exempt from hallah: rice, millet, poppy-seed, sesame seeds, pulse, and less than five-fourths [of a kab] of [the five kinds of] grain, sponge-cakes, honey-cakes, dumplings, a cake [cooked] in a pan and medumma are exempt from hallah.

Dough which was originally [intended for] sponge-cakes, and in the end is [cooked as] sponge-cake, is exempt from hallah. [If it was] originally [ordinary] dough, but in the end [cooked as] sponge-cakes, [or if it was] originally [intended for] sponge-cakes, but finally [cooked as ordinary] dough, it is subject to hallah. Similarly, bread crumbs (kenuvkaot) are subject [to hallah].

Meisah: Bet Shammai exempts [from hallah], And Bet Hillel makes liable [for hallah]. Halita: Bet Shammai makes liable, And Bet Hillel exempts. The loaves of the thanksgiving sacrifice and the wafers of a nazirite: if one made them for oneself, they are exempt [from hallah]. [If one made them] to sell in the market, they are subject [to hallah].

A baker who made dough to divide it up into pieces, it is subject to hallah. Women who gave [flour] to a baker to make for them dough, if there is not in any one of them a [minimum] measure, it is exempt from hallah.

Dough for dogs:If shepherds eat it: it is subject to hallah, and one may use it to make an eruv or a shittuf; and one should say the blessings over it, and one should make an invitation for birkat hamazon over it; and it may be made on a festival; and one fulfills his obligation with it on Pesah. But if shepherds do not eat it: it is not subject to hallah; and one may not use it to make an eruv, or a shittuf; and one does not say the blessings over it, and one does not make an invitation for birkat hamazon over it; and it may not be made on a festival; and one does not fulfill his obligation with it on Pesah. In either case it is susceptible to ritual defilement affecting food.

In the case of hallah and terumah:One is liable for death on account of [having eaten] them death [intentionally], or to [repay] an added fifth [if unwittingly]; They are forbidden to non-priests; They are the property of the priest; They are nullified [in a mixture of] one-hundred-and-one [parts, the rest being non-sacred dough or produce]; They require washing of one’s hands; And [waiting until] the setting of the sun [prior to eating them]; They may not be separated from pure [stuff] for impure; But rather from that which is close, And from that [in a] finished [state]. If one said: “All my threshing-floor is terumah, or all my dough is hallah,” he has not said anything, unless he has left some over.

Chapter 2

Produce [grown] outside the land [of Israel] that came into the land is subject to Hallah. [If it] went out from here to there: Rabbi Eliezer makes it liable, But Rabbi Akiva makes it exempt.

Earth from outside the land has come to the land [of Israel] in a boat, [the produce grown in it] is subject to tithes and to the [law relating to] the seventh year. Rabbi Judah: when does this apply? When the boat touches [the ground]. Dough which has been kneaded with fruit-juice is subject to hallah, and may be eaten with unclean hands.

A woman may sit and separate hallah while she is naked, since she can cover herself but a man may not. If one is not able to make one's dough in cleanness he should make it [in separate] kavs, rather than make it in uncleanness. But Rabbi Akiva says: let him make it in uncleanness rather than make it [in separate] kavs, just as he calls the clean, so too he calls the unclean; this one he cals hallah with the Name, and the other he also calls hallah with the Name, but [separate] kavs have no portion [devoted] to the Name.

One who makes his dough [in separate] kavs, and they touch one another, they are exempt from hallah unless they stick together. Rabbi Eliezer says: also if one takes out [loaves from an oven] and puts [them] into a basket, the basket joins them together for [the purposes of] hallah.

If one separates his hallah [while it is still] flour, it is not hallah, and in the hand of a priest it is considered stolen property. The dough is still subject to hallah; And the flour, if there is the minimum quantity, it [also is] subject to hallah. And it is prohibited to non-priests, the words of Rabbi Joshua. They said to him: It happened that a non-priest sage seized it [for himself]. He said to them: He did something damaging to himself, but he benefited others.

Five-fourths [of a kav] of flour are subject to hallah. If their leaven, their light bran and their coarse bran [make up the] five-fourths, they are subject. If their coarse bran had been removed from them and returned to them, they are exempt.

The [minimum] measure of hallah is one twenty-fourth [part of the dough]. If he makes dough for himself, or if he makes it for his son’s [wedding] banquet, it is one twenty-fourth. If a baker makes to sell in the market, and so [also] if a woman makes to sell in the market, it is one forty-eighth. If dough is made unclean either unwittingly or by an unforeseeable circumstance, it is one forty-eighth. If it was made unclean intentionally, it is one twenty-fourth, in order that a sinner should not profit.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Hallah may be taken from [dough] that is clean, [in order to exempt] that which is unclean. How [may this be done]? [If one has] clean dough and unclean dough, he takes sufficient hallah out of the [clean] dough whose hallah has not yet been taken, and puts [dough] less than the size of an egg in the middle, in order that he may take off [the hallah] from what is close together. But the sages prohibit.

Chapter 3

One may snack from dough, until it is rolled, in [the case of] wheat [flour], or before it is made into a solid mass, in [the case of] barley [flour]. [Once] one has rolled it [in the case of] wheat [flour], or made it into a solid mass, in [the case of] barley [flour], one who eats it is liable for death [at the hands of heaven]. As soon as she puts in the water she should lift out the hallah, provided that there are not five-fourths [of a kav] of flour left there.

Dough which became medumma before she had rolled it, it is exempt [from hallah]. If after she had rolled it, it is subject [to hallah]. If there occurred to her some doubtful uncleanness before she had rolled it, it may be completed in uncleanness. If after she had rolled it, it should be completed in cleanness.

[If] she dedicated her dough [to the Temple] before rolling it, and then redeemed it, it is subject [to hallah]. [If she dedicated it] after rolling it, and redeemed it, it is subject [to hallah]. [But if] she dedicated it before rolling it, and the Temple treasurer rolled it, and after that she redeemed it, it is exempt, since at the time of its obligation it was exempt.

Similarly one who dedicates his produce prior to the stage when they are subject to tithes and then redeemed them, they are liable [to be tithed]. If [he dedicated them] when they had already become subject to tithes and then redeemed them, they are liable [to be tithed]. If he dedicated them before they had ripened, and they became ripe while in the possession of the [Temple] treasurer, and he then redeemed them, they are exempt, since at the time when they would have been liable, they were exempt.

If a Gentile gave [flour] to an Israelite to make for him dough, it is exempt from hallah. If the Gentile gave it to him as a gift, before rolling it, he is liable. If after rolling it, he is exempt. If one makes dough together with a Gentile, then if there is not in [the portion] of the Israelite the minimum measure subject to hallah, it is exempt from hallah.

A convert who converted and had dough: if it was made before he became a convert, he is exempt [from hallah]. After he converted, he is liable. And if there is doubt, he is liable, but [a non-priest who has unwittingly eaten of such hallah] is not liable for the additional one-fifth. Rabbi Akiva said: it all depends on the [time of the] formation of the light crust in the oven.

One who makes dough from wheat [flour] and from rice [flour] if it has a taste of grain, it is subject to hallah, and one can fulfill one’s obligation with it on Pesah. But if it does not have the taste of grain, it is not subject to hallah, and one cannot fulfill with it one’s obligation on Pesah.

One who takes leaven out of dough from which hallah had not been taken and puts it into dough from which hallah had been taken:If he has a supply from another place, he can take out [hallah] in accordance with the precise amount. But if does not, he takes out one [portion of] hallah for the whole [dough].

Similarly, if olives of [regular] picking became mixed with olives [left over] for striking-off [by the poor], or grapes of [regular] picking, with grapes [left over] for gleaning [by the poor]:If he has a supply from another place, he can take out [terumah and tithes] in accordance with the precise amount. But if does not, he takes out one terumah and terumat maaser for all of the grapes. And as for the rest, [he takes out] tithe and the second tithe in accordance with the precise amount.

One who takes leaven from a dough of wheat [flour] and puts [it] into dough of rice [flour], [then] if it has the taste of grain, it is subject to hallah, [but] if not, it is exempt. If so, why did they say: “Untithed produce of any amount renders food prohibited”? That is [with regard to a mixture of] a species with its own species, but [with regard to a mixture of a species] not with its own species, only when it imparts taste.

Chapter 4

Two women who made [separate doughs] from two [separate] kavs, and these [doughs] touched one another, even if they are of the same species, they are exempt [from hallah]. When they belong to one woman: If one species [comes into contact] with the same species, they are subject [to hallah]. If different species, they are exempt.

What counts as a species with its same species?Wheat is not reckoned together with any [species] other than with spelt; Barley is reckoned together with all [species] except wheat. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: the rest of the species are reckoned together one with another.

[If there are two doughs from] two [separate] kavs, and a kav of rice [dough] or a kav of terumah dough [lying] between, they are not reckoned together. [If there was] dough from which hallah had already been taken [lying] between, they are reckoned together, since it had once been subject to hallah.

A kav of [dough made from] new grain and a kav of [dough from] old grain which are stuck together: Rabbi Ishmael says: let him take [hallah] from the middle; But the sages prohibit. One who has taken hallah from [dough made out of] one kav: Rabbi Akiva says: it is hallah; But the sages say: it is not hallah.

Two [separate] kavs [of dough], this one had its hallah removed on its own, and this one had its hallah removed on its own, and then he went back and made of them one dough: Rabbi Akiva exempts; But the sages make it liable. It turns out that the stringency of his [first] ruling leads to the leniency of his other ruling.

A man may take the requisite amount for hallah out of [clean] dough from which hallah has not [previously] been removed in order to remove it in a state of cleanness in order to go on separating [hallah] from it for [unclean] demai, until it becomes putrid, since hallah for demai may be taken from clean [dough] for unclean [dough], and from [one dough for another dough] which is not in close proximity.

An Israelite who was a tenant of a non-Jew in Syria: Rabbi Eliezer makes their produce liable to tithes and to [the law of] the sabbatical year; But Rabban Gamaliel makes [it] exempt. Rabban Gamaliel says: [one is to give] two hallah-portions in Syria; But Rabbi Eliezer says: [only] one hallah-portion. They adopted the lenient ruling of Rabban Gamaliel and the lenient ruling of Rabbi Eliezer. Eventually they went back and acted in accordance with Rabban Gamaliel in both respects.

Rabban Gamaliel says: there are three territories with regard to [liability to] hallah:From the land of Israel to Chezib: one hallah-portion. From Chezib to the river and to Amanah: two hallah-portions. One for the fire and one for the priest. The one for the fire has a minimum measure, and the one for the priest does not have a minimum measure. From the river and from Amanah and inward: two hallah-portions. One for the fire and one for the priest. The one for the fire has no minimum measure, and the one for the priest has a minimum measure. And [a priest] who has immersed himself during the day [and has not waited till sunset for his purification to be complete] may eat it. Rabbi Yose says: he does not require immersion. But it is forbidden to zavim and zavot, to menstruants, and to women after childbirth; It may be eaten with a non-priest at the [same] table; And it may be given to any priest.

These may be given to any priest:Devoted things (haramim); Firstlings; The redemption of the first born; The [lamb substituted as] ransom for the firstling of a donkey; The shoulder, the two cheeks and the maw; The first of the fleece; Oil [fit only] for burning; Consecrated food [which must be eaten] within the Temple; And bikkurim. Rabbi Judah prohibits bikkurim. Vetches of terumah: Rabbi Akiva permits, But the sages prohibit.

Nittai of Tekoa brought hallah-portions from Be-Yitur, but they did not accept from him. The people of Alexandria brought hallah, but they did not accept from them. The people from Mt. Zevoim brought bikkurim prior to Atzeret (Shavuot), but they did not accept from them, on for it is written in the Torah: “And the festival of the harvest, the first-fruits of your labors, which you have sown in the field” (Exodus 23:16).

Ben Antigonus brought up firstlings from Babylon, but they did not accept from him. Joseph the priest brought first fruits of wine and oil, but they did not accept from him. He also brought up his sons and members of his household to celebrate Pesah katan in Jerusalem, but they turned him back, so that the thing should not become firmly fixed as an obligation. Ariston brought his first fruits from Apamea and they accepted from him, because they said, one who buys [a field] in Syria is as one who buys [a field] in the outskirts of Jerusalem.

Mishnah Orlah

Chapter 1

One who plants [a fruit tree] as a fence or to provide wood beams, it is exempt from [the law of] orlah. Rabbi Yose says: even if he said “The inward [facing part of the tree] is for food, and the outward [facing part] is for a fence,” the inward [facing part] is subject [to orlah], and the outward [facing part] is exempt.

If at the time when our ancestors came into the land and they found [a tree already] planted it was exempt [from the laws of orlah]. If they planted [a tree], even though they had not yet conquered [the land], it was subject [to orlah]. If one planted a tree for [the use of] the many, it is subject. But Rabbi Judah makes it exempt. If one has planted [a tree] in the public domain, or if a non-Jew has planted, or if a robber has planted, or one who plants on a boat, or [a tree] that has grown of itself, it is subject to orlah.

If a tree was uprooted and the hard soil together with it, or if a stream swept it away and the hard soil together with it, [then] if it could have lived it is exempt, But if [it could] not, it is subject. If the hard soil has been detached from its side, or if a ploughshare shook it, or if someone shook it, and one reset it with earth, [then] if it could have lived, it is exempt, But if not, it is subject.

If a tree was uprooted and one root was left [in the ground], it is exempt. How much must the [thickness of the] root be? Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said in the name of Rabb Eliezer ben Judah a man of Bartota: as [thick as] a pin [used for] stretching.

A tree which was uprooted and it has a bent-down [and rooted] shoot, and it [the tree] derives sustenance from it [the shoot], the old [tree] is [considered] like the shoot. If one bends [and roots] from it year after year, and it became detached, one counts from the time it became detached. A grafted shoot of vines, and a grafted shoot [growing] on another grafted shoot, even if he rooted them in the soil, they are permitted. Rabbi Meir said: in an instance where it is strongly [grafted], it is permitted, but in an instance where it is poorly [grafted], it is prohibited. A bent-down [and rooted] shoot that has become detached and is full of fruit, [then] if it increased one two hundredth, it is prohibited.

If a shoot of orlah or a vineyard in which seeds had been planted (kilayim), became mixed up with [other] shoots, behold one may not gather [the fruit]. But if one has gathered [it], it is neutralized in two hundred-and-one, provided that he did not act deliberately. Rabbi Yose says: even if he acted deliberately, it becomes neutralized in two hundred-and-one.

Leaves, sprouts, sap of vines, and vine-buds are permitted in respect of orlah and the laws of the fourth year, and to a nazirite, but are prohibited if they come from an Asherah [tree]. Rabbi Yose says: vine-buds are prohibited because they are fruit. Rabbi Eliezer said: if one curdles [milk] with the resinous substances of [a tree liable to] orlah, it is prohibited. Rabbi Joshua said: I have received an explicit tradition that if one curdles [milk] with the resinous substance of the leaves, or with the resinous substance of the roots, it is permitted, but with the resinous substance of the unripe berries, it is prohibited, because these are fruit.

Defective grapes, grape kernels, grape husks, and the temed drink made from them, the peel of a pomegranate and its sprout, nutshells, and fruit-seeds, are all subject to the laws of orlah, asherah and a nazirite, but permitted in respect of a fourth year vineyard. Fallen unripe fruit is subject to all of them.

Rabbi Yose says: one may plant a shoot of orlah; But one may not plant a nut of orlah, because it is fruit. And one may not graft early date berries of orlah.

Chapter 2

Terumah, terumat maaser of demai, hallah and bikkurim, are neutralized in a hundred-and-one mixture. And they are reckoned together [to form the statutory minimum]. And it is necessary to remove [from the mixture an amount equal to that of the consecrated produce contained in it]. Orlah and kilayim of the vineyard are neutralized in a two-hundred-and-one mixture. And they are reckoned together [to form the statutory minimum]. But it is not necessary to remove [from the mixture an amount equal to that of the consecrated produce contained in it]. Rabbi Shimon says: they are not reckoned together. Rabbi Eliezer says: they are reckoned together when they impart flavor, but not to prohibit.

Terumah can void orlah, and orlah can void terumah. How so? [For instance] a seah of terumah fell into one hundred, and afterwards three kavs of orlah or three kavs of mixed-seeds of the vineyard [fell in]. This is [an instance] where terumah goes towards neutralizing orlah, and orlah terumah.

Orlah can void kilayim, and kilayim [can void] orlah, and orlah [can void] orlah. How so? A seah of orlah falls into two hundred [seahs] and afterwards there falls in a seah and a little bit more of orlah, or a seah and a little bit more of kilayim of the vineyard--this is [a case] where orlah can void kilayim, and kilayim [can void] orlah, and orlah [can void] orlah.

Whatever causes something to ferment, or seasons, or makes medumma with terumah, with orlah or with ‘mixed-seeds’ of the vineyard, is prohibited. Bet Shammai says: it also renders unclean. But Bet Hillel says: it never renders unclean unless it has the volume of an egg.

Dostai of Kefar Yitmah was one of the disciples of Bet Shammai, and he said, “I received a tradition from Shammai the elder who said: “It never renders unclean unless it contains the volume of an egg.”

Concerning what did they say: “Anything that causes fermentation or seasons or which renders medumma we rule stringently”? [In the case of] a species [mixed] with its [like] species. [When did they say] “we rule [sometimes] leniently and [sometimes] stringently”? [In the case of] a species [mixed] with a different kind of species. How so? If leaven of wheat fell into dough of wheat and there is enough to cause fermentation, [then] whether there is enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, or there is not enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, it is prohibited. If there is not enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, [then] whether there is enough to cause fermentation, or there is not enough to cause fermentation, it is prohibited.

[We rule sometimes] leniently and [sometimes] stringently, [in the case of] a species [mixed] with a different kind of species. How so? If crushed beans were boiled together with lentils, and there is enough of them [the crushed beans] to impart flavor, [then] whether there is enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, or there is not enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, it is prohibited. [But] if there is not enough to impart flavor, [then] whether there is enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, or there is not enough to become neutralized in one-hundred-and-one, [the mixture] is permitted.

If leaven of hullin has fallen into dough, and there was enough of it to cause fermentation, and after that leaven of terumah fell in or leaven of kilayim of the vineyard, and there is enough to cause fermentation, [the dough] is prohibited.

If leaven of hullin has fallen into dough and caused it to ferment, and after that there fell in leaven of terumah or of kilayim of the vineyard, and there was enough to cause fermentation, [the dough] is prohibited. But Rabbi Shimon permits it.

Seasonings [consisting] of two or three categories of one species, or [consisting] of three species [of one category], are forbidden and combine. Rabbi Shimon said: Two or three categories of one species, or two species of one category, do not combine.

Leaven of hullin and of terumah fell into dough, and neither this was sufficient to cause fermentation nor was that sufficient to cause fermentation, but together they caused [the dough] to ferment:Rabbi Eliezer says: I go after the last. But the sages say: whether the prohibited fell in first or last, it never causes the dough to become prohibited unless there is enough to cause fermentation.

Yoezer, master of the temple (Ish Habirah), was one of the disciples of Bet Shammai and he said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel the elder as he was standing at the eastern gate [of the Temple], and he said: it never causes the dough to become prohibited unless there is enough to cause fermentation.

Vessels which were oiled with unclean oil, and [later] he returned and oiled them with clean oil; Or he [first] oiled them with clean oil, and [later] he returned [to them] and oiled them with unclean oil: Rabbi Eliezer says: “I go after the first.” And the sages say: after the last.

Leaven of terumah and of kilayim of the vineyard which fell into dough, this one is not sufficient to cause fermentation, nor is that one sufficient to cause fermentation, but together they cause fermentation:It [the dough] is prohibited to non-priests and permitted to priests. Rabbi Shimon permits it to both to non-priests and to priests.

Seasonings of terumah and of kilayim of the vineyard that fell into a dish, and there is not enough of one to season, nor is there of the other to season, but together they seasoned:It [the dish] is prohibited to non-priests but permitted to priests. Rabbi Shimon declares it permitted to non-priests and to priests.

A piece of [meat from] one of the most holy [sacrifices] and [a piece] of [meat which is] piggul, or remnant, which were cooked with other pieces, it [the non-sacred meat] is prohibited to non-priests but permitted to priests. Rabbi Shimon declares it permitted to non-priests and to priests.

Meat of most holy [sacrifices] and meat of less holy [sacrifices] were cooked together with ordinary meat: [the dish] is prohibited to the unclean, but permitted to the clean.

Chapter 3

A garment dyed with peels of orlah [fruit] must be burned. If it became mixed up with other [garments], all of them shall be burned, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: it becomes neutralized in two-hundred-and-one.

If one dyed a thread the whole [length] of a sit with orlah peels, and wove it into a garment, and it is not known which [thread] it is:Rabbi Meir says: the garment must be burned; But the sages say: it becomes neutralized in two-hundred-and-one.

If one wove thread the whole [length] of a sit from [the wool of a] first-born animal into a garment, the garment must be burned. [If from] the hair of a nazirite or of the first-born of a donkey into sack-cloth, the sack-cloth must be burned. And if even the smallest amount [from wool or hair of] consecrated [animals], that which it is woven into] is consecrated.

A dish which one cooked with shells of orlah must be burned. If [the dish] became mixed up with other [dishes], it becomes neutralized in two-hundred-and-one.

An oven that was lit with shells of orlah, and then one baked bread in it, the bread must be burned. If it became mixed up with other [loaves] it becomes neutralized in two-hundred-and-one.

If one has bundles of fenugreek of kilayim of the vineyard, they must be burned. If they became mixed up with others, all of them must be burned, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say they become neutralized in two-hundred-and-one.

For Rabbi Meir used to say: anything that is normally [sold] by counting causes [a mixture] to become consecrated [in even the smallest amount]. But the sages say only six things consecrate [a mixture in even the smallest amount], and Rabbi Akiba says seven [things]. And these are they: Nuts with soft shells; badan pomegranates; stopped-up casks; beet shoots; cabbage-heads; Greek pumpkins. Rabbi Akiba says: also loaves [baked by] a householder. To those to which orlah applies [they prohibit the mixture] as orlah, [to those of which] kilayim of the vineyard apply [they prohibit the mixture as] kilayim of the vineyard.

How so? If the nuts cracked, or if the pomegranates burst open, or the casks became unstopped, or the pumpkins were cut, or the loaves were broken up, they become neutralized in two-hundred-and-one.

Doubtful orlah: in the land of Israel is prohibited, in Syria is permitted, and outside the land one may go down and purchase [from a non-Israelite] as long as he has not seen him gathering it. A vineyard planted with vegetables [which are kilayim], and they [the vegetables] are sold outside of it: in the land of Israel these are prohibited, and in Syria they are permitted; outside the land one may go down and purchase them as long as he does not gather [them] with [one’s own] hand. New [produce] is prohibited by the Torah in all places. And orlah is a halachah. And kilayim are an enactment of the scribes.

Mishnah Bikkurim

Chapter 1

There are some who bring bikkurim and recite [the declaration]; others who only bring, but do not recite; and there are some who neither bring nor recite.The following are those that do not bring: one who plants [a vine] on his own property, but buries [a shoot in the ground] so that [it] grows on property belonging to [another] individual or to the public. And similarly if one buries [a shoot in the ground] of another person’s private property or in public property, so that it grows on his own property; Or, if one plants [a vine] on his own [property] and [buries it in the ground] so that it still grows on his own property, but there is a private or public road between, such a one does not bring [bikkurim.] Rabbi Judah says: such a one has to bring bikkurim.

For what reason may he not bring them? Because it is said, “The first-fruits of your land” (Exodus 23:19) until all of their growth is on your land. Sharecroppers, leasers, or occupiers of confiscated property (sikarikon), or a robber does not bring them for the same reason, because it says, “The first-fruits of your land.”

Bikkurim are brought only from the seven species. Not from dates grown on hills, nor from [the other species] grown in the valley, nor from olives that are not choice. Bikkurim are not to be brought before Shavuot. The people from Mt. Zevoim brought bikkurim prior to Atzeret (Shavuot), but they did not accept from them, on for it is written in the Torah: “And the festival of the harvest, the first-fruits of your labors, which you have sown in the field” (Exodus 23:16).

These bring [bikkurim] but do not read the declaration:The convert, since he cannot say: “Which the Lord has sworn to our fathers, to give to us” (Deuteronomy 26:3). If his mother was an Israelite, then he brings bikkurim and recites. When he prays privately, he says: “God of the fathers of Israel,” but when he is in the synagogue, he should say: “The God of your fathers.” But if his mother was an Israelite, he says: “The God of our fathers’.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: a woman who is a daughter of a convert may not marry a priest unless her mother was herself an Israelite. [This law applies equally to the offspring] whether of proselytes or freed slaves, even to ten generations, unless their mother is an Israelite. A guardian, an agent, a slave, a woman, one of doubtful sex, or a hermaphrodite bring the bikkurim, but do not recite, since they cannot say: “Which you, O Lord, have given to me” (Deuteronomy 26:10).

One who buys two trees [that had grown] in property belonging to his fellow brings bikkurim but does not recite the declaration. Rabbi Meir says: he brings and recites. If the well dried up, or the tree was cut down, he brings but does not recite. Rabbi Judah says: he brings and recites. From Atzeret (Shavuot) until the Festival (of Sukkot) he brings and recites. From the Festival (of Sukkot) and until Hannukah he brings, but does not recite. Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: he brings and recites.

If one set aside his bikkurim and [afterwards] sold his field, he brings but does not recite. The second one [who bought the field] does not bring [bikkurim] of the same species, but of another species he brings and recites. Rabbi Judah says: he may also bring of the same kind and recite.

If one set aside his bikkurim and they were robbed, or rotted, were stolen or lost, or became unclean, he must bring others in their place, but does not recite [the declaration]. These others are not subject to the law of the [added] fifth. If they become unclean while in the Temple court, he must scatter them and he does not recite.

From where do we know that one is responsible [for his bikkurim] until he brings them to the temple Mount? Because it says: “The first of the first-fruits of your land you shall bring into the house of the Lord your God” (Exodus 23:19) this teaches that he is responsible until he brings them to the Temple Mount. If he brought [bikkurim] of one kind and made the recital and then brought of another kind, he does not make a [second] recital.

These bring and recite:[One who brings bikkurim] from Atzeret until the Festival [of Sukkot], from the seven species, from fruit grown on the mountains, or dates grown in the valleys, from oil-olives, and from [produce] from the other side of the Jordan. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: one does not bring [bikkurim] from transjordania, since that is not a land flowing with milk and honey.

One who bought three trees in another’s field, he brings [bikkurim] and recites. Rabbi Meir says: even [if he bought] only two. If he bought one tree with its land, he brings [bikkurim] and recites. Rabbi Judah says: even sharecroppers and leasers bring and recite.

Chapter 2

Regarding terumah and bikkurim:One is liable to death And the [additional] fifth; And they are forbidden to non-priests; And they are the property of the priest; And they are neutralized in a hundred and one parts; And they require the washing of hands; And the setting of the sun. These [laws] apply only to terumah and bikkurim, but not to tithe.

There are [laws] which apply to [second tithe] and bikkurim but not to terumah:That [second] tithe and bikkurim must to be brought to [the appointed] place; They require confession; They are forbidden to an onen. But Rabbi Shimon permits [bikkurim to an onen]; They are subject to [the law of] removal. But Rabbi Shimon exempts [bikkurim from removal]. And in Jerusalem the slightest mixture of them [with hullin of the same species] renders it forbidden to be consumed [as common food outside of Jerusalem.] And what grows from them in Jerusalem is forbidden to be consumed [outside of Jerusalem], Even by non-priests or by cattle; But Rabbi Shimon permits. These are [the laws] which apply to [second] tithe and bikkurim, but not to terumah.

There are [laws] which apply to terumah and maaser [sheni] but not to bikkurim:Terumah and the [second] tithe render forbidden [the contents of] the threshing-floor; They have a set amount. They apply to all produce; Both during and after Temple times; [And they apply to to produce grown] by sharecroppers, leasers, or occupiers of confiscated property (sikarikon), or a robber. These are [the laws] which apply to terumah and maaser [sheni], but not to bikkurim.

And there are [laws] which apply to bikkurim which do not [apply] to terumah or maaser sheni:For bikkurim can become acquired while still attached [to the soil]. And a man may make his entire field bikkurim; He is responsible for them; And they require a sacrifice, a song, waving and spending the night in Jerusalem.

The terumah of tithe is like bikkurim in two ways, and like terumah in two other ways:It may be taken from pure produce for impure produce; And from such produce that is not in close proximity, like bikkurim. And it renders the contents of the threshing-floor forbidden, And it has a prescribed amount like terumah.

An etrog is similar in three ways to [the fruit of an ordinary] tree, and in one way to a vegetable. It is similar to a tree in respect of orlah, fourth year plantings, and [the law of] the seventh year; And it is similar to a vegetable in one thing: that its tithing goes according to the time it is harvested, the words of Rabban Gamaliel. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is similar to a tree in all ways.

The blood of those who walk on two [legs] is like the blood of beasts in that it renders seeds susceptible [to impurity]. And it is like the blood of a sheretz, in that one is not liable for eating it.

A koy is in some ways like a wild animal (hayyah); in some ways it is like a domesticated animal (behemah); in some ways it is like both a behemah and a hayyah, and in some ways it is like neither a behemah nor a hayyah.

How is it like a wild animal?Its blood must be covered like the blood of a wild animal. It may not be slaughtered on a festival. If he slaughtered it, he should not cover its blood. Its fat is impure like that of a wild animal, but its impurity is of doubtful status. One does not redeem with it the first-born of a donkey.

And how is [the koy] similar to a behemah (a domesticated beast)?Its fat (helev) is prohibited like the fat of a behemah, but one [who eats it] is not liable for karet. It may not be bought with the money from second tithe to be eaten in Jerusalem. It is subject to [the priest’s share of] the shoulder, the two cheeks and the maw. Rabbi Eliezer exempts it because the burden of proof is upon the one who extracts from his neighbor.

And how is [a koy] neither like a behemah nor like a hayyah?It is forbidden because of kilayim [to yoke it] with either a behemah or a hayyah. One who deeds his son his behemah and his hayyah he has not [thereby] given him the koy. If one says, “I will become a nazirite if this is [not] a hayyah or a behemah”, he is a nazirite. In all other ways it is like a behemah and a hayyah: It requires slaughtering (shehitah) like them both; It carries carrion impurity; And to it applies the law relating to a limb of a living being like them both.

Chapter 3

How does one set aside bikkurim? A man goes down into his field, he sees a fig that ripened, or a cluster of grapes that ripened, or a pomegranate that ripened, he ties a reed-rope around it and says: “Let these be bikkurim.” Rabbi Shimon says: even so, he must again designate them as bikkurim after they have been plucked from the soil.

How were the bikkurim taken up [to Jerusalem]? All [the inhabitants of] the cities of the maamad would assemble in the city of the maamad, and they would spend the night in the open street and they would not entering any of the houses. Early in the morning the officer would say: “Let us arise and go up to Zion, into the house of the Lord our God” (Jeremiah 31:5).

Those who lived near [Jerusalem] would bring fresh figs and grapes, while those who lived far away would bring dried figs and raisins. An ox would go in front of them, his horns bedecked with gold and with an olive-crown on its head. The flute would play before them until they would draw close to Jerusalem. When they drew close to Jerusalem they would send messengers in advance, and they would adorn their bikkurim. The governors and chiefs and treasurers [of the Temple] would go out to greet them, and according to the rank of the entrants they would go forth. All the skilled artisans of Jerusalem would stand up before them and greet them saying, “Our brothers, men of such and such a place, we welcome you in peace.”

The flute would play before them, until they reached the Temple Mount. When they reached the Temple Mount even King Agrippas would take the basket and place it on his shoulder and walk as far as the Temple Court. When he got to the Temple Court, the Levites would sing the song: “I will extol You, O Lord, for You have raised me up, and You have not let my enemies rejoice over me” (Psalms 30:2).

The birds [tied to] the basket were [offered] as whole burnt-offerings, and those which they held in their hands they gave to the priests.

While the basket was still on his shoulder he recites from: "I acknowledge this day before the LORD your God that I have entered the land that the LORD swore to our fathers to assign us” (Deuteronomy 26:3) until he completes the passage. Rabbi Judah said: until [he reaches] “My father was a fugitive Aramean” (v.. When he reaches, “My father was a fugitive Aramean”, he takes the basket off his shoulder and holds it by its edges, and the priest places his hand beneath it and waves it. He then recites from “My father was a fugitive Aramean” until he completes the entire passage. He then deposits the basket by the side of the altar, bow and depart.

Originally all who knew how to recite would recite while those who did not know how to recite, others would read it for them [and they would repeat the words]. But when they refrained from bringing, they decreed that they should read the words to both those who could and those who could not [recite so that they could repeat after them].

The rich would bring their bikkurim in baskets overlaid with silver or gold, while the poor used wicker-baskets of peeled willow-branches, and the baskets and the bikkurim were given to the priest.

Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas says: they would decorate the bikkurim [with produce] other than the seven species. But Rabbi Akiva says: they may decorate only with produce of the seven kinds.

Rabbi Shimon says: there are three elements in bikkurim: the bikkurim, the additions to the bikkurim, and the ornamentations of the bikkurim. The additions to the bikkurim must be of a like kind; But the ornamentations can be of a different kind. The additions to the bikkurim can only be eaten in purity, and are exempt from demai. But the ornamentations of the bikkurim are subject to demai.

When did they say that the additions to the bikkurim are like bikkurim [themselves]? When they come from the land [of Israel]; but if they do not come from the land, they were not regarded as bikkurim [themselves].

In what respect did they say that bikkurim are the property of the priest? In that he can purchase with bikkurim slaves and land and unclean beasts, and a creditor [of his] may take them for his debt, and his wife for her ketubah. As may be done with a Torah scroll. Rabbi Judah says: bikkurim may be given only to [a priest that is] a haver (an associate) and as a favor. But the sages say: they are given to the men of the mishmar, and they divide them among themselves as [they do] with all other consecrated objects.

Chapter 4

The hermaphrodite is in some ways like men, and in other ways like women. In other ways he is like men and women, and in others he is like neither men nor women.

In what ways is he like men? He causes impurity with white discharge, like men; He dresses like men; He can take a wife but not be taken as a wife, like men. [When he is born] his mother counts the blood of purification, like men; He may not be secluded with women, like men. He is not maintained with the daughters, like men; He transgresses the law of: “You shall not round” (Leviticus 19:2 and “You shall not defile for the dead,” (Leviticus 21:1) like men; And he must perform all the commandments of the Torah, like men.

And in what ways is he like women? He causes impurity with red discharge, like women; And he must not be secluded with men, like women; And he doesn’t make his brother’s wife liable for yibbum (levirate marriage); And he does not share [in the inheritance] with the sons, like women; And he cannot eat most holy sacrifices, like women. At his birth his mother counts the blood of her impurity like [they do when they give birth to a] girl; And he is disqualified from being a witness, like women. If he had illicit intercourse, he is disqualified from eating terumah, like women.

In what ways is he like both men and women? One who strikes him or curses him is liable, as in the case of men and women; One who unwittingly kills him must go into exile, and if on purpose, then [the slayer] receives the death penalty, as in the case of men and women. His mother must [at his birth] bring an offering, as in the case of men and women. He may eat holy things that are eaten outside of the Temple; And he may inherit any inheritance, as in the case of men and women.

And in what is he different from both men and women? One does not burn terumah if it came into contact with his discharge, Neither is he liable for entering the temple while impure, unlike men or women. He must not be sold as a Hebrew slave, unlike men or women. He cannot be evaluated, unlike men or women. If one says: “I will be a nazirite, if he is neither a man nor a woman,” then he becomes a nazirite. Rabbi Yose says: the hermaphrodite is a unique creature, and the sages could not decide about him. But this is not so with a tumtum (one of doubtful), for sometimes he is a man and sometimes he is a woman.

Mishnah Shabbat

Chapter 1

The acts of carrying out from a public domain into a private domain or vice versa, which are prohibited on Shabbat, are primarily two basic actions that comprise four cases from the perspective of a person inside a private domain, and two basic actions that comprise four cases from the perspective of a person outside, in a public domain. The mishna elaborates: How do these eight cases take place? In order to answer that question, the mishna cites cases involving a poor person and a homeowner. The poor person stands outside, in the public domain, and the homeowner stands inside, in the private domain. The poor person lifted an object in the public domain, extended his hand into the private domain, and placed the object into the hand of the homeowner. In that case, the poor person performed the prohibited labor of carrying from the public domain into the private domain in its entirety. Or, the poor person reached his hand into the private domain, took an item from the hand of the homeowner, and carried it out into the public domain. In that case, the poor person performed the prohibited labor of carrying out from the private domain into the public domain in its entirety. In both of these cases, because the poor person performed the prohibited labor in its entirety, he is liable and the homeowner is exempt. The mishna cites two additional cases. In these, the prohibited labor is performed by the homeowner, who is in the private domain: The homeowner lifted an item in the private domain, extended his hand into the public domain, and placed the object into the hand of the poor person. In that case, the homeowner performed the labor of carrying out from the private domain into the public domain in its entirety. Or, the homeowner reached his hand into the public domain, took an object from the hand of the poor person, and carried it into the private domain. In that case, the homeowner performed the labor of carrying from the public domain into the private domain in its entirety. In both of those cases, because the homeowner performed the prohibited labor in its entirety, he is liable and the poor person is exempt. There are four additional cases where neither the homeowner nor the poor person performed the labor in its entirety, and therefore neither is liable: The poor person extended his hand into the private domain and either the homeowner took an object from his hand and placed it in the private domain or the homeowner placed an object into the hand of the poor person, and the poor person carried the object out into the public domain. In those cases and the two that follow, the act of transferring the object from one domain to another was performed jointly by two people, the poor person and the homeowner. Because each performed only part of the prohibited labor, both of them are exempt. So too, in a case where the homeowner extended his hand into the public domain and, either the poor person took an object from the homeowner’s hand and placed it in the public domain or the poor person placed an object into the homeowner’s hand and the homeowner carried the object into the private domain. Because each performed only part of the prohibited labor, both of them are exempt.

After having dealt with the limited and defined topic of the halakhot of carrying out on Shabbat, the mishna begins to deal with the halakhot of Shabbat chronologically, beginning with activities that one may not perform prior to the onset of Shabbat. With regard to one’s daily conduct, the mishna says: A person may not sit before the barber adjacent to the time of minḥa until he recites the afternoon prayer. And a person may not enter the bathhouse and may not enter to work in a tannery [ burseki ]. And he may neither begin to eat a meal nor to sit in judgment until he prays. And however, if they already began engaging in those activities, they need not stop and recite the Amida prayer. The tanna articulated a principle: One stops engaging in all of these activities to recite Shema and one does not stop to recite the Amida prayer.

This mishna deals with various decrees, especially with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, which were issued in order to distance a person from transgressions that he is liable to commit through habit and routine. The mishna said: The tailor may not go out with his needle adjacent to nightfall on Shabbat eve, lest he forget that he is carrying the needle and go out with it to the public domain even after Shabbat begins. And, similarly, the scribe [ lavlar ] may not go out with his quill [ kulmos ] for the same reason. And one may not shake his clothes on Shabbat to rid them of lice; and one may not read a book by candlelight, so that he will not come to adjust the wick of the lamp. However, in truth they said an established halakha : The attendant sees where in the book the children under his supervision are reading in the Torah, even by candlelight on Shabbat. However, he himself may not read. Similarly, the Sages issued a similar decree with regard to other halakhot, as they said: The zav may not eat even with his wife the zava, despite the fact that they are both ritually impure, because, by eating together, they will come to excessive intimacy and become accustomed to sin.

And these are among the halakhot that the Sages, who went up to visit him, said in the upper story of Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya ben Garon. The precise nature of these halakhot will be explained in the Gemara. These halakhot are considered one unit because they share a distinctive element. Since many Sages were there, among them most of the generation’s Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, they engaged in discussion of various halakhot of the Torah. It turned out that when the people expressing opinions were counted, the students of Beit Shammai outnumbered the students of Beit Hillel, and they issued decrees with regard to eighteen matters on that day in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.

In this mishna there is a fundamental dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai: Must one begin refraining from actions prohibited on Shabbat on Shabbat eve? Or, may one initiate an action prior to Shabbat, even if he knows that it will continue on its own on Shabbat itself? These are the details of that dispute: Beit Shammai say: One may only soak dry ink in water and dry plants, which produce dyes, in water and vetch for animal food to soften them in water on Shabbat eve, adjacent to Shabbat, if there is clearly sufficient time for them to soak for their designated purpose while it is still day, before Shabbat begins, and their continued soaking on Shabbat will have no effect. And Beit Hillel permit doing so.

Beit Shammai say: One may only place bundles of combed flax inside the oven on Shabbat eve if there is sufficient time so that they will be heated while it is still day. And one may only place wool into the dyer’s kettle if there is sufficient time for the wool to absorb the dye while it is still day. And Beit Hillel permit doing so. Beit Shammai say: One may spread traps for an animal and birds and fish only if there is sufficient time remaining in the day for them to be trapped in them while it is still day, and Beit Hillel permit doing so even if there is not sufficient time remaining in the day.

Beit Shammai say: One may only sell an item to a gentile on Shabbat eve, and one may only load a burden on his donkey with him, and one may only lift a burden on him if there remains sufficient time for the gentile to arrive to a near place prior to Shabbat, and the Jew will play no role in the performance of a prohibited labor by the gentile on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel permit doing so.

Beit Shammai say: One may not give skins to a gentile tanner, nor clothes to a gentile launderer, unless there is sufficient time for work on them to be completed while it is still day, before Shabbat begins. And in all of them Beit Hillel permit doing so with the sun, i.e., as long as the sun is shining on Friday.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: The ancestral house of my father, the dynasty of Nesi’im from the house of Hillel, was accustomed to give its white clothes to a gentile launderer no fewer than three days before Shabbat. And, however, these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that, ab initio, one may load the beam of the olive press on the olives on Shabbat eve while it is still day, so that the oil will continue to be squeezed out of the olives on Shabbat. So too, one may load the circular wine press to accelerate the process of producing wine from the grapes.

This mishna enumerates actions that may only be performed on Shabbat eve if the prohibited labor will be totally or mostly completed while it is still day. One may only roast meat, an onion, or an egg if there remains sufficient time so that they could be roasted while it is still day. One may only place dough to bake into bread in the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall, and may only place a cake on the coals, if there is time enough that the surface of this cake or bread will form a crust while it is still day. Rabbi Eliezer says: Enough time so that its bottom crust should harden, which takes less time.

However in a case that is an exception, one may, ab initio, lower the Paschal lamb into the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall, so that its roasting is completed on Shabbat if Passover eve coincides with Shabbat eve. And one may, ab initio, kindle the fire in the bonfire of the Chamber of the Hearth in the Temple on Shabbat eve, adjacent to the start of Shabbat, and allow the fire to spread afterward throughout all the wood in the bonfire. And, however, in the outlying areas, meaning in all of Eretz Yisrael outside the Temple, it is prohibited to light a bonfire on Shabbat eve, unless there is sufficient time for the fire to take hold in most of the bonfire, while it is still day. Rabbi Yehuda says: With a bonfire of coals, even in the outlying areas one is permitted to light the fire on Shabbat eve at nightfall, even if the fire only spread to any amount of the bonfire. The coals, once they are kindled, will not be extinguished again, and there is no concern lest he come to tend to them on Shabbat.

Chapter 2

This mishna cites a list of fuels and wicks that one may not use in kindling the Shabbat lights, either because their use might induce one to perform a prohibited labor on Shabbat or because they are not in keeping with the deference due Shabbat. The mishna begins by listing the materials that one may not use as wicks. That is followed by a list of the substances that one may not use as fuel. With what may one light the Shabbat lamp, and with what may one not light it? With regard to types of prohibited wicks, one may light neither with cedar bast [ lekhesh ], nor with uncombed flax [ ḥosen ], nor with raw silk [ kalakh ], nor with willow bast [ petilat ha ’ idan ], nor with desert weed [ petilat hamidbar ], nor with green moss that is on the surface of the water. With regard to types of prohibited oils, one may light neither with pitch [ zefet ], nor with wax [ sha ’ ava ], nor with castor oil [ shemen kik ], nor with burnt oil [ shemen sereifa ], nor with fat from a sheep’s tail [ alya ], nor with tallow [ ḥelev ]. Naḥum the Mede says: One may light with boiled tallow. And the Rabbis say: Both tallow that was boiled and tallow that was not boiled, one may not light with them.

In continuation of the previous mishna, this mishna adds that one may not light with burnt oil on a Festival, as the Gemara will explain below. With regard to lighting Shabbat lamps, there were Sages who prohibited the use of specific oils. Rabbi Yishmael says that one may not light with tar [ itran ] in deference to Shabbat because tar smells bad and disturbs those in the house. And the Rabbis permit lighting with all oils for lamps as long as they burn properly; with sesame oil, with nut oil, with turnip oil, with fish oil, with gourd oil, with tar, and even with naphtha [ neft ]. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may light only with olive oil in deference to Shabbat, as it is the choicest and most pleasant of the oils.

Of all substances that emerge from the tree, one may light only with flax on Shabbat ( Tosafot ) because the other substances do not burn well. And of all substances that emerge from the tree, the only substance that becomes ritually impure with impurity transmitted by tents over a corpse is flax. If there is a dead body inside a house or a tent that is made from any materials that originate from a tree, everything in the house becomes ritually impure. However, only in the case of flax does the tent itself become impure. The wick of a garment, i.e., cloth made into a wick for a lamp, that one folded it into a size and shape suitable for a wick, but did not yet singe it slightly in order to facilitate its lighting, Rabbi Eliezer says: This wick is ritually impure. With regard to the laws of ritual impurity, it can, like other garments, still become ritually impure and one may not light with it on Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva says: It is ritually pure and one may even light with it on Shabbat.

The fundamental dispute in this mishna is with regard to the determination whether or not indirect acts of kindling and extinguishing fall within the parameters of the prohibition on Shabbat. The Rabbis said: A person may not pierce a hole in an eggshell and fill it with oil, and place it over the mouth of a lamp so that the egg will drip additional oil into the lamp and thereby extend the time that it burns. And this is the ruling even if it is not an actual egg but an earthenware vessel. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so. However, if the craftsman, who crafts ceramic vessels, attached the egg to the lamp from the outset, one is permitted to fill it with oil because it constitutes a single, large vessel. The Rabbis decreed that a person may not fill a bowl with oil, and place it beside the lamp, and place the unlit head of the wick into the bowl so that it draws additional oil from the bowl and thereby extend the time that the lamp burns. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so.

One who extinguishes the lamp on Shabbat because he is afraid due to gentiles, from whom he is hiding in his home, and due to thieves, or if one is afraid due to an evil spirit, i.e., he is depressed and prefers sitting in the dark, or if he extinguished the flame due to the sick person so that he will sleep, he is exempt. However, in a case where he extinguishes the flame in order to spare the lamp, spare the oil, or spare the wick, he is liable. Rabbi Yosei exempts him in all of those cases, as in his opinion no labor prohibited by Torah law is being performed by extinguishing the flame, except for the case where he seeks to spare the wick. Only in that case is extinguishing a creative action because he makes the wick into charcoal by extinguishing the flame.

This mishna concludes the aggadic treatment of the topic of kindling the Shabbat lights. For three transgressions women are punished and die during childbirth: For the fact that they are not careful in observing the laws of a menstruating woman, and in separating ḥalla from the dough, and in lighting the Shabbat lamp.

There are three things a person must say in his home on Shabbat eve at nightfall and not before. The mishna elaborates: He should ask the members of his household, have you tithed the crop that required tithing? Have you placed the eiruv for joining the courtyards and joining the Shabbat borders? If you have done so, light the lamp in honor of Shabbat. The Sages stated a principle: If the time arrives on Friday when there is uncertainty whether it is nightfall and uncertainty whether it is not yet nightfall, one may not tithe the crop that has definitely not been tithed, and one may not immerse ritually impure vessels in a ritual bath to render them ritually pure, and one may not light the Shabbat lights. However, one may tithe demai, doubtfully tithed produce, which must be tithed due to mere suspicion. And one may place an eiruv and insulate the hot water to be used on Shabbat.

Chapter 3

With regard to a stove that was lit on Shabbat eve with straw or with rakings, scraps collected from the field, one may place a pot of cooked food atop it on Shabbat. The fire in this stove was certainly extinguished while it was still day, as both straw and rakings are materials that burn quickly. However, if the stove was lit with pomace, pulp that remains from sesame seeds, olives, and the like after the oil is squeezed from them, and if it was lit with wood, one may not place a pot atop it on Shabbat until he sweeps the coals from the stove while it is still day or until he places ashes on the coals, so that the fire will not ignite on Shabbat. Beit Shammai say: Even after one has swept away the coals, it is only permitted to place hot water on it, as it is sufficiently hot and does not require additional cooking, but not cooked food. Since, in general, one prefers that food will cook more, there is concern lest he come to ignite the fire by stoking the coals. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot water and cooked food may be placed. Beit Shammai say: One may remove a pot from the stove on Shabbat but may not return it. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return it.

The halakhot that were stated with regard to a stove were specific to a stove’s unique structure and the manner in which it retains heat. However, with regard to other baking apparatuses, i.e., an oven or a kupaḥ, there are different rules. The mishna delineates: An oven that they lit even with straw or rakings, one may neither place a pot inside it nor atop it on Shabbat. Whereas a kupaḥ that was lit with straw or rakings, its legal status is like that of a stove, and one is permitted to place a pot atop it on Shabbat. If it were lit with pomace or with wood, its legal status is like that of an oven and it is prohibited to place a pot atop it on Shabbat.

In addition to the halakhot that deal with cooking on the fire on Shabbat, several related halakhot are discussed. The mishna says: One may not place a raw egg next to an urn full of hot water so that it will roast slightly. And one may not even wrap it in cloths, i.e., one may not heat the egg inside cloths that were heated in the sun. And Rabbi Yosei permits doing so in that case. And, similarly, one may not insulate it in sand or in road dust that was heated in the sun so that it will roast. Although there is no actual cooking with fire here, it is similar to cooking and the Sages issued a decree to prohibit doing so.

The mishna relates a story about the people of the city of Tiberias, and they ran a cold-water pipe [ silon ] through a canal of hot water from the Tiberias hot springs. They thought that by doing so, they could heat the cold potable water on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to them: If the water passed through on Shabbat, its legal status is like that of hot water that was heated on Shabbat, and the water is prohibited both for bathing and for drinking. And if the water passed through on a Festival, then it is prohibited for bathing but permitted for drinking. On Festivals, one is even permitted to boil water on actual fire for the purposes of eating and drinking. In this mishna, the Sages discuss two vessels used for heating water. With regard to a mulyar, a bronze vessel into which coals are placed in an outer compartment and water is placed into an adjacent inner compartment, whose coals were swept, one may drink from it on Shabbat. With regard to an antikhi, which is a vessel with a different configuration, even if its coals were swept, one may not drink from it on Shabbat.

The Sages added to the laws of leaving food on a source of heat and cooking food on Shabbat: An urn that was emptied of its hot water on Shabbat, one may not place cold water into it so that the cold water will be heated. However, one may place cold water into an urn or into a cup that were emptied of their hot water in order to warm it but not in order to heat it. In continuation of the discussion of vessels where the prohibition of cooking applies even though the vessels are not actually on the fire itself, the mishna establishes: A stew pot [ ilpas ] and a pot that were removed from the fire while they were still boiling, even if they were removed before Shabbat, one may not place spices into them on Shabbat itself. Even though the pot is not actually standing on the fire, the spices are still cooked in it because the pot is a primary vessel, i.e., a vessel whose contents were cooked on the fire. However, one may place the spices into a bowl or into a tureen [ tamḥui ], which is a large bowl into which people pour the contents a stew pot or a pot. Bowls and tureens are both secondary vessels and food placed into them does not get cooked. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may place spices into anything on Shabbat except for a vessel that has in it something containing vinegar or brine of salted fish.

From a discussion of the halakhot of insulation and preparation for Shabbat followed by a brief tangent dealing with the prohibited labor of cooking on Shabbat, the mishna proceeds to briefly discuss prohibitions relating to set-aside [ muktze ] items in terms of Shabbat lamps. One may not place a vessel beneath the oil lamp, the vessel containing the oil and the wick, on Shabbat in order to receive the oil that drips from the wick. And if one placed the vessel on Friday while it was still day, it is permitted. However, in any case, one may not make use of the oil on Shabbat because it is not from the oil prepared from Shabbat eve for use on Shabbat. The oil in the lamp was already set aside and designated solely for the purpose of lighting the lamp. The dispute in this mishna seems to be a local one; however, it is the key to several halakhot in the area of the prohibition of set-aside [ muktze ]. One may move a new oil lamp on Shabbat but not an old one that was already used. A lamp that was used is covered with soot and unsuitable for use. It is therefore considered set aside from use due to its disgusting nature. Rabbi Shimon says: All oil lamps may be moved on Shabbat except for an oil lamp that is burning on Shabbat, due to the concern that it might be extinguished. One may place a vessel beneath the oil lamp in order to receive burning sparks of oil that fall from the lamp so that they will not cause a fire. And he may not place water into the vessel because he thereby extinguishes the sparks. When a pot is removed from the fire on Shabbat eve it may be insulated in materials that preserve its heat, but not in materials that increase its heat. Raising the temperature of a pot is tantamount to cooking.

Chapter 4

The mishnayot that follow list those materials in which such a pot may be insulated on Shabbat eve and those materials in which it may not be insulated. In what may one insulate a pot of cooked food on Shabbat eve, and in what may one not insulate it? One may neither insulate it in the solid residue of produce that has been pressed free of its oil, nor in manure, nor in salt, nor in lime, nor in sand, whether those materials are moist or whether they are dry. All of these materials spontaneously generate heat when piled for an extended period. Therefore, they add heat to a pot insulated in them. And one may neither insulate a pot in straw, nor in the residue of grapes that have been pressed for their juice, nor in soft material, e.g., from tattered clothing, nor in grass, when these materials are moist. However, one may insulate a pot in them when they are dry. One may insulate a pot of hot food on Shabbat eve in clothing, in produce, in doves’ wings, in a carpenter’s wood-shavings, and in the chaff of fine flax. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits doing so when it is fine, and permits doing so when it is coarse.

One may insulate cooked food on Shabbat eve in animal hides and may move those hides on Shabbat. So too, one may insulate food in wool fleece and, in contrast to hides, one may not move the fleece. How, then, does one act if he insulated food in fleece, and now wishes to remove the pot? He lifts the cover, which he is permitted to move, and the fleece falls by itself. He need not even touch it. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: If he placed the pot in a basket filled with fleece, he leans the basket on its side so that the fleece will fall to the side and takes the pot. Otherwise, there is concern lest the wool collapse when he lifts the pot from the basket. And then, he will be unable to replace the pot, as it is prohibited to move the wool to make room for the pot, since the wool is set-aside. And the Rabbis disagree and say: He may take the pot and afterward replace it. If one did not cover a pot of cooked food on Shabbat eve while it was still day, he may not cover it after dark. However, if one covered it while it was still day and it was uncovered on Shabbat, he is permitted to cover it even on Shabbat. One may fill a jug with cold water on Shabbat and place it beneath a pillow or a cushion to prevent it from getting warm.

Chapter 5

Due to the mitzva to rest one’s animals on Shabbat, one’s animal may not go out into the public domain bearing a burden. However, an object designated to protect the animal or to prevent it from fleeing is not considered a burden; therefore, an animal bearing objects that serve that purpose may go out into the public domain. The mishna asks: With what may an animal go out into the public domain on Shabbat and with what may it not go out? A camel may go out on Shabbat with an afsar, and a naka may go out with a ḥatam, and a luvdekim may go out with a perumbiya. All these terms will be defined in the Gemara. And a horse may go out with a chain around its neck. And, in general, all animals that typically have a chain around their necks when they go out to the public domain may go out with a chain on Shabbat and may be pulled by the chain. If these chains contracted ritual impurity, one may sprinkle waters of purification on them and immerse them in their place on the animal, and they need not first be removed.

A donkey may go out on Shabbat with a saddlecloth that protects it from the cold when it is tied to the animal, and there is no room for concern lest it fall. Rams may go out levuvin. Ewes may go out sheḥuzot, kevulot, and kevunot. All of these terms are discussed and explained in the Gemara. She-goats may go out with their udders bound. Rabbi Yosei prohibits the animals from going out with all of these items, as he considers them burdens, except for the ewes that are kevunot. Rabbi Yehuda says: Goats may go out on Shabbat with their udders bound to dry their milk supply and discontinue their lactation, in order to facilitate conception. In that case, they are tied with a tight, permanent knot, and there is no concern lest it fall in the public domain. However, they may not go out with their udders bound to conserve their milk, as in that case they are bound loosely.

And with what may an animal not go out into the public domain on Shabbat? A camel may not go out with a saddlecloth, nor may it go out akud or ragul, which are different ways of tying its legs together, as will be explained in the Gemara. And likewise, tying all other animals in those manners is prohibited. And likewise, one may not tie camels one to the other and pull the lead camel, thereby pulling the others after it. However, he may place the ropes tied to each of the camels in his hand and pull them all, provided that he does not intertwine the ropes.

This mishna lists additional objects with which an animal may not go out into the public domain on Shabbat: A donkey may neither go out with the saddlecloth when it is not tied to its back, nor with a bell even if it is plugged to prevent it from ringing, nor with a ladder that is around its neck, nor with a strap that is around its leg. And the roosters may not go out with strings and not with a strap on their feet, which are tied there as a sign of ownership. And the rams may not go out with a small wagon under their tails, as it was common practice to put a small wagon under the tails of grown sheep so that the tail would not be injured by dragging on the ground. And ewes may not go out ḥanunot, nor may a calf go out with a gimon, nor may a cow go out with the skin of a hedgehog [ kupar ], nor with a strap between its horns. The mishna relates that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya’s cow would go out on Shabbat with a strap between its horns, contrary to the will of the Sages.

Chapter 6

The mishna lists items that a woman may or may not carry into, or wear in the public domain on Shabbat. This depends the particular object is considered an ornament, which she may wear, or merely a burden for the woman, which she may not. Even if it is considered an ornament, there is still concern that she might remove it and carry it in her hand in the public domain, which is prohibited by Torah law. With what items may a woman go out into the public domain on Shabbat and with what items may she not go out? A woman may neither go out with strings of wool, nor with strings of flax, nor with strips of any other materials that a woman braids in the hair of her head. And a woman may not immerse in a ritual bath with them in her hair until she loosens them. When the strings or strips are tight, the water cannot reach her hair unobstructed, invalidating her immersion. And, likewise, a woman may neither go out with the ornament called totefet, nor with sarvitin that are not sewn into her head covering, nor with a kavul into the public domain. And, likewise, a woman may neither go out with a city of gold ornament, nor with a katla ornament, nor with nose rings, nor with a ring that has no seal on it, nor with a needle that is not perforated, which are merely for decorative purposes. And if she unwittingly went out wearing any of these, she is not liable to bring a sin-offering. According to Torah law, a woman is permitted to go out into the public domain wearing ornaments. However, the Sages decreed that a woman may not go out wearing certain ornaments, lest she remove them to show them to another and inadvertently carry them four cubits in the public domain.

A man may not go out on Shabbat with a spiked sandal, as will be explained in the Gemara. And he may not go out with a single sandal when there is no wound on his foot. And he may neither go out with phylacteries, nor with an amulet when it is not from an expert, but rather it was written by someone who has not established a reputation as an expert in writing amulets that are effective for those who carry them. And he may neither go out with shiryon, nor with a kasda, nor with maggafayim. These terms will be explained in the Gemara. And if he went out into the public domain with any of these, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

A woman may neither go out to the public domain with a perforated needle, i.e., a standard needle with an eye, nor with a ring that has a seal on it, nor with a kulyar, nor with a kovelet, the identity of which will be discussed in the Gemara, nor with a flask of balsam oil. And if she did go out into the public domain, she is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who holds that in doing so she violated the Torah prohibition of carrying a burden in the public domain on Shabbat. And the Rabbis exempt one who goes out on Shabbat with a kovelet and with a flask of balsam oil. In their opinion, these are ornaments, and therefore they do not fundamentally violate the Torah prohibition of carrying in the public domain on Shabbat.

Just as it is prohibited for a woman to carry out certain items unique to a woman into the public domain, the Sages said that a man may neither go out on Shabbat with a sword, nor with a bow, nor with a shield [ teris ], nor with an alla, nor with a spear. And if he unwittingly went out with one of these weapons to the public domain he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: These weapons are ornaments for him; just as a man is permitted to go out into the public domain with other ornaments, he is permitted to go out with weapons. And the Rabbis say: They are nothing other than reprehensible and in the future they will be eliminated, as it is written: “And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation will not raise sword against nation, neither will they learn war anymore” (Isaiah 2:4). With regard to women’s ornaments, they added that a garter placed on her leg to hold up stockings is pure and cannot become ritually impure as a utensil, and she may even go out with it on Shabbat. However, ankle chains, which were also women’s ornaments, can become ritually impure, and she may not go out with them on Shabbat.

The mishna continues to discuss those items with which it is permitted to go out and those items with which it is prohibited to go out on Shabbat. A woman may go out with strands of hair that she put on her head, whether they are from her own hair that she made into a wig, or whether they are from the hair of another, or whether they are from the hair of an animal. And a woman may go out with an ornament called totefet, and with sarvitin when they are sewn and will not fall. She may go out on Shabbat with a woolen cap or with a wig to the courtyard, although not to the public domain. And likewise she may go out with a cloth that is in her ear, and with a cloth in her sandal, and with a cloth that she placed due to her menstrual status. She may go out on Shabbat with pepper, or with a grain of salt, or anything placed in her mouth for healing or for preventing bad odor, as long as she does not put these objects in her mouth for the first time on Shabbat. And if it fell out she may not replace it. A false tooth as well as (Ramban) a gold tooth, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits going out with it, and the Rabbis prohibit doing so.

A woman may go out with a sela coin that she ties on a wound on her foot. The young girls may go out with strings, and even with wood chips that are in the holes in their ears so that the holes will not seal. Young girls would have their ears pierced, but earrings were not placed in their ears until they were older. Jewish women in Arab countries may go out veiled, with a scarf covering their face, and Jewish women in Media may go out with cloaks fastened with stones. And, any person in any place is permitted to go out on Shabbat clothed in that way; however, the Sages spoke in the present, addressing prevalent situations.

A woman may fasten her cloak on a stone by inserting a small stone and wrapping her cloak around it, as she would with a button. And likewise, she may do so on a nut or on a coin, as long as she does not fasten her cloak with them on Shabbat ab initio.

One with an amputated leg may go out on Shabbat with his wooden leg, as it has the legal status of a shoe; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yosei prohibits going out into the public domain with the wooden leg, since he does not consider it to have the legal status of a shoe. And if the wooden leg has a receptacle for pads, a concave space at the top of the leg into which pads are placed to cushion the amputated leg, it assumes the status of a wooden vessel and can become ritually impure. And his supports, which are shoes that one who had both of his feet amputated places on his knees in order to walk on his knees, if a zav wears them, they are subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. A zav is a primary source of ritual impurity. If he touches a vessel it assumes first-degree ritual impurity status. However, vessels on which he treads, sits, lies, or leans become primary sources of ritual impurity, provided they are designated for that purpose. These supports are vessels designated for treading. And one may go out with them into the public domain on Shabbat since they have the legal status of shoes. And one may enter the Temple courtyard with them. Although, generally, wearing shoes in the Temple courtyard is prohibited, in this regard, the supports do not have the legal status of shoes. However, if one who is crippled to the extent that he cannot walk at all sits on a chair that is attached to him, places supports on his hands, and propels himself along with his hands, his chair and supports are subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. And one may not go out with them on Shabbat, and one may not enter the Temple courtyard with them. Loketamin, which will be explained in the Gemara, are ritually pure in the sense that they cannot become ritually impure because they are not vessels, and one may not go out with them on Shabbat.

Young boys may go out on Shabbat with knots as a folk remedy and princes with bells. And any person is permitted to go out on Shabbat with those objects; however, the Sages spoke in the present, addressing situations that were prevalent.

One may go out on Shabbat with a locust egg, and with a fox tooth, and with a nail from the crucified, for the purpose of healing; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis prohibit using these remedies even during the week, due to the prohibition of following the ways of the Amorite. These are superstitious beliefs and the customs of gentiles from which one must distance oneself.

Chapter 7

The Sages stated a significant principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who is entirely ignorant of the mitzva of Shabbat according to Torah law, and performed numerous prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot, is liable to bring only one sin-offering for all those labors when he becomes aware that those actions were prohibited. One who knows the essence of Shabbat but forgets which day is Shabbat, i.e., one who lost track of the days of the week, and performs numerous prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin-offering for each Shabbat when he becomes aware that he performed those actions on Shabbat. One who is aware that the day is Shabbat but temporarily forgot that certain labors were prohibited and performed numerous prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every primary category of labor that he performed. One who performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single category of labor is liable to bring only one sin-offering.

This fundamental mishna enumerates those who perform the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, which number forty-less-one. They are grouped in accordance with their function: One who sows, and one who plows, and one who reaps, and one who gathers sheaves into a pile, and one who threshes, removing the kernel from the husk, and one who winnows threshed grain in the wind, and one who selects the inedible waste from the edible, and one who grinds, and one who sifts the flour in a sieve, and one who kneads dough, and one who bakes. Additional primary categories of prohibited labor are the following: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, and one who combs the fleece and straightens it, and one who dyes it, and one who spins the wool, and one who stretches the threads of the warp in the loom, and one who constructs two meshes, tying the threads of the warp to the base of the loom, and one who weaves two threads, and one who severs two threads for constructive purposes, and one who ties a knot, and one who unties a knot, and one who sews two stitches with a needle, as well as one who tears a fabric in order to sew two stitches. One who traps a deer, or any living creature, and one who slaughters it, and one who flays it, and one who salts its hide, a step in the tanning process, and one who tans its hide, and one who smooths it, removing hairs and veins, and one who cuts it into measured parts. One who writes two letters and one who erases in order to write two letters. One who builds a structure, and one who dismantles it, one who extinguishes a fire, and one who kindles a fire. One who strikes a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), and one who carries out an object from domain to domain. All these are primary categories of labor, and they number forty-less-one.

And they stated an additional principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. Anything fit to store, in the sense that it is large enough to make it worthwhile to store for future use, and people typically store items like it, and one carried it out into a prohibited domain on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for that action. And anything not fit to store and people typically do not store items like it, since it is too insignificant to warrant storage, and one carried it out on Shabbat, only the one who stores it is liable. By storing the item, one indicates that the item is significant to him, even though it is not significant for the typical person. Therefore, he alone is liable for carrying it out into a prohibited domain.

The mishna lists the measures in which various substances are significant and generally stored. One who carries out straw in a measure equivalent to a cow’s mouthful is liable. The measure that determines liability for etza is equivalent to a camel’s mouthful. Because it is a coarser food, he must carry out a greater amount in order to be liable. The measure that determines liability for ears of grain is equivalent to a lamb’s mouthful. The measure that determines liability for grass is equivalent to a goat’s mouthful, which is smaller than that of a lamb. The measure that determines liability for garlic leaves and onion leaves, if they are moist and fit for human consumption, is equivalent to a dried fig-bulk. A dried fig-bulk is the standard measure for human food. If the garlic leaves and onion leaves are dry, the measure for liability is equivalent to a goat’s mouthful. And none of these substances join together with one another to constitute a measure for liability because they are not equal in their measures. One who carries out a measure of foods fit for human consumption equivalent to a dried fig-bulk into a domain where carrying is prohibited on Shabbat is liable. And all those foods join together with one another to constitute that amount because they are equal in their measures. This amount is calculated without their shells, and their seeds, and their stems, and their bran, the husk that comes off of the wheat kernel when pounded, and their coarse bran that remains in the flour. Rabbi Yehuda says: None of the shells are calculated, except for the shells of lentils, which join together with the lentils to comprise the measure for liability because they are cooked and eaten with them.

Chapter 8

One who carries out undiluted wine from a private domain to a public domain or vice versa is liable only for a measure equivalent to the wine typically diluted in a cup. Pure wine was diluted with water. The measure that determines liability for carrying out wine is a measure suitable to be diluted for a significant cup of wine. The measure that determines liability for carrying out milk is equivalent to that which is swallowed in one gulp. The measure that determines liability for carrying out honey is equivalent to that which is used to place on a sore caused by chafing. The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb. The measure that determines liability for carrying out water is equivalent to that which is used to rub and spread on an eye bandage. And the measure that determines liability for carrying out all other liquids is a quarter of a log. And the measure that determines liability for carrying out all waste water is a quarter of a log. Rabbi Shimon says: The measure that determines liability for all liquids is a quarter of a log. He further stated: And all these measures were only stated with regard to those who store them. One indicates that he considers these liquids significant by storing them. One is only liable for carrying out an object that is significant to him. Others, for whom these measures are insignificant, are not liable for carrying them out.

One who carries out a rope is liable in a measure equivalent to that which is used to form an ear-shaped handle for a basket. The measure that determines liability for carrying out reed grass is equivalent to that which is used to make a loop for hanging a sifter or a sieve. Rabbi Yehuda says: The measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to take the measure of a shoe for a child, as the reed is used to measure the size of the foot. The measure that determines liability for carrying out paper is equivalent to that which is used to write a tax receipt. And one who carries out a tax receipt itself on Shabbat is liable. The measure that determines liability for carrying out paper from which the writing has been erased and which can no longer be used for writing, is equivalent to that which is used to wrap around a small jar of perfume.

The measure that determines liability for carrying out animal hide is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which is used to write the shortest portion in the phylacteries, which is the portion of Shema Yisrael. The measure that determines liability for carrying out ink is equivalent to that which is used to write two letters. The measure that determines liability for carrying out blue eye shadow is equivalent to that which is used to paint one eye blue.

The measure that determines liability for carrying out glue is equivalent to that which is used to place on the top of a board to catch birds. The measure that determines liability for carrying out tar and sulfur is equivalent to that which is used to seal a hole in a vessel and to make a small hole in that seal. The measure that determines liability for carrying out wax is equivalent to that which is used to place on the opening of a small hole to seal it. The measure that determines liability for carrying out crushed earthenware is equivalent to that which is used to knead and make from it an opening for the bellows to be placed in a gold refiners’ crucible. Rabbi Yehuda says: Equivalent to that which is used to make a small tripod [ pitput ] for the crucible. The measure that determines liability for carrying out bran is equivalent to that which is used to place on the hole of a gold refiners’ crucible. The measure that determines liability for carrying out lime is equivalent to that which is used to spread as a depilatory on the smallest of girls. Rabbi Yehuda says: Equivalent to that which is used to spread on the hair that grows over the temple so that it will lie flat. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Equivalent to that which is used to spread on the temple to remove fine hairs.

The measure that determines liability for carrying out earth on Shabbat is equivalent to the seal of large sacks; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Earth was used to seal the openings of sacks so that any tampering would be evident. And the Rabbis say: The measure for liability is much smaller, equivalent to the seal of letters. The measure that determines liability for carrying out manure and fine sand is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize one stalk of cabbage; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: The measure that determines liability for carrying it out is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize a leek, which is less than that used for cabbage. The measure that determines liability for carrying out coarse sand is equivalent to that which is used to place on a full spoon of plaster. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a reed is equivalent to that which is used to make a quill. And if the reed was thick and unfit for writing, or if it was fragmented, its measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to cook an egg most easily cooked, one that is already beaten and placed in a stew pot.

The measure that determines liability for carrying out a bone is equivalent to that which is used to make a spoon. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to make from it a key. The measure that determines liability for carrying out glass is equivalent to that which is used to scrape and smooth the top of a bobbin, a sharpened stick used by weavers. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a pebble or a stone is equivalent to that which is used to throw at a bird to chase it away. Rabbi Elazar bar Ya’akov says: Equivalent to that which is used to throw at an animal, which is larger.

One who carries out a shard of earthenware on Shabbat is liable if it is in a measure equivalent to that which is used to place between one pillar and another when piled on the ground to separate them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to stoke a fire with it. Rabbi Yosei says: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to hold a quarter of a log in it. Rabbi Meir said: Although there is no proof for the matter, there is a biblical allusion to my opinion, as it is stated: “And He shall break it as a potter’s vessel is broken, smashing it without sparing; and there shall not be found among its pieces a shard to rake fire on the hearth” (Isaiah 30:14). Rabbi Yosei said to him: Is there proof from there? The verse concludes: “And to extract water from the cistern,” indicating that earthenware is significant if it is large enough to hold water.

Chapter 9

Rabbi Akiva said: From where is it derived that idolatry, e.g., a statue of a deity, transmits impurity imparted by carrying even when the person who carries it does not come into contact with it, just as a menstruating woman does? As it is stated: “ And you will defile the silver overlays of your statues, and the golden plating of your idols, you will cast them away as you would a menstruating woman [ dava ], you will tell it, get out” (Isaiah 30:22). Just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity imparted by carrying, so too, idolatry transmits impurity imparted by carrying.

This is another mishna that digresses from the central topic of this tractate. It, too, is based on an allusion from the Bible. From where is it derived that the ship is ritually pure, in the sense that it cannot become impure? As it is stated: “The way of a ship in the midst of the sea” (Proverbs 30:19). The mishna continues to discuss an additional halakha based on a biblical allusion. From where is it derived that in a garden bed that is six by six handbreadths, that one may plant five different types of seeds in it? He may do so without violating the prohibition of sowing a mixture of diverse kinds of seeds in the following manner. One sows four types of plants on each of the four sides of the garden bed and one in the middle. There is an allusion to this in the text, as it is stated: “For as the earth brings forth its growth, and as a garden causes its seeds to grow, so will the Lord God cause justice and praise to spring forth before all the nations” (Isaiah 61:11). Its seed, in the singular, is not stated; rather, its seeds, written in the plural. Apparently, it is possible that several seeds may be planted in a small garden.

The mishna continues to cite a series of unrelated halakhot based upon biblical allusions. From where is it derived that a woman who discharges semen even on the third day after relations is ritually impure, just like one who touches semen (see Leviticus 15:17)? Because the semen remains fit for insemination, it can transmit impurity, as it is stated prior to the revelation at Sinai: “And he said to the people, prepare yourselves for three days, do not approach a woman” (Exodus 19:15). This three-day separation period ensured that even a woman who discharged semen would be pure. The mishna cites another halakha based on a biblical allusion: From where is it derived that one may wash the circumcision on the third day, meaning the third day after the circumcision, even if it occurs on Shabbat? As it is stated: “And it came to pass on the third day when they were in pain” (Genesis 34:25). The pain of circumcision lasts at least three days, and as long as the child is in pain he is considered to be in danger. The mishna cites another halakha with an allusion in the Bible: From where is it derived that one ties a scarlet strip of wool to the head of the scapegoat that is dispatched to Azazel? As it is stated: “If your sins be like scarlet, they will become white like snow” (Isaiah 1:18). Since the goat is offered to atone for sins, red wool is tied to its horns.

The mishna cites another allusion. From where is it derived that smearing oil on one’s body is like drinking and is similarly prohibited on Yom Kippur? Although there is no proof for this, there is an allusion to it, as it is stated: “And it comes into his inward parts like water and like oil into his bones” (Psalms 109:18). The verse appears to equate smearing oil on one’s body with drinking water.

After an extended digression for a discussion of matters unrelated to the halakhot of Shabbat, this mishna resumes treatment of the halakhot of carrying from domain to domain on Shabbat. One who carries out wood on Shabbat is liable for a measure equivalent to the amount of wood necessary to cook an easily cooked egg. The measure that determines liability for carrying out spices is equivalent to that which is used to season an easily cooked egg. And all types of spices join together with one another to constitute the measure for liability. The measure that determines liability for carrying out nutshells, pomegranate peels, safflower, and madder, which are used to produce dyes, is equivalent to the amount that is used to dye a small garment placed atop a woman’s hairnet. The measure that determines liability for carrying out urine, natron, and borit, cimolian earth [ Kimoleya ], and potash, all of which are abrasive materials used for laundry, is equivalent to the amount that is used to launder a small garment placed atop a woman’s hairnet. And Rabbi Yehuda says: The measure that determines liability for these materials is equivalent to that which is used to remove a stain.

The measure that determines liability for carrying out pepper on Shabbat is any amount. Similarly, the measure that determines liability for carrying out tar is any amount. The measure that determines liability for carrying out various kinds of perfumes and various kinds of metals is any amount. The measure that determines liability for carrying out stones of the altar or earth of the altar, sacred scrolls or their coverings that became tattered due to an insect called mekek that destroys scrolls, and mekek that destroys their coverings, is any amount. That is because people store them in order to bury them, due to their sanctity, and accord significance to even a small measure of those items. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who carries out accessories of idolatry on Shabbat is liable for carrying out any amount, as it is stated: “And there shall cleave nothing of the proscribed items to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18). Since even the smallest amount is prohibited and must be burned, any amount is significant.

One who carries out a merchant’s basket, even if there are many types of spices and jewelry in it, is obligated to bring only one sin-offering, because he performed only one act of carrying out. The measure that determines liability for carrying out garden seeds on Shabbat is less than a fig-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: The measure for liability is five seeds. The measure that determines liability for carrying out cucumber seeds is two seeds because they are large and conspicuous. The measure that determines liability for carrying out squash seeds is two seeds. The measure that determines liability for carrying out seeds of Egyptian beans is two. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a live kosher locust is any amount. For carrying out a dead kosher locust, which is edible, it is the same as any other food, a fig-bulk. The measure that determines liability for carrying out the locust called tzipporet keramim, whether dead or alive, is any amount; this is because one stores them for medicinal purposes or as a talisman, which renders even a small quantity significant. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who carries out a live non-kosher locust is liable for carrying out any amount, because people store locusts for a child who wants to play with it.

Chapter 10

One who stores a seed for sowing, or as a sample, or for medicinal purposes and carried it out on Shabbat is liable for carrying out any amount. By storing that measure, he indicates that it is significant to him. Therefore, he is liable for carrying it, despite the fact that what he carried out is less than the halakhic measure that determines liability for that item. And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. If one stored the seed, carried it out, and then brought it back in, with no intention to utilize it for the specific purpose for which he stored it, he is only liable if he brought in its measure for liability (Rav Shmuel Strashun).

One who carries out food from his house on Shabbat and placed it on the threshold of the door, whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt because he did not perform his prohibited labor of carrying from domain to domain all at once. Similarly, if one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, which is in the public domain, and part of the basket remained inside, even though most of the fruit is outside in the public domain, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

One who carries out an object into the public domain on Shabbat, whether he carried it out in his right hand or in his left hand, whether he carried it in his lap or on his shoulders, he is liable. All of these are typical methods of carrying out an object, as this was the method of carrying the sacred vessels of the Tabernacle employed by the sons of Kehat in the desert. All labors prohibited on Shabbat are derived from the Tabernacle, including the prohibited labor of carrying out from domain to domain. But one who carries an object out in an unusual, backhanded manner, or with his foot, or with his mouth, or with his elbow, with his ear, or with his hair, or with his belt [ punda ] whose opening faced downward, or between his belt and his cloak, or with the hem of his cloak, or with his shoe, or with his sandal, he is exempt because he did not carry it out in a manner typical of those who carry.

One who intends to carry out an object with the object before him, and as he was walking the object came to be carried behind him, is exempt. However, if he intended to carry it out behind him and it came to be carried before him, he is liable. In truth they said: A woman who girded herself in a pants-like sinar worn beneath the outer garments, whether she placed an object before her or behind her, and it came to be carried on the other side, she is liable, as it is common for the sinar to be reversed. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even those royal couriers, who receive notes [ pittakin ], carry those notes in their belts, and are not particular where on their belt they carry the notes (Rav Hai Gaon), are liable for carrying out the notes whether they carried them before them or behind them.

One who carries a large mass out to the public domain on Shabbat is liable. If two carried it out together, they are exempt because neither performed a complete prohibited labor. However, if one person is unable to carry it out alone, and therefore two people carried it out, they are liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt even in that case. One who carries out foods less than the measure that determines liability for carrying out food in a vessel on Shabbat is exempt, even for carrying out the vessel, because the vessel is secondary to the food inside it. Since one is not liable for carrying out the food, he is not liable for carrying out the vessel either. Similarly, one who carries out a living person on a bed is exempt, even for carrying out the bed, because the bed is secondary to the person. One who carries out a corpse on a bed is liable. And similarly, one who carries out an olive-bulk of a corpse, or an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, or a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal, which are the minimal measures of these items that transmit ritual impurity, is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. He holds that one is only liable for performing a prohibited labor for its own sake. One who carries out an object in order to bring it to its destination is liable. However, people carry out a corpse or an animal carcass only to be rid of them.

With regard to one who removes his fingernails with one another on Shabbat without scissors, or with his teeth, and the same is true with regard to one who removes his hair with his hands, and the same is true with regard to his mustache, and the same is true with regard to his beard, and the same is true with regard to a woman who braids her hair, and the same is true with regard to one who applies blue eye shadow, and the same is true with regard to one who applies blush, Rabbi Eliezer deems them all liable, as they each performed a labor prohibited by Torah law. And the Rabbis prohibited performing all of these actions due to rabbinic decree. None of the actions constitute prohibited labors. One who severs a leaf or a fruit from a plant growing in a perforated flowerpot on Shabbat is liable, as a plant in a flowerpot with holes in it has the legal status of a plant connected to the ground. Picking from it is prohibited due to reaping. And one who picks from an imperforated pot is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so ab initio. And Rabbi Shimon deems one who does so exempt in both this, the case of the perforated flowerpot, and that, the case of the imperforated flowerpot.

Chapter 11

One who throws an object on Shabbat from the private domain to the public domain or from the public domain to the private domain is liable. However, one who throws an object from the private domain to the other private domain, and the object passes through the public domain between the two, Rabbi Akiva deems him liable for carrying into the public domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

How so? If there are two balconies [ gezuztra’ot ] that are private domains opposite each other on either side of the public domain, one who passes or throws an object from the one on this side to the one on that side is exempt. However, if the balconies were on the same level on the same side of the public thoroughfare, and the public domain separated the two, one who passes from one to the other is liable, and one who throws is exempt, as that method, passing, was the service of the Levites who carried the beams of the Tabernacle. In the Tabernacle, two wagons along the same level stood behind one another in the public domain, and the Levites passed the beams from one wagon to the other through the public domain on the same side of a thoroughfare. But they did not throw from one wagon to another because the beams were heavy. Passing, which was performed in the Tabernacle, is prohibited. Throwing, which was not performed in the Tabernacle, is not prohibited. With regard to the bank surrounding a pit and the boulder that are ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one who takes an object from them to the public domain and similarly one who places an object from the public domain atop them is liable for carrying from one domain to another. If the height or width of the pit or the boulder is less than that height, ten handbreadths, one is exempt because the legal status of those protrusions is not distinct from that of the surrounding public domain.

With regard to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain, if the object hits the wall above ten handbreadths from the ground, which is an exempt domain, it is as if one threw it in the air, and he is exempt. If it hits the wall below ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he threw it and it landed on the ground, and one who throws an object four cubits and it lands on the ground is liable. If one threw an object in the public domain, intending for it to land within four cubits, meaning that he had no intention of violating the Torah prohibition of carrying, and the object rolled and went beyond four cubits, he is exempt. However, if one threw an object with the intention of it landing beyond four cubits, and the object rolled back within four cubits, he is liable from when he originally threw the object.

One who throws an object four cubits into the sea is exempt. If there was a swamp and the public domain passes through it, one who throws an object four cubits into it is liable like one who carried four cubits in the public domain. And how deep is this swamp? It is less than ten handbreadths deep. In the case of a swamp that the public domain passes through, one who throws an object four cubits into the swamp is liable.

One who throws an object from the sea to dry land, or from dry land to the sea, or from the sea onto a boat, or from a boat into the sea, or from one boat to another is exempt because the sea has the legal status of a karmelit. If boats are tied together, one may carry an object from one to the other on Shabbat. However, if they are not tied, even though they are adjacent, one may not carry from one to the other.

One who unwittingly throws an object from one domain to another or one who throws an object four cubits within the public domain, and after the object left his hand he remembered that he is in violation of a prohibition, if another caught it, or if a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt. Similarly, if one threw a rock on Shabbat to inflict a wound on a person or on an animal, for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and he remembered that he was in violation of a prohibition before the wound was inflicted, he is exempt. This is the principle: All who are liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action are unwitting. However, if the beginning of one’s action was unwitting and the conclusion was intentional, as he became aware that he was in violation of a prohibition, or if the beginning of one’s action was intentional and the conclusion was unwitting, the individuals in both of these cases are exempt until both the beginning and the conclusion are unwitting.

Chapter 12

With regard to one who builds on Shabbat, thereby violating a prohibition in a primary category of prohibited labor, how much must he build to be liable to bring a sin-offering? The Sages said: One who builds is liable for building any amount. And one who chisels, or strikes with a hammer or with an adze, or one who drills a hole of any size on Shabbat, is liable. This is the principle: Anyone who performs a prohibited labor and his labor endures on Shabbat is liable. And so too, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who strikes an anvil with a sledgehammer during his labor has performed a constructive act and is liable, because he is as one who improves the labor that he is performing.

One who plows is liable for plowing any amount of land on Shabbat. One who weeds and removes grass on Shabbat, and one who removes dry branches and who prunes any amount is liable. With regard to one who gathers wood, if he did so to enhance the tree or the land, he is liable for any amount; if he did so for fuel, he is liable for collecting a measure equivalent to that which is used to cook an easily cooked egg. With regard to one who gathers grass, if he did so to enhance the plants or the land, he is liable for any amount; if he did so to feed an animal, he is liable for collecting a measure equivalent to a goat’s mouthful.

One who writes two letters on Shabbat, whether he did so with his right hand or his left, whether they were the same letter or two different letters, whether he did so using two different types of ink, in any language, he is liable. Rabbi Yosei said: One is deemed liable for writing two letters only due to marking, as they would write symbols on adjacent beams of the Tabernacle to know which beam was another beam’s counterpart. Rabbi Yehuda said: We found that one is liable for writing even if he did not complete what he was writing, so that he wrote a small name that constituted part of a longer name, e.g., Shem [ shin mem ] from the name Shimon or from Shmuel; Noaḥ [ nun ḥet ] from Naḥor; Dan [ dalet nun ] from Daniel; Gad [ gimmel dalet ] from Gaddiel. In all of these cases, the first two letters of the longer name constitute the shorter name.

One who writes two letters on Shabbat during one lapse of awareness is liable. The following substances used as ink are explained in the Gemara. One is liable if he wrote with deyo, with sam, with sikra, with gum [ komos ], or with copper sulfate [ kankantom ] or with any substance that makes a mark. If one wrote on two walls of a house that form a corner, or on two parts of a writing tablet, and the two items are read together, he is liable. One who writes on his flesh on Shabbat is liable. If one unwittingly scratches letters on his flesh on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt.

If one wrote with liquids or with fruit juice, or if one drew letters with road dust, with scribes’ dust that they use to dry the ink, or with any substance with which the writing does not endure, he is exempt. Similarly, if one wrote by holding the pen on the back of his hand, with his foot, with his mouth, or with his elbow; if one wrote only a single letter, even if it was adjacent to other preexisting writing; or if one wrote over other writing; if one meant to write the letter ḥet and instead wrote the two halves of the ḥet as two instances of the letter zayin ; if one wrote one letter on the ground and one on a rafter; if one wrote one letter on two walls of a house, or on two parts of a writing tablet that are not read together, he is exempt. If one wrote one letter as an abbreviation representing an entire word, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beteira deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

With regard to one who writes two letters on Shabbat in two separate lapses of awareness separated by a period of awareness that the day was Shabbat, writing one letter in the morning and one letter in the afternoon, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to bring a sin-offering like someone who has unintentionally performed a full-fledged prohibited labor, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

Chapter 13

Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering if he wove three threads at the beginning of something new, or if he adds one thread to a preexisting woven fabric. And the Rabbis say: Both at the beginning and at the end, its measure for liability is two threads.

One who makes two meshes, i.e., ties the threads of the warp, attaching them to either the nirin or the keiros, which will be explained in the Gemara, in a winnow, sieve, or basket, is liable for making meshes. And one who sews is liable if he sews two stitches. And one who tears is liable if he tears enough fabric in order to sew two stitches to repair it.

One who rends his garment in his anger or in anguish over his dead relative is exempt. And anyone else who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt. And one who performs a labor destructively in order to repair is liable, and his measure for liability is equivalent to the measure for one who performs that labor constructively.

The measure that determines liability for one who whitens, or one who combs, or one who dyes, or one who spins wool is the full width of a double sit, which is the distance between the forefinger and the middle finger. And for one who weaves two threads, the measure that determines liability is one sit.

Rabbi Yehuda says: One who traps a bird into a closet or cage, and one who traps a deer into a house is liable. The Rabbis say: One is liable for trapping a bird into a closet and for trapping a deer into a garden, or into a courtyard, or into an enclosure [ bivar ], he is liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not all enclosures are identical. This is the principle: If the trapping of the animal is inadequate and it is still necessary to pursue and apprehend it, one is not liable. However, if one trapped a deer into an enclosure in which the trapping is not inadequate, he is liable.

If a deer entered a house on its own and one locked the door before it, he is liable for trapping. If two people locked the door, they are exempt, because neither performed a complete labor. If one person is incapable of locking the door and two people locked it, they are liable because that is the typical manner of performing that labor. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt as he holds that two people who perform a single labor are never liable by Torah law.

If one person sat in the entrance of a courtyard in which there is a deer, but did not fill the entire doorway, and a second person sat and filled it, the second person is liable because he completed the labor of trapping. However, if the first person sat in the doorway and filled it, and a second person came and sat next to him, the first person is liable and the second is exempt even if the first person stood and went away, leaving the second one to secure the deer. The mishna explains: To what is this second person’s action similar? To one who locks his house to secure it, and it turns out a deer that was trapped before Shabbat is also secured inside it. In that case, he is exempt even though he enhances security on the deer, because he did not trap the animal.

Chapter 14

With regard to any of the eight creeping animals mentioned in the Torah, one who traps them or wounds them on Shabbat is liable. The Torah states: “The following shall be impure for you among the creeping animals that swarm upon the earth: The weasel, and the mouse, and the dab lizard of every variety; and the gecko, and the land-crocodile, and the lizard, and the skink, and the chameleon” (Leviticus 11:29–30). With regard to other abominations and crawling things, one who wounds them is exempt. One who traps them for a specific need is liable; one who traps them for no specific need is exempt. With regard to animals or birds that are in his possession, i.e., an animal that is domesticated and under someone’s control, one who traps them is exempt; and, however, one who wounds them is liable.

One may not make brine [ hilmei ] on Shabbat, but one may make salt water and dip one’s bread in it, and place it in cooked food. Rabbi Yosei said: But isn’t it still brine, whether it is a large quantity or whether it is a small quantity? And this is the type of salt water that is permitted: Salt water in which one places oil initially into the water or into the salt. This is salt water prepared not in the usual manner.

One may not eat eizoveyon on Shabbat because healthy people do not eat it, and therefore it is clear that anyone eating it is doing so for its medicinal value. However, one may eat a plant called yo’ezer and may drink abuvro’e. Furthermore, all types of food that healthy people eat may be eaten by a person even for medicinal purposes. And one may drink all drinks except for water from palm trees and a kos ikarin because they are known as a remedy for jaundice. Therefore, it is prohibited to drink them on Shabbat for curative purposes. However, one may drink palm tree water on Shabbat in order to quench his thirst, and one may smear ikarin oil on himself for non-medical purposes.

One who is concerned about pain in his teeth may not sip vinegar through them on Shabbat for medicinal purposes: however, he may dip his food in vinegar in his usual manner and eat it, and if he is healed by the vinegar, he is healed. One who is concerned about pain in his loins may not smear wine and vinegar on them on Shabbat because that is a medical treatment. However, one may smear oil on them. However, one may not use rose oil, which is very expensive and used exclusively as a cure. However, princes may smear with rose oil on their wounds on Shabbat because it is their usual manner to smear rose oil on themselves during the week for pleasure. Rabbi Shimon says: All of the Jewish people are princes, and it is permitted for them to smear rose oil on themselves on Shabbat.

Chapter 15

And these are knots for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering if one tied them on Shabbat: A camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot, both of which are meant to be permanent. And just as one is liable to bring a sin-offering for tying these knots, so too, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for untying them. Rabbi Meir says a principle: For tying any knot that one can untie with one of his hands, one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, because a loose knot of that sort is not considered permanent even if that was his intention.

You have knots for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering as one is liable for tying a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot; however, it is nevertheless prohibited to tie them. A woman may tie closed the opening of her robe with straps, as well as the strings of her hairnet and the laces of her girdle, i.e., a wide belt tied with laces. One may also tie the straps of a shoe or a sandal, as well as the spouts of wine or oil jugs. One may also tie a garment over a pot of meat. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: One may tie a rope across an entrance before an animal so that it will not go out. One may tie a bucket with a belt on Shabbat, as he will certainly not leave it tied to the bucket, and therefore it is not a permanent knot. But one may not tie a bucket with a rope. Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so. Rabbi Yehuda stated a principle: With regard to any knot that is not permanent, one is not liable for tying it.

One may fold the garments after removing them even four or five times, and one may make the beds from Shabbat evening in preparation for Shabbat day, but not from Shabbat in preparation for the conclusion of Shabbat, since one may not perform an action on Shabbat that is preparation for a weekday. Rabbi Yishmael says: One may fold the garments and make the beds from Yom Kippur in preparation for Shabbat if Yom Kippur occurs on Friday. And the fats of the offerings that were sacrificed on Shabbat are offered on Yom Kippur, but not those of Yom Kippur on Shabbat, because the sanctity of Shabbat is greater than the sanctity of Yom Kippur. Rabbi Akiva says: Neither are the fats of the offerings sacrificed on Shabbat offered on Yom Kippur, nor are those of Yom Kippur offered on Shabbat.

Chapter 16

With regard to all sacred writings, one may rescue them from the fire on Shabbat, whether they are read in public, e.g., Torah or Prophets scrolls, or whether they are not read in public, e.g., Writings scrolls. This ruling applies even though they were written in any foreign language. According to the Rabbis, those scrolls are not read in public, but they are still sacred and require burial. And why does one not read the Writings on Shabbat? Due to suspension of Torah study in the study hall. People came to the study hall at specific times on Shabbat to hear words of halakha, and other texts were not allowed at those times. One may rescue the casing of a Torah scroll from a fire on Shabbat together with the Torah scroll, and the casing of phylacteries along with the phylacteries, even if they have money inside them. And to where may one rescue them? Into an alley that is closed, which, if it is surrounded on three sides, is considered to be a private domain by Torah law. Ben Beteira says: Even into an open alley.

One may rescue food for three meals from a fire on Shabbat. One may rescue food that is suitable for a person for a person; and one may rescue food that is suitable for an animal for an animal. How so? If a fire ignited on Friday night before the Shabbat evening meal, one may rescue food for three meals. If a fire ignited in the morning, after the Shabbat evening meal has been eaten and before the meal of Shabbat day, one may only rescue food for two meals. If a fire ignited in the afternoon, one may rescue food for one meal. Rabbi Yosei says: One may always rescue food for three meals, which is the measure that the Sages permitted without distinguishing between the times of day.

One may rescue a basket full of loaves and the like from a fire on Shabbat, even if there is food for one hundred meals in it. And one may rescue a round cake of dried figs, even though it is very large, and one may rescue a barrel full of wine. And one may even say to others: Come and rescue for yourselves. And if the people who rescue with him were clever, they make a calculation with him after Shabbat in order to receive payment for the items that they rescued. To where may one rescue items moved from the fire? One may do so to a courtyard where an eiruv was established, and it is permitted to carry. Ben Beteira says: One may do so even to a courtyard where an eiruv was not established.

And one may carry there all the utensils, and put on all the garments that he can wear, and one may wrap all the cloths that he can wrap around himself in order to rescue his property. Rabbi Yosei says: One may put on only eighteen garments at once, as people sometimes wear that number of garments, but not more. However, one may again put on that number of garments and carry it out. And he may say to others: Come and rescue with me.

Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas says: One may spread out a moist goat’s hide over a box, a chest, or a closet that caught fire, because the fire singes and does not burn it. The fire does not burn the wet goat’s hide but merely singes it, and by doing so the wooden vessels are preserved. And one may establish a barrier against the fire with all vessels, both full and empty, so that the fire will not pass. Rabbi Yosei prohibits using new earthenware vessels full of water, because they cannot withstand the heat of the fire and they will burst and extinguish the fire, and it is prohibited to cause the fire to be extinguished on Shabbat even indirectly.

If a gentile comes to extinguish a Jew’s fire on Shabbat, one may not say to him: Extinguish, and: Do not extinguish, because responsibility for his rest is not incumbent upon the Jew. However, if a Jewish child comes to extinguish a fire on Shabbat, they do not listen to him and allow him to extinguish it, even though he is not yet obligated in mitzva observance, because responsibility for his rest is incumbent upon the Jew.

One may overturn a bowl on top of a lamp so that fire will not take hold in the ceiling beam on Shabbat. And similarly, one may overturn a bowl on top of a child’s feces inside the house so he will not touch it and dirty himself, and on top of a scorpion so that it will not bite. Rabbi Yehuda said: An incident came before Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai in his village of Arav, where a person covered a scorpion on Shabbat, and Rabban Yoḥanan said: I am concerned that he is liable to bring a sin-offering because he might have violated a Torah prohibition.

If a gentile kindled a lamp on Shabbat for his own purposes, a Jew also uses its light; and if the gentile kindled it for a Jew, the Sages prohibited to utilize its light. Similarly, if a gentile drew water from a well in the public domain to give his animal to drink, a Jew gives his own animal to drink after him from the same water; and if he drew the water initially for the benefit of a Jew, it is prohibited for a Jew to give his animal to drink from that water. Similarly, if a gentile made a ramp on Shabbat to disembark from a ship, a Jew disembarks after him; and if he made the ramp for a Jew, it is prohibited. There was an incident in which Rabban Gamliel and the Elders were traveling on a ship and a gentile made a ramp on Shabbat in order to disembark from the ship on it; and Rabban Gamliel and the Elders disembarked on it as well.

Chapter 17

All vessels may be moved on Shabbat, and their doors, which are part of these vessels, along with them, even if they were dismantled on Shabbat, as the doors of these vessels are unlike the doors of the house. It is prohibited to make use of the doors of a house on Shabbat, even if they were removed from the entrance, because they are not prepared from before Shabbat.

Likewise a person may move a mallet, which is generally used for labor prohibited on Shabbat, to crack nuts with it. Likewise, one may move an axe, a tool generally used to chop wood, to cut a cake of figs with it. So too, one may move a saw to cut cheese with it. Similarly, one may move a spade to scoop dried figs with it. One may also move a winnowing shovel and a pitchfork, both of which are designated for use with crops in a barn, to place food on it for a child. One is likewise permitted to take a reed or a shuttle from a spindle, ordinarily used for weaving, in order to insert it into food like a fork. One is permitted to move an ordinary hand needle used for sewing clothes to extract a thorn with it, and one may move a sack maker’s needle to open the door with it.

A reed that is used for turning olives in a bundle, if there is a cork-like knot at the top of it, it can become ritually impure as a vessel, and if not, it cannot become ritually impure, because it is not a vessel. In either case, it may be moved on Shabbat for use in a permitted action.

Rabbi Yosei says: All utensils may be moved on Shabbat except for a large saw and the blade of a plow. Since they must be sharp and ready for use and there is concern that they might be damaged, one sets them aside from his consciousness and they may not be used for any other purpose. All vessels may be moved for a specific purpose and not for a specific purpose. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Vessels may only be moved for a specific purpose.

All vessels that may be moved on Shabbat, their shards may be moved along with them, as long as they are suited for some purpose. Shards of a large bowl may be used to cover the mouth of a barrel. Shards of a glass vessel may be used to cover the mouth of a cruse. Rabbi Yehuda says: As long as they are suited for a purpose similar to their original use. Shards of a large bowl must be suited to pour soup into them, and shards of a glass vessel must be suited to pour oil into them.

A stone that is in a gourd used to draw water [ kiruya ], if they fill it with water and the stone does not fall, one may fill with it on Shabbat, and if not, and the stone does fall, one may not fill with it. With regard to a vine branch that is tied to a pitcher, one may fill water with it on Shabbat because the branch became part of the vessel.

With regard to a window shutter, Rabbi Eliezer says: When it is tied to and hanging from the window, i.e., it is not touching the ground, one may shutter the window with it, because it is not considered building; and if not, i.e., it is touching the ground, one may not shutter the window with it. And the Rabbis say: Both in this case and in that case one may shutter with it.

All covers of vessels that have a handle may be moved on Shabbat. Rabbi Yosei said: In what case is this statement said? In the case of a cover for the ground, i.e., the cover of a pit; however, with regard to covers of vessels, both in this case and in that case, even if they do not have handles, they may be moved on Shabbat.

Chapter 18

On Shabbat, one may move even four or five baskets of straw and baskets of produce, due to the guests, who require that place to sit, and due to suspension of Torah study in the study hall, where space is required to seat the students. However, one may not move these items to create space in the storeroom. One may move ritually pure teruma, although it may only be eaten by a priest; and doubtfully tithed produce [ demai ], which may not be eaten until tithes are separated from it due to concern that an am ha’aretz did not separate its tithes; and first tithe whose teruma of the tithe has already been taken and given to priests; and second tithe and consecrated items that were redeemed; and even dry lupine, which is not fit for consumption by a person, because it is goat food. However, one may neither move untithed produce, nor first tithe whose teruma has not been taken, nor second tithe and consecrated items that were not redeemed, nor raw arum and raw mustard, as all of these items are not fit for consumption and are therefore set aside. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits moving in the case of arum because it is food for ravens.

With regard to bundles of straw, and bundles of wood, and bundles of twigs, if one prepared them on Shabbat eve for animal food, one may move them. And if not, one may not move them. One may overturn a basket in front of the chicks so that they can climb on and climb off of it. Likewise, with regard to a hen that fled that one seeks to retrieve, one may push it even with his hands until it reenters the house. One may help calves and foals to walk, and likewise a woman may help her son to walk. Rabbi Yehuda said: When is it permitted? When her son picks one foot up and puts one foot down by himself. However, if her son were dragging both his feet, it would be prohibited because it would be like carrying him in the public domain.

One may not birth an animal on a Festival, and all the more one may not birth it on Shabbat. However, one may assist it to give birth. And one may birth a woman even on Shabbat, and call a midwife for her to travel from place to place, even when the midwife’s travel involves the desecration of Shabbat. And one may desecrate Shabbat for a woman giving birth. And one may tie the umbilical cord of a child born on Shabbat. Rabbi Yosei says: One may even cut the umbilical cord. And all the requirements of circumcision may be performed for a baby whose eighth day of life occurs on Shabbat.

Chapter 19

As a continuation to the discussion at the end of the previous chapter, which mentioned circumcision in the context of a discussion of the halakhot of childbirth on Shabbat, the mishna continues to address the halakhot of circumcision. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he did not bring an implement for circumcising the child on Shabbat eve, he brings it on Shabbat itself uncovered so that it will be clear to all that he is bringing a circumcision scalpel. And in times of danger, when decrees of persecution prohibit Jews from circumcising their children, one covers it in the presence of witnesses who can testify that he transported the scalpel to perform a mitzva. And furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer said with regard to this issue: One may even cut down trees to prepare charcoal in order to fashion iron tools for the purpose of circumcision. Rabbi Eliezer’s approach was not universally accepted, and a principle was stated by Rabbi Akiva: Any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat, including transporting the circumcision scalpel. However, any prohibited labor involved in the mitzva of circumcision itself that cannot be performed on Shabbat eve overrides Shabbat.

When the eighth day of a baby’s life occurs on Shabbat, he must be circumcised on that day. Therefore, one performs all the necessities of the circumcision, even on Shabbat: One circumcises the foreskin, and uncovers the skin by removing the thin membrane beneath the foreskin, and sucks the blood from the wound, and places on it both a bandage [ ispelanit ] and cumin as a salve. If one did not grind the cumin from Shabbat eve, he chews it with his teeth and places it on the place of circumcision as a salve. If he did not mix wine and oil on Shabbat eve, a mixture designed to heal and strengthen the child, this, the wine, is placed on the wound by itself and that, the oil, is placed by itself. And on Shabbat one may not make a pouch to place over the circumcision as a bandage ab initio, but he may wrap a rag over it as a dressing. If he did not prepare the bandage on Shabbat eve by bringing it to the place where the circumcision was performed, he wraps the bandage on his finger and brings it on Shabbat, even from a different courtyard. While the Sages permitted it to be brought, they required that it be performed in an unusual fashion, by wearing it in the manner of a garment.

One may wash the baby on Shabbat, both before the circumcision and after the circumcision. And one may sprinkle hot water on him by hand but not with a vessel, in order to depart from the usual manner in which this is done. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may wash the baby on the third day following his circumcision, even if that third day occurs on Shabbat. On the third day following circumcision, the baby is considered to be in danger, as it is stated with regard to the men of Shekhem, who were circumcised: “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain” (Genesis 34:25). This teaches us that on the third day the pain of circumcision poses a danger. If there is uncertainty whether or not to circumcise a baby, and likewise in the case of a hermaphrodite [ androginos ] baby, who possesses both male and female genitals, one does not desecrate Shabbat to perform the circumcision, since it is not certain that the circumcision is required. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so for a hermaphrodite baby.

One who had two babies to circumcise, one of whom he needed to circumcise on the day after Shabbat, and one of whom he needed to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one that should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, because he performed the prohibited labor of causing a wound not in the framework of performing a mitzva, as no obligation yet exists to circumcise the child. If there were two babies, one to circumcise on Shabbat eve, and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one that he should have circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, as circumcision after its appointed time does not override Shabbat. And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him; since he intended to perform a mitzva, and despite his error in fact performed a mitzva, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering.

Although a child is generally circumcised at eight days, as the verse states: “And on the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3), nevertheless, at times he is circumcised at nine days, at times at ten days, at eleven days, and at twelve days, no earlier and no later. How so? In his usual manner, a child is circumcised at eight days. If he was born at twilight and it is therefore uncertain on which day he was born, he is circumcised at nine days, as his circumcision is postponed due to that uncertainty, as perhaps the eighth day from his birth has not yet arrived. If he was born at twilight on Shabbat eve, he is not circumcised on the following Shabbat, due to the uncertainty whether it is the eighth or ninth day since his birth, and only a circumcision definitely performed at the appointed time overrides Shabbat. Rather, he is circumcised on Sunday, and the result is that he is circumcised at ten days. If there was a Festival after that Shabbat, he is not circumcised on the Festival either, and he is circumcised at eleven days. And if that Shabbat was followed by two days of Rosh HaShana, the result is that he is circumcised at twelve days. The mishna states another halakha : With regard to a sick child, one does not circumcise him until he becomes healthy.

These are the shreds of flesh that invalidate the circumcision if they are not cut. The essential element of circumcision is the removal of the flesh that covers most of the corona, and a child that was not circumcised in this manner is considered uncircumcised, and he does not eat teruma. And if he was properly circumcised but he was fleshy, and it appears as though he has not been properly circumcised, the circumcisor should correct it by circumcising more than necessary, to avoid the appearance of transgression, so he will not appear uncircumcised. If one circumcised but did not uncover the flesh at the area of the circumcision by folding back the thin membrane beneath the foreskin, it is as if he had not circumcised.

Chapter 20

Rabbi Eliezer says: One may suspend and stretch over a base the strainer through which sediment is filtered from wine, on a Festival. And one may place wine through a strainer that was already suspended the day before; however, one may not suspend the strainer on Shabbat. And the Rabbis say: One may not suspend the strainer on a Festival, and one may not place wine for filtering through a suspended strainer on Shabbat; however, one may place wine through a suspended strainer on a Festival.

One may pour water over sediment that is in a strainer on Shabbat so that it will become clear and clean. And similarly, one may filter wine through cloths and through an Egyptian basket made from palm leaves. Since these liquids are drinkable even without filtering, doing so does not violate the prohibition of selecting. And likewise, one may place an egg in a mustard strainer in order to separate the yolk from the egg-white, and one may prepare anumlin, a wine-based drink, on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: On Shabbat one may only make anumlin in a small cup; on a Festival, in a larger vessel; and on the intermediate days of a Festival, one may even prepare it in a barrel. Rabbi Tzadok says: There is no objective principle; rather, it is all according to the number of guests; if they are numerous, one may prepare a larger quantity of anumlin.

One may not soak asafoetida in lukewarm water to prepare a medicinal drink from it; however, one may place it into vinegar like a standard spice. And one may not soak vetches in water in order to separate them from their chaff, nor rub them by hand so as to remove their chaff. However, one may place them into a sieve or into a basket, and if the chaff gets removed, so be it. One may not sift straw in a sieve, and similarly, one may not place it on a high place so that that the chaff blows away in the wind; however, one may take the straw in a sieve and place it into the trough of an animal, and one need not be concerned if the chaff is removed in the process.

One may sweep hay from before an animal that is being fattened, and one may move hay to the sides for an animal that grazes on its own in the field (Rabbeinu Ḥananel); this is the statement of Rabbi Dosa. And the Rabbis prohibit doing so. One may take hay from before this animal and place it before that animal on Shabbat.

With regard to straw that is on top of a bed, if a person wishes to lie on it, he may not move it with his hand to smooth it, as the straw is set aside for kindling; rather, he may move it with his body. Since moving straw with one’s body is not the usual manner, it is permitted. And if the straw was designated as animal food, or a pillow or sheet was on it, which would clearly indicate that the straw was placed on the bed so one could sleep on it, the straw is not considered set-aside, and one may move it even with his hand. A press which belongs to a homeowner, one may loosen it on Shabbat. This press is used to dry and press clothing after laundering. One loosens it to remove clothing from it. However, one may not press clothing with it on Shabbat. And in the case of a press that belongs to a launderer, which is made specifically for pressing and requires professional expertise for its operation, one may not touch it. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the launderer’s press was loosened somewhat on Shabbat eve, he may loosen it completely on Shabbat and remove the garment.

Chapter 21

A person may take his son in his hands on Shabbat, and even though there is a stone, which is a set-aside item, in the child’s hand, it is not prohibited to pick up the child. And it is permissible to take a basket with a stone inside it on Shabbat. And one may move ritually impure teruma, which may not be eaten and is set-aside, with ritually pure teruma, as well as with non-sacred produce. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may even lift a measure of teruma that was nullified from a mixture of one hundred measures of non-sacred produce and one measure of teruma. When a measure of teruma is mixed with non-sacred produce, if the non-sacred produce is one hundred times the measure of teruma, the teruma is nullified. However, the Sages instituted that one must remove an amount equivalent to that measure of teruma and give it to a priest. The remainder is considered non-sacred produce. Rabbi Yehuda permits removing that measure on Shabbat to render the mixture permitted to eat.

With regard to a stone, which is set-aside on Shabbat and may not be moved, that was placed on the mouth of a barrel, one tilts the barrel on its side, and the stone falls. If the barrel was among other barrels, and the other barrels might break if the stone falls on them, he lifts the barrel to distance it from the other barrels, and then tilts it on its side, and the stone falls. With regard to coins that are on a cushion, he shakes the cushion and the coins fall. If there was bird dung ( Arukh ) on the cushion, he wipes it with a rag, but he may not wash it with water because of the prohibition against laundering. If the cushion was made of leather, and laundering is not a concern, he places water on it until the bird dung ceases.

Beit Shammai say: One may clear bones and shells left from the Shabbat meal from the table with his hand. And Beit Hillel say: One may remove the entire board [ tavla ] that is the table surface and shake the bones and shells off of it, but he may not lift them with his hand because they are set-aside and may not be moved. One may clear bread crumbs from the table, even if they are less than an olive-bulk, and pea and lentil pods. Even though it is not fit for human consumption, it may be moved because it is animal fodder. With regard to a sponge, if it has leather as a handle, one may wipe the table with it, and if not, one may not wipe the table with it lest he come to squeeze liquid from it. And the Rabbis say: Both this, a dry sponge with a handle, and that, one without a handle, may be moved on Shabbat and it does not become ritually impure. A sponge is not among the substances that can become ritually impure, neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic decree.

Chapter 22

From a barrel of wine or oil that broke on Shabbat, one may rescue from it food sufficient for three meals, and one may also say to others: Come and rescue food for yourselves. This applies provided that one does not soak up the wine or oil with a sponge or rag, due to the prohibition of squeezing. One may not squeeze fruits on Shabbat in order to extract liquids from them. And if liquids seeped out on their own, it is prohibited to use them on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the fruits were designated for eating, the liquid that seeps from them on Shabbat is permitted. There is no concern lest one purposely squeeze liquids from fruit that is designated for eating. And if the fruits were originally designated for liquids, the liquids that seep from them on Shabbat are prohibited. In the case of honeycombs that one crushed on Shabbat eve, and honey and wax seeped from them on their own on Shabbat, they are prohibited, and Rabbi Eliezer permits using them.

Any salted food item that was already placed in hot water, i.e., cooked, before Shabbat, one may soak it in hot water even on Shabbat. And anything that was not placed in hot water before Shabbat, one may rinse it in hot water on Shabbat but may not soak it, with the exception of old salted fish and small salted fish and the kolyas ha’ispanin fish, for which rinsing with hot water itself is completion of the prohibited labor of cooking.

A person may break a barrel on Shabbat in order to eat dried figs from it, provided he does not intend to make a vessel. And one may not perforate the plug of a barrel to extract wine from it; rather, one must remove the plug entirely to avoid creating a new opening for the barrel. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis permit puncturing the plug, but they too restrict this leniency and say that one may not perforate the plug of the barrel on its side. And if it was already perforated, one may not apply wax to it to seal the hole, because in doing so he spreads the wax evenly on the barrel and thereby violates the prohibited labor of smoothing. Rabbi Yehuda said: An incident of that kind came before Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai in the city of Arav, and he said: I am concerned for him, because he may be liable to bring a sin-offering as a result of this.

One may place a cooked dish into an empty pit on Shabbat so that it will be protected from the heat, and similarly, one may place good potable water into a vessel and place the vessel into bad, non-potable water so that the potable water will cool off. And one may also place cold water out in the sun so that it will be heated. They also taught: Someone whose garments fell into water while walking on the road may replace them and continue to walk wearing them and need not be concerned about violating the prohibitions against wringing or laundering. When he reaches the outer courtyard of a place where he can leave his clothes, he spreads them in the sun to dry, but not opposite the masses, as they will suspect him of laundering on Shabbat.

One who bathes on Shabbat in a ritual bath formed by cave water or in the water of Tiberias and dried himself even with ten towels may not carry them in his hand, lest he forget that it is Shabbat and wring the water from them. However, ten people may use one towel to dry their faces, hands, and feet, and may carry them in their hands. Even though in this case the towel would be quite wet, it is permitted to handle the towel because there are several people present, and they will remind each other that it is prohibited to wring a towel on Shabbat.

Apropos the waters of Tiberias, the mishna discusses the halakhot of bathing and medicine on Shabbat. One may smear oil on his body and gently rub his body with his hand; however, one may not exert himself with vigorous massage or by means of exercise in order to benefit from the therapeutic effects of sweating; and one may not scrape the oil off with a scraper. Additionally, one may not go into a swampy river [ kurdima ], on Shabbat. And one may not make a drug to induce vomiting, nor may one align a young infant’s bones to straighten them, nor may one reset a break in a bone. One whose hand or foot was dislocated may not move them about vigorously in cold water, which is the standard method of treatment; however, one may wash the limb in the typical manner, and if one is cured through this washing, he is cured.

Chapter 23

One may borrow jugs of wine and jugs of oil from another on Shabbat, as long as one does not say the following to him: Loan me. And similarly, a woman may borrow from another loaves of bread on Shabbat. And if the lender does not trust him that he will return them, the borrower may leave his cloak with him as collateral and make the proper calculation with him after Shabbat. And similarly, on the eve of Passover in Jerusalem, when it occurs on Shabbat, one who is procuring a Paschal lamb may leave his cloak with him, i.e., the person from whom he is purchasing it, and take the lamb to bring as his Paschal lamb, and then make the proper calculation with him after the Festival.

One may count his guests who are coming to his meal and his appetizers, as long as he does so from memory; but one may not read them from a written list, the reason for which will be explained in the Gemara. A person may draw lots with his children and family members at the table on Shabbat, in order to determine who will receive which portion, as long as he does not intend to set a large portion against a small portion in such a lottery. Rather, the portions must be of equal size. And one may cast lots among the priests for sanctified foods on a Festival, but not for the specific portions.

A person may not hire workers on Shabbat to work for him after Shabbat because even speaking about weekday matters is prohibited on Shabbat. Similarly, a person may not tell another on Shabbat to hire workers for him. One may not even wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary in order to leave the boundary immediately after Shabbat to hire workers for himself or to bring produce from his field. But he may wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary in order to guard his produce that is outside the Shabbat boundary, and he may then bring produce back in his hand, since he did not initially intend to wait at the edge of the boundary for this purpose. Abba Shaul stated a general principle: With regard to anything that I am permitted to discuss on Shabbat, I am permitted to wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary for its sake.

One may wait for nightfall at the Shabbat boundary to attend to the needs of a bride and the needs of a corpse, such as to bring him a coffin and shrouds. If a gentile brought flutes on Shabbat in order to play music during the eulogy and funeral procession, a Jew may not eulogize with them as accompaniment, unless they were brought from a nearby location within the Shabbat boundary and transporting them did not include any violation of halakha. If gentiles made someone a coffin and dug him a grave on Shabbat, and they then changed their minds and decided to give it to someone else, a Jew may be buried in it. However, if it was initially intended for a Jew, a Jew may never be buried in it.

One may perform all of the needs of the dead on Shabbat. One may smear oil on the body and rinse it with water, and all of this is permitted provided that one does not move any of its limbs, which would constitute a violation of the laws of set-aside objects. When necessary, one may also remove a pillow from beneath it and thereby place it on cold sand in order to delay its decomposition. Similarly, one may tie the jaw of a corpse that is in the process of opening. One may not move it directly so that it will rise back to its original position, but so that it will not continue to open. And similarly, if one has a roof beam that has broken on Shabbat, one may support it with a bench or with long poles from a bed. One may not move it so that the beam will rise back to its original place, but so that it will not continue to fall. One may not shut the eyes of the dead on Shabbat because the body is set-aside. And one may not shut the eyes even on a weekday while the soul departs. One must wait until the person has died. And one who shuts the eyes while the soul departs is a murderer because he has hastened the person’s death.

Chapter 24

One who was traveling on Shabbat eve and night fell, and Shabbat began while he was still en route, gives his money pouch to a gentile traveling with him. And if there is no gentile with him he places it on the donkey. Once he reached the outer courtyard of the city, where belongings can be securely placed, he takes the vessels that may be moved on Shabbat off the donkey. With regard to the vessels that may not be moved on Shabbat, he unties the ropes that attach his bags to the donkey, and the bags of vessels fall on their own.

One may untie peki’in of grain before an animal on Shabbat, and one may spread the kifin but not the zirin. These terms will be explained in the Gemara. One may not crush hay or carobs before an animal on Shabbat in order to facilitate its eating. He may do so neither for a small animal [ daka ] nor for a large one. Rabbi Yehuda permits to do so with carobs for a small animal, because it can swallow the hard carobs only with difficulty.

One may not forcibly overfeed a camel on Shabbat and one may not force-feed it, even if in doing so he does not overfeed the camel. However, one may place food into its mouth. And the mishna makes a distinction, which will be explained in the Gemara, between two manners of placing food in the mouths of cattle. One may not place food in the mouths of calves on Shabbat in the manner of hamra’a, but one may do so in the manner of halata. And one may force-feed chickens. And one may add water to bran used as animal feed, but one may not knead the mixture. And one may not place water before bees or before doves in a dove-cote, because they are capable of finding their own food; however, one may place water before geese and chickens and before hardisian [ hardeisiyyot ] doves.

One may cut the pumpkins before an animal on Shabbat, as long as they were picked prior to Shabbat. And likewise one may cut an animal carcass before the dogs on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was not already a carcass, i.e., it was not dead, prior to Shabbat, it is prohibited to cut it or even move it on Shabbat because it is not prepared for use on Shabbat.

A father or husband may nullify his daughter’s or his wife’s vows on Shabbat, and one may request from a Sage to dissolve vows that are for the purpose of Shabbat. Failure to dissolve the vow will compromise one’s fulfillment of the mitzva to delight in Shabbat. And one may seal a window on Shabbat to prevent light from entering, and one may measure a rag to determine whether or not it is large enough to contract ritual impurity, and one may measure a ritual bath to determine if it contains enough water for immersion. The mishna relates that there was an incident in the time of Rabbi Tzadok’s father and the time of Abba Shaul ben Botnit, in which they sealed a window using an earthenware vessel and tied an earthenware shard with a long reed-grass with a temporary knot, in order to ascertain whether or not the roofing had an opening the size of a handbreadth. And from their statements and their actions, we derived that one may seal a window, and measure, and tie a knot on Shabbat.

Mishnah Eruvin

Chapter 1

If an alleyway is enclosed on three sides with courtyards opening into it from three sides, and the fourth side opens into a public domain, it is prohibited by rabbinic law to carry objects in it on Shabbat. However, carrying in an alleyway under those circumstances is permitted if a cross beam is placed horizontally over the entrance to the alleyway. The mishna teaches that if the cross beam spans the entrance to an alleyway at a height above twenty cubits, one must diminish the height of the cross beam so that it is less than twenty cubits. Rabbi Yehuda says: He need not diminish it, since the cross beam enables one to carry in the alleyway even at that height. If the entrance to the alleyway is wider than ten cubits, one must diminish its width. However, if the entrance to the alleyway has the form of a doorway, i.e., two vertical posts on the two sides, and a horizontal beam spanning the space between them, even if it is wider than ten cubits, he need not diminish it, as it is then regarded as an entrance, rather than a breach, even if it is very wide.

There is a basic dispute with regard to the method of rendering an alleyway fit for one to carry within it on Shabbat. Beit Shammai say: Both a side post and a cross beam are required. Beit Hillel say: Either a side post or a cross beam. Rabbi Eliezer says: Two side posts are required, one on each side of the alleyway. In the name of Rabbi Yishmael, one student said before Rabbi Akiva: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree about an alleyway that is less than four cubits wide, as they both agree that carrying is rendered permitted by either a side post or a cross beam. With regard to what did they disagree? It is with regard to an alleyway that is wider than four cubits, and up to ten cubits wide; as Beit Shammai say: It requires both a side post and a cross beam. And Beit Hillel say: It requires either a side post or a cross beam. Rabbi Akiva said to the disciple: It is not so, as they disagree both about this case, i.e., an alleyway that is less than four cubits wide, and about that case, i.e., an alleyway that is between four and ten cubits wide.

The cross beam, which the Sages stated may be used to render an alleyway fit for one to carry within it, must be wide enough to receive and hold a small brick. And this small brick is half a large brick, which measures three handbreadths, i.e., a handbreadth and a half. It is sufficient that the cross beam will be a handbreadth in width, not a handbreadth and a half, enough to hold a small brick across its width.

And the cross beam must be wide enough to hold a small brick and also sturdy enough to hold a small brick and not collapse. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it is wide enough to hold the brick, even though it is not sturdy enough to actually support it, it is sufficient.

Therefore, even if the cross beam is made of straw or reeds, one considers it as though it were made of metal. If the cross beam is curved, so that a small brick cannot rest on it, one considers it as though it were straight; if it is round, one considers it as though it were square. The following principle was stated with regard to a round cross beam: Any beam with a circumference of three handbreadths is a handbreadth in width, i.e., in diameter.

The side posts the Sages spoke of with regard to rendering an alleyway fit for one to carry within it, their height must be at least ten handbreadths, and their width and thickness may be any amount. Rabbi Yosei says: Their width must be at least three handbreadths.

One may construct side posts from anything, even a living creature, provided that it was properly attached to the entrance of the alleyway, and Rabbi Yosei prohibits using a living creature as a side post. The mishna continues with a similar dispute: Even a living creature imparts ritual impurity if it used as the covering of a grave. But Rabbi Meir deems it pure. Likewise, one may write women’s bills of divorce on anything, even a living creature. But Rabbi Yosei HaGelili invalidates a bill of divorce written on a living creature.

If a caravan camped in a valley, i.e., an open space not enclosed by walls, and the travelers enclosed their camp with partitions made of the animals’ equipment, e.g., saddles and the like, one may carry inside the enclosed area, provided that the resultant partition will be a fence ten handbreadths high, and that there will not be breaches in the partition greater than the built segment. Any breach that is approximately ten cubits wide is permitted and does not invalidate the partition because it is considered like an entrance. However, if one of the breaches is greater than ten cubits, it is prohibited to carry anywhere in the enclosed area.

If a caravan is camped in a field, and the travelers seek to construct partitions to render the area fit for one to carry within it on Shabbat, one surrounds the area with three ropes, one above another, and a third one above the other two. One is permitted to carry within the circumscribed area provided that there will not be a gap of three handbreadths between one rope and the next. The measure of the ropes and their combined thickness must be greater than a handbreadth, so that the entire partition, consisting of three ropes and the empty spaces between them, will be ten handbreadths high.

Alternatively, one may surround the area with boards that stand upright, provided that there will not be a gap of three handbreadths between one board and the next. When the Sages issued this ruling, they spoke exclusively of a caravan; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that a partition of this kind, which consists of only horizontal or vertical elements, is permitted exclusively in exigent circumstances. Otherwise, full-fledged partitions are required. However, the Rabbis say: They spoke of a caravan in the mishna only because they spoke in the present, citing the most typical case. Those traveling in caravans were typically unable to erect full-fledged partitions, so they would surround their camps with ropes or boards. However, the halakha in the mishna applies in all cases. The mishna cites an additional dispute: Any partition that is not constructed of both warp and woof, i.e., vertical and horizontal elements, is not a partition; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. He holds that the vertical boards and the horizontal ropes are not considered a partition, even in the exigent circumstances of a caravan. However, the Rabbis say: One of the two elements, either vertical or horizontal, is sufficient. The Sages exempted a soldier in a military camp in four matters: One may bring wood for kindling from any place with no concern that he is stealing wood from its owners; and one is exempt from ritual washing of the hands before eating; and one is exempt from the separation of tithes from doubtfully tithed produce [ demai ], i.e., produce purchased from an am ha’aretz, one who is not diligent in separating tithes; and one is exempt from establishing an eiruv.

Chapter 2

One may arrange upright boards [ passin ] around a well in the public domain in order to permit drawing water from the well on Shabbat. A well is usually at least four handbreadths wide and ten handbreadths deep. Therefore, it is considered a private domain, and it is prohibited to draw water from it on Shabbat, as that would constitute a violation of the prohibition to carry from a private domain into a public one. The Sages therefore instituted that a virtual partition may be built in the area surrounding the well, so that the enclosed area could be considered a private domain, thus permitting use of the well and carrying of the water within the partitioned area. In this specific instance, the Sages demonstrated special leniency and did not require a proper partition to enclose the entire area. For this purpose, it suffices if there are four double posts [ deyomadin ] that look like eight single posts, i.e., four corner pieces, each comprised of two posts joined together at right angles; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: There must be eight posts that look like twelve. How so? There must be four double posts, one in each corner, with four plain posts, one between each pair of double posts. The height of the double posts must be at least ten handbreadths, their width must be six handbreadths, and their thickness may be even a minimal amount. And between them, i.e., between the posts, there may be a gap the size of two teams [ revakot ] of three oxen each; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and says: There may be a slightly larger gap, the size of two teams of four oxen each, and this gap is measured with the cows being tied together and not untied, and with the minimal space necessary for one team to be entering while the other one is leaving.

It is permitted to bring the posts closer to the well, provided that the enclosed area is large enough for a cow to stand with its head and the majority of its body inside the partitioned space while it drinks. It is permitted to distance the boards from the well and expand the enclosed area by any amount, i.e., as much as one wishes, provided that he increases the number of upright boards between the double posts.

Rabbi Yehuda says: The partitioned area may be expanded up to an area of two beit se’a, which is an area of five thousand square cubits. The Rabbis said to him: They only spoke of an area of two beit se’a with regard to a garden or an enclosure used for storing wood, scrap, and the like [ karpef ]. But if it was a pen [ dir ], or a stable [ sahar ], or a backyard, or a courtyard in front of the house, even if it had an area of five beit kor or even ten beit kor, it is permitted. And it is permitted to distance the boards and expand the enclosed area by any amount, provided that one increases the upright boards between the double posts.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If the path of the public domain passes through the area of the upright boards surrounding a well and obstructs it, one must divert the path to the sides, so that the public will circumvent the enclosed area; otherwise, the partition is invalid and the enclosed area cannot be regarded as a private domain. And the Rabbis say: One need not divert the path of the public domain, for the partition is valid even if many people pass through it. In the case of a public cistern containing collected water, as well as a public well containing spring water, and even a private well, one may arrange upright boards around them in order to allow one to carry in the enclosed area, as delineated above. But in the case of a private cistern, there are two deficiencies: It belongs to an individual, and it does not contain spring water. Consequently, it is impossible to permit drawing from it on Shabbat by means of boards set up in the corners; rather, one must construct for it a proper partition ten handbreadths high; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: One may arrange upright boards only for a public well. But for the others, that is, a public cistern or a private well, one must set up a belt, i.e., a partition consisting of ropes, ten handbreadths high. Such an arrangement creates a proper partition based on the principle of lavud, namely, that solid surfaces with gaps between them smaller than three handbreadths are considered joined.

And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava said: With regard to a garden or a karpef, an enclosed courtyard used for storage, that is not more than seventy cubits and a remainder, a little more, as will be explained below, by seventy cubits and a remainder, and is surrounded by a wall ten handbreadths high, one may carry inside it, as it constitutes a proper private domain. This is provided that it contains a watchman’s booth or a dwelling place, or it is near the town in which its owner lives, so that he uses it and it is treated like a dwelling. Rabbi Yehuda says: This is not necessary, for even if it contains only a water cistern, an elongated water ditch, or a cave, i.e., a covered pit containing water, one may carry inside it, as the water bestows upon it the status of a dwelling. Rabbi Akiva says: Even if it has none of these one may carry inside it, provided that it measures not more than seventy cubits and a remainder by seventy cubits and a remainder. Rabbi Eliezer says: If its length is greater than its breadth, even by one cubit, one may not carry inside it, even though its total area does not exceed an area of two beit se’a, because in an area that was enclosed not for the purpose of residence, carrying is only permitted if the area is perfectly square. Rabbi Yosei says: Even if its length is double its breadth, one may carry inside it, and there is no need to be particular about a square shape.

Rabbi Elai said: I heard from Rabbi Eliezer that one is permitted to carry in a garden or karpef, even if the garden is an area of a beit kor, i.e., thirty times larger than the area of a beit se’a. Incidentally, he adds: And I also heard from him another halakha : If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot and did not join in an eiruv with the other residents when they established an eiruv, and on Shabbat he ceded ownership of his part in the courtyard to the other residents, then it is prohibited for him, the one who forgot to establish an eiruv, to bring in objects or take them out from his house to the courtyard; however, it is permitted to them, the other residents, to bring objects from their houses to that person’s house via the courtyard, and vice versa. We do not say that the failure of one resident to join in the eiruv nullifies the validity of the eiruv for the entire courtyard. And I also heard from him another halakha, that one may fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover with arkablin, a certain bitter herb. With regard to all three rulings, I circulated among all of Rabbi Eliezer’s disciples, seeking a colleague who had also heard these matters from him, but I could not find one.

Chapter 3

One may establish a joining of houses in courtyards [ eiruv ḥatzerot ] in order to permit carrying on Shabbat in a courtyard shared by two or more houses, and one may establish a joining of Shabbat borders [ eiruv teḥumin ] in order to extend the distance one is permitted to walk on Shabbat; and similarly, one may merge courtyards in order to permit carrying in an alleyway shared by two or more courtyards. This may be done with all kinds of food except for water and salt, as they are not considered foods and therefore may not be used for these purposes. The mishna continues with two similar principles: All types of food may be bought with second- tithe money, which must be taken to Jerusalem and used to purchase food (Deuteronomy 14:26), except for water and salt. Similarly, one who vows that nourishment is prohibited to him is permitted to eat water and salt, as they are not considered sources of nourishment. It was further stated with regard to the laws of joining courtyards that one may establish an eiruv teḥumin for a nazirite with wine, even though he is prohibited to drink it, because it is permitted to others. And similarly, one may establish an eiruv teḥumin for an Israelite with teruma, even though he may not eat it, because it is permitted to a priest. The food used for an eiruv teḥumin must be fit for human consumption, but it is not essential that it be fit for the consumption of the one for whom it is being used. Summakhos, however, says: One may only establish an eiruv teḥumin for an Israelite with unconsecrated food. It was additionally stated that one may establish an eiruv teḥumin for a priest in a beit haperas, a field containing a grave that was plowed over. There is doubt as to the location of bone fragments in the entire area. A priest is prohibited to come into contact with a corpse, and therefore may not enter a beit haperas. Rabbi Yehuda says: An eiruv teḥumin may be established for a priest even between the graves in a graveyard, an area which the priest may not enter by Torah law, since he can interpose between himself and the graves and go and eat the food that comprises the eiruv without contracting ritual impurity.

One may establish an eiruv with demai, produce purchased from one who may not have separated the required tithes, and similarly, one may establish an eiruv with the first tithe whose teruma has been taken in order to be given to a priest, and with the second tithe and consecrated articles that have been redeemed; and priests may establish an eiruv with ḥalla, the portion of dough that must be given to a priest. However, one may not establish an eiruv with tevel, produce from which the priestly dues [ teruma ] and other tithes have not been separated, nor with first tithe whose teruma, which must be given to a priest, has not been taken, nor with the second tithe or consecrated articles that have not been redeemed. If one sends his eiruv in the hands of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, all of whom are regarded as legally incompetent, or in the hands of one who does not accept the principle of eiruv, it is not a valid eiruv. But if one told another person to receive it from him at a specific location and set it down in that spot, it is a valid eiruv. The critical point in the establishment of an eiruv is that it must be deposited in the proper location by a competent person; but it is immaterial how the eiruv arrives there.

If one placed his eiruv in a tree above ten handbreadths from the ground, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv ; if it is below ten handbreadths, his eiruv is a valid eiruv. If he placed the eiruv in a pit, even if it was a hundred cubits deep, his eiruv is a valid eiruv. If one placed his eiruv on top of a reed or on top of a pole [ kundas ], when the reed or pole is detached from its original place and stuck into the ground, even if it is a hundred cubits high, it is a valid eiruv, as one can remove the reed or pole from the ground and take his eiruv. If one put the eiruv in a cupboard and locked it, and the key was lost, so that he is now unable to open the cupboard and access the eiruv, it is nonetheless a valid eiruv. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he does not know that the key is in its place, it is not a valid eiruv.

If one’s eiruv rolled beyond the Shabbat limit, and he no longer has access to his eiruv since he may not go beyond his limit, or if a pile of stones fell on it, or if it was burnt, or if the eiruv was teruma and it became ritually impure; if any of these occurrences took place while it was still day, prior to the onset of Shabbat, it is not a valid eiruv, since one did not have an eiruv at twilight, which is the time one’s Shabbat residence is established. However, if any of these occurred after dark, when it was already Shabbat, it is a valid eiruv, as it was intact and accessible at the time one’s Shabbat residence is determined. If the matter is in doubt, i.e., if he does not know when one of the aforementioned incidents occurred, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: This person is in the position of both a donkey driver, who must prod the animal from behind, and a camel driver, who must lead the animal from the front, i.e., he is a person who is pulled in two opposite directions. Due to the uncertainty concerning his Shabbat border, he must act stringently, as though his resting place were both in his town and at the location where he placed the eiruv. He must restrict his Shabbat movement to those areas that are within two thousand cubits of both locations. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon disagree and say: An eiruv whose validity is in doubt is nevertheless valid. Rav Yosei said: The Sage Avtolemos testified in the name of five Elders that an eiruv whose validity is in doubt is valid.

A person may make a condition with regard to his eiruv of Shabbat borders. In other words, he need not decide in advance in which direction his eiruv should take effect. For example, he may deposit an eiruv on each of two opposite sides of his town, and say: If gentiles come from the east, my eiruv is in the west, so that I can escape in that direction; and if they come from the west, my eiruv is in the east. If they come from here and from there, i.e., from both directions, I will go wherever I wish, and my eiruv will retroactively take effect in that direction; and if they do not come at all, neither from here nor from there, I will be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town and give up both eiruvin that I deposited, leaving me with two thousand cubits in all directions from the town. Similarly, one may say: If a Sage comes from the east and he is spending Shabbat beyond the boundaries of my town, my eiruv is in the east, so that I may go out to greet him there; and if he comes from the west, my eiruv is in the west. If one Sage comes from here, and another Sage comes from there, I will go wherever I wish; and if no Sage comes, neither from here nor from there, I will be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one of the Sages coming from opposite directions was his teacher, he may go only to his teacher, as it is assumed that was his original intention. And if they were both his teachers, so that there is no reason to suppose that he preferred one over the other, he may go wherever he wishes.

Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a Festival adjacent to Shabbat, whether before it, on a Friday, or after it, on a Sunday, a person may establish two eiruvin of Shabbat borders [ teḥumin ] and say as follows: My eiruv on the first day shall be to the east, and on the second day to the west. Alternatively, one may say: On the first day it shall be to the west and on the second day to the east. Similarly, one may say: My eiruv shall apply on the first day, but on the second day I shall be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town, or: My eiruv shall apply on the second day, but on the first day I shall be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town. And the Rabbis disagree and say that such a split is impossible. Rather, he either establishes an eiruv in one direction for both days, or he establishes no eiruv at all; either he establishes an eiruv for the two days, or he establishes no eiruv at all. What does one do to establish an eiruv that will be valid for both the Festival and Shabbat? He or his agent brings the eiruv to the location that he wishes to establish as his residence on the eve of the first day, and he stays there with it until nightfall, the time when the eiruv establishes that location as his residence for the Festival, and then he takes it with him and goes away, so that it will not become lost before the following evening, in which case he would not have an eiruv for the second day. On the eve of the second day, he takes it back to the same place as the day before, and he stays there with it until nightfall, thereby establishing his residence for Shabbat, and then he may eat the eiruv and go away, if he so desires. Consequently, he benefits in that he is permitted to walk in the direction that he desires, and he benefits in that he is permitted to eat his eiruv. However, if the eiruv was eaten on the first day, his eiruv is effective for the first day, and his eiruv is not effective for the second day. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: If so, you agree with me that Shabbat and a Festival constitute two distinct sanctities, as if not, the eiruv that went into effect during the twilight period on the eve of the first day should have remained in effect for both days, even if it was eaten during the first day. This being the case, you should also agree with me that one can make two separate eiruvin for the two days in two different directions.

During the time period when the Jewish calendar was established by the court according to the testimony of witnesses who had seen the new moon, Rosh HaShana would be observed for only one day if witnesses arrived on that day, and for two days if witnesses failed to arrive and the month of Elul was declared to be an extended, thirty-day month. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to Rosh HaShana, if one feared that the month of Elul might be extended, and he wanted to travel in two different directions on the two days that could be Rosh HaShana, this person may establish two eiruvin and say: My eiruv on the first day shall be to the east and on the second day to the west, or alternatively: On the first day it shall be to the west, and on the second day to the east. Similarly, he may say: My eiruv shall apply on the first day, but on the second day I shall be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town, or alternatively: My eiruv shall apply on the second day, but on the first day I shall be like the rest of the inhabitants of my town. And the Rabbis did not agree with him that the two days of Rosh HaShana can be divided in such a manner.

And Rabbi Yehuda said further, with regard to the two days of Rosh HaShana that one observes because he does not know which is the real day of the Festival: A person may make a condition with regard to a basket of tevel produce on the first day of the Festival and say as follows: If today is the Festival and tomorrow is an ordinary weekday I will separate the teruma and tithes tomorrow, and I have performed nothing today; if today is an ordinary weekday, I hereby separate the appropriate teruma and tithes now. He may then eat the produce on the second day of the Festival, since one of his two acts of tithing was certainly performed on an ordinary weekday. And similarly, an egg that was laid on the first day of the Festival may be eaten on the second day, since one of the days is certainly an ordinary weekday. And the Rabbis did not agree with him even with regard to these two days.

Rabbi Dosa ben Harekinas says: One who passes before the ark in the synagogue and leads the congregation in prayer on the first day of the festival of Rosh HaShana says: Strengthen us, O Lord our God, on this day of the New Moon, whether it is today or tomorrow. And similarly, on the following day he says: Whether Rosh HaShana is today or yesterday. And the Rabbis did not agree with him that one should formulate his prayer in this conditional manner.

Chapter 4

With regard to one whom gentiles forcibly took him out beyond the Shabbat limit, or if an evil spirit took him out, i.e., he was temporarily insane, and found himself outside the Shabbat limit, he has only four cubits that he may walk from where he is standing. If the gentiles returned him, or if he came back while still under the influence of the evil spirit, it is as though he had never left his Shabbat limit, and he may move about within his original limit as before. If the gentiles brought him to a different city that was surrounded by walls, or if they put him into a pen or a stable, i.e., animal enclosures, the Sages disagree. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya say: He may walk about the entire city, as the whole city is considered like four cubits. Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva say: He has only four cubits from where he was placed. The mishna relates: There was an incident where all of these Sages were coming from Pelandarsin, an overseas location, and their boat set sail on the sea on Shabbat, taking them beyond their Shabbat limit. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya walked about the entire boat, as they hold that the entire boat is considered like four cubits, while Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva did not move beyond four cubits, as they sought to be stringent with themselves.

The mishna further relates that on one occasion, they did not enter the port [ namel ] until after nightfall on Shabbat eve. The others said to Rabban Gamliel: What is the halakha with regard to alighting from the boat at this time? In other words, were we already within the city’s limit before Shabbat commenced? He said to them: You are permitted to alight, as I was watching, and I observed that we were already within the city’s limit before nightfall. We acquired our resting place in the city during the twilight period. Therefore, it is permitted to walk throughout the city even after nightfall.

With regard to one who was permitted to leave his Shabbat limit, i.e., he went out to testify that he had seen the new moon or for some life-saving purpose, and they said to him along the way: The action has already been performed, and there is no need for you to travel for that purpose, he has two thousand cubits in each direction from the location where he was standing when this was told to him. If he was within his original limit, it is considered as if he had not left his limit, and he may return to his original location. The Sages formulated a principle: All who go out to battle and save lives may return to their original locations on Shabbat.

With regard to a person who was sitting along the road on Shabbat eve toward nightfall, unaware that he was within the city’s Shabbat limit, and when he stood up after Shabbat had already commenced, he saw that he was near the town, i.e., within its limit, since he had not intended to acquire his place of residence in the town, he may not enter it, but rather he measures two thousand cubits from his place; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: He may enter the town. Rabbi Yehuda said: It once happened that Rabbi Tarfon entered a town on Shabbat without intention from the beginning of Shabbat to establish residence in the city.

With regard to one who was sleeping along the road on Shabbat eve and did not know that night had fallen, he has two thousand cubits in each direction; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, who maintains that knowledge and awareness are not necessary for one to acquire residence, but rather, a person’s presence in a given location establishes residence there. But the Rabbis say: He has only four cubits, as since he did not knowingly acquire residence, he did not establish a Shabbat limit. Rabbi Eliezer says: He has only four cubits total and he is in the middle of them, i.e., he has two cubits in each direction. Rabbi Yehuda says: He may walk four cubits in any direction he wishes. But Rabbi Yehuda agrees that if he selected for himself the direction in which he wants to walk those four cubits, he cannot retract and walk four cubits in a different direction.

With regard to a case where there were two people in this situation, positioned in such a way that part of the four cubits of one were subsumed within the four cubits of the other, they may each bring food and eat together in the shared area in the middle, provided that the one does not carry anything from his four-cubit limit into that of his fellow. With regard to a case where there were three people in this situation, and certain parts of the four cubits of the middle one were subsumed within the respective limits of each of the others, so that he shared a certain area with each of them, he is permitted to eat with either of them, and they are both permitted to eat with him; but the two outer ones are forbidden to eat with each other, since they share no common area. Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this comparable? It is like three courtyards that open into one another, and also open into a public domain. If the two outer courtyards established an eiruv with the middle one, the middle one is permitted to carry to the two outer ones, and they are permitted to carry to it, but the two outer courtyards are prohibited to carry from one to the other, as they did not establish an eiruv with one another.

With regard to one who was coming along the way on Shabbat eve, and it grew dark while he was traveling, and he was familiar with a tree or a fence located two thousand cubits from his current location, and two thousand cubits from his house, and he said: My residence is beneath that tree, rather than in his present location, he has not said anything, as he did not establish a fixed location as his residence. If, however, he said: My residence is at the tree’s trunk, he acquired residence there, and he may therefore walk from the place he is standing to the trunk of the tree two thousand cubits away, and from the trunk of the tree to his house, an additional two thousand cubits. Consequently, he walks after nightfall a total of four thousand cubits.

If one is not familiar with a tree or any other noticeable landmark, or if he is not an expert in the halakha, unaware that residence can be established from a distance, and he said: My residence is at my current location, then his presence at his current location acquires for him the right to walk two thousand cubits in each direction. The manner in which the two thousand cubits are measured is the subject of a tannaitic dispute. These cubits are measured circularly, i.e., as a circle with a radius of two thousand cubits; this is the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigenos. And the Rabbis say: These are measured squarely, i.e., as a square tablet, with each side measuring four thousand cubits, so that he gains the corners. He is permitted to walk from the middle to the corners of the square as well, a distance of approximately 2,800 cubits.

And this is the meaning of that which the Sages said: The pauper establishes an eiruv with his feet, i.e., one who does not have the bread required to establish an eiruv may walk anywhere within his Shabbat limit and declare: This is my residence, and his Shabbat limit is measured from that location. Rabbi Meir said: We have this leniency in effect only for a pauper, who does not have food for two meals. However, one who has bread may only establish residence with bread. Rabbi Yehuda says: This leniency is in effect for both a pauper and a wealthy person. The Sages said that one establishes an eiruv with bread only in order to be lenient with the wealthy person, so that he need not exert himself and go out and establish an eiruv with his feet. Instead, he can appoint an agent to place bread for him in that location. This, however, does not negate the option of personally going to that location in order to establish residence without bread.

If a person set out to go on a Shabbat eve to a town for which an eiruv is established in order to go there on Shabbat, and another person caused him to return home, he himself is permitted to go to that city on Shabbat, and for all the other residents of the town it is prohibited to go there. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: Anyone who can establish an eiruv, and negated his residence in his original place, and did not establish an eiruv, i.e., he did not at least state that he seeks to establish residence somewhere else, is likened to both a donkey driver, who walks behind the animal and prods it, and a camel driver, who walks before the animal and leads it, in the sense that he is pulled in two opposite directions. Due to the uncertainty with regard to the location of his Shabbat limit, his movement is restricted as though his residence was established in both his city and at a location along the way to the other city. He may not venture beyond two thousand cubits from either location.

One who intentionally, not for the purpose of performing a mitzva, went out beyond his Shabbat limit, even if only one cubit, may not reenter. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he went out two cubits he may reenter; however, if he went out three cubits he may not reenter. With regard to one for whom it grew dark while he was traveling outside the Shabbat limit of the town where he was heading, even if he was only one cubit outside the limit he may not enter the town. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he was fifteen cubits beyond the limit he may enter the town, because the surveyors do not precisely demarcate the measures; rather, they mark the Shabbat limit within the two thousand cubits, due to those who err.

Chapter 5

How does one extend the boundaries of cities in order to ensure that all its protrusions are included within the borders of the city? He extends a straight line across the edge of the city, and if a house is recessed and another house protrudes, or a turret [ pagum ] is recessed and another turret protrudes from that line, and similarly, if there were remnants of walls ten handbreadths high, and bridges and monuments over graves in which there is a residence, one extends the measure of that side of the city as though there were other structures opposite them in the adjacent corner of the city. And prior to measuring the Shabbat limit, one renders the city like a square tablet so that it gains the corners, although there are actually no houses in those corners.

One allocates a karpef to every city, i.e., the measure of a karpef, which is slightly more than seventy cubits, is added to every city, and the two thousand cubits of the Shabbat limit are measured from there; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They spoke of the addition of a karpef only with regard to the space between two adjacent cities. How so? If this city has seventy cubits and a remainder vacant on one side, and that city has seventy cubits and a remainder vacant on the adjacent side, and the two areas of seventy-plus cubits overlap, the karpef combines the two cities into one.

And likewise, in the case of three villages that are arranged as a triangle, if there are only 141⅓ cubits separating between the two outer villages, the middle village combines the three villages into one.

One may measure a Shabbat limit only with a rope fifty cubits long, no less and no more, as will be explained in the Gemara. And one may measure the limit only at the level of one’s heart, i.e., whoever comes to measure the limit must hold the rope next to his chest. If one was measuring the limit and he reached a canyon or a fence, the height of the fence and the depth of the canyon are not counted toward the two thousand cubits; rather, he spans it and then resumes his measurement. Two people hold the two ends of the rope straight across the canyon or the fence, and the distance is measured as though the area were completely flat. If one reached a hill, he does not measure its height; rather, he spans the hill as if it were not there and then resumes his measurement, provided he does not thereby go out beyond the city’s Shabbat limit, as those watching the surveyor might mistakenly think the limit extends to that point. If, due to the width of the canyon or hill, he cannot span it, with regard to this situation Rabbi Dostai bar Yannai said in the name of Rabbi Meir: I heard that one may pierce hills. In other words, one measures the distance as if there were a hole from one side of the hill to the other, so that in effect, he measures only the horizontal distance and ignores the differences in elevation.

One may measure the Shabbat limit only with an expert surveyor. If it is discovered that the surveyor extended the limit in one place and reduced it in another place, so that the line marking the Shabbat limit is not straight, one accepts the measurement of the place where he extended the limit and straightens the limit accordingly. Similarly, if the surveyor extended the limit for one and reduced it for another, one accepts the extended measurement. And furthermore, even a gentile slave and even a gentile maidservant, whose testimonies are generally considered unreliable, are trustworthy to say: The Shabbat limit extended until here; as the Sages did not state the matter, the laws of Shabbat limits, to be stringent, but rather to be lenient. The prohibition to walk more than two thousand cubits is rabbinic in origin and is therefore interpreted leniently.

Although this chapter as a whole deals with halakhot governing the joining of Shabbat boundaries, this mishna returns to the halakhot governing a joining of courtyards. If a private city, which does not have many residents, grows and becomes a heavily populated public city, one may establish a joining of the courtyards for all of it, as long as it does not include a public domain as defined by Torah law. And if a public city loses residents over time and becomes a private city, one may not establish an eiruv for all of it unless one maintains an area outside the eiruv that is like the size of the city of Ḥadasha in Judea, which has fifty residents. Carrying within the eiruv is permitted, but it remains prohibited to carry in the area excluded from the eiruv. The reason for this requirement is to ensure that the laws of eiruv will not be forgotten. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The excluded area need not be so large; rather, it is sufficient to exclude three courtyards with two houses each.

One who was to the east of his home when Shabbat began, and he had said to his son before Shabbat: Establish an eiruv for me to the west; or, if he was to the west of his home and he had said to his son: Establish an eiruv for me to the east, the halakha is as follows: If there is a distance of two thousand cubits from his current location to his house, and the distance to his eiruv is greater than this, he is permitted to walk to his house, and from there he may walk two thousand cubits in every direction, but it is prohibited for him to walk to the spot where his son had deposited his eiruv. If the distance from one’s current location to his eiruv is two thousand cubits, and the distance to his house is greater than this, he is prohibited from walking to his house, and he is permitted to walk to the spot of his eiruv, and from there he may walk two thousand cubits in every direction. In other words, with regard to the Shabbat limit, one’s place of residence for Shabbat cannot be more than two thousand cubits from his physical location when Shabbat begins. One who places his eiruv in the outskirts of the city, i.e., within an area of slightly more than seventy cubits surrounding the city, it is as though he has not done anything. The two thousand cubits of one’s Shabbat limit are measured from the edge of the outskirts of the city even if there is no eiruv, and one therefore gains nothing from placing an eiruv within this area. If, however, he placed his eiruv outside the city’s boundary, even if he placed it only one cubit beyond the city, what he gains in distance through his eiruv on one side of the city he loses on the other side.

The residents of a large city may walk through an entire small city, and the residents of a small city may walk through an entire large city, even if part of it is located more than two thousand cubits from their city. How so? One who was in a large city and placed his eiruv in a small city, or one who was in a small city and placed his eiruv in a large city, may walk through the entire city in which he placed his eiruv and another two thousand cubits beyond it, as the entire city is considered as though it were only four cubits.

Rabbi Akiva says: He has only two thousand cubits from the place of his eiruv, as the actual area of the city is included in the calculation. Rabbi Akiva said to the Rabbis: Do you not concede to me that one who places his eiruv in a cave has only two thousand cubits from the place of his eiruv, and that consequently the entire cave is not considered as merely four cubits? The Rabbis said to him: When does this apply? When the cave has no residents. But if it has residents, it is considered as though it were only four cubits, and one may walk through all of it and another two thousand cubits beyond it. Consequently, the halakha with regard to an eiruv placed inside a cave is sometimes more lenient than the halakha governing an eiruv placed in the area above the cave. If one places his eiruv inside a cave that has residents, he has two thousand cubits beyond the cave; if he places it above the cave, where there are no residents, he has only two thousand cubits from the place of his eiruv. And as for one who is measuring his Shabbat limit, with regard to whom the Sages said that one gives him two thousand cubits, that measurement applies even if the end of his measurement terminates in the middle of a cave. He may not walk further into the cave, even if the cave is inhabited.

Chapter 6

One who resides with a gentile in the same courtyard, or one who lives in the same courtyard with one who does not accept the principle of eiruv, even though he is not a gentile, such as a Samaritan [ Kuti ], this person renders it prohibited for him to carry from his own house into the courtyard or from the courtyard into his house, unless he rents this person’s rights in the courtyard, as will be explained below. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Actually, the gentile does not render it prohibited for one to carry, unless there are two Jews living in the same courtyard who themselves would prohibit one another from carrying if there were no eiruv. In such a case, the presence of the gentile renders the eiruv ineffective. However, if only one Jew lives there, the gentile does not render it prohibited for him to carry in the courtyard.

Rabban Gamliel said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights to the alleyway before Shabbat. And Father said to us: Hurry and take out your utensils to the alleyway to establish possession of it, before he changes his mind and takes out his own utensils so as to reclaim his rights, in which case he would render it prohibited for you to use the entire alleyway. Rabbi Yehuda says: Rabban Gamliel’s father spoke to them with a different formulation, saying: Hurry and do whatever you must do in the alleyway prior to Shabbat, before he takes out his utensils and renders it prohibited for you to use the alleyway. In other words, you may not bring out utensils to the alleyway at all on Shabbat, as the institution of an eiruv cannot be used in the neighborhood of a Sadducee. This is because, even if he renounced his rights to the alleyway, he can always retract and reclaim them.

If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot and did not participate in an eiruv with the other residents before Shabbat, and on Shabbat he renounced his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, his house is prohibited both to him, who forgot to establish an eiruv, and to them, the other residents, to bring in objects from the courtyard to his house or to take them out from his house into the courtyard. But their houses are permitted both to him and to them, for taking objects out into the courtyard and for bringing them in. If they gave away their rights in the courtyard to him, i.e., if they renounced their rights in his favor, he is permitted to carry from his house into the courtyard, but they are prohibited from doing so. If two residents of the courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, and the others renounced their rights in the courtyard in their favor, they prohibit one another. In this scenario, the courtyard would belong to both of them, but each individual house remains the domain of its owner. It would therefore be prohibited for each of these residents to carry into the courtyard. For one resident may give away and receive rights in a domain, whereas two residents may only give away rights in a domain, but they may not receive rights in a domain. Since they did not establish an eiruv, it is unreasonable for the other residents of the courtyard to give away their rights in the domain, as the two who are prohibited because they did not participate in the eiruv render it prohibited for each other to carry.

The mishna poses a general question: When may one give away rights in a domain? Beit Shammai say: While it is still day, i.e., before the onset of Shabbat; and Beit Hillel say: Even after nightfall, when it is already Shabbat. The mishna cites another dispute: If one gave away his rights in his courtyard to the other residents of the courtyard, renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with them the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard – whether unwittingly, forgetting that he had renounced his rights, or intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard, for his action cancels his renunciation; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited; but if he acted unwittingly, he does not render carrying prohibited.

If a homeowner was in partnership with his neighbors, with this one in wine and with that one in wine, they need not establish an eiruv, for due to their authentic partnership they are considered to be one household, and no further partnership is required. If, however, he was in partnership with this one in wine and with that one in oil, they must establish an eiruv. As they are not partners in the same item, they are not all considered one partnership. Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case and that case, i.e., even if he partners with his neighbors in different items, they need not establish an eiruv.

With regard to five groups of people who spent Shabbat in one hall [ teraklin ] that was subdivided by partitions into separate rooms, each of which had a separate entrance to a courtyard that was shared with other houses, Beit Shammai say: An eiruv is required for each and every group, i.e., each group must contribute separately to the eiruv of the courtyard, as each is considered a different house. And Beit Hillel say: One eiruv suffices for all of them, as the partitions do not render the different sections separate houses. And Beit Hillel concede that when some of them occupy separate rooms or upper stories, they require a separate eiruv for each and every group, and the fact that they are in the same building does not render them one unified group.

In the case of brothers who were eating at their father’s table and sleeping in their own houses in the same courtyard, a separate contribution to the eiruv is required for each and every one of them. Therefore, if one of them forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, he must renounce his rights in the courtyard in order to render carrying in the courtyard permitted to the rest of the courtyard’s residents. When do they state this halakha? They state it when they take their eiruv elsewhere in the courtyard, i.e., to the house of one of the other residents. But if the eiruv was coming to them, i.e., if it was placed in their father’s house, or if there are no other residents with the brothers and their father in the courtyard, they are not required to establish an eiruv, as they are considered like a single individual living in a courtyard.

If five courtyards open into one another and also open into an alleyway, the following distinctions apply: If the residents of the courtyard established an eiruv in the courtyards and did not merge the courtyards that open into the alleyway, they are permitted to carry in the courtyards and they are prohibited to carry in the alleyway. The eiruv they established cannot also serve as a merging of the courtyards that open into the alleyway. And if they merged the courtyards of the alleyway, they are permitted to carry both here, in the alleyway, and there, in the courtyards. If they established an eiruv in the courtyards and also merged the courtyards of the alleyway, and one of the residents of the courtyard forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv in his courtyard, but did participate in the merging of the courtyards in the alleyway, they are permitted both here and there, as the merging of courtyards in the alleyway serves as an effective eiruv for the courtyards as well. However, if one of the residents of the alleyway forgot and did not participate in the merging of courtyards that open into the alleyway, they are permitted to carry in the courtyards and prohibited from carrying in the alleyway, as the principle is: An alleyway is to its courtyards as a courtyard is to its houses.

With regard to two courtyards, one of which was within the other, and the outer one opened into the public domain, the following distinctions apply: If the inner courtyard established an eiruv for itself and the outer one did not establish an eiruv, carrying in the inner one is permitted and carrying in the outer one is prohibited. If the outer courtyard established an eiruv and the inner one did not, carrying in both is prohibited, as the residents of the inner courtyard pass through the outer one, and are considered to a certain extent as residents of the courtyard who did not participate in the eiruv. If this courtyard established an eiruv for itself, and that courtyard also established an eiruv for itself, but they did not establish a joint eiruv with one another, this one is permitted by itself, and that one is permitted by itself, but they may not carry from one to the other. Rabbi Akiva prohibits carrying in the outer one even in such a case, as the right of entry to the outer courtyard enjoyed by the residents of the inner courtyard renders it prohibited. And the Rabbis disagree and say: The right of entry enjoyed by the residents of the inner courtyard does not render it prohibited. Since the residents of the inner courtyard do not use the outer one other than to pass through it, and they are permitted to carry in their own courtyard, they do not render it prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard.

If one resident of the outer courtyard forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, carrying in the inner courtyard is permitted and in the outer one is prohibited. If one resident of the inner courtyard forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, they are both prohibited, as the right of way enjoyed by the members of the inner courtyard through the outer courtyard renders the outer one prohibited as well. If the residents of both courtyards put their eiruv in one place, and one person, whether he was from the inner courtyard or from the outer one, forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, they are both prohibited for carrying within them, as the two courtyards are treated as one. And if the courtyards belonged to individuals, i.e., if only one person lived in each courtyard, they are not required to establish an eiruv, as this requirement applies only to a courtyard occupied by multiple residents.

Chapter 7

If there is a window in a wall that separates between two courtyards, and the window measures four by four handbreadths and is within ten handbreadths of the ground, the inhabitants of the courtyards establish two eiruvin, one for each courtyard. And if they desire, they may establish one eiruv, thereby merging the two courtyards, as they may be considered as one due to the window. However, if the window measures less than four by four handbreadths, or if it is above ten handbreadths from the ground, it is no longer considered a valid opening, and the two courtyards cannot be considered a single courtyard. Therefore, the residents establish two eiruvin, but they may not establish one eiruv.

If a wall between two courtyards is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, the residents of the courtyard establish two eiruvin, a separate one for each courtyard, but they may not establish one eiruv. If there was produce on top of the wall, these residents of one courtyard may ascend from this side and eat from it, and those residents of the other courtyard may ascend from that side and eat from it, provided that they do not lower the produce down from on top of the wall to one of the courtyards. If the wall was breached, the following distinction applies: If the breach was up to ten cubits wide, they establish two eiruvin, and if they desire, they may establish one eiruv, as it is similar to an entrance, like any opening less than ten cubits wide. If the breach was more than this, they establish one eiruv, and they may not establish two, as a breach of this size nullifies the partition and joins the two courtyards into a single domain.

With regard to a ditch between two courtyards that is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide, it is considered a full-fledged partition, and the residents of the courtyard establish two eiruvin, one for each courtyard, but they may not establish one eiruv. Even if the ditch is filled with straw or hay, it is not regarded as sealed and is therefore not nullified. However, if the ditch is filled with dirt or pebbles, the residents establish one eiruv, but they may not establish two eiruvin, as the ditch is nullified and considered nonexistent.

If one placed a board four handbreadths wide across the ditch so that he could cross it, and similarly, if two balconies [ gezuztraot ] in two different courtyards are opposite one another, and one placed a board four handbreadths wide between them, the residents of the courtyards or balconies establish two eiruvin, and if they desire, they may establish one, as the board serves as an opening and a passageway between them. If the width of the plank is less than four handbreadths, the residents establish two eiruvin, but they may not establish one eiruv.

With regard to a haystack that is positioned between two courtyards and is ten handbreadths high, it has the status of a partition, and therefore the residents of the courtyards may establish two eiruvin, and they may not establish one eiruv. These, the inhabitants of one courtyard, may feed their animals from here, from one side of the haystack, and those, the inhabitants of the other courtyard, may feed their animals from there, from the other side of the haystack. There is no concern that the haystack might become too small to serve as a partition. If the height of the hay was reduced to less than ten handbreadths across its entire length, its legal status is no longer that of a partition. Consequently, the residents of both courtyards establish one eiruv, and they do not establish two eiruvin.

How does one merge the courtyards that open into the alleyway, if a person wishes to act on behalf of all the residents of the alleyway? He places a barrel filled with his own food and says: This is for all the residents of the alleyway. For this gift to be acquired by the others, someone must accept it on their behalf, and the tanna therefore teaches that he may confer possession to them even by means of his adult son or daughter, and likewise by means of his Hebrew slave or maidservant, whom he does not own, and by means of his wife. These people may acquire the eiruv on behalf of all the residents of the alleyway. However, he may not confer possession by means of his minor son or daughter, nor by means of his Canaanite slave or maidservant, because they cannot effect acquisition, as ownership of objects that come into their possession is as if those objects came into his possession. Consequently, the master or father cannot confer possession to the slave or minor respectively on behalf of others as their acquisition is ineffective and the object remains in his own possession.

If the food in the barrel for the merging of the alleyway diminished and was less than the requisite measure, one may add a little of his own and confer possession to the others, and he need not inform them of his addition. However, if new residents were added to the residents of the alleyway, he may add food on behalf of those residents and confer possession to them, and he must inform the new residents of their inclusion in the merging of alleyways.

What is the measure of food required for a merging of the alleyways? When the residents of the alley are numerous, food for two meals is sufficient for all of them; when they are few, less than a certain number, a dried fig-bulk for each and every one of them is enough.

Rabbi Yosei said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to the beginning of an eiruv, when it is initially established. However, with regard to the remnants of an eiruv, e.g., if the eiruv decreased in size on Shabbat, it remains valid if even any amount remains. And in general they said that it is necessary to join the courtyards, even though a merging of the alleyways was already in place, only so that the halakhic category of eiruv will not be forgotten by the children, i.e., so that the next generation should be aware that an eiruv can be established for a courtyard, for otherwise they would be entirely unaware of this halakhic category.

One may join courtyards and merge alleyways with all types of food, except for water and salt, as they are not considered foods. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua says that a different limitation applies: A whole loaf may be used for an eiruv. With regard to a baked product even the size of a se’a, if it consists of pieces, one may not join courtyards with it. However, with regard to a loaf, even one the size of an issar, if it is whole, one may join courtyards with it.

A person may give a ma’a coin to a grocer or a baker, if they live in the same alleyway or courtyard, so that the grocer or baker will confer upon him possession of wine or bread for a merging of the alleyway or an eiruv, if other residents come to them to purchase these products for that purpose. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: His money did not confer possession on him, as the transfer of money alone is not a valid mode of acquisition and cannot confer possession. One must perform a valid mode of acquisition, e.g., pulling an article into one’s possession, to transfer ownership. And the Rabbis concede with regard to all other people, apart from grocers and bakers, that if one gave them money for the food of an eiruv, his money confers possession upon him, as one may establish an eiruv for a person only with his knowledge and at his bidding. With regard to a grocer or baker, the person giving the money does not intend to appoint the grocer or the baker as his agent and the money itself does not effect an acquisition, and consequently, he did not accomplish anything. With regard to anyone else, however, there is no doubt that he must have intended to appoint him his agent, and his act is effective. Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to a joining of Shabbat boundaries, but with regard to a joining of courtyards, one may establish an eiruv for a person either with his knowledge or without his knowledge. The reason is because one may act for a person’s benefit in his absence, but one may not act to a person’s disadvantage in his absence. As a participant in a joining of courtyards benefits from his inclusion in the eiruv, his consent is not required. However, with regard to a joining of Shabbat boundaries, although it enables one to go farther in one direction, he loses the option of traveling in the opposite direction. When an action is to a person’s disadvantage, or if it entails both benefits and disadvantages, one may act on that person’s behalf only if he has been explicitly appointed his agent.

Chapter 8

How does one participate in the joining of Shabbat boundaries? One who wishes to establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries for himself and others places a barrel of food in the location he designates as their place of residence, and says: This is for all the residents of my town, for anyone who wishes to go on Shabbat to a house of mourning or to a house of a wedding feast situated beyond the Shabbat limit. Anyone who accepted upon himself while it was still day, i.e., before the onset of Shabbat, that he will rely on the eiruv, is permitted to rely upon it; but if one did so only after nightfall, he is prohibited to rely upon it, as the principle is that one may not establish an eiruv after nightfall.

What is the measure for an joining of Shabbat boundaries? It consists of a quantity of food sufficient for two meals for each and every one of those included in the eiruv. The tanna’im disagree with regard to the size of these two meals. It is referring to one’s food that he eats on a weekday and not on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is referring to the amount he eats on Shabbat and not on a weekday. And both this Sage, Rabbi Meir, and that Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, intended to be lenient, as Rabbi Meir maintains that people eat more food on Shabbat, whereas Rabbi Yehuda believes that they consume more on a weekday. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Food for two meals is the size of a loaf bought with a pundeyon, which is one-forty-eighth of a sela, when four se’a of wheat are sold for a sela. Rabbi Shimon says: Food for two meals is two of three parts of a loaf, when three loaves are prepared from a kav of wheat. In other words, the measure is two-thirds of a loaf the size of one-third of a kav. Having discussed measures with regard to a loaf of bread, the mishna states that half of this loaf is the amount called a half [ peras ], a measure relevant for the halakhot of a leprous house. If one enters a house afflicted with leprosy and remains there long enough to eat this amount of food, the clothes he is wearing become ritually impure. And half of its half, a quarter of this loaf, is the amount of ritually impure food that disqualifies the body. In other words, impure food of this amount imparts ritual impurity to the body of the eater, and disqualifies him by rabbinic law from eating teruma.

If both the residents of houses that open directly into a courtyard and the residents of apartments that open onto a balcony from which stairs lead down to that courtyard forgot and did not establish an eiruv between them, anything in the courtyard that is ten handbreadths high, e.g., a mound or a post, is part of the balcony. The residents of the apartments open to the balcony may transfer objects to and from their apartments onto the mound or post. Any post or mound that is lower than this height is part of the courtyard. A similar halakha applies to an embankment that surrounds a cistern or a rock: If the embankments that surround a cistern or rock are ten handbreadths high, they belong to the balcony; if they are lower than this, they may be used only by the inhabitants of the courtyard. In what case are these matters, the halakha that anything higher than ten handbreadths belongs to the balcony, stated? When the mound or embankment is near the balcony. But in a case where the embankment or mound is distant from it, even if it is ten handbreadths high, the right to use the embankment or mound goes to the members of the courtyard. And what is considered near? Anything that is not four handbreadths removed from the balcony.

With regard to one who placed his eiruv of courtyards in a gatehouse or in a portico, a roofed structure without walls or with incomplete walls, or one who deposited it in a balcony, this is not a valid eiruv. And one who resides there, in any of these structures, does not render it prohibited for the homeowner and the other residents of the courtyard to carry, even if he did not contribute to the eiruv. If, however, one deposited his eiruv in a hay shed or in a cowshed or in a woodshed or in a storehouse, this is a valid eiruv, as it is located in a properly guarded place. And one who resides there with permission, if he neglected to contribute to the eiruv, he renders it prohibited for the homeowner and the other residents of the courtyard to carry. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the homeowner has there, in the hay shed or the other places listed above, a right of usage, i.e., if he is entitled to use all or part of the area for his own purposes, then the one who lives there does not render it prohibited for the homeowner, as the area is considered the homeowner’s quarters, and the person living there is classified as a member of his household.

One who leaves his house, which is located in a shared courtyard, and goes to spend Shabbat in a different town, whether he is a gentile or a Jew, he renders it prohibited for the other residents to use the courtyard as though he were still at home; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not render it prohibited for them, as he left behind him an empty residence. Rabbi Yosei says: A gentile renders it prohibited but a Jew does not render it prohibited, as it is not the manner of a Jew to come home on Shabbat. A Jew will not return home, therefore his empty residence does not render it prohibited. By contrast, a gentile might return over the course of Shabbat. Therefore, he is not considered to have fully uprooted himself from his house, and he renders it prohibited. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if the Jew left his house and went to spend Shabbat with his daughter who lived in the same town, he does not render it prohibited. Although he can return home at any time, it is assumed that he has already removed from his mind any thought of going back there and has established his Shabbat residence away from his home.

In the case of a cistern that is located between two courtyards, situated partly in each courtyard, one may not draw water from it on Shabbat, lest the residents of one courtyard draw water from the domain of the other courtyard, unless a partition ten handbreadths high was erected for it as a separation between the domains. This partition is effective whether it is below, in the water, or whether it is within the airspace of the cistern below the rim, above the surface of the water. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: This is the subject of an early dispute of tanna’im, as Beit Shammai said that the partition, which permits drawing water, must be placed below; and Beit Hillel said it should be positioned above. Rabbi Yehuda said: A partition is no better than the wall between them. A wall dividing the two courtyards passes over the cistern, therefore it is not necessary to erect an additional partition in the cistern’s airspace.

With regard to a water channel that passes through a courtyard, the residents may not draw water from it on Shabbat, unless they erected for it a partition ten handbreadths high at the entrance and at the exit of the courtyard. Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no need for a special partition, as the wall that runs on top of it, i.e., the courtyard wall, is considered as a partition. Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving a water channel that passed through the courtyards of the town of Avel, from which the residents would draw water from it on Shabbat by the authority of the Elders, relying on the courtyard wall suspended above it. They said to him: It is due to the fact that channel was not of the size that requires a partition, i.e., it was less than ten handbreadths deep or less than ten handbreadths wide, it was permitted to draw water from it even without a partition.

With regard to a balcony that extends over a body of water, if a hole was opened in the floor, its residents may not draw water from it through the hole on Shabbat, unless they erected for it a partition ten handbreadths high around the hole. It is permitted to draw water by means of that partition, whether it is positioned above the balcony, in which case the partition is seen as descending downward, or whether it is placed below the balcony. And likewise, with regard to two such balconies, one above the other, if they erected a partition for the upper balcony but they did not erect one for the lower one, the residents are both prohibited from drawing water through the upper one, unless they establish an eiruv between them.

With regard to a courtyard that is less than four cubits by four cubits in area, one may not pour waste water into it on Shabbat, unless a pit was fashioned to receive the water, and the pit holds two se’a in volume from its edge below. This halakha applies whether the pit was fashioned outside the courtyard or whether it was dug inside the courtyard itself. The only difference is as follows: If the pit was dug outside in the adjoining public domain, it is necessary to arch over it, so that the water will not flow into the public domain. If it was dug inside the courtyard, it is not necessary to arch over it.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: In the case of a drainage ditch whose first four cubits are arched over in the public domain, one may pour waste water into it on Shabbat. And the Rabbis say: Even if a roof or a courtyard is a hundred cubits in area, one may not pour water directly onto the mouth of the drainage ditch. However, he may pour it upon the roof, from which the water spills into the drain of its own accord. A courtyard and a portico, a roofed but unwalled structure in front of a house, combine for the four cubits by virtue of which it is permitted to pour water even into a courtyard that lacks a pit.

And likewise, with regard to two upper stories [ deyotaot ], one opposite the other in the same small courtyard, if the residents of one of them fashioned a pit in the courtyard, and the residents of the other did not fashion a pit, those who fashioned a pit are permitted to pour their waste water into the courtyard, whereas those who did not fashion a pit are prohibited to do so.

Chapter 9

All the roofs of the city are considered one domain. It is permitted to carry from one roof to another, even if the residents of the houses did not establish an eiruv between them. The Sages did not prohibit carrying between roofs, as it is rare to transfer an item from one roof to another. However, it is only permitted to transfer objects between roofs provided that one roof is neither ten handbreadths higher nor ten handbreadths lower than the adjacent roof. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Each and every one of the roofs is a domain in and of itself. It is permitted to carry from one to the other only if the residents of both houses established an eiruv. Rabbi Shimon says: Roofs, courtyards, and enclosures are all one domain with regard to vessels that were inside them when Shabbat began, and one may therefore carry from one of these areas to another. However, they are not one domain with regard to vessels that were inside the house when Shabbat began and were later taken into one of the above domains. A vessel that was inside the house when Shabbat began and subsequently carried to one of these areas may be carried from one roof, courtyard, or enclosure to another only if an eiruv had been established between the domains.

If a large roof was adjacent to a small roof, and the boundary between them was no wider than ten cubits, use of the large one is permitted, i.e., one may bring objects up to the roof from the house below and carry them on the roof, and use of the small one is prohibited. A similar halakha applies to a large courtyard that was breached into a small one, in a manner that one entire side of the small courtyard was breached, but the breach was less than ten cubits; it is permitted for the residents of the large courtyard to carry, but it is prohibited for the residents of the small one to do so. The rationale for this difference is because in that case, the legal status of the breach is like that of the entrance of the large courtyard. As the breach in the wall of the larger courtyard is surrounded on both sides by the remaining portions of that wall, and the breach is no greater than ten cubits wide, its legal status is like that of an entrance in the wall of the courtyard, and therefore it is permitted to carry in the large courtyard. With regard to the small courtyard, however, since one entire side of the small courtyard was breached, there remains no partition whatsoever on that side and carrying in that courtyard is therefore prohibited. With regard to a courtyard that was breached into the public domain, and the breach was more than ten cubits wide, so that it cannot be considered an entrance, one who carries an object from inside the courtyard into the private domain, or from the private domain into it, is liable, as it ceases to be a private domain and is subsumed into the public domain. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis disagree and say: One who carries from inside the courtyard into the public domain, or from the public domain into it, is exempt, because its legal status is like that of a karmelit. Although it ceases to be a private domain, it does not become a full-fledged public domain.

With regard to a courtyard that was breached on Shabbat into a public domain from two of its sides, and likewise with regard to a house that was breached from two of its sides, and likewise with regard to an alleyway whose cross beams or side posts were removed on Shabbat, the residents of that domain are permitted to carry there on that Shabbat, but are prohibited from doing so in the future. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: This cannot be the halakha, as if they are permitted to carry there on that Shabbat, they are likewise permitted to do so in the future, and if they are prohibited from carrying there in the future, they are also prohibited from carrying there on that Shabbat.

With regard to one who builds an upper story atop two houses on opposite sides of a public domain that passes beneath it, and likewise bridges with a thoroughfare beneath them that rest on walls on opposite sides of a public domain, one may carry beneath the upper story and beneath the bridge on Shabbat. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that these areas are considered private domains. And the Rabbis prohibit carrying in these areas. And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: One may establish an eiruv even for an alleyway that is open at both ends, with no need for any additional measures, and the Rabbis prohibit doing so.

Chapter 10

One who finds phylacteries outside the city on Shabbat, where they are in danger of becoming lost or damaged, brings them in to his house pair by pair by donning them in the manner in which they are typically donned for the mitzva. Rabban Gamliel says: He brings them in two pairs by two pairs. In what case is this statement that one is permitted to carry phylacteries inside said? It is with regard to old phylacteries, which have already been used and are designated for the mitzva. However, with regard to new ones, as it is unclear whether they are phylacteries or merely amulets in the form of phylacteries, he is exempt from performing the task. If one finds phylacteries tied in bundles or in wrapped piles, in which case he is unable to carry them in pairs, he sits there and waits with them until dark, guarding them until the conclusion of Shabbat, and then brings them in to his house. And in a time of danger, when it is dangerous to tarry outside town, he covers the phylacteries and proceeds on his way.

Rabbi Shimon says that there is an alternative method of transferring the phylacteries: One gives them to another who is less than four cubits from him, and the other passes them to another, until the phylacteries reach the outermost courtyard of the city. Since carrying less than four cubits in a public domain is not prohibited by Torah law, in this case, the Sages permitted carrying in that manner due to the sanctity of the phylacteries. And similarly, with regard to one’s son who was born in a field and may not be carried on Shabbat, since that is akin to carrying a burden in the public domain: One gives him to another, and the other passes him to another, even if it requires a hundred people. Rabbi Yehuda says: A person may even give a barrel to another, and the other may pass it to another, and in that way even take it beyond the Shabbat limit, provided that no one person carries it more than four cubits. They said to him: This barrel may not go a greater distance than the feet of its owner, i.e., it may not be carried any farther than its owner may walk.

One who was reading a sacred book in scroll form on Shabbat on an elevated, wide threshold, and the book rolled from his hand into the public domain, he may roll it back to himself, since one of its ends remains in his hand. If he was reading on top the roof, which is a full-fledged private domain, and the book rolled from his hand, as long as the edge of the book did not reach within ten handbreadths above the public domain, the book is still in its own domain, and he may roll it back to himself. However, once the book has reached within ten handbreadths above the public domain, it is prohibited to roll the book back to oneself. In that case, he may only turn it over onto the side with writing, so that the writing of the book will be facedown and not exposed and degraded. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the scroll is removed only a needle breadth from the ground, he rolls it back to himself. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if the scroll is on the ground itself, he rolls it back to himself, as you have nothing that was instituted as a rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest that stands as an impediment before the rescue of sacred writings.

With regard to a ledge in front of a window, that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one may place objects upon it or remove them from it on Shabbat via the window. A person may stand in a private domain and move objects that are in a public domain, as there is no concern that he might mistakenly bring them into the private domain. Similarly, one may stand in a public domain and move objects in a private domain, provided that he does not carry them beyond four cubits in the public domain, which is prohibited on Shabbat.

However, a person may not stand in a private domain and urinate into a public domain, nor may one stand in a public domain and urinate into a private domain. And likewise, one may not spit in such a manner that the spittle passes from a private domain to a public domain or vice versa. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even once a person’s spittle is gathered in his mouth, he may not walk four cubits in the public domain until he spits it out, for he would be carrying the accumulated spittle in his mouth, which is akin to carrying any other object.

A person may stand in a private domain and extend his head and drink in a public domain, and he may stand in a public domain and drink in a private domain, only if he brings his head and most of his body into the domain in which he drinks. And the same applies in a winepress, as will be explained in the Gemara. A person standing in a public domain on Shabbat may catch water in a vessel from a gutter running along the side of a roof, if it is less than ten handbreadths off the ground, which is part of the public domain. And from a pipe that protrudes from the roof, one may drink in any manner, i.e., not only by catching the water in a vessel, but even by pressing his mouth directly against the spout.

With regard to a cistern in a public domain, with an embankment ten handbreadths high, i.e., the embankment constitutes a private domain by itself, if there is a window above the cistern, i.e., the window of an adjacent house is situated above the cistern, one may draw water from the cistern on Shabbat through the window, as it is permitted to carry from one private domain to another. Similarly, with regard to a garbage dump in a public domain that is ten handbreadths high, which means it has the status of a private domain, if there is a window above the pile of refuse that abuts the garbage dump, one may throw water from the window onto the dump on Shabbat, as it is permitted to carry from one private domain to another.

With regard to a tree that was hanging over the ground, i.e., its branches hung down on all sides like a tent so that it threw a shadow on the ground, if the tips of its branches are no higher than three handbreadths from the ground, one may carry under it. This applies even if the tree is planted in a public domain, as the branches form partitions which turn the enclosed area into a private domain. If its roots were three handbreadths higher than the ground, one may not sit on them, as it is prohibited to use a tree on Shabbat. Any part of a tree that is three handbreadths above the ground has the status of a tree with regard to this prohibition. With regard to the door to a rear court, i.e., a door that opens from a house to the courtyard situated behind it, which is typically not a proper door but merely a wooden board without hinges that closes off the doorway; and likewise bundles of thorns that seal a breach; and reed mats, one may not close an opening with them on Shabbat. This would be considered building or completing a building, unless they remain above the ground even when they are open.

A person may not stand in the private domain and open a door located in the public domain with a key, lest he inadvertently transfer the key from one domain to the other. Likewise, one may not stand in the public domain and open a door in the private domain with a key, unless in the latter case he erected a partition ten handbreadths high around the door and stands inside it. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to him: There was an incident at the poultry dealers’ market in Jerusalem, where they would fatten fowl for slaughter (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), and they would lock the doors to their shops and place the key in the window that was over the door, which was more than ten handbreadths off the ground, and nobody was concerned about the possible violation of any prohibition. Rabbi Yosei says: That place was a market of wool dealers.

With regard to a bolt that secures a door in place and that has a thick knob [ gelustera ] at its end, a useful implement for a variety of purposes, the tanna’im disagree whether the bolt has the status of a vessel, and one may therefore close the door with it, or whether it is considered a cross beam, which would mean that doing so is classified as building. Rabbi Eliezer prohibits its use, and Rabbi Yosei permits it. Rabbi Eliezer said: An incident occurred in a synagogue in Tiberias, where they were accustomed to treat use of this bolt as permitted, until Rabban Gamliel and the Elders came and prohibited it to them. Rabbi Yosei says that the opposite was the case: At first they were accustomed to treat use of this bolt as prohibited, and Rabban Gamliel and the Elders came and permitted it to them.

With regard to a bolt that is attached to the door, but owing to the length of the rope, it does not hang from the door but drags along the ground, one may lock a door with it in the Temple on Shabbat, as this is prohibited only by rabbinic decree, issued to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest, and rabbinic decrees are not in effect in the Temple. However, one may not lock a door with this bolt in the country outside the Temple. And with regard to one that is not tied at all but rests entirely on the ground, it is prohibited in both places, in and outside the Temple, as the use of this bolt is considered building. Rabbi Yehuda says: One that rests entirely on the ground is permitted in the Temple, and one that drags along the ground is permitted even in the rest of the country.

One may restore the lower hinge pin of the door of a carriage, box, or cupboard that becomes dislocated to its place on Shabbat in the Temple, as this action is prohibited by rabbinic decree, which is not in effect in the Temple; but it may not be restored to its place in the rest of the country. And restoring the upper hinge pin is prohibited in both places, as this is considered building, a labor prohibited by Torah law, which applies everywhere. Rabbi Yehuda says: Restoring the upper hinge pin to its place is permitted in the Temple, while one may restore the lower one to its place even in the rest of the country.

One may return to its place a bandage that became detached from a wound on Shabbat in the Temple. In the Temple, this is not prohibited as a preventive measure, lest one come to spread the ointment and thereby perform the prohibited labor of smoothing. However, one may not return a bandage to its place in the rest of the country. If one sought to apply the bandage for the first time to an untreated wound on Shabbat, it is prohibited in both places. One may tie up on Shabbat a string [ nima ] that came loose from a harp used in the Temple, but not in the rest of the country. And tying the string to the harp for the first time is prohibited both here and there. A wart is an example of a blemish that temporarily disqualifies a priest from performing the Temple service, and disqualifies an animal from being offered on the altar; they regain their fitness once the wart is removed. Consequently, on Shabbat one may cut off a wart by hand in the Temple, as this constitutes a preparatory act required for the sacrificial service. However, he may not cut off a wart in the rest of the country. And if he seeks to cut off the wart with an instrument, it is prohibited in both places.

With regard to a priest who was injured on his finger on Shabbat, he may temporarily wrap it with a reed so that his wound is not visible while he is serving in the Temple. This leniency applies in the Temple, but not in the country, as it also heals the wound, and medical treatment is prohibited on Shabbat due to rabbinic decree. If his intention is to draw blood from the wound or to absorb blood, it is prohibited in both places. One may scatter salt on Shabbat on the ramp that leads to the altar so that the priests will not slip on their way up. And likewise, one may draw water from the Cistern of the Exiles and from the Great Cistern, which were located in the Temple, by means of the wheel designed for drawing water, even on Shabbat. And one may draw water from the Heker Well only on a Festival.

With regard to the carcass of a creeping animal, of one of the eight species of reptile or rodent listed in Leviticus 11:29–30, one of the primary sources of ritual impurity that is found in the Temple, a priest should carry it out on Shabbat in his girdle, which was one of the priestly garments. Although the girdle will be defiled by the carcass of the creeping animal, this is the best way to proceed, so as not to delay the removal of the impurity from the Temple. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. Rabbi Yehuda says: The creeping animal carcass should be removed with wooden prongs, so as not to increase the impurity, as a wooden prong is not susceptible to impurity. It is obvious that on a weekday the creeping animal carcass is removed from wherever it is found in the Temple, but from where does one remove it on Shabbat? From the Sanctuary, from the Entrance Hall, and from the area in the courtyard between the Entrance Hall and the altar, the most sanctified precincts of the Temple. However, it need not be removed from the rest of the courtyard. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas. Rabbi Akiva says: Any place where one is liable to be punished with karet if he intentionally enters there in a state of ritual impurity, and is liable to bring a sin-offering if he does so unwittingly, from there one must remove it. This includes the entire area of the Temple courtyard. And as for the rest of the places in the Temple, one covers the creeping animal carcass with a bowl [ pesakhter ] and leaves it there until the conclusion of Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon says that this is the principle: Wherever the Sages permitted something to you, they granted you only from your own, as they permitted to you only activities that are prohibited due to rabbinic decree, not labors prohibited by Torah law.

Mishnah Pesachim

Chapter 1

On the evening [ or ] of the fourteenth of the month of Nisan, one searches for leavened bread in his home by candlelight. Any place into which one does not typically take leavened bread does not require a search, as it is unlikely that there is any leavened bread there. And with regard to what the Sages of previous generations meant when they said that one must search two rows of wine barrels in a cellar, i.e., a place into which one typically takes some leavened bread, the early tanna’im are in dispute. Beit Shammai say that this is referring to searching the first two rows across the entire cellar, and Beit Hillel say: There is no need to search that extensively, as it is sufficient to search the two external rows, which are the upper ones. This dispute will be explained and illustrated in the Gemara.

After conducting the search, one need not be concerned that perhaps a marten dragged leaven from house to house, or from place to place, placing leaven in a house that was already searched. As if so, one need also be concerned that perhaps leaven might have been dragged from courtyard to courtyard and from city to city. In that case, there is no end to the matter, and it would be impossible to rely on any search for leaven.

Rabbi Yehuda says: One searches for leaven on the evening of the fourteenth of Nisan, and on the fourteenth in the morning, and at the time of the removal of leaven. And the Rabbis say: that is not the case; however, if one did not search on the evening of the fourteenth he should search on the fourteenth during the day. If he did not search on the fourteenth, he should search during the festival of Passover. If he did not search during the Festival, he should search after the Festival, as any leaven that remained in his possession during the Festival is classified as leaven owned by a Jew during Passover, which one is obligated to remove. And the principle is: With regard to the leaven that one leaves after the search, he should place it in a concealed location where it will most likely be left untouched, so that it will not require searching after it if it goes missing.

The tanna’im disagree regarding until what time leaven may be eaten and at what time it must be removed on Passover eve. Rabbi Meir says: One may eat leaven the entire fifth hour of the fourteenth of Nisan, and one must burn it immediately afterward at the beginning of the sixth hour. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may eat the entire fourth hour and one places it in abeyance for the entire fifth hour, and one burns it at the beginning of the sixth hour.

And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: Two disqualified loaves of a thanks-offering are placed on the bench in the colonnade in the Temple as an indicator. There was a specially designated place for these loaves in the Temple. As long as the loaves are placed there, the entire nation continues to eat leaven. When one of the loaves was taken away, the people know that the time had come to place the leaven in abeyance, meaning that they neither eat nor burn their leaven. When they were both taken away, the entire nation began burning their leaven. Rabban Gamliel says that the times are divided differently: Non-sacred foods are eaten the entire fourth hour, and teruma may be eaten during the entire fifth hour. Since it is a mitzva to eat teruma and burning it is prohibited, additional time was allocated for its consumption. And one burns all leaven including teruma at the beginning of the sixth hour.

Apropos the removal of leaven on Passover eve, including the consecrated loaves of thanks-offerings and teruma, the mishna cites a related halakha. Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest says: In all the days of the priests, they did not refrain from burning meat that became ritually impure by coming into contact with a secondary source of ritual impurity, i.e., an object that had come into contact with a primary source of impurity, together with meat that became ritually impure by contact with a primary source of impurity. They would do so even though they would thereby add a degree of impurity to the impurity of the first piece of meat, which was previously impure to a lesser degree. Rabbi Akiva added to the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest and said: In all the days of the priests, they did not refrain from lighting teruma oil that was ritually disqualified by coming into contact with one who immersed himself during that day and who does not become completely purified until nightfall in a lamp that became ritually impure with first-degree impurity through contact with one who became ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. They did so even though they would thereby add impurity to the impurity of the oil. A person who immersed himself during that day assumes the status of second-degree ritual impurity. His contact renders the oil ritually impure with third-degree ritual impurity. The lamp with first-degree ritual impurity renders the oil ritually impure with second-degree impurity.

Rabbi Meir said: From their statements we learned that one may burn ritually pure teruma with impure teruma when removing leaven on Passover eve. The rationale that applies to the two previous cases applies here as well. Since both items are being burned, one may disregard the fact that one item will assume a higher degree of ritual impurity in the process. Rabbi Yosei said: That is not the inference from which the halakha in the case of ritually pure and ritually impure teruma can be learned. In those first two cases, the two items are both ritually impure, albeit at different degrees of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir is referring to the combination of impure teruma with pure teruma, which would render pure teruma ritually impure. And in fact Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, who disagree with regard to the burning of leavened teruma, nevertheless concede that one burns this ritually pure teruma by itself and that impure teruma by itself. With regard to what did they disagree? They disagreed with regard to whether one may burn teruma in abeyance, i.e., teruma whose purity is uncertain, and definitely impure teruma together, as Rabbi Eliezer says: This teruma in abeyance should be burned by itself, and that impure teruma should be burned by itself; and Rabbi Yehoshua says: In that case, both of them may be burned as one.

Chapter 2

For the entire time that it is permitted to eat leavened bread, one may also feed it to his domesticated animals, to non-domesticated animals, and to birds; and one may sell it to a gentile; and it is permitted to derive benefit from it. After its time passes, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, and one may not even light an oven or a stove with leavened bread. With regard to the manner of removal of leavened bread, Rabbi Yehuda says: The removal of leavened bread is to be accomplished only through burning. And the Rabbis say: Burning is not required, as one may even crumble it and throw it into the wind or cast it into the sea.

It is permitted for a Jew to derive benefit from leavened bread of a gentile over which Passover has elapsed, i.e., leavened bread that remains after the conclusion of Passover. However, it is prohibited to derive benefit from leaven of a Jew over which Passover has elapsed, as it is stated: “And no leavened bread shall be seen with you, neither shall there be leaven seen with you, in all your borders” (Exodus 13:7).

If a gentile lent money to a Jew, and the Jew gave him leavened bread as collateral until after Passover, and after Passover the gentile retains this leavened bread in lieu of payment, then one is permitted to derive benefit from this leavened bread. Since the leavened bread was retained by the gentile based on the transfer that took place prior to Passover, the leavened bread is considered to have belonged to the gentile during Passover. Whereas if a Jew lent money to a gentile, and leavened bread was given as collateral during Passover in the same manner as in the previous case, then after Passover it is forbidden to derive benefit from this leavened bread. Since this leavened bread was considered to be in the Jew’s property during Passover, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it afterward. Leavened bread upon which a rockslide has fallen is considered as though it has been eliminated, and it is not necessary to dig it up in order to burn it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any leavened bread that has been covered to such an extent that a dog cannot search after it is considered to have been eliminated.

If one unwittingly eats teruma of leavened bread on Passover, not realizing that the food was teruma, then he must pay the principal and an additional fifth. This is because one who unwittingly eats teruma must compensate the priest for the value of the teruma and add a fifth of the value, even though the teruma is considered to be valueless on Passover. If he intentionally ate the teruma then he is exempt from payment; as he is liable to receive the severe punishment of karet, he is therefore exempt from the lesser punishment of payment. If he ate impure teruma in this manner then he is not even required to pay its monetary value in wood, for one who derives benefit from impure teruma calculates its value by treating it as though it were fuel for burning. While impure teruma can be used in this manner during the rest of the year, one may not derive any benefit from leavened bread on Passover, and therefore such teruma is worthless.

These are the types of grain with which a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover: With wheat, with barley, with spelt [ kusmin ], with rye [ shifon ], and with oats [ shibbolet shu’al ]. And one fulfills his obligation by eating not only matza made from properly tithed grains, but even with matza made from doubtfully tithed produce, and matza made with first tithe from which its teruma was already taken, or second tithe and consecrated food that were redeemed. And priests may eat matza prepared from ḥalla, the portion of dough that is given to priests, or with teruma, as priests are permitted to eat these portions. However, one may not fulfill one’s obligation to eat matza made with untithed produce, nor with matza made from the first tithe from which its teruma was not separated, nor with matza made either from the second tithe, nor from consecrated grain that was not redeemed. With regard to one who prepared loaves of matza that are brought with a thanks-offering, or to the wafers brought by a nazirite, the Sages drew the following distinction: If he prepared them for himself, then he does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza with them. However, if he prepared them to sell them in the market to those who require these loaves or wafers, one fulfills the obligation to eat matza with them.

And these are the vegetables with which a person can fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover: One can fulfill his obligation with ḥazeret, with chervil [ tamkha ], and with field eryngo [ ḥarḥavina ], and with endives [ olashin ], and with maror. One fulfills his obligation with them whether they are fresh or whether they are dry. However, one does not fulfill his obligation if they are pickled in water or vinegar, nor if they are over-boiled [ shaluk ] in hot water, nor if they are boiled [ mevushal ]. The mishna adds: And all these different types of vegetables join together to the measure of an olive-bulk, i.e., it is not necessary to eat this amount from one specific type of vegetable. And one fulfills his obligation by eating their stalk, as it is not necessary to eat the leaves. And one fulfills the obligation with doubtfully tithed produce, with first-tithe produce whose teruma has been taken and given to a priest, and with both second-tithe produce and consecrated property that were redeemed.

One may not soak coarse bran for feeding chickens, lest it be leavened. However, one may pour boiling water onto the bran before feeding it to the chickens, as it will not become leavened from this brief exposure to water. A woman may not soak coarse bran to bring by hand to the bathhouse for use as a cleanser; however, she may rub coarse bran on her dry skin. Likewise, the Sages said: A person may not chew wheat and place it on his wound, due to the fact that the wheat will be leavened from the saliva and his chewing.

One may not add flour to ḥaroset, a seasoned, pungent food, or to mustard, to dull the sharp taste. In both cases, the pungency of these foods might accelerate the leavening of the flour. And if one added flour to either of these, the mixture may be eaten immediately before it is leavened; and Rabbi Meir prohibits this, lest the food be leavened immediately. The mishna continues: One may not boil the Paschal lamb in ordinary liquids or in fruit juices, as the Torah explicitly states that it must be roasted. However, one may baste it while it is roasting and dip it into liquid while eating it. The tanna further states: Water that has been used by a baker for cooling his hands or washing dishes should be poured out, because this water leavens the dough, as the water probably contains a small quantity of flour and dough.

Chapter 3

And for possessing these one transgresses [ overin ] the prohibitions of: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, on Passover, although not all of them are considered food: Babylonian kutaḥ, a dip with a sharp flavor that contains flour; Median beer; Edomite vinegar; Egyptian zitom, a type of beer; dyers’ broth [ zoman ]; bakers’ well-worked dough; and kolan of soferim. Rabbi Eliezer says: The same prohibition also applies to women’s adornments, i.e., cosmetics, that contain leaven. This is the principle: If one possesses any substance that is derived from a type of grain that became leavened, although it is not actually bread, one transgresses the prohibitions of: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, on Passover. These substances are included in the warning, i.e., the biblical prohibition of possessing leaven, but there is no element of karet if one eats them.

With regard to dough that is in the cracks of a kneading bowl, if there is an olive-bulk of dough in one place, one is obligated to remove it. And if the dough does not add up to this amount, it is nullified due to its insignificance. And similarly, with regard to the halakhot of immersion to purify the bowl from ritual impurity, if one is particular about the dough that is stuck in the cracks and he plans to remove it and use it, it is a foreign substance that interposes between the kneading bowl and the water of the ritual bath, and invalidates the immersion of the bowl, leaving it ritually impure. And if he wants the dough to remain in place, its status is like that of the kneading bowl itself and is not an interposition. Deaf dough is dough for which it is difficult to determine if it has been leavened. It is comparable to a deaf-mute, who cannot communicate. If there is dough similar to it in that water was added to both at the same time, which became leavened, the deaf dough is prohibited. Although it has not shown external signs of becoming leavened, it can be presumed that the deaf dough has also become leavened.

How does one separate ḥalla in ritual impurity during the Festival day of Passover? Ordinarily, one may separate ritually pure ḥalla from dough and give it to a priest immediately so that he may eat it. Ritually impure ḥalla is unfit for a priest and must be burned, yet it is prohibited to bake or burn anything that is not fit to be eaten during the Festival day. However, it is also prohibited to wait and burn it after the Festival day, since it will become leavened in the meantime. Rabbi Eliezer says: A woman should not designate it as ḥalla prior to baking; rather, she should refrain from doing so until it is baked. In other words, she should wait until she has baked all of the dough, and there is no risk of it becoming leavened. Only then should she separate ḥalla from it. The portion of ḥalla may then be kept until after the Festival day, when it may be burned. Ben Beteira says: She should separate the ḥalla before it is baked, and place the dough in cold water so that it will not become leavened. Rabbi Yehoshua said: This is not the leavened bread about which we are warned with the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found. These prohibitions do not apply because the ḥalla does not actually belong to the owner of the dough; it is instead considered to be consecrated property. Rather, she should separate the ḥalla and leave it until the evening; and if it becomes leavened, then it will become leavened, but this is of no concern.

Rabban Gamliel says: Three women may knead their dough as one, meaning at one time, and bake the batches of dough in one oven, one after the other, and they need not be concerned that their dough will become leavened while they are waiting to use the oven. And the Rabbis say: Three women may be engaged in preparing dough as one, in the following manner: One kneads her dough as another one arranges her own dough so it takes the form of matza, while another one bakes her dough. Rabbi Akiva says: Not all women, not all wood, and not all ovens are the same, and therefore no set rules should be established. Rather, this is the principle: If the dough begins to rise, she should spread cold water in which she immersed her hands, onto the dough, in order to stop the leavening process.

Dough at the beginning of the leavening process [ siur ], must be burned, but one who eats it is exempt from the punishment of karet because the dough had not become fully leavened. Dough that has reached the stage of cracking must be burned, and one who eats it intentionally is liable to receive karet, as he has intentionally eaten leavened bread during Passover. What is considered siur? Dough that has been leavened to the point that it has cracks that look like the antennae of locusts. The stage of cracking occurs later in the leavening process, when the cracks intermingle. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: One who intentionally eats either this or that, dough with cracks like locust antennae or with cracks that have become intermingled, is liable to receive karet, as once dough begins to crack it has certainly become leavened. And what is siur? It is any dough whose surface has becomes pale like the face of a person whose hair stands on end due to fear.

With regard to the fourteenth of Nisan that occurs on Shabbat, one removes all leaven from his possession, whether it is teruma or non-sacred food, before Shabbat, except for that which will be eaten during the first part of Shabbat. In that case, one cannot remove leaven from his possession on the fourteenth of Nisan itself as he does in other years. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One may remove the leaven at its usual time on the fourteenth of Nisan by throwing it away or declaring it ownerless. Rabbi Eliezer bar Tzadok says: Teruma should be removed before Shabbat, as only a few people are permitted to eat it and therefore one can presume that it will remain uneaten during Shabbat. However, non-sacred foods should be removed at their usual time, on the fourteenth of Nisan itself.

One who is traveling on the eve of Passover to slaughter his Paschal lamb, to circumcise his son, or to eat a betrothal feast in his father-in-law’s house, and he remembers that he has leavened bread in his house, if he is able to return to his house and remove the leaven and afterward return to the mitzva toward which he was traveling, he should return home and remove his leaven. But if there is not enough time for him to go home and remove the leaven, and still complete the mitzva that he already began, he should nullify it in his heart, as by Torah law this is sufficient. If one was traveling to save Jews from an attack by gentiles, from a flooding river, from bandits, from a fire, or from a collapsed building, he should not even attempt to return, and instead he should nullify the leaven in his heart. This applies even if he could remove his leaven and still return to his previous activity. If he went to establish his Shabbat residence in order to adjust his Shabbat limit for an optional purpose, rather than in order to fulfill a commandment, he should return immediately to remove his leaven.

And so too, the same halakha applies to one who left Jerusalem and remembered that there was consecrated meat in his hand. Meat that is taken out of Jerusalem becomes disqualified, and one is required to burn it in proximity to the Temple. If he passed the area of Mount Scopus [ Tzofim ], beyond which one cannot see Jerusalem, he burns the meat at the site where he is located; and if he has not traveled that far, he must return and burn it before the Temple with wood from the arrangement on the altar, which was designated for burning consecrated items that were disqualified. The mishna asks: For how much leaven or consecrated meat is one required to return? Rabbi Meir says: In both this case and that case, one must return for an egg-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda says: In both this case and that case, one must return for an olive-bulk. And the Rabbis say that the amount depends on the case: With regard to consecrated meat, he is required to return if he has an olive-bulk, but in a case where he remembers that he has leavened bread, he required to return only for an egg-bulk.

Chapter 4

In a place where the people were accustomed to perform labor on Passover eve until midday, one may do so on that day. In a place where the people were accustomed not to perform labor, one may not do so. The performance of labor on the eve of Passover is not prohibited by Torah law, but is dependent on local custom. If one travels from a place where people perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people do not perform labor, or from a place where people do not perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people perform labor, the Sages impose upon him the stringencies of both the place from which he left and the stringencies of the place to which he went. In both cases, he may not perform labor. The Sages stated a principle: And a person may not deviate from the local custom, due to potential dispute.

Similarly, one who transports Sabbatical Year produce from a place where a crop has ceased in the fields to a place where it has not yet ceased or from a place where it has not yet ceased to a place where it has already ceased is obligated to remove the produce from his possession, in accordance with the stringencies of both locations. It is permitted for homeowners to eat Sabbatical Year produce in their houses only as long as that species of fruit remains in the field as ownerless property. However, once that particular fruit is no longer available for animals in the fields, one is required to remove what remains of that species from his home. The statement in the mishna is referring to one who transported fruit from a location where it ceased in the fields to one where it did not, and vice versa. Rabbi Yehuda says that he need not remove the produce, as he can say to a local resident: You, too, go out and bring this produce from a place where it remains in the field.

Apropos different local customs discussed in the first mishna in this chapter, this mishna discusses various halakhot with regard to which there are different customs. In a place where the people were accustomed to sell small livestock to gentiles, one may sell them. In a place where the people were not accustomed to sell them due to certain concerns and decrees, one may not sell them. However, in every place, one may sell to gentiles neither large livestock, e.g., cows and camels, nor calves or foals, whether these animals are whole or damaged. The Sages prohibited those sales due to the concern lest the transaction be voided or one side reconsider, creating retroactively a situation where a Jew’s animal performed labor for the gentile on Shabbat in violation of an explicit Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of a damaged animal because it is incapable of performing labor. Ben Beteira permits the sale of a horse for riding, because riding a horse on Shabbat is not prohibited by Torah law.

The mishna cites another custom related to Passover. In a place where people were accustomed to eat roasted meat on Passover evenings, outside of Jerusalem or after the Temple was destroyed, one may eat it. In a place where people were accustomed not to eat outside Jerusalem, one may not eat it. The mishna discusses additional differences between local customs. In a place where people were accustomed to kindle a lamp in the house on Yom Kippur evenings, one kindles it. In a place where people were accustomed not to kindle a lamp, one does not kindle it. However, even in a place where the custom is not to kindle lamps in houses, one kindles in synagogues and study halls, in deference to these places. Similarly, lamps should be kindled in dark alleyways, so people will not be hurt, and next to the sick.

This mishna continues the previous discussion of customs. In a place where people were accustomed to perform labor on the Ninth of Av, one performs labor. In a place where people were accustomed not to perform labor, one does not perform labor. And in all places Torah scholars are idle and do not perform labor on the Ninth of Av, due to the mourning over the Temple’s destruction. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to the Ninth of Av, a person should always conduct himself as a Torah scholar and refrain from performing labor. Apropos the discussion of performing labor on Passover eve, differences in other customs were cited. And the Rabbis say: In Judea, people would perform labor on Passover eves until midday, and in the Galilee people would not perform labor on Passover eve at all. With regard to performing labor on the night before Passover eve, the night between the thirteenth and fourteenth of Nisan, Beit Shammai prohibit performing labor, and Beit Hillel permit doing so until sunrise.

Rabbi Meir says: With regard to any labor that one began before the fourteenth of Nisan, he may complete it on the fourteenth before midday. However, one may not begin to perform that labor from the outset on the fourteenth, even if he is able to complete it before midday. And the Rabbis say: The practitioners of only three crafts are permitted to perform labor until midday on Passover eve, and they are: Tailors, barbers, and launderers, whose work is needed for the Festival. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Even shoemakers are permitted to work on the fourteenth.

This mishna continues the discussion of the halakhot of Passover eve. One may place eggs under hens on the fourteenth of Nisan so that the birds will brood until the eggs hatch. And if a hen fled from brooding, one may restore it to its place. And if a brooding hen died, one may place another in its stead. Similarly, one may sweep dung from beneath the legs of an animal on the fourteenth of Nisan. And during the intermediate days of the Festival one may clear it to the sides. Similarly, one may take vessels to the craftsman’s house for repair and bring others from there even though they are not for the purpose of the Festival.

The mishna continues the discussion of the halakhot of Passover eve, along with other local customs. Six actions were performed by the Jewish residents of Jericho, contrary to common practice. With regard to three, the Sages reprimanded them, and with regard to three, the Sages did not reprimand them. And these are the ones with regard to which they did not reprimand them: The residents of Jericho would graft palm trees the entire day on the fourteenth of Nisan; and they would bundle Shema, as explained in the Gemara; and they would harvest and pile grain before the omer offering was brought. And these are the ones with regard to which the Sages reprimanded them: They would permit the use of consecrated branches of carob or sycamore trees. This refers to trees whose branches were cut and consecrated for Temple upkeep, which subsequently sprouted new branches; and they would eat fallen fruit from beneath palm trees that shed fruit that had fallen on Shabbat; and they would designate the produce in the corner for the poor in a field of vegetables, which is exempt from this obligation even by rabbinic law. And the Sages reprimanded the people of Jericho for doing these three things.

The Sages taught: King Hezekiah performed six actions. With regard to three of them, the Sages of his generation conceded to him; and with regard to three of them, the Sages did not concede to him. Due to King Hezekiah’s father’s wickedness, he dragged the bones of his father Ahaz on a bier of ropes and did not afford him the respect due to a king, and the Sages conceded to him. He ground the copper snake that Moses fashioned in the desert because Israel worshipped it, and the Sages conceded to him. He suppressed the Book of Cures, and they conceded to him. And with regard to three actions, the Sages did not concede to him. He cut off the doors of the Sanctuary and sent them to the King of Assyria, and they did not concede to him because he thereby demeaned the Temple. He sealed the waters of the upper Gihon stream, diverting its water into the city by means of a tunnel, and they did not concede to him, because he harmed the local populace in the process and should have relied upon God ( Me’iri ). He intercalated the year, delaying the advent of the month of Nisan during Nisan, and they did not concede to him. The Gemara explains that he declared the first of Nisan to be the thirtieth of Adar and only then intercalated the year (see II Chronicles 30:2).

Chapter 5

The daily afternoon offering is slaughtered at eight and a half hours of the day, which is two and a half hours after midday, and is sacrificed, i.e., its offering on the altar is completed, at nine and a half hours of the day. On the eves of Passover, when the Paschal lamb must be offered after the daily offering, the daily offering is sacrificed earlier; it is slaughtered at seven and a half hours and sacrificed at eight and a half hours, whether it occurs during the week or on Shabbat. If Passover eve occurs on Shabbat eve, when the Paschal lamb must be offered even earlier to ensure that it will be roasted before the onset of Shabbat, the daily offering is slaughtered at six and a half hours and sacrificed at seven and a half hours, and the Paschal lamb is offered thereafter.

The Paschal lamb that the priest slaughtered not for its own purpose, i.e., at the time of slaughter he said that his intent was to slaughter it as a different offering, e.g., a peace-offering or burnt-offering, rather than as a Paschal lamb; or if the priest received the blood, or carried the blood to the altar, or sprinkled the blood on the altar while saying that it was not for the purpose of the Paschal lamb; or if the priest performed the rites both for its own purpose and not for its own purpose; or not for its own purpose and for its own purpose; in all these cases, the Paschal lamb is disqualified. How does one perform the rites for its own purpose and not for its own purpose? It is in a case where the priest said that his intent is for the purpose of the Paschal lamb and for the purpose of a peace-offering. And how does one perform rites not for its own purpose and for its own purpose? It is in a case where the priest says that the offering is for the purpose of a peace-offering and for the purpose of a Paschal lamb.

If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for people who cannot eat it or for those who did not register in advance to eat it, or if one slaughtered it for people who are uncircumcised or for those who are ritually impure, whom the Torah prohibits from eating the Paschal lamb, it is disqualified. However, if one slaughtered it for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it; for those who have registered for it and for those who have not registered for it; for the circumcised and for the uncircumcised; for the ritually impure and for the ritually pure, it is valid, for a partially invalid intent does not disqualify the offering. If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb before midday it is disqualified, as it is stated: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). If he slaughtered it before the daily afternoon offering it is valid, as long as another person stirs its blood in order to prevent it from congealing until the blood of the daily offering is sprinkled. And if the blood of the Paschal lamb is sprinkled before the blood of the daily offering, it is nonetheless valid, as this change does not disqualify the offering.

One who slaughters the Paschal lamb with leavened bread still in his possession violates a negative commandment, as the Torah states: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread; neither shall the sacrifice of the festival of Passover be left until the morning” (Exodus 34:25). Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who slaughters the daily afternoon offering on Passover eve with leaven in his possession violates the commandment. Rabbi Shimon says: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb on the fourteenth of Nisan for its own purpose with leaven in his possession is liable; but if he slaughtered it for a different purpose he is exempt. And for all other offerings that one slaughters on Passover eve, when owning leaven is prohibited, whether he slaughtered them for their own purpose or he slaughtered them for a different purpose, he is exempt. And during the festival of Passover, if one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for its own purpose he is exempt. Since a Paschal lamb that is slaughtered for its own purpose at an improper time is disqualified, it is not an offering at all and there is no violation of the commandment: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread.” However, if he slaughtered it for a different purpose and thereby validated the sacrifice as a peace-offering, he is liable for having sacrificed it with leaven in his possession. And for all other offerings that one slaughters on Passover, when it is prohibited to slaughter with leaven in one’s possession, whether he slaughtered them for their own purpose or he slaughtered them for a different purpose, he is liable. This is with the exception of a sin-offering that he slaughtered for a different purpose with leaven in his possession. Unlike other offerings, a sin-offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered for a different purpose, and therefore one does not violate the prohibition of “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread.”

The Paschal lamb was slaughtered in three groups, meaning those bringing the offering were divided into three separate sets, as it is stated: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). The verse is interpreted as referring to three groups: Assembly, congregation, and Israel. The procedure for sacrificing the offering was as follows: The first group of people sacrificing the offering entered, and when the Temple courtyard became filled with them they closed the doors of the Temple courtyard. They sounded uninterrupted, broken, and uninterrupted trumpet blasts, as was done while sacrificing any offering. The priests stood in rows from the place of slaughter to the altar, and in their hands they held bowls [ bezikhin ] of silver and bowls of gold in order to receive the blood of the offerings. There was a row entirely composed of priests holding silver bowls, and a row entirely composed of priests holding gold bowls, as the gold and silver bowls were not mixed in the same row. The bowls did not have flat bases that would allow them to be put down, out of concern that perhaps the priests would set them down and forget about them and in the meantime the blood would congeal and become disqualified for sprinkling on the altar.

An Israelite would slaughter the sacrifice, and a priest would receive the blood and immediately hand it to another priest standing next to him, and the other priest would pass it to another. Each priest would receive a full bowl of blood from the priest next to him and return to him an empty bowl being passed in the opposite direction, the contents of which had already been sprinkled on the altar. The priest who was closest to the altar would sprinkle a single sprinkling of blood against the base of the altar, i.e., against the north and west sides of the altar, where there was a base.

The first group exited upon completion of the rite, and the second group entered; the second group left upon completion of its rite, and the third group entered. As it was done by the first group, so was it done by the second and third groups. All the people standing in the Temple courtyard while the Paschal lambs were being slaughtered would recite hallel. If they finished reciting it before all the offerings were slaughtered, they recited it a second time, and if they finished reciting it a second time, they recited it a third time, although in practice they never recited it a third time, as the priests worked efficiently and finished the rite before this became necessary. Rabbi Yehuda says: The third group never reached even once the opening verse of the fourth chapter of hallel : “I love that the Lord hears the voice of my supplications” (Psalms 116:1), because its people were few and the slaughtering of all the offerings was completed during the recitation of the first three chapters.

As it was done during the week, so was it done on Shabbat; only that on Shabbat the priests would rinse the Temple courtyard, cleaning away the blood, contrary to the wishes of the Sages, as the priests did not want to veer from the weekday procedure in this regard. Rabbi Yehuda says: Before the floor was rinsed, a priest would fill a cup with the blood of the many offerings brought that day that was now mixed together on the floor and then sprinkle it with a single sprinkling upon the altar. But the Rabbis did not agree with Rabbi Yehuda with regard to this point.

How would one suspend and flay the Paschal lamb in the Temple? Iron hooks [ unkelayot ] were secured into the walls and pillars, and upon them one would suspend the offering and flay it. If anyone lacked a place among the hooks in the Temple courtyard to suspend and flay the offering, there were thin, smooth rods there, which he would place on his own shoulder and on another’s shoulder, and from it he would suspend the offering and flay it. Rabbi Eliezer says: When the fourteenth of Nisan occurred on Shabbat, when moving the rods is prohibited (Rambam), he would rest his hand on another’s shoulder and the other’s hand on his own shoulder and suspend the offering and flay it.

He would tear open the flesh of the offering and remove its sacrificial parts, i.e., the fats and other parts offered on the altar. He would place the sacrificial parts in a large basin [ mageis ] and burn them on the altar. If this took place on Shabbat, when carrying is prohibited, the first group would exit and remain on the Temple Mount; the second group would remain within the rampart, which was an area outside the women’s courtyard; and the third group would stand in its place in the Temple. They would wait there until nightfall, and as soon as it became dark, they would all go out and roast their Paschal lambs, everyone in his own place.

Chapter 6

These are the matters related to the Paschal lamb that override Shabbat, when the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat: Its slaughter, the sprinkling of its blood, the cleaning of its intestines and the burning of its fats on the altar, all of which are services that must be performed on Passover eve while it is still day. However, its roasting and the washing of its intestines, which need not be done by day, do not override Shabbat; rather, one waits until after Shabbat to perform these tasks. Carrying the Paschal lamb through a public domain does not override Shabbat. The Paschal offering consisted of either a lamb or a goat, sometimes quite young and unable to walk the entire way, so that it had to be carried on a person’s shoulders. Similarly, bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit and cutting off its wart do not override Shabbat, as all these tasks could have been performed before Shabbat. A wart is considered a blemish that disqualifies the animal from being brought as an offering, but once the wart is removed, the animal is fit to be sacrificed on the altar. Rabbi Eliezer says: All of these procedures override Shabbat.

Rabbi Eliezer said: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference? If slaughter, which is ordinarily forbidden on Shabbat as a biblically prohibited labor, nonetheless overrides Shabbat when performed for the sake of the Paschal lamb, then these activities, namely carrying the animal, bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit, and the like, which are prohibited due to rabbinic decree, should they not override Shabbat? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The law governing a Festival proves otherwise, for the Torah permitted on it acts that are normally prohibited as labor, such as slaughtering, cooking, and baking, and yet it is forbidden to do on it acts that are prohibited due to rabbinic decree. Thus, we cannot derive policy with regard to rabbinic prohibitions from the rules that govern Torah laws. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: What is this, Yehoshua? How can you suggest such a weak proof? What proof can be deduced from optional activities that would apply to a mitzva? How does the fact that rabbinic decrees remain in effect on a Festival with respect to optional activities prove that one is also forbidden to transgress a rabbinic decree in order to fulfill the mitzva of offering the Paschal lamb? Rabbi Akiva responded and said in defense of Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion: Sprinkling the purifying water of a red heifer upon someone who had contracted ritual impurity through contact with a corpse proves the matter, for it is done for the sake of a mitzva, in order to allow the person to offer the Paschal lamb, and it is prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, and nonetheless it does not override Shabbat, for the purification rite is not performed on the eve of Passover that falls on Shabbat. So, too, you should not be surprised about these activities, namely carrying the animal, bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit, and cutting off its wart, that although they are performed for the sake of a mitzva and they are prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I do not accept this proof. With regard to this sprinkling itself, I infer that it, too, is permitted for the same reason: If slaughter, which is a biblically prohibited labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not right that sprinkling the purifying water of a red heifer, which is prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, should override Shabbat? You cannot challenge me based on a premise with which I disagree. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Eliezer: Or perhaps we can reverse the order of your argument and say the opposite: If, as we know by accepted tradition, sprinkling the purifying water on Shabbat, which is prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, does not override Shabbat, then with regard to slaughter, which is prohibited as a biblically prohibited labor, is it not right that it should not override Shabbat? Therefore, it should be prohibited to slaughter the Paschal lamb when the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, how can you say this? You have thus uprooted what is written in the Torah: “Let the children of Israel offer the Paschal lamb in its appointed time” (Numbers 9:2); the phrase “at its appointed time” indicates that the offering must be brought on that day, whether it is a weekday or Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Eliezer: My teacher, bring me an appointed time stated in the Torah for these tasks, namely, carrying the animal or bringing it from outside the Shabbat limits, like the appointed time stated with respect to slaughter. The Paschal lamb must be slaughtered on the fourteenth of Nisan, but there is no fixed time when the animal must be brought to the Temple, and it is therefore possible to transport it before Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva stated a principle: Any prohibited labor required for the offering of the sacrifice that can be performed on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughter, which cannot be performed on the eve of Shabbat, overrides Shabbat.

When does one bring a Festival peace-offering with the Paschal lamb? A special offering is brought on the fourteenth of Nisan together with the Paschal lamb when the Paschal lamb comes on a weekday rather than on Shabbat, and when it comes in a state of ritual purity as opposed to when it is brought in a state of impurity because most of the community is impure, and when many people are registered for the Paschal lamb so that each person will receive only a small portion from it. When these three conditions are met, the Festival peace-offering is eaten first and the Paschal lamb is eaten afterward. When, however, the Paschal lamb comes on Shabbat, or when few people are registered for it so that each person will receive a large portion, or when it is brought in a state of ritual impurity, one does not bring a Festival peace-offering with it.

With regard to the extra offering itself, the Festival peace-offering would come from the flock, from the herd, from sheep or from goats, from males or from females, as the Festival peace-offering is not bound by the limitations governing the Paschal offering, which must be specifically a young male sheep or goat. And the Festival peace-offering is eaten for two days and one night like other peace-offerings.

A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, not knowing that it is prohibited for him to do so, is disqualified, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for it because he unwittingly performed a prohibited labor on Shabbat. As for all other offerings, such as a peace-offering, that one unwittingly slaughtered on Shabbat for the purpose of a Paschal offering, if they were not fit for the Paschal offering, e.g., if they were female or cattle or more than a year old and clearly ineligible for the Paschal offering, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Because he did not fulfill the mitzva to bring a Paschal offering, his act of slaughter was therefore unnecessary. And if they were fit, Rabbi Eliezer nevertheless deems him liable to bring a sin-offering for his unwitting transgression. But Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him, because he maintains that if someone intended to perform a mitzva, and despite his error he in fact performed a mitzva, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering. And in this case he performed a mitzva, because offerings that are sacrificed for a different purpose are still fit. Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: If, with regard to the Paschal lamb, which is permitted to be slaughtered on Shabbat for its own purpose, when one changed its purpose he is nevertheless liable, then, with regard to other offerings that are forbidden to be slaughtered on Shabbat even for their own purpose, when one changed their purpose, is it not right that he should be liable? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, this reasoning is faulty. If you say that one is liable to bring a sin-offering if he slaughtered a Paschal lamb for a different purpose, it is because he changed its purpose for something forbidden, as the offering he intended it to be may not be slaughtered on Shabbat. But can you necessarily say the same thing about other offerings that he slaughtered for the purpose of a Paschal offering and thus changed their purpose for something that is permitted to be sacrificed on Shabbat? Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: Let the communal offerings, such as the daily offering and the additional-offerings of Shabbat and the Festivals, prove the matter, for they are permitted to be slaughtered on Shabbat for their own purpose, and nevertheless, one who unnecessarily slaughters a different offering for their purpose is liable. This indicates that even when a particular offering may be slaughtered, one is nevertheless liable if he slaughtered a different offering for the purpose of the permitted offering. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, if you say this halakha with regard to communal offerings, it is because they have a limit, as there is a specific number of communal offerings that must be offered on any particular day and there is no reason one would mistakenly sacrifice extra offerings for this purpose. But can you necessarily say the same thing about the Paschal lamb, which does not have a limit, making it more likely for someone to make a mistake? Rabbi Meir says: According to Rabbi Yehoshua, even one who unwittingly slaughters other offerings for the purpose of communal offerings beyond their daily limit is exempt for the same reason, i.e., that he intended to fulfill a mitzva that is permitted on Shabbat.

The mishna continues with another halakha with regard to the Paschal lamb: If one slaughtered a Paschal lamb on Shabbat and mistakenly intended it for those who cannot eat it, such as sick or elderly people who are unable to eat the meat, or for those who did not register for it, or for the sake of the uncircumcised or for those ritually impure, the offering is disqualified and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his unnecessary act of slaughter. If, however, he slaughtered it for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, or for those who registered for it and for those who did not register for it, or for the circumcised and for those who are uncircumcised, or for those who are ritually impure and those who are ritually pure, he is exempt. Since a Paschal lamb slaughtered with dual intentions of these types is valid, the act of slaughter was justified. If he slaughtered it and it was found to have a blemish, the offering is disqualified, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for having unwittingly performed a prohibited labor on Shabbat, as he should have examined the animal before it was slaughtered. If he slaughtered it and it was found to have a hidden condition that would cause it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ] and that could not have been discovered before the slaughter even if it were examined properly, the offering is disqualified, but he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. This is not a case of shogeg, unwitting violation of Shabbat, but rather of ones, an unavoidable accident. If he slaughtered it and afterward it became known that the owners had withdrawn from it and registered for a different Paschal lamb, in which case this one was slaughtered unnecessarily, as no one was registered for it, or it became known that they had died or became ritually impure, in all these cases he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, because he slaughtered with permission. At the time of the slaughter, he did not know and had no reason to suspect that the offering would be disqualified.

Chapter 7

How does one roast the Paschal lamb? One brings a spit [ shappud ] of pomegranate wood and thrusts it into the mouth of the lamb until it reaches its anus, and one then puts its legs and entrails inside it and roasts it all together; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: One does not insert its legs and entrails inside it, as this is a type of cooking. Anything placed inside the offering does not get roasted directly by the fire and is considered to have been cooked. Rather, one suspends the legs and entrails from the spit above the animal’s head outside it.

One may not roast the Paschal lamb on the metal spit nor on a metal grill [ askela ]. However, Rabbi Tzadok said: There was an incident with Rabban Gamliel, who said to his slave Tavi: Go and roast the Paschal lamb for us on the grill. If the Paschal lamb touched the earthenware surface of an oven, one must peel off its place on the Paschal lamb, as it was roasted by the heat of the oven and not by the fire itself. If some of the gravy of the Paschal lamb dripped on the earthenware and then returned to it, i.e., the gravy splattered back onto the meat, one must remove its place. Peeling off the outer layer is not enough, and one must remove some of the meat underneath the outer layer, because it is considered to have been cooked by the liquid rather than roasted by the fire. If some of the Paschal lamb’s gravy dripped onto hot flour, one must remove a handful of flour from its place, i.e., the place where the gravy landed in the flour, and destroy it.

In a case where one smears the Paschal lamb with teruma oil, if the Paschal lamb belongs to a group of priests they may eat it, as they are permitted to eat teruma. If the Paschal lamb belongs to a group of Israelites, then if it is still raw, one must rinse it in order to remove the teruma oil; and if it is roasted, one must peel off the outer layer that has absorbed the oil, so that the Israelites do not eat the teruma, which is prohibited to them. If one smears the Paschal lamb with oil of the second tithe, he may not demand money for it from the members of the group, as one may not redeem second tithe in Jerusalem. Second-tithe produce that is in Jerusalem is meant to be eaten; it may be given as a gift to others, but may not be redeemed or sold.

Five items, i.e., offerings, may be brought in a state of ritual impurity, but they may not be eaten in a state of ritual impurity. They are all communal offerings: The omer, which is brought in Nisan; the two loaves brought on Shavuot ; the shewbread, which were arranged each week; the communal peace-offerings, which were brought on Shavuot ; and the goats sacrificed on the New Moons, which were sin-offerings eaten by the priests. However, the Paschal lamb that is sacrificed in impurity is eaten even in impurity, as it is brought to begin with only for eating, which is the essence of the mitzva. With regard to other offerings, the essence of their mitzva is fulfilled when they are sacrificed on the altar, and the eating is non-essential.

If the meat of the Paschal lamb became ritually impure, and the fat remains pure and may be burned on the altar, one may not sprinkle the blood. On the other hand, if the fat became impure and the meat remains pure, one may sprinkle the blood because the meat remains fit to be eaten. This is the halakha with regard to a Paschal lamb, whose primary purpose is to be eaten by those who have registered for it. However, with regard to other offerings it is not so. Rather, although the meat has become impure and the fat remains pure, one may sprinkle the blood, because part of the offering still remains valid.

If the entire community or most of it became ritually impure, or the priests were all impure and the community was pure, they should perform the ritual of the Paschal lamb in ritual impurity. If a minority of the community became impure, even if they are many people, those who are pure perform the ritual of the Paschal lamb on the first Pesaḥ, and those who are impure perform the ritual on the second Pesaḥ.

In a case of a Paschal lamb whose blood was sprinkled and subsequently it became known that the meat or blood was ritually impure, the frontplate of the High Priest appeases God for the ritual impurity after the fact, and the owners are exempt from observing the second Pesaḥ. If it became known later that the body of the individual who brought the Paschal lamb had become ritually impure, the frontplate does not appease God. The individual has not fulfilled his obligation to bring the Paschal lamb, and therefore he must observe the second Pesaḥ. This is because the Sages said that with regard to the nazirite and one who performs the ritual of the Paschal lamb, the frontplate appeases God for both impurity of the blood and meat of the offering, but the frontplate does not appease God for impurity of the body of the individual bringing the offering. The mishna introduces a halakha with regard to ritual impurity of the deep, a term that refers to a source of impurity that is unknown to anyone and is discovered only after it has rendered someone impure. If it became known after the offering was brought that the person had become impure due to ritual impurity of the deep, e.g., if he was informed that there was a concealed grave under the place he had sat in a house where he had previously stayed, the frontplate appeases God and the offering is valid.

If the whole Paschal lamb or most of it became ritually impure, one burns it before the Temple [ habira ] with wood from the arrangement of wood on the altar that was given to the owners of the Paschal lamb for this purpose. If a minority of it became impure, and similarly, with regard to the parts of the Paschal lamb that are leftover, which must be burned, the owners of the Paschal lamb burn it in their courtyards or on their roofs, with their own wood. Only the miserly, who want to save the expenditure of wood, burn it before the Temple in order to benefit from the wood of the arrangement.

A Paschal lamb that was taken out of its permissible area or that became ritually impure should be burned immediately on the eve of Passover. If the owners became ritually impure or died, its form must be allowed to decay by leaving it for a period of time instead of burning it immediately, and it should be burned on the sixteenth of Nisan, immediately after the first day of the Festival. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: This, too, should be burned immediately, because it has no one to eat it, which is also so severe a disqualification that decay of form is not required.

The bones of the Paschal lamb that contain edible marrow but cannot be eaten because it is prohibited to break the bones of the Paschal lamb; and the sinews; and the leftover meat should all be burned on the sixteenth of Nisan, immediately after the first day of the Festival. If the sixteenth occurs on Shabbat, they should be burned on the seventeenth, because the mitzva to burn them does not override Shabbat or the Festival. Therefore, they are burned on the first weekday.

Anything that is fit to be eaten in an adult ox, whose bones have fully hardened, may be eaten in a young kid. One may register for a Paschal offering in order to eat any of these parts, and eating any such part is considered a fulfillment of the mitzva to eat the Paschal lamb. However, any part of the animal that is inedible in an adult ox is not considered meat, even if it is soft enough to be eaten in a young kid. One may not register for a Paschal offering in order to eat one of these parts, and eating it is not a fulfillment of the mitzva to eat the Paschal lamb. And the soft ends of the ribs and the cartilage are soft enough to be considered edible and may therefore be eaten from the Paschal lamb. One who breaks the bone of a Paschal lamb that is ritually pure receives forty lashes for having violated a prohibition stated in the Torah. But one who leaves over part of a ritually pure Paschal lamb and one who breaks the bone of a ritually impure Paschal lamb do not receive forty lashes.

If a portion of a limb has gone out of its permissible boundary, one must cut the meat until one reaches the bone at the point that separates between the part of the limb that went out of its boundary and the part that did not, and then peel the meat away from the bone until one reaches the joint, and cut off the limb at the joint, as it is prohibited to break the bone itself. And with regard to other offerings, one may chop off the part that exited with a hatchet, as it is not subject to the prohibition of breaking a bone. How does one determine the outer boundaries of a particular location? Anything that is located from the inside of the doorway inward is considered as though it is inside, and anything that is located from the doorway outward is considered as though it is outside. And the windows in the wall and the thickness of the wall are considered as though they are inside, such that an offering is considered to have exited the premises only if it is taken outside the wall.

Two groups that were eating one Paschal lamb in one house need not be concerned that they will appear to be one group. Rather, these turn their faces this way and eat, and these turn their faces that way and eat. And it is permissible for them to have the boiler from which they pour hot water in the middle, so that the waiter can easily serve both groups. When the attendant who is serving both groups gets up to pour for the group of which he is not a member, he must close his mouth and turn his face so that he does not accidentally eat with the other group, until he reaches his group again and eats with it. And the bride, who is embarrassed to eat in the presence of men she does not know, turns her face away from her group and eats, although this may make it seem as though she is part of a different group.

Chapter 8

A woman, when she is living in her husband’s house, if her husband slaughtered the Paschal lamb on her behalf and her father also slaughtered the Paschal lamb on her behalf, she should eat from her husband’s lamb because it is assumed that the wife intended to be included in her husband’s group. However, if, as was often customary, she went on the first Festival following her marriage to observe the Festival in her father’s house, then, if both her husband slaughtered the Paschal lamb on her behalf and her father also slaughtered the Paschal lamb on her behalf, she may eat in whichever place she wishes, since it is not obvious with whose group she intended to be included. In the case of an orphan with multiple guardians, if each of his guardians [ apotropsin ] slaughtered a Paschal lamb on his behalf, intending that he be included in their group, he may eat in whichever place he wishes. A slave jointly owned by two partners may not eat from the lamb of either of them, unless it was stipulated beforehand from whose lamb he will partake. One who is half slave and half free man may not eat from his master’s lamb. It is assumed that the master did not intend to allow this person’s free half to partake of the lamb, and therefore the master did not slaughter the lamb with him in mind. Consequently, the half slave is not included among those registered for his master’s offering unless he was explicitly included.

In the case of one who says to his slave: Go and slaughter the Paschal offering on my behalf, but does not specify which type of animal to slaughter, the halakha is as follows: If the slave slaughtered a kid, his master may eat it; if he slaughtered a lamb, his master may eat it. If the slave slaughtered both a kid and a lamb, his master should eat from the first one that was slaughtered; the second is invalid and should be burned. If the master had stated explicitly which type of animal to slaughter, but the slave forgot what his master said to him, what should he do? He should slaughter both a lamb and a kid and say the following stipulation: If my master said to me that I should slaughter a kid, the kid is for his Paschal offering and the lamb is for mine; and if my master said to me that I should slaughter a lamb, the lamb is for his Paschal offering and the kid is for mine. In this way, once the master ultimately clarifies what he had originally said, both animals may be used accordingly. If his master also forgot what he said to him, neither animal may be used, since it has not been clarified which of the animals the slave and master are registered for. Therefore, both of them, the lamb and the kid, go out to the place designated for burning, in accordance with the halakha pertaining to offerings that may not be eaten. However, despite this, both the master and slave are exempt from observing the second Pesaḥ if the blood of the animals has already been applied to the altar before the master forgot.

In the case of one who says to his children: I am slaughtering the Paschal lamb on behalf of whomever of you goes up first to Jerusalem, as soon as the first of the children has entered his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires on behalf of his brothers their portions together with him. Additional people can always be registered for a Paschal lamb, as long as there will be at least an olive-bulk of the lamb’s meat for each and every person registered. People can be registered and withdraw themselves from being registered for a Paschal lamb until it is slaughtered. Rabbi Shimon says: Even until the priest sprinkles the blood.

If one who is registered for a Paschal lamb unilaterally registers another person with him in his portion of the Paschal lamb, the other members of his group are permitted to give him, i.e., the one who included the additional person, only his portion, which was originally allotted to him. And he, the additional person, eats from his portion, i.e., the portion of he who added him; and they, the other members of the group, eat from theirs. This is because they did not agree to the inclusion of the additional person.

A zav, a man who experiences a gonorrheal discharge, who saw two sightings of discharge is ritually impure. To become ritually pure and able to partake of offerings, he must wait seven clean days during which he does not see any discharge. Then he immerses in a ritual bath. He will then be considered ritually pure upon nightfall. One slaughters the Paschal lamb on his behalf if Passover eve is on his seventh day, despite the fact he is still not ritually pure at the time of slaughter, since by the night of Passover he will be ritually pure and able to eat it. If he saw three sightings, in which case, in addition to the seven clean days he must bring an offering on the eighth day to be allowed to partake of offerings, one slaughters the Paschal lamb on his behalf if Passover eve is on his eighth day. It is presumed that by the evening his offering will have been brought and his purification complete. A woman who keeps watch a day for a day is one who became ritually impure after experiencing a discharge of blood outside of her regular menstrual cycle on one day or two consecutive days. She must keep watch on the day following her last discharge to be certain she does not experience any additional discharges. To ritually purify herself, she should, on that day, immerse in a ritual bath, and on condition that she doesn’t experience any discharges throughout that day, she is considered ritually pure already from the time she immersed. If she saw a discharge on one day, one slaughters the Paschal lamb on her behalf after she has immersed on her second day, despite the possibility that she may see additional discharges later that day. If she saw a discharge on two days, one slaughters the Paschal lamb on her behalf on the third day. And a zava is a woman who experienced discharges on three consecutive days. She must, like a zav, wait a full seven clean days with no discharges, immerse, and then bring a sacrifice on the eighth day. One slaughters a Paschal lamb on her behalf only on the eighth day.

An acute mourner, i.e., a mourner on the day of the death of an immediate relative; and one clearing a pile of stones that collapsed on top of a person, in which case there is a possibility that the person buried underneath is dead and his corpse will impart ritual impurity to the person clearing the pile; and similarly, one whom the governing body promised to release from prison on the night of Passover; and an ill person and an elderly person who are still capable of eating an olive-bulk of meat, one slaughters the Paschal lamb on their behalf, since they are currently fit to eat the Paschal lamb. However, with regard to all of them, this is only true when they are included in a group with other people who will definitely be able to partake of the lamb; but we do not slaughter the Paschal lamb on their behalf if they are by themselves, either as individuals or in a group composed entirely of such people, because perhaps they will cause the Paschal lamb to become disqualified, since there is a possibility that by the night of Passover they will be unable to partake of the Paschal lamb. Therefore, since they were registered for a Paschal lamb and it was slaughtered when they were still fit to partake of it, even if a disqualification occurred to them later, preventing them from partaking of the Paschal lamb, they are nevertheless exempt from observing the second Pesaḥ. The exemption from the second Pesaḥ is dependent not on whether they partook of a Paschal lamb, but on whether it was validly slaughtered on their behalf. This holds true except for one who was clearing a pile of stones where the person buried underneath was eventually found dead, because in such a case the person searching for him certainly stood over the corpse at some point. He had therefore become ritually impure from the outset, even before the Paschal lamb was slaughtered. Consequently, he would not have been fit even during the slaughter and will have to observe the second Pesaḥ.

We do not slaughter the Paschal lamb on behalf of an individual, only for a group of people; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Yosei permits it. And even if there is a group of one hundred who together are unable to eat an olive-bulk of it, we do not slaughter on their behalf. And we do not make a group for a Paschal lamb that consists of women, slaves, and minors.

An acute mourner, i.e., a mourner on the day of the death of an immediate relative, is prohibited from eating sacrificial food. By Torah law, the prohibition applies only to the day of death itself, but it is permitted to partake of sacrificial food on the following night. By rabbinic decree, the period of acute mourning is extended to include the night as well. Despite this, an acute mourner immerses and eats his Paschal lamb in the evening. But he may still not eat other sacrificial food. However, one who hears about the death of his dead, i.e., he discovers that one of his immediate relatives died more than thirty days after the death, his status of acute mourning applies on a rabbinic level. And one who gathers the bones of his parents, who are buried in a temporary location for their flesh to decay and who is moving them to a permanent burial place must also observe a day of acute mourning by rabbinic decree. These mourners immerse and eat all types of sacrificial food at night. Since in these cases, even during the day, the mourning is by rabbinic decree, the Sages did not extend it into the evening. With regard to a convert who converted on Passover eve, Beit Shammai say: He immerses and eats his Paschal lamb in the evening. And Beit Hillel say: One who separates from the foreskin by being circumcised is ritually impure, like one who separates from the grave after coming in contact with a corpse. Consequently, he must first observe the seven-day purification process necessary to remove ritually impurity imparted by a corpse. Only then, from the eighth day onward, may he partake of sacrificial meat.

Chapter 9

One who was ritually impure or on a distant journey and did not observe the first Pesaḥ by participating in the offering of the Paschal lamb on the fourteenth of Nisan should observe the second Pesaḥ by participating in the offering on the fourteenth of Iyyar. If one unwittingly forgot or was prevented due to circumstances beyond his control and did not observe the first Pesaḥ, he too should observe the second Pesaḥ. If so, that the second Pesaḥ is observed even by someone who forgot or was prevented from observing the first Pesaḥ, why is it stated in the Torah that the second Pesaḥ is observed only by one who was ritually impure or on a distant journey? These cases were specified in order to teach that these two groups of people are exempt from karet if they do not observe the second Pesaḥ, but those who were not ritually impure or on a distant journey are liable to receive karet, as the Gemara will explain.

What is the definition of a distant journey that exempts one from observing the first Pesaḥ? Anywhere from the city of Modi’im and beyond, and from anywhere located an equal distance from Jerusalem and beyond in every direction; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says: From the threshold of the Temple courtyard and beyond is considered a distant journey;therefore, anyone located outside the courtyard at the time that the Paschal lamb is slaughtered is exempt from observing the first Pesaḥ. Rabbi Yosei said to him: Therefore, the word is dotted over the letter heh in the word “distant [ reḥoka ]” to say that the meaning of the word should be qualified: It should be understood that it is not because he is really distant; rather, it includes anyone located from the threshold of the Temple courtyard and beyond.

What is the difference between the Paschal lamb offered on the first Pesaḥ and the Paschal lamb offered on the second Pesaḥ? On the first Pesaḥ, at the time of slaughtering the Paschal lamb, it is prohibited to own leavened bread due to the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found. And on the second Pesaḥ it is permissible for one to have both leavened bread and matza with him in the house. Another difference is that the Paschal lamb offered on the first Pesaḥ requires the recitation of hallel as it is eaten and the second does not require the recitation of hallel as it is eaten. However, they are the same in that the Paschal lambs sacrificed on both the first and second Pesaḥ require the recitation of hallel as they are prepared, i.e., as they are slaughtered, and they are both eaten roasted with matza and bitter herbs, and they override Shabbat in that they may be slaughtered and their blood sprinkled even on Shabbat.

When the Paschal lamb is sacrificed in a state of ritual impurity due to the fact that the majority of the Jewish people are ritually impure, zavim, and zavot, and menstruating women, and women after childbirth may not eat it, because the Paschal lamb overrides only ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, but it does not override other forms of ritual impurity. However, if they violated the halakha and ate from the offering, they are exempt from karet. One who eats sacrificial food in a state of ritual impurity is generally liable to receive karet ; however, since in this case the offering is sacrificed in a state of ritual impurity, there is no punishment of karet even for ritually impure individuals who are not permitted to eat it. And Rabbi Eliezer exempts these individuals from karet even for entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity, despite their not being permitted to enter, because people who are impure due to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse are permitted to enter the Temple in this situation despite their impurity.

What are the differences between the Paschal lamb that the Jewish people offered in Egypt and the Paschal lamb offered in all later generations? The Paschal lamb the Jewish people offered in Egypt had to be taken from the tenth of the month of Nisan and required the people to sprinkle its blood with a bundle of hyssop, unlike the Paschal lamb in all later years, and its blood was also sprinkled upon the lintel and the two doorposts, and it was eaten with haste; in addition, the Paschal lamb in Egypt was only on one night, whereas the Paschal lamb throughout the generations is observed for seven days.

Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard two rulings from my teachers: One ruling was that the substitute of a Paschal lamb is sacrificed as a peace-offering after Passover, and another ruling was that the substitute of a Paschal lamb is not sacrificed as a peace-offering after Passover; and I cannot explain these two rulings, as I do not remember the circumstances to which each ruling applies. Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain: With regard to a lamb that is separated as a Paschal lamb and is then lost, leading the owner to separate another animal as its replacement, and is later found before the slaughter of the replacement Paschal lamb, it is left to graze until it becomes unfit [ yista’ev ] and disqualified for use as a sacrifice. It is then sold and becomes unconsecrated, and the owner must bring a peace-offering with its proceeds. And so too, the same is true with regard to its substitute: If one separates another lamb as a substitute for this replacement, the sanctity of the original lamb extends to the substitute as well. In the case outlined above, the substitute would graze, just like the replacement, until it developed a blemish and would then be sold. This is the circumstance in which the substitute of a Paschal lamb is not sacrificed. On the other hand, if the lost lamb is found after the slaughter of the replacement Paschal lamb, it itself is sacrificed as a peace-offering, and so too, its substitute is sacrificed, which explains the ruling that the substitute of a Paschal lamb is sacrificed as a peace-offering.

In the case of one who separates a female animal for his Paschal lamb although the Torah requires a male, or a male that is in its second year although a Paschal lamb must be an animal that is in its first year, the animal is left to graze until it develops a blemish and becomes unfit, and it is then sold and its money is used for free-will offerings or peace-offerings. With regard to one who separates his Paschal lamb and then dies, his son may not bring it after him for the purpose of a Paschal lamb because it may no longer be used for that purpose after its owner has died. Rather, it is brought for the purpose of a peace-offering.

In the case of a Paschal lamb that was intermingled with other offerings, such as guilt-offerings and burnt-offerings, and it is not known which animal was separated for which offering, all of them are left to graze until they develop a blemish and become unfit; and they are then sold, and with the proceeds of the choicest of them he must bring this type of sacrifice, and with the proceeds of the choicest of them he must bring this other type of sacrifice, meaning that he must purchase one of each type of sacrifice that was intermingled at the value of the most expensive animal in the group. And he loses the difference from his own pocket. Not all the offerings were as expensive as the most valuable animal in the group, yet he must purchase an animal for each type of offering for the value of the most expensive animal in the group. If a Paschal lamb was intermingled with firstborn animals, Rabbi Shimon says: If those whose offerings became mixed together were groups of priests, they may eat all of the animals on Passover night. This is because priests are permitted to eat the meat of a firstborn animal, and the slaughter and other services for a firstborn animal are the same as those for a Paschal lamb. The attending priests should state that they intend to sacrifice as a Paschal lamb whichever animal is the Paschal lamb and to sacrifice as a firstborn animal whichever animal is a firstborn.

With regard to a group whose Paschal lamb was lost, and they said to one member of the group: Go and search for our Paschal lamb, and when you find it, slaughter it on our behalf; and he went and found the missing offering and slaughtered it on behalf of the entire group, but in the meantime they took a different animal and slaughtered it as a Paschal lamb, the halakha is as follows: If his Paschal lamb was slaughtered first, he eats from his offering, as he is considered to be registered specifically for that offering, and they eat with him from his offering, because he included them in his offering and it belongs to the entire group. The second animal does not have any registrants and is therefore burned. And if theirs was slaughtered first, they eat from theirs because they withdrew from the original offering through the act of slaughtering a replacement, and he eats from his because he was not registered for the replacement offering sacrificed by the remainder of his group. And if it is not known which of the offerings was slaughtered first, or if both the group and the individual slaughtered them together, he eats from his and they do not eat with him in case theirs was slaughtered first, and theirs must be taken out to the place designated for burning. The offering slaughtered by the group may not be eaten due to the concern that it was slaughtered second and the members of the group would therefore have been included in the first offering. However, they are exempt from performing the offering of the Paschal lamb on the second Pesaḥ, because they were included in the slaughter of whichever animal was slaughtered first. It is only due to external circumstances that they cannot complete the mitzva by eating the Paschal lamb, and this does not prevent them from fulfilling their obligation. A somewhat different case of a lost Paschal lamb would occur if the group had sent one member as an agent to search for the lost animal, and the agent said to the other members of the group before he left: If I am late, go and slaughter a Paschal lamb for me. He then went and found the lost Paschal lamb and slaughtered it, and they took another animal and slaughtered it as a Paschal lamb. In that case, if theirs was slaughtered first, they eat from theirs and he eats with them, because he requested to be included in their offering and they registered him for their Paschal lamb. And if his was slaughtered first, he eats from his and they eat from theirs, because the fact that they slaughtered a different animal indicates that they have withdrawn from the original offering. And if it is not known which of the animals was slaughtered first, or if both the group and the individual slaughtered them together, they eat from theirs because they definitely withdrew from the original offering by slaughtering a different one, and he does not eat with them because he also intended to be included in the animal he slaughtered and it is not clear which was slaughtered first. Therefore, his must be taken out to the place designated for burning; and he is exempt from performing the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb on the second Pesaḥ. If he said to them that if he is delayed they should include him in their Paschal lamb, and they said to him that if he finds the original offering he should slaughter it on their behalf, all of them eat from the first sacrifice that was slaughtered. And if it is not known which of them was slaughtered first, both of them must be taken out to the place designated for burning, and the entire group is exempt from participating in the Paschal lamb on the second Pesaḥ. If he did not say anything to them and they did not say anything to him, meaning that neither side granted the other authority to slaughter a Paschal lamb on its behalf, they are not responsible for each other, and the members of the group eat their Paschal lamb while the individual sent to find the lost animal eats from his own offering. The reason for this is that the individual is registered only for the original offering, while the other members of the group withdrew from that lost offering by sacrificing a different Paschal lamb.

Two groups whose Paschal lambs have become intermingled and they do not know which one belongs to which group should act in the following manner: These members of the first group draw one of the animals separated as a Paschal lamb for themselves, and those members of the second group draw one for themselves. One of these, a member of one group, comes to those, the members of the other group, and one of those members of the second group comes to these members of the first group. And this is what each group says to the member of the other group who has come to join them: If this Paschal lamb that is now in our possession is ours, you are withdrawn from the Paschal lamb that was yours, and you are registered for our Paschal lamb and you may eat from it. And if this Paschal lamb is yours, meaning that it actually belongs to the other group, including this individual, we are hereby withdrawn from ours and we are registered for your Paschal lamb, which you agree to share with us. The other group makes the same statement. And similarly, if there were five groups of five people each or of ten people each, they draw one person from each and every group, and they say this statement mentioned in the case of two groups. The remaining member or members of each group will grant the representatives of the other groups that have come to join them a share in the Paschal lamb, and they will acquire a share in it for themselves in case the animal they have chosen belonged originally to one of the other groups.

In the case of two individuals whose Paschal lambs became intermingled and each person was the only one registered for his offering, what should they do? This person draws one of the Paschal lambs for himself and that person draws one for himself; this person registers someone from the marketplace with him on his Paschal lamb and that person registers someone from the marketplace with him on his Paschal lamb. Once this has been done, this one comes to that person from the marketplace who has been added to the other person’s sacrifice, and that one comes to this person from the marketplace who has been added to the first person’s sacrifice, and this is what they say: If this Paschal lamb is mine, you are withdrawn from yours and you are registered for mine, and if this is your Paschal lamb, I am withdrawn from mine and I am hereby registered for yours, as described previously. The reason it is necessary for each individual to add an additional person to his Paschal lamb, is to ensure that when each person withdraws from his original Paschal lamb and registers for the other, no Paschal lamb will be left ownerless for any amount of time.

Chapter 10

On the eve of Passover, adjacent to minḥa time, a person may not eat until dark, so that he will be able to eat matza that night with a hearty appetite. Even the poorest of Jews should not eat the meal on Passover night until he reclines on his left side, as free and wealthy people recline when they eat. And the distributors of charity should not give a poor person less than four cups of wine for the Festival meal of Passover night. And this halakha applies even if the poor person is one of the poorest members of society and receives his food from the charity plate.

The tanna describes the beginning of the Passover seder. The attendants poured the wine of the first cup for the leader of the seder. Beit Shammai say: One recites the blessing over the sanctification of the day, i.e., the kiddush for the Festival: Who blesses Israel and the Festivals, and thereafter he recites the blessing over the wine: Who creates fruit of the vine. And Beit Hillel say: One recites the blessing over the wine and thereafter recites the blessing over the day.

The attendants brought vegetables before the leader of the seder prior to the meal, if there were no other vegetables on the table. He dips the ḥazeret into water or vinegar, to taste some food before he reaches the dessert of the bread, i.e., the bitter herbs, which were eaten after the matza. They brought before him matza and ḥazeret and ḥaroset, and at least two cooked dishes in honor of the Festival. The tanna comments that this was the practice, although eating ḥaroset is not a mitzva but merely a custom. Rabbi Eliezer ben Tzadok says: Actually, it is a mitzva to eat ḥaroset. And in the period when the Temple stood and they offered the Paschal lamb, they brought before him the body of the Paschal lamb.

The attendants poured the second cup for the leader of the seder, and here the son asks his father the questions about the differences between Passover night and a regular night. And if the son does not have the intelligence to ask questions on his own, his father teaches him the questions. The mishna lists the questions: Why is this night different from all other nights? As on all other nights we eat leavened bread and matza as preferred; on this night all our bread is matza. As on all other nights we eat other vegetables; on this night we eat bitter herbs. The mishna continues its list of the questions. When the Temple was standing one would ask: As on all other nights we eat either roasted, stewed, or cooked meat, but on this night all the meat is the roasted meat of the Paschal lamb. The final question was asked even after the destruction of the Temple: As on all other nights we dip the vegetables in a liquid during the meal only once; however, on this night we dip twice. And according to the intelligence and the ability of the son, his father teaches him about the Exodus. When teaching his son about the Exodus. He begins with the Jewish people’s disgrace and concludes with their glory. And he expounds from the passage: “An Aramean tried to destroy my father” (Deuteronomy 26:5), the declaration one recites when presenting his first fruits at the Temple, until he concludes explaining the entire section.

Rabban Gamliel would say: Anyone who did not say these three matters on Passover has not fulfilled his obligation: The Paschal lamb, matza, and bitter herbs. When one mentions these matters, he must elaborate and explain them: The Paschal lamb is brought because the Omnipresent passed over [ pasaḥ ] the houses of our forefathers in Egypt, as it is stated: “That you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Paschal offering for He passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when he smote the Egyptians, and delivered our houses” (Exodus 12:27). Rabban Gamliel continues to explain: The reason for matza is because our forefathers were redeemed from Egypt, as it is stated: “And they baked the dough that they took out of Egypt as cakes of matzot, for it was not leavened, as they were thrust out of Egypt and could not tarry, neither had they prepared for themselves any victual” (Exodus 12:39). The reason for bitter herbs is because the Egyptians embittered our forefathers’ lives in Egypt, as it is stated: “And they embittered their lives with hard service, in mortar and in brick; in all manner of service in the field, all the service that they made them serve was with rigor” (Exodus 1:14). The tanna of the mishna further states: In each and every generation a person must view himself as though he personally left Egypt, as it is stated: “And you shall tell your son on that day, saying: It is because of this which the Lord did for me when I came forth out of Egypt” (Exodus 13:8). In every generation, each person must say: “This which the Lord did for me,” and not: This which the Lord did for my forefathers. The mishna continues with the text of the Haggadah. Therefore we are obligated to thank, praise, glorify, extol, exalt, honor, bless, revere, and laud [ lekales ] the One who performed for our forefathers and for us all these miracles: He took us out from slavery to freedom, from sorrow to joy, from mourning to a Festival, from darkness to a great light, and from enslavement to redemption. And we will say before Him: Halleluya. At this point one recites the hallel that is said on all joyous days. Since one does not complete hallel at this point in the seder, the mishna asks:

Until where does one recite hallel? Beit Shammai say: Until “Who makes the barren woman dwell in her house as a joyful mother of children, halleluya ” (Psalms 113:9). And Beit Hillel say: Until “Who turned the rock into a pool of water, the flint into a fountain of waters” (Psalms 114:8). And one concludes this section of hallel with a blessing that refers to redemption. Rabbi Tarfon says that although one should recite: Who redeemed us and redeemed our forefathers from Egypt, one who did so would not conclude with the formula: Blessed are You, Lord. Rabbi Akiva says that one recites a different version of this blessing: So too, the Lord our God and the God of our forefathers will bring us to future holidays and Festivals in peace, happy over the building of Your city and joyous in Your service. And there we will eat from the Paschal lamb and other offerings, etc., until: Blessed are You, Lord, Who redeemed Israel.

They poured for the leader of the seder the third cup of wine, and he recites the blessing over his food, Grace After Meals. Next, they pour him the fourth cup. He completes hallel over it, as he already recited the first part of hallel before the meal. And he also recites the blessing of the song at the end of hallel over the fourth cup. During the period between these cups, i.e., the first three cups established by the Sages, if one wishes to drink more he may drink; however, between the third cup and the fourth cup one should not drink.

One does not conclude after the Paschal lamb with an afikoman. If some of the participants at the seder fell asleep, thereby interrupting their meal, they may eat from the Paschal lamb when they awake. If the entire company fell asleep, they may not eat any more. If they all fall asleep, this is considered a complete interruption, and if they were to resume their meal it would be akin to eating the offering in two different places. Rabbi Yosei says: If they dozed they may eat from the Paschal lamb when they awake, but if they fell fast asleep they may not eat from it.

The Sages further said: The Paschal lamb after midnight renders one’s hands ritually impure, as it becomes notar, an offering that remained after the time when they may be eaten has expired; and the Sages ruled that both piggul, offerings that were invalidated due to inappropriate intent while being sacrificed, and notar render one’s hands ritually impure. If one recited the blessing over the Paschal lamb, which is: Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to eat the Paschal lamb, he has also exempted himself from reciting a blessing over the Festival offering. The blessing for the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth of Nisan is: Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to eat the offering. However, if he recited the blessing over the Festival offering, he has not exempted himself from reciting a blessing over the Paschal lamb. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: This blessing does not exempt one from reciting a blessing over this one, and that blessing does not exempt that one, as there is a separate blessing for each offering.

Mishnah Shekalim

Chapter 1

On the first of Adar the court proclaims concerning the collection of shekels, i.e., the yearly half-shekel contribution to the Temple treasury made by each adult male for the purpose of buying communal offerings. And they also proclaim with regard to the obligation to uproot forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds of food crops in gardens and fields. And on the fifteenth day of the month of Adar, the Scroll [ Megilla ] of Esther is read in the cities [ kerakim ] surrounded by walls from the time of Joshua. And they also repair the roads that were damaged in the winter, and the streets, and the cisterns. And at that time they perform all that is necessary for public welfare. And they also mark the Jewish gravesites anew, so that people would know their location and avoid ritual impurity, as the previous markers may have eroded during the rainy season. And agents of the court also go out to inspect the fields for diverse kinds of food crops, to determine whether or not the farmers had in fact uprooted these seeds after the proclamation on the first of the month. If the agents of the court found that these diverse kinds had not been uprooted, they themselves would uproot them.

At the end of the last mishna it was stated that the court sends out agents on the fifteenth of Adar to inspect whether the owners of fields had indeed uprooted any diverse kinds of crops as instructed. Rabbi Yehuda said: At first those agents would uproot the diverse kinds of crops and cast them in front of the owners of the fields. When the number of transgressors who would not uproot diverse kinds in their fields increased, and the Sages saw that this tactic was ineffective, they would cast the uprooted crops onto the roads. Ultimately, they instituted that the entire field should be declared ownerless.

On the fifteenth of Adar, money changers would sit at tables set up in the rest of the country, outside the Temple, to handle the collection of shekels. On the twenty-fifth of Adar, the money changers sat in the Temple. From the time when the money changers sat in the Temple, the court began to seize collateral from those who had yet to donate the half-shekel. From whom did they seize collateral? From Levites, Israelites, converts, and emancipated slaves. However, they did not seize collateral from women, slaves, or minors. And any minor whose father began one year to contribute a half-shekel on his behalf, despite the fact that he was not obligated to do so, he may not cease to do so in subsequent years. The court does not seize collateral from priests, although they are legally obligated to give a half-shekel like all other Jews, because of the ways of peace. The mishna goes on to explain the status of priests with regard to the contribution of the half-shekel.

Rabbi Yehuda said that ben Bukhri testified in Yavne: Any priest who contributes the half-shekel is not considered a sinner, despite the fact that he is not obligated to do so. Rabbi Yehuda added that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said to ben Bukhri: Not so; rather, any priest who does not contribute the half-shekel is considered a sinner, as they are obligated like all other Jews. However, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai continued, the priests who do not contribute interpret this verse to their own advantage: “And every meal-offering of the priest shall be wholly made to smoke; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16). Those priests claim as follows: Since the omer offering and the two loaves, i.e., the public offering of two loaves from the new wheat brought on the festival of Shavuot, and the shewbread placed on the sacred table in the Sanctuary each Shabbat, which are all meal-offerings, are ours, then if we contribute shekels we will have partial ownership of these communal offerings, as they are purchased with the shekels. How, then, can they be eaten? They ought to be regarded as priests’ meal-offerings, which must be wholly burnt. But since these offerings are eaten, the priests concluded that they are not obligated to contribute the half-shekel. This argument does not, however, take into account the fact that communal offerings belong to the public, which is understood as its own entity, and are not regarded as shared offerings of all who contribute to the public purse.

Although the Sages said, as stated in the previous mishna, that the court does not seize collateral from women, slaves, and minors, as they are not obligated to contribute, however, if they contributed a shekel of their own accord, the Temple treasurers accept from them. Conversely, in the case of a gentile or a Samaritan [ Kuti ] who contributed a shekel to participate in the communal offerings, they do not accept it from them. And likewise, they do not accept from a gentile or a Samaritan pairs of birds sacrificed in the purification ritual of a zav, pairs of birds of a zava, or pairs of birds of a woman who gave birth, all of which are brought for ritual purification, or sin-offerings or guilt-offerings. This is the principle: With regard to anything that can be brought to the altar as a vow or as a free-will offering, the priests accept it from gentiles and Samaritans, and with regard to anything that cannot be brought as a vow or as a free-will offering, they may not accept it from them. And this principle was similarly articulated by Ezra, when he recorded the Jewish leadership’s rejection of the Samaritans’ request to assist the Jews in the construction of the Second Temple, as it is stated: “But Zerubbabel, and Joshua, and the rest of the heads of fathers’ houses of Israel, said unto them: You have nothing to do with us to build a house unto our God; but we ourselves together will build unto the Lord the God of Israel, as King Cyrus the king of Persia has commanded us” (Ezra 4:3).

[4a] The mishna states another halakha : And these are the people who are obligated in the premium [ kalbon ], a small sum added to the half-shekel collected: Levites, Israelites, converts, and emancipated Canaanite slaves, but not priests, women, Canaanite slaves, or minors. One who contributes a half-shekel on behalf of a priest, on behalf of a woman, on behalf of a slave, or on behalf of a child, is exempt from the premium, as they are exempt. But if he contributed on his own behalf and on behalf of another, i.e., he contributed one whole shekel to discharge both his own obligation and that of someone else, he is obligated in one premium. Rabbi Meir says: He must pay two premiums. The mishna further states: One who gives the collection agent a sela, i.e., a whole shekel, and takes a shekel, i.e., a half-shekel, as change is obligated in two premiums.

One who contributes a half-shekel on behalf of a poor person, on behalf of his neighbor, or on behalf of a resident of his city is exempt from the premium. The Sages did not obligate in the premium those who use their own money to fulfill the obligation of another. But if one loaned them a half-shekel, rather than paying it on their behalf, he is obligated to pay the premium. Since the recipients of the loan must repay the money, it is as though the half-shekel were paid from their property rather than the lender’s. Partnered brothers, who have fully divided among themselves their late father’s assets, and who, if they jointly pay a whole shekel from those assets to discharge both of their obligations, are obligated in the premium like any other two private individuals, are exempt from the animal tithe for the livestock they inherited. Since they have completely divided between them all inherited assets, they are considered purchasers of the livestock, and a purchaser is exempt from the animal tithe. But when they have not completely divided the assets, and they are therefore obligated in the animal tithe, as the livestock is considered in their father’s possession, they are exempt from the premium for their joint payment, as in the case of one who pays on behalf of another. And how much is a premium? A silver ma’a. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: It is only half a ma’a.

Chapter 2

When people who live far from Jerusalem wish to send to Jerusalem the shekels that have been levied from their community, they may combine their shekels and exchange them for darics [ darkonot ], which are large gold coins, due to the burden of the way. Instead of carrying large amounts of shekels, the agents who deliver the funds will bring a much lighter burden of gold coins with them. The mishna adds: Just as there were collection horns in the Temple to receive the half-shekel contributions, so too there were collection horns in the rest of the country, i.e., areas outside of Jerusalem. The local inhabitants placed their half-shekels in these horns, which were later brought to Jerusalem. § With regard to the residents of a town who sent their shekels to the Temple and they were stolen from the agent on the way or were lost, if the collection of the chamber had already been collected before these shekels arrived, the agents must take the oath of a bailee to the treasurers [ gizbarin ]. After the collection of the chamber, all the shekels that have been contributed become the property of the Temple, so the Temple treasurers who are in charge of this property become the opposing litigants of the agents. If the ceremony has not yet been performed and the contributions have not yet been collected into the baskets, the shekels are considered the property of the residents of the town, and therefore the agents must take an oath to absolve themselves to the residents of the town. Since those shekels are still considered the property of the residents of the town because the shekels never reached the Temple, they have not fulfilled their obligation. Therefore, the residents of the town must contribute other shekels in their place. If, after the residents of the town contributed other shekels, the original shekels were found or the thieves returned them, both these original shekels and those newly contributed ones have the status of consecrated shekels and belong to the Temple. However, they do not count for the following year. The people cannot claim that since they contributed twice in one year they are exempt from contributing the next year.

With regard to one who gives his shekel to his fellow to contribute on his behalf by placing it in the collection horn for him, and the fellow instead contributed it for himself, if at the time that he placed the shekel in the collection horn the collection of the chamber had been collected, the fellow is guilty of misuse of consecrated property. When they perform the collection of the chamber, the treasurers also have in mind the shekels that have been contributed but are not yet in the possession of the Temple treasury, so that all those who have contributed shekels will have a part in the communal sacrifices. Therefore, when the agent gives this shekel for himself, he is considered to be deriving benefit from a consecrated item and is guilty of unintentional misuse of consecrated property. With regard to one who mistakenly contributes his shekel from consecrated money, and then the collection of the chamber was collected and an animal purchased with those funds was sacrificed as a communal offering, he is guilty of misuse of consecrated property once the animal has been offered. This is because at that point the money used to purchase the animal is transferred to non-sacred status. However, before that point, merely contributing consecrated money is not considered misuse. If one mistakenly contributed his shekel from money used to redeem the fruits of the second tithe or from money from the permitted sale of produce grown during the Sabbatical Year, he must eat non-sacred fruits besides the ones he already possesses, corresponding to the value of the shekel, and he must treat them with the sanctity of second tithes or Sabbatical Year fruits.

With regard to one who gathers together small coins and said: These are for my shekel, and subsequently discovered that it amounted to more than a half-shekel. Beit Shammai say: The leftover coins are placed in the collection horn designated for a free-will offering, as the money is consecrated property but it does not have the status of a shekel. Beit Hillel say: The leftover money is non-sacred property since, ab initio, he had in mind to consecrate a half-shekel and no more. An item that was consecrated by mistake does not have the status of consecrated property. However, if he originally said: I am gathering together this money so that I will bring my shekel from these, they agree that the leftover money is non-sacred property. If one who was obligated to bring a sin-offering gathered together coins and said: These are for my sin-offering, then if he had accumulated more than was needed, they agree that the leftover money must be designated as a free-will offering. However, if he originally said: That I will bring my sin-offering from these, they agree that the leftover money is non-sacred property.

Rabbi Shimon said: What is the difference between shekels and a sin-offering? Why do Beit Hillel say that the leftover money is non-sacred property in the case of shekels, while with regard to a sin-offering they say that the leftover money is consecrated for a free-will offering? Rather, the issue is that shekels have a fixed value, a half-shekel and no more. Therefore, there is a clear amount beyond which one did not intend the money to become consecrated property. However, a sin-offering has no fixed value. Since the entire sum that one collected could have been used to purchase a sin-offering, whatever he didn’t use must at least be designated for a free-will offering. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even for shekels there is no real fixed value. For when the Jewish people ascended from the exile, they would contribute darics, which are Median coins worth two shekels by Torah law. They brought these coins with them and would give a half of one to fulfill their half-shekel obligation. Later on, when the Median Empire was dissolved, they reverted to contributing with a sela, a silver coin of equal weight to the the shekel mentioned in the Torah. People would contribute a half- sela for their half-shekel requirement. When the value of this currency changed later on, they reverted to contributing with a tiva, a different coin which is worth a half-shekel. Some people wished to contribute only dinars, which are half the value of the tiva, i.e., one quarter shekel in value. The Sages refused to accept it and required them to contribute at least the half-shekel mentioned in the Torah. Nevertheless, it is clear that the obligation of contributing shekels does not have a fixed value. Rabbi Shimon said in response: Even so, despite the fact that during different periods there were different amounts used to fulfill the obligation of the half-shekel, everyone has equal standing, i.e., at any particular time, everyone contributes the same amount. Therefore, any sum collected beyond that amount was not intended to be consecrated. However, a sin-offering has no fixed amount whatsoever; this person may bring an animal worth a sela, and that one may bring one worth two, and this one may bring one worth three. Therefore, it cannot be supposed that there was no intention to consecrate the whole sum.

The leftover money from what was set aside for shekels is non-sacred property, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel in the previous mishna. The mishna now discusses similar cases for other sacred items: However, with regard to the leftover money from what one set aside to purchase the tenth of an ephah of fine flour for a meal-offering and the leftover money from what one set aside to purchase offerings that he is liable to sacrifice due to ritual impurity or a sin, such as the pairs of birds of a zav, the pairs of birds of a zava, and the pairs of birds of a woman after childbirth, sin-offerings, or guilt-offerings, in these cases, its leftover money must be used for free-will offerings that are offered as repletion of the altar, i.e., burnt-offerings sacrificed at times when the altar was idle. This is the principle: Whatever money is designated for a sin-offering or for a guilt-offering, its leftover money must be used for a free-will offering. The leftover money from what one set aside to purchase a burnt-offering that he owes, due to a vow or to volunteering, must be used for another burnt-offering that he will bring in the future. The leftover money from what one set aside to purchase fine flour for a meal-offering must be used for another meal-offering. The leftover money from what one set aside to purchase a peace-offering must be used for another peace-offering. The leftover money from what one set aside to purchase a lamb for his Paschal lamb is not used for another Paschal lamb, such as for the following year. Rather, it is used for purchasing a peace-offering. The leftover money from what one set aside to purchase sacrifices for a number of nazirites must be used to purchase sacrifices for other nazirites. The leftover money from what a single nazirite set aside for his own offering must be used for a free-will offering. The leftover money collected for freeing unspecified captives must be allocated to freeing captives. The leftover money collected for freeing a specific captive is given as a gift to that captive. The leftover money collected as charity for the poor must be allocated to the poor. The leftover money collected for a specific poor person is given as a gift to that poor person. The leftover money collected for burying the dead must be allocated to burying the dead. The leftover money collected to bury or provide burial shrouds for a particular deceased person is given to his heirs. Rabbi Meir says: It is uncertain what should be done, and therefore the leftover money for the deceased should be placed in a safe place until Elijah comes and teaches what should be done. Rabbi Natan says: With the leftover money collected for a deceased person they build a monument [ nefesh ] on his grave for him.

Chapter 3

On three occasions during the year the ceremony of the collection of the Temple treasury chamber is performed. During the ceremony, a priest enters the treasury chamber with three containers, lifts up [ torem ] some of the coins, and places them in the containers. These funds, known as the collection of the chamber, are used to purchase animals for communal offerings and other needs of the Temple. These three occasions are: Half a month, fifteen days, before Passover, on the day before the first of the month of Nisan; half a month before Shavuot, on or around the twentieth of Iyar; half a month before the festival of Sukkot, on the day before Rosh HaShana. These three days are also the due dates that were established by the Sages for the setting aside of animal tithes. On each of these days one is obligated to tithe the animals that were born during the intervening period, and it is prohibited for him to eat or sell them until he does so. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Ben Azzai says that the dates established by the Sages for the setting aside of animal tithes are the twenty-ninth of Adar, the first of Sivan, and the twenty-ninth of Av. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say that the dates for the animal tithes are the first of Nisan, the first of Sivan, and the twenty-ninth of Elul. And why did Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say the twenty-ninth of Elul and not the first of Tishrei, as they said the first of Nisan and Sivan? Because the first of Tishrei is the festival of Rosh HaShana, and it is not permitted to tithe on a Festival. Therefore, the Sages advanced the day of tithing the animals born over the course of the summer to the twenty-ninth of Elul.

The funds are collected from the Temple treasury chamber with three baskets, each measuring three se’a. On the baskets is written, respectively, alef, beit, gimmel, based on the order in which the baskets are filled, to indicate from which basket coins should be taken to buy sacrifices. The coins were used in the order of their collection. Rabbi Yishmael says: The letters written on them were in Greek, alfa, beta, gamma. The one who collects the funds from the chamber must not enter while wearing a cuffed garment [ ḥafut ], and not with a shoe, and not with a sandal, and not with phylacteries, and not with an amulet, since all of these have places into which money can be inserted. The concern is that perhaps the one collecting the funds will one day become poor, and people will say that it is because of the sin of stealing the shekels of the chamber that he became poor, as they will suspect that he stole money and hid it in those places. Or perhaps he will become rich and people will say that he became rich from stealing the funds of the chamber, even though he did not actually do so. Even though one should not suspect someone of stealing consecrated shekels, the one collecting the funds from the chamber must nevertheless take these precautions, as a person must appear justified before people just as he must appear justified before the Omnipresent [ HaMakom ], and it is stated: “And you shall be guiltless before the Lord and before Israel” (Numbers 32:22). From here it may be inferred that it is not enough to be innocent before God; one must also be innocent before the Jewish people. Even in situations where there is little concern that one may commit a sin, the proper course is to remain above any possible suspicion of misconduct. And the verse states: “So shall you find grace and good understanding in the sight of God and man” (Proverbs 3:4).

In order to indicate the importance that was attached to the ceremony of the collection of the Temple treasury chamber, the mishna relates that the members of the house of Rabban Gamliel desired that their shekels be the ones collected from the chamber and used for the purchase of the communal offerings. Each of them would therefore come to the Temple specifically on the day of the ceremony of the collection of the chamber, enter the chamber with his shekel between his fingers, and toss it in front of the one collecting the money so that he would see it and place it in the basket containing the money to be taken out of the chamber. Understanding what was happening, the one collecting the money from the chamber would purposely push this shekel into the basket, so that it would later be used to buy communal offerings. The one collecting the funds from the chamber may not begin to collect the money until he asks the Temple treasurers three times: Shall I collect the funds, and they say to him: Collect them, collect them, collect them, three times.

The coins were stored in the Temple treasury in three large baskets, each measuring nine se’a. In the collection of the chamber ceremony, coins were removed from these baskets and placed in smaller baskets of three se’a each that were marked with letters (see the previous mishna on daf 8a). After he collected the funds from the first large basket and put them into one of the smaller baskets labeled with the letter alef, he immediately covered with a leather cover the large basket from which he had removed the money. After collecting funds from the second large basket, he covered it with a leather cover as well. But after collecting funds from the third large basket, he did not cover it. The mishna asks: Why did he cover the first two baskets? In order to mark them as already having had funds collected from them. In this way, there was no concern that perhaps he would forget and once again collect funds from a basket from which funds had already been collected. The mishna specifies the intent of the one collecting the funds from the baskets as he does so: He collected funds from the first basket on behalf of the people living in Eretz Yisrael; from the second basket on behalf of the people living in the cities near Eretz Yisrael; and from the third basket on behalf of the people living in Babylonia, and on behalf of the people living in Media, and on behalf of the people living in the distant countries.

Chapter 4

At certain times of the year, half-shekels that had been donated to the Temple and stored in a chamber in the Temple were collected in order to be used for various purposes. The mishna asks: The collection of half-shekels, what would they do with it? They would purchase animals for the daily offerings, which were offered each morning and afternoon; and for the additional offerings, which were offered on Shabbat, the New Moon, and Festivals; and wine for their libations; barley for the omer meal-offering; and wheat for both the two loaves offered on Shavuot and the shewbread; and animals for all the communal offerings. § The guards of the sefiḥin, grain that grew without being purposely planted, during the Sabbatical Year, ensured that people did not take this ownerless grain, so that it remained available to be used for the omer and the offering of the two loaves. They collect their wages from the collection of the Temple treasury chamber. Rabbi Yosei says: One who so desires may even volunteer his services and guard the grain as an unpaid bailee. The Rabbis said to him: Even you must say that the omer and the two loaves come only from communal funds and not from any one individual. If one were to volunteer his services, he would acquire the grain for himself by guarding it and transporting it to the Temple. In that case, these offerings would have come from an individual. So that the offerings come solely from communal funds, the guards must receive payment from the half-shekels removed from the chamber.

The red heifer, the scapegoat, and the strip of crimson wool used in the process of burning the red heifer all come from the collection of the Temple treasury chamber, despite the fact that they are not sacrificial offerings. The same is true for the ramp built from the Temple Mount to the location on the Mount of Olives, where they would slaughter the red heifer; the ramp built to lead the scapegoat out of the city; the strip of crimson wool that was tied between its horns; any repairs required for the aqueduct that ran through the Temple courtyard and the walls of the city and its towers; and for all the needs of the city, such as street repairs, security, and the like. All of these come from the remains of the chamber, i.e., from the money that remained in the chamber after the three collections of money were taken to use for communal offerings. Abba Shaul says: The High Priests construct the ramp for the red heifer from their own funds.

What would they do with the leftover remains of the chamber after all the items mentioned above had been attended to? They would purchase wine, oil, and fine flour and sell them to those who needed them for their private offerings. And the profit from these sales would go to consecrated property, i.e., to the Temple treasury; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: One may not generate profit by selling consecrated property, neither may one profit from funds set aside for the poor.

What would they do with the leftover funds of the collection that had not been spent on communal offerings? They would purchase golden plates as a coating for the walls and floor of the Holy of Holies. Rabbi Yishmael says: The leftover produce was used to purchase the repletion of the altar, i.e., burnt-offerings sacrificed at times when the altar was idle. The leftover funds of the collection were used to purchase sacred vessels. Rabbi Akiva says: The leftover funds of the collection were used to purchase the animals used for the repletion of the altar, since they had originally been collected for offerings. The leftover libations were used to purchase sacred vessels. Rabbi Ḥananya, the deputy [ segan ] High Priest, says: The leftover libations were used to purchase animals for the repletion of the altar, while the leftover funds of the collection were used to purchase sacred vessels. Both this Sage, Rabbi Akiva, and that Sage, Rabbi Ḥananya, did not agree with Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion with regard to the leftover produce.

The leftover incense from one year could not be used the following year, as it had been purchased with the shekels collected for the previous year. What would be done with it in order to make it usable? The Temple treasurers would set aside an amount of it equal to the value of the wages of the artisans who worked in the Temple. They would then desacralize that incense by transferring its sanctity to the money owed to the artisans. They would then give the incense to the artisans as their wages. Finally, they would return and buy back the incense from the artisans with funds from the new collection of shekels. If the new funds come on time, i.e., by the beginning of Nisan, they purchase the incense with funds from the new collection of shekels. And if not, they may still purchase it from the old collection, and it is valid.

One who consecrates all his possessions without specifying for what purpose, his possessions are consecrated for Temple maintenance. And if among them there are items that are suitable for use as communal offerings, which may not be used for the maintenance of the Temple but only for sacrificial purposes, what is done with those items to remove their consecration for Temple maintenance, in order that they may be reconsecrated for sacrificial use? They are given to Temple artisans as their wages, and thereby they are desacralized; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Ben Azzai said to him: This is not the method to be used. Rather, the same method that is used to desacralize the leftover incense, as is described in the previous mishna, should also be used here, i.e., they set aside from the consecrated items the equivalent of the value owed to the artisans for their wages, and they desacralize them by transferring their sanctity onto the money allocated for the artisans’ wages, and then they give those items, which are no longer consecrated, to the artisans as their wages. According to both opinions, once the desacralized items are in the possession of the artisans, one of Temple treasurers should repurchase those items using money from that year’s new collection of half-shekels, consecrating them for sacrificial use during the coming year.

In the case of one who consecrates all his possessions without specifying for what purpose, and among them there is an animal that is suitable to be sacrificed on the altar, male or female, what should be done with it? Rabbi Eliezer says: Since he did not specify otherwise, everything is consecrated for Temple maintenance. Therefore, any males should be sold for the needs of burnt-offerings, i.e., to individuals who will sacrifice them as such. And any females, since they cannot be brought as burnt-offerings, should be sold for the needs of peace-offerings, i.e., to individuals who will sacrifice them as such. And their monetary value that is received from their sale is allocated with the rest of his property for Temple maintenance. Rabbi Yehoshua says: Although he did not specify for what purpose he consecrated his possessions, it may be assumed that he intended the animals to be consecrated as burnt-offerings. Therefore, any males should themselves be sacrificed as burnt-offerings, and any females, since they cannot be brought as burnt-offerings, should be sold for the needs of peace-offerings, i.e., to individuals who will sacrifice them as such, and their monetary value that is received from their sale should be used to purchase and bring burnt-offerings. According to both opinions, the rest of the possessions, which are not suitable for sacrificial use, are allocated for Temple maintenance. Rabbi Akiva said: I see the statement of Rabbi Eliezer as more correct than the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, since Rabbi Eliezer applied his method equally to both animals and other possessions in treating both as consecrated for Temple maintenance, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua made a distinction between them. Rabbi Papeyyas said: I heard the statements of both of them applied to different situations: One who consecrates all his possessions and explicitly states that his animals are to be included, clearly intends to equate his animals with the rest of his possessions, that both should be consecrated for the same purpose, i.e., for Temple maintenance. Therefore, he should act in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

However, with regard to one who consecrates all his possessions without explicitly specifying that this includes his animals, since there is no reason to presume that he wishes them all to be consecrated for the same purpose, it is presumed that each item is consecrated for the purpose most suited to it. Therefore, he should act in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua. In the case of one who consecrates all his possessions, and among them there were items that are suitable to be sacrificed on the altar, such as wines for libations, and oils for meal-offerings, and birds, e.g., turtledoves or young pigeons, Rabbi Eliezer says: They are sold for the needs of that kind of item, i.e., to individuals who will use them as such. And he should bring with their monetary value that is received from their sale burnt-offerings. And the rest of the possessions are allocated for Temple maintenance.

Once every thirty days, the prices at which the Temple supplies such as wine, flour, or oil will be purchased are set for the Temple chamber. This set price is implemented in the following way: Any merchant who undertakes to provide fine flour after the chamber set a price of four se’a per sela, even if the general market price rose and stood at three se’a per sela, he must provide fine flour based on the set price of four se’a per sela. However, if the chamber’s set price was three se’a per sela, and the general market price fell to four se’a per sela, he must now provide fine flour based on the new market price of four se’a per sela. This is in order that the Temple treasury of consecrated property always has the upper hand. If the fine flour became wormy, it became wormy for the merchant, i.e., he bears the loss of the ruined fine flour and must provide new fine flour in its place. Similarly, if the wine turned to vinegar, it turned to vinegar for the merchant. This is because the merchant only receives, i.e., earns, his money once the altar is satisfied, i.e., the transaction is only realized once the items have been sacrificed on the altar.

Chapter 5

These are the officials who served in specific positions in the Temple: Yoḥanan ben Pineḥas was responsible for the seals. One who paid for a specific type of sacrificial item received a seal, which he presented to the Temple official in exchange for that item. Aḥiyya was responsible for the libations, i.e., the wine, oil, and flour prepared with the level of ritual purity necessary for the libation offerings and the meal-offerings, which accompanied many animal offerings. Aḥiyya supplied the libations to those who presented the appropriate seal. Matya ben Shmuel was responsible for the lotteries, which were used to select priests for the various Temple services each day. Petaḥya was responsible for the pairs of birds, i.e., the turtledoves or pigeons, brought by a zav, a zava, a woman after childbirth, and a leper. They placed the appropriate sum of money into the horn designated for this purpose, and each day Petaḥya oversaw the purchase of birds from that money and their sacrifice in the proper manner. Incidentally, the Gemara mentions: Petaḥya is Mordecai from the book of Esther. And why was he called Petaḥya, which resembles the word for opening [ petaḥ ]? The reason is that he would open, i.e., elucidate, difficult topics and interpret them to the people, and because he knew all seventy languages known at the time. The mishna resumes the list of officials. Ben Aḥiyya was responsible for the care of the priests who suffered from intestinal disease. Neḥunya was the well digger for pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem for the Festivals. Gevini was the Temple crier who would awaken the priests and the Levites for their Temple duties. Ben Gever was responsible for locking the Temple gates in the evening and for unlocking them in the morning. Ben Bevai was appointed over the shreds of garments, which were formed into wicks for the Temple candelabra. He also supervised the twisting of those wicks into the appropriate thickness for the various nights during the different seasons of the year. Ben Arza was responsible for the cymbal, which was rung as a signal that the Levites should commence their song. Hugras ben Levi was responsible for the song. He taught and conducted the singers in the Temple. The house of Garmu was responsible for the preparation of the shewbread; the house of Avtinas was responsible for the preparation of the incense; and Elazar was responsible for weaving the Temple curtains; and Pineḥas was the valet, who assisted the priests in fitting their clothes and dressing themselves for their Temple service.

There must be no fewer than seven trustees [ amarkolin ] and three treasurers appointed over the Temple administration. And we do not appoint an authority over the public comprised of fewer than two people, except for ben Aḥiyya, who was responsible for healing priests who suffered from intestinal disease, and Elazar, who was responsible for the weaving of the Temple curtains. The reason for these exceptions is that the majority of the public accepted these men upon themselves as officials who served without the assistance of even a single partner.

This mishna provides details of the functions performed by Yoḥanan ben Pineḥas and Aḥiyya, the officials mentioned in the first mishna of this chapter, which concerns the seals and libations. There were four seals in the Temple that confirmed that the bearer had paid for the libations that accompanied his offering. And one of the following inscriptions was written on them: Calf; male, i.e., a ram; kid; and sinner, i.e., a leper, as leprosy is a punishment for one of seven sins (see Arakhin 16a). Conversely, ben Azzai says: There were five seals, and the following was written upon them in Aramaic, not Hebrew: Calf, male, kid, poor sinner, and rich sinner. The mishna explains the significance of each of the four aforementioned seals. The calf seal serves as a payment receipt for libations of cattle offerings, whether they are large or small, male or female, as all offerings from the cow family are accompanied by the same libation. The kid seal serves for libations of sheep or goat offerings, whether large or small, male or female, except for those of rams aged thirteen months and older. The ram seal, which was earlier called the male seal, serves exclusively for ram libations. The sinner seal serves for libations of the three animal offerings of a leper, for the completion of his purification.

One who seeks libations for his offering goes to Yoḥanan, the official who was responsible for the seals, and gives him the appropriate sum of money and receives a seal from him. With that seal he subsequently comes to Aḥiyya, who was responsible for the libations, and gives him Yoḥanan’s seal and receives his libations from him. In the evening, Yoḥanan and Aḥiyya would get together to reconcile their accounts, and Aḥiyya would take out the seals he had received and accept the money Yoḥanan had received in exchange for them. If the money was less than the value of the seals, they were less to him, i.e., Yoḥanan would bear the loss, and Yoḥanan would have to pay the difference to the Temple treasury from his own property. And if there was some money left over, i.e., the total money was greater than the value of the seals, they were left over to the benefit of the Temple treasury of consecrated property, as the Temple treasury always has the upper hand.

With regard to one who lost his seal that he purchased from Yoḥanan, Yoḥanan and Aḥiyya would wait to resolve his problem until the evening. And when they added their accounts in the evening, if they found for him a surplus of money equivalent to the value of his seal, they would give him the corresponding libations. And if not, they would not give him libations. And the name of the day of the week was written upon the seals because of the cheats. They might try to use old seals that had been lost by the Temple officials or by someone who had brought an offering at an earlier date, so as to receive libations in a deceitful manner.

There were two special chambers in the Temple, one called the chamber of secret gifts and the other one called the chamber of vessels. The mishna explains the purpose of these chambers. In the chamber of secret gifts, sin-fearing people put money secretly and poor people of noble descent support themselves from it secretly. With regard to the chamber of vessels, anyone who donates a vessel to the Temple drops it inside that chamber, and once every thirty days the treasurers open it. And any vessel that they found for it a use for Temple maintenance, they leave it for that purpose, and the rest are sold, and their monetary value is allocated to Temple maintenance.

Chapter 6

There were thirteen collection horns, narrow at the top and wide at the bottom, into which were placed the shekels that were collected for the various needs of the Temple. There were also thirteen tables for various purposes, and thirteen prostrations in the Temple. The members of the household of Rabban Gamliel and the members of the household of Rabbi Ḥananya, the deputy High Priest, would prostrate themselves in fourteen places. And where was this extra location? It was facing the wood depository, as there was a tradition handed down to them from their fathers that the Ark was sequestered there.

The mishna relates that there was an incident involving a certain priest who was going about his duties and saw a certain flagstone that was different from the others. He noticed that one of the stones was slightly raised above the others, indicating that it had been removed and returned to its place. The priest understood that this was the opening to an underground tunnel where the Ark was concealed. He came and said to his fellow that he had noticed this deviation in the floor. He did not manage to conclude relating the incident before his soul left him, i.e., he died. Following this event, they knew with certainty that the Ark was sequestered there and that God had prevented that priest from revealing its location.

The previous mishna mentioned that there were thirteen prostrations in the Temple. Where were these prostrations? There were four in the north of the courtyard, four in the south, three in the east and two in the west, as the thirteen prostrations were facing the thirteen gates of the Temple courtyard. The thirteen gates were as follows: The southern ones, listed in order, beginning with the one adjacent to the western side, were the Upper Gate, and the topography of the courtyard was such that there was an incline on the east-west plane, therefore the gate farthest to the west was higher than the other gates; the Gate of Kindling, through which the priests would bring the wood for the arrangement of fire on top of the altar; the Gate of the Firstborn, through which priests would bring the ritually pure firstborn animals to be sacrificed, as it is permitted to slaughter firstborn animals on the southern side of the courtyard; and the Gate of Water. The mishna elaborates: And why was it named the Gate of Water? Since through it they would bring in the vial of water for the water libation on the festival of Sukkot, as they would ceremoniously draw the water from the Pool of Siloam and bring it to the altar through this gate. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: There was a different reason for this name. It was called the Gate of Water because through it the water would trickle [ mefakim ], and in the future this water will increase and go out from under the threshold of the House. Facing these gates were the ones in the north, listed in order from the one closest to the west: The Gate of Jeconiah; the Gate of the Offering, through which they would bring the offerings of the most sacred order, as these could be slaughtered only in the northern part of the courtyard; the Gate of Women, where women would enter the courtyard to place their hands on the heads of their offerings; and the Gate of Song, through which they would bring the musical instruments into the courtyard. The mishna asks: And why was it called the Gate of Jeconiah? The reason is that through it Jeconiah went out to his exile. Before Jeconiah was exiled by Nebuchadnezzar to Babylon he came to take leave of the Temple, and he left through this gate. The mishna resumes the list with the gates that are in the east: the Gate of Nicanor, which was named after Nicanor, who brought the doors of this gate from Egypt (see Yoma 38a). And the Gate of Nicanor had two wickets [ pishpeshin ], one on its right and one on its left. And there were two gates in the west that did not have a name, making a total of thirteen gates.

This mishna details the exact location and purpose of the thirteen tables in the Temple. There were thirteen tables in the Temple. Eight of them were made of marble and were located in the slaughtering area, north of the altar, where the priests would slaughter the offerings of the most sacred order. Upon these tables they would wash the innards of the offerings, as the marble was cool and preserved the freshness of the meat. And there were two more tables on the western side of the ramp, south of the altar, one of marble and one of silver.On the table of marble they would place the limbs before they were sacrificed, and from there the priests would bring them up to the altar. On the table made of silver they would place the ninety-three sacred vessels brought out from the Chamber of Vessels each morning for the services of that day. And there were two tables in the Entrance Hall to the Sanctuary, on the inside of the Entrance Hall, near the opening to the Temple, one of marble and one of gold. On the table of marble they would put the shewbread before its entrance to the Sanctuary after it was baked on the eve of Shabbat. And they would place the old shewbread on the table of gold upon its exit from the Sanctuary, to be divided among the priests. The reason the shewbread was placed on a marble table before being brought into the Sanctuary and on a golden one upon when removed from there is that one elevates to a higher level in matters of sanctity and one does not downgrade. Since it had been placed on the golden Shewbread table all week inside the Sanctuary, upon its removal it could not be derogated to a marble table and so was placed on a different golden table in the Entrance Hall. Finally, there was one table of gold inside the Sanctuary, i.e. the Shewbread table, upon which the shewbread was placed always.

There were thirteen collection horns in the Temple, and the intended use of the funds was written upon each one, as follows: New shekels, old shekels, pairs of birds, fledglings designated for burnt-offerings, wood for the arrangement on the altar, frankincense that accompanied meal-offerings, and gold donated for the Ark cover. The remaining six horns were designated for communal free-will offerings. The horn labeled new shekels was designated for the half-shekel donation that was brought every year for the needs of that year. The horn labeled old shekels was for one who did not bring his half-shekel the previous year, who would contribute his shekel for the following year. The funds in the horn labeled pairs of birds are designated for the turtledoves used for bird-offerings, and the one labeled fledglings for burnt-offerings are used to purchase young pigeons as burnt-offerings. All of these, i.e., the funds in both horns, were used exclusively for voluntary burnt-offerings. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: The funds in both the horn labeled pairs of birds and the horn labeled fledglings were for young pigeons and turtledoves. The distinction between them is that the funds in the horn labeled pairs of birds were designated for the obligatory offerings of a zav, a zava, a woman after childbirth, and a leper. These offerings included a pair of birds, one brought for a sin-offering, and the other one brought for a burnt-offering. Conversely, the funds in the horn labeled fledglings for burnt-offerings were all used exclusively for voluntary burnt-offerings.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate wood to the Temple, must donate no fewer than two logs for the arrangement on the altar. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate frankincense, must donate no less than a handful of frankincense, the amount brought with a meal-offering. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate gold, must donate no less than a dinar of gold. It was stated that six horns were designated for communal free-will offerings. The Mishna asks: With regard to the money designated for communal free-will offerings, what would they do with this money? The Mishna answers that they used it to purchase animals for burnt-offerings, as the meat from these offerings was offered on the altar to God and the hides were given to the priests. This midrash was taught by Jehoiada the High Priest: There is an apparent contradiction between two verses. With regard to the guilt-offering, the verse states: “It is a guilt-offering; he is certainly guilty before the Lord” (Leviticus 5:19). This verse indicates that the guilt-offering goes to God, not the priests. However, a different verse states: “As is the sin-offering, so is the guilt-offering; there is one law for them; the priest who makes atonement with it, he shall have it” (Leviticus 7:7). This verse indicates that the offering is designated for the priests alone. How can these two verses be reconciled? The Mishna explains that this is the principle: Any funds that come due to a sin-offering or due to a guilt-offering, i.e., leftover coins designated for one of these offerings, they should be used for the purchase of animals for a voluntary burnt-offering, as the meat will be offered on the altar to God, and the hides will go to the priests. In this manner the two verses are found to be fulfilled, as it is both a guilt-offering to God as well as a guilt-offering to the priest. And this halakha also explains the verse that says: “The guilt-offering money and the sin-offering money was not brought into the House of the Lord; it was for the priests” (II Kings 12:17). This verse is understood to refer to the hides given to the priests.

Chapter 7

If money was found on the floor of the Temple between one of the collection horns marked shekels and the collection horn marked free-will offerings, that is to say, between the first and the thirteenth collection horns, in which funds contributed to the Temple were stored, the following distinctions apply: If the money was found closer to the horn marked shekels, it is allocated to the shekels; if it was found closer to the horn marked free-will offerings, it is allocated to free-will offerings; and if it was equidistant from the horn marked shekels and the horn marked free-will offerings, it is allocated to free-will offerings. If the money was found between the horn marked wood and the horn marked frankincense, that is, between the fifth and sixth horns, if it was closer to the horn marked wood, it is allocated to wood; if it was closer to the horn marked frankincense, it is allocated to frankincense; and if it was found equidistant from both, it is allocated to frankincense. If the money was found between the horn marked pairs of bird-offerings and the horn marked doves for burnt-offerings, i.e., between the third and the fourth horns, if it is closer to the horn marked pairs of bird-offerings, it is allocated to pairs of bird-offerings; if it was found closer to the horn marked doves for burnt-offerings, it is allocated to doves for burnt-offerings; and if it was found equidistant from both, it is allocated to doves for burnt-offerings. And similarly, if money was found anywhere else between a container for ordinary, non-sacred money and one containing second-tithe money, the following distinctions apply: If the money was found closer to the non-sacred money, it is allocated to the non-sacred money; if it was found closer to second-tithe money, it is allocated to second-tithe money; and if it was found equidistant from both, it is allocated to second-tithe money. This is the principle: In cases of doubt, the ruling follows whichever is closer, even if this involves being lenient, but if the money was found equidistant from both, the ruling follows whichever allocation involves being stringent.

This mishna considers other situations in which something is found and its source is unknown. Money found before animal merchants in Jerusalem is always presumed to be second- tithe money. The presumption is based on the fact that in Jerusalem, most of the animals are bought with second-tithe money and sacrificed as peace-offerings. And money found on the Temple Mount is presumed to be non-sacred money. And with regard to money found in the rest of Jerusalem, the following distinction applies: If it was found during the rest of the days of the year, it is presumed to be non-sacred money, but if it was found during the time of a pilgrim Festival, it is all presumed to be second- tithe money, because most of the money found in Jerusalem at the time of a Festival is second-tithe money.

The mishna continues: With regard to meat that was found in the Temple courtyard, and it is not known from whence it came, the halakha is as follows: If it is whole limbs of the animal, in the manner that burnt-offerings are brought to the altar, it is presumed to be burnt-offerings. And if it is in small pieces, it is presumed to be sin-offerings. And if the meat, in whatever form, is found in the city of Jerusalem, as opposed to the courtyard, it is presumed to be the meat of peace-offerings, as most of the meat in Jerusalem is the meat of peace-offerings. Since it is possible that the time during which it is permitted to eat any of it has already passed, both this and that, whether it is determined to be the meat of burnt-offerings or the meat of peace-offerings, its form must be allowed to decay, i.e., it must be left until it is definitely disqualified, and then it must be taken out to the place of burning, where offerings that have become disqualified are burned. With regard to meat found in the outlying areas, outside of Jerusalem, if it is in the form of whole limbs, the meat presumably comes from carcasses of animals that were not properly slaughtered, for meat unfit for eating was generally cut up into full limbs, to be fed to dogs or sold to gentiles. But if it is in small pieces, it is presumably kosher and permitted to be eaten, as kosher meat was ordinarily cut up into small pieces. And if meat is found at the time of a Festival, when meat is plentiful, so that it is generally not cut up into small pieces, then even whole limbs are permitted to be eaten.

If an animal that is fit for the altar was found straying, from Jerusalem and as far as Migdal Eder, and similarly if it was found within that distance from Jerusalem in any other direction, it is presumed that the animal came from Jerusalem. Most of the animals in Jerusalem were designated for offerings, and presumably this one was as well. Males are presumed to be burnt-offerings, as only males are brought as burnt-offerings. Females are presumed to be peace-offerings, as it is permitted to bring a female peace-offering. Rabbi Yehuda says: An animal that is fit for the Paschal offering, i.e., a one-year-old male lamb or kid, is presumed to be a Paschal offering, provided that it was found within thirty days before the Festival of Passover.

Originally, the court would seize collateral from one who found such an animal, as security until he would bring with it the libations associated with this offering, as if the found animal were his own and he had committed himself to bring the libations. This brought about a situation in which those who found the animals began leaving them where they found them, and absconding, so as not to become liable for the libations. The court therefore instituted that the libations accompanying these offerings would come from public funds, that is, from the Temple treasury.

Rabbi Shimon said: The court instituted seven ordinances with regard to the financial aspects of offerings and consecrations. And this ordinance, namely, that the cost of the libations accompanying the sacrifice of a found animal is borne by the public, is one of them. These are the other ordinances: If a gentile sent his burnt-offering from abroad, outside Eretz Yisrael, and he sent with it money for the purchase of the libations that must accompany it, the libations are offered at his expense. And if the gentile did not cover the cost of the libations, it is a condition of the court that the libations are sacrificed at the public’s expense, with funds taken from the Temple treasury. And likewise, in the case of a convert who died without heirs and left animals that he had designated as offerings. If he has the libations, i.e., if he also had set aside libations or money for that purpose, the libations are sacrificed from his estate. And if he did not do so, the libations are sacrificed from public funds. And another ordinance: It is a condition of the court with regard to a High Priest who died, and a new High Priest had not yet been appointed in his place, that his meal-offering, i.e., the griddle-cake offering that the High Priest would bring each day from one-tenth of an ephah of flour, would be sacrificed from public funds. Rabbi Yehuda says: It was brought from the property of the High Priest’s heirs, i.e., his estate, and not from public funds. In any event, the offering was not brought as it would have been brought by the High Priest himself were he still alive, half in the morning and half in the evening, but rather it was sacrificed all at once, from a whole one-tenth of an ephah.

The fourth ordinance was about the salt in the Temple that was designated for salting the offerings, and the fifth was about the wood that was used for the burning of the offerings. These ordinances decreed that the priests may use them also to prepare the meat of the offerings that they eat. And the sixth ordinance concerned the red heifer: that deriving benefit from its ashes is not considered misusing consecrated property. And the seventh ordinance was about disqualified pairs of bird-offerings: It ruled that their replacements should come from public funds. Rabbi Yosei disagreed and says: The expense does not fall upon the public, but rather upon whoever supplies all the pairs of bird-offerings to the Temple; he must also supply, at no additional charge, the replacements for the disqualified birds.

Chapter 8

The mishna discusses the ritual purity of items found either in the Temple or in Jerusalem and its environs, in continuation of the previous chapter’s discussion of found money, animals, or meat. All the spittle that is found in Jerusalem is ritually pure. Since neither ritually impure people nor gentiles were commonly present in Jerusalem, the Sages decreed an exception to the rule that spittle that is found is ritually impure since it presumably comes from one of those groups. This is the case except for spittle found in the upper marketplace, where gentiles and ritually impure Jews were likely to be present. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: On all the other days of the year, i.e., any day that is not on one of the three pilgrim Festivals, Passover, Shavuot, and Sukkot, spittle that is found in the middle of the street is ritually impure, and spittle that is found on the sides of the street is ritually pure. According to Rabbi Yosei, it was common for people who were ritually impure to be present in the streets of Jerusalem. They would be careful to walk in the middle of the street, while the ritually pure who wished to remain so would walk on the sides. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that spittle found in the middle of the street is from one who is impure, while spittle found on the side of the street is from one who is pure. But during the time of the Festival, when most of the people in Jerusalem were there for the Festival and were ritually pure, the spittle found in the middle of the street was ritually pure, and that found on the sides of the street was ritually impure. The difference is due to the fact that at the time of the Festival, the ritually impure minority moves to the sides of the streets.

The mishna continues: All the vessels that are found in Jerusalem on the way down into the bathhouse, wherein one purifies vessels in a ritual bath, are ritually impure, and those that are found on the way up are ritually pure. The mishna explains: Their descent into the bathhouse is not by the same route as their ascent out of it, and it can be assumed that those found on the way down have not yet been immersed, while those found on the way up have been. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. However, Rabbi Yosei says: They are all ritually pure, except for the basket, and the shovel, and the meritza, which are specifically used for graves, to gather up the bones of the dead. These tools must be presumed to be ritually impure, but in general, vessels are presumed to be pure.

The mishna continues with another ruling about ritual purity: One may slaughter immediately with a knife that was found on the fourteenth of Nisan, i.e., the day the Paschal lamb is slaughtered, and need not be concerned that it is ritually impure. Presumably it was immersed the day before so that it could be used to slaughter the Paschal offering. If he found it on the thirteenth of Nisan, he immerses it again. Perhaps its owners had not yet immersed it, since they still had time to do so before the evening. If one finds a cleaver [ kofitz ], which is used to slaughter an animal and break its bones, whether it was on this day, i.e., the fourteenth, or on that day, i.e., the thirteenth, he immerses it again out of doubt. Since breaking the bones of the Paschal lamb is prohibited, its owners would have no need for it on the fourteenth, and it cannot be presumed that it has already been immersed to make it ritually pure. However, if the fourteenth occurs on Shabbat, he may slaughter with the cleaver immediately. Since immersing a vessel is prohibited on Shabbat, and presumably the owner of the cleaver wants it to be ritually pure on the fifteenth, one can assume that he immersed it already on Friday, the thirteenth of Nisan. It is therefore ritually pure. If the cleaver was found on the fifteenth of Nisan, i.e., if it was found on the Festival itself, he may slaughter with it immediately. The owners of the cleaver would have immersed it so that they could use it on the fifteenth to cut up the bones of a Festival peace-offering. If the cleaver was found attached to a knife, it is like a knife, i.e., if it was found on the thirteenth of Nisan it is presumed impure, and if it was found on the fourteenth he may slaughter with it immediately, as it was certainly immersed on the day before.

With regard to a curtain that became ritually impure from a secondary source of impurity, since its ritual impurity is by rabbinic law and not Torah law, there is no need to remove it from the Temple. Rather, it is immersed inside the Temple. And if it were removed to outside the courtyard in order to immerse it, it can be brought back into the courtyard immediately. Since it is ritually impure only by rabbinic law, there is no need to wait until sunset before returning it. But if it became impure from a primary source of impurity, e.g., it came into contact with the carcass of one of the eight creeping animals that confer impurity by Torah law, it is immersed outside the courtyard and is spread out to dry on the rampart. This is the low wall surrounding the Temple courtyard and the buildings within it, which has a lower level of holiness than the courtyard. The reason for this policy is because the sun needs to set on it. Immersion does not confer ritual purity on an item that became impure by Torah law until after the sun has set. And if this curtain were new, it is spread out to dry on top of the bench [ itztabba ], a prominent place on the Temple Mount, so that the people will see its craftsmanship and perceive its beauty.

The Gemara discusses the aforementioned curtain that separated the Holy of Holies from the Sanctuary. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon the son of the deputy High Priest: The curtain has the thickness of a handbreadth, and it is woven from seventy-two strands of yarn. And each and every strand from those seventy-two is made from twenty-four threads. The curtain was made from four materials: Sky-blue wool, purple wool, scarlet wool, and fine linen, and a strand was made up of six threads of each type of material. And with regard to the dimensions of the curtain, its length was forty cubits, as the height of the ceiling of the Sanctuary; and its width was twenty cubits, to match the width of the entrance; and it was made from eighty-two ten-thousands, i.e., 820,000 golden dinar. And they used to make two new curtains every year. And the curtain was so heavy that they needed three hundred priests to carry it when they would immerse it.

With regard to the flesh of offerings of the most sacred order that became impure, whether it became impure from a primary source of impurity or from a secondary source of impurity, whether it became impure inside the courtyard or outside, it must be burned. There is a dispute among the tanna’im with regard to where it is burned. Beit Shammai say: It all should be burned inside the Temple courtyard, except for that which became impure from a primary source of ritual impurity outside, as under such circumstances, it is not appropriate to bring it inside the Temple. Beit Hillel say: It all should be burned outside the Temple courtyard, except for that which became ritually impure by a secondary source of impurity inside. In such a case the flesh need not be removed from the courtyard and is burned there.

Rabbi Elazar says: Flesh from offerings of the most sacred order that became ritually impure from a primary source of ritual impurity, whether it became so inside the courtyard or outside, is burned outside. Since its ritual impurity is of the most stringent type, it is not to be brought into the courtyard, or allowed to remain there. However, an item that became ritually impure from a secondary source of ritual impurity, whether it became ritually impure outside or inside, is burned inside. Since its ritual impurity is of a lenient type, it can be brought into the courtyard in order to be burned. Rabbi Akiva says: The place of its impurity is where its burning should occur. Therefore, regardless of whether the source is primary or secondary, such flesh is burned wherever it presently is.

The limbs of the daily offering were not placed directly on the altar fire. Instead, after cutting up the offering, its limbs were placed first on the ramp of the altar, from the halfway point and below, on the lower sixteen cubits of the ramp, on its western side. Limbs of the additional offerings of the Shabbat and Festivals were placed on the ramp from the halfway point and below on its eastern side. Additional New Moon offerings were placed on top of the upper part of the edge [ karkov ] of the altar. Another law: The obligation to give half-shekels each year and to offer the first fruits is practiced only in the presence of the Temple, as fulfillment of these mitzvot is only possible then. But the mitzvot of produce tithes and grain tithes and of animal tithes and of the sanctified firstborn animals are practiced whether one is in the presence of the Temple, or one is not in the presence of the Temple. Although animal tithes and firstborn cannot be sacrificed without a Temple, once they develop a blemish, they may be eaten by their owners. If, in the present time when there is no Temple, one consecrates shekels for the mitzva of the half-shekel or fruits for the mitzva of first fruits, they are consecrated, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from them. Rabbi Shimon says: One who declared first fruits to be consecrated, in the present time, does not give them that status and they are not consecrated.

Mishnah Yoma

Chapter 1

Seven days prior to Yom Kippur the Sages would remove the High Priest, who performs the entire Yom Kippur service, from his house to the Chamber of Parhedrin, a room in the Temple designated specifically for the High Priest during that period. And they would designate another priest in his stead to replace him lest a disqualification due to impurity or another circumstance beyond his control prevent him from entering the Temple on Yom Kippur. Rabbi Yehuda says: The Sages would even designate another wife for him lest his wife die, as it is stated in the Torah portion of the Yom Kippur service: “And it will atone for him and for his house” (Leviticus 16:6); the Sages interpreted the term: His house, that is his wife. The priest must be married in order to fulfill this commandment. Due to the concern lest his wife die, another wife was designated to address that possibility. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: If so, that this is a concern, there is no end to the matter, as what if the designated replacement wife dies? This possibility need not be a source of concern.

During all seven days of the High Priest’s sequestering before Yom Kippur, he sprinkles the blood of the daily burnt-offering, and he burns the incense, and he removes the ashes of the lamps of the candelabrum, and he sacrifices the head and the hind leg of the daily offering. The High Priest performs these tasks in order to grow accustomed to the services that he will perform on Yom Kippur. On all the other days of the year, if the High Priest wishes to sacrifice any of the offerings, he sacrifices them, as the High Priest sacrifices any portion that he chooses first and takes any portion that he chooses first.

The Sages provided the High Priest with Elders selected from the Elders of the court, and they would read before him the order of the service of the day of Yom Kippur. And they would say to him: My Master, High Priest. Read the order of the service with your own mouth, as perhaps you forgot this reading or perhaps you did not learn to read. On Yom Kippur eve in the morning, the Elders stand him at the eastern gate of the courtyard and pass before him bulls and rams and sheep so that he will be familiar with the animals and grow accustomed to the service, as these were the animals sacrificed on Yom Kippur.

Throughout all the seven days that the High Priest was in the Parhedrin chamber, they would not withhold from him any food or drink that he desired. However, on Yom Kippur eve at nightfall, they would not allow him to eat a great deal because food induces sleep and they did not allow him to sleep, as will be explained.

The Elders of the court who read the order of the service of the day before the High Priest passed him to the Elders of the priesthood, and they took him up to the House of Avtinas. And they administered him an oath and took leave of him and went on their way. When they administered this oath they said to him: My Master, High Priest. We are agents of the court, and you are our agent and the agent of the court. We administer an oath to you in the name of Him who housed His name in this House, that you will not change even one matter from all that we have said to you with regard to the burning of the incense or any other service that you will perform when alone. After this oath, he would leave them and cry, and they would leave him and cry in sorrow that the oath was necessary.

They kept him occupied throughout the night to prevent him from sleeping. If he was a scholar, he would teach Torah. If he was not a scholar, Torah scholars would teach Torah before him. And if he was accustomed to read the Bible, he would read; and if he was not, they would read the Bible before him. And what books would they read before him to pique his interest so that he would not fall asleep? They would read from Job, and from Ezra, and from Chronicles. Zekharya, son of Kevutal, says: Many times I read before him from the book of Daniel.

If the High Priest sought to sleep at night, the young priests would snap the middle [ tzerada ] finger against the thumb before him, and they would say to him every so often: My Master, High Priest. Stand from your bed and chill yourself once on the floor and overcome your drowsiness. And they would engage him in various ways until the time would arrive to slaughter the daily offering.

Every day the priests would remove the ashes from the altar and place them on the east side of the ramp at the crow of the rooster or adjacent to it, whether before it or after it, as there was no insistence on a precise time. And on Yom Kippur they would remove the ashes earlier, from midnight onward. And on the Festivals, the ashes were removed even earlier, at the end of the first watch. And the call of the rooster would not arrive on Festivals until the Temple courtyard was full with the Jewish people who vowed to bring offerings and would fulfill their obligations on the Festivals. Those offerings were sacrificed immediately following the daily offering.

Chapter 2

Initially, the practice among the priests was that whoever wishes to remove the ashes from the altar removes them. And when there are many priests who wish to perform that task, the privilege to do so is determined by a race: The priests run and ascend on the ramp leading to the top of the altar. Any priest who precedes another and reaches within four cubits of the top of the altar first is privileged to remove the ashes. And if both of them were equal and neither preceded the other, the appointed priest says to all the priests: Extend your fingers, and a lottery was performed, as will be explained. And what fingers do they extend for the lottery? They may extend one or two fingers, and the priests do not extend a thumb in the Temple. The reason is that the lottery was conducted by the appointee choosing a number and counting the extended fingers of the priests standing in a circle. As the count progressed, a priest could calculate and manipulate the result in his favor by surreptitiously extending his thumb and an additional finger. Since there is separation between the thumb and the forefinger it could appear as though they belonged to two different priests, skewing the results of the lottery.

Initially, that was the procedure; however, an incident occurred where both of them were equal as they were running and ascending on the ramp, and one of them shoved another and he fell and his leg was broken. And once the court saw that people were coming to potential danger, they instituted that priests would remove ashes from the altar only by means of a lottery. There were four lotteries there, in the Temple, on a daily basis to determine the priests privileged to perform the various services, and this, determining which priest would remove the ashes, was the first lottery.

The second lottery conducted daily among the priests determines the following: Who slaughters the daily morning offering, who sprinkles its blood, who removes the ashes from the inner altar, and who removes the ashes and burnt wicks from the candelabrum, and who takes the limbs of the daily offering up to the ramp to be burned later. This is how the limbs were divided before taking them up to the altar: The head and the right leg were carried by one priest, and the two forelegs were carried by a second priest. The tail, including the lower vertebrae of the spinal column and the fat tail, and the left leg were carried by a third priest. And the breast and the throat and some of the inner organs attached to it were carried by a fourth priest. And the two flanks were taken by a fifth priest, and the intestines by a sixth priest. And the fine flour of the meal-offering accompanying the daily offering was carried by a seventh priest. And the High Priest’s daily griddle-cake offering was carried by an eighth priest, and the wine for libation was carried by a ninth priest. Altogether thirteen priests prevailed in this lottery: Nine priests who carried the daily offering and its accompanying elements, and four who performed the slaughter, sprinkling, and removal of ashes from the inner altar and the candelabrum. Ben Azzai said before Rabbi Akiva in the name of RabbiYehoshua: That was not the sequence of taking the limbs up to the ramp; rather, the order in which it was sacrificed was according to the way it walks when alive, as will be explained in the Gemara.

Before the third lottery, the appointee declared: Let only those priests who are new to offering the incense come and participate in the lottery for the incense. The fourth lottery was open to those new to the service along with those old hands who had already performed it,to determine who would take the limbs up from the ramp, where they had been placed earlier, to the altar.

The daily offering is sacrificed and its limbs are carried by nine priests, as mentioned in a previous mishna. These nine carry the limbs and the accompanying libations and meal-offerings. Occasionally, the service is performed by ten priests, occasionally by eleven, and sometimes by twelve priests; no fewer than nine and no more than twelve. How so? The daily offering itself is sacrificed by nine priests, as explained earlier. On the festival of Sukkot a priest in whose hand is a jug of water for the water libation is added, and there are ten priests. On Sukkot, a water libation is poured on the altar in addition to the standard wine libation. In the daily afternoon offering, eleven priests participate in the service. How so? The daily offering itself is sacrificed by nine, and there are an additional two priests in whose hands are two logs that are placed on the altar. The mitzva of placing the two logs in the morning was assigned in the first lottery, as the Gemara explained earlier. On Shabbat, eleven priests participate. How so? The daily morning offering itself is performed by nine, and there are an additional two priests in whose hands are two vessels of frankincense that accompany the shewbread. This frankincense is burned on Shabbat. And on Shabbat that occurs within the festival of Sukkot there is an additional priest in whose hand is a jug of water for the water libation, for a total of twelve priests.

A ram that is brought for a communal burnt-offering is sacrificed by eleven priests. The flesh on the various limbs is taken by five priests, as in the case of the sheep of the daily offering. The intestines, and the fine flour of the meal-offering, and the wine of the libation are carried by two priests each, because the meal-offering and wine libation that accompany a ram are larger than those that accompany a sheep.

A bull is sacrificed by twenty-four priests. How so? The head and the right leg are sacrificed first, but due to its size the head is carried by one priest and the leg by two. The tail and the left leg are carried as follows: The tail is sacrificed by two and the leg by two. The breast and the neck are carried as follows: The breast is offered by one and the neck by three priests. The two forelegs are carried by two priests, and the two flanks are carried by two. The intestines and the fine flour and the wine are carried by three each, because the meal-offering and wine libation that accompany a bull are larger than those that accompany a ram. In what case is this statement said, that this is the sequence followed? It is in the case of communal offerings. However, in the case of an individual offering brought to fulfill a vow or an obligation, if a single priest wishes to sacrifice it alone he may sacrifice it alone, or if he chooses he may include other priests in the service. With regard to the flaying and the cutting of both these, individual offerings, and those, communal offerings, they are equal, as will be explained in the Gemara.

Chapter 3

The appointed priest said to the other priests: Go out and observe if it is day and the time for slaughter has arrived. If the time has arrived, the observer says: There is light [ barkai ]. Matya ben Shmuel says that the appointed priest phrased his question differently: Is the entire eastern sky illuminated even to Hebron? And the observer says: Yes.

And why did they need to ascertain whether or not it is day, which is typically evident to all? It was necessary, as once, the light of the moon rose, and they imagined that the eastern sky was illuminated with sunlight, and they slaughtered the daily offering before its appropriate time. The animal was later taken out to the place designated for burning and burned because it was slaughtered too early. In order to prevent similar errors in the future, the Sages instituted that they would carefully assess the situation until they were certain that it was day. After the priests announced the start of the day, they led the High Priest down to the Hall of Immersion. The Gemara comments: This was the principle in the Temple: Anyone who covers his legs, a euphemism for defecating, requires immersion afterward; and anyone who urinates requires sanctification of the hands and feet with water from the basin afterward.

A person does not enter the Temple courtyard for the Temple service, even if he is pure, until he immerses. Five immersions and ten sanctifications the High Priest immerses and sanctifies his hands and feet, respectively, on the day of Yom Kippur. And all of these immersions and sanctifications take place in the sacred area, the Temple courtyard, on the roof of the Hall of Parva, except for this first immersion alone. As that immersion is not unique to Yom Kippur, it may be performed outside the courtyard.

They spread a sheet of fine linen between him and the people in the interest of modesty, and then the High Priest immersed and sanctified his hands and feet. The High Priest removed the white garments that he was wearing, descended to the ritual bath, and immersed. He ascended and dried himself with a towel. Then they brought him the golden garments of the High Priest, and he dressed in the garments, and he sanctified his hands and his feet. They brought him the sheep for the daily morning offering, which he slaughtered by cutting most of the way through the gullet and the windpipe. And a different priest completed the slaughter on his behalf so that the High Priest could receive the blood in a vessel and proceed with the order of the Yom Kippur service. As soon as the slaughter was completed, the High Priest received the blood in a vessel and sprinkled it on the altar. He entered the Sanctuary to burn the morning incense and to remove the ashes from the lamps of the candelabrum; and he left the Sanctuary and returned to the courtyard to sacrifice the head and the limbs of the sheep sacrificed for the daily offering and the High Priest’s daily griddle-cake offering, and the wine libation of the daily offering.

The Mishna comments: The morning incense was burned between the receiving and sprinkling of the blood and the burning of the limbs; and the afternoon incense was burned between the taking of the limbs up to the altar and the pouring of the libations that accompanied the offering. With regard to the immersion, if the High Priest was old and found it difficult to immerse in cold water, or if he was delicate [ istenis ], they would heat hot water for him on Yom Kippur eve and place it into the cold water of the ritual bath in order to temper its chill so the High Priest could immerse without discomfort.

They brought the High Priest to immerse a second time in the Hall of Parva, which was in the sacred area, the Temple courtyard. They spread a sheet of fine linen between him and the people in the interest of modesty. And he sanctified his hands and his feet and removed his garments. Rabbi Meir says that this was the sequence: He first removed his garments and then he sanctified his hands and his feet. He descended and immersed a second time. He ascended and dried himself. And they immediately brought him the white garments, in which he dressed, and he sanctified his hands and his feet.

In the morning he would wear linen garments from the Egyptian city of Pelusium worth twelve maneh, 1,200 dinars or zuz. These garments were very expensive due to their high quality. And in the afternoon he wore linen garments from India, which were slightly less expensive, worth eight hundred zuz. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: In the morning he would wear garments worth eighteen maneh, and in the afternoon he would wear garments worth twelve maneh. In total, the clothes were worth thirty maneh. These sums for the garments came from the community, and if the High Priest wished to add money to purchase even finer garments, he would add funding of his own.

The High Priest comes and stands next to his bull, and his bull was standing between the Entrance Hall and the altar with its head facing to the south and its face to the west. And the priest stands to the east of the bull, and his face points to the west. And the priest places his two hands on the bull and confesses. And this is what he would say in his confession: Please, God, I have sinned, I have done wrong, and I have rebelled before You, I and my family. Please, God, grant atonement, please, for the sins, and for the wrongs, and for the rebellions that I have sinned, and done wrong, and rebelled before You, I and my family, as it is written in the Torah of Moses your servant: “For on this day atonement shall be made for you to cleanse you of all your sins; you shall be clean before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:30). And the priests and the people who were in the courtyard respond after he recites the name of God: Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom forever and all time.

The priest then came to the eastern side of the Temple courtyard, farthest from the Holy of Holies, to the north of the altar. The deputy was to his right, and the head of the patrilineal family belonging to the priestly watch that was assigned to serve in the Temple that week was to his left. And they arranged two goats there, and there was a lottery receptacle there, and in it were two lots. These were originally made of boxwood, and the High Priest Yehoshua ben Gamla fashioned them of gold, and the people would mention him favorably for what he did. Since the mishna mentions an item designed to enhance the Temple service, it also lists other such items:

The High Priest ben Katin made twelve spigots for the basin so that several priests could sanctify their hands and feet at once, as previously the basin had only two. He also made a machine [ mukheni ] for sinking the basin into flowing water during the night so that its water would not be disqualified by remaining overnight. Had the water remained in the basin overnight, it would have been necessary to pour it out the following morning. By immersing the basin in flowing water, the water inside remained fit for use the next morning. King Munbaz would contribute the funds required to make the handles of all the Yom Kippur vessels of gold. Queen Helene, his mother, fashioned a decorative gold chandelier above the entrance of the Sanctuary. She also fashioned a golden tablet [ tavla ] on which the Torah portion relating to sota was written. The tablet could be utilized to copy this Torah portion, so that a Torah scroll need not be taken out for that purpose. With regard to Nicanor, miracles were performed to his doors, the doors in the gate of the Temple named for him, the Gate of Nicanor. And the people would mention all of those whose contributions were listed favorably.

Apropos the mention in the mishna of people who took action in the Temple and were mentioned favorably, the mishna lists those who took action in the Temple and were mentioned unfavorably. The craftsmen of the House of Garmu did not want to teach the secret of the preparation of the shewbread and sought to keep the secret within their family. The craftsmen of the House of Avtinas did not want to teach the secret of the preparation of the incense. Also, Hugras ben Levi knew a chapter in the art of music, as will be explained, and he did not want to teach it to others. And the scribe ben Kamtzar did not want to teach a special act of writing. He was expert at writing all four letters of a four-letter name simultaneously. About the first ones, who were mentioned favorably, it is stated: “The memory of the righteous shall be for a blessing” (Proverbs 10:7); and about these who were concerned only for themselves it is stated: “But the name of the wicked shall rot” (Proverbs 10:7).

Chapter 4

The High Priest would mix the lots in the lottery receptacle used to hold them and draw the two lots from it, one in each hand. Upon one was written: For God. And upon the other one was written: For Azazel. The deputy High Priest would stand to the High Priest’s right, and the head of the patrilineal family would stand to his left. If the lot for the name of God came up in his right hand, the Deputy would say to him: My master, High Priest, raise your right hand so that all can see with which hand the lot for God was selected. And if the lot for the name of God came up in his left hand, the head of the patrilineal family would say to him: My master, High Priest, raise your left hand. Then he would place the two lots upon the two goats, the lot that arose in his right hand on the goat standing to his right side and the lot in his left hand on the goat to his left. And upon placing the lot for God upon the appropriate goat, he would say: For God, as a sin-offering. Rabbi Yishmael says: He need not say: As a sin-offering. Rather, it is sufficient to say: For God. And upon saying the name of God, the priests and the people respond after him: Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom forever and all time.

The High Priest tied a strip of crimson wool upon the head of the scapegoat and positioned the goat opposite the place from which it was dispatched, i.e., near the gate through which it was taken; and the same was done to the goat that was to be slaughtered, opposite the place of its slaughter. He comes and stands next to his bull a second time, and places his two hands upon it, and confesses. And this is what he would say: Please God, I have sinned, I have done wrong, and I have rebelled before You, I and my family and the children of Aaron, your sacred people. Please God, grant atonement, please, for the sins, and for the wrongs, and for the rebellions that I have sinned, and done wrong, and rebelled before You, I, and my family, and the children of Aaron, your sacred people, as it is written in the Torah of Moses, your servant: “For on this day atonement shall be made for you to cleanse you of all your sins; you shall be clean before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:30). And they, the priests and the people in the Temple courtyard, respond after him upon hearing the name of God: Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom forever and all time.

The High Priest would slaughter the bull and receive its blood in a bowl, and give it to the one who stirs it. The stirrer would stand on the fourth row of tiles in the Sanctuary and stir the blood lest it coagulate while the High Priest sacrificed the incense. He would take a coal pan and ascend to the top of the altar and clear the upper layer of coals to this side and to that side and with the coal pan scoop up coals from among the inner, consumed coals. And he would then descend and place the coal pan with the coals on the fourth row of tiles in the Temple courtyard.

The mishna comments on some of the contrasts between the service and protocols followed on Yom Kippur and those followed throughout the rest of the year: On every other day, a priest would scoop up the coals with a coal pan made of silver and pour the coals from there into a coal pan of gold. But on this day, on Yom Kippur, the High Priest scoops up with a coal pan of gold, and with that coal pan he would bring the coals into the Holy of Holies. On every other day, a priest scoops up the coals with a coal pan of four kav and pours the coals into a coal pan of three kav. But on this day, the High Priest scoops with one of three kav, and with it he would bring the coals into the Holy of Holies. Rabbi Yosei says a variation of this distinction: On every other day, a priest scoops up the coals with a coal pan of a se’a, which is six kav and then pours the coals into a coal pan of three kav. But on this day, the High Priest scoops with a coal pan of three kav, and with it he would bring the coals into the Holy of Holies. On every other day, the coal pan was heavy. But on this day it was light, so as not to tire the High Priest. On every other day, its handle was short, but on this day it was long so that he could also use his arm to support its weight. On every other day, it was of greenish gold, but on this day it was of a red gold. These are the statements of Rabbi Menaḥem. On every other day, a priest sacrificed a peras, half a maneh, of incense in the morning, and a peras in the afternoon, but on this day the High Priest adds an additional handful of incense and burns it in the Holy of Holies. On every other day, the incense was ground fine as prescribed by the Torah, but on this day it was superfine.

On every other day, priests ascend on the eastern side of the ramp and descend on its western side, but on this day the High Priest ascends in the middle of the ramp and descends in the middle. Rabbi Yehuda says: There was no difference in this regard. Even during the rest of the year, the High Priest always ascends in the middle of the ramp and descends in the middle, due to his eminence. On every other day, the High Priest sanctifies his hands and his feet from the laver like the other priests, and on this day he sanctifies them from the golden flask, due to the eminence of the High Priest. Rabbi Yehuda says there was no difference in this regard. Even during the rest of the year, the High Priest always sanctifies his hands and his feet from the golden flask.

On every other day there were four arrangements of wood there, upon the altar, but on this day there were five; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: On every other day there were three, but on this day there were four. Rabbi Yehuda says: On every other day there were two, but on this day there were three.

Chapter 5

They brought out the spoon and the coal pan to the High Priest so he may perform the service of the incense. He scoops his handfuls from the incense and places it into the spoon. The High Priest with large hands fills the spoon with incense in an amount corresponding to the large size of his hands, and the High Priest with small hands fills the spoon with incense in an amount corresponding to the small size of his hands. And this was the measure of the spoon, i.e., it was made to correspond to the size of his hands. He took the coal pan in his right hand and the spoon in his left hand. The High Priest would then walk west through the Sanctuary until he reaches the area between the two curtains that separated the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies, and the space between them was one cubit. Rabbi Yosei says: There was only one curtain there, as it is stated: “And the curtain shall divide for you between the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies” (Exodus 26:33). The outer curtain between the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies was hooked [ perufa ] slightly open on the south side of the Sanctuary, and the inner curtain hooked slightly open on the north side of the Sanctuary, and therefore the High Priest could not enter the Holy of Holies directly. Rather, he enters through the southern opening and walks between the curtains until he reaches the opening to the north. When he reaches the opening to the north, he enters the Holy of Holies through that opening, turns his face to the south, and walks to his left along the curtain until he reaches the area before the Ark. When he reaches the Ark, he places the coal pan between the two staves. He piles the incense atop the coals, and the whole chamber in its entirety would fill with smoke. He then exits and comes out the way that he entered. He does not turn around but leaves the Holy of Holies walking while facing the Ark. And he recites a brief prayer in the outer chamber, in the Sanctuary. And he would not extend his prayer there so as not to alarm the Jewish people, who would otherwise conclude that something happened and that he died in the Holy of Holies.

After the Ark was taken into exile, there was a rock in the Holy of Holies from the days of the early prophets, David and Samuel, who laid the groundwork for construction of the Temple, and this stone was called the foundation rock. It was three fingerbreadths higher than the ground, and the High Priest would place the incense on it.

After the High Priest left the Holy of Holies, he took the blood of the bull sacrificed as a sin-offering from the one who was stirring it, so it would not coagulate. He entered into the place that he had previously entered, the Holy of Holies, and stood at the place where he had previously stood to offer the incense, between the staves. And he sprinkled from the blood, one time upward and seven times downward. And he would neither intend to sprinkle the blood upward nor to sprinkle it downward, but rather like one who whips, with the blood sprinkled in a single column, one drop below the other. And this is how he would count as he sprinkled, to avoid error: One; one and one; one and two; one and three; one and four; one and five; one and six; one and seven. The High Priest then emerged from there and placed the bowl with the remaining blood on the golden pedestal in the Sanctuary.

They brought him the goat to be sacrificed as a sin-offering to God. He slaughtered it and received its blood in the bowl. He again entered into the place that he had previously entered, the Holy of Holies, and stood at the place that he previously stood, and sprinkled from the blood of the goat one time upward and seven times downward. And this is how he would count, just as he counted when sprinkling the blood of the bull: One; one and one; one and two; etc. The High Priest then emerged from the Holy of Holies and placed the bowl with the remaining blood on the second golden pedestal in the Sanctuary. Rabbi Yehuda says: There was only one pedestal there, and he took the blood of the bull from the pedestal and placed the blood of the goat in its place. And he sprinkled from the blood of the bull on the curtain opposite the Ark from outside the Holy of Holies, one time upward and seven times downward, and he would not intend, etc. And this is how he would count, etc. When he concluded, he took the blood of the goat from the pedestal and placed blood of the bull in its place on the pedestal. And he sprinkled from the goat’s blood on the curtain opposite the Ark from outside, just as he did with the blood of the bull, one time upward and seven times downward, etc. Afterward, he poured the blood of the bull into the blood of the goat and placed the blood from the full bowl into the empty bowl, so that the blood would be mixed well.

It is stated: “And he shall go out to the altar that is before the Lord, and make atonement for it; and he shall take of the blood of the bull, and of the blood of the goat, and place it upon the corners of the altar round about” (Leviticus 16:18). This altar is the golden altar, since the outer altar is not before the Lord in the Sanctuary. He began to cleanse the altar, sprinkling the blood downward. From where does he begin? He begins from the northeast corner, and proceeds to the northwest corner, and then to the southwest corner, and finally to the southeast corner. A way to remember this is: At the place where he begins sprinkling the blood for a sin-offering sacrificed on the outer altar, the southeast corner, there he finishes sprinkling the blood on the inner altar. Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest would not circle the altar; rather, he stood in one place and sprinkled the blood from there. Since the altar was only one square cubit, he could sprinkle the blood on all four corners without moving. And on all the corners he would present the blood from below upward, except for that corner that was directly before him, on which he would present the blood from above downward.

He sprinkled blood on the pure gold of the altar seven times after clearing away the ashes. And he would pour the remainder of the blood on the western base of the outer altar. On a related topic, the mishna teaches that he would pour the remaining blood of an offering, after it was sprinkled, on the outer altar, on its southern base. These remainders of blood from the outer altar and those remainders of blood from the inner altar are mixed in the canal beneath the altar and flow out with the water used to rinse the area to the Kidron River. This water was sold to gardeners for use as fertilizer. The gardeners paid for this water and thereby redeemed it from its sanctity. Failure to do so would render them guilty of misuse of consecrated property.

Each action performed in the context of the service of Yom Kippur stated in the mishna, as in the Torah, is listed in order. If the High Priest performed one of the actions before another, he has done nothing. If he performed the sprinkling of the blood of the goat before the sprinkling of the blood of the bull, he must repeat the action and sprinkle the blood of the goat after sprinkling the blood of the bull, so that the actions are performed in the proper order. And if the blood spills before he completed the presentations that were sprinkled inside the Holy of Holies, he must slaughter another bull or goat, and bring other blood, and then repeat all the services from the beginning inside the Holy of Holies. And similarly, if the blood spills before he finishes the presentations in the Sanctuary, he must begin the service in the Sanctuary from the beginning, and likewise with regard to the sprinkling of blood on the golden altar. Since they are each acts of atonement in and of themselves, there is no need to repeat the service of the entire day from the beginning. Rather, he need only repeat the specific element that he failed to complete. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: From the place that he interrupted that particular service, when the blood spilled, there he resumes performance of that service. In their opinion, each individual sprinkling in each of these services is an act in and of itself, and there is no need to repeat what he has already done.

Chapter 6

The mitzva of the two Yom Kippur goats, the goat sacrificed to God and the goat sent to Azazel that are brought as a pair, is as follows, ab initio : That they will both be identical in appearance, i.e., color, and in height, and in monetary value, and their acquisition must be as one, i.e., they must be purchased together. And even if they are not identical, nevertheless, they are valid. And similarly, if he acquired one today and one tomorrow, they are valid. If one of the goats died, if it died before the High Priest drew the lots, he immediately takes a counterpart for the second, since neither has yet been designated. And if it died after the High Priest drew the lots, he brings another pair of goats and draws lots over them from the start. After that lottery he utters a stipulation: If the one to be sacrificed to God died, that goat upon which the lot for God was drawn in the second lottery shall stand in its stead; and if the one to be sent to Azazel died, that goat upon which the lot for Azazel was drawn shall stand in its stead. And the second, superfluous goat, i.e., in the case where a new pair of goats was brought, should graze until it becomes unfit, at which point it will be sold, and the money received from its sale will go toward the purchase of a public gift-offering. Although for individual sin-offerings in similar circumstances there is no remedy and it is left to die, that is not the case here, as a communal sin-offering is not left to die. On the other hand, Rabbi Yehuda says: In this it should be left to die. And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: If the blood of the goat sacrificed to God spilled before it was sprinkled, the scapegoat is left to die. Similarly, if the scapegoat dies, the blood of the goat sacrificed to God should be spilled, and two other goats are brought and lots are drawn.

The Yom Kippur service continues: The High Priest comes over to the scapegoat, places both his hands upon it, and confesses. And he would say as follows: Please, God, Your people, the house of Israel, have sinned, and done wrong, and rebelled before You. Please, God, grant atonement, please, for the sins, and for the wrongs, and for the rebellions that they have sinned, and done wrong, and rebelled before You, Your people, the house of Israel, as it is written in the Torah of Moses Your servant, saying: “For on this day atonement shall be made for you to cleanse you of all your sins; before the Lord you shall be purified” (Leviticus 16:30). And the priests and the people standing in the Temple courtyard, when they would hear the Explicit Name emerging from the mouth of the High Priest, when the High Priest did not use one of the substitute names for God, they would kneel and prostrate themselves and fall on their faces, and say: Blessed is the name of His glorious kingdom forever and ever.

After the confession over the scapegoat, the priest passed the goat to the one who was to lead it to the wilderness. According to the halakha, everyone is eligible to lead it, but the High Priests established a fixed custom and did not allow an Israelite to lead it. Rabbi Yosei said: That was not always the case. There was an incident where a person named Arsela led the goat to the wilderness, and he was an Israelite.

And they made a ramp for the goat due to the Babylonian Jews who were in Jerusalem, who would pluck at the goat’s hair and would say to the goat: Take our sins and go, take our sins and go, and do not leave them with us. People from among the prominent residents of Jerusalem would escort the one leading the goat until they reached the first booth. Booths were set up along the path to the wilderness to provide the escort a place to rest. There were ten booths from Jerusalem to the cliff, with a distance of ninety ris between them. As there are seven and a half ris for each mil, the total distance was twelve mil.

At each and every booth, people there say to him: Here is food; here is water, if you need it. And they escort him from booth to booth, except for the last person at the last booth, who does not reach the cliff with him. Rather, he stands from a distance and observes his actions to ensure that he fulfills the mitzva properly.

What did the one designated to dispatch the goat do there? He divided a strip of crimson into two parts, half of the strip tied to the rock, and half of it tied between the two horns of the goat. And he pushed the goat backward, and it rolls and descends. And it would not reach halfway down the mountain until it was torn limb from limb. The one designated to dispatch the goat came and sat under the roofing of last booth until it grows dark and only then went home. And from what point are the garments of the man rendered impure, as it is stated that he is impure and his clothes requires immersion? From the moment he emerges outside the wall of Jerusalem. Rabbi Shimon says: His clothes are rendered impure only from the moment that he pushes the goat from the cliff.

After the High Priest passed the goat to the man tasked with dispatching the goat, he came next to the bull and the goat that were to be burned. He tore their flesh but was not required to cut it into pieces, and removed the portions of the offering consumed on the altar and placed them in a large bowl [ magis ] and burned them on the altar. He interwove and bound the bull and the goat together into braids as one mass. They were placed in that way upon two poles and carried by four people who took them out to the place designated for burning, outside of Jerusalem. And at what point do the bull and goat render the garments of those who carried them impure, as it is written: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments” (Leviticus 16:28)? They render the garments impure from the moment that they emerged outside the wall of the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Shimon says: They render the garments impure from the moment that the fire has ignited in most of the bull and the goat.

They said to the High Priest: The goat has reached the wilderness. And how did they know in the Temple that the goat reached the wilderness? They would build platforms [ dirkaot ] all along the way and people would stand on them and wave scarves [ sudarin ] to signal when the goat arrived. And therefore they knew that the goat reached the wilderness. Rabbi Yehuda said: Why did they need these platforms? Didn’t they already have a reliable indicator? From Jerusalem to Beit Ḥiddudo, the edge of the wilderness, where the mitzva of dispatching the goat was performed, was a distance of three mil. Since the nobles of Jerusalem walked a mil to escort the dispatcher and returned a mil, and waited the time equivalent to the time it takes to walk a mil, they knew that the goat reached the wilderness. There was no need for the platforms. Rabbi Yishmael says: Didn’t they have a different indicator? There was a strip of crimson tied to the entrance to the Sanctuary, and when the goat reached the wilderness and the mitzva was fulfilled the strip would turn white, as it is stated: “Though your sins be as scarlet, they will become white as snow” (Isaiah 1:18).

Chapter 7

The High Priest came to read the Torah. If he wished to read the Torah while still dressed in the fine linen garments, i.e., the priestly vestments he wore during the previous service, he may read wearing them; and if not he is permitted to read in a white robe of his own, which is not a priestly vestment. The synagogue attendant takes a Torah scroll and gives it to the head of the synagogue that stood on the Temple Mount; and the head of the synagogue gives it to the deputy High Priest, and the Deputy gives it to the High Priest, and the High Priest stands and receives the scroll from his hands. And he reads from the scroll the Torah portion beginning with the verse: “After the death” (Leviticus 16:1) and the portion beginning with the verse: “But on the tenth” (Leviticus 23:26), and furls the Torah scroll and places it on his bosom and says: More than what I have read before you is written here. The Torah portion beginning with the verse: “And on the tenth,” from the book of Numbers (29:7), he then reads by heart. And he recites after the reading the following eight blessings: Concerning the Torah: Who has given us the Torah of truth; and concerning the Temple service: Find favor in Your people Israel and accept the service in Your most holy House... for You alone do we serve with reverence; and concerning thanksgiving: We give thanks to You; and concerning pardon of iniquity: Pardon our iniquities on this Yom Kippur; and concerning the Temple in and of itself, which concludes: Blessed…Who chose the Temple; and concerning the Jewish People in and of itself, which concludes: Blessed…Who chose Israel; and concerning Jerusalem in and of itself, which concludes: Blessed…Who chose Jerusalem; and concerning the priests in and of themselves, which concludes: Blessed…Who chose the priests; and concerning the rest of the prayer, which concludes: Blessed…Who listens to prayer.

The Mishna comments: One who sees the High Priest reading the Torah does not see the bull and goat that are burned; and one who sees the bull and goat that are burned does not see the High Priest reading the Torah. The Mishna explains: And this is not due to the fact that one is not permitted to see both, but because there was a distant path between them, and the performance of both of them is undertaken simultaneously.

If the High Priest read the Torah in sacred white fine linen garments, he then sanctified his hands and feet as he did each time before removing the priestly vestments. He then removed the linen garments, descended to the ritual bath, and immersed. Afterward he ascended and dried himself with a towel, and they brought him the golden garments of the High Priesthood, and he dressed in them and sanctified his hands and feet. The mishna addresses those offerings whose sacrifice has still not been mentioned. The verses in Leviticus, chapter 16, detail the special offerings of the atonement service of Yom Kippur. Of those offerings, the ram of the High Priest and the ram of the people have still not been addressed. In addition to this, the additional offerings of Yom Kippur detailed in Numbers, chapter 29, have not yet been discussed. These include seven one-year-old lambs and a bull to be brought as a burnt-offering and a goat to be brought as a sin-offering. The mishna continues: He emerged and offered his ram and the ram of the people and the seven unblemished year-old lambs mandated to be offered that day. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Akiva says: Those offerings were not sacrificed at this point; rather, they were sacrificed with the daily morning offering; and the bull of the Yom Kippur burnt-offering; and the goat whose services are performed outside of the Sanctuary, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, were sacrificed with the daily afternoon offering.

After sacrificing these offerings, he sanctified his hands and feet and removed the golden garments, and he descended into the ritual bath and immersed and ascended and dried himself. They brought him the white garments again, and he dressed in them and sanctified his hands and feet. Afterward he entered the Holy of Holies to take out the incense spoon and the coal pan, which he had brought there earlier. He again sanctified his hands and feet and removed the white garments and descended to the ritual bath and immersed and ascended and dried himself with a towel. They brought him the golden garments, and he dressed in them and sanctified his hands and feet and entered the Sanctuary to burn the afternoon incense and to remove the ashes from the lamps, which signified the end of the day’s service. And he sanctified his hands and feet and removed the golden garments, and he descended to the ritual bath and immersed and ascended and dried himself. They then brought him his own clothing and he dressed, since the service was complete and Yom Kippur was over; and the people escort him to his house in deference to him. And the High Priest would make a feast for his loved ones and his friends when he emerged in peace from the Sanctuary.

Throughout the year the High Priest serves in eight garments, and the common priest serves in four: In a tunic and trousers and a mitre and a belt. The High Priest adds another four garments beyond those worn by the common priest: A breastplate, and an ephod, and a robe, and a frontplate. When dressed in these eight garments, the High Priest may be consulted for the decision of the Urim VeTummim. And he may be consulted for the decision of the Urim VeTummim only on behalf of the king, or on behalf of the president of the court, or on behalf of one whom the community needs. Individual inquiries are not posed to the Urim VeTummim.

Chapter 8

On Yom Kippur, the day on which there is a mitzva by Torah law to afflict oneself, it is prohibited to engage in eating and in drinking, and in bathing, and in smearing oil on one’s body, and in wearing shoes, and in conjugal relations. However, the king, in deference to his eminence, and a new bride within thirty days of her marriage, who wishes to look especially attractive at the beginning of her relationship with her husband, may wash their faces on Yom Kippur. A woman after childbirth, who is suffering, may wear shoes because going barefoot causes her pain. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Rabbis prohibit these activities for a king, a new bride, and a woman after childbirth.

The mishna elaborates: One who eats a large date-bulk of food, equivalent to a date and its pit, or who drinks a cheekful of liquid on Yom Kippur is liable to receive the punishment of karet for failing to fulfill the mitzva to afflict oneself on Yom Kippur. All foods that one eats join together to constitute a date-bulk; and all liquids that one drinks join together to constitute a cheekful. However, if one eats and drinks, the food and beverage do not join together to constitute a measure that determines liability, as each is measured separately.

If one ate and drank unwittingly within one lapse of awareness, e.g., he forgot that it is Yom Kippur, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. However, if he ate and performed labor unwittingly, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as by doing so he violated two separate prohibitions. If he ate foods that are not fit for eating, or drank liquids that are not fit for drinking, or drank fish brine or the briny liquid in which fish are pickled, he is exempt, as that is not the typical manner of eating or drinking.

With regard to the children, one does not afflict them by withholding food on Yom Kippur; however, one trains them one year before or two years before they reach majority, by means of a partial fast lasting several hours, so that they will be accustomed to fulfill mitzvot.

With regard to a pregnant woman who smelled food and was overcome by a craving to eat it, one feeds her until she recovers, as failure to do so could lead to a life-threatening situation. If a person is ill and requires food due to potential danger, one feeds him according to the advice of medical experts who determine that he indeed requires food. And if there are no experts there, one feeds him according to his own instructions, until he says that he has eaten enough and needs no more.

In the case of one who is seized with the life-threatening illness bulmos, causing him unbearable hunger pangs and impaired vision, one may feed him even impure foods on Yom Kippur or any other day until his eyes recover, as the return of his sight indicates that he is recovering. In the case of one whom a mad dog bit, one may not feed him from the lobe of the dog’s liver. This was thought to be a remedy for the bite, but the Rabbis deem it ineffective. And Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash permits feeding it to him, as he deems it effective. And furthermore, Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash said: With regard to one who suffers pain in his throat, one may place medicine inside his mouth on Shabbat, although administering a remedy is prohibited on Shabbat. This is because there is uncertainty whether or not it is a life-threatening situation for him, as it is difficult to ascertain the severity of internal pain. And a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat.

Similarly, with regard to one upon whom a rockslide fell, and there is uncertainty whether he is there under the debris or whether he is not there; and there is uncertainty whether he is still alive or whether he is dead; and there is uncertainty whether the person under the debris is a gentile or whether he is a Jew, one clears the pile from atop him. One may perform any action necessary to rescue him from beneath the debris. If they found him alive after beginning to clear the debris, they continue to clear the pile until they can extricate him. And if they found him dead, they should leave him, since one may not desecrate Shabbat to preserve the dignity of the dead.

A sin-offering, which atones for unwitting performance of transgressions punishable by karet, and a definite guilt-offering, which is brought for robbery and misuse of consecrated items, atone for those sins. Death and Yom Kippur atone for sins when accompanied by repentance. Repentance itself atones for minor transgressions, for both positive mitzvot and negative mitzvot. And repentance places punishment for severe transgressions in abeyance until Yom Kippur comes and completely atones for the transgression.

With regard to one who says: I will sin and then I will repent, I will sin and I will repent, Heaven does not provide him the opportunity to repent, and he will remain a sinner all his days. With regard to one who says: I will sin and Yom Kippur will atone for my sins, Yom Kippur does not atone for his sins. Furthermore, for transgressions between a person and God, Yom Kippur atones; however, for transgressions between a person and another, Yom Kippur does not atone until he appeases the other person. Similarly, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya taught that point from the verse: “From all your sins you shall be cleansed before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:30). For transgressions between a person and God, Yom Kippur atones; however, for transgressions between a person and another, Yom Kippur does not atone until he appeases the other person. In conclusion, Rabbi Akiva said: How fortunate are you, Israel; before Whom are you purified, and Who purifies you? It is your Father in Heaven, as it is stated: “And I will sprinkle purifying water upon you, and you shall be purified” (Ezekiel 36:25). And it says: “The ritual bath of Israel is God” (Jeremiah 17:13). Just as a ritual bath purifies the impure, so too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, purifies Israel.

Mishnah Sukkah

Chapter 1

A sukka, i.e., its roofing, which is the main and most crucial element of the mitzva, that is more than twenty cubits high is unfit. Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit. Similarly, a sukka that is not even ten handbreadths high, and one that does not have three walls, and one whose sunlight that passes through its roofing is greater than its shade are unfit. With regard to an old sukka, Beit Shammai deem it unfit for the mitzva of sukka and Beit Hillel deem it fit. And which is considered an old sukka? It is any booth that one established thirty days or more prior to the Festival without expressly designating that it was for the mitzva of sukka. In that case, the assumption is that he constructed it for some other purpose. However, if he established it expressly for the sake of the festival of Sukkot, even if he constructed it at the beginning of the previous year, it is fit for use in the fulfillment of the mitzva of sukka, even according to Beit Shammai.

With regard to one who establishes his sukka beneath a tree, it is as though he established it inside the house and it is unfit. If one established a sukka atop another sukka, the upper sukka is fit and the lower sukka is unfit. Rabbi Yehuda says: If there are no residents in the upper sukka, the lower sukka is fit.

If one spread a sheet over the roofing as protection for those sitting in the sukka due to the sun, or if one spread a sheet beneath the roofing as protection due to the falling leaves, or if one spread a sheet as a canopy over the frame of a four-post [ kinof ] bed, the area in the sukka beneath the sheets is unfit. In the first two cases, because the sheet is susceptible to ritual impurity, it renders the otherwise fit roofing unfit. In the case of the canopy, one is not sitting under the roofing of the sukka ; rather, he is sitting inside a tent. However, one may spread the sheet over the frame of a two-post [ naklitei ] bed, which has one post in the middle of each end of the bed. When spreading the sheet over the posts it forms an inclined rather than a flat roof, and a tent with an inclined roof is not considered a significant structure.

If one trellised climbing plants such as a grapevine, or gourd plant, or ivy [ kissos ], over a sukka while they were still attached to the ground, and then added roofing atop them, the sukka is unfit. If the amount of fit roofing was greater than the plants attached to the ground, or if he cut the climbing plants so that they were no longer attached to the ground, it is fit. This is the principle with regard to the roofing of a sukka : Anything that is susceptible to ritual impurity, e.g., vessels, or its growth is not from the ground, e.g., animal hides, one may not roof his sukka with it. And anything that is not susceptible to ritual impurity and its growth is from the ground, one may roof his sukka with it.

One may not roof a sukka with bundles of straw tied with rope, or bundles of wood, or bundles of twigs. And with regard to all of the bundles, if one untied them, they are fit for use in roofing the sukka, as their lack of fitness is due to the fact that the bundles are tied. And even when tied, all of the bundles are fit for use in constructing the walls of the sukka.

One may roof the sukka with boards like those used in the ceiling of a house; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir prohibits their use. If one placed a board that is four handbreadths wide atop the sukka, the sukka is fit. He fulfills his obligation, provided he does not sleep beneath the board.

In the case of a roof made of boards that are four handbreadths wide upon which there is no coat of plaster, Rabbi Yehuda says that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree with regard to the manner in which to render it fit. Beit Shammai say: One moves each board, and then it is considered as though he placed the board there for the sake of the mitzva of sukka, and one then removes one board from among the boards and replaces it with fit roofing. Beit Hillel say: One need not perform both actions; rather, one must either move the boards or remove one from among them. Rabbi Meir says: One only removes one from among them and does not move the others.

In the case of one who roofs his sukka with metal skewers or with the long boards of the bed, which compose its frame, if there is space between each one of them equal to the width of the skewers or the boards, and if he places fit roofing in those spaces, the sukka is fit. In the case of one who hollows out and creates a space inside a stack of grain, it is not a sukka.

One who lowers the walls of the sukka from up downward, if the lower edge of the wall is three handbreadths above the ground, the sukka is unfit. Since animals can enter through that space, it is not the wall of a fit sukka. However, if one constructs the wall from down upward, if the wall is ten handbreadths high, even if it does not reach the roofing, the sukka is fit. Rabbi Yosei says: Just as a wall built from down upward must be ten handbreadths, so too, in a case where one lowers the wall from up downward, it must be ten handbreadths in length. Regardless of its height off the ground, it is the wall of a fit sukka, as the legal status of a ten-handbreadth partition is that of a full-fledged partition in all areas of halakha. If one distanced the roofing from the walls of the sukka at a distance of three handbreadths the sukka is unfit, because three handbreadths of open space, even adjacent to the walls, render the sukka unfit.

In the case of a house that was breached, creating a hole in the middle of the roof, and one roofed over the breach, if from the wall to the roofing there are four or more cubits of the remaining original roof, it is an unfit sukka. If the roofing is less than four cubits from the wall, the sukka is fit, based on the principle of curved wall; the remaining intact ceiling is considered an extension of the vertical wall. And likewise, in the case of a courtyard that is surrounded on three sides by a portico, which has a roof but no walls, if one placed roofing over the courtyard between the different sides of the portico and the roof of the portico is four cubits wide, the sukka is unfit. Similarly, a large sukka that was surrounded at the edge of its roofing with material with which one may not roof a sukka, e.g., vessels susceptible to ritual impurity, if there are four cubits beneath the unfit roofing, the sukka is unfit. The principle of curved wall does not apply to unfit roofing that measures four cubits or more.

One who establishes his sukka like a type of circular hut, with no roof whose walls slope down from the center or who rested the sukka against the wall, by taking long branches and placing one end on the ground and leaning the other end against the wall to establish a structure with no roof, Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit because it does not have a roof, and the Rabbis deem it fit; as, in their opinion, the roof and the walls may be a single entity, indistinguishable from each other. In the case of a large mat of reeds, if one initially produced it for the purpose of lying upon it, it is susceptible to ritual impurity like any other vessel, and therefore one may not roof a sukka with it. If one initially produced it for roofing, one may roof a sukka with it, and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity, as its legal status is not that of a vessel. Rabbi Eliezer says that the distinction between mats is based on use, not size. Therefore, with regard to both a small mat and a large mat, if one produced it for the purpose of lying upon it, it is susceptible to ritual impurity and one may not roof a sukka with it. If one produced it for roofing, one may roof a sukka with it, and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.

Chapter 2

One who sleeps beneath the bed in the sukka did not fulfill his obligation, because the bed constitutes a tent that serves as a barrier between him and the roofing of the sukka. Rabbi Yehuda said: It was our custom that we would sleep beneath the bed before the Elders and they did not say anything to us to the effect that we are not fulfilling our obligation. Apparently, the halakhic status of the bed is not like that of a tent and it does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva. § Rabbi Shimon said, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: There was an incident involving Tavi, the Canaanite slave of Rabban Gamliel, who was sleeping beneath the bed, and Rabban Gamliel lightheartedly said to the Elders: Did you see my slave Tavi, who is a Torah scholar and knows that slaves are exempt from the mitzva of sukka? Since it is a positive, time-bound mitzva, Canaanite slaves, whose status with regard to this halakhic category is like that of women, are exempt from the obligation to fulfill the mitzva of sukka. Therefore, he sleeps under the bed. Rabbi Shimon continued: And by the way, as Rabban Gamliel was not issuing a halakhic ruling, we learned that one who sleeps beneath the bed did not fulfill his obligation.

One who supports his sukka on the legs of the bed, i.e., he leans the sukka roofing on a bed, the sukka is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the sukka cannot stand in and of itself without support of the bed, it is unfit. A sukka that is meduvlelet and whose shade exceeds its sunlight is fit. A sukka whose roofing is thick like a house of sorts, even though it is so thick that the stars cannot be seen from within it, is fit.

In the case of one who establishes his sukka at the top of the wagon or at the top of the ship, although it is portable it is fit, as it is sufficient for a sukka to be a temporary residence. And one may ascend and enter it even on the first Festival day. In the case of one who establishes his sukka at the top of a tree or atop a camel, the sukka is fit, but one may not ascend and enter it on the first Festival day because the Sages prohibit climbing or using trees or animals on the Festival. If two of the walls of the sukka are in the tree and one is established on the ground by a person, or if two are established on the ground by a person and one is in the tree, the sukka is fit, but one may not ascend and enter it on the first Festival day because it is prohibited to use the tree. However, if three of the walls are established on the ground by a person and one is in the tree, then since it contains the minimum number of walls required, it is fit, and one may enter it on the first Festival day. The mishna summarizes that this is the principle: Any case where, were the tree removed, the sukka would be able to remain standing in and of itself, it is fit, and one may ascend and enter it on the Festival, since the tree is not its primary support.

mishna In the case of one who establishes his sukka between the trees, and the trees serve as walls for it, the sukka is fit. Those on the path to perform a mitzva are exempt from the mitzva of sukka. The ill and their caretakers are exempt from the mitzva of sukka. One may eat and drink in the framework of a casual meal outside the sukka.

Apropos eating in the sukka, which is discussed in the previous mishna, this mishna relates: An incident occurred where they brought a cooked dish to Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai for him to taste, and to Rabban Gamliel they brought two dates and a bucket of water. And they each said: Take them up to the sukka and we will eat them there. In contrast, the mishna relates: And when they gave Rabbi Tzadok less than an egg-bulk of food, he took the food in a cloth for cleanliness; he did not wash his hands because in his opinion, one is not required to wash his hands before eating less than an egg-bulk. And he ate it outside the sukka and did not recite a blessing after eating it. He holds that one is not required to recite a blessing after eating less than an egg-bulk, as it is not satisfying, and it is written: “And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 8:10). The Gemara will explain the halakhic rationale for each of these actions described.

Rabbi Eliezer says: A person is obligated to eat fourteen meals in the sukka over the course of the seven days of the festival of Sukkot, one during the day each day and one at night each night. And the Rabbis say: There is no quota for the number of meals, and one may choose whether or not to eat any of the meals except for the meal on the evening of the first Festival day of Sukkot, which one is required to eat in the sukka. And furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer said: One who did not eat a meal on the evening of the first day of the Festival should compensate with a meal on the evening of the last day of the Festival, on the Eighth Day of Assembly, despite the fact that he will not eat it in the sukka. And the Rabbis say: There is no compensation for this matter, and with regard to similar cases where it is impossible to rectify failure to fulfill a positive mitzva, it is stated: “That which is crooked cannot be made straight; and that which is wanting cannot be numbered” (Ecclesiastes 1:15).

In the case of one whose head and most of his body were in the sukka and his table was in the house, Beit Shammai deem it unfit, and Beit Hillel deem it fit. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: And wasn’t there an incident where the Elders of Beit Shammai and the Elders of Beit Hillel went to visit Rabbi Yoḥanan ben HaḤoranit and they found him such that he was sitting with his head and most of his body in the sukka and his table in the house, and they said nothing to him? Even Beit Shammai did not object. Beit Shammai said to them: Is there proof from there? That is not what happened; rather, they said to him: If you were accustomed to act in this manner, you have never fulfilled the mitzva of sukka in your life.

The mishna continues: Women, slaves, and minors are exempt from the mitzva of sukka. A minor who does not need his mother any longer is obligated in the mitzva. There was an incident where the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth just before Sukkot, and Shammai removed the coat of plaster from the roof, leaving the beams, and roofed with the beams over the bed for the newborn minor.

All seven days of Sukkot, a person renders his sukka his permanent residence and his house his temporary residence. If rain fell, from when is it permitted to vacate the sukka? It is permitted from the point that it is raining so hard that the congealed dish will spoil. The Sages told a parable: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a servant who comes to pour wine for his master, and he pours a jug [ kiton ] of water in his face to show him that his presence is not desired. So too, in the sukka, rain is an indication that the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not want the person to fulfill the mitzva of sukka.

Chapter 3

A lulav that was stolen or that is completely dry is unfit for use in fulfilling the mitzva of the four species. The lulav of a tree worshipped as idolatry [ asheira ] and a lulav from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry, which must be burned along with all the city’s property, are unfit. If the top of the lulav was severed or if the palm leaves were severed from the spine of the lulav, it is unfit. If its leaves, although still attached, were spread and are no longer completely joined to the spine, it is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: In that case, one should bind the lulav from the top, to join the leaves that spread to the spine. A lulav from the palms of the Iron Mountain are fit for use, although it differs from one taken from a standard palm tree, in that its leaves are shorter and do not cover the entire spine. A lulav that has three handbreadths in length, sufficient to enable one to wave with it, is fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva.

A myrtle branch that was stolen or that is completely dry is unfit. A myrtle branch of a tree worshipped as idolatry [ asheira ] or a myrtle branch from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry is unfit. If the top of the myrtle branch was severed, if the leaves were severed completely, or if its berries were more numerous than its leaves, it is unfit. If one diminished their number by plucking berries so that they no longer outnumbered the leaves, the myrtle branch is fit. But one may not diminish the number on the Festival itself.

A willow branch that was stolen or is completely dry is unfit. One from a tree worshipped as idolatry [ asheira ] or from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry is unfit. If the top was severed, or its leaves were severed, or if it is the tzaftzafa, a species similar to, but not actually a willow, it is unfit. However, a willow branch that is slightly dried, and one that a minority of its leaves fell, and a branch from a willow that does not grow by the river, but instead is from a non-irrigated field, is fit.

Rabbi Yishmael says: The mitzva of the four species is to take three myrtle branches, and two willow branches, one lulav, and one etrog. With regard to the myrtle branches, even if the tops of two are severed and the top of one is not severed, it is fit. Rabbi Tarfon says: Even if the tops of all three are severed, it is fit. Rabbi Akiva says with regard to the number of each of the species: Just as there is one lulav and one etrog, so too there is one myrtle branch and one willow branch.

An etrog that was stolen or is completely dry is unfit. One from a tree worshipped as idolatry [ asheira ] or from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry is unfit. An etrog that is fruit that grew on a tree during the three years after it was planted [ orla ] is unfit, because it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from it. An etrog of impure teruma is unfit. With regard to an etrog of pure teruma, one may not take it ab initio, and if one took it, it is fit, and he fulfilled his obligation after the fact. With regard to an etrog of demai, which is produce acquired from an am ha’aretz, who does not reliably tithe his produce, Beit Shammai deem it unfit, and Beit Hillel deem it fit. With regard to an etrog of second tithe in Jerusalem, one may not take it ab initio ; and if he took it, it is fit.

If boil-like blemishes arose on the majority of the etrog ; if its pestle -like protuberance on the upper, blossom end was removed; if the etrog was peeled, split, or pierced and is missing any amount, it is unfit. However, if boil-like blemishes arose only on its minority; if its stem, which connects it to the tree, was removed; or it was pierced but is not missing any amount, it is fit. A Cushite etrog, which is black like a Cushite, is unfit. And with regard to an etrog that is leek green, Rabbi Meir deems it fit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it unfit.

What is the minimum measure of a small etrog? Rabbi Meir says: It may be no smaller than a walnut-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda says: It may be no smaller than an egg-bulk. And in a large etrog, the maximum measure is so that one could hold two in his one hand; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: It is fit even if it is so large that he can hold only one in his two hands.

One may bind the lulav only with its own species; i.e., one of the four species taken with the lulav. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One may do so even with a string or with a cord. Rabbi Meir said: There was an incident involving the men of Jerusalem who would bind their lulavim with gold rings. The Sages said to him: They would bind it with its own species beneath the rings, which serve a merely decorative purpose and not a halakhic one.

And where in the recitation of hallel would they wave the lulav? They would do so at the verse: “Thank the Lord, for He is good” (Psalms 118:1, 29) that appears at both the beginning and the end of the psalm, and at the verse: “Lord, please save us” (Psalms 118:25); this is the statement of Beit Hillel. And Beit Shammai say: They would wave the lulav even at the verse: “Lord, please grant us success” (Psalms 118:25). Rabbi Akiva said: I was observing Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua and saw that all the people were waving their lulavim, and the two of them waved their lulav only at: “Lord, please save us,” indicating that this is the halakha. With regard to one who was coming along the way and did not have a lulav in his hand to take and fulfill the mitzva while traveling, when he enters his house to eat, he should take the lulav at his table. He interrupts his meal to fulfill the mitzva of lulav. If he did not take the lulav in the morning, he should take it in the afternoon, as the entire day is suited for fulfilling the mitzva of lulav.

With regard to one for whom a Canaanite slave, a woman, or a minor was reciting hallel, he repeats after them what they are saying word for word. The mishna notes: And may a curse come to him for being so ignorant that he needs them to recite it for him. If an adult male was reciting hallel on his behalf, he need not repeat each word, as the adult male can fulfill the obligation to recite hallel on his behalf. Rather, he simply answers: Halleluya, to each phrase that is recited.

In a place where they were accustomed to repeat certain verses, he, too, should repeat them. If the custom is to recite them plainly, without repetition, he should recite them plainly. In a place where the custom is to recite a blessing after hallel, he should recite a blessing. Everything is in accordance with the local custom in these matters. In the case of one who purchases a lulav from another who is an am ha’aretz during the Sabbatical Year, the seller gives him an etrog along with it as a gift, as he is not permitted to purchase the etrog during the Sabbatical Year because it is prohibited to engage in commerce with Sabbatical-Year produce.

Originally, during the Temple era, the lulav was taken in the Temple for seven days, and in the rest of the country outside the Temple it was taken for one day. Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted an ordinance that the lulav should be taken even in the rest of the country for seven days, in commemoration of the Temple. And for similar reasons, he instituted an ordinance that for the entire day of waving the omer offering, it should be prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop. It is prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop until the omer offering is brought and waved in the Temple on the sixteenth of Nisan. The offering was sacrificed in the morning; however, after taking potential delays into consideration, the new crop remained prohibited until it was clear that the offering had been sacrificed. Practically speaking, it was prohibited to eat the new grain until the sixteenth of Nisan was over; it was permitted only on the seventeenth. Once the Temple was destroyed and there was no longer an omer offering sacrificed, it was permitted to eat the new crop on the sixteenth. However, Rabban Yoḥanan instituted an ordinance that eating the new grain would remain prohibited until the seventeenth to commemorate the Temple.

If the first day of the festival of Sukkot occurs on Shabbat, all of the people bring their lulavim to the synagogue on Shabbat eve, as it is prohibited to carry in a public domain on Shabbat. The next day, on Shabbat, everyone rises early and comes to the synagogue. Each and every one recognizes his lulav and takes it. This emphasis that each and every one recognizes his own lulav and takes it is because the Sages said: A person does not fulfill his obligation to take the lulav on the first day of the Festival with the lulav of another, and on the rest of the days of the Festival a person fulfills his obligation even with the lulav of another.

Rabbi Yosei says: If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried the lulav out into the public domain, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering for this unwitting transgression because he carried it out with permission, i.e., he was preoccupied with the performance of the mitzva and carried it out.

A woman may receive a lulav from her son or from her husband and return it on Shabbat to the water in which it had been placed. Rabbi Yehuda says: On Shabbat one may return the lulav to the water; and on the Festival one may even add fresh water to the vessel so the lulav will not wilt; and during the intermediate days of the Festival, one may even change the water. A minor who knows how to wave the lulav is obligated in the mitzva of lulav due to the requirement to train him in the performance of mitzvot.

Chapter 4

The lulav is taken and the altar is encircled together with the willow branch either six or seven days, depending on which day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat. The obligation to recite the full hallel and the mitzva of rejoicing, i.e., eating the meat of the peace-offering, is in effect for eight days, seven days of Sukkot and the Eighth Day of Assembly. The mitzva of sukka and the ritual of the water libation on the altar are in effect for seven days. The flute is played in the Temple for five or six days, depending on which day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, to enhance the rejoicing on the Festival.

The mishna elaborates: The lulav is taken for seven days. How so? If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, since the mitzva to take the lulav on the first day is a mitzva by Torah law, it overrides Shabbat and one takes the lulav that day. As a result, the lulav is then taken for seven days. And if the first day occurs on one of the rest of the days of the week and one of the other days of the Festival coincides with Shabbat, the lulav is taken only six days. Since the mitzva to take the lulav is a mitzva by rabbinic law throughout the rest of Sukkot, it does not override Shabbat.

The altar is encircled with the willow branch for seven days. How so? If the seventh day of the mitzva of the willow branch occurs on Shabbat, since on that day it is a mitzva by Torah law, it overrides Shabbat and the mitzva of the willow branch is then performed for seven days. And if the seventh day occurs on one of the rest of the days of the week, and one of the other days of the Festival coincides with Shabbat, since the mitzva of the willow branch is then by rabbinic law and consequently does not override Shabbat, it is performed for only six days.

How is the mitzva of lulav fulfilled in the Temple when the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat? If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, all the people bring their lulavim to the Temple Mount on Friday. The attendants receive the lulavim from them and arrange them on a bench [ itztaba ], while the Elders place their lulavim in the chamber. They were given permission to do so due to the concern that they would be injured the following morning in the rush of people in search of their lulavim. And the court teaches the people to say: With regard to anyone whom my lulav reaches his possession, it is his as a gift. They did so to avoid the likely situation where people would inadvertently take lulavim that did not belong to them, as on the first day of the Festival one does not fulfill his obligation with a lulav that does not belong to him. The next day everyone rises early and comes to the Temple, and the attendants throw the lulavim before them. And in the confusion, the people snatch the lulavim and in the process strike one another. And when the court saw that they came to potential danger, they instituted that each and every person will take his lulav in his house and fulfill the mitzva there.

How is the mitzva of the willow branch fulfilled? There was a place below Jerusalem, and it was called Motza. They would descend there and gather willow branches [ murbiyyot ] from there. And they would then come and stand them upright at the sides of the altar, and the tops of the branches would be inclined over the top of the altar. They then sounded a tekia, a simple uninterrupted blast, sounded a terua, a broken sound and/or a series of short staccato blasts, and sounded another tekia. Each day they would circle the altar one time and say: “Lord, please save us. Lord, please grant us success” (Psalms 118:25). Rabbi Yehuda says that they would say: Ani vaho, please save us. And on that day, the seventh day of Sukkot, they would circle the altar seven times. At the time of their departure at the end of the Festival, what would they say? It is beautiful for you, altar; it is beautiful for you, altar. Rabbi Elazar said that they would say: To the Lord and to you, altar; to the Lord and to you, altar.

The mishna notes: As its performance during the week, so is its performance on Shabbat; except for the fact that they would gather the branches from Shabbat eve and place them in basins of gold so that they would not dry. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: There was a unique custom on the seventh day. They would bring palm branches to the Temple and place them on the ground at the sides of the altar, and that seventh day of Sukkot was called: The day of the placing of palm branches.

Immediately after fulfilling the mitzva of taking the four species on the seventh day of the festival of Sukkot, children remove their lulavim from the binding and eat their etrogim as an expression of extreme joy.

This mishna elaborates upon the first mishna in this chapter. The obligation to recite hallel and the mitzva of rejoicing on the Festival by sacrificing and eating the meat of peace-offerings are always for eight days. The mishna explains: How so? This teaches that a person is obligated in hallel, and in the mitzva of rejoicing, and in reverence for the last day of the Festival like he is for all the other days of the Festival. The mitzva of sukka is seven days. How does one fulfill this obligation for seven full days? When one finished eating on the seventh day, he should not dismantle his sukka immediately, because the obligation continues until the end of the day. However, he takes the vessels down from the sukka into the house from minḥa time and onward in deference to the last day of the Festival, when he will require the vessels in the house.

With regard to the rite of water libation performed in the Temple during the Festival, how was it performed? One would fill a golden jug with a capacity of three log with water from the Siloam pool. When those who went to bring the water reached the Gate of the Water, so called because the water for the libation was brought through this gate leading to the Temple courtyard, they sounded a tekia, sounded a terua, and sounded another tekia as an expression of joy. The priest ascended the ramp of the altar and turned to his left. There were two silver basins there into which he poured the water. Rabbi Yehuda said: They were limestone basins, but they would blacken due to the wine and therefore looked like silver. The two basins were perforated at the bottom with two thin perforated nose-like protrusions. One of the basins, used for the wine libation, had a perforation that was broad, and one, used for the water libation, had a perforation that was thin, so that the flow of both the water and the wine, which do not have the same viscosity, would conclude simultaneously. The basin to the west of the altar was for water, and the basin to the east of the altar was for wine. However, if one poured the contents of the basin of water into the basin of wine, or the contents of the basin of wine into the basin of water, he fulfilled his obligation, as failure to pour the libation from the prescribed location does not disqualify the libation after the fact. Rabbi Yehuda says: The basin for the water libation was not that large; rather, one would pour the water with a vessel that had a capacity of one log on all eight days of the Festival and not only seven. And the appointee says to the one pouring the water into the silver basin: Raise your hand, so that his actions would be visible, as one time a Sadducee priest intentionally poured the water on his feet, as the Sadducees did not accept the oral tradition requiring water libation, and in their rage all the people pelted him with their etrogim.

Rabbi Yehuda continues: As its performance during the week, so is its performance on Shabbat, except that on Shabbat one would not draw water. Instead, on Shabbat eve, one would fill a golden barrel that was not consecrated for exclusive use in the Temple from the Siloam pool, and he would place it in the Temple chamber and draw water from there on Shabbat. If the water in the barrel spilled, or if it was exposed overnight, leading to concern that a snake may have deposited poison in the water, one would fill the jug with water from the basin in the Temple courtyard, as exposed wine or water is unfit for the altar. Just as it is prohibited for people to drink them due to the potential danger, so too, they may not be poured on the altar.

Chapter 5

The flute is played on the festival of Sukkot for five or six days. This is the flute of the Place of the Drawing of the Water, whose playing overrides neither Shabbat nor the Festival. Therefore, if the first Festival day occurred on Shabbat, they would play the flute for six days that year. However, if Shabbat coincided with one of the intermediate days of the Festival, they would play the flute for only five days. One who did not see the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of the Water never saw celebration in his days.

This was the sequence of events: At the conclusion of the first Festival day the priests and the Levites descended from the Israelites’ courtyard to the Women’s Courtyard, where they would introduce a significant repair, as the Gemara will explain. There were golden candelabra atop poles there in the courtyard. And there were four basins made of gold at the top of each candelabrum. And there were four ladders for each and every pole and there were four children from the priesthood trainees, and in their hands were pitchers with a capacity of 120 log of oil that they would pour into each and every basin.

From the worn trousers of the priests and their belts they would loosen and tear strips to use as wicks, and with them they would light the candelabra. And the light from the candelabra was so bright that there was not a courtyard in Jerusalem that was not illuminated from the light of the Place of the Drawing of the Water.

The pious and the men of action would dance before the people who attended the celebration, with flaming torches that they would juggle in their hands, and they would say before them passages of song and praise to God. And the Levites would play on lyres, harps, cymbals, and trumpets, and countless other musical instruments. The musicians would stand on the fifteen stairs that descend from the Israelites’ courtyard to the Women’s Courtyard, corresponding to the fifteen Songs of the Ascents in Psalms, i.e., chapters 120–134, and upon which the Levites stand with musical instruments and recite their song. And this was the ceremony of the Water Libation: Two priests stood at the Upper Gate that descends from the Israelites’ courtyard to the Women’s Courtyard, with two trumpets in their hands. When the rooster crowed at dawn, they sounded a tekia, and sounded a terua, and sounded a tekia. When they who would draw the water reached the tenth stair the trumpeters sounded a tekia, and sounded a terua, and sounded a tekia, to indicate that the time to draw water from the Siloam pool had arrived. When they reached the Women’s Courtyard with the basins of water in their hands, the trumpeters sounded a tekia, and sounded a terua, and sounded a tekia. When they reached the ground of the Women’s Courtyard, the trumpeters sounded a tekia, and sounded a terua, and sounded a tekia. They continued sounding the trumpets until they reached the gate through which one exits to the east, from the Women’s Courtyard to the eastern slope of the Temple Mount. When they reached the gate through which one exits to the east, they turned from facing east to facing west, toward the Holy of Holies, and said: Our ancestors who were in this place during the First Temple period who did not conduct themselves appropriately, stood “with their backs toward the Sanctuary of the Lord, and their faces toward the east; and they worshipped the sun toward the east” (Ezekiel 8:16), and we, our eyes are to God. Rabbi Yehuda says that they would repeat and say: We are to God, and our eyes are to God.

One sounds no fewer than twenty-one trumpet blasts in the Temple, and one sounds no more than forty-eight. The mishna elaborates: Each day there were twenty-one trumpet blasts in the Temple: Three blasts were sounded for the opening of the gates in the morning, nine for the daily morning offering, and nine for the daily afternoon offering, totaling twenty-one. And on a day when the additional offerings were sacrificed, e.g., the New Moon, with the additional offerings they would add nine additional blasts. And on Shabbat eve they would add six blasts sounded adjacent to the onset of Shabbat: Three to stop the people from their labor, as the blasts inform the people that Shabbat is approaching and they stop working, and three at the onset of Shabbat to demarcate between sacred and profane. On Shabbat eve during the festival of Sukkot, there were forty-eight blasts. How so? Three in the morning for the opening of the gates; three for the upper gate; and three for the lower gate; and three for the filling of the vessel with water, as described in the sequence of the ritual of drawing the water for the water libation (48b); and three when pouring the water libation upon the altar; nine for the daily morning offering; and nine for the daily afternoon offering; and nine for the additional offerings; three to stop the people from work; and three more to demarcate between sacred and profane, totaling forty-eight blasts.

On the first Festival day of Sukkot there were thirteen bulls, two rams, and one goat there. The mishna proceeds to discuss the division of labor for the Festival offerings among the twenty-four priestly watches, all of which serve in the Temple on the pilgrimage Festivals. The sixteen offerings mentioned above were divided among sixteen priestly watches, one offering per watch. Fourteen sheep remained to be divided among the eight remaining watches. On the first day of the Festival, six of the eight remaining watches sacrifice two sheep each for a total of twelve, and the remaining two watches sacrifice one sheep each. On the second day of the Festival, i.e., the first day of the intermediate days, when twelve bulls were sacrificed, fifteen of the priestly watches sacrifice the bulls, rams, and goat, five of the remaining watches sacrifice two sheep each, and the remaining four watches sacrifice one sheep each. On the third day of the Festival, when eleven bulls were sacrificed, fourteen of the priestly watches sacrifice the bulls, rams, and goat, four of the remaining watches sacrifice two sheep each, and the remaining six watches sacrifice one sheep each. On the fourth day of the Festival, when ten bulls were sacrificed, thirteen of the priestly watches sacrifice the bulls, rams, and goat, three of the remaining watches sacrifice two sheep each, and the remaining eight watches sacrifice one sheep each. On the fifth day, when nine bulls were sacrificed, twelve watches sacrifice the bulls, rams, and goat, two of the twelve remaining watches sacrifice two sheep each, and the remaining ten watches sacrifice one sheep each. On the sixth day, when eight bulls were sacrificed, eleven watches sacrifice the bulls, rams, and goat, one of the remaining watches sacrifices two sheep, and the remaining twelve watches sacrifice one sheep each. On the seventh day they are all equal and bring one offering each. On the eighth day, when there was a completely different configuration of offerings, they returned to the standard lottery system used to determine which of the priestly watches would sacrifice the offerings, as they did on the other pilgrimage Festivals, which do not have as many offerings as does Sukkot. They said about the ordering of the priestly watches: One who sacrificed bulls today will not sacrifice bulls tomorrow; rather, they will sacrifice one of the other types of offerings. They rotate, so that each of the watches will have the opportunity to sacrifice bulls as well as other animals.

At three times during the year, all twenty-four priestly watches have equal status, in that all receive a share in the Temple service independent of the standard order of the watches and all receive a share in the accompanying gifts of the priesthood: In the portions of the offerings of the Festivals sacrificed on the altar and in the distribution of the shewbread on Shabbat during the Festivals. On Shavuot that coincides with Shabbat, when the two loaves offered on Shavuot would be distributed together with the distribution of the shewbread, the priest charged with the distribution says to each priest: Here is matza from the shewbread for you, and here is leavened bread from the two loaves for you. The principle is that the priestly watch whose time is fixed during the Festival sacrifices the daily offerings during the Festival, as well as vow-offerings, free-will offerings, and all other communal offerings. And that watch sacrifices all of them even during the Festival, when other aspects of the service are shared by all the watches. In the case of a Festival that occurs adjacent to Shabbat, both when it occurs preceding it and when it occurs following it, all the watches that arrived early or remained late to serve in the Temple were of equal status in the distribution of the shewbread on that Shabbat.

If one day happened to separate between the Festival and Shabbat, the watch whose time was scheduled would take ten of the twelve loaves of shewbread, and the watch that was detained after the Festival because there was insufficient time to get home before Shabbat takes two loaves. And during the rest of the days of the year, when the changing of the watches takes place on Shabbat, the incoming watch takes six loaves and the outgoing watch takes six loaves. Rabbi Yehuda says: The incoming watch takes seven loaves and the outgoing takes five. The standard procedure was that the members of the incoming watch divide the shewbread in the north section of the courtyard, and the outgoing watch in the south. However, there was one exception: The watch of Bilga, due to a penalty imposed upon it, always divides the shewbread to its members in the south, even when it is the incoming watch. And its ring used to facilitate slaughter of the animals was fixed in place, rendering it useless, and its niche among the niches in the wall of the Chamber of Knives, where the priests would store their knives and other vessels, was sealed.

Mishnah Beitzah

Chapter 1

With regard to an egg that was laid on a Festival ( Eduyyot 4:1), Beit Shammai say: It may be eaten even on that day, and Beit Hillel say: It may not be eaten, as the Gemara will explain at length. Apropos this exceptional case, in which Beit Shammai are lenient and Beit Hillel are strict, the mishna cites additional halakhot of the Festivals in which this unusual phenomenon occurs ( Yoma 79b). Beit Shammai say: Leaven, i.e., dough that has leavened to such an extent that it is no longer used as food but as a leavening agent for other dough, is prohibited on Passover in the measure of an olive-bulk. However, the measure for edible leavened bread is greater, that of a large date-bulk. And Beit Hillel say: For both this and that, the measure is that of an olive-bulk.

Furthermore, with regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird on a Festival ( Eduyyot 4:2), in which case there is a mitzva from the Torah to cover the blood after slaughtering (Leviticus 17:13), Beit Shammai say: He digs earth with a shovel and covers the blood with that earth ab initio. And Beit Hillel say: He may not slaughter ab initio, unless he had earth prepared for that purpose while it was still day. But even Beit Hillel concede that if one already slaughtered the animal or the bird, then he should dig with a shovel and cover the blood. Additionally, they agree that the ashes of a stove are considered prepared for the use of covering blood, as will be explained by the Gemara.

Beit Shammai say: One may not carry a ladder, which was used for reaching doves, from one dovecote to another. However, one may move it slightly so that he tilts it from one window to another in the same dovecote. And Beit Hillel permit even carrying a ladder from one dovecote to another. Beit Shammai say: One may not take fledgling doves from a dovecote on a Festival, unless he shook the ones he wished to take while it was still day, thereby preparing them. And Beit Hillel say: It is not necessary to shake; rather, it is sufficient if one stands the day before and says: I will take this fledgling and that one.

If, on the eve of a Festival, one designated black fledglings to be slaughtered, and on the following day found white ones in the dovecote, rather than the birds he had designated, or if one designated white ones to be slaughtered and found black ones, or if one designated two fledglings to be slaughtered and found three, they are prohibited, as these are not the same fledglings he had designated earlier. If, however, one designated three to be slaughtered and found only two, they are permitted, as it is presumed that one of the fledglings escaped. If one designated them inside the nest and the next day he cannot find them there, and he found fledglings before the nest, they are prohibited, as they might be fledglings other than the ones he designated and left inside the nest. But if there are only those fledglings in the immediate vicinity, they are permitted, as it can be assumed that these are the ones he designated inside the nest.

Beit Shammai say: One may not remove the shutters [ terisin ] of a store on a Festival, due to the prohibition against building and demolishing. And Beit Hillel permit one not only to open the shutters, but even to replace them. Beit Shammai say: One may not take a large pestle from a mortar, which is normally used for crushing wheat in the preparation of porridge, for any other purpose on a Festival, e.g., to cut meat on it; and Beit Hillel permit it. Likewise, Beit Shammai say: One may not place an unprocessed hide before those who will tread on it, as this constitutes the prohibited labor of tanning on a Festival. And one may not lift the hide from its place, as it is considered muktze, unless there is an olive-bulk of meat on it, in which case it may be carried on account of its meat; and Beit Hillel permit it in both cases. Beit Shammai say: One may carry out on a Festival neither a minor child, nor a lulav, nor a Torah Scroll into the public domain, as none of these are required for the preparation of food; and Beit Hillel permit it.

The separation of ḥalla is permitted on a Festival, as one is permitted to prepare dough and bake it on a Festival, and bread may not be eaten without first separating ḥalla. Beit Shammai say: One may not bring separated ḥalla or any of the other priestly gifts, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw of a slaughtered animal, to a priest on a Festival, though it is permitted to separate them from an animal slaughtered on a Festival. This is prohibited regardless of whether they were separated last evening, i.e., before the Festival, or whether they were separated today. And Beit Hillel permit it. Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: This halakha can be derived by an analogy: Ḥalla and the other gifts are both considered a gift to the priest, and likewise teruma separated from produce is also a gift to the priest. Just as you agree that one may not bring teruma to a priest on a Festival, so too, one may not bring the other gifts. Beit Hillel said to them: No, this analogy is incorrect. If you said that you derive the halakha from teruma, where its separation is not allowed on the Festival, how will you say the same with regard to the gifts from an animal or ḥalla, concerning which their separation is allowed on the Festival? Since it is not prohibited to separate these gifts, they may likewise be brought to a priest.

Beit Shammai say: Spices may be pounded on a Festival in a slightly unusual manner, with a wooden pestle, and salt may be pounded only with an earthenware flask or with a wooden pot ladle, in a manner very different from that of a weekday. And Beit Hillel say: Spices may be pounded in their usual manner, even with a stone pestle, and as for salt, although it must be pounded in an irregular manner, a slight modification such as pounding it with a wooden pestle is enough to render the act permitted.

With regard to one who selects legumes on a Festival by separating the edible and inedible portions, Beit Shammai say: He may select food and eat it immediately, while leaving the refuse. And Beit Hillel say: He may select in his usual manner, in his lap, with a tray, or with a large vessel, but he may not do so with a tablet, nor with a winnow, nor with a sieve, as these vessels are specially designed for selecting, which gives his action the appearance of a weekday activity. Rabban Gamliel says: One may even wash the legumes in water and skim off the refuse floating on top.

Beit Shammai say: One may send only portions of prepared food on a Festival, but not any other gifts. And Beit Hillel say: One may even send gifts of domesticated animals, undomesticated animals, and fowl, whether alive or slaughtered. Similarly, one may send wines, oils, and vessels of flour, and even legumes, but not grain, which is unfit for use, as one may not grind it on the Festival. And Rabbi Shimon permits sending gifts even in the case of grain, as it can be made into porridge without being ground.

One may send clothes, whether they are sewn or whether they are unsewn, and even if they contain diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen [ sha’atnez ]. But one may do so only if they serve the purposes of the Festival. However, one may not send a spiked sandal, which has nails fixed to it, as the Sages decreed that one may not wear a sandal of this kind on a Shabbat or Festival, nor an unsewn shoe, which is not suitable for a Festival. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not even send a white shoe, which people do not usually wear, because it requires an artisan to paint it black. This is the general principle: Anything that one may use on a Festival, one may send it.

Chapter 2

With regard to a Festival that occurs on Shabbat eve, one may not cook on the Festival with the initial intent to cook for Shabbat. However, he may cook on that day for the Festival itself, and if he left over any food, he left it over for Shabbat. The early Sages also instituted an ordinance: The joining of cooked foods [ eiruv tavshilin ], which the mishna explains. One may prepare a cooked dish designated for Shabbat on a Festival eve and rely on it to cook on the Festival for Shabbat. The tanna’im disagreed with regard to the details of this ordinance: Beit Shammai say: For the purpose of the joining of cooked foods one must prepare two cooked dishes, and Beit Hillel say: One dish is sufficient. And they both agree with regard to a fish and the egg that is fried on it that these are considered two dishes for this purpose. If one ate the food prepared before the Festival as an eiruv and none of it remained for Shabbat, or if it was lost, he may not rely on it and cook with the initial intent to cook for Shabbat. If he left any part of the eiruv, he may rely on it to cook for Shabbat.

If a Festival occurs directly after Shabbat, i.e., on a Sunday, and one wishes to behave in a proper manner and purify himself and his vessels in honor of the Festival, Beit Shammai say: One must immerse everything before Shabbat, and Beit Hillel say: Vessels must be immersed before Shabbat, but a person may immerse himself even on Shabbat.

And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel both agree that one may bring ritually impure water into contact with ritually pure water in stone vessels on Shabbat in order to purify the water. Impure water can be purified if it is placed into a vessel that does not contract ritual impurity, such as a stone vessel, and then lowered with the vessel into a ritual bath. The water becomes purified when it comes into contact with the water of the ritual bath. Although this is not considered proper immersion, water may nevertheless be purified in this manner. However, one may not immerse the impure water in a ritually impure vessel in order to purify the vessel at the same time. Likewise, one may immerse on a Festival from one principle to another, and from one group to another, as will be explained in the Gemara.

Beit Shammai say: One may bring peace-offerings on a Festival, but one may not place his hands on them, as this is considered using animals, which is prohibited on a Festival by rabbinic decree. However, one may not bring burnt-offerings, apart from the obligatory daily and additional offerings of the day, because burnt-offerings are consumed entirely on the altar and not by people, and slaughter is permitted on a Festival only for the purpose of human consumption. And Beit Hillel say: One may bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings, and one may even place his hands on them.

Beit Shammai say: A person may not heat water on a Festival in order to wash his feet unless it is also fit for drinking, as they hold that kindling a fire on a Festival is permitted only for the sake of preparing food, but not for washing. But Beit Hillel permit one to kindle a fire on a Festival even for washing. A person may kindle a large fire and warm himself at it.

Rabban Gamliel was stringent about three things in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai: One may not insulate hot food on a Festival for Shabbat ab initio, but rather one ought to do so on the eve of the Festival; and one may not set up a metal candelabrum that fell on a Festival; and one may not bake thick loaves on a Festival but only thin ones, due to the great effort entailed in preparing the former. Rabban Gamliel said: From the days of my father’s household they would never bake thick loaves on a Festival, but only thin ones. The Sages said to him: What shall we do for your father’s household, who were stringent with themselves but lenient with all of the Jewish people, to allow them to bake thick loaves and cakes baked on coals.

Rabban Gamliel also said three things as leniencies, in opposition to the view of most of the Sages: One may sweep the room of the couches on a Festival, i.e., the dining room, where they would recline on couches to eat, as there is no concern that by sweeping the room one might come to fill in the holes and level the ground. And one may place incense consisting of fragrant herbs on burning coals in order to perfume one’s house on a Festival. And one may prepare a whole kid goat, meaning a kid goat roasted whole, with its entrails over its head, on the night of Passover, as was the custom when they roasted the Paschal lamb in the Temple. However, the Rabbis prohibit all three practices: It is prohibited to sweep lest one come to level the ground, it is prohibited to burn incense because it does not meet the criteria of permitted food preparation, and it is prohibited to eat a kid that was roasted whole on the night of Passover because it would appear as if he were eating consecrated food outside the Temple.

There are three things that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya permits and the Rabbis prohibit: His cow would go out on Shabbat with a decorative strap between its horns. Rabbi Elazar holds that such a strap is considered an ornament for the cow rather than a burden, whereas the Sages view it as a burden. And one may comb [ mekardin ] an animal with a fine comb on a Festival in order to remove ticks and dirt from its hair; the Rabbis prohibit this due to a concern that he might thereby come to wound or bruise the animal. And one may grind pepper needed on the Festival even in its own mill, although this appears similar to a weekday labor. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not comb an animal to remove ticks and dirt from its hair on a Festival because this certainly creates a wound, but one may brush it with a wooden comb, as its blunt teeth do not wound the animal. But the Rabbis say: One may not comb, nor may one even brush.

The aforementioned pepper mill is a composite vessel, and each of its parts must be considered independently with respect to ritual impurity. It is susceptible to ritual impurity because of each of the three vessels of which it is comprised: It is susceptible to impurity because it is a wooden receptacle, it is susceptible to impurity because it is a metal vessel, and it is susceptible to impurity because it is a sieve.

A child’s wagon, with which he plays and upon which he also sits, is susceptible to ritual impurity imparted by treading. It is considered a fixed seat of the child, so that if the child is a zav and he sits on the wagon, it contracts the ritual impurity imparted by the treading of a zav. And this wagon may be handled on Shabbat, as it is considered a vessel. And it may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat only upon cloth, a stone pavement, or the like, as otherwise it would create a furrow when dragged, and one would be liable due to the prohibited labor of plowing. Rabbi Yehuda says: For this reason, no vessels may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat except for a wagon, which is permitted because its wheels do not make a furrow in the ground but merely press the earth down. Since no earth is moved from its place, this is not considered digging or plowing on Shabbat.

Chapter 3

One may not trap fish from their ponds on a Festival even with the intention of eating them, as this falls into the category of hunting, a type of labor that is not permitted on a Festival. Nor may one place food before them, as it is not his duty to feed them; rather, they maintain themselves by eating smaller fish or different types of algae that grow in the water. However, one may trap an animal or a bird from their enclosures [ beivarim ], as they are viewed as already captured, and therefore the action is not considered an act of hunting. And one may also place food before them as one does for other household animals. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not all enclosures are identical with respect to the halakhot of hunting. This is the principle: With regard to any animal inside such an enclosure whose trapping is inadequate, meaning that the enclosure is large and contains hiding places so that it is still necessary to pursue and apprehend the animal, it is prohibited for one to catch it; and with regard to any animal whose trapping is not inadequate, as it is possible to seize it immediately without having to engage in further pursuit, it is permitted for one to catch it.

If traps for animals, birds, and fish were set on the eve of a Festival, one may not take anything from them on the Festival, unless he knows that the animals found in the traps had already been caught on the eve of the Festival. And an incident is related where a certain gentile brought fish to Rabban Gamliel, and the latter said: The fish are permitted, but I do not wish to accept them from him, as I despise him.

If an animal is in danger of dying, in which case its meat would be prohibited as the animal had not been properly slaughtered, and one wishes to slaughter it in the hope that it will be found fit for eating and he will be spared a loss, he may not slaughter it on a Festival unless there is still time in the day for him to eat an olive-bulk of roasted meat from the animal, so that it is possible to say that he slaughtered the animal for the sake of the Festival. Rabbi Akiva says: There need not be enough time for him to roast it; rather, it is sufficient even if there is only time to eat an olive-bulk of raw meat from the place where the animal is slaughtered, i.e., from its neck, without going to the trouble of removing its hide and roasting it. If one slaughtered an animal on a Festival in the field, he may not bring it to his house on a pole or on a set of poles carried by two people, as this appears similar to a weekday activity. Rather, he must alter his usual weekday manner of performing this action and bring it in by hand, limb by limb. A male firstborn of cattle, sheep, or goats belonging to a Jew is sanctified from birth and must be given to a priest to be sacrificed on the altar in the Temple. If a firstborn animal acquired a physical blemish that disqualifies it from being sacrificed as an offering, it still must be given to a priest, but it may be redeemed, slaughtered, and eaten as non-sacred meat.

If a firstborn animal fell into a cistern on a Festival, and there is concern that it might die there, Rabbi Yehuda says: An expert in these matters goes down into the cistern and examines the animal. If it has a permanent blemish, owing to which it may be slaughtered and eaten, he may raise it from the cistern and slaughter it; but if it does not have a blemish, or if its blemish is temporary, he may not slaughter it. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if it has a blemish, it is prohibited to slaughter it, as any firstborn animal whose blemish is not perceptible while it is still day, i.e., on the day before the Festival, is not considered to be among the animals prepared prior to the Festival for use on the Festival.

With regard to an animal that died, one may not move it from its place on a Festival. And such an incident once occurred and they asked Rabbi Tarfon about it. And on that same occasion they also asked him about ḥalla that had been separated from dough and then became ritually impure on a Festival. Such ḥalla is not fit to be eaten by anyone, nor may it be used in any other manner, e.g., as animal feed or as fuel for a fire, on that day. Rabbi Tarfon entered the study hall and inquired about these matters, and the Sages said to him: One may not move them from their place.

One may not register to have a portion of an animal on a Festival ab initio, since it is prohibited to divide up an animal into portions for different people, as this is similar to conducting business, a weekday activity, on a Festival. But one may register for the animal on the eve of the Festival, and then those who registered for the animal may slaughter and divide it between them on the Festival itself in accordance with the agreement reached the day before. The next day, each pays the slaughterer according to his portion of the animal. Rabbi Yehuda says: A person selling meat on a Festival who wishes to know its weight in order to determine its price may not weigh it against regular weights in the ordinary weekday manner, but he may weigh the meat against a vessel or against a cleaver [ kofitz ] and then calculate the weight of the meat by weighing the vessel or cleaver later. And the Rabbis say: One may not look at the pans of a balance scale at all, meaning that they may not be used for weighing in any manner or for any other purpose.

One may not sharpen a knife on a Festival in the ordinary weekday manner. However, one may do so in an unusual fashion, e.g., to run one knife over another, thereby sharpening the blade. A person may not say to a butcher on a Festival: Weigh for me a dinar’s worth of meat, since if he mentions a sum of money, it looks like a commercial transaction. But the butcher may slaughter an animal and apportion it among his customers without stipulating a price.

One person may say to another on a Festival: Fill this vessel for me, and I will return its contents or reimburse you after the Festival, but he may not ask him to fill the vessel in a particular measure. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was a measuring utensil, he may not fill it. There was an incident involving Abba Shaul ben Botnit, a Sage who was also a grocer, who would fill his measures on the eve of a Festival and give them to his customers on the Festival. In this way he would know exactly how much he had given each person, without conducting any measurements on the Festival itself. Abba Shaul, a Sage distinct from Abba Shaul ben Botnit, says: He would do this even on the intermediate days of a Festival because of the clarity of the measures, i.e., in order to clarify precisely how much must be given to each customer, since the measurement is more precise once the foam of the liquid being measured has subsided. And the Rabbis say: Even on a weekday it is proper to do so, because of the draining of the measures. This method allows all the liquid to drain fully out of the seller’s measuring utensil so that the amount is exact. A person may go on a Festival to a grocer from whom he is accustomed to buy and say to him: Give me eggs and nuts of such-and-such a number, as it is the manner of a homeowner to count this way in his own house. Counting eggs or nuts is not considered a commercial activity, as people regularly mention the number of eggs and nuts that they need.

Chapter 4

One who brings wine jugs from one place to another place may not bring a large number of them in a basket or in a tub in the usual weekday manner on a Festival, as this is disrespectful of the Festival; but he may bring one or two barrels on his shoulder or carry them in front of himself. Similarly, one who brings straw for kindling or for feeding animals may not place the tub behind him while carrying it, as this is the usual weekday manner; but he may transport it in front of him in his hand, in an unusual fashion. And one may begin taking straw for kindling from the pile of straw, although he did not designate the pile for this purpose the day before; but one may not begin to take from the wood in the wood storage, a small yard behind the house where people store various items that they do not intend to use in the near future.

One may not take wood from a sukka on any Festival, not only on the festival of Sukkot, because this is considered dismantling, but one may take from near it. One may bring wood chopped from a tree the previous day from an unfenced field, but only from that which has been gathered into a pile before the Festival for the purpose of using it for kindling. However, scattered wood is muktze and may not be handled. And if one brings wood from a karpef used for storage, he may bring even from the scattered wood, as it is considered a guarded courtyard rather than a field, and one does not remove even scattered items from his mind if they are stored inside such an enclosure. The mishna explains: What is a karpef? It is any enclosure that is near a city, but if it is far from a city, it is considered a field; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: Any fenced place into which one can enter only with a key is a karpef, even if it is located at a distance from a city, provided that it is within the Shabbat limit.

One may not chop wood on a Festival neither from beams intended for construction nor from a beam that broke on a Festival, although it no longer serves any purpose. And one may not chop wood on a Festival, neither with an ax, nor with a saw, nor with a sickle, as these are clearly craftsman’s tools used on weekdays. Rather, one may chop only with a cleaver. Using this tool differs greatly from the weekday manner in which wood is chopped. If there is a house that is filled with produce and locked on all sides, and a hole formed in one of its walls or its roof, one may remove produce through the place of the hole. The produce is not considered muktze, even though one cannot reach it without the existence of the hole. Rabbi Meir says: One may even make a hole ab initio and take produce through that opening.

On a Festival, one may not hollow out a piece of clay to form a lamp into which he will place oil and a wick because he thereby creates a vessel. And similarly, one may not produce charcoal at all on a Festival because this is not labor for sustenance. And similarly, one may not cut the wick, as this is considered mending a vessel. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one requires a wick of a particular length, he may cut it by burning it in a fire but not by cutting it with a knife.

One may not break earthenware on a Festival. And one may not cut paper in order to roast salted fish on it. Earthenware shards or pieces of paper that have been soaked in water were placed on the metal surface or in the oven in which the fish was roasted, so that it would not be burned by the heat. And one may not sweep out anything that has fallen into an oven or stove that interferes with the baking, such as plaster. But one may press down and flatten any accumulated dust and ashes at the bottom of the oven, which might prevent it from lighting properly. And one may not draw two barrels together in order to place a pot on them, so that its contents will be cooked by a fire lit between the barrels. And one may not prop a pot that does not stand straight with a piece of wood, in order to prevent it from falling. And similarly, with a door. And one may not lead an animal with a stick in the public domain on a Festival; and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, permits it.

Rabbi Eliezer says: On a Festival, a person may remove a sliver from a pile of straw or from similar material that is before him, in order to clean with it between his teeth. And he may collect straw from a courtyard and kindle it, for anything in a courtyard is considered prepared for all purposes. The Rabbis say: He may collect these materials only from things placed before him in his house, as they are certainly prepared for all uses, and kindle them. With regard to objects lying in his courtyard, however, as their collection takes great effort, he certainly did not have them in mind the day before, and they are therefore muktze.

The mishna states a different halakha : One may not produce fire, neither from wood, by rubbing one piece against another; nor from stones knocked against each other; nor from hot dirt; nor from tiles struck against each other; nor from water placed in round, glass vessels, which produces fire by focusing the rays of the sun. And similarly, one may not whiten tiles with a burning-hot heat in order to roast upon them afterward. And Rabbi Eliezer further stated the following leniency: A person may stand over objects in storage, such as produce that he has for some reason previously set aside from use, on Shabbat eve during the Sabbatical Year, during which no tithes are separated, which means one may take fruit on the following day without the need for any corrective measure, and say: From here, from these fruits, I will eat tomorrow. And the Rabbis say: He may not eat unless he marks the pile of fruit the day before and explicitly says: From here to there I will take.

Chapter 5

One may lower produce, which had been laid out on a roof to dry, into the house through a skylight on a Festival, in order to prevent it from becoming ruined in the rain. Although it is a strenuous activity, it is permitted do to so on a Festival in order to prevent a financial loss; however, one may not do so on Shabbat. And one may cover produce inside a building with cloths to prevent damage due to a leak in the ceiling over it, and similarly one may cover jugs of wine and jugs of oil for the same reason. And one may place a vessel beneath a leak in order to catch the water on Shabbat, to prevent it from dirtying the house.

Any act for which one is liable due to a rabbinic decree made to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest [ shevut ]; or if it is notable because it is optional, i.e., it involves an aspect of a mitzva but is not a complete mitzva; or if it is notable because it is a full-fledged mitzva, if it is prohibited on Shabbat, one is liable for it on a Festival as well. And these are the acts prohibited by the Sages as shevut : One may not climb a tree on Shabbat, nor ride on an animal, nor swim in the water, nor clap his hands together, nor clap his hand on the thigh, nor dance. And the following are acts that are prohibited on Shabbat and are notable because they are optional, i.e., which involve an aspect of a mitzva but are not complete mitzvot: One may not judge, nor betroth a woman, nor perform ḥalitza, which is done in lieu of levirate marriage, nor perform levirate marriage. And the following are prohibited on Shabbat despite the fact that they are notable because of the full-fledged mitzva involved in them: One may not consecrate, nor take a valuation vow (see Leviticus 27), nor consecrate objects for use by the priests or the Temple, nor separate teruma and tithes from produce. The Sages spoke of all these acts being prohibited even with regard to a Festival; all the more so are they prohibited on Shabbat. The general principle is: There is no difference between a Festival and Shabbat, except for work involving preparation of food alone, which is permitted on a Festival but prohibited on Shabbat.

The status of animals and vessels on Festivals is as the feet of their owner, meaning that one’s animals and vessels are governed by his own travel limitations on Shabbat and Festivals. In the case of one who delivers his animal to his son or to a shepherd before the Festival to care for it, these are as the feet of the owner, rather than those of the son or the shepherd. Vessels that have been inherited by several brothers and have not been divided among them but are still owned jointly, if they are designated for the use of one of the brothers in the house and the other brothers have no part in them, these are as his feet, and they are subject to his travel limitations. And as for those that are not designated for any particular brother, these are as a place where they may all go. They are limited by the travel limitations of every one of the brothers, as when one brother made a joining of Shabbat boundaries [ eiruv teḥumin ] and the others did not.

One who borrows a vessel from another on the eve of a Festival, it is as the feet of the borrower rather than the owner, as when the Festival began the vessel established its place of rest in possession of the borrower. However, if he borrowed it on the Festival itself, it is as the feet of the lender, since at the start of the Festival its place of rest was established in the possession of its owner. And similarly, a woman who borrowed spices from another to put in a dish, or water and salt to put in her dough, these foods, i.e., the dish and the dough, which contain ingredients belonging to both parties, are as the feet of both of them; they are limited by the travel limitations of both parties. Rabbi Yehuda exempts one from travel limitations in the case of water, because it has no substance in the mixture and therefore is not considered connected to the original owner.

A coal that one borrowed from another on the Festival is as the feet of the owner, and it may be carried on the Festival to any place where its owner may walk. Since it has substance, it is associated with its owner. But a flame that one lit from another’s flame may be taken anywhere, as it has no substance. This essential difference between a coal and a flame has additional halakhic ramifications: If one uses a coal of consecrated property for a non-consecrated purpose, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property, since it has substance. But if one uses a consecrated flame, although according to rabbinic law one may not derive benefit from it ab initio, if one did benefit from it, he is not liable for misuse, since it does not have substance. Similarly, one who takes out a coal from a private domain to the public domain on Shabbat is liable for the prohibited labor of carrying, but one who takes out a flame is exempt. With regard to a cistern of an individual, water drawn from it is as the feet of the individual who owns the cistern, and the water may be carried only to those places where its owner is permitted to walk. And water drawn from a cistern belonging jointly to all the people dwelling in a particular town is as the feet of the people of that town. And water drawn from a cistern of those who come up to Eretz Yisrael from Babylonia, i.e., a public cistern, is as the feet of whoever fills his vessel with its water; the water has no defined boundary of its own since it is made available to all.

With regard to one who had produce in a different city beyond the Shabbat limit, and the residents of that city where the produce was located joined the Shabbat boundaries, enabling them to reach the owner’s home on the Festival,and they wish to bring him some of his produce, they may not bring it to him. His produce is as his feet; since it is outside of his Shabbat limit, it may not be taken from its place. However, if the owner placed an eiruv to enable travel to that city, the legal status of his produce is like his status with regard to the Shabbat limit. People from that city who also placed an eiruv may bring the produce to him, since he himself may walk to the produce and take it.

With regard to one who invited guests to visit him from a town beyond his Shabbat limit, and they joined the Shabbat boundaries to enable them to reach his house, they may not carry in their hands back to their town any portions they received from him as gifts. These portions are as the feet of the host, since they belonged to him on the eve of the Festival. This is true unless he transferred ownership of their portions to them on the eve of the Festival, in which case the gifts may be carried wherever the recipients may walk. On a Festival one may not water or slaughter desert animals, which graze mainly outside the town, as they are considered muktze. However, one may water and slaughter domestic animals. The mishna elaborates: These are considered domestic animals: Those that sleep in the city at night. Desert animals are those that sleep in the pasture and come into town only rarely.

Mishnah Rosh Hashanah

Chapter 1

They are four days in the year that serve as the New Year, each for a different purpose: On the first of Nisan is the New Year for kings; it is from this date that the years of a king’s rule are counted. And the first of Nisan is also the New Year for the order of the Festivals, as it determines which is considered the first Festival of the year and which the last. On the first of Elul is the New Year for animal tithes; all the animals born prior to that date belong to the previous tithe year and are tithed as a single unit, whereas those born after that date belong to the next tithe year. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: The New Year for animal tithes is on the first of Tishrei. On the first of Tishrei is the New Year for counting years, as will be explained in the Gemara; for calculating Sabbatical Years and Jubilee Years, i.e., from the first of Tishrei there is a biblical prohibition to work the land during these years; for planting, for determining the years of orla, the three-year period from when a tree has been planted during which time its fruit is forbidden; and for tithing vegetables, as vegetables picked prior to that date cannot be tithed together with vegetables picked after that date. On the first of Shevat is the New Year for the tree; the fruit of a tree that was formed prior to that date belong to the previous tithe year and cannot be tithed together with fruit that was formed after that date; this ruling is in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai. But Beit Hillel say: The New Year for trees is on the fifteenth of Shevat.

At four times of the year the world is judged: On Passover judgment is passed concerning grain; on Shavuot concerning fruits that grow on a tree; on Rosh HaShana, all creatures pass before Him like sheep [ benei maron ], as it is stated: “He Who fashions their hearts alike, Who considers all their deeds” (Psalms 33:15); and on the festival of Sukkot they are judged concerning water, i.e., the rainfall of the coming year.

In six months of the year the messengers go out from the court in Jerusalem to report throughout Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora which day was established as the New Moon, the thirtieth or the thirty-first day since the previous New Moon. They go out in the month of Nisan, due to Passover, so that people will know on which day to celebrate it; in the month of Av, due to the fast of the Ninth of Av; in Elul, due to Rosh HaShana, which begins thirty days after the New Moon of Elul; in Tishrei, due to the need to establish the correct dates on which to celebrate the Festivals of Tishrei, i.e., Yom Kippur and Sukkot ; in Kislev, due to Hanukkah; and in Adar, due to Purim. And when the Temple was standing, messengers would also go out in the month of Iyyar due to small Passover, i.e., second Pesaḥ, which occurs on the fourteenth of Iyyar. This holiday allowed those who were ritually impure or on a distant journey on the fourteenth of Nisan, and therefore incapable of bringing the Paschal lamb at that time, to bring their Paschal lamb a month later.

Only for the sake of two months may witnesses who saw the new moon desecrate Shabbat, should that be necessary in order for them to offer testimony before the court: For the month of Nisan and for the month of Tishrei, for in these months messengers are sent out to Syria, and by them, i.e., these months, the dates of the major Festivals are set: Yom Kippur, Sukkot, Passover, and Shavuot. And when the Temple was standing, the witnesses desecrated Shabbat for the fixing of the New Moon of all the months, due to the imperative of fixing the proper offering of the New Moon at the correct time.

Whether the new moon was seen clearly [ ba’alil ] by everyone or whether it was not clearly seen, one may desecrate Shabbat in order to testify before the court. Rabbi Yosei says: If the moon was clearly seen, they may not desecrate Shabbat for it, since other witnesses, located nearer to the court, will certainly testify. If these distant witnesses go to court to testify, they will desecrate Shabbat unnecessarily.

There was once an incident where more than forty pairs of witnesses were passing through on their way to Jerusalem to testify about the new moon, and Rabbi Akiva detained them in Lod, telling them that there was no need for them to desecrate Shabbat for this purpose. Rabban Gamliel sent a message to him: If you detain the many people who wish to testify about the new moon, you will cause them to stumble in the future. They will say: Why should we go, seeing that our testimony is unnecessary? At some point they will be needed, and no witnesses will come to the court.

If a father and his son saw the new moon, they should both go to the court in Jerusalem. It is not that they can join together to give testimony, for close relatives are disqualified from testifying together, but they both go so that if one of them is disqualified, the second may join together with another witness to testify about the new moon. Rabbi Shimon says: A father and his son and all their relatives are fit to combine together as witnesses for testimony to determine the start of the month. Rabbi Yosei said: There was an incident with Toviyya the doctor. When he saw the new moon in Jerusalem, he and his son and his freed slave all went to testify. The priests accepted him and his son as witnesses and disqualified his slave, for they ruled stringently that the month may be sanctified only on the basis of the testimony of those of Jewish lineage. And when they came before the court, they accepted him and his slave as witnesses and disqualified his son, due to the familial relationship.

The following are unfit to give testimony, as they are considered thieves and robbers: One who plays with dice [ kubbiyya ] or other games of chance for money; and those who lend money with interest; and those who race pigeons and place wagers on the outcome; and merchants who deal in produce of the Sabbatical Year, which may be eaten, but may not be an object of commerce; and slaves. This is the principle: Any testimony for which a woman is unfit, these too are unfit. Although in certain cases a woman’s testimony is accepted, e.g., to testify to the death of someone’s husband, in the majority of cases her testimony is not valid.

With regard to one who saw the new moon but is unable to go to Jerusalem by foot because he is sick or has difficulty walking, others may bring him on a donkey or even in a bed, even on Shabbat if necessary. And if the witnesses are concerned that bandits may be lying in wait for them along the road, they may take clubs or other weapons in their hands, even on Shabbat. And if it was a long journey to Jerusalem, they may take sustenance with them, although it is ordinarily prohibited to carry on Shabbat, since for a distance of a walk of a night and a day, the witnesses may desecrate Shabbat and go out to give testimony to determine the start of the month. This is as it is stated: “These are the Festivals of the Lord, sacred gatherings, which you shall declare in their seasons” (Leviticus 23:4). This teaches that, in all cases, the Festivals must be fixed at their proper times, even if it entails the transgression of Torah prohibitions.

Chapter 2

If the members of the Great Sanhedrin in Jerusalem are not familiar with that one who saw the new moon, i.e., that he is a valid witness, the members of his local court of twenty-three send another with him to testify about him. The mishna adds: Initially, the court would accept testimony to determine the start of the month from any person, as all are presumed to be qualified witnesses, absent any disqualifying factors. However, when the Boethusians, a sect whose members had their own opinions with regard to the establishment of the Festivals, corrupted the process by sending false witnesses to testify about the new moon, the Sages instituted that they would accept this testimony only from those men familiar to the Sanhedrin as valid witnesses.

Initially, after the court sanctified the new month they would light torches on the mountaintops, from one peak to another, to signal to the community in Babylonia that the month had been sanctified. After the Samaritans [ Kutim ] corrupted and ruined this method by lighting torches at the wrong times to confuse the Jews, the Sages instituted that messengers should go out to the Diaspora and inform them of the start of the month.

The mishna asks: How would they light the torches during that earlier period? They would bring items that burn well, e.g., long poles of cedar, reeds, pinewood, and beaten flax, and tie them together with a string. And someone would then ascend to the top of the mountain and light the torch on fire with them, and wave it back and forth and up and down, until he would see his colleague doing likewise on the top of the second mountain. In this manner he would know that the next messenger had received the message and passed it on. And similarly, the second torchbearer would wait for a signal from the one on the top of the third mountain, and so on. In this manner the message would reach the Diaspora.

And from which mountains would they light the torches? They would transmit the message from the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem to Sartava, and from Sartava to Gerofina, and from Gerofina to Ḥavran, and from Ḥavran to Beit Baltin. And from Beit Baltin they would not move to light torches in any other predetermined location. Rather, the one who was appointed for this task would wave the torch back and forth and up and down, until he would see the entire Diaspora before him alight like one large bonfire, as they would light torches to continue transmitting the message from place to place all the way to the farthest reaches of the Diaspora.

There was a large courtyard in Jerusalem, which was called Beit Ya’zek. And there all the witnesses coming to testify about the new moon would gather, and the court of seventy-one judges would examine them there. And they would prepare great feasts for them, so that they would be willing and accustomed to coming and submitting their testimony. Initially, when witnesses would arrive on Shabbat from a distant place, they would not move from there all day, as they had left their Shabbat limit, and it was consequently prohibited for them to walk more than four cubits in any direction once they had completed their mission. Concerned that this limitation would discourage witnesses from coming, Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that the witnesses be permitted to walk two thousand cubits in each direction. The mishna continues: And not only these witnesses are granted two thousand cubits from their new place, but this applies also to a midwife who comes to deliver a child, and one who comes to rescue Jews from a fire, from an invasion of gentile troops, from a flooding river, or from the collapse of a building. All these are considered like the inhabitants of the city where they arrive, and therefore they have two thousand cubits in each direction.

How do they examine the witnesses who come to testify about the new moon? They deal with them in order, as the pair of witnesses that arrives first they examine first. They bring in the greater of the two witnesses, and they say to him: Say how you saw the moon. Was it in front of the sun or behind the sun? To its north or to its south? How high was the moon over the horizon, and in which direction did it tilt? And how wide was it? If, for example, he said that he saw the moon in front of the sun, he has not said anything of substance, as this is impossible and therefore he is either mistaken or lying. And after they finish hearing the first witness’s testimony, they would bring in the second witness and examine him in a similar manner. If their statements match, their testimony is accepted and the court sanctifies the New Moon. And the court then asks all the other pairs of witnesses certain general matters, without probing into all the details. They do this not because they require the additional testimony, but so that the witnesses should not leave disappointed, and so that the witnesses should be accustomed to coming to testify, and will not hesitate to come the next time, when they might be needed.

After the witnesses have been examined and their testimony accepted, the head of the court says: It is sanctified. And all the people respond after him: It is sanctified; it is sanctified. Whether the moon was seen at its anticipated time, on the thirtieth day of the previous month, or whether it was not seen at its anticipated time, in which case witnesses are not necessary to establish the following day as the New Moon, the court sanctifies it and formally proclaims the day as the New Moon. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: If the new moon was not seen at its anticipated time, the court does not sanctify the New Moon on the following day, as the celestial court in Heaven has already sanctified it, precluding the need for the additional sanctification by the earthly court.

Rabban Gamliel had a diagram of the different forms of the moon drawn on a tablet that hung on the wall of his attic, which he would show to the laymen who came to testify about the new moon but were unable to describe adequately what they had seen. And he would say to them: Did you see a form like this or like this? There was an incident in which two witnesses came to testify about the new moon, and they said: We saw the waning moon in the morning in the east, and that same day we saw the new moon in the evening in the west. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: They are false witnesses, as it is impossible to see the new moon so soon after the last sighting of the waning moon. However, when they arrived in Yavne, Rabban Gamliel accepted them as witnesses without concern. And there was another incident in which two witnesses came and said: We saw the new moon at its anticipated time, i.e., on the night of the thirtieth day of the previous month; however, on the following night, i.e., the start of the thirty-first, which is often the determinant of a full, thirty-day month, it was not seen. And nevertheless Rabban Gamliel accepted their testimony and established the New Moon on the thirtieth day. Rabbi Dosa ben Horkinas disagreed and said: They are false witnesses; how can witnesses testify that a woman gave birth and the next day her belly is between her teeth, i.e., she is obviously still pregnant? If the new moon was already visible at its anticipated time, how could it not be seen a day later? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: I see the logic of your statement; the New Moon must be established a day later.

Upon hearing that Rabbi Yehoshua had challenged his ruling, Rabban Gamliel sent a message to him: I decree against you that you must appear before me with your staff and with your money on the day on which Yom Kippur occurs according to your calculation; according to my calculation, that day is the eleventh of Tishrei, the day after Yom Kippur. Rabbi Akiva went and found Rabbi Yehoshua distressed that the head of the Great Sanhedrin was forcing him to desecrate the day that he maintained was Yom Kippur. In an attempt to console him, Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yehoshua: I can learn from a verse that everything that Rabban Gamliel did in sanctifying the month is done, i.e., it is valid. As it is stated: “These are the appointed seasons of the Lord, sacred convocations, which you shall proclaim in their season” (Leviticus 23:4). This verse indicates that whether you have proclaimed them at their proper time or whether you have declared them not at their proper time, I have only these Festivals as established by the representatives of the Jewish people. Rabbi Yehoshua then came to Rabbi Dosa ben Horkinas, who said to him: If we come to debate and question the rulings of the court of Rabban Gamliel, we must debate and question the rulings of every court that has stood from the days of Moses until now. As it is stated: “Then Moses went up, and Aaron, Nadav and Avihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel” (Exodus 24:9). But why were the names of these seventy Elders not specified? Rather, this comes to teach that every set of three judges that stands as a court over the Jewish people has the same status as the court of Moses. Since it is not revealed who sat on that court, apparently it is enough that they were official judges in a Jewish court. When Rabbi Yehoshua heard that even Rabbi Dosa ben Horkinas maintained that they must submit to Rabban Gamliel’s decision, he took his staff and his money in his hand, and went to Yavne to Rabban Gamliel on the day on which Yom Kippur occurred according to his own calculation. Upon seeing him, Rabban Gamliel stood up and kissed him on his head. He said to him: Come in peace, my teacher and my student. You are my teacher in wisdom, as Rabbi Yehoshua was wiser than anyone else in his generation, and you are my student, as you accepted my statement, despite your disagreement.

Chapter 3

If the court and all of the Jewish people saw the new moon, and the witnesses were interrogated, but the court did not manage to say: Sanctified, before nightfall, so that the thirtieth day already passed, the previous month is rendered a full, thirty-day month, and the following day is observed as the New Moon. If the court alone saw the new moon, two members of the court should stand and testify before the others, and the court should say: Sanctified, sanctified. If three people saw the new moon, and they are themselves members of a court for this purpose, two of them should stand and seat two of their colleagues next to the individual who remains of the three, thereby forming a new court of three. The two standing judges should then testify before the three seated judges that they saw the new moon and the seated judges say: Sanctified, sanctified. This procedure is necessary because an individual is not authorized to declare the month sanctified by himself. Rather, a court of three is required.

The mishna begins to discuss the primary mitzva of Rosh HaShana, sounding the shofar. All shofarot are fit for blowing except for the horn of a cow, because it is a horn [ keren ] and not a shofar. Rabbi Yosei said: But aren’t all shofarot called horn, as it is stated: “And it shall come to pass, that when they sound a long blast with the horn [ keren ] of a ram [ yovel ]” (Joshua 6:5), and a ram’s horn is a shofar fit for sounding on Rosh HaShana?

The shofar that was used on Rosh HaShana in the Temple was made from the straight horn of an ibex, and its mouth, the mouthpiece into which one blows, was plated with gold. And there were two trumpets, one on each of the two sides of the person sounding the shofar. The shofar would sound a long blast, whereas the trumpets would sound a short blast, because the mitzva of the day is with the shofar.

And in contrast, the shofarot used on public fast days were made from the curved horns of rams, and their mouths were plated with silver. There were two trumpets in the middle between the shofarot, and the shofar would sound a short blast, whereas the trumpets would sound a long blast, for the mitzva of the day is with the trumpets.

Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year is the same as Rosh HaShana with regard to both the shofar blasts that are sounded and the additional blessings that are recited in the Amida prayer. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and says: There is a difference between the two days: On Rosh HaShana one blows with horns of rams, whereas in Jubilee Years one blows with horns of ibexes.

A shofar that was cracked and then glued together, even though it appears to be whole, is unfit. Similarly, if one glued together broken fragments of shofarot to form a complete shofar, the shofar is unfit. If the shofar was punctured and the puncture was sealed, if it impedes the blowing, the shofar is unfit, but if not, it is fit.

If one sounds a shofar into a pit, or into a cistern, or into a large jug, if he clearly heard the sound of the shofar, he has fulfilled his obligation; but if he heard the sound of an echo, he has not fulfilled his obligation. And similarly, if one was passing behind a synagogue,or his house was adjacent to the synagogue, and he heard the sound of the shofar or the sound of the Scroll of Esther being read, if he focused his heart, i.e. his intent, to fulfill his obligation, he has fulfilled his obligation; but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. It is therefore possible for two people to hear the shofar blasts, but only one of them fulfills his obligation. Even though this one heard and also the other one heard, nevertheless, this one focused his heart to fulfill his obligation and has therefore indeed fulfilled it, but the other one did not focus his heart, and so he has not fulfilled his obligation.

Incidental to the discussion of the required intent when sounding the shofar, the mishna cites the verse: “And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand, that Israel prevailed; and when he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed” (Exodus 17:11). It may be asked: Did the hands of Moses make war when he raised them or break war when he lowered them? Rather, the verse comes to tell you that as long as the Jewish people turned their eyes upward and subjected their hearts to their Father in Heaven, they prevailed, but if not, they fell. Similarly, you can say: The verse states: “Make for yourself a fiery serpent, and set it upon a pole; and it shall come to pass, that everyone that is bitten, when he sees it, he shall live” (Numbers 21:8). Once again it may be asked: Did the serpent kill, or did the serpent preserve life? Rather, when the Jewish people turned their eyes upward and subjected their hearts to their Father in Heaven, they were healed, but if not, they rotted from their snakebites. Returning to its halakhic discussion, the mishna continues: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who sounds the shofar cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of the community. This is the principle with regard to similar matters: Whoever is not obligated to do a certain matter cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of the community.

Chapter 4

With regard to the Festival day of Rosh HaShana that occurs on Shabbat, in the Temple they would sound the shofar as usual. However, they would not sound it in the rest of the country outside the Temple. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the people should sound the shofar on Shabbat in every place where there is a court of twenty-three judges. Rabbi Elazar said: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted this practice only in Yavne, where the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges resided in his time, but nowhere else. They said to him: He instituted the practice both in Yavne and in any place where there is a court.

The mishna adds: And Jerusalem in earlier times had this additional superiority over Yavne after Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted this practice, for in any city whose residents could see Jerusalem and hear the sounding of the shofar from there, and which was near to Jerusalem and people could come to Jerusalem from there, they would sound the shofar there as well, as it was considered part of Jerusalem. But in Yavne they would sound the shofar only in the court itself, not in the surrounding cities.

After the previous mishna mentioned Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s ordinance that applies to the sounding of the shofar, this mishna records other ordinances instituted by the same Sage: At first, during the Temple era, the lulav was taken in the Temple all seven days of Sukkot, and in the rest of the country outside the Temple, it was taken only one day, on the first day of the Festival. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the lulav should be taken even in the rest of the country all seven days, in commemoration of the Temple. And for similar reasons, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that for the entire day of waving the omer offering, i.e., the sixteenth of Nisan, eating the grain of the new crop is prohibited. By Torah law, when the Temple is standing the new grain may not be eaten until after the omer offering is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan, usually early in the morning. When the Temple is not standing it may be eaten from the time that the eastern horizon is illuminated at daybreak. However, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted a prohibition against eating the new grain throughout the entire sixteenth of Nisan, until the seventeenth, to commemorate the Temple.

Initially, they would accept testimony to determine the start of the month throughout the entire thirtieth day from the beginning of the month of Elul, before Rosh HaShana, and if witnesses arrived from afar and testified that they had sighted the New Moon the previous night, they would declare that day the Festival. Once, the witnesses tarried coming until the hour was late, and the Levites erred with regard to the song, i.e., the psalm that they were supposed to recite, as they did not know at the time whether it was a Festival or an ordinary weekday. From that point on, the Sages instituted that they would accept testimony to determine the start of the month only until minḥa time. If witnesses had not arrived by that hour, they would declare Elul a thirty-day month and calculate the dates of the Festivals accordingly. And if witnesses came from minḥa time onward, although the calculations for the dates of the Festivals would begin from the following day, the people would nevertheless observe that day, on which the witnesses arrived, as sacred, so that in future years they would not treat the entire day as a weekday and engage in labor from the morning on the assumption that the witnesses will arrive only after minḥa time. And they would also observe the following day as sacred. On the second day, they observed Rosh HaShana in full, both by sacrificing its offerings as well as by calculating the upcoming Festivals from that date. After the Temple was destroyed and there was no longer any reason for this ordinance, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that they would once again accept testimony to determine the start of the month the entire day. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said: And this, too, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted, that even if the head of the court of seventy-one is in any other place, not where the Great Sanhedrin is in session, the witnesses should nevertheless go only to the place where the Great Sanhedrin gathers to deliver testimony to determine the start of the month. Although the date of the month is dependent on the head of the Great Sanhedrin, as it is he who declares that the month is sanctified (see 24a), nevertheless, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the members of the Great Sanhedrin may sanctify the month in the absence of the head of the court.

The order of the blessings of the additional prayer on Rosh HaShana is as follows: One recites the blessing of the Patriarchs, the blessing of God’s Mighty Deeds, and the blessing of the Sanctification of God’s Name, all of which are recited all year long. And one includes the blessing of Kingship, containing many biblical verses on that theme, with them, i.e., in the blessing of the Sanctification of God’s Name, and he does not sound the shofar after it. Next, one adds a special blessing for the Sanctification of the Day, and sounds the shofar after it; followed by the blessing of Remembrances, which contains many biblical verses addressing that theme, and sounds the shofar after it; and recites the blessing of Shofarot, which includes verses that mention the shofar, and sounds the shofar after it. And he then returns to the regular Amida prayer and recites the blessing of God’s Service and the blessing of Thanksgiving and the Priestly Blessing. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If one does not sound the shofar for the blessing of Kingship, why does he mention it? Rather, the order of the blessings is as follows: One recites the blessing of the Patriarchs and that of God’s Mighty Deeds and that of the Sanctification of God’s Name. He subsequently includes the blessing of Kingship in the blessing of the Sanctification of the Day, and sounds the shofar. Next he recites the blessing of Remembrances, and sounds the shofar after it, and the blessing of Shofarot and sounds the shofar after it. He then recites the blessing of God’s Service and the blessing of Thanksgiving and the Priestly Blessing.

One does not recite fewer than ten verses in theblessing of Kingship, or fewer than ten verses in the blessing of Remembrances, or fewer than ten verses in the blessing of Shofarot. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: If one recited three from each of them, he has fulfilled his obligation. One does not mention verses of Remembrance, Kingship, and Shofar that have a theme of punishment. When reciting the ten verses, one begins with verses from the Torah and concludes with verses from the Prophets. Rabbi Yosei says: If he concluded with a verse from the Torah, he has fulfilled his obligation.

With regard to one who is passing before the ark, as prayer leader, on the festival of Rosh HaShana, it is the second prayer leader, i.e., the one who leads the additional prayer, who sounds the shofar on behalf of the congregation. And on a day when the hallel is recited, the first prayer leader, i.e., the one who leads the morning prayer, recites the hallel on behalf of the congregation.

With regard to the shofar of Rosh HaShana, one may not pass the Shabbat limit for it, i.e., to go and hear it, nor may one clear a pile of rubble to uncover a buried shofar. One may not climb a tree, nor may one ride on an animal, nor may one swim in water, in order to find a shofar to sound. And one may not cut the shofar to prepare it for use, neither with an object that is prohibited due to a rabbinic decree nor with an object that may not be used due to a prohibition by Torah law. However, if one wishes to place water or wine into the shofar on Rosh HaShana so that it emits a clear sound, he may place it, as this does not constitute a prohibited labor. One need not prevent children from sounding the shofar on Rosh HaShana, despite the fact that they are not obligated in mitzvot. Rather, one occupies himself with them, encouraging and instructing them, until they learn how to sound it properly. The mishna adds: One who acts unawares and sounds the shofar without any intention to perform the mitzva has not fulfilled his obligation. And, similarly, one who hears the shofar blasts from one who acts unawares has not fulfilled his obligation.

The order of the blasts is three sets of three blasts each, which are: Tekia, terua, and tekia. The length of a tekia is equal to the length of three teruot, and the length of a terua is equal to the length of three whimpers. If one sounded the first tekia of the initial series of tekia, terua, tekia, and then extended the second tekia of that series to the length of two tekiot, so that it should count as both the second tekia of the first set and the first tekia of the second set, he has in his hand the fulfillment of only one tekia, and he must begin the second set with a new tekia. With regard to one who recited the blessings of the additional prayer, and only afterward a shofar became available to him, he sounds a tekia, sounds a terua, and sounds a tekia, an order he repeats three times. Just as the prayer leader is obligated in the prayer of Rosh HaShana, so too, each and every individual is obligated in these prayers. Rabban Gamliel disagrees and says: Individuals are not obligated, as the prayer leader fulfills the obligation on behalf of the many.

Mishnah Ta'anit

Chapter 1

From when, i.e., from which date, does one begin to mention the might of the rains by inserting the phrase: He makes the wind blow and rain fall, in the second blessing of the Amida prayer? Rabbi Eliezer says: The phrase is inserted from the first Festival day of the festival of Sukkot. Rabbi Yehoshua says: From the last Festival day of the festival of Sukkot. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: Since rain is nothing other than a sign of a curse during the festival of Sukkot, as rainfall forces Jews to leave their sukkot, why should one mention the might of rain during this period? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I too did not say that it is proper to request rain at this time, but it is proper only to mention the phrase: He makes the wind blow and rain fall, in its due time. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: If so, i.e., if reciting the phrase does not constitute a request for rain, one should always mention rain, even in the summer.

The mishna states a general principle: One requests rain only immediately preceding the rainy season. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to the one who passes before the ark as prayer leader on the concluding Festival day of the festival of Sukkot, the Eighth Day of Assembly: The last prayer leader, who leads the additional prayer, mentions rain, whereas the first prayer leader, for the morning prayer, does not mention rain. The opposite is the case at the conclusion of the period for mentioning rain on the first Festival day of Passover: Here, the first prayer leader, who leads the morning prayer, mentions rain, while the last prayer leader, who leads the additional prayer, does not mention rain. Until when does one request rain? Rabbi Yehuda says: We request rain until Passover has passed. Rabbi Meir says: Until the month of Nisan has ended, as it is stated: “And He causes to come down for you the rain, the first rain and the last rain, in the first month” (Joel 2:23). Since the verse states that it rains in Nisan, the first month, this indicates that the entire month is considered part of the rainy season.

On the third of the month of Marḥeshvan one starts to request rain by inserting the phrase: And give dew and rain, in the blessing of the years, the ninth blessing of the Amida. Rabban Gamliel says: One starts to request rain on the seventh of Marḥeshvan, which is fifteen days after the festival of Sukkot. Rabban Gamliel explains that one waits these extra four days so that the last pilgrim of the Jewish people, who traveled to Jerusalem on foot for the Festival, can reach the Euphrates River without being inconvenienced by rain on his journey home.

If the seventeenth of Marḥeshvan arrived and rain has not fallen, individuals, but not the entire community, begin to fast three fasts for rain. How are these fasts conducted? As the fast begins in the morning, one may eat and drink after dark, and one is permitted during the days of the fasts themselves to engage in the performance of work, in bathing, in smearing oil on one’s body, in wearing shoes, and in conjugal relations.

If the New Moon of Kislev arrived and rain has still not fallen, the court decrees three fasts on the entire community. Similar to the individual fasts, everyone may eat and drink after dark, and they are permitted to engage in the performance of work, in bathing, in smearing one’s body with oil, in wearing shoes, and in conjugal relations.

If these three regular fasts have passed and they have not been answered with rain, the court decrees three other fasts upon the community. These are severe fasts, in which one may eat and drink only while it is still day, before the beginning of the night of the fast, and on the day of the fast itself they are prohibited to engage in the performance of work, in bathing, in smearing with oil, in wearing shoes, and in marital relations; and they lock the bathhouses so that no one should come to bathe on that day. If these three fasts have passed and they still have not been answered, the court decrees on them another seven fasts, which are a total of thirteen fasts, upon the community, not including the first three fasts observed by individuals. These seven fast days are more severe than the first ones, as on these days, in addition to all the earlier stringencies, they sound the alarm, as will be explained in the Gemara, and they lock the stores. Although shops must remained closed most of the time on these days, on Monday they open them a little at nightfall to allow people to purchase food for breaking their fast, and on Thursday they are permitted to open the stores all day in deference to Shabbat, so that people may purchase food for the sacred day.

If these fasts have passed and they have not been answered the court does not decree additional fasts, but the entire community observes the customs of mourning. They decrease their engagement in business transactions, in building and planting, in betrothals and marriages, and in greetings between each person and his fellow, like people who have been rebuked by God. The individuals, i.e., Torah scholars, resume fasting every Monday and Thursday until the month of Nisan ends. After this date they no longer pray for rain, since if Nisan has ended and rains subsequently fall, they are a sign of a curse, as it is stated: “Is not the wheat harvest today? I will call to the Lord that He may send thunder and rain, and you will know and see that your wickedness is great” (I Samuel 12:17). The wheat harvest is around the time of Shavuot, well after Nisan.

Chapter 2

What is the customary order of fast days? Normally the sacred ark in the synagogue, which was mobile, was kept in a locked room. However, on fast days they remove the ark to the main city square and place burnt ashes upon the ark, as a sign of mourning. And they also place ashes on the head of the Nasi, and on the head of the deputy Nasi, and each and every member of the community likewise places ashes upon his head. The eldest member of the community says to the congregation statements of reproof, for example: Our brothers, it is not stated with regard to the people of Nineveh: And God saw their sackcloth and their fasting. Rather, the verse says: “And God saw their deeds, that they had turned from their evil way” (Jonah 3:10). And in the Prophets it says: “And rend your hearts and not your garments, and return to the Lord your God” (Joel 2:13). This teaches that prayer and fasting are insufficient, as one must also repent and amend his ways in practice.

They stood for prayer. The congregation appoints an elder, who is experienced in leading prayer, to descend before the ark as communal prayer leader. And this prayer leader must have children and must have an empty house, i.e., he must be poor, so that his heart will be fully concentrated on the prayer for the needs of his community. And he recites twenty-four blessings before the congregation: The eighteen blessings of the everyday Amida prayer, to which he adds another six blessings,

and they are as follows: The special series of blessings recited on Rosh HaShana, the Remembrances and Shofarot ; and the sections of Psalms that begin with the verses: “In my distress I called to the Lord and He answered me” (Psalms 120:1), “I will lift up my eyes to the mountains; from where will my help come” (Psalms 121:1), “Out of the depths I have called You, O Lord” (Psalms 130:1), and “A prayer of the afflicted, when he faints” (Psalms 102:1). Rabbi Yehuda says: The prayer leader did not need to recite the Remembrances and Shofarot passages. Rather, he recites instead of them the passage beginning with: “If there be famine in the land, if there be pestilence” (I Kings 8:37), followed by the verse “The word of the Lord that came to Jeremiah concerning the droughts” (Jeremiah 14:1). And he recites at the end of all of these six blessing their unique conclusions.

For the conclusion of the first blessing: Redeemer of Israel, he recites: He Who answered Abraham on Mount Moriah (see Genesis 22:11–18), He will answer you and hear the sound of your cry on this day. Blessed are You, Lord, Redeemer of Israel. For the second blessing, to which he adds the verses of Remembrances, he recites: He Who answered our forefathers at the Red Sea (see Exodus 14:15–31), He will answer you and hear the sound of your cry on this day. Blessed are You, Lord, Who remembers the forgotten. For the third blessing, which includes the verses of Shofarot, he recites: He Who answered Joshua at Gilgal, when they sounded the shofar in Jericho (see Joshua 5:6), He will answer you and hear the sound of your cry on this day. Blessed are You, Lord, Who hears the terua. For the fourth blessing, he recites: He Who answered Samuel in Mizpah (see I Samuel, chapter 7), He will answer you and hear the sound of your cry on this day. Blessed are You, Lord, Who hears cries. For the fifth he recites: He Who answered Elijah on Mount Carmel (see I Kings, chapter 18), He will answer you and hear the sound of your cry on this day. Blessed are You, Lord, Who hears prayer. For the sixth blessing he recites: He Who answered Jonah from within the innards of the fish (see Jonah 2:2–11), He will answer you and hear the sound of your cry on this day. Blessed are You, Lord, Who answers in a time of trouble. For the conclusion of the seventh blessing, which is actually the sixth additional blessing, as the first blessing listed here is an expanded version of a regular weekday blessing, he recites: He Who answered David and Solomon his son in Jerusalem (see I Kings 8:12–53), He will answer you and hear the sound of your cry on this day. Blessed are You, Lord, Who has mercy on the Land.

The mishna relates: An incident occurred in the days of Rabbi Ḥalafta and Rabbi Ḥananya ben Teradyon, that someone passed before the ark as prayer leader and finished the entire blessing of the fast day, but the congregation did not answer amen after him. Instead, the attendant of the synagogue said: Sound the  shofar with a long, unwavering sound, priests, blow the shofar. The prayer leader continued: He Who answered Abraham on Mount Moriah, He will answer you and hear the sound of your cry on this day. Once again, the attendant announced: Blast the shofar, with a wavering sound, sons of Aaron, blast. The prayer leader resumed: He Who answered our forefathers by the Red Sea, He will answer you and hear the sound of your cry on this day, and continued in this way. And when this matter came before the Sages, and they heard the custom of Rabbi Ḥalafta and Rabbi Ḥananya ben Teradyon, they said: They would act in accordance with this custom only at the Eastern Gate of the Temple and on the Temple Mount. However, this ceremony is never performed outside the Temple.

On the first three fasts, the members of the priestly watch, who are in charge of the Temple service that week, fast but do not complete their fast. And the members of the patrilineal family, who perform the Temple service on that particular day, did not fast at all. On the second set of three fast days, the members of the priestly watch fast and complete the fast, and the members of the patrilineal family fast but do not complete their fasts. On the final seven fasts, both groups fast and complete the fasts. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua. And the Rabbis say: On the first three fasts, the members of both groups do not fast at all. On the second three fast days, the members of the priestly watch fast and do not complete their fast, and the members of the patrilineal family do not fast at all. On the final seven, the members of the priestly watch fast and complete the fast, and the members of the patrilineal family fast but do not complete their fast.

The mishna mentions another difference between the members of the priestly watch and the patrilineal family: The members of the priestly watch were permitted to drink wine during the nights, but not during the days, as they might be called upon to assist in the Temple service, which may not be performed after drinking wine. And the members of the patrilineal family, who performed the Temple service, were not permitted to drink wine, neither at night nor during the day, as their tasks were performed at night as well. It is prohibited for both the members of the priestly watch and the members of the non-priestly watch to cut their hair or launder their garments throughout the week, but on Thursday it is permitted for them to cut their hair and launder their clothes in deference to Shabbat.

The mishna returns to the issue of fasting: Any day concerning which it is written in Megillat Ta’anit not to eulogize on that day, it is also prohibited to eulogize on the day before, but it is permitted to do so on the following day. Rabbi Yosei says: It is prohibited to eulogize both on the day before and on the following day. The mishna continues: With regard to those days concerning which it is written only not to fast, it is permitted to fast on the day before and on the following day. Rabbi Yosei says: Fasting the day before is prohibited, but on the following day it is permitted to fast.

The mishna continues: One may not decree a fast on the community starting on a Thursday, so as not to cause an increase in prices. If the first of a series of fasts is on a Thursday, then on Friday everyone will come to purchase their food for after the fast and for Shabbat, which will allow the storeowners to take advantage of the crowds and raise their prices. Rather, the first set of three fasts is on a Monday, Thursday, and the following Monday, and the second set of three is on a Thursday, Monday, and the following Thursday. Rabbi Yosei says: Just as the first three fasts do not begin on Thursday, so too, neither the second set nor the last set starts on a Thursday. Instead, all the series of fasts begin on a Monday.

The mishna further states: One may not decree a fast on the community on New Moons, on Hanukkah, or on Purim. And if they decreed and began a set of fasts, and only afterward realized that one of the fasts would occur on one of these days, they do not interrupt the sequence. This is the statement of Rabban Gamliel. Rabbi Meir said: Although Rabban Gamliel said that they do not interrupt the sequence, he concedes that on these days, which are days with special observances, they do not complete the fast. And similarly, when the Ninth of Av occurs on Shabbat eve, the fast is not completed and one eats before the start of Shabbat, so as not to enter Shabbat while fasting.

Chapter 3

The order of these fasts of increasing severity, as explained in Chapter One, is stated only in a case when the first rainfall has not materialized. However, if there is vegetation that grew and its appearance changed due to disease, the court does not wait at all; they cry out about it immediately. And likewise, if rain ceased for a period of forty days between one rainfall and another, they cry out about it because it is a plague of drought.

If sufficient rain fell for the vegetation but not enough fell for the trees; or if it was enough for the trees but not for the vegetation; or if sufficient rain fell for both this and that, i.e., vegetation and trees, but not enough to fill the cisterns, ditches, and caves with water to last the summer, they cry out about it immediately.

And likewise, if there is a particular city upon which it did not rain, while the surrounding area did receive rain, this is considered a divine curse, as it is written: “And I caused it to rain upon one city, but caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon, and the portion upon which it did not rain withered” (Amos 4:7). In a case of this kind, that city fasts and cries out by blowing the shofar, and all of its surrounding areas join them in their fast, but they do not cry out. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and says: They cry out but they do not fast.

The mishna continues: And likewise, if a city is afflicted by pestilence or collapsing buildings, that city fasts and cries out, and all of its surrounding areas fast but they do not cry out. Rabbi Akiva says: They cry out but they do not fast. The mishna inquires: What is considered a plague of pestilence? When is a series of deaths treated as a plague? The mishna answers: If a city that sends out five hundred infantrymen, i.e., it has a population of five hundred able-bodied men, and three dead are taken out of it on three consecutive days, this is a plague of pestilence, which requires fasting and crying out. If the death rate is lower than that, this is not pestilence.

For the following calamities they cry out in every place: For blight; for mildew; for locusts; for caterpillars, a type of locust that comes in large swarms and descends upon a certain place; for dangerous beasts that have entered a town; and for the sword, i.e., legions of an invading army. The reason that they cry out about these misfortunes in every place is because these are calamities that spread.

An incident occurred in which Elders descended from Jerusalem to their cities throughout Eretz Yisrael and decreed a fast throughout the land because there was seen in the city of Ashkelon a small amount of blight, enough to fill the mouth of an oven. This fast was observed throughout Eretz Yisrael, as blight spreads quickly. And furthermore, they decreed a fast because wolves had eaten two children in Transjordan. Rabbi Yosei says: This fast was decreed not because they ate the children, but because these wolves were merely seen in an inhabited area.

For the following calamities they cry out even on Shabbat: For a city that is surrounded by gentile troops, or for a place in danger of being flooded by a river that has swelled its banks, or for a ship tossed about at sea. Rabbi Yosei said: One may cry out on Shabbat to summon help, but it may not be sounded for crying out to God. Shimon the Timnite says: One may cry out on Shabbat even for pestilence, but the Rabbis did not agree with him.

The mishna adds: In general, they cry out on account of any trouble that should not befall the community, a euphemism for trouble that may befall the community, except for an overabundance of rain. Although too much rain may be disastrous, one does not cry out over it, because rain is a sign of a blessing. The mishna relates: An incident occurred in which the people said to Ḥoni HaMe’aggel: Pray that rain should fall. He said to them: Go out and bring in the clay ovens used to roast the Paschal lambs, so that they will not dissolve in the water, as torrential rains are certain to fall. He prayed, and no rain fell at all. What did he do? He drew a circle on the ground and stood inside it and said before God: Master of the Universe, Your children have turned their faces toward me, as I am like a member of Your household. Therefore, I take an oath by Your great name that I will not move from here until You have mercy upon Your children and answer their prayers for rain. Rain began to trickle down, but only in small droplets. He said: I did not ask for this, but for rain to fill the cisterns, ditches, and caves with enough water to last the entire year. Rain began to fall furiously. He said: I did not ask for this damaging rain either, but for rain of benevolence, blessing, and generosity. Subsequently, the rains fell in their standard manner but continued unabated, filling the city with water until all of the Jews exited the residential areas of Jerusalem and went to the Temple Mount due to the rain. They came and said to him: Just as you prayed over the rains that they should fall, so too, pray that they should stop. He said to them: Go out and see if the Claimants’ Stone, a large stone located in the city, upon which proclamations would be posted with regard to lost and found articles, has been washed away. In other words, if the water has not obliterated the Claimants’ Stone, it is not yet appropriate to pray for the rain to cease. Shimon ben Shetaḥ, the Nasi of the Sanhedrin at the time, relayed to Ḥoni HaMe’aggel: Were you not Ḥoni, I would have decreed that you be ostracized, but what can I do to you? You nag [ mitḥatei ] God and He does your bidding, like a son who nags his father and his father does his bidding without reprimand. After all, rain fell as you requested. About you, the verse states: “Let your father and your mother be glad, and let her who bore you rejoice” (Proverbs 23:25).

The mishna teaches another halakha with regard to fast days: If they were fasting for rain, and rain fell for them before sunrise, they need not complete their fast until the evening. However, if it fell after sunrise, they must complete their fast. Rabbi Eliezer says: If rain fell before midday, they need not complete their fast; but if it rains after midday, they must complete their fast. The mishna relates: An incident occurred in which the court decreed a fast in Lod due to a lack of rain, and rain fell for them before midday. Rabbi Tarfon said to the people: Go out, and eat, and drink, and treat this day as a Festival. And they went out, and ate, and drank, and treated the day as a Festival, and in the afternoon they came to the synagogue and recited the great hallel, to thank God for answering their prayers.

Chapter 4

At three times in the year priests raise their hands to recite the Priestly Benediction four times in a single day, in the morning prayer, in the additional prayer, in the afternoon prayer, and in the evening in the closing of the gates, i.e., the ne’ila prayer. And these are the three times: During communal fasts held due to lack of rain, on which the closing prayer is recited; and during non-priestly watches [ ma’amadot ], when the Israelite members of the guard parallel to the priestly watch come and read the act of Creation from the Torah, as explained below; and on Yom Kippur.

These are the non-priestly watches: Since it is stated: “Command the children of Israel and say to them: My offering of food, which is presented to Me made by a fire, of a sweet savor to Me, you shall guard the sacrifice to Me in its due season” (Numbers 28:2), this verse teaches that the daily offering was a communal obligation that applied to every member of the Jewish people. The mishna asks: But how can a person’s offering be sacrificed when he is not standing next to it? The mishna explains: Since it is impossible for the entire nation to be present in Jerusalem when the daily offering is brought, the early prophets, Samuel and David, instituted the division of the priests into twenty-four priestly watches, each of which served for approximately one week, twice per year. For each and every priestly watch there was a corresponding non-priestly watch in Jerusalem of priests, Levites, and Israelites who would stand by the communal offerings for that day to represent the community. When the time arrived for the members of a certain priestly watch to ascend, the priests and Levites of that watch would ascend to Jerusalem to perform the Temple service. And as for the Israelites assigned to that priestly watch, some of them went up to Jerusalem, while the rest of them assembled in their towns and read the act of Creation.

And the members of the non-priestly watch, who represented the entire community that week, would fast four days a week, from Monday until Thursday. And they would not fast on Shabbat eve, in deference to Shabbat, as they did not wish to start Shabbat while fasting. And they did not fast on Sunday, so as not to go from rest and delight immediately to exertion and fasting, and run the risk that they might die as a result of the abrupt change. Which portions of the Torah would the members of the non-priestly watch read on each day? On Sunday they would read the portions starting with: “In the beginning” and “Let there be a firmament” (Genesis 1:1–8). On Monday they would read: “Let there be a firmament” and “Let the waters be gathered” (Genesis 1:9–13). On Tuesday they would read: “Let the waters be gathered” and “Let there be lights” (Genesis 1:14–19). On Wednesday: “Let there be lights” and “Let the waters swarm” (Genesis 1:20–23). On Thursday: “Let the waters swarm” and “Let the earth bring forth” (Genesis 1:24–31). On Friday: “Let the earth bring forth” and “And the heaven and the earth were finished” (Genesis 2:1–3). A long passage, consisting of six verses or more, is read by two people, and a short passage is read by one, as one cannot read fewer than three verses from the Torah together. They read from the Torah in the morning prayer and in the additional prayer. In the afternoon prayer the members of the non-priestly watch enter the synagogue and read the daily portion by heart, just as one recites Shema every day. On Shabbat eve at the afternoon prayer, they would not enter the synagogue for the communal Torah readings, in deference to Shabbat.

The mishna states a principle: On any day that has the recitation of hallel, but on which the additional offering was not sacrificed, e.g., Hanukkah, there is no reading of the Torah by the non-priestly watch in the morning prayer. On days that have both hallel and an additional offering, such as Festivals, the non-priestly watch would also not read from the Torah at the closing prayer. When a wood offering was brought, as explained below, there was no non-priestly watch in the afternoon prayer. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Ben Azzai said to Rabbi Akiva that this is how Rabbi Yehoshua would teach this halakha : On days when an additional offering was sacrificed, there was no non-priestly watch in the afternoon prayer. When a wood offering was brought, there was no non-priestly watch in the closing prayer. Upon hearing this, Rabbi Akiva retracted his ruling and began to teach in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai.

The mishna details the times for the wood offering of priests and the people. These were private holidays specific to certain families, on which their members would volunteer a wood offering for the altar. There were nine such days and families: On the first of Nisan, the descendants of Araḥ ben Yehuda; on the twentieth of Tammuz, the descendants of David ben Yehuda; on the fifth of Av, the descendants of Parosh ben Yehuda; on the seventh of Av, the descendants of Jonadab ben Rechab; on the tenth of Av, the descendants of Sena’a ben Binyamin; on the fifteenth of Av, the descendants of Zattu ben Yehuda. And included with this group of Zattu ben Yehuda’s descendants were other priests; and Levites; and anyone who erred with regard to his tribe, i.e., Israelites who did not know which tribe they were from, and the descendants of those who deceived the authorities with a pestle; and the descendants of those who packed dried figs. These last groups and their descriptions are explained in the Gemara. The mishna resumes its list. On the twentieth of Av, the descendants of Paḥat Moav ben Yehuda; on the twentieth of Elul, the descendants of Adin ben Yehuda; on the first of Tevet, the descendants of Parosh returned to bring wood for a second time; likewise on the first of Tevet, there was no non-priestly watch, as it is Hanukkah, on which hallel is recited, and it is the New Moon, on which an additional offering is sacrificed, and there was also a wood offering.

The mishna discusses the five major communal fast days. Five calamitous matters occurred to our forefathers on the seventeenth of Tammuz, and five other disasters happened on the Ninth of Av. On the seventeenth of Tammuz the tablets were broken by Moses when he saw that the Jews had made the golden calf; the daily offering was nullified by the Roman authorities and was never sacrificed again; the city walls of Jerusalem were breached; the general Apostemos publicly burned a Torah scroll; and Manasseh placed an idol in the Sanctuary. On the Ninth of Av it was decreed upon our ancestors that they would all die in the wilderness and not enter Eretz Yisrael; and the Temple was destroyed the first time, in the days of Nebuchadnezzar, and the second time, by the Romans; and Beitar was captured; and the city of Jerusalem was plowed, as a sign that it would never be rebuilt. Not only does one fast on the Ninth of Av, but from when the month of Av begins, one decreases acts of rejoicing.

During the week in which the Ninth of Av occurs, it is prohibited to cut one’s hair and to launder clothes, but if the Ninth of Av occurs on a Friday, on Thursday these actions are permitted in deference to Shabbat. On the eve of the Ninth of Av a person may not eat two cooked dishes in one meal. Furthermore, one may neither eat meat nor drink wine. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One must adjust and decrease the amount he eats. Rabbi Yehuda obligates one to overturn the bed and sleep on the floor like one in a state of mourning, but the Rabbis did not agree with him. The mishna cites a passage that concludes its discussion of the month of Av, as well as the entire tractate of Ta’anit, on a positive note.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There were no days as joyous for the Jewish people as the fifteenth of Av and as Yom Kippur, as on them the daughters of Jerusalem would go out in white clothes, which each woman borrowed from another. Why were they borrowed? They did this so as not to embarrass one who did not have her own white garments. All the garments that the women borrowed require immersion, as those who previously wore them might have been ritually impure. And the daughters of Jerusalem would go out and dance in the vineyards. And what would they say? Young man, please lift up your eyes and see what you choose for yourself for a wife. Do not set your eyes toward beauty, but set your eyes toward a good family, as the verse states: “Grace is deceitful and beauty is vain, but a woman who fears the Lord, she shall be praised” (Proverbs 31:30), and it further says: “Give her the fruit of her hands, and let her works praise her in the gates” (Proverbs 31:31). And similarly, it says in another verse: “Go forth, daughters of Zion, and gaze upon King Solomon, upon the crown with which his mother crowned him on the day of his wedding, and on the day of the gladness of his heart” (Song of Songs 3:11). This verse is explained as an allusion to special days: “On the day of his wedding”; this is the giving of the Torah through the second set of tablets on Yom Kippur. The name King Solomon in this context, which also means king of peace, is interpreted as a reference to God. “And on the day of the gladness of his heart”; this is the building of the Temple, may it be rebuilt speedily in our days.

Mishnah Megillah

Chapter 1

The Megilla is read on the eleventh, on the twelfth, on the thirteenth, on the fourteenth, or on the fifteenth of the month of Adar, not earlier and not later. The mishna explains the circumstances when the Megilla is read on each of these days. Cities [ kerakin ] that have been surrounded by a wall since the days of Joshua, son of Nun, read the Megilla on the fifteenth of Adar, whereas villages and large towns that have not been walled since the days of Joshua, son of Nun, read it on the fourteenth. However, the Sages instituted that the villages may advance their reading to the day of assembly, i.e., Monday or Thursday, when the rabbinical courts are in session and the Torah is read publicly, and the villagers therefore come to the larger towns.

How so? If the fourteenth of Adar occurs on Monday, the villages and large towns read it on that day, and the walled cities read it on the next day, the fifteenth. If the fourteenth occurs on Tuesday or Wednesday, the villages advance their reading to the day of assembly, i.e., Monday, the twelfth or thirteenth of Adar; the large towns read it on that day, i.e., the fourteenth of Adar, and the walled cities read it on the next day, the fifteenth. If the fourteenth occurs on Thursday, the villages and large towns read it on that day, the fourteenth, and the walled cities read it on the next day, the fifteenth. If the fourteenth occurs on Shabbat eve, the villages advance their reading to the day of assembly, i.e., Thursday, the thirteenth of Adar; and the large towns and the walled cities read it on that day, i.e., the fourteenth of Adar. Even the walled cities read the Megilla on the fourteenth rather than on the fifteenth, as they do not read it on Shabbat. If the fourteenth occurs on Shabbat, both the villages and large towns advance their reading to the day of assembly, i.e., Thursday, the twelfth of Adar; and the walled cities read it on the day after Purim, the fifteenth. If the fourteenth occurs on Sunday, the villages advance their reading to the day of assembly, i.e., Thursday, the eleventh of Adar; and the large towns read it on that day, i.e., the fourteenth of Adar; and the walled cities read it on the next day, the fifteenth.

What is considered a large city, where the Megilla is read on the fourteenth of Adar? Any city in which there are ten idlers. However, if there are fewer than that, it is considered a village, even if it has many inhabitants. It was with regard to these times for reading the Megilla that the Sages said that one advances the reading of the Megilla before the fourteenth of Adar and one does not postpone the reading to after its proper time. However, with regard to the time when families of priests donate wood for the fire on the altar, which were times those families would treat as Festivals; as well as the fast of the Ninth of Av; the Festival peace-offering that was brought on the Festivals; and the commandment of assembly [ hakhel ] of the entire Jewish people in the Temple courtyard on Sukkot in the year following the Sabbatical year to hear the king read the book of Deuteronomy; one postpones their observance until after Shabbat and does not advance their observance to before Shabbat. The mishna continues: Even though the Sages said that one advances the time for reading the Megilla and one does not postpone the reading, one is permitted to eulogize and fast on these days, as they are not actually Purim; nevertheless, gifts for the poor are distributed on this day. Rabbi Yehuda said: When is the Megilla read on the day of assembly, before the fourteenth of Adar? In a place where the villagers generally enter town on Monday and Thursday. However, in a place where they do not generally enter town on Monday and Thursday, one may read the Megilla only in its designated time, the fourteenth of Adar.

If the people read the Megilla during the first Adar and subsequently the year was then intercalated by the court and now the following month will be the second Adar, one reads the Megilla again during the second Adar. The Sages formulated a principle: The difference between the first Adar and the second Adar with regard to the mitzvot that are performed during those months is only that the reading of the Megilla and distributing gifts to the poor are performed in the second Adar and not in the first Adar.

The previous mishna concluded with the formula: The difference between…is only, thereby distinguishing between the halakhot in two different cases. The following mishnayot employ the same formula and distinguish between the halakhot in cases unrelated to Purim and the Megilla. The first is: The difference between Festivals and Shabbat with regard to the labor prohibited on those days is only in preparing food alone. It is permitted to cook and bake in order to prepare food on Festivals; however, on Shabbat it is prohibited. The difference between Shabbat and Yom Kippur with regard to the labor prohibited on those days is only that in this case, i.e., Shabbat, its intentional desecration is punishable at the hand of Man, as he is stoned by a court based on the testimony of witnesses who forewarned the transgressor; and in that case, i.e., Yom Kippur, its intentional desecration is punishable at the hand of God, with karet.

The difference between one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow and one for whom benefit from another’s food is forbidden by vow is only with regard to stepping foot on his property, and with regard to borrowing utensils from him that one does not use in the preparation of food, but for other purposes; as those two benefits are prohibited to the former, but permitted to the latter. The difference between animals consecrated to the Temple as vow offerings and animals consecrated as gift offerings is only that in the case of vow offerings, if they died or were lost before being sacrificed on the altar, one is obligated in the responsibility to replace them, and in the case of gift offerings, if they died or were lost, one is not obligated in the responsibility to replace them.

The difference between a zav who experiences two emissions of a pus-like discharge from his penis and one who experiences three emissions is only that the zav who experienced three emissions is obligated to bring an offering after he recovers, in order to complete his purification process. The difference between a quarantined leper, i.e., one examined by a priest who found his symptoms to be inconclusive, and who must therefore remain in isolation for a period of up to two weeks waiting to see if conclusive symptoms develop; and a confirmed leper, i.e., one whose symptoms were conclusive and the priest declared him an absolute leper, is only with regard to letting the hair on one’s head grow wild and rending one’s garments. A confirmed leper is obligated to let the hair on his head grow wild and rend his garments; a quarantined leper is not. The difference between a leper purified from quarantine, whose symptoms never became conclusive, and a leper purified from a state of confirmed leprosy is only with regard to shaving the hair on all his body and bringing birds as a purification offering, which are obligations incumbent only upon the confirmed leper.

The difference between Torah scrolls, and phylacteries and mezuzot, in terms of the manner in which they are written, is only that Torah scrolls are written in any language, whereas phylacteries and mezuzot are written only in Ashurit, i.e., in Hebrew and using the Hebrew script. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even with regard to Torah scrolls, the Sages permitted them to be written only in Greek. Torah scrolls written in any other language do not have the sanctity of a Torah scroll.

The difference between a High Priest anointed with the oil of anointing, which was the method through which High Priests were consecrated until the oil was sequestered toward the end of the First Temple period, and one consecrated by donning multiple garments unique to the High Priest, which was the practice during the Second Temple period, is only that the latter does not bring the bull that comes for transgression of any of the mitzvot. An anointed High Priest who unwittingly issued an erroneous halakhic ruling and acted upon that ruling, and transgressed a mitzva whose unwitting violation renders one liable to bring a sin-offering, is obligated to bring a sin-offering unique to one in his position. The difference between a High Priest currently serving in that capacity and a former High Priest, who temporarily filled that position when the High Priest was unfit for service, is only with regard to the bull brought by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, and the tenth of an ephah meal-offering brought daily by the High Priest. Each of these offerings is brought only by the current High Priest, and not by a former High Priest.

The difference between a great, public altar, such as the altars established at Nob and Gibeon, which served as religious centers following the destruction of the Tabernacle in Shiloh, and a small, personal altar on which individuals would sacrifice their offerings, is only with regard to Paschal lambs, which may not be sacrificed on a small altar. This is the principle: Any offering that is vowed or contributed voluntarily is sacrificed on a small altar, and any offering that is neither vowed nor contributed voluntarily, but rather is compulsory, e.g., a sin-offering, is not sacrificed on a small altar.

The difference between the Tabernacle in Shilo and the Temple in Jerusalem is only that in Shiloh one eats offerings of lesser sanctity, e.g., individual peace-offerings, thanks-offerings, and the Paschal lamb, and also the second tithe, in any place that overlooks Shiloh, as Shiloh was not a walled city and any place within its Shabbat boundary was regarded as part of the city. And in Jerusalem one eats those consecrated items only within the walls. And here, in Shiloh, and there, in Jerusalem, offerings of the most sacred order are eaten only within the hangings. The Tabernacle courtyard in Shiloh was surrounded by hangings and the Temple courtyard in Jerusalem was surrounded by a wall. There is another difference: With regard to the sanctity of Shiloh, after the Tabernacle was destroyed, there is permission to sacrifice offerings on improvised altars. But with regard to the sanctity of Jerusalem, after the Temple was destroyed, there is no permission to sacrifice offerings on improvised altars, as the prohibition remains intact.

Chapter 2

With regard to one who reads the Megilla out of order, reading a later section first, and then going back to the earlier section, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If he read it by heart, or if he read it in Aramaic translation or in any other language that he does not understand, he has not fulfilled his obligation. However, for those who speak a foreign language, one may read the Megilla in that foreign language. And one who speaks a foreign language who heard the Megilla read in Ashurit, i.e., in Hebrew, has fulfilled his obligation.

If one read the Megilla at intervals, pausing and resuming, or while he is dozing off, he has fulfilled his obligation. If one was writing a Megilla, or expounding upon it, or correcting it, and he read all its words as he was doing so, the following distinction applies: If he had intent to fulfill his obligation with that reading he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If one reads from a Megilla that was written not with ink but with sam or with sikra or with komos or with kankantom, or from a Megilla that was written not on parchment but on neyar or on diftera, a kind of unprocessed leather, he has not fulfilled his obligation. He does not fulfill his obligation unless he reads from a Megilla that is written in Ashurit, i.e., in the Hebrew language and using the Hebrew script, upon parchment and with ink.

With regard to a resident of an unwalled town who went to a walled city, where the Megilla is read on the fifteenth of Adar, and conversely, a resident of a walled city who went to an unwalled town where it is read on the fourteenth, the following distinction applies: If he is destined to return to his original place, he reads it according to the halakha governing his own place, and if not, i.e., if he is not destined to return to his place, he reads with them, the residents of his current location. Beginning from where must a person read the Megilla in order to fulfill his obligation? Rabbi Meir says: He must read all of it. Rabbi Yehuda says: He need read only from “There was a certain Jew” (Esther 2:5). Rabbi Yosei says: From “After these things” (Esther 3:1).

Everyone is fit to read the Megilla, except for a deaf person, an imbecile, and a minor. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and says that a minor is fit to read the Megilla. One may not read the Megilla, nor perform a circumcision, nor immerse himself in a ritual bath, nor sprinkle water of purification to purify people and objects that had contracted ritual impurity through contact with a corpse until after sunrise. And also a woman who observes a clean day for each day she experiences a discharge, i.e., a woman who experienced one or two days of non-menstrual bleeding, and must now wait until a day has passed without any discharge of blood before regaining ritual purity, she too may not immerse herself until the sun has risen. And with regard to all these activities that are supposed to be performed during the day, if one did them after daybreak, i.e., after the appearance of the first light of the sun, even before sunrise, they are valid, as at this point it is already considered daytime.

Although it is preferable to fulfill a particular day’s mitzva at the earliest possible hour, the entire day is a valid time for reading the Megilla; for reciting hallel ; for sounding the shofar on Rosh HaShana; for taking the lulav and the other species on Sukkot; for the additional prayer recited on Shabbat and other occasions; and for the additional offerings sacrificed in the Temple on these occasions. And the entire day is also a valid time for the confession over the bulls brought by the Sanhedrin or by the High Priest to atone for mistakes they had made in their instruction to the people; for the declaration made on the last day of Passover in the fourth and seventh year of the Sabbatical cycle, stating that one’s obligations with regard to tithes have been properly fulfilled (see Deuteronomy 26:12–15); and for the confession of sins made by the High Priest on Yom Kippur over the special offerings brought on that day. The entire day is also a valid time for placing hands on the head of an offering; for slaughtering an offering; for waving those offerings that require waving in the Temple; for bringing meal-offerings near to the altar; for scooping out a fistful of flour from a meal-offering in order to burn it on the altar; and for burning the fistful of flour on the altar; for pinching the necks of the turtledoves and young pigeons sacrificed as offerings in the Temple; and for receiving the blood of an offering in a vessel; and for sprinkling blood on the altar and on the curtain separating between the Holy and the Holy of Holies. And the entire day is also a valid time for giving a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [ sota ] to drink from the bitter waters (see Numbers 5:11–31); for breaking the neck of the heifer as part of the procedure followed when a corpse is found outside a town and it is not known who caused his death (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9); and for all the steps in the purification process of the leper (see Leviticus 14:1–20).

Correspondingly, all the mitzvot that must be performed at night may be performed anytime during the night: The entire night is a valid time for reaping the omer of barley on the night following the first day of Passover, for burning the fats of offerings that had been brought during the preceding day, and for burning the limbs of burnt-offerings. This is the principle: Something that it is a mitzva to perform during the day is valid if performed anytime during the entire day; something that it is a mitzva to perform at night is valid if performed anytime during the entire night.

Chapter 3

Residents of a town who sold the town square, which was at times used for public prayer and therefore attained a certain degree of sanctity, may use the proceeds of the sale only to purchase something of a greater degree of sanctity. They may therefore purchase a synagogue with the proceeds of the sale. If they sold a synagogue, they may purchase an ark in which to house sacred scrolls. If they sold an ark, they may purchase wrapping cloths for the sacred scrolls. If they sold wrapping cloths, they may purchase scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings. If they sold scrolls of the Prophets and Writings, they may purchase a Torah scroll. However, the proceeds of a sale of a sacred item may not be used to purchase an item of a lesser degree of sanctity. Therefore, if they sold a Torah scroll, they may not use the proceeds to purchase scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings. If they sold scrolls of the Prophets and Writings, they may not purchase wrapping cloths. If they sold wrapping cloths, they may not purchase an ark. If they sold an ark, they may not purchase a synagogue. If they sold a synagogue, they may not purchase a town square. And similarly, the same limitation applies to any surplus funds from the sale of sacred items, i.e., if after selling an item and purchasing something of a greater degree of sanctity there remain additional, unused funds, the leftover funds are subject to the same principle and may be used to purchase only something of a degree of sanctity greater than that of the original item. They may not sell a sacred object belonging to the community to an individual, even if the object will still be used for the same purpose, due to the fact that by doing so they downgrade its degree of sanctity, as an item used by fewer people is considered to have a lower degree of sanctity than one used by many; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. The Rabbis said to him: If so, by your logic, it should also not be permitted to sell a sacred object from a large town to a small town. However, such a sale is certainly permitted, and therefore it must also be permitted to sell such an object to an individual.

They may sell a synagogue only with a stipulation that if the sellers so desire it, the buyers will return it to them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They may sell a synagogue with a permanent sale for any usage, except the following four things, which would be an affront to the synagogue’s previous sanctity: For a bathhouse, where people stand undressed; or for a tannery [ burseki ], due to the foul smell; for immersion, i.e., to be used as a ritual bath, where people also stand undressed; or for a lavatory. Rabbi Yehuda says: They may sell a synagogue for the generic purpose of serving as a courtyard, and then the buyer may then do with it as he wishes, even if that is one of the above four purposes.

And Rabbi Yehuda said further: A synagogue that fell into ruin still may not be used for a mundane purpose. Therefore, one may not eulogize in it. And nor may one stretch out and repair ropes in it. The wide expanse of the synagogue would have been particularly suitable for this. And nor may one spread animal traps within it. And nor may one spread out produce upon its roof to dry. And nor may one make it into a shortcut. The halakha that a synagogue in disrepair still may not be used for mundane purposes is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And I will bring desolation to your sanctuaries” (Leviticus 26:31). The fact that the word “sanctuaries” appears after the word “desolation” indicates that their sanctity remains upon them even when they are desolate. However, if grass sprang up of its own accord in the ruined synagogue, although it is not befitting its sanctity, one should not pick it, due to the anguish that it will bring to those who see it. It will remind them of the disrepair of the synagogue and the need to rebuild it.

On four Shabbatot during and surround-ing the month of Adar, a Torah portion of seasonal significance is read. When the New Moon of Adar occurs on Shabbat, the congregation reads the portion of Shekalim on that Shabbat. If the New Moon occurs during the middle of the week, they advance the reading of that portion to the previous Shabbat, and, in such a case, they interrupt the reading of the four portions on the following Shabbat, which would be the first Shabbat of the month of Adar, and no additional portion is read on it. On the second Shabbat, the Shabbat prior to Purim, they read the portion: “Remember what Amalek did” (Deuteronomy 25:17–19), which details the mitzva to remember and destroy the nation of Amalek. On the third Shabbat, they read the portion of the Red Heifer [ Para ] (Numbers 19:1–22), which details the purification process for one who became ritually impure through contact with a corpse. On the fourth Shabbat, they read the portion: “This month [ haḥodesh ] shall be for you” (Exodus 12:1–20), which describes the offering of the Paschal lamb. On the fifth Shabbat, they resume the regular weekly order of readings and no special portion is read. For all special days, the congregation interrupts the regular weekly order of readings, and a special portion relating to the character of the day is read. This applies on the New Moons, on Hanukkah, and on Purim, on fast days, and on the non-priestly watches, and on Yom Kippur.

On the first day of Passover, the congregation reads from the portion of the Festivals of Leviticus (Leviticus 22:26–23:44). On Shavuot they read the portion of “Seven weeks” (Deuteronomy 16:9–12). On Rosh HaShana they read the portion of “And on the seventh month on the first of the month” (Leviticus 23:23–25). On Yom Kippur they read the portion of “After the death” (Leviticus 16). On the first Festival day of Sukkot they read from the portion of the Festivals of Leviticus (Leviticus 22:26–23:44), and on the other days of Sukkot they read selections from the portion of the offerings of Sukkot (Numbers 29:12–39).

On each day of Hanukkah they read selections from the portion of the dedication of the altar by the tribal princes (Numbers 7). On Purim they read the portion of “And Amalek came” (Exodus 17:8–16). On the New Moon they read the portion of “And in the beginnings of your months” (Numbers 28:11–15). And in the non-priestly watches they read the act of Creation (Genesis 1:1–2:3). The Jewish people were divided into twenty-four watches. Each week, it would be the turn of a different watch to send representatives to Jerusalem to be present in the Temple to witness the sacrificial service. Those remaining behind would fast during the week, from Monday to Thursday, offer special prayers, and read the account of Creation from the Torah. On fast days, they read the portion of blessings and curses (Leviticus, chapter 26). One should not interrupt the reading of the curses by having two different people read them. Rather, one person reads all of them. On Mondays, and on Thursdays, and on Shabbat during the afternoon service, they read in accordance with the regular weekly order, i.e., they proceed to read the first section of the Torah portion that follows the portion that was read on the previous Shabbat morning. However, these readings are not counted as a progression in the reckoning of reading the Torah portions, i.e., they do not proceed on Monday to read the section that immediately follows the section read on Shabbat during the afternoon, and then the following section on Thursday. Rather, until the reading on the following Shabbat morning, they return to and read the same first section of the Torah portion that follows the portion that was read on the previous Shabbat morning. On Festivals and holidays, they read a portion relating to the character of the day, as it is stated: “And Moses declared to the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Lord” (Leviticus 23:44), which indicates that part of the mitzva of the Festivals is that the people should read the portion relating to them, each one in its appointed time.

Chapter 4

One who reads the Megilla may position himself as he wishes, either standing or sitting. Whether one person reads the Megilla or two people read it together, they have fulfilled their obligation. In a place where the people are accustomed to recite a blessing over the reading, one should recite a blessing. And in a place where it is customary not to recite a blessing, one should not recite a blessing. The mishna records several laws governing public Torah readings. On Mondays and Thursdays during the morning service and on Shabbat during the afternoon service, three people read from the Torah; one may neither decrease the number of readers nor add to them. And one does not conclude with a reading from the Prophets [ haftara ] on these occasions. Both the one who begins the reading and the one who concludes the reading from the Torah recite a blessing; one recites before the beginning of the reading and one recites after its conclusion, but the middle reader does not recite a blessing.

On the days of the New Moon and on the intermediate days of a Festival, four people read from the Torah; one may neither decrease the number of readers nor add to them. And one does not conclude with a reading from the Prophets. Both the one who begins the reading and the one who concludes the reading from the Torah recite a blessing. The first reader recites a blessing before the beginning of the reading, and the last reader recites a blessing after its conclusion, but the middle readers do not recite a blessing. The mishna formulates a general principle with regard to the number of people who read from the Torah on different occasions. This is the principle: Any day on which there is an additional offering sacrificed in the Temple and that is not a Festival, i.e., the New Moon and the intermediate days of a Festival, four people read from the Torah; on a Festival, five people read; on Yom Kippur, six people read; and on Shabbat, seven people read. One may not decrease the number of readers, but one may add to them. And on these days one concludes with a reading from the Prophets. Both the one who begins the reading and the one who concludes the reading from the Torah recite a blessing; one recites before the beginning of the reading and one recites after its conclusion, but the middle readers do not recite a blessing.

One does not recite the introductory prayers and blessing [ poresin ] before Shema ; nor does one pass before the ark to repeat the Amida prayer; nor do the priests lift their hands to recite the Priestly Benediction; nor is the Torah read in public; nor does one conclude with a reading from the Prophets [ haftara ] in the presence of fewer than ten men. And one does not observe the practice of standing up and sitting down for the delivery of eulogies at a funeral service; nor does one recite the mourners’ blessing or comfort mourners in two lines after the funeral; or recite the bridegrooms’ blessing; and one does not invite others to recite Grace after Meals, i.e., conduct a zimmun, with the name of God, with fewer than ten men present. If one consecrated land and now wishes to redeem it, the land must be assessed by nine men and one priest, for a total of ten. And similarly, assessing the value of a person who has pledged his own value to the Temple must be undertaken by ten people, one of whom must be a priest.

One who reads from the Torah in the synagogue should not read fewer than three verses. And when it is being translated, he should not read to the translator more than one verse at a time, so that the translator will not become confused. And with regard to the Prophets, one may read to the translator three verses at a time. With respect to the Torah, an incorrect translation might lead to an error in practice, but this concern does not apply to the Prophets. If the three verses constitute three separate paragraphs, that is to say, if each verse is a paragraph in itself, one must read them to the translator one by one. One may skip from one place to another while reading the Prophets, but one may not skip from one place to another while reading the Torah. How far may he skip? As far as he can, provided that the translator will not conclude his translation while the reader is still rolling the scroll to the new location. The reader may not cause the congregation to wait for him after the translator has finished, as that would be disrespectful to the congregation.

The one who concludes with a reading from the Prophets [ haftara ] is also the one who is honored to recite the introductory prayers and blessing before Shema, and he passes before the ark to repeat the Amida prayer, and if he is a priest he lifts his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction. And if the one who reads the haftara is a minor, who may read the haftara but is not qualified to lead the congregation in prayer, his father or teacher is honored to pass before the ark in his place.

A minor may read the Torah in public and also translate the text for the congregation into Aramaic, but he may not recite the introductory prayers and blessing before Shema, and he may not pass before the ark to lead the congregation in prayer, and he may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction. One whose limbs are exposed [ poḥe’aḥ ] may recite the introductory prayers and blessing before Shema and translate the Torah reading into Aramaic, but he may not read from the Torah out of respect for the Torah; he may not pass before the ark to lead the congregation in prayer; and he may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction out of respect for the congregation. One who is blind may recite the introductory prayers and blessing before Shema, and he may also translate the Torah reading into Aramaic. Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who has not seen the luminaries, the sun, moon, and stars, in his life, i.e., he was blind from birth, may not recite the introductory prayers and blessing before Shema. The first of the blessings before Shema is the blessing over the luminaries, and one who has never seen them cannot recite the blessing at all.

A priest who has blemishes on his hands may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction. Because of his blemish, people will look at his hands, and it is prohibited to look at the hands of the priests during the Priestly Benediction. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one whose hands were colored with satis, a blue dye, may not lift his hands to recite the Priestly Benediction because the congregation will look at him.

One who says: I will not pass before the ark to lead the prayer service in colored garments, may not pass before the ark to lead the prayer service even in white garments. There is concern that one who insists on wearing clothing of a specific color during his prayers is a heretic and therefore unfit to lead the service. Similarly, if one says: I will not pass before the ark wearing sandals, he may not pass before it even barefoot, as he is not acting in accordance with the teachings of the Sages. One who constructs his phylacteries in a round shape exposes himself to danger during times of persecution, when foreign governments impose a ban on the mitzva of phylacteries, and yet he does not fulfill the mitzva to don phylacteries, as phylacteries must be square. If one placed the phylacteries worn on the head on his forehead, and not in its proper place above his hairline, or if he placed the phylacteries worn on the arm on his palm, and not on his bicep, this is the way of the heretics, i.e., those who reject the tradition of the Sages with regard to the proper placement of the phylacteries. If one plated his phylacteries with gold or placed the phylacteries worn on the arm on the outside of his sleeve [ unkeli ], this is the way of the outsiders, i.e., those who do not take part in the traditions of the Jewish people.

If one says in his prayers: May the good bless You, this is a path of heresy, as heretics divide the world into two domains, good and evil. If one says the following in his prayers: Just as Your mercy is extended to a bird’s nest, as You have commanded us to send away the mother before taking her chicks or eggs (see Deuteronomy 22:6–7), so too extend Your mercy to us; or: May Your name be mentioned with the good; or: We give thanks, we give thanks, twice, he is suspected of heretical beliefs and they silence him. If one modifies the text while reading the laws of forbidden sexual relations, i.e., he introduces euphemisms out of a sense of propriety, they silence him. Similarly, if one says while translating the verse: “And you shall not give any of your seed to set them apart to Molekh” (Leviticus 18:21): And you shall not give any of your seed to impregnate an Aramean woman, he is silenced with rebuke.

The incident of Reuben, about which it says: “And Reuben went and lay with Bilhah, his father’s concubine” (Genesis 35:22), is read from the Torah in public but not translated, so that the uneducated not come to denigrate Reuben. The incident of Tamar (Genesis, chapter 38) is read in public and also translated. The first report of the incident of the Golden Calf, i.e., the Torah’s account of the incident itself (Exodus 32:1–20), is read and translated, but the second narrative, i.e., Aaron’s report to Moses of what had taken place (Exodus 32:21–24) is read but not translated. The verses constituting the Priestly Benediction (Numbers 6:24–26) and the incident of David and Amnon (II Samuel, chapter 13) are neither read nor translated. One may not conclude the Torah reading with by reading from the Prophets the account of the Divine Chariot (Ezekiel, chapter 1), so as not to publicize that which was meant to remain hidden. And Rabbi Yehuda permits it. Rabbi Eliezer says: One may not conclude with section from the Prophets beginning with: “Make known to Jerusalem her abominations” (Ezekiel 16:2), because it speaks derogatively of the Jewish people.

Mishnah Moed Katan

Chapter 1

One may irrigate a field that requires irrigation on the intermediate days of a Festival as well as during the Sabbatical Year, both from a newly emerged spring that began to flow only during the Festival, and from a spring that did not just emerge and that has been flowing for some time. However, one may not irrigate a field with rainwater collected in a cistern, a procedure that requires excessive exertion, or with water drawn with a shadoof [ kilon ], a lever used to raise water with a bucket from deep down in a well. And one may not construct circular ditches around the bases of grapevines on the intermediate days of a Festival.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may not construct a new water channel during the intermediate days of a Festival or during the Sabbatical Year. And the Rabbis say: One may construct a new water channel during the Sabbatical Year and one may repair damaged water channels during the intermediate days of a Festival. In addition to performing labor on one’s own property in order to avoid financial loss, it is also permitted to perform labor on the intermediate days of a Festival for the public welfare: One may repair damaged water cisterns that are in the public domain, and clean them out by removing the dirt and sediment that accumulated there; one may repair roads, streets, and ritual baths; and one may tend to all other public needs. So too, one may mark graves to inform the public of their ritual impurity, and inspectors may even go out to uproot the shoots of prohibited diverse kinds [ kilayim ] that grew in the fields during the rainy season.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: In a field that is filled with trees, one may draw water via channels from one tree to another tree on the intermediate days of a Festival because trees are in dire need of water. And this is permitted provided that in doing so he does not water the entire field. With regard to plants that were not watered prior to the Festival, one may not water them on the intermediate days of the Festival because they do not need the water. But the Rabbis permit watering in this case, i.e., trees, and that case, i.e., plants.

One may trap moles [ ishut ] and mice in an orchard and in a field of grain in a way that is not his usual manner, i.e., as he would trap them all year round, both on the intermediate days of a Festival and during the Sabbatical Year. But the Rabbis say: In an orchard he may trap them in his usual manner, but in a field of grain, where there is no danger of substantial financial loss, he may only trap them in a way that is not his usual manner. And one may seal a breach in the wall of his garden on the intermediate days of a Festival, and during the Sabbatical Year one may even build a wall in his usual manner, as this is not considered an agricultural labor. Consequently, despite the fact that this benefits the garden by offering it protection, it is not prohibited during the Sabbatical Year.

When symptoms of leprosy appear, they must be examined by a priest, who determines whether or not the symptoms qualify as leprosy. Rabbi Meir says: A priest may initially examine an individual showing symptoms of leprosy on the intermediate days of a Festival in order to be lenient, i.e., he may pronounce the individual to be free of leprosy, but not in order to be stringent; he may not pronounce the individual to be impure. The individual does not become ritually impure until the priest pronounces him to have leprosy, and therefore the priest may remain silent and thereby prevent causing the afflicted individual distress during the Festival. And the Rabbis say: The priest may not examine the symptoms in order to be lenient or in order to be stringent. Rabbi Meir also stated another leniency concerning the halakhot of the intermediate days of a Festival: A person may gather the bones of his father and mother from their temporary graves on the intermediate days of a Festival. In ancient times, it was customary to first bury a corpse in a temporary grave. After the flesh had decomposed, the bones would be collected, placed in a coffin, and buried in a vault together with the bones of the deceased individual’s ancestors. This is permitted on the intermediate days of a Festival because the fact that one merited to bring the bones of his deceased parents to the graves of their ancestors is a source of joy for him. Rabbi Yosei says: One does not gather these bones on the intermediate days of a Festival, because it is a source of mourning for him. Even though he is happy to be able to bury his parents’ bones in their ancestral graves, he is still pained by the memory of their death. And all agree that a person may not arouse [ ye’orer ] lamentation for his deceased relative, and he may not eulogize him during the thirty days before a pilgrimage Festival.

One may not dig crypts or graves on the intermediate days of a Festival in preparation for those who are still alive, but one may adjust previously dug crypts on the intermediate days of a Festival in order to receive a particular corpse. And one may also construct a laundry pond on the intermediate days of a Festival as it does not involve excessive effort. And one may also prepare a coffin if he is together with the corpse in the same courtyard, as in that case everyone knows that he is preparing the coffin for the deceased. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits making the coffin unless one has wooden boards with him that had already been cut before the Festival and that need only to be attached.

One may not marry a woman on the intermediate days of a Festival, not virgins and not widows, and one may not perform levirate marriage with his sister-in-law, if his brother died childless, because it is a joyous occasion for him. However, one may remarry his divorced wife on the intermediate days of a Festival, as this is not as great a joy for him. And a woman may engage in all her usual cosmetic treatments to enhance her physical appearance on the intermediate days of a Festival. Rabbi Yehuda says: She may not apply lime to her skin because it is temporarily a disgrace to her, as she is unattractive before the lime is peeled off and will therefore be distressed during the Festival.

The mishna continues: A layman, who is not a skilled tailor, may sew in his usual manner if necessary for the Festival, whereas a craftsman may form only temporary stitches. And one may interweave the cords attached to the frames of beds upon which a mattress is placed. Rabbi Yosei says: One may only tighten the cords but not interweave them.

One may set up an oven, a stove, and a mill on the intermediate days of a Festival. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not chisel millstones for the first time on the intermediate days of a Festival.

One may construct a railing for a roof or a balcony if it is done in a nonprofessional manner, as the work of a layman, but not if it is done skillfully, as the work of a craftsman. One may plaster the cracks in an oven and roll over them with a roller, a wooden tool used to smooth out clay, with a hand or a foot, but not with a presser, a tool that is specially designed for this task. With regard to the hinge of a door, and the cylinder of the hinge, and the cross beam that holds the door, and a lock and a key that broke, one may fix them on the intermediate days of a Festival as these items are essential for the Festival and their repair cannot be delayed. This is permitted, provided that he does not intend ahead of time to do his labor on the Festival and delay it until that time. And with regard to all preserved food from which one can eat on the Festival, since they become ready to be eaten in a short amount of time, he may preserve them on the intermediate days of a Festival.

Chapter 2

The mishna discusses one who had already turned over his olives as part of the process of preparing them for pressing, and mourning for a close relative befell him and as a result he was prohibited from engaging in work, or some other unavoidable accident occurred, or his workers misled him, promising to come but failing to do so, so that he could not press his olives before the Festival. Under these circumstances, during the intermediate days of the Festival, he may place the olives in the press and load the beam with weights for the initial pressing of the olives and leave it this way until after the Festival; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: He may press the olives and complete the process and then plug each barrel of oil in its usual manner. Since delay can entail financial loss, the Sages did not require him to alter the normal process of extracting the oil.

And similarly, with regard to one whose wine was already in the collection pit beside the wine press and needed to be removed lest it sour, and mourning for some close relative or some other unavoidable accident befell him, or his workers misled him, promising to come but failing to do so, during the intermediate days of the Festival he may draw off the wine and complete the process, and then plug each barrel of wine in its usual manner; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Yehuda says: He should construct a wooden panel to cover the collection pit so that the wine will not sour.

A person may bring his fruit in from the field on the intermediate days of the Festival because he is concerned about thieves, and he may draw his flax out of the soaking pool so that it is not ruined from soaking too long in the water, provided that he does not plan from the outset to perform his work on the intermediate days of the Festival. And with regard to all of these cases, if one planned from the outset to perform his labor on the intermediate days of the Festival, the fruit of that labor must be lost and no benefit may be derived from it.

One may not purchase houses, slaves, and cattle on the intermediate days of a Festival unless it is for the sake of the Festival, or to provide for the needs of the seller who does not have anything to eat. One may not move his possessions from house to house during the intermediate days of a Festival, but he may move them to his courtyard if that is necessary. One may not bring home utensils from the house of a craftsman after he has completed his work, but if one is concerned about them that if he leaves them in the craftsman’s house they are likely to be stolen, he may move them to another courtyard.

On the intermediate days of a Festival, figs that were spread out to dry may be covered with straw to protect them from rain and dew. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may even condense the figs. Those who sell produce, clothing, and utensils may sell them in private, for the sake of the Festival. Fishermen, and groats makers [ dashoshot ], and bean pounders, who pulverize the beans, may ply their trades in private for the sake of the Festival. Rabbi Yosei says: They were stringent with themselves to refrain from this work even with respect to what was needed for the Festival.

Chapter 3

And these may shave and cut their hair on the intermediate days of a Festival: One who comes from a country overseas; and one who is released from a house of captivity; and one who comes out of prison on the intermediate days of a Festival; and one who had been ostracized and therefore prohibited from cutting his hair, and the Sages released him from his decree of ostracism on the intermediate days of the Festival; and similarly, one who had vowed not to cut his hair and then requested of a Sage to dissolve his vow and was released from it on the intermediate days of the Festival; and the nazirite whose term of naziriteship ended on the intermediate days of a Festival; and the leper who needs to purify himself on the intermediate days and must shave his entire body in order to leave his state of ritual impurity and regain his ritual purity. Since these people were not able to cut their hair on the eve of the Festival, they are permitted to do so on the intermediate days of the Festival.

And these may launder their clothes on the intermediate days of a Festival: One who comes from a country overseas; and one who is released from a house of captivity; and one who comes out of prison on the intermediate days of a Festival; and one who had been ostracized and the Sages released him from his decree of ostracism; and similarly, one who had vowed not to launder his clothes and he requested from a Sage to dissolve his vow and was released from it on the intermediate days of a Festival. Hand towels; and barbers’ towels, which are used to cover a person having a haircut; and body-drying towels, all of which get quickly soiled, may be laundered on the intermediate days of a Festival. Zavim, men suffering from an impure venereal emission; zavot, women who experience a flow of menstrual-type blood on three consecutive days during a time of the month when they do not expect to experience menstrual bleeding; menstruating women; women who have just given birth; and all others who leave a state of ritual impurity for a state of ritual purity on the intermediate days of the Festival, these people are all permitted to launder their clothes in order to purify themselves. But all other people are prohibited from laundering during the intermediate days of the Festival.

And these are the documents that may be written on the intermediate days of a Festival: Documents of betrothal of wives, through which bridegrooms betroth their brides; bills of divorce; receipts for the repayment of debts; wills [ deyateiki ]; deeds of gift; perozbolin, documents through which lenders authorize the courts to collect their loans on their behalf, thereby preventing the Sabbatical year from canceling their debts; letters of valuation, which were drawn up by the court when they valuated property and transferred it to the lender; and letters of sustenance, which were drawn up when one accepted upon himself to maintain another, e.g., his step-daughter. The list continues: Documents of the ritual through which the brother-in-law frees the yevama of her levirate bonds [ ḥalitza ], thereby freeing her from the obligation to marry one of her deceased husband’s brothers; documents in which the court records the refusal of a girl upon reaching majority to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brothers married her as a minor after the death of her father; documents of arbitration, in which the court summarizes a conflict that had been resolved through arbitration; court rulings; and the official correspondence of the ruling authorities.

One may not write bills of debt on the intermediate days of a Festival. But if the lender does not trust the borrower, and he is concerned that the borrower will later deny the loan, or if the scribe has nothing to eat, then he may write a bill of debt during the Festival week. One may not write Torah scrolls, phylacteries, or mezuzot on the intermediate days of a Festival, nor may one correct a single letter, even in the Torah scroll of Ezra, which was kept in the Temple and upon which all the Jewish communities relied. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may write phylacteries and mezuzot for himself on the intermediate days of a Festival if he needs them. And one may spin sky-blue wool for his ritual fringes on his thigh, but not in the ordinary manner with a spindle, as this procedure must be performed in an altered manner on the intermediate days of a Festival.

One who buries his deceased relative three days before a pilgrimage Festival has the decree of the seven- day period of mourning, i.e., the halakhot and prohibitions associated with that period, nullified for him by the Festival. He is not required to complete this seven-day mourning period after the Festival. If one buries his deceased relative eight days before a pilgrimage Festival, then the decree of thirty days is nullified for him. The restrictions that ordinarily apply during this thirty-day mourning period no longer apply after the Festival. This is because the Sages said a principle with regard to this issue: Shabbat counts as one of the days of mourning, although one may not mourn on it and it does not interrupt the mourning period, which continues after Shabbat. The pilgrimage Festivals, on the other hand, interrupt the mourning period, so that if one began mourning before such a Festival, then the mourning period is canceled by the Festival. They do not, however, count. If one did not begin mourning before the Festival, or if his relative died during the Festival, then he is required to complete his mourning period afterward, as the days of the Festival do not count toward the requisite days of mourning.

Rabbi Eliezer says: From the time that the Temple was destroyed, Shavuot is like Shabbat, because nowadays the days following Shavuot are not treated like Festival days. When the Temple stood, many of the Festival’s offerings that could not be sacrificed on Shavuot itself would be sacrificed during the six days following the Festival. Nowadays, however, when offerings are no longer sacrificed, Shavuot lasts for only one day in Eretz Yisrael, and therefore it is treated like Shabbat with regard to mourning: It counts as one of the days of mourning, but does not interrupt the period of mourning. Rabban Gamliel says: Even Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur are considered like the pilgrimage Festivals, in that they interrupt the mourning period but are not counted toward the days of mourning. And the Rabbis say: The halakha is neither in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer nor in accordance with the statement of Rabban Gamliel. Rather, with regard to mourning, Shavuot is treated like the other pilgrimage Festivals, whereas Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur are treated like Shabbat.

Mourners do not rend their garments during the intermediate days of a Festival and do not remove their garments from their shoulders. And others do not provide them with a meal [ mavrin ] after the burial, except for close relatives of the deceased. And the consolers provide the first meal after the burial only while the mourner is sitting on an upright bed, and not on one that is overturned. One does not bring the first meal after the burial to the house of mourning on a small tray [ tavla ], in a bowl [ iskutla ], or in a narrow-mouthed basket [ kanon ], but rather in ordinary baskets. And the mourners’ blessing is not recited on the intermediate days of a Festival, but the consolers may stand in a row when the mourners leave the cemetery and console them. And the mourners dismiss the many consolers, by telling them that they may return home after they have fulfilled the mitzva of consoling the mourners.

The bier of the deceased is not set down in the street during the intermediate days of a Festival so as not to encourage eulogies. On an ordinary weekday, people would gather in the street around the bier to eulogize the deceased, but this should be avoided during the intermediate days of the Festival. And the biers of women are never set down, even if it is not the intermediate days of a Festival, due to their honor. Blood might drip from their bodies, and it would cause them dishonor if their blood stained the street. On the intermediate days of a Festival women may wail in grief over the deceased, but they may not clap [ metapeḥot ] their hands in mourning. Rabbi Yishmael says: Those who are close to the bier may clap.

On New Moons, Hanukkah and Purim, which are not Festivals by Torah law, the women may both wail and clap their hands in mourning. On both the intermediate days of a Festival and on New Moons, Hanukkah and Purim they may not lament. After the deceased has been buried they may neither wail nor clap. The mishna explains: What is considered wailing? This is when they all wail together simultaneously. And what is considered a lament? This is when one speaks and they all answer after her with a repeated refrain, as it is stated: “And teach your daughters wailing and everyone her neighbor lamentation” (Jeremiah 9:19). In order to conclude on a positive note, the mishna says: But with regard to the future, the verse states: “He will destroy death forever; and the Lord, God, will wipe away tears from off all faces and the reproach of His people He will take away from off all the earth” (Isaiah 25:8).

Mishnah Chagigah

Chapter 1

All are obligated on the three pilgrim Festivals in the mitzva of appearance, i.e., to appear in the Temple as well as to sacrifice an offering, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor; and a tumtum, and a hermaphrodite, and women, and slaves who are not emancipated; and the lame, and the blind, and the sick, and the old, and one who is unable to ascend to Jerusalem on his own legs. Who has the status of a minor with regard to this halakha? Any child who is unable to ride on his father’s shoulders and ascend from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount; this is  the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel say: Any child who is unable to hold his father’s hand and ascend on foot from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount, as it is stated: “Three times [ regalim ]” (Exodus 23:14). Since the term for feet is raglayim, Beit Hillel infer from here that the obligation to ascend involves the use of one’s legs.

Beit Shammai say: The burnt-offering of appearance brought on a pilgrim Festival must be worth at least two silver coins, and the Festival peace -offering must be worth at least one silver ma’a coin. And Beit Hillel say: The burnt-offering of appearance must be worth at least one silver ma’a and the Festival peace -offering at least two silver coins.

Burnt -offerings that one sacrifices on the intermediate days of the Festival must come from non-sacred property, not from sacred property such as second-tithe money. But the peace- offerings may be brought from the second tithe, i.e., from money with which one redeemed second tithe, which is subsequently used to purchase food in Jerusalem. With regard to the Festival peace-offering sacrificed on the first day of the festival of Passover, Beit Shammai say: It must come from non-sacred property, and Beit Hillel say: It may be brought even from the second tithe.

In general, Israelites fulfill their obligation to eat peace-offerings of rejoicing with their voluntary vows and gift offerings donated during the year and sacrificed on the Festival; and likewise with animal tithes. And the priests fulfill their obligation of rejoicing with the meat of sin -offerings and guilt -offerings and with firstborn offerings, as the priests receive a portion of these, and with the breast and thigh of peace-offerings, to which they are also entitled. However, they do not fulfill their obligation with birds, e.g., a bird sacrificed as a sin-offering, nor with meal -offerings, as only the eating of meat constitutes rejoicing.

One who has many eaters, i.e., members of his household, and a small amount of property, may bring many peace- offerings and few burnt- offerings, so he can feed the members of his household with the peace-offerings. If one has much property and few eaters, he should bring many burnt- offerings and few peace- offerings. If both these and those, his property and the members of his household, are few, with regard to this individual it is stated in the mishna (2a) that the Sages established the smallest amount of one silver ma’a for the burnt-offering of appearance in the Temple and two silver coins for the Festival peace-offerings. If both his eaters and his property are many, with regard to this individual it is stated: “Every man shall give as he is able, according to the blessing of the Lord your God, which He has given you” (Deuteronomy 16:17).

With regard to one who did not celebrate by bringing the Festival peace-offering on the first day of the festival of Sukkot, he may celebrate and bring it during the entire remaining days of the pilgrimage Festival, and even on the final day of the Festival, i.e., on the Eighth Day of Assembly. If the pilgrimage Festival passed and one did not celebrate by bringing the Festival peace-offering, he is not obligated to pay restitution for it. Even if he consecrated an animal for this purpose and it was lost, once the Festival is over he has no obligation to replace it, as he has missed the opportunity for performing this mitzva. And about this it is stated: “That which is crooked cannot be made straight; and that which is wanting cannot be numbered” (Ecclesiastes 1:15).

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Who is the crooked that cannot be made straight? This verse is referring to one who engaged in intercourse with a woman forbidden to him and fathered a mamzer with her. This individual is unable to rectify his sin, because the status of the illegitimate child is permanent. And if you say that it is referring to one who steals or robs, although he is crooked he can return what he stole and in this manner his sin will be rectified. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: One calls crooked only someone who was initially straight and subsequently became crooked. And who is this? This is a Torah scholar who leaves his Torah study. Here is an example of something straight that became crooked.

Incidental to the Festival peace-offering, the mishna describes the nature of various areas of Torah study. The halakhot of the dissolution of vows, when one requests from a Sage to dissolve them, fly in the air and have nothing to support them, as these halakhot are not mentioned explicitly in the Torah. There is only a slight allusion to the dissolution of vows in the Torah, which is taught by the Sages as part of the oral tradition. The halakhot of Shabbat, Festival peace -offerings, and misuse of consecrated property are like mountains suspended by a hair, as they have little written about them in the Torah, and yet the details of their halakhot are numerous. The details of monetary law, sacrificial rites, ritual purity and impurity, and the halakhot of those with whom relations are forbidden all have something to support them, i.e., there is ample basis in the Torah for these halakhot, and these are the essential parts of Torah.

Chapter 2

One may not expound the topic of forbidden sexual relations before three or more individuals; nor may one expound the act of Creation and the secrets of the beginning of the world before two or more individuals; nor may one expound by oneself the Design of the Divine Chariot, a mystical teaching with regard to the ways God conducts the world, unless he is wise and understands most matters on his own. The mishna continues in the same vein: Whoever looks at four matters, it would have been better for him had he never entered the world: Anyone who reflects upon what is above the firmament and what is below the earth, what was before Creation, and what will be after the end of the world. And anyone who has no concern for the honor of his Maker, who inquires into and deals with matters not permitted to him, deserves to have never come to the world.

Yosei ben Yo’ezer says not to place one’s hands on offerings before slaughtering them on a Festival because this is considered performing labor with an animal on a Festival. His colleague, Yosef ben Yoḥanan, says to place them; Yehoshua ben Peraḥya says not to place them; Nitai HaArbeli says to place them; Yehuda ben Tabbai says not to place them; Shimon ben Shataḥ says to place them; Shemaya says to place them; Avtalyon says not to place them. Hillel and Menaḥem did not disagree with regard to this issue. Menaḥem departed from his post, and Shammai entered in his stead. Shammai says not to place them; Hillel says to place them. The first members of each pair served as Nasi, and their counterparts served as deputy Nasi.

Beit Shammai say: One may bring peace-offerings on a Festival because both the owners and the priests partake of them, but one may not place his hands on them, on the peace-offerings before sacrificing them. However, one may not bring burnt-offerings at all because they are not eaten, and labor is permitted on Festivals only for the sake of preparing food for humans. And Beit Hillel say: One may bring peace-offerings and also burnt-offerings, and one places his hands on both of them.

If the festival of Shavuot occurs on the eve of Shabbat, Beit Shammai say: The day of slaughter is after Shabbat, on Sunday. This is the day on which the animals brought in honor of the pilgrim Festival are slaughtered, since they maintain that the Festival burnt-offering is not sacrificed on the Festival day itself but on the following day, and all burnt-offerings vowed by individuals are postponed to the following day. And Beit Hillel say: The day of slaughter is not after Shabbat. Since the slaughter may be performed on the Festival day itself, it is unnecessary to postpone it. But they concede that if Shavuot occurs on Shabbat, the day of slaughter is after Shabbat. The mishna relates that when the day of slaughter was on a Sunday, the High Priest would not dress in his festive garments but would wear his regular clothing. And all were permitted to eulogize and fast on this day. This was done in order not to uphold and reinforce the opinion of the Sadducees, who would say: Shavuot must always occur after Shabbat. As the day of slaughter was on Sunday, it was necessary to demonstrate that we do not accept the view of the Sadducees, and that the day is not a Festival.

One must wash his hands by pouring a quarter- log of water over them before eating non-sacred food, and for tithes and for teruma ; but for eating sacrificial food one must immerse one’s hands in purification waters, such as those of a ritual bath. And with regard to one who wishes to touch the purification waters of the red heifer used for sprinkling, concerning which the Sages ordained further measures of sanctity, if one’s hands were rendered impure even by rabbinical ritual impurity, which usually only renders the hands impure, his entire body is rendered impure, and he must immerse himself in a ritual bath.

The mishna continues to list additional differences between various levels of ritual purity: If one immersed for the purpose of eating non-sacred food, he assumes a presumptive status of ritual purity for non-sacred food, and it is prohibited for him to eat tithes, as he did not purify himself with the intention of eating tithes. If one immersed to eat tithes, he assumes a presumptive status for tithes, but he is prohibited from eating teruma. If one immersed for teruma, he assumes a presumptive status for teruma, but he is prohibited from eating sacrificial food. If he immersed for sacrificial food, he assumes a presumptive status for sacrificial food, but he is prohibited from coming in contact with the purification waters. The principle is as follows: One who immersed to eat a food in a stringent category is permitted to eat a food in a lenient one. Another principle: One who immersed without the intention to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity, i.e., one who immersed but did not intend to purify himself, it is as though he has not immersed at all.

The mishna continues: The garments of an am ha’aretz, one who is not careful with regard to the laws of ritual purity, are considered impure with the ritual impurity imparted by the treading of a zav. That is considered a primary level of impurity for individuals who are scrupulous with regard to impurity [ perushin ]. The garments of perushin are considered impure by the treading of a zav for priests who eat teruma ; the garments of those who eat teruma are considered impure by the treading of a zav for those who eat sacrificial food; and likewise the garments of those who eat sacrificial food are considered impure by the treading of a zav for those dealing with the preparation of the purification waters. The mishna relates: Yosef ben Yo’ezer was the most pious member of the priesthood and was extremely careful to eat teruma in a state of ritual purity, and yet his cloth was considered impure by the treading of a zav for those who ate sacrificial food. Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda would eat non-sacred food while following the laws of ritual purity for sacrificial food all his days, and nevertheless his cloth was considered impure by the treading of a zav for those preparing the purification waters.

Chapter 3

Concerning several matters there is greater stringency with regard to sacrificial food than with regard to teruma, a portion of the produce designated for the priest. This expresses itself in many ways, the first being that one may immerse vessels inside other vessels to purify them for teruma ; but not for sacrificial food, for which one must immerse each vessel separately. Another difference is that the halakhot of the back of a vessel and its inside and its place for gripping apply to vessels used for teruma, meaning that each part of the vessel has its own use and is considered a separate vessel in that it does not convey impurity to the other parts of the vessel when it contracts impurity; but not to sacrificial food, for which an impure section of the vessel does convey impurity to all the other sections. Likewise, one who carries an object trodden on by a zav, a man suffering from gonorrhea, may carry teruma at the same time, if he is careful that neither he nor the impure object should come into contact with the teruma, but this may not be done with sacrificial food. The garments of those who eat teruma are like an object trodden on by a zav with regard to sacrificial food. The mishna lists other stringencies that apply to sacrificial foods but not to teruma : The characteristics of teruma are not like the characteristics of sacrificial food, as in the case of vessels that are used with sacrificial food, if one has a garment or vessel that is tied up he must untie it and dry it if there was any moisture on it, as both a knot and absorbed moisture are considered interpositions that prevent the water of the ritual bath from reaching the entire garment. And he may then immerse them, and afterward he may tie them up again if he wishes. But with regard to teruma he may, if he so desires, tie up the garment and then immerse it without any concern that the knot might be considered an interposition.

Vessels that were fashioned and completed in purity nevertheless require immersion to be considered pure for sacrificial food s, but not for teruma. A vessel combines all the food that is in it with regard to sacrificial food, meaning that if one piece of food becomes impure all the other pieces become impure as well; but not with regard to teruma, concerning which each piece is treated independently. The mishna continues the list of differences between sacrificial food and teruma. Sacrificial food that is impure with fourth-degree impurity is disqualified, meaning that the sacrificial food is rendered impure but it does not impart impurity to other items. Teruma is disqualified when it is impure with third-degree impurity; it is not susceptible to fourth-degree impurity at all. And with regard to teruma, if one of one’s hands became impure by rabbinic law that renders only the hands impure, its counterpart, i.e., the other hand, remains pure. But with regard to sacrificial food, if one hand becomes impure he must immerse them both, as one hand renders its counterpart impure with regard to sacrificial food but not with regard to teruma.

One may eat dry foods, i.e., foods that have never come into contact with liquid and are therefore not susceptible to impurity, with impure hands when it is teruma, but not when it is sacrificial food. An acute mourner [ onen ], i.e., someone who has experienced the loss of a close relative on that day, who had not come into contact with the deceased; and one who is lacking atonement, i.e., someone who still needs to bring an offering to complete his purification procedure, such as a zav or a woman after childbirth, both require immersion in order to eat sacrificial food. The onen would immerse after the day has passed and the one lacking atonement would immerse after the requisite offering is brought. However, immersion in these cases is not necessary for eating teruma.

The previous mishna listed stringencies that apply to sacrificial food but not to teruma. However, there are also stringencies that apply to teruma over sacrificial food: In Judea all people, even people who are not generally meticulous in their observance of the halakhot of ritual purity [ amei ha’aretz ], are trusted with regard to the purity of consecrated wine and oil throughout all the days of the year. And during the period of the winepress and olive press, when grapes and olives are pressed and made into wine and oil, respectively, they are trusted even with regard to the purity of teruma, as all people, including amei ha’aretz, purify their vessels for this season. But once the periods of the winepress and olive press have passed, if amei ha’aretz brought to him, i.e., to a priest who is meticulous concerning the halakhot of ritual purity [ ḥaver ], a barrel of teruma wine, he may not accept it from them, as amei ha’aretz are not trusted with regard to matters of ritual purity during the rest of the year. But the giver may leave it over for the following winepress season, in the following year, at which point the ḥaver priest may accept it from him, although it was prohibited for him to accept the same barrel beforehand. And if the giver said to the priest: I separated and placed into this barrel of teruma a quarter - log of sacrificial wine or oil, he is trusted with regard to the entire contents of the barrel. Since an am ha’aretz is trusted with regard to the purity of sacrificial food, he is also believed with regard to teruma that is mingled with the sacrificial food. With regard to jugs of wine and jugs of oil that are mingled, amei ha’aretz are trusted with regard to them during the period of the winepress and the olive press, and also up to seventy days before the winepress, for that is when people begin to purify their vessels in preparation for the wine-pressing season.

From Modi’im and inward toward Jerusalem, i.e., in the area surrounding Jerusalem, up to the distance of the town of Modi’im, which is fifteen mil from Jerusalem, all potters, including amei ha’aretz, are deemed credible with regard to the purity of earthenware vessels that they have produced. Because these places supplied earthenware vessels for the people in Jerusalem, the Sages did not decree impurity for them. From Modi’im and outward, however, they are not deemed credible. The details of this ruling are specified: How so? A potter who sells pots, if he entered within Modi’im from outside it, although the potter, and the pots, and the customers were all previously located outside Modi’im, where he is not deemed credible with regard to purity, he is now deemed credible. And the opposite is true of the opposite case: If the same person who was deemed credible inside left the boundaries of Modi’im, he is no longer deemed credible.

In the case of amei ha’aretz tax collectors who entered a house to collect items for a tax, and similarly thieves who returned the vessels they had stolen, they are deemed credible when they say: We did not touch the rest of the objects in the house, and those items remain pure. And in Jerusalem all people, even amei ha’aretz, are deemed credible with regard to sacrificial food throughout the year, and during a pilgrimage Festival they are deemed credible even with regard to teruma.

In the case of one who opens his barrel of wine for public sale, and similarly one who starts selling his dough during the time of the pilgrimage Festival, and these items perforce come into contact with amei ha’aretz, Rabbi Yehuda says: Since the food was pure, despite its contact with amei ha’aretz, when he began selling it, he may finish selling it in a state of purity even after the Festival, and there is no concern about the contact that has been made by amei ha’aretz during the Festival. But the Rabbis say: He may not finish selling it. Once the pilgrimage Festival has passed by, the priests pass all the vessels of the Temple courtyard through a process of purification, since they were touched by am ha’aretz priests during the Festival. If the Festival passed by into a Friday, i.e., if the Festival ended on Thursday night, they would not pass the vessels through the purification process on that day, due to the honor of Shabbat, in order to give the priests time to prepare the requirements of Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: They do not even purify them on Thursday, in the event that the Festival ended on Wednesday night, because the priests are not free to do so.

How do they pass all the vessels of the Temple courtyard through a process of purification? They immerse the vessels that were in the Temple. And they say to the am ha’aretz priests who served in the Temple during the Festival: Be careful that you not touch the table of the shewbread. If you defile it by touching it, it would need to be removed for immersion, and this would lead to the temporary suspension of the mitzva of the shewbread, which had to be on the table at all times. The mishna continues: All the vessels that were in the Temple had second and third substitute vessels, so that if the first ones became impure they could bring the second ones in their place. All the vessels that were in the Temple required immersion after the Festival, apart from the golden altar and the bronze altar, because they are considered like the ground and therefore, like land itself, not susceptible to impurity. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: It is because they are coated.

Mishnah Yevamot

Chapter 1

The Torah law obligating a man whose brother died without children [ yavam ] to marry his deceased brother’s widow [ yevama ] or to free her from her levirate bonds through the act of ḥalitza applies only when it is permitted for the widow to marry her surviving brother-in-law. However, in cases where the yevama is forbidden to her yavam due to her status as a close family relative, the mitzva of levirate marriage is not applicable, and she is exempt from both levirate marriage and ḥalitza. The Sages further taught that the exemption of a yevama from levirate marriage also exempts her rival wife. In other words, if the deceased brother had two wives, each a so-called rival of the other, and only one wife is a relative of the surviving brother, then the rival wife is also exempt from both levirate marriage and ḥalitza. Moreover, if that same rival wife entered into levirate marriage with a different brother of the deceased, one to whom she is not forbidden, then were this third brother also to die childless, so that the obligation of levirate marriage would again be incurred by the second brother, not only is the forbidden rival wife exempt from levirate marriage and ḥalitza, her new rival wives from her second marriage are also exempt. That is to say, any other wife of the third brother is exempt from the mitzva of levirate marriage, as she is the rival wife of that first rival wife, who was exempted from levirate marriage following her first husband’s death due the exemption of her original rival wife. The same principle applies if that second rival wife subsequently enters into levirate marriage with another permitted brother, and so on. In summary, every widow who is exempt from marrying her brother-in-law due to her status as rival wife of a forbidden relative is treated as a forbidden relative herself and is therefore exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage and causes exemption for future rival wives as well. The mishna describes various cases that invoke the principles above. Fifteen categories of women constitute familial relations that are forbidden as incestuous, and consequently, these women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage forever, i.e., they also exempt rival wives of rival wives of rival wives, and so on. And these women are: The daughter of the yavam, i.e., the deceased brother had married a daughter of his brother, which means that when he died childless, his brother’s own daughter came before her father for levirate marriage, and therefore she is exempt. And the same applies if the deceased brother’s widow is the daughter of the daughter of the yavam, or if she is the daughter of his son, or the daughter of his wife. And similarly, if the yevama is the daughter of the son of the wife of her yavam or the daughter of his wife’s daughter, or if she is the mother-in-law of her yavam, or his mother-in-law’s mother, or his father-in-law’s mother, then she is exempt from ḥalitza and levirate marriage. The mishna continues its list of close relatives. If the yevama is the maternal half sister of the yavam, or if she is the sister of his mother, or his wife’s sister, then she is exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage Or if she was the wife of his maternal half brother, and after this brother died or divorced his wife, she married another of his father’s brothers, who was not her relative, and this brother died, she is exempt. In this case, the obligation to enter into levirate marriage should be incurred by the surviving brother, but since she was previously the wife of his maternal brother, she is exempt. And the same applies to the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, i.e., the wife of a man who died before his brother was born. As will be explained, the obligation of levirate marriage does not apply to the yavam in this case. Since levirate marriage does not apply to him, the yevama remains forbidden to him as his brother’s wife. And the last case is if one’s yevama had previously been his daughter-in-law, and after his son had died one’s brother married her, before he too passed away. These fifteen women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives from ḥalitza and levirate marriage forever. § And with regard to all of these women listed as prohibited relations, these halakhot apply only if they were married to the deceased brother until the time of his death. However, this is not the case if they died during the deceased brother’s lifetime, or if they refused their husbands when they were minors. This refusal is referring to the decree of the Sages that a girl under the age of twelve whose father is no longer alive may be married off by her mother or brothers. However, this marriage is not final, as she can terminate it by performing an act of refusal, i.e., by declaring, while still a minor, that she does not desire this marriage. In this case, the marriage is annulled retroactively and she is considered as though she were never married at all. Or if those women were divorced by their husband, the deceased brother, or were found to be a sexually underdeveloped woman [ aylonit ], i.e., a woman who is so underdeveloped that she is not considered a woman in the full sense, these halakhot do not apply. Her marriage is considered a mistaken marriage and is null and void. In all these cases their rival wives are permitted, as the exemption for rival wives of forbidden relatives applies only when the forbidden relative was the brother’s wife at the time of his death, when the halakhot of levirate marriage came into effect. § And the mishna comments that the language of this principle is imprecise, as you cannot say with regard to his mother-in-law and with regard to his mother-in-law’s mother and with regard to his father-in-law’s mother that they were found to be an aylonit, as an aylonit is sterile and therefore cannot become a mother or a mother-in-law. Nor is the mishna precise when it states: Or refused, as refusal applies only to minors, who cannot give birth.

The mishna explains: How do these women exempt their rival wives? If, for example, his daughter or any one of those women with whom relations are forbidden was married to his brother and this brother had another wife, and the brother died, then just as his daughter is exempt from levirate marriage, so too her rival wife is exempt. If his daughter’s rival wife subsequently went and married his second brother, to whom she is permitted, and he had another wife, and he died childless as well, which means that his wife comes before the first yavam, the daughter’s father, for levirate marriage, then just as his daughter’s rival wife is exempt, so too the rival wife of her rival wife is exempt. The mishna adds: Even if they are one hundred brothers, the same logic applies. If a woman is exempt from levirate marriage because she is the rival wife of a forbidden relative or the rival wife of a rival wife of this kind, and she herself has an additional rival wife, this rival wife is also exempt and in turn exempts her own rival wives from levirate marriage. How so? What are the cases in which if they died their rival wives are permitted? If, for example, one’s daughter or any one of those women with whom relations are forbidden was married to his brother, and this brother had another wife, and then his daughter died or was divorced and afterward his brother died, her rival wife is permitted to him. § The mishna states another principle: And if any of these forbidden relatives was a minor who could refuse her husband, then even if she did not refuse, her rival wife performs ḥalitza and does not enter into levirate marriage. The rival wife may not enter into levirate marriage, as she is the rival wife of a forbidden relative. However, she is not entirely exempt from levirate marriage and must be released by ḥalitza because the marriage of the forbidden relative was not a fully valid marriage, and therefore, by Torah law, the other woman is not considered a rival wife of a forbidden relative.

Six women with whom relations are forbidden who were not enumerated in the first mishna are forbidden by prohibitions that are more severe than those listed in that mishna because they may be married only to others and may never be married to any of the brothers, due to the closeness of their relationship. However, this stringency entails a corresponding leniency: Since the halakha of levirate marriage is entirely inapplicable in these cases, their rival wives are permitted. The rival wife of a forbidden relative is forbidden herself only if the mitzva of levirate marriage is applicable, but where it is not in effect she is permitted. The six women with whom relations are forbidden are as follows: His mother, and his father’s wife, and his father’s sister, and his paternal half sister, and the wife of his father’s brother, and the wife of his paternal half brother. Each of these women with whom relations are forbidden is forbidden equally to all of the brothers, and the mitzva of levirate marriage is inapplicable. Therefore, her rival wife is permitted.

Up to this point, the discussions were based on the assumption that not only may a forbidden relative not enter into levirate marriage, but her rival wife is also exempt. However, this issue is subject to a long-standing dispute. Beit Shammai permit the rival wives to the brothers, as they did not accept the interpretation of the verses that indicates that rival wives are prohibited. And Beit Hillel forbid them. The previous mishnayot are in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. If any of the rival wives of the brother performed ḥalitza, Beit Shammai disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood, as in their opinion these rival wives were fit for levirate marriage, which means that the ḥalitza was fully valid. Consequently, they are disqualified from marrying a priest, like all other women who perform ḥalitza. And Beit Hillel deem them fit, as they maintain that no legal act of ḥalitza was performed here at all. If they entered into levirate marriage, Beit Shammai deem them fit for the priesthood, as in their opinion, this is a fully legal levirate marriage. And Beit Hillel disqualify them, because they engaged in licentious sexual relations as the rival wives of a forbidden relative. § The mishna comments: Although Beit Hillel prohibit the rival wives to the brothers and Beit Shammai permit them, and although these disqualify these women and those deem them fit, Beit Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from Beit Hillel, nor did Beit Hillel refrain from marrying women from Beit Shammai. Furthermore, with regard to all of the disputes concerning the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity, where these rule that an article is ritually pure and those rule it ritually impure, they did not refrain from handling ritually pure objects each with the other, as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel frequently used each other’s vessels.

Chapter 2

Each of the women enumerated in the first chapter causes exemption from levirate marriage and ḥalitza for her rival wives. This is due to the close family relationship she has with her brother-in-law, making her forbidden to him. The single exception is the case explained in this mishna. What is the case of the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist? For example: If there were two brothers, and one of them died childless, and subsequently a brother of theirs was born, after which the second brother, the elder, took his deceased brother’s wife in levirate marriage, and then died as well. Consequently, two women require levirate marriage: The widow of the first brother who had been taken in levirate marriage by the second brother, and the widow of the second brother, the first widow’s rival wife. The first widow, who had been the wife of the first brother to die, goes out without any obligation to be taken in levirate marriage by the youngest brother who was born later, since she is the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. The first deceased brother never lived at the same time as the newly born brother. The second widow, who had been married to the second brother, is exempt due to her rival wife. The mishna discusses an additional situation: If the second brother had performed only levirate betrothal with her, meaning that he had not yet consummated the marriage, and then died, both the wife betrothed by a levirate betrothal to the second brother and the wife of the second brother fall before the youngest brother born after the death of the first brother. In that case, the first wife certainly goes out and is exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage, since she is to him the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. The second, however, was never effectively the rival wife of the first brother’s wife, as the first brother’s wife had only been betrothed by levirate betrothal and was not fully married to the second brother. Therefore, she performs ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage.

If there were two brothers, and one died, and the second entered into levirate marriage with his brother’s wife while he was already married to another woman, and subsequently a third brother was born to them, and the second brother then died, whereby both of his wives happened before the third brother for levirate marriage, then the first woman, who was the wife of the first brother, is exempt due to the fact that she is the wife of a brother with whom the third brother did not coexist, and the second woman, who was the first wife of the second brother, is exempt due to her rival wife. If the second brother had performed only levirate betrothal with her and then died before fully marrying her, the second woman performs ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage, as the levirate betrothal is not considered a sufficiently valid marriage so as to render her the rival wife of a relation forbidden to the third brother. Rabbi Shimon says with regard to the first clause of the mishna: The third brother either enters into levirate marriage with whichever one he wishes, or he performs ḥalitza with whichever one he wishes. Since he was born after his second brother had already entered into levirate marriage with the first brother’s widow, she is considered the wife of a brother with whom he did coexist, not the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. Therefore, he may enter into levirate marriage with her.

The Sages stated a principle about a yevama : Whoever is forbidden by a prohibition of forbidden relations to her yavam neither performs ḥalitza nor enters into levirate marriage and is completely exempt. If she is forbidden by a prohibition resulting from a mitzva or by a prohibition stemming from sanctity, as will be explained later, then since in these cases the obligation of levirate marriage is not fundamentally nullified she performs ḥalitza in order to become free of the levirate bond, and due to her prohibition she does not enter into levirate marriage. The Sages stated another principle: If two sisters who had been married to two brothers who subsequently died happened before the third brother for levirate marriage, and one of those sisters is a close relation to this third brother and is therefore forbidden to him, she is exempt from levirate marriage. But the other, her sister who is her yevama, i.e., her sister-in-law, performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. In this case, they are not ruled to be two sisters who happened before him simultaneously for levirate marriage, since one of them is prohibited to him as a forbidden relation, and therefore she never actually happened before him at all.

The mishna explains: A prohibition resulting from a mitzva is referring to secondary forbidden relationships, which are prohibited by rabbinic law. The Sages prohibited marriage to certain women who were not forbidden by the Torah but were nevertheless deemed forbidden incestuous relations. A prohibition stemming from sanctity is referring to marriage of a widow to a High Priest, a divorcée or a woman who has performed ḥalitza [ ḥalutza ] to a common priest, a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [ mamzeret ] or a Gibeonite woman to an Israelite, and also an Israelite woman to a Gibeonite or to a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [ mamzer ].

In the case of anyone who has a brother of any kind, that brother creates a levirate bond causing his yevama to be required to perform levirate marriage if the first brother dies childless. And he is his brother in all respects, except for one who has a brother born from a Canaanite maidservant or from a gentile woman, as these do not have the legal status of brothers. Similarly, in the case of anyone who has a child of any kind, that child exempts his father’s wife from levirate marriage, since his father did not die childless. And that child is liable to receive capital punishment if he strikes his father or curses him. And he is his child in all respects, except for whoever has a child born from a Canaanite maidservant or from a gentile woman, as these do not have the halakhic status of children.

In the case of one who betrothed one of two sisters and does not know which of them he betrothed, so that both are forbidden to him, he gives a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one due to the uncertainty. If the man who had betrothed one of these women died before he could give a bill of divorce, and he had one brother, that brother performs ḥalitza with both of them, but he may not take either in levirate marriage. This is because he does not know which woman is his yevama and which is forbidden to him as the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. If the man who betrothed one of these women had two brothers, one of them performs ḥalitza with one of the sisters, but he may not enter into levirate marriage with her due to the possibility that she is the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. And one takes the other in levirate marriage if he so desires. If the two brothers married the two sisters before consulting the court, the court does not remove them from their marriage and they are permitted to remain married. The couple who performed levirate marriage second was even permitted to do so, since there was no longer any doubt about the levirate bond.

Furthermore, in the case of two unrelated men who betrothed two sisters: If this one does not know which sister he betrothed and that one does not know which sister he betrothed, this one gives two bills of divorce, one to each of the women, and that one gives two bills of divorce. If the two men died before they divorced, and this one had a brother and that one had a brother, then this brother performs ḥalitza with both of them, and that brother performs ḥalitza with both of them. If this one had one brother and that one had two brothers, the single brother performs ḥalitza with both of them, and of the two brothers, one performs ḥalitza and one performs levirate marriage if he so desires. If they married the sisters before consulting the court, the court does not remove them from the marriage and they are not told to divorce them. If this one had two brothers and that one had two brothers, the brother of this one performs ḥalitza with one sister, and the brother of that one performs ḥalitza with one sister. The brother of this one who performed ḥalitza may take the woman who performed ḥalitza [ ḥalutza ] of that other’s brother in levirate marriage, and the brother of that second one who performed ḥalitza may take the ḥalutza of that other’s brother in levirate marriage. If the two brothers performed ḥalitza with both wives before consulting the court, the two brothers of the second man may not take sisters in levirate marriage lest one marry the sister of a woman who with whom he had a levirate bond. Rather, one performs ḥalitza and one performs levirate marriage if he so desires. If they married their wives before consulting the court, the court does not remove them from the marriage.

It is a mitzva for the eldest to consummate the levirate marriage, i.e., the eldest takes precedence over the other brothers, though they too are obligated. But if the younger brother consummated the levirate marriage first, he acquires the yevama as his wife. One suspected by others of engaging in sexual relations with a Canaanite maidservant and she was later set free, or one suspected of relations with a gentile woman and she subsequently converted, may not marry that woman, since this will strengthen the suspicions against him. But if he did marry her, they, the judges of the court, do not remove her from him, i.e., they do not require him to divorce her. With regard to one who is suspected of illicit relations with a married woman and they, the judges of the court, removed her from her husband, i.e., required them to divorce due to this, even if the man suspected of the illicit relations subsequently married her, he must divorce her.

An agent who brought a bill of divorce from a country overseas and said: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, as required in order to establish the bill of divorce as valid, may not marry the wife, i.e., the divorcée. Since the validity of the bill of divorce is based upon his testimony, marrying the divorcée creates the impression that he had an ulterior motive for his testimony. Similarly, a witness who testified that a certain man died, or testified: I killed him, or: We killed him, may not marry that man’s wife. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he testified: I killed him, his wife may not be married at all based on that evidence, as his testimony is unreliable, but if he said: We killed him, his wife may be married to anyone other than those witnesses.

A Sage who refused to release a woman from a vow that rendered the wife forbidden to her husband by that vow, resulting in her being divorced from her husband, may not marry her, so as to avoid suspicion that he rendered her forbidden to her husband in order to marry her himself. However, a judge before whom a woman performed refusal when she was a minor, declaring that she did not desire the husband chosen for her by her family, or before whom she performed ḥalitza, may marry her because he was only one member of the court, thereby alleviating suspicion. And for all of these who were involved in permitting the wife to remarry, i.e., the judge, the agent who brought a bill of divorce, and the one who testified for a woman that her husband died, if they had wives at the time of the ruling or the testimony and their wives died thereafter, then those women they had set free are permitted to be married to them. There is no concern that while their wives were still alive these individuals set their eyes upon another woman. And with regard to all of these women who were prohibited from marrying a certain man due to some suspicion, if they were subsequently married to others and then were divorced or widowed from the second husband, they are permitted to be married to them, i.e., to the judge, messenger, or witness who permitted her to remarry. And all of these women who were prohibited from marrying due to some suspicion are permitted to the sons or to the brothers of those who set them free.

Chapter 3

In the case of four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and the ones married to the sisters died, then those sisters must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. Since both sisters require levirate marriage with each of the surviving brothers, a levirate bond exists between each sister and the brothers. Each of them is considered the sister of a woman with whom each brother has a levirate bond and is therefore forbidden to him by rabbinic law. And if they married the sisters before consulting the court, they should divorce them, for the Sages decreed that in this situation they may not remain married. Rabbi Eliezer says that there is a dispute in this matter: Beit Shammai say: He may maintain her as his wife, while Beit Hillel say: They must divorce them.

If one of the sisters was forbidden to one of the brothers due to a prohibition against forbidden relations because she was a relative of his wife or a relative on his mother’s side, then he is forbidden to marry her but permitted to marry her sister. Because she is his close relative, she is exempt from levirate marriage with him, and therefore she is not bound to him with a levirate bond. Consequently, her sister is not considered the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond, and he is permitted to enter into levirate marriage with her. But the second brother, who is not a close relative of either sister, is forbidden to marry both of them. Indeed, for him each woman remains the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. If a prohibition resulting from a mitzva or a prohibition stemming from sanctity will be transgressed when one of the women marries one of the brothers, then her sister must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage, as she is considered the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. In this case, the sister who is forbidden to the brother due to a mitzva or due to sanctity is bound to the brother for the purpose of ḥalitza.

If one of those women was forbidden to this one brother due to a prohibition against forbidden relations and the second woman was forbidden to that second brother due to a prohibition against forbidden relations, then she who is forbidden to this brother is permitted to that brother, and she who is forbidden to that brother is permitted to this one. And this is the case that was referred to when they said: When her sister is also her yevama, i.e., in a case where two sisters are also yevamot and therefore happened for levirate marriage before two brothers, she either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. This must be referring to a case where each sister is forbidden to one of the brothers due to a prohibition concerning forbidden relatives. In this case, each sister has a levirate bond only with the one brother to whom she is permitted, and the prohibition against marrying the sister of a woman with whom one has a levirate bond does not apply. Therefore, each brother can either perform the act of ḥalitza or consummate the levirate marriage with the sister to whom he is not related.

In the case of three brothers, two of whom were married to close relatives, e.g., two sisters; or a woman and her daughter; or a woman and her daughter’s daughter; or a woman and her son’s daughter, if the two brothers who were married to two close relatives died and their wives happened before a third brother for levirate marriage, then these two women must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage, as each of them is a relative of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. And Rabbi Shimon exempts them even from the obligation to perform ḥalitza. If one of them was forbidden to him, the third brother, due to a prohibition against forbidden relatives, then he is prohibited from marrying her but is permitted to marry her sister. Because the woman who is forbidden to him is not considered to be a woman who requires him for levirate marriage, there is only one woman who happens before him for levirate marriage. However, if one of the women was forbidden due to a prohibition resulting from a mitzva or a prohibition stemming from sanctity, then they must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. This is because these prohibitions do not completely cancel the levirate bond.

In the case of three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and one who was single, the following occurred: The husband of one of the sisters died childless, leaving behind his wife, and the single brother performed levirate betrothal [ ma’amar ] to this wife. The single brother performed an act of betrothal to the yevama but did not yet consummate the marriage by engaging in sexual intercourse. Afterward, the second brother died, and therefore the second brother’s wife, the sister of the betrothed, happened before the single brother for levirate marriage as well. In this case, Beit Shammai say: His wife remains with him. The woman he betrothed is considered like his wife, and he is not required to divorce her. And this other woman leaves the yavam and is exempt from levirate marriage as the sister of a wife. Beit Hillel say: Being as he had not yet entered into marriage with the first woman, he is required to perform levirate marriage with both women. Therefore, he divorces his wife, i.e., the woman to whom he performed levirate betrothal, with a bill of divorce, which nullifies levirate betrothal, and by ḥalitza, which nullifies the levirate bond. And, he sends away the wife of his second brother with ḥalitza as well. They comment: This is the case that was referred to when the Sages said: Woe unto him for his wife and woe unto him for the wife of his brother. Due to the combination of circumstances, he loses them both.

In the case of three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and one who was married to an unrelated woman, the following occurred: The husband of one of the sisters died childless, and the brother who was married to the unrelated woman married, i.e., performed lev irate marriage with, the deceased brother’s wife and later died himself, childless. In this situation, both women happen for levirate marriage before the other, remaining, brother. The first woman is dismissed due to the prohibition proscribing the sister of one’s wife, as she is the sister of this brother’s wife, and the second woman is dismissed due to her status as the first woman’s rival wife. Following the first levirate marriage, this second woman became the rival wife of the sister, and is therefore exempt from levirate marriage as well. If, however, the brother married to the unrelated woman performed only levirate betrothal, but had not yet consummated the levirate marriage with the sister, and he died, the unrelated woman, whose halakhic status with regard to yibbum is similar to that of a sister’s rival wife, must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. In the case of three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and one who was married to an unrelated woman, the following occurred: One of the husbands of the sisters died, and he who was married to the unrelated woman married the deceased husband’s wife, and then the wife of the second brother, the other one of the sisters, died. Afterward, the brother who was married to the unrelated woman died, leaving two women for levirate marriage before the remaining brother: The unrelated woman and the woman who was previously prohibited as the sister of his deceased wife. In this case, the sister is forbidden to him forever. She is not forbidden due to her status as his wife’s sister, as his wife already died and one’s wife’s sister is permitted after the wife’s death. However, since she was already forbidden to him at one time, she is forbidden to him forever. When she first happened before the brothers for levirate marriage, before the third brother married her, she was forbidden to the second brother as his wife’s sister. Therefore, she is forbidden to him forever. In addition, she exempts her rival wife, the unrelated woman, from levirate marriage.

In the case of three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and one who was married to an unrelated woman, the following occurred: Shimon, the husband of one of the sisters, divorced his wife, and then Levi, who was married to the unrelated woman, died, and Shimon, the man who divorced his wife, married, i.e., performed levirate marriage with, her, i.e., this unrelated woman. And then Shimon himself later died, so that the unrelated woman happened for levirate marriage before Reuven, the third brother, who is married to the second sister. In this scenario, Reuven is allowed to consummate the levirate marriage with the unrelated woman. This is the case that was referred to when they said: And with regard to all those fifteen forbidden relatives who died or were divorced, their rival wives are permitted to enter into levirate marriage. This is because at the time that they happened before the yavam for levirate marriage they were no longer the rival wives of a forbidden relative.

And if any of these fifteen women who are prohibited as forbidden relatives had undergone a betrothal or divorce whose status is uncertain with the deceased brother, then those women who were their rival wives must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage since they are possibly the rival wives of forbidden relatives. The mishna elaborates: How could there be a situation of uncertainty with regard to betrothal? If in the public domain he threw her an item for the purpose of betrothal and there were eight cubits between them, and the item was possibly closer to him and did not enter into her domain, and possibly closer to her, i.e., within four cubits of her, whereby she could acquire the object, this is a case of uncertainty with regard to betrothal. Uncertainty with regard to divorce occurs when, for instance, he wrote a bill of divorce in his handwriting but there are no signatures of witnesses on the document, or there are the signatures of witnesses on the document but there is no date written in it, or the date is written in it but there is only the signature of a single witness. Since there is doubt as to whether these three kinds of bills of divorce are valid, a woman who was divorced through them is only possibly divorced, and so this case is called uncertainty with regard to divorce.

In the case of three brothers who were married to three unrelated women, and one of the brothers died, the following occurred: The second brother performed levirate betrothal with the wife of the deceased brother and before he was able to consummate the levirate marriage he died as well, leaving behind two women who happen before the third brother for levirate marriage. Then those two women must perform ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. As it is stated: “If brothers dwell together and one of them dies and he has no child, the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin; her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5). This teaches that a woman eligible for levirate marriage is one who has one levirate relationship and not one who has a double levirate relationship. In this case, the wife of the first deceased brother requires levirate marriage due to both the marriage with her first husband as well as the levirate betrothal with the second brother. Rabbi Shimon says: He may consummate the levirate marriage with whichever woman he wishes and then perform ḥalitza with the second. In the case where two brothers were married to two sisters, and one of the brothers died, the widow at this point would be exempt from levirate marriage as the sister of his wife. And afterward the wife of the second brother died. Although the yevama is no longer the sister of his wife, this woman is nevertheless forbidden to him forever, since she had already been forbidden to him at one time.

In the case of two men who betrothed two women, and at the time that they entered the wedding canopy, after the betrothal, the men switched this wife with that wife and that one with this one, then these two men are liable for engaging in forbidden sexual relations with a married woman, since each of them had intercourse with his fellow’s wife. The act of betrothal is sufficient to prohibit a woman to all other men as a married woman. Therefore, when the women were switched, both men transgressed this violation. And if they were brothers, then they are also liable for forbidden sexual relations with a brother’s wife. And if these women were sisters, then they are liable for taking a wife and her sister as well. And if they were menstruating women, they would be liable for intercourse with a menstruating woman as well. And following these forbidden sexual relations, we separate these women from their husbands for three months, lest they were impregnated by that forbidden act of intercourse. Doing so makes it possible to distinguish a child born of these relations, so that he could be rendered a mamzer. And if they were female minors and unable to bear children, then we immediately return them to their original husbands. And if they were daughters of priests, they are thereby disqualified from eating of teruma. By engaging in illicit sexual acts, they were rendered forbidden to priests and disqualified from eating teruma.

Chapter 4

When a man who has a brother dies childless, his widow [ yevama ] and one of his brothers [ yavam ] may perform a ritual through which she is freed of her levirate bonds [ ḥalitza ]. It is then considered, with regard to forbidden relationships, as though they had been married and divorced. Therefore, he is forbidden to her relatives, and she to his. However, with regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and then she is found to have been pregnant at the time of the ḥalitza and she gave birth, in the event that the offspring is viable, the deceased husband has been survived by offspring and so there was never any levirate bond; consequently, the ḥalitza that was performed was entirely unnecessary and a meaningless act. As such, he remains permitted to her relatives and she remains permitted to his relatives. Furthermore, since the ḥalitza was meaningless, she is not afforded the status of a ḥalutza, i.e., a yevama who performed ḥalitza, a status akin to that of a divorcée. Therefore, the ḥalitza does not disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood. If the offspring is not viable, then it emerges that the ḥalitza was indeed necessary. Therefore, he is forbidden to engage in relations with her relatives and she is forbidden to engage in relations with his relatives, as though they had been married and divorced, and the ḥalitza disqualifies her from marrying into the priesthood, as she is afforded the status of a ḥalutza.

With regard to one who consummates the levirate marriage with his yevama, i.e., he had intercourse with her under the assumption that there is a levirate bond and so there is a mitzva to do so, and then she is found to have been pregnant at the time of the intercourse and she gave birth, in the event that the offspring is viable the deceased brother has been survived by offspring and it is evident that there was never any levirate bond. In that case, the relations they had, rather than being a mitzva, were a violation of the prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s brother’s wife. Therefore, the yavam must send her out, i.e., they must separate, as she is forbidden to him as his brother’s wife, and to atone for the forbidden relations that they had, they are each obligated to bring a sin- offering, as is the halakha for all who inadvertently transgress a prohibition that, when performed intentionally, is punishable by karet. And if the offspring is not viable, and therefore there was in fact a levirate bond, he may maintain her as his wife since his intercourse with her was a valid consummation of levirate marriage. If they consummated the levirate marriage and seven months later she gave birth, there is uncertainty whether the child is nine months old, i.e., counting from conception, and is the offspring of the first husband, and as such there was no levirate bond, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, i.e., the yavam, and not of the deceased, in which case there was a levirate bond. In that case, due to the possibility that she is forbidden to him as his brother’s wife, he must send her out. However, the lineage of the child is unflawed, since regardless of whether it was born of the first or second husband, there was no transgression involved in its conception. Furthermore, to atone for the possibility that they had forbidden relations they are both obligated to bring a guilt- offering for uncertainty, as is the halakha for anyone who is uncertain whether they inadvertently transgressed a prohibition that would require one to bring a sin-offering.

With regard to a widow waiting for her yavam to either consummate a levirate marriage or perform ḥalitza with her, i.e., a yevama, to whom property was bequeathed: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel both agree that she may sell or give away that property ab initio, and that if she did, the transfer is valid. Since she has only a levirate bond with the yavam, she retains total control of the property. This is in contrast to a betrothed woman, concerning whom Beit Hillel rule that she may not sell such property because her betrothed also has rights to it ( Ketubot 78a). If she died, what should be done with the money assured to her in her marriage contract by her deceased husband and with her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her, in which a husband only ever has a usufructuary interest? Beit Shammai say: The husband’s heirs, i.e., the yavam, who stands to inherit from the husband when he consummates the levirate marriage, should divide up the property together with her father’s heirs, i.e., the woman’s family. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status. Therefore, money assured to her in her marriage contract remains in the possession of the husband’s heirs. Since it was to be paid from the husband’s own property, the money is retained by his estate and passes to his heirs. And her property that enters and leaves the marriage with her remains in the possession of the father’s heirs. Since those properties belonged to her, upon her death they are inherited by her father or his heirs.

If the yavam consummated the levirate marriage with her, then her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, and therefore the yavam has the same rights to her property as in a regular marriage. And the only exception to this is that her marriage contract will still be payable from the property of her first husband and not from the property of the yavam.

The mitzva of levirate marriage is for the eldest of the brothers to consummate the levirate marriage. If the eldest does not want to do so, the court goes to each of the other brothers and requires them to do so. If they do not want to do so, the court returns to the eldest brother and says to him: The mitzva is incumbent upon you; either perform ḥalitza or consummate the levirate marriage.

If a brother made his decision dependent upon the possibility that one of his other brothers will eventually consummate the levirate marriage, saying that he will do so only if they do not, then whether he makes it dependent upon a brother who is currently a minor, meaning that the yevama should wait until he matures, or upon his eldest brother, who is not currently present, meaning the yevama should wait until he comes from overseas, or upon a brother who is a deaf-mute or an imbecile, as perhaps they will recover from their disability, the court does not listen to him; rather, the judges of the court say to him: The mitzva is incumbent upon you; either perform ḥalitza or consummate the levirate marriage.

One who performs ḥalitza with his yevama is like any one of the other brothers with respect to the inheritance of the deceased brother’s estate, i.e., each of the brothers takes an equal share of the inheritance. And if there is a father of the deceased, who is still alive, the property of the deceased belongs to the father. One who consummates levirate marriage with his yevama thereby acquires his deceased brother’s property solely for himself. Rabbi Yehuda says: In either case, whether he consummated the levirate marriage or performed ḥalitza, if there is a father who is still alive, the property belongs to the father. In the case of one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama, by rabbinic decree it is as though she had been married to him and then he divorced her. Consequently, he is forbidden to engage in relations with her relatives and she is forbidden to engage in relations with his relatives. Accordingly, he is forbidden to engage in relations with her mother, and with her mother’s mother, and with her father’s mother, and with her daughter, and with her daughter’s daughter, and with her son’s daughter, and with her sister while his yevama is still alive. However, the other brothers who did not perform ḥalitza are permitted to her relatives. And she is forbidden to engage in relations with his father, and with his father’s father, and with his son, and with his son’s son, and with his brother, and with his brother’s son. The mishna states an additional principle: A man is permitted to engage in relations with a relative of a rival wife of his ḥalutza, i.e., his yevama with whom he performed ḥalitza. Since he did not perform ḥalitza with her, she is not regarded as though she had actually been married to him. However, he is forbidden to engage in relations with a rival wife of a relative of his ḥalutza, i.e., in addition to being forbidden to the relatives of his ḥalutza, he is also forbidden to their rival wives.

In the case of a yavam who performed ḥalitza with his yevama and then his brother married her sister and died, the sister performs ḥalitza with the yavam, but she may not enter into levirate marriage with him, since as a sister of his ḥalutza she is forbidden to him. And similarly, in the case of one who divorced his wife and his brother married her sister and died, then that woman is exempt both from ḥalitza and from consummating levirate marriage, since as the sister of his former wife she is forbidden to him.

In the case of a widow waiting for her yavam to consummate levirate marriage or perform ḥalitza with her, and the brother of the yavam betrothed her sister, they said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira: They say to the brother: Wait and do not marry the woman you betrothed until your brother performs an act, either of ḥalitza or of consummating the levirate marriage, as until he does there remains a levirate bond between the yevama and each of the brothers, and it is prohibited to marry the sister of a woman to whom one is bound by a levirate bond. If a brother of the one who betrothed the sister of the yevama performed ḥalitza with the yevama or consummated a levirate marriage with her, since by doing so the levirate bond between the yevama and the one who betrothed her sister is dissolved, he may then enter into marriage with his wife, who until that point was only betrothed to him, as she is no longer the sister of a woman to whom he is bound by a levirate bond. Similarly, if the yevama died, since his levirate bond to her is dissolved upon her death, he may proceed to enter into marriage with his betrothed wife. However, if the yavam died without performing an act that would have dissolved the levirate bond, he must divorce his wife with a bill of divorce, as she is forbidden to him as the sister of a woman to whom he is bound by a levirate bond, and his brother’s wife he must send out with ḥalitza, as she is forbidden to him as the sister of his divorcée.

A yevama may neither perform ḥalitza nor enter into levirate marriage until she has waited three months from the time of her husband’s death. And similarly, all other women may not be betrothed and may not marry until they have waited three months since their previous marriage ended. This waiting period is necessary so that, should a woman give birth shortly after remarrying, it will be obvious who the father of the child is. This applies both to virgins and non-virgins, both to divorcées and widows, and both to women who were married to their previous husbands and women who were only betrothed. All of these women must wait three months before remarrying even though for some of them the reason for doing so does not apply. Rabbi Yehuda says: The women who were married to their previous husbands may be betrothed, and the women who were only betrothed to their previous husbands may marry without waiting three months. This is true except for the betrothed women that are in the area of Judea, due to the fact that the groom is familiar with her. The custom in Judea was for the couple to be secluded together before the marriage so that they would become familiar with each other. This led to the possibility that they might cohabit even during their betrothal period. Rabbi Yehuda holds that one does not need to wait three months whenever the reason for doing so does not apply. Rabbi Yosei says: All of the women may be betrothed within three months even if they were previously married, except for a widow, due to the mourning period she must observe for her deceased husband.

In a case of four brothers married to four women and some of the brothers died childless, their wives thereby become yevamot. If the eldest of the brothers who survived wished to consummate the levirate marriage with all of his yevamot, he has permission to do so. In the case of one who was married to two women and died childless, the intercourse or ḥalitza of either one of the wives with the yavam releases her rival wife from the levirate bond, and the rival wife need not enter into levirate marriage or perform ḥalitza. If one of these women was fit to marry into the priesthood and one was unfit, then if he performs ḥalitza, he should perform ḥalitza with the unfit woman rather than with the one who is fit for the priesthood, since doing so with the woman who is fit would needlessly disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood. But if he consummates the levirate marriage, he may consummate the levirate marriage with the one who is fit.

With regard to one who remarries his divorcée after she had been married to another man from whom she was then widowed or divorced, or one who marries the woman with whom he performed ḥalitza [ ḥalutza ], or one who marries a relative of his ḥalutza, since all such marriages are forbidden he must divorce her, and the offspring born from such unions is a mamzer ; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. He holds that even the offspring from relations forbidden by a prohibition punishable by lashes is a mamzer. The Rabbis say: The offspring in those cases is not a mamzer, but they concede with regard to one who marries a relative of his divorcée, a union forbidden by a prohibition entailing karet, that the offspring is a mamzer. They hold that only the offspring from relations forbidden by a prohibition entailing karet is a mamzer.

Which offspring of forbidden relations have the status of a mamzer? It is the offspring of a union with any next of kin that is subject to a Torah prohibition that he should not engage in sexual relations with them; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Shimon HaTimni says: It is the offspring of a union with any forbidden relation for which one is liable to receive karet at the hand of Heaven. And the halakha is in accordance with his statement. Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is the offspring of a union with any forbidden relation for which one is liable to receive court- imposed capital punishment. Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai said: I found a scroll recording people’s lineages in Jerusalem, and it was written in it that so-and-so is a mamzer from an adulterous union with a married woman, a sin punishable by court-imposed capital punishment. The only reason for the scroll to state the reason that this individual is a mamzer is in order to support the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua. The mishna delineates the circumstances in which it is prohibited to engage in relations with the sister of one’s wife and the sister of one’s yevama : If a man’s wife died, he is permitted to her sister. If he divorced her and then she died, he is permitted to her sister. If he divorced his wife and then she was married to another and then died, he is permitted to her sister. If his yevama died, he is permitted to her sister. If he performed ḥalitza with her and then she died, he is permitted to her sister. If after ḥalitza she was married to another and then died, he is permitted to her sister. The principle underlying all these cases is that the prohibition against engaging in relations with her sister only applies while the wife or yevama remain alive, irrespective of their current relationship to the man.

Chapter 5

Rabban Gamliel says: A bill of divorce [ get ] is not effective when given after a bill of divorce was previously given to a yevama. Once a yevama receives a bill of divorce from a yavam, no bill of divorce given by that yavam to her rival wife or a bill of divorce given to her by a different yavam is of any effect. And levirate betrothal is not effective after a previous levirate betrothal was performed, and intercourse with a second yevama is not effective after intercourse with the first one, and ḥalitza is not effective after ḥalitza was previously performed. But the Rabbis say: A bill of divorce is effective when given after a bill of divorce, and levirate betrothal is effective after levirate betrothal, but nothing is effective after intercourse or after ḥalitza. If a yavam has relations with the yevama or performs ḥalitza with her, no other action performed afterward is effective, whether performed by that yavam toward a different yevama or by any yavam with the original yevama.

The mishna elaborates: How do these laws work in practice? If a yavam performed levirate betrothal with his yevama, and he later gave her a bill of divorce, she nevertheless requires ḥalitza from him. The bill of divorce does not fully exempt her from levirate marriage, as the levirate bond remains intact. If he performed levirate betrothal and then ḥalitza, she requires a bill of divorce from him in order to cancel the levirate betrothal. If the yavam performed levirate betrothal and then engaged in intercourse with the yevama, this is the way to perform levirate marriage in accordance with its mitzva, as the Sages instituted this as the proper procedure for a yavam to perform levirate marriage.

If the yavam gave the yevama a bill of divorce and afterward performed levirate betrothal with her, she requires another bill of divorce to cancel the levirate betrothal, as well as ḥalitza to nullify the levirate bond. If he gave her a bill of divorce and then engaged in intercourse with her, she requires a bill of divorce to cancel the betrothal that took place via intercourse, and ḥalitza to nullify the levirate bond; the intercourse did not affect the levirate bond because once he gave her a bill of divorce she was forbidden to him. If he gave her a bill of divorce and performed ḥalitza, nothing is effective after ḥalitza, as the levirate bond was completely nullified. Similarly, if he performed ḥalitza with her and then either performed levirate betrothal, or gave a bill of divorce, or engaged in intercourse with her; alternatively, if he engaged in intercourse with her and then either performed levirate betrothal, or gave a bill of divorce, or performed ḥalitza after they engaged in relations, nothing is effective after ḥalitza or intercourse. Any action performed afterward is unrelated to the levirate bond. The above principles apply both in cases of one yevama to one yavam, as well as in cases of two yevamot to one yavam.

How so? If he performed levirate betrothal with this yevama and levirate betrothal with that one, i.e., her rival wife, they require two bills of divorce, each for her own levirate betrothal, and ḥalitza with one of them, to release them both from the levirate bond. If he performed levirate betrothal with this one and gave a bill of divorce to that one, the first woman requires a bill of divorce to cancel the levirate betrothal, and one of them must receive ḥalitza. If he performed levirate betrothal with this one and engaged in intercourse with that one, they require two bills of divorce and he must perform ḥalitza with one of them. If the yavam performed levirate betrothal with this one and performed ḥalitza with that one, the first woman requires a bill of divorce. If the yavam gave a bill of divorce to this yevama and a bill of divorce to that one, they require ḥalitza from him. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one and engaged in intercourse with that one, the latter requires a bill of divorce and ḥalitza. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one and performed levirate betrothal with that one, the latter requires a bill of divorce and he must perform ḥalitza with one of them. If the yavam gave a bill of divorce to this woman and performed ḥalitza with that one, nothing is effective after ḥalitza, and he cannot betroth the rival wife.

If he performed ḥalitza with one yevama and then performed ḥalitza with a second yevama, or he performed ḥalitza with one yevama and then proceeded to either perform levirate betrothal, give a bill of divorce, or engage in intercourse with a second; alternatively, he engaged in intercourse with one yevama and engaged in intercourse with the second yevama, or he engaged in intercourse with one yevama and proceeded to either perform levirate betrothal, give a bill of divorce, or perform ḥalitza with the second, nothing is effective after ḥalitza or intercourse. These halakhot apply both in cases of one yavam to two yevamot, as well as two yevamin to one yevama.

If he performed ḥalitza with one yevama and then proceeded to either perform levirate betrothal, give a bill of divorce, or engage in intercourse with a second yevama ; alternatively, he engaged in intercourse with one yevama and then proceeded to perform levirate betrothal, or give a bill of divorce, or perform ḥalitza with a second yevama, nothing is effective after ḥalitza, whether the ḥalitza took place at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. All of these halakhot accord with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains betrothal does not take effect on a woman who is forbidden due to the prohibition against betrothing a yevama after ḥalitza. But with regard to intercourse, when it is at the beginning, i.e., the first act the yavam performed with his yevama, nothing is effective after it and any subsequent action is void. However, if it was performed in the middle, and similarly if it was performed at the end, i.e., after some other action that impairs the validity of his intercourse, something is effective after it. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Both with regard to intercourse and ḥalitza, whether performed at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, nothing is effective after it. If the yavam performed a valid action according to Torah law, any subsequent action is of no consequence according to halakha.

Chapter 6

One who had intercourse with his yevama, whether unwittingly, i.e., he thought he was having intercourse with someone else, or intentionally, i.e., he knew she was his yevama and nevertheless had intercourse with her without intent to perform levirate marriage; whether due to coercion or willingly; even if he was unwitting and her participation was intentional, his participation was intentional and she was unwitting, he was coerced and she was not coerced, or she was coerced and he was not coerced; both one who merely engages in the initial stage of intercourse and one who completes the act of intercourse has thereby acquired his yevama. And similarly, the Torah did not distinguish between an act of intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, and intercourse in a typical manner.

And so too, with regard to a man who had intercourse with any one of those with whom relations are forbidden [ arayot ] by the Torah or with those who are unfit for him even though they are not in the category of arayot, for example, a widow with a High Priest; a divorcée and a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ ḥalutza ] with a common priest; a mamzeret, i.e., a woman born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship, or a Gibeonite woman with an Israelite; the daughter of an Israelite with a mamzer or a Gibeonite; he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood through this act no matter how it was performed, and the Torah did not distinguish between the act of intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, and intercourse in a typical manner.

A widow to a High Priest, a divorcée, or a ḥalutza to a common priest, even if they had only engaged in betrothal and had not yet had intercourse, may not partake of teruma. Since they are forbidden to the men who betrothed them, the betrothal itself disqualifies them from the privileges of priesthood even if they are the daughters of priests. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon declare them fit to partake of teruma. Since the prohibition is violated through the act of intercourse and not betrothal, the women are disqualified only once they have intercourse. In a case where these women were widowed or divorced, if it was from marriage, they are disqualified from the priesthood and may not partake of teruma. This is because a woman prohibited from marrying a priest who has intercourse with a priest becomes a ḥalala, and is thereby disqualified from partaking of teruma. However, if they were widowed or divorced from their state of betrothal, they are once again fit to partake of teruma according to all opinions.

A High Priest may not marry a widow, whether she is a widow from betrothal or a widow from marriage. And he may not marry a grown woman. He may marry only a minor or a young woman. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon declare a grown woman fit to marry a High Priest. And he may not marry a woman whose hymen was torn accidentally. If a priest betrothed a widow and was subsequently appointed to be High Priest, he may marry her. And there was an incident with Yehoshua ben Gamla, who betrothed Marta bat Baitos, a widow, and the king subsequently appointed him to be High Priest, and he nevertheless married her. Conversely, in the case of a widow waiting for her yavam who happened before a common priest, i.e., the priest was her yavam, and he was subsequently appointed to be High Priest, then even if he had already performed levirate betrothal with her, he may not marry her, because she is a widow. A High Priest whose brother died without children performs ḥalitza and he does not perform levirate marriage, as he may not marry a widow.

A common priest may not marry a sexually underdeveloped woman [ aylonit ], who is incapable of bearing children, unless he already has a wife and children. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if he has a wife and children, he may not marry a sexually underdeveloped woman, as she is the zona about whom it is stated in the Torah that a priest may not marry her. Intercourse with her is considered a licentious act because she is incapable of bearing children. And the Rabbis say: The only women in the category of zona, who are therefore forbidden to a priest, are a female convert, a freed maidservant, and any woman who engaged in licentious sexual intercourse with a man she is prohibited from marrying.

A man may not neglect the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply unless he already has children. Beit Shammai say: One fulfills this mitzva with two males, and Beit Hillel say: A male and a female, as it is stated: “Male and female He created them” (Genesis 5:2). If a man married a woman and stayed with her for ten years and she did not give birth, he is no longer permitted to neglect the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. Consequently, he must either divorce her and marry someone else, or take another wife while still married to her. If he divorced her she is permitted to marry another man, as it is not necessarily on her account that she and her first husband did not have children, and the second husband is permitted to stay with her for ten years. And if she had a miscarriage, he counts the ten years from the time of the miscarriage. A man is commanded with regard to the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply, but not a woman. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says that a woman is also commanded, as the verse states with regard to both of them: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28).

Chapter 7

A widow married to a High Priest, and a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ ḥalutza ] married to a common priest are all unions prohibited by Torah law. If one of these women brought with her into the marriage slaves of usufruct [ melog ] property or slaves of guaranteed investment, then the slaves of usufruct property do not partake of teruma but the slaves of guaranteed investment do partake of teruma. And these are slaves of usufruct property: They are those with regard to whom the couple stipulated that if the slaves die, their death is her loss, and if they increase in value, their increase is her gain. Although the husband is obligated in their sustenance, they do not partake of teruma, as they belong to her, not to him. He owns only the right of their use while he is married to her. And these are slaves of guaranteed investment: They are those with regard to whom the couple stipulated that if they die, their death is his loss, and if they increase in value, their increase is his gain. Since he bears financial responsibility for compensating her in the event of their loss, they partake of teruma, as they are considered his property.

In the case of an Israelite woman who married a priest in a halakhic marriage and who brought slaves with her into the marriage, whether they are slaves of usufruct property or slaves of guaranteed investment, they partake of teruma. And in the case of the daughter of a priest who married an Israelite and who brought slaves with her into the marriage, whether they are slaves of usufruct property or slaves of guaranteed investment, they do not partake of teruma, although, as she is the daughter of a priest, it is permitted for her and her slaves to partake of teruma beforehand.

With regard to an Israelite woman who married a priest and he died and left her pregnant, her slaves of guaranteed investment may not partake of teruma during her pregnancy, due to the share of the fetus, as an inheritor of his father, in the ownership of the slaves. In the opposite case, where the Israelite husband of a priest’s daughter died and left her pregnant, the fetus disqualifies her from partaking of teruma. However, in the current case, the fetus does not enable its mother or the slaves to partake of teruma, despite the fact that it is the child of a priest. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. The Rabbis said to him: Since you testified before us about the case of an Israelite woman who was married to a priest, in the case of the daughter of a priest who was married to a priest and he died and left her pregnant, her slaves should not partake of teruma either, due to the fetus’s share. The same halakha should apply whether the woman is an Israelite or the daughter of a priest.

With regard to the fetus of a divorcée or a widow whose husband left her pregnant; and a man whose married brother died childless [ yavam ]; and betrothal; and a married deaf-mute; and a nine-year-and-one-day-old boy who engaged in intercourse with a woman; if any of these men are Israelites and the woman is the daughter of a priest, they disqualify her from partaking of teruma. But if she is an Israelite and they are priests, they do not enable her to partake of teruma. Likewise, in the case of a boy with regard to whom there is uncertainty as to whether he is nine years and one day old and uncertainty whether he is not, who engaged in intercourse with a woman; and in the case of a boy who betrothed a woman, with regard to whom there is uncertainty as to whether he has grown two pubic hairs and is considered an adult and uncertainty whether he has not grown, they too can disqualify the woman from partaking of teruma and cannot enable her to partake, as in the previous cases. If the house fell upon a man and upon his brother’s daughter, to whom he was married, and it is unknown which of them died first, her rival wife performs ḥalitza and does not enter into levirate marriage. Entering into levirate marriage is not possible, as, if the wife died after her husband, the surviving wife would be rendered the rival wife of a forbidden relative, since the yavam is the father of the wife who died. This status prevents the creation of a levirate bond between him and the surviving wife as well. On the other hand, ḥalitza is necessary in case the wife died before her husband, thereby allowing the creation of a levirate bond between her rival wife and her father, the yavam.

In the case of one who rapes a woman without marrying her; or one who seduces a woman without marrying her; or an imbecile who engages in intercourse with a woman, even if he did marry her, if they are non-priests they do not disqualify the daughter of a priest from partaking of teruma, and if they are priests they do not enable an Israelite woman to partake of teruma. And if they are not fit to enter the assembly of Israel through marriage, they disqualify the daughter of a priest from partaking of teruma. How so? If it was an Israelite who engaged in extramarital intercourse with the daughter of a priest, she may partake of teruma, as this act of intercourse does not disqualify her. If he impregnated her, she may not partake of teruma, as she is carrying an Israelite fetus. If the fetus was cut in her womb, i.e., she miscarried, she may partake of teruma. If the man was a priest who engaged in intercourse with an Israelite woman, she may not partake of teruma. If he impregnated her, she still may not partake of teruma, as a fetus does not enable its mother to partake. If she gave birth she may partake due to her child, a priest. It is therefore found in this case that the power of the son is greater than that of the father, as the father of this child does not enable the woman to partake of teruma, but the son does. A slave disqualifies a woman from partaking of teruma due to his engaging in intercourse with her, and he does not disqualify a woman because he is her offspring. How so? In what case would a slave theoretically disqualify a woman because he is her offspring? If an Israelite woman was married to a priest, or the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite; and she a bore him a son; and the son went and pressed himself onto a maidservant, an epithet for intercourse used in this context due to the shame involved in having intercourse with a maidservant; and she bore him a son, then this son is a slave. If the latter’s father’s mother was an Israelite who was married to a priest, and her husband died, she may not partake of teruma due to her grandson, as he is not a priest but a slave. On the other hand, if she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, and he died, leaving only this grandson, she may partake of teruma, as the grandson is not considered his father’s offspring. A mamzer disqualifies a woman from partaking of teruma, and he also enables a woman to partake of teruma. How so? If an Israelite woman was married to a priest, or the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite, and she bore him a daughter, and the daughter went and married a slave or a gentile and bore him a son, this son is a mamzer. If his mother’s mother was an Israelite woman married to a priest, even if her husband died, she may partake of teruma, as she has surviving offspring from a priest. Conversely, if she is the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, she may not partake of teruma, even after her Israelite husband’s death, as she has offspring from him.

Even with regard to a High Priest, sometimes he disqualifies his grandmother from partaking of teruma. How so? If the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite, and she bore him a daughter, and the daughter went and married a priest and bore him a son, this son is fit to be a High Priest, who stands and serves on the altar. This son enables his mother to partake of teruma, as he is a priest. And yet, he disqualifies his mother’s mother from partaking of teruma, as he is her offspring from her Israelite husband. This grandmother can say in disapproval: Let there not be many like my daughter’s son, the High Priest, as he disqualifies me from partaking of teruma.

Chapter 8

An uncircumcised priest, e.g., one for whom circumcision was considered too dangerous, and all those who are ritually impure with any type of impurity, may not partake of teruma, the portion of produce that must be set aside for the priests. However, their wives and their slaves may partake of teruma. With regard to both a man with crushed testicles or with other wounds to his genitals [ petzua dakka ] and one whose penis has been severed [ kerut shofkha ], it is prohibited for them to marry a woman who was born Jewish. If they are priests they and their slaves may partake of teruma, as this condition does not disqualify them or their property. However, their wives may not partake of teruma, because if a priest has relations with his wife after suffering his injury, he renders her a ḥalala, a woman who is disqualified from marrying a priest, as he has engaged in forbidden sexual relations with her. If such a priest did not know his wife, i.e., did not engage in sexual relations with her, after his testicles were crushed or his penis was severed, she may partake of teruma, as she had married the priest in a permitted manner.

And who is deemed a man with crushed testicles? It is anyone whose testicles have been wounded, even one of them. And one whose penis has been severed is anyone whose sexual member has been cut off. As for the measure that renders him unfit, if there remains a portion of the corona, even as much as a hairsbreadth, he is still fit. However, if nothing at all is left of the corona, he is considered as one with a severed penis, for whom it is prohibited by Torah law to marry a Jewish woman. A man with crushed testicles or with other wounds to his genitals and one whose penis has been severed are permitted to marry a female convert or an emancipated maidservant, and they are prohibited only from entering into the congregation and marrying a woman who was born Jewish, as it is stated: “A man wounded with crushed testicles or a severed penis shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:2).

Ammonite and Moabite converts are prohibited from entering into the congregation and marrying a woman who was born Jewish, and their prohibition is eternal, for all generations. However, their female counterparts, even the convert herself, are permitted immediately. Egyptian and Edomite converts are prohibited from entering into the congregation only for three generations, both males and females. Rabbi Shimon renders permitted Egyptian and Edomite females immediately. Rabbi Shimon said: The matter may be derived by way of an a fortiori inference: If in a place where the Torah rendered prohibited the males with an eternal prohibition, i.e., Ammonites and Moabites, it rendered permitted the females immediately, then in a place where it rendered prohibited the males for only three generations, i.e., Egyptians and Edomites, is it not right that we should render permitted the females immediately? Rabbi Shimon’s colleagues said to him: If you are reporting a halakha that you received from your teachers, we will accept it from you. But if you merely wish to prove your case with an a fortiori inference based on your own reasoning, there is a refutation of your argument. Rabbi Shimon said to them: That is not so. I disagree with your claim that the a fortiori inference can be refuted, but in any case I am stating a halakha handed down to me by my teachers. Mamzerim and the Gibeonites who converted to Judaism in the days of Joshua are prohibited from entering into the congregation and marrying a woman who was born Jewish. Their prohibition is eternal, for all generations, and it applies to both males and females.

Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard two rulings from my teachers. One ruling is that a eunuch performs ḥalitza with his yevama, and his brothers perform ḥalitza with his wife, and the other ruling is that a eunuch does not perform ḥalitza with his yevama, and his brothers do not perform ḥalitza with his wife. And I cannot explain these two rulings, as I do not remember the circumstances to which each ruling applies. Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain. A eunuch caused by man, i.e., one who became emasculated after birth, performs ḥalitza with his yevama and his brothers perform ḥalitza with his wife, because he had an hour of fitness, a time when he was fertile. On the other hand, a eunuch by natural causes, i.e., who was entirely lacking in sexual capacity from birth, does not perform ḥalitza with his yevama and his brothers do not perform ḥalitza with his wife, because he did not have an hour of fitness, as he never had the potential to father children. Rabbi Eliezer says: No; rather, the opposite is the case: A eunuch by natural causes performs ḥalitza with his yevama and his brothers perform ḥalitza with his wife because he can be cured, whereas a eunuch caused by man does not perform ḥalitza with his yevama and his brothers do not perform ḥalitza with his wife because he cannot be cured. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beteira testified about a man named ben Megusat, who lived in Jerusalem and was a eunuch caused by man, that his brothers nevertheless entered into levirate marriage with his wife, in order to fulfill and confirm the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

A sexually underdeveloped man does not perform ḥalitza or enter into levirate marriage with his yevama. And similarly, a sexually underdeveloped woman [ aylonit ], who is incapable of bearing children, does not perform ḥalitza or enter into levirate marriage with her yavam. If a sexually underdeveloped man performed ḥalitza with his yevama, he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, as his ḥalitza is invalid. However, if he had intercourse with her, he has disqualified her. This is because it is considered licentious sexual intercourse, since such intercourse does not fulfill the mitzva of levirate marriage and is therefore categorized as forbidden relations with one’s sister-in-law. And similarly, with regard to a sexually underdeveloped woman, if one of the brothers performed ḥalitza with her he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. However, if he had intercourse with her, he has disqualified her because the intercourse is considered licentious sexual intercourse.

If a priest who is a eunuch by natural causes married an Israelite woman, he enables her to eat teruma. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: If a priest who is a hermaphrodite, possessing both male and female genitals, married an Israelite woman, he enables her to eat teruma. Rabbi Yehuda says: If a tumtum, whose external sexual organs are indeterminate, was torn open so that his genitals were exposed, and he was found to be a male, he must not perform ḥalitza, because he is treated like a eunuch. A hermaphrodite may marry a woman but he may not be married by a man, as he is considered a man. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one had intercourse with a hermaphrodite, he is liable to receive the punishment of stoning on his account as if he had had relations with a male.

Chapter 9

There are women who are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamin, while others are permitted to their yevamin and forbidden to their husbands. Certain women are permitted both to these and to those, and others are forbidden to both these and to those. The mishna elaborates: And these are cases of women who are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamin : In the case of a common priest who married a widow, and he has a brother who is the High Priest, the widow, who was permitted to her husband, is forbidden to her yavam, as it is prohibited for the High Priest to marry a widow. The same is true in the case of a priest disqualified due to flawed lineage [ ḥalal ], e.g., the son of a priest and a divorcée, who married a woman fit to marry a priest, and he has a brother who is a priest fit for service. That woman was permitted to marry the ḥalal but is forbidden to his brother. Having engaged in intercourse with the ḥalal, she is rendered a ḥalala, a woman disqualified from marrying a priest. Another example is the case of an Israelite of unflawed lineage who married an Israelite woman of similar lineage, and he has a brother who is a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [ mamzer ]; or a mamzer who married a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [ mamzeret ], and he has a brother who is an Israelite of unflawed lineage. A mamzer is permitted to marry a mamzeret, but neither is per-mitted to a Jew of unflawed lineage. In each of these cases, these women are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamin.

And these are cases of women who are permitted to their yevamin and forbidden to their husbands: For example, there is the case of a High Priest who betrothed a widow, and he has a brother who is a common priest, whom she is permitted to marry. This is true only if the High Priest merely betrothed her. However, if he consummated the marriage, he rendered her a ḥalala forbidden to all priests, including her yavam. The additional cases are a priest fit for service who married a ḥalala and he has a brother who is a ḥalal ; an Israelite of unflawed lineage who married a mamzeret, and he has a brother who is a mamzer ; and a mamzer who married an Israelite woman of unflawed lineage, and he has a brother who is, similarly, an Israelite of unflawed lineage. All of these women are permitted to their yevamin and forbidden to their husbands. And these are cases where women are forbidden both to these and to those: A High Priest who married a widow, and he has a brother who is a High Priest or a common priest; a priest fit for service who married a ḥalala, and he has a brother who is a priest fit for service; an Israelite of unflawed lineage who married a mamzeret, and he has a brother who is similarly an ordinary Israelite, or a mamzer who married an Israelite woman of unflawed lineage, and he has a brother who is a mamzer. All of these women are forbidden both to these and to those. And all other women are permitted to their husbands and to their yevamin.

With regard to secondary relatives, who are forbidden by rabbinic law, if the woman is a secondary relative to the husband but not a secondary relative to the yavam, she is forbidden to the husband and permitted to the yavam. Conversely, if she is a secondary relative to the yavam but not a secondary relative to the husband, she is forbidden to the yavam and permitted to the husband. If she is a secondary relative both to this man and to that man, she is forbidden to this one and to that one. Furthermore, if a man marries a woman forbidden to him as a secondary relative, she does not have the right to receive payment for her marriage contract if divorced or widowed, nor is she entitled to payment from her husband for the produce of her property that he used, nor is she entitled to provisions for her sustenance from his estate, nor does she get back her worn clothes or other objects she brought with her to her marriage. And the lineage of the offspring is unflawed, and the court forces him to divorce her. In contrast, a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ ḥalutza ] married to a common priest, a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite of unflawed lineage, and an Israelite woman of unflawed lineage married to a Gibeonite or to a mamzer all have the right to receive payment for their marriage contract, although it was prohibited for them to marry.

If there is an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest or pregnant from a priest, and he died; and a widow awaiting her yavam, who is a priest; and similarly, the daughter of a priest who is betrothed, pregnant from, or is a widow waiting for her yavam, who is an Israelite, she may not partake of teruma. If there is an Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite or pregnant from a Levite; and a widow awaiting her yavam, who is a Levite; and similarly the daughter of a Levite who is betrothed, pregnant from, or a widow waiting for her yavam, who is an Israelite, she may not partake of tithes. If there is a daughter of a Levite betrothed to a priest or pregnant from a priest; and a widow awaiting her yavam, who is a priest; and similarly a daughter of a priest who is betrothed to or pregnant from a Levite, or is a widow waiting for her yavam, who is a Levite, she may partake of neither teruma nor tithes. This follows the halakha that betrothal, pregnancy, and waiting for a yavam disqualify the daughter of a priest from eating teruma, but they do not enable an Israelite woman to partake of teruma.

An Israelite woman married to a priest may partake of teruma. If the priest died and she has a child from him, she may continue to partake of teruma. If she subsequently married a Levite, she may no longer partake of teruma but she may partake of the first tithe on his account. If he, too, died and she had a child from him, she may continue to partake of tithe on account of the child. If she then married an Israelite, she may partake of neither teruma nor tithe. If her Israelite husband died and she had a child from him, she still may partake of neither teruma nor tithe. If her child from the Israelite also died, while her son from the Levite remained alive, she may partake of tithe on account of the Levite’s child. If her child from the Levite died, leaving her with a son from the priest, she may once again partake of teruma. If her child from the priest died as well, she may no longer partake of either teruma or tithe.

The daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may not partake of teruma. If the Israelite died and she has a son from him, she may not partake of teruma as long as that son is alive. If she subsequently married a Levite she may partake of tithe. If he died, and she had a son from him, she may still partake of tithe. If she subsequently married a priest, she may partake of teruma. If the priest died and she had a son from him, she may partake of teruma. If her son from the priest also died, she may not partake of teruma, but she may partake of tithe, as she has a son from a Levite. If her son from the Levite died, she may no longer partake of tithe. If her son from the Israelite died, she returns to her father’s house and may once again partake of teruma. And with regard to this woman, it is stated: “And she is returned unto her father’s house, as in her youth; she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13).

Chapter 10

With regard to a woman whose husband went overseas, and witnesses came and they said to her: Your husband is dead, and she married another man on the basis of this testimony, and afterward her husband came back from out of the country, she must leave both this man and that one, as they are both forbidden to her. And she requires a bill of divorce from this one and that one. And furthermore, she has a claim to neither payment of her marriage contract, nor the profits of her property used by either of them, nor sustenance, nor the worn clothes she brought to the marriage. She has rights to these claims neither against this man nor against that one, i.e., she cannot collect these payments from either her first or second husband. And if she took any of these items from this man or from that one, she must return them to him. And the offspring is a mamzer from this one and from that one. Her child from the second husband is a definite mamzer, as she was never divorced from her first husband, and the Sages decreed that if she returned to her first husband, a child born later from him is also a mamzer. And neither this man nor that man may become impure for her upon her death, if they are priests. And neither this one nor that one is entitled to the rights that stem from the marriage bond: Neither to her found articles, nor to her earnings, nor to the nullification of her vows. If she was a regular Israelite woman, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, as her intercourse with the second husband is considered an act of illicit sexual relations, and the daughter of a Levite is disqualified from partaking of the first tithe, and the daughter of a priest is disqualified from partaking of teruma. And neither the heirs of this man nor the heirs of that one inherit her marriage contract, as she is not considered married to either of them. This clause will be explained in the Gemara. And if they both died childless, the brothers of this one and the brothers of this one must perform ḥalitza and they do not enter into levirate marriage. Rabbi Yosei disagrees with the first tanna and says that she does receive payment of her marriage contract, and the obligation of her marriage contract is upon the property of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar says: The first husband is entitled to her found articles, to her earnings, and to the nullification of her vows. Since her second marriage was an error, the first husband does not forfeit his rights. Rabbi Shimon says an even more far-reaching ruling: Her sexual relations or her ḥalitza with the brothers of the first husband exempts her rival wife, as it is considered a proper levirate marriage or ḥalitza, and certainly she does not require ḥalitza from the brother of the second husband. And if she returns to her first husband, the child from him is not a mamzer. All these halakhot refer to a situation when she married with the permission of the court, after hearing that her husband had died. But if she married without the consent of the court, basing herself entirely on the testimony she heard, and her husband returned, it is permitted for her to return to her first husband. The mishna adds another difference between these two scenarios: If she married by permission of the court, she must leave both of them and she is exempt from bringing the offering, i.e., the sin-offering for her unwitting adultery, as she had the authorization of the court and is therefore considered to have acted under duress.

If, however, she did not marry by permission of the court, she must leave her second husband and is liable to bring an offering for mistakenly having relations with a man forbidden to her. In this regard, the power of the court is greater, as she is exempt from bringing an offering. If the court instructed her to marry on the basis of inaccurate testimony, and she went and ruined herself by engaging in licentious relations outside matrimony, she is liable to bring an offering, as they permitted her only to marry, and not to engage in licentious relations.

With regard to a woman whose husband and child went overseas, and witnesses came and said to her: Your husband died and afterward your child died, she does not require levirate marriage, as she had a child when her husband died. And for this reason she married another man. And if afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, i.e., the child died before the husband, which means that she did require levirate marriage, she is therefore a yevama who married a stranger without ḥalitza and she must consequently leave her second husband. And with regard to the first child, the one born before they heard about the reversal, and the last one, born after they realized who actually died first, each of these children is a mamzer. Conversely, if they said to her: Your child died and afterward your husband died, and she therefore entered into levirate marriage, and afterward they said to her that the matters were reversed, which means she married her husband’s brother when there was no obligation of levirate marriage, she must leave her husband, and the first child and the last one are each a mamzer. If they said to her: Your husband died, and she married, and afterward they said to her that he was alive at the time of her marriage and he later died, she must leave the second husband. And the first child, born when her original husband was still alive, is a mamzer, and the last one, born after his death, is not a mamzer. If they said to her: Your husband died, and she became betrothed to another man, and afterward her husband came, she is permitted to return to him, as betrothal alone does not render her forbidden to her husband. Furthermore, although the last man, i.e., her betrothed, gave her a bill of divorce, he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. She was never his wife, for the betrothal was invalid, and a bill of divorce given to the wife of another man does not disqualify her. This was taught by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya: The verse states with regard to priests: “Neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7), which indicates: And not one who was divorced from a man who is not her husband, e.g., the second man in this case.

In the case of one whose wife went overseas and people came and told him: Your wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward his wife came back from overseas, the original wife is permitted to return to him, as his erroneous marriage to her sister is considered licentious sexual relations, and one who has intercourse with his wife’s relatives has not rendered his first wife forbidden to himself. And he is permitted to the relatives of the second woman, e.g., her daughter, and this second woman is permitted to his relatives, e.g., his son, as the marriage was entirely invalid. And if the first woman died he is permitted to the second woman, despite the fact that he has already engaged in forbidden relations with her. If they said to him that his wife is dead, and he married her sister, and afterward they said to him that she was alive when he married the sister and only later died, in this case the first child, born to the sister while his wife was still alive, is a mamzer, as he was born from the union of a man and his sister-in-law, and the last one is not a mamzer. Rabbi Yosei says: Whoever disqualifies others also disqualifies himself, and whoever does not disqualify others does not disqualify himself either. Rabbi Yosei’s obscure statement will be explained by the Gemara.

Witnesses said to a husband: Your wife is dead, and he married her paternal sister, and witnesses subsequently told him that his second wife was dead and he married her maternal sister; afterward witnesses said that this one too was dead and he married her paternal sister; finally they told him that she was dead and he married the last woman’s maternal sister, and then they were all discovered to be alive. In this case he is permitted to his first wife, and to the third and to the fifth. Since these women are not sisters, his betrothal to them is effective. Consequently, if he died and one of them entered into levirate marriage, they exempt their rival wives. But he is forbidden to the second and fourth wife, each of whom is the sister of his original wife. Therefore, if he passed away and the yavam had relations with one of them, his relations with any one of them does not exempt her rival wife, as she was forbidden to his brother, which means there was no mitzva of levirate marriage here at all. And if he had relations with the second woman in the aforementioned list after the death of the first, i.e., the first one indeed died but the other rumors were all false, in that case he is permitted to the second and the fourth, who are his lawful wives, and they exempt their rival wives, and he is forbidden to the third and the fifth, the sisters of the women married to him, and the sexual relations of the brother with any one of them does not exempt her rival wife.

The mishna addresses a different issue: If a boy aged nine years and one day had relations with his yevama he thereby disqualifies his brothers from levirate marriage, despite the fact that as a minor he has not acquired the yevama through this act of intercourse, and the brothers likewise disqualify the woman from him if they have intercourse with the yevama. However, there is a difference between them, as he disqualifies them only if he engaged in relations with her first, and the brothers disqualify him whether they had relations first or last. The mishna explains: How so? A boy aged nine years and one day who had relations with his yevama has disqualified his brothers, as they are no longer eligible to marry her. If his brothers had relations with her, or performed levirate betrothal with her, or gave her a bill of divorce, or performed ḥalitza with her, they permanently disqualify him from engaging in relations with her.

If a boy aged nine years and one day had sexual relations with his yevama, and afterward his brother, who is also nine years and one day old, had relations with her, the second brother disqualifies her to the first one. Rabbi Shimon says he does not disqualify her.

If a minor aged nine years and one day had relations with his yevama, and afterward that same boy had relations with her rival wife, he thereby disqualifies her to himself, and both women are now forbidden to him. Rabbi Shimon says he does not disqualify her. If a boy aged nine years and one day had relations with his yevama and died, that yevama performs ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage. If the minor married a woman in a regular manner and died, she is exempt from levirate marriage and ḥalitza, as by Torah law a minor cannot marry.

If a boy aged nine years and one day had relations with his yevama, and after he matured he married a different woman and then died childless, if he did not carnally know the first woman after he matured, but only when he was a minor, the first one performs ḥalitza and may not enter into levirate marriage, as she is in essence a yevama who had relations with a minor, and the second woman either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage, as she is his full-fledged wife. Rabbi Shimon says: The brother consummates levirate marriage with whichever woman he chooses, and performs ḥalitza with the second one. The mishna comments: This is the halakha both for a boy who is nine years and one day old, and also for one who is twenty years old who has not developed two pubic hairs. He has the status of a nine-year-old boy in this regard, as his intercourse is not considered a proper act of intercourse.

Chapter 11

One may marry a relative, e.g., the sister or the mother, of the woman he raped and of the woman he seduced. However, one who rapes and one who seduces a relative of the woman who is married to him is liable to receive capital punishment or karet for engaging in prohibited sexual intercourse, depending on the particular family relationship. A man may marry a woman raped by his father, or a woman seduced by his father, or a woman raped by his son, or a woman seduced by his son. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits marriage in the case of a woman raped by his father or a woman seduced by his father.

With regard to a female convert whose sons converted with her, they do not perform ḥalitza for each other’s wives, and they do not perform levirate marriage with them, as their conversions are considered rebirth, and they are considered unrelated. This is so even if the conception of the first son was not in the sanctity of Israel, i.e., the mother had not yet converted when she conceived of him, but his birth was in the sanctity of Israel, as his mother had converted by the time she gave birth to him, whereas the second son was both conceived and born in sanctity. The first son is considered a convert, who is unrelated to his brother. And this halakha similarly applies to a maidservant whose sons were freed with her, as they too are not considered relatives.

With regard to five women whose offspring were mixed, i.e., their lineage became indeterminate, and they had other sons as well who were not mixed, and the mixed sons matured and married women and subsequently died, then four sons who were not mixed, each one from a different mother, must perform ḥalitza with one of the widows, as she might be the sister-in-law of any of them. And one son of the mother whose sons did not perform ḥalitza may perform levirate marriage with her instead of ḥalitza ; even if she is not his sister-in-law, once she has received ḥalitza from the others she may marry any man. Subsequently, he and three of the four other sons must perform ḥalitza with one of the remaining widows, and the other one may perform levirate marriage. When this process has been completed for all the widows, four ḥalitzot and a levirate marriage are found altogether for each and every widow.

With regard to a woman whose offspring was mixed with the offspring of her daughter-in-law, and their lineage was consequently indeterminate, and the mixed sons matured and married women, and subsequently they died, the certain sons of the daughter-in-law perform ḥalitza with the wives, but not levirate marriage, as with regard to each wife it is uncertain whether she is his brother’s wife, and therefore his yevama, and uncertain whether she is his father’s brother’s wife, who is forbidden to him. However, the certain sons of the elder woman, i.e., the mother-in-law, perform either ḥalitza or levirate marriage, as with regard to each wife it is uncertain whether she is his brother’s wife, in which case levirate marriage is valid, or his brother’s son’s wife, in which case she is permitted to him, after having performed ḥalitza with a son of the daughter-in-law. If the sons of certain, unflawed lineage were the ones who died, then the mixed sons perform ḥalitza with the widows of the elder woman’s sons but not levirate marriage, as it is uncertain whether she is his brother’s wife or his father’s brother’s wife. With the widows of the certain sons of the daughter-in-law, one of the mixed sons performs ḥalitza, in case she is his brother’s wife. And the other one performs levirate marriage, as even if she is his brother’s son’s wife, she is permitted to him.

In the case of a priestess whose offspring was mixed with her maidservant’s offspring, they may partake of teruma, as both a priest and the slave of a priest partake of teruma. And they receive one share of teruma in the granary. And they may not become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, as each of them might be a priest. And they may not marry women, whether unflawed women, who may not marry a slave, or women unfit to marry into the priesthood, as with regard to each of them it is uncertain whether he is a priest or a slave. If the mixed sons matured and freed each other, they may marry women fit to marry into the priesthood, as a freed slave may marry such women. However, neither may marry a woman unfit for the priesthood, in case he is a priest. And they may not become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, since they are uncertain priests. However, if they became impure, they do not receive the forty lashes, as each of them might not be priest. And they may not partake of teruma, as one of them is not a priest. However, if they ate teruma unwittingly they do not pay the principal and the additional fifth, as each of them might be a priest. And they do not receive a share of teruma in the granary, as neither can prove that he is a priest. However, they may sell the teruma that they remove from their own produce, and although they may not eat it, the money is theirs. Since it cannot be proven with regard to either of them that he is not a priest, teruma cannot be appropriated from them. And they do not receive a share of the consecrated offerings of the Temple, as each of them might not be a priest. And one may not give them consecrated offerings to sacrifice for the same reason. However, the hides of their own offerings may not be appropriated from their possession, as it cannot be proven with regard to either of them that he is not a priest. And they are exempt from giving a priest the foreleg, and from giving him the jaw, and from giving him the maw of their non-consecrated kosher animals. And with regard to either of them, the firstling of his kosher animal should graze until it becomes unfit to be sacrificed, i.e., until it gets a blemish. It is against his interest to sacrifice the animal before it gets a blemish, thereby letting it be eaten by the priests. Once it gets a blemish, it cannot be appropriated from him. Since he is possibly a priest, he may claim that the animal is the property of a priest. The animal then becomes his private property, and he may eat it if he wishes. And in general, we place upon him both the stringencies of priests and the stringencies of Israelites.

With regard to a woman who did not wait three months after separating from her husband, and remarried and gave birth to a son, and it is not known if he was born after nine months of pregnancy to the former husband or if he was born after seven months to the latter husband, if she had sons of certain patrilineage from the first husband and sons of certain patrilineage from the second one, and the son of uncertain patrilineage married and died childless, then the brothers from both husbands must perform ḥalitza with his wife, as they might be his paternal brothers. But they may not perform levirate marriage with her, in case he is only their maternal half brother, and his wife is forbidden to them. And similarly, with regard to him and their wives, if one of them dies childless, he performs ḥalitza and not levirate marriage. If he had half brothers from the first husband and half brothers from the second, not from the same mother but from the same father, he performs ḥalitza or levirate marriage with their widows. If he is indeed their paternal half brother, then the widows are his yevamot ; if not, he may marry them like any other man. And similarly, with regard to them and his wife, one half brother from one father performs ḥalitza and one from the other father performs levirate marriage.

If one of his two uncertain fathers was an Israelite and one was a priest, he may marry only a woman fit to marry a priest, due to the possibility that he is a priest. And he may not become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse because he might be a priest. But if he became impure, he does not receive the forty lashes, as he might be a non-priest. Likewise, he does not partake of teruma, in case he is a non-priest. However, if he ate teruma he does not pay the principal and the additional fifth, as he might be a priest. And he does not receive teruma at the granary. However, he may sell the teruma of his own produce and the money is his. It cannot be taken away from him due to the uncertainty with regard to his status. And he does not receive a share of the sacred of the consecrated offerings, and one may not give him the consecrated offerings to sacrifice. However, the hides of his own offerings may not be appropriated from his possession. And he is exempt from giving a priest the foreleg, and the jaw, and the maw of his non-consecrated animals. And the firstling of his animal should graze until it becomes unfit to be sacrificed because it gets a blemish. And in general, we place upon him the stringencies of priests and the stringencies of Israelites. If both uncertain fathers were priests, then if they die he is in a state of acute mourning over each of them, in case the deceased is his father. And if he dies, they are both in a state of acute mourning over him, as one of them is his father. He may not become ritually impure to bury them, as each one may not be his relative, and they may not become ritually impure to bury him for the same reason. He does not inherit from them, as the heirs of both husbands can reject his claims. However, they inherit from him if he has no sons and split his inheritance equally. And he is exempt from capital punishment for striking and for cursing both this father and that one. Although one who strikes or curses his father or mother is liable to receive the death penalty, he cannot be held liable, as it is unknown which of the men is his father. He must ascend to the Temple service with the priestly watch of this father and of that one, as he belongs to one of these watches and is obligated to serve with them. However, he does not receive a share of the portion of the offerings that gets eaten, as the members of each watch can claim that he is a member of the other watch. If both uncertain fathers were in one priestly watch, he receives one share, as he certainly belongs to that watch.

Chapter 12

The mitzva of ḥalitza, the ritual through which the yavam frees the yevama of her levirate bonds, must be performed before three judges, and the ritual does not require the judges to be experts fit to adjudicate other matters, as even if all three are laymen, it is acceptable. If she performed ḥalitza while he was wearing a shoe made of soft leather that covers the whole foot, her ḥalitza is valid, but if she performed ḥalitza while he was wearing a soft shoe [ anpileya ] made of cloth, her ḥalitza is invalid, as it is not considered a real shoe. If ḥalitza was performed while he was wearing a sandal, i.e., footwear made of hard leather, that has a heel, it is valid; but if performed with a sandal without a heel, it is invalid ḥalitza. If the leg of the yavam was amputated anywhere from the knee down and she performed ḥalitza as he wore a shoe on the stump of his leg, it is valid ḥalitza. If, however, the leg was amputated anywhere from the knee and above, and she performed ḥalitza as he wore a shoe on the stump of his leg, it is invalid ḥalitza.

If she performed ḥalitza while the man was wearing a sandal that did not belong to him, or a sandal made of wood, or on the left shoe, which was being worn on his right foot, it is valid ḥalitza. If she performed ḥalitza as the man was wearing a shoe that was too large for him but which he can still walk in, or a shoe that was too small but that covered most of his foot, her ḥalitza is valid. If a woman performed ḥalitza at night, her ḥalitza is valid, but Rabbi Elazar invalidates it. If she performed ḥalitza on the left foot, her ḥalitza is invalid, but Rabbi Elazar validates it.

If she, i.e., the yevama, removed the shoe and spat in accordance with the halakha but did not recite the necessary text, her ḥalitza is valid. If she recited the text and spat but did not remove the shoe, her ḥalitza is disqualified. If she removed the shoe and recited the text but did not spit, Rabbi Elazar says: Her ḥalitza is disqualified, while Rabbi Akiva says: Her ḥalitza is valid. Rabbi Elazar said to him: The verse states: “So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9). “So” is an exclusionary term indicating that only precisely in this fashion is ḥalitza valid. Therefore, any term that constitutes an action for ḥalitza is indispensable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: You derive proof from there? But it states: “So shall it be done to the man” indicating that only a term constituting an action toward the man, namely any aspect of ḥalitza that concerns the man’s body, such as removal of his shoe, is indispensable. But spitting, which does not involve the man, although it takes place in his presence, is not indispensable.

The mishna lists additional halakhot with regard to ḥalitza. If a deaf-mute man underwent ḥalitza, or a deaf-mute woman performed ḥalitza, or if an adult woman performs ḥalitza with a male minor, her ḥalitza is invalid and the woman may not marry. If a female minor performed ḥalitza, she must perform ḥalitza a second time once she becomes an adult, and if she does not perform the second ḥalitza, her first ḥalitza is invalid.

If she performed ḥalitza before two or three judges and one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified as a judge for some other reason, her ḥalitza is invalid. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler validate the ḥalitza in this case. And an incident occurred involving a certain person who performed ḥalitza between him and her alone in prison, i.e., not in the presence of others, and the case came before Rabbi Akiva and he validated it.

The mitzva of ḥalitza is performed as follows: He and his yevama come to the court, and the scholars of the court give him advice appropriate for him, whether to enter levirate marriage or to perform ḥalitza, as it is stated: “And the Elders of his city shall call him and speak to him” (Deuteronomy 25:8). If they decide to perform ḥalitza, she says: “My brother-in-law refused to establish a name for his brother in Israel, he did not wish to consummate the levirate marriage” (Deuteronomy 25:7), and afterward he says: “I do not wish to take her” (Deuteronomy 25:8). And they would say these statements in the sacred Hebrew language and not in any other language. Afterward, the shoe is removed and she spits before him, as is written: “His yevama shall approach him, before the Elders, and remove his shoe from on his foot and spit before him” (Deuteronomy 25:9), which indicates that this spittle must be visible to the judges. “And she shall respond and say: So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9). Up until this point the judges would prompt the parties to recite the text that they are required to say. And when Rabbi Hyrkanus once prompted the participants in ḥalitza under the ela tree in the village of Eitam, he prompted them to finish reciting the whole Torah passage, after which they established the custom of completing the whole Torah passage. Therefore, they continue and say the following verse: “And his name shall be called in Israel: The house of he who had his shoe removed” (Deuteronomy 25:10). This mitzva of saying: The house of he who had his shoe removed, applies to the judges, but not to the students, i.e., the students of the judges and other onlookers who are present. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is a mitzva upon all those present to say: He who had his shoe removed.

Chapter 13

The Sages decreed that in the case of a minor girl whose father died, her mother or brothers may marry her off. However, such a marriage does not have the same legal status as the marriage of an adult. Therefore, if the minor regrets having married, she is allowed to make a declaration of refusal to her husband, thereby annulling the marital bond. The Sages disagreed with regard to the details of this halakha : Beit Shammai say: Only betrothed girls may refuse. A girl may refuse, upon reaching adulthood, to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brothers married her as a minor after the death of her father. But Beit Hillel say that both betrothed and fully married girls may refuse. Beit Shammai say: Refusal may be directed only at her husband and not at her yavam. In such a situation, she must perform ḥalitza in order to dissolve the levirate bond. But Beit Hillel say: It may be directed at her husband or her yavam. Beit Shammai say: The refusal must take place specifically in the presence of the husband. But Beit Hillel say: It may take place either in his presence or in his absence. Beit Shammai say: The refusal must take place specifically in court. But Beit Hillel say: It may take place either in court, or not in court. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: She may refuse as long as she is a minor, even four or five times if her relatives married her off again to another man after each refusal. Beit Shammai said to them: The daughters of Israel are not to be treated with disregard and should not be passed from one man to another. Rather, she refuses once. And then she must wait until she reaches majority, and refuse, and marry.

Who is a minor girl who needs to perform refusal in order to annul her marriage? Any minor whose mother or brother married her off with her consent. If they married her off without her consent, she need not refuse her husband at all and may leave her husband without a declaration of refusal. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Any girl who is so young that she cannot keep her betrothal, i.e., the money or document of betrothal, safe does not need to refuse, as the Sages instituted marriage only for a girl old enough to understand what she is doing. Rabbi Elazar says: The act of a minor girl is nothing, so that if a minor girl’s mother or brothers marry her off, the marriage is essentially invalid. Rather, her status is as though she were a seduced unmarried woman. Therefore, a minor daughter of a non-priest married to a priest may not eat teruma, and the minor daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may eat teruma.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says otherwise: If there is any obstruction in the matter due to the man, it is as if she were his wife. If there is any obstruction in the matter that is not due to the man, it is as if she were not his wife. This statement will be explained in the Gemara.

If a minor girl refuses a man, he is permitted to marry her close relatives, such as her mother or her sister, and she is permitted to marry his close relatives, such as his father or brother, and he has not disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, as she is not considered divorced. However, if he gave her a bill of divorce, then even though the marriage was valid according to rabbinic law and not Torah law, he is prohibited from marrying her close relatives, and she is prohibited from marrying his close relatives, and he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce but afterward remarried her, and she subsequently refused him and married another man, and then she was widowed or divorced from her second husband, she is permitted to return to him. Since she left him the last time by means of refusal, the refusal cancels the bill of divorce that he gave her previously, and her status is that of a minor girl who refused her husband, who is not forbidden to her first husband after a second marriage. However, if the order was different, and if she refused him and he subsequently remarried her, and this time he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man, and she was widowed or divorced, she is forbidden to return to him, like any divorced woman who married another man. This is the principle concerning a minor girl who refused her husband and then married several times: If the bill of divorce followed the refusal and she remarried, she is forbidden to return to him. If the refusal followed the bill of divorce, she is permitted to return to him. Since the refusal followed the bill of divorce it is clear that she was a minor and neither the marriage nor the divorce were valid by Torah law. However, when the ultimate separation is by means of a bill of divorce, there is no indication that she was a minor at the time and there is potential for confusion with an adult divorcée.

If a minor girl refuses one man and marries another, and he divorces her, and then she marries another man and refuses him, and then she marries another man and he divorces her, this is the principle for this case: With regard to anyone she leaves by means of a bill of divorce, it is prohibited for her to return to him. With regard to anyone she leaves by means of refusal, she is permitted to return to him.

With regard to one who divorces a woman and remarries her and then dies childless, his wife is permitted to enter into levirate marriage with her yavam, but Rabbi Elazar prohibits this. Likewise, with regard to one who divorces an orphaned minor girl whose mother and brothers married her off and remarries her and subsequently dies, she is permitted to the yavam in levirate marriage, and Rabbi Elazar prohibits it. A minor girl whose father married her off, in which case the marriage is valid by Torah law, and who was subsequently divorced while she was still a minor is like an orphan during the lifetime of her father, as he no longer has the right to marry her off, and she cannot become fully married because she is a minor. And if the husband remarries her while she is still a minor and then dies childless, everyone agrees that she is forbidden to the yavam and may not enter into levirate marriage.

If two brothers are married to two minor sisters, and the husband of one of them dies childless, this widowed girl shall be exempt from levirate marriage due to her status as a forbidden relative, as one is prohibited from marrying the sister of his wife. The same halakha applies to two deaf-mute women, whose status is like that of two minors in this matter, as their marriages are valid by rabbinic law. And if two brothers were married to two sisters, one of them an adult and the other a minor, and the husband of the minor dies, the minor shall leave due to her status as the sister of a wife, as in the first case in the mishna. But if the husband of the adult dies, it generates a Torah obligation of levirate marriage, which is not abrogated by the rabbinic prohibition proscribing the yevama as his wife’s sister. This prohibition is by rabbinic law, because marriage to a minor is rabbinic in origin. What does one do under such circumstances? Rabbi Eliezer says: We instruct the minor, i.e., his wife, to refuse him, so that her marriage is dissolved and he may then enter into levirate marriage with her adult sister, the widow of his childless brother. Rabban Gamliel says: If the minor refuses of her own accord, her refusal is valid. And if not, she should wait until she reaches majority, whereupon her marriage is valid by Torah law, and that widowed adult sister shall be exempt from levirate marriage due to her status as the sister of a wife. Rabbi Yehoshua says: When the brother married to the adult sister dies, leaving the brother married to the minor, woe [ ee ] to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife. Under these circumstances, he loses both women: He must release his own wife with a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by performing ḥalitza. He cannot stay married to his wife because she is the sister of his yevama, and he cannot enter into levirate marriage with the yevama even after divorcing his wife, because the yevama is his wife’s sister. The principle that one is completely absolved from levirate marriage when the potential yevama is a forbidden relative does not apply because Torah law does not recognize his marriage to his minor wife. That marriage’s rabbinic sanction does not suffice to render the yevama, his wife’s sister, a forbidden relative who is not a candidate for levirate marriage.

If a man was married to two orphaned minors and died, consummation of levirate marriage or ḥalitza with one of them exempts her rival wife from either levirate marriage or ḥalitza, rendering her free to remarry. Likewise, if two deaf-mutes were married to one man who died, consummation of levirate marriage or ḥalitza with one of them exempts her rival wife. In both of these cases, both women are married by rabbinic law and consequently become yevamot by rabbinic law. Since their statuses are equal, one can exempt the other. If one wife is a minor and the other is a deaf-mute, consummation of levirate marriage or ḥalitza with one of them does not exempt her rival wife. Although both women are married by rabbinic law, their statuses are not the same and one cannot exempt the other. If one of them was halakhically competent and one was a deaf-mute, consummation of levirate marriage with the halakhically competent wife exempts the deaf-mute, as the halakhically competent women’s marriage and levirate marriage are by Torah law. But consummation of levirate marriage with the deaf-mute does not exempt the halakhically competent wife. Likewise, if one was an adult woman and one a minor girl, consummation of levirate marriage with the adult exempts the minor but consummation of levirate marriage with the minor does not exempt the adult.

If a man was married to two minor orphans and he died, and a yavam engaged in intercourse with the first of them to consummate the levirate marriage, and then engaged in intercourse with the second, or if his brother who is also their yavam engaged in intercourse with the second, the yavam or his brother did not disqualify the first girl from staying married to him, as her levirate marriage was consummated. Likewise, if the two wives were two female deaf-mutes, the first wife may remain married to the yavam. Intercourse with the second wife, though prohibited, has no effect: If the marriage was of uncertain status, then either the levirate marriage was concluded when he engaged in intercourse with the first, or neither wife was really married to the first husband, and they are therefore not rival wives. If the initial marriage was partial, then since both wives have the same standing, the levirate marriage with the first wife fully realizes whatever degree of levirate marriage is available. If one wife was a minor and the other a deaf-mute, and the yavam engaged in intercourse with the minor and then engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute, then the yavam or his brother disqualified the minor from staying married due to the Sages’ decree, lest it be confused with a situation where the intercourse with the deaf-mute was first. If the yavam engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute and then engaged in intercourse with the minor, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the minor, then the yavam or his brother disqualified the deaf-mute from staying married. The marriage to the deaf-mute creates a partial acquisition that does not exempt the second wife from levirate marriage, as she, as a minor, has a different standing. Accordingly, intercourse with the second wife also creates a partial acquisition and thereby both women are prohibited to the yavam, as it is prohibited to consummate levirate marriage with more than one wife.

If one widow was halakhically competent and one widow was a deaf-mute, and the yavam engaged in intercourse with the halakhically competent woman and then engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute, or if his brother then engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute, the yavam or his brother did not disqualify the halakhically competent woman from staying married. Since the yavam consummated the levirate marriage with her first, the levirate bond was entirely dissolved and the intercourse with the deaf-mute, though forbidden, had no effect. If the yavam engaged in intercourse with the deaf-mute and then engaged in intercourse with the halakhically competent woman, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the halakhically competent woman, the yavam or his brother disqualified the deaf-mute from staying married. Consummation of the levirate marriage with the deaf-mute creates only a partial acquisition that does not fully dissolve the levirate bond.

If the deceased brother had two wives, an adult and a minor, and the yavam engaged in sexual intercourse with the adult, then engaged in intercourse with the minor, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the minor, the yavam or his brother did not disqualify the adult from staying married, as the consummation of the levirate marriage with the adult completely dissolves the levirate bond. If the yavam engaged in intercourse with the minor, and then engaged in intercourse with the adult, or if his brother engaged in intercourse with the adult, the yavam or his brother disqualified the minor from staying married. Rabbi Elazar says: The court instructs the minor to refuse him thereby annulling her marriage retroactively, and then the minor is permitted to marry any man.

If a minor yavam engaged in sexual intercourse with a minor yevama, they should grow up together, living as a married couple. He may not divorce her, as he is a minor. If he engaged in sexual intercourse with an adult yevama, she should raise him, i.e., they must stay married, as there is no way for him to divorce her until he reaches majority. When a yevama said within thirty days of her marriage: I have not engaged in sexual intercourse with him, the court forces him to perform ḥalitza with her. If she said this after thirty days but he claimed that he had engaged in sexual intercourse, the court asks him to perform ḥalitza with her, as there are grounds to believe him. And when he admits that he did not engage in intercourse with her, even after twelve months, the court forces him to perform ḥalitza with her.

If a woman vows during her husband’s lifetime to derive no benefit from her yavam, the court forces him to perform ḥalitza with her as it is forbidden for her to engage in sexual intercourse with him to consummate the levirate marriage. If she vowed after the death of her husband to derive no benefit from her yavam, the court asks him to perform ḥalitza with her. And if she intended to do so, i.e., she had an ulterior motive of avoiding levirate marriage when she vowed, even if she made the vow during her husband’s lifetime, the court merely asks him to perform ḥalitza with her.

Chapter 14

With regard to a deaf-mute who married a halakhically competent woman, and a halakhically competent man who married a deaf-mute: If either man wants to divorce his wife, he may divorce her, and if he wants to maintain her as his wife, he may maintain her. The reason why a deaf-mute man can divorce his wife is that just as he marries her by intimation, i.e., his marriage is not performed by explicit speech, as deaf-mutes rely on gestures, so too, he divorces her by intimation. Likewise, in the case of a halakhically competent man who married a halakhically competent woman, and she later became a deaf-mute: If he wants to divorce his wife, he may divorce her, as a wife does not have to have intellectual capacity to receive a bill of divorce, and if he wants to maintain her as his wife, he may maintain her. If she became an imbecile, he may not divorce her, i.e., a bill of divorce is ineffective in this case. If he became a deaf-mute or an imbecile after they were married, he may never divorce her, as he does not have the legal competence to give a bill of divorce. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: For what reason is the halakha that in the case of the woman who becomes a deaf-mute, her husband may divorce her, but in the case of the man who becomes a deaf-mute, he may not divorce his wife? If the bill of divorce written by someone who formerly possessed all his senses and later became a deaf-mute is invalid, it stands to reason that it should not be valid when she becomes a deaf-mute either. They said to him: The man who divorces his wife is not similar to the woman who is divorced, as the woman is divorced whether she is willing or unwilling. Since the woman’s consent is not required, she may be divorced even if she is a deaf-mute. And, conversely, the man divorces his wife only willingly, and therefore the bill of divorce of a deaf-mute, who is not legally competent, is ineffective.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgada testified with regard to a female deaf-mute whose father married her off when she was a minor, which means her marriage was valid by Torah law, that she can be divorced with a bill of divorce even when she matures and is no longer under her father’s authority, despite the fact that she is not legally competent. They said to him: This woman, too, has a similar status. In other words, a woman who possessed all her faculties and later became a deaf-mute is comparable to a minor whose marriage was valid by Torah law and later, when she matured and was no longer under the authority of her father, received a bill of divorce. Both of these women can receive a bill of divorce, in accordance with the principle stated in the previous paragraph.

The mishna continues: In a case where there were two deaf-mute brothers married to two deaf-mute sisters or to two halakhically competent sisters, or to two sisters, one of whom was a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent; or in a case where there were two deaf-mute sisters married to two halakhically competent brothers or to two deaf-mute brothers or to two brothers, one of whom was a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, all these women are exempt from ḥalitza and from levirate marriage. Each of them is forbidden to her yavam because he is married to her sister. And if they were unrelated women, i.e., the women are not sisters, the men may marry them in levirate marriage, and if they want to divorce them later, they may divorce them.

However, if two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and other one halakhically competent, were married to two halakhically competent sisters, and the deaf-mute married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? His brother’s wife is released without levirate marriage or ḥalitza, due to the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, as his wife’s sister came before him for levirate marriage by Torah law, and the legal status of her marriage and her levirate marriage is higher than his own marriage, which applies only by rabbinic law. And his brother’s wife is forbidden to him forever, and there is no remedy for her. He cannot marry her, as by rabbinic law she is the sister of his ex-wife, nor can he exempt her by means of ḥalitza, as he is a deaf-mute.

If two halakhically competent brothers were married to two sisters, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, and the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? The deaf-mute sister is released due to the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute sister do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, as the halakhically competent sister came before him for levirate marriage, and the status of her levirate bond is higher than the status of his marriage to his wife, a deaf-mute. And he releases his brother’s wife, who is not a deaf-mute, by means of ḥalitza, as they are both legally competent and can therefore perform ḥalitza.

If two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, were married to two sisters, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, and the deaf-mute brother married to the deaf-mute sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister do? The deaf-mute woman is released due to the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the deaf-mute sister do? He divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, which is as valid as their original marriage. And his brother’s wife is forbidden to him forever. There is no remedy for her, as he may not consummate levirate marriage with her because she is the sister of his ex-wife by rabbinic law, and he cannot perform ḥalitza with her either, as he is a deaf-mute.

If two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, were married to two unrelated, halakhically competent women, and the deaf-mute married to the halakhically competent woman died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman do? He either performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the other halakhically competent woman do? He cannot perform ḥalitza with her, as he is a deaf-mute. Rather, he marries her, and he may never divorce her, as sexual intercourse between a yavam and his yevama creates a valid marriage that cannot be broken by the bill of divorce of a deaf-mute.

If two halakhically competent brothers were married to two unrelated women, one of whom is halakhically competent and the other one a deaf-mute, and the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute woman died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman do? The brother cannot perform ḥalitza with her, as she is a deaf-mute. Rather, he marries the deaf-mute, and if he wishes to divorce her, he may subsequently divorce her with a bill of divorce. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent sister died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the deaf-mute do? Either he performs ḥalitza or he enters into levirate marriage.

If two brothers, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, were married to two unrelated women, one of whom is a deaf-mute and the other one halakhically competent, and the deaf-mute brother who was married to the deaf-mute woman died, what should the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman do? He may marry her if he desires the deaf-mute woman, and if he wishes afterward to divorce her, he may divorce her. If the halakhically competent brother married to the halakhically competent woman died, what should the deaf-mute brother married to the deaf-mute woman do? He marries his yevama and may never divorce her, as he does not have the legal capacity to end a valid marriage.

Chapter 15

With regard to a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, if there was peace between him and her, i.e., the couple were not fighting at the time, and there was also peace in the world, i.e., there was no war at that time, and the woman came back by herself and said: My husband died, she may marry on the basis of her own testimony. Likewise, if she said: My husband died, and they did not have children, but her husband had a brother, she may enter into levirate marriage. If there was peace between him and her when they left but there was war in the world, or if there was a quarrel between him and her and peace in the world, and she came and said: My husband died, she is not deemed credible, as she may be mistaken or lying. Rabbi Yehuda says: She is never deemed credible when she testifies that her husband died, unless she came crying and her clothing was torn, in which case it is apparent that she is speaking the truth. They said to him: This is an incorrect distinction. Rather, both this woman who cries and this woman who does not cry may marry on the basis of their own testimony.

Beit Hillel say: We heard that one may accept the testimony of a woman concerning the death of her husband only when she comes from the grain harvest, and when she testified in the same country where he died, and in circumstances similar to the incident that occurred, in which a lenient ruling was issued, as will be explained. Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: The same halakha applies to a wife who comes from the grain harvest, and one who comes from the olive harvest, and also one who comes from the grape harvest, and even one who comes from one country to another country. Although the incident in question took place during the grain harvest, the Sages spoke of the grain harvest only because it was the present occurrence, i.e., that is what happened in practice, but this is no proof that she is deemed credible only when she arrived specifically from the grain harvest. The mishna comments: Beit Hillel retracted their opinion, and decided to teach in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai on this issue.

Beit Shammai say: A woman who testifies that her husband died may marry, and take the money guaranteed in her marriage contract. Beit Hillel say: She may marry, but she may not take her marriage contract, as qualified witnesses are required for monetary matters. Beit Shammai said to them: If you have permitted a woman potentially forbidden to him, which is a relatively stringent prohibition, based merely upon her own testimony, will we not permit a monetary matter, which is more lenient, as the money can be returned and this sin does not entail such a severe punishment? Beit Hillel said to them: This is no proof, as we find that the brothers do not come into the inheritance from the deceased brother based on her testimony. Evidently, although this testimony is accepted with regard to forbidden sexual relationships, it is not effective for monetary matters. Beit Shammai said to them: But we can learn this halakha from the scroll of the marriage contract, as every husband writes for her that: If you marry another man, take what is written for you in this contract. This shows that her right to receive the money of her marriage contract is dependent upon her eligibility to remarry. In this case, as she is deemed credible when she says her husband died and she may marry again, she is likewise entitled to the money of the marriage contract. And Beit Hillel again retracted their opinion, and decided to teach in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.

All are deemed credible when they come to give testimony with regard to the death of a woman’s husband, apart from her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, the wife of her yavam, and her husband’s daughter, her stepdaughter. The reason is that these women are likely to hate her and will lie to her detriment. The mishna explains: In the case of a divorce all people, including these women, may bring her bill of divorce and testify that it was written appropriately. What, then, is the difference between a bill of divorce and death? The mishna answers: The difference is that in the case of a bill of divorce the writing proves the accuracy of the testimony, i.e., her testimony is supported by the text of the document itself, whereas with regard to the death of her husband there is no proof apart from the statement of the woman herself. If one witness says: The man died, and the wife married based on this testimony, and one other witness came and said: He did not die, she need not leave her new husband due to this testimony. However, if one witness comes and says: The husband died, and two witnesses say: He did not die, then even though she married based on the first witness she must leave her new husband. If two witnesses say: He died, and one witness says: He did not die, the testimony of the two witnesses is accepted, and even though she did not yet marry, she may marry.

If two women who were married to the same man come forward, and one of them says that the husband died, and the other one says he did not die, the one who says he died may marry on the basis of her own testimony, and she takes the money of her marriage contract. And the one who said he did not die may not marry, and does not take the money of her marriage contract. If one wife says: He died in a normal manner, and the other one says: He was killed, Rabbi Meir says: Since they contradict one another, these women may not marry. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say: Since they both agree that he is not alive they may marry, despite the fact that they dispute the circumstances of his demise. If a witness says: He died, and a witness says: He did not die, or one woman says: He died, and another woman says: He did not die, this woman may not marry.

In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and she comes and says: My husband died, she may marry, and she takes her marriage contract based on her own testimony. And it remains prohibited for her rival wife to remarry, as a woman cannot testify on behalf of her rival wife. If the rival wife was an Israelite woman married to a priest, she may continue to partake of teruma, as she is not permitted to remarry, and therefore the presumption that the husband is still alive is maintained in relation to her. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression. According to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, there is a concern that she might be eating teruma unlawfully. There is no remedy for this situation unless it is prohibited for the rival wife to marry, as she cannot rely on the testimony of her rival wife, and it is also prohibited for her to partake of teruma, lest the other woman was speaking the truth. In other words, the halakha is stringent on both counts.

The mishna discusses a similar case. If a woman said: My husband died and afterward my father-in-law died, she may marry and take her marriage contract, and it is prohibited for her mother-in-law to remarry, as a woman may not testify on behalf of her mother-in-law. If the mother-in-law was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may partake of teruma ; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare her from transgression; there is no remedy unless it is prohibited for the mother-in-law to marry and also prohibited for her to partake of teruma. In relation to the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva in the previous mishna, in which Rabbi Akiva states that one must avoid a possible transgression, the mishna cites two similar cases involving other topics. With regard to one who betrothed one of five women, and he does not know which of them he betrothed, and each one of them says: He betrothed me, if he does not want to marry any of them he gives a bill of divorce to each and every one of them so none will have the status of a woman with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether she is divorced. And he leaves the marriage contract among them and departs. The marriage contract remains in dispute between the women until they clarify which of them is entitled to the money. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression, as perhaps the woman he actually betrothed will not receive the money to which she is entitled. There is no remedy unless he gives a bill of divorce and a marriage contract payment to each and every one. And likewise, in the case of one who stole money from one of five people and does not know from which of them he stole, and each one says: He stole from me, he leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and they will decide among themselves how to distribute the money; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare him from transgression; there is no remedy unless he pays each and every one of them.

In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and her son was with them, and later she came back and said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is deemed credible. It is permitted for her to remarry, and she is exempt from levirate marriage. The reason is that she had children when she left, and therefore she retains her presumptive status of one who is exempt from levirate marriage. However, if she said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, i.e., she may not enter into levirate marriage. And yet we are concerned and give some credence to her statement, in case she was actually widowed by a childless husband, and therefore she performs ḥalitza to exempt her from the levirate bond with her yavam, and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

If she went with her childless husband and returned alone and testified: A son was born to me overseas, and she further said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible and may even enter into levirate marriage, as she was presumed to be childless when she left and consequently she retains that presumptive status. However, if she said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is not deemed credible for the purpose of exempting her from levirate marriage, but the court is concerned about her statement. And therefore she must perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

If she said: A yavam was born for me overseas, i.e., when the family left the country her husband did not have a brother, and she claims that in the meantime a brother was born to her husband, and she also said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, in either case she is deemed credible. This is because when she left she was not presumed to require levirate marriage, and the suggestion that her husband now has a brother is based solely on her testimony. However, if she went, she and her husband and her yavam, overseas, and upon her return she said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, as a woman is not deemed credible if she says: My yavam died, in order that she may marry another man. And she is not deemed credible if she says that her sister died, in order that she may enter the house of her sister’s husband. And a man is not deemed credible if he says: My brother died, so that he may enter into levirate marriage with his brother’s wife, and he is not deemed credible when he says that his wife died, in order that he may marry his wife’s sister. The Sages accepted impaired testimony of this kind only when there was a concern about creating a situation of a deserted wife.

Chapter 16

In the case of a woman whose husband and rival wife traveled to a country overseas, and witnesses came and told her: Your husband died, she shall not marry any other man, in case she requires levirate marriage with her brother-in-law, i.e., yavam, in which case she is prohibited from marrying anyone else. And she also shall not enter into levirate marriage until she knows whether she, i.e., her rival wife, is pregnant. If her rival wife bears a child to her late husband, she does not have a levirate bond with her brother-in-law, and she is therefore prohibited from marrying him. If she had a mother-in-law overseas, but her late husband had no brothers, she need not be concerned that a brother to her husband may have been born. But if her mother-in-law departed from her town pregnant, this widow should be concerned that perhaps her late husband now has a brother, with whom she is obligated in levirate marriage. Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even in such a case she need not be concerned and may marry whomever she wishes.

If there are two sisters-in-law married to two childless brothers who testify about their marital status, and this one says: My husband died, and that one says: My husband died, although each one of them is deemed credible with regard to her own status as a widow, this one is prohibited from marrying due to the possibility that the husband of that other sister may be alive, obligating her in levirate marriage, and that one is prohibited from marrying due to the husband of this sister, according to the same rationale. Although each is accorded credibility as to her own husband’s death, the halakha is that sisters-in-law are among the five types of women not accorded credibility with regard to each other’s permissibility to marry because of possible conflicts of interest. If this one has witnesses to her husband’s death, and that one does not have witnesses, then the one who has witnesses is prohibited from marrying, as there are no witnesses to the death of her yavam to exempt her from levirate marriage; but the one who has no witnesses is permitted to marry based on her own testimony that her husband died combined with the witnesses’ testimony exempting her from levirate marriage. If this one has children and that one has no children, then the one with children is permitted to marry, as she herself is deemed credible with regard to her husband’s death, and her children exempt her from levirate marriage. But the one without children is prohibited from marrying, as the death of her yavam has not been corroborated independently of her sister-in-law’s testimony. If there were two additional yevamin with whom these two widows entered into levirate marriage, and then the yevamin died childless, the women are prohibited from marrying, since the concern about an additional living yavam still remains. Rabbi Elazar says: Since these women were permitted to marry the living brothers-in-law, as the testimony of each was deemed credible with regard to her own status, they are permitted, from then on, to marry any man because their statements, taken together, indicate that neither one is obligated to enter into levirate marriage.

One may testify that a man died only if he can testify about seeing the countenance [ partzuf ] of the face with the nose, as this allows one to identify the individual with certainty. Although there are distinguishing marks [ simanim ] on his body and his personal belongings, which appear to indicate his identity, one may not rely on these as identification. Furthermore, one may not testify that a person died until his soul actually departs. And even if one saw him cut open and severely wounded, or crucified, or with a wild animal eating parts of him, he may not testify that he died. Additionally, one may testify to someone’s death only when the body was witnessed up to three days following death and not after that, since the appearance may change due to decomposition. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: One cannot establish general guidelines for this matter because not every person, nor every place, nor every hour is identical. Decomposition is not uniform. It occurs at different rates in different situations.

If a man fell into the water and did not come out, whether the body of water has a visible end or does not have a visible end, his wife is prohibited from remarrying. There is no absolute proof that the man died, as it is possible that he emerged from the water some distance away. Rabbi Meir said: An incident occurred involving a certain person who fell into the Great Cistern and emerged only after three days. This is evidence that sometimes one may survive a fall into water, even when everyone assumes he is dead. Rabbi Yosei said: An incident occurred involving a blind man who descended to immerse for ritual purity in a cave, and his guide descended after him, and they disappeared there, and they remained there long enough for their souls to have departed, and the Sages permitted their wives to marry because they had disappeared into the water and not emerged. And there was another incident in Asya in which they lowered a certain man into the sea on a rope, and when they pulled the rope back to land only his leg came up in their hands, and they were not certain whether he was alive or dead. The Sages said: If his leg was cut from the knee and above, his wife may marry, as he did not survive such a wound; if his leg was cut only from the knee and below, she may not marry.

Even if one heard from the women, who were saying: So-and-so died, this is sufficient in order to testify to his death. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if one heard from the children, who were saying: We are going to eulogize and bury so-and-so, that is also sufficient. Furthermore, one may rely upon someone mentioning that a man died, regardless of whether the speaker intends to testify and thereby allow the man’s wife to remarry or whether he does not intend to offer formal testimony. Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava says: With regard to a Jew who offers this information, it may be relied upon even if he intends for his statement to be considered formal testimony. However, with regard to a gentile, if he intended to testify, his testimony is not considered valid testimony. His statement is relied upon only when he does not intend to state it as formal testimony.

Witnesses may testify that an individual died even if they saw his corpse only by candlelight or by moonlight. And the court may allow a woman to marry based on the statement of a disembodied voice proclaiming that her husband died. There was an incident with regard to a certain individual who stood at the top of a mountain and said: So-and-so, son of so-and-so, from such and such a place died. They went and found no person there, but even so they relied upon the statement and allowed the wife of the individual declared dead to marry. And there was another incident in Tzalmon, a city in the Galilee, where a particular man said: I am so-and-so, son of so-and-so. A snake bit me and I am dying. And they went and found his corpse but could not recognize him, yet they went ahead and allowed his wife to marry based on what he said in his dying moments.

Rabbi Akiva said: When I descended to Neharde’a, in Babylonia, to intercalate the year, I found the Sage Neḥemya of Beit D’li. He said to me: I heard that the Sages in Eretz Yisrael do not allow a woman to remarry based on the testimony of a single witness, except for Yehuda ben Bava. And I told him: That is so. He said to me: Tell the Sages in my name: You know that the country is confounded by army troops, and I cannot come myself. I declare that I received this tradition from Rabban Gamliel the Elder, that the court may allow a woman to remarry based on the testimony of a single witness. Rabbi Akiva continues: And when I came and presented the matter before Rabban Gamliel of Yavne, the grandson of Rabban Gamliel the Elder, he rejoiced at my words and said: We have found a companion who agrees with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, and since his lenient opinion is no longer the opinion of a lone Sage, it may now be relied upon. As a result of this event, Rabban Gamliel remembered that people were murdered in Tel Arza, and Rabban Gamliel then allowed their wives to remarry based on only one witness. And from then onward they established as protocol to allow a woman to remarry based on hearsay testimony, a slave’s testimony, a woman’s testimony, or a maidservant’s testimony. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua say: The court may not allow a woman to remarry based on only one witness. Rabbi Akiva says: The court may not allow a woman to marry based on the testimony of a woman, nor based on the testimony of a slave, nor based on the testimony of a maidservant, nor based on the testimony of close relatives. They said to Rabbi Akiva: Do we not rely upon a woman’s testimony? After all, an incident occurred involving Levites who traveled to Tzoar, the city of date palms. And one of them became ill, and they brought him to an inn [ pundak ] to rest, while they continued on their travels. Upon their return to the inn they said to the innkeeper, who was a woman: Where is our friend? She told them: He died, and I buried him. And based on her testimony they allowed his wife to remarry. And shouldn’t a priestess, or any Jewish woman who testifies that a man died, be deemed as credible as an innkeeper? Rabbi Akiva said to them: When a woman will be as convincing as the innkeeper, then she shall also be deemed credible. The innkeeper brought them his staff, and his bag, and the Torah scroll that was in his possession, thereby providing supporting evidence to reinforce her claim.

Mishnah Ketubot

Chapter 1

A virgin is married on Wednesday and a widow on Thursday. The reason for the former is that twice a week courts convene in the towns, on Monday and Thursday, so that if the husband had a claim concerning the bride’s virginity when consummating the marriage on Wednesday night, he would go early the next day to court and make his claim.

With regard to a virgin, her marriage contract is two hundred dinars, and with regard to a widow, her marriage contract is one hundred dinars. With regard to a virgin who is a widow, a divorcée, or a ḥalutza who achieved that status from a state of betrothal, before marriage and before consummation of the marriage, for all of these their marriage contract is two hundred dinars, and they are subject to a claim concerning their virginity, as their presumptive status of virginity is intact. With regard to a female convert, or a captive woman, or a maidservant, who were ransomed with regard to the captive, or who converted with regard to the convert, or who were freed with regard to the maidservant, when they were less than three years and one day old, their marriage contract is two hundred dinars, as their presumptive status is that of a virgin. Even if they were subject to intercourse when they were younger than that age, the hymen remains intact. And they are subject to a claim concerning their virginity.

With regard to an adult man who engaged in intercourse with a minor girl less than three years old; or a minor boy less than nine years old who engaged in intercourse with an adult woman; or a woman who had her hymen ruptured by wood or any other foreign object, for all these women their marriage contract is two hundred dinars, as their legal status is that of a virgin. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The marriage contract of a woman whose hymen was ruptured by wood is one hundred dinars, as physically, since her hymen is not intact, she is no longer a virgin.

With regard to a virgin who is either a widow, a divorcée, or a ḥalutza who achieved that status from a state of marriage, for all these women their marriage contract is one hundred dinars, and they are not subject to a claim concerning their virginity. Since they were married, even if they did not engage in intercourse with their husband, their presumptive status is that of non-virgins, and the second husband cannot claim that he was misled with regard to their status as virgins. And similarly, with regard to a female convert, or a captive woman, or a maidservant, who were ransomed with regard to the captive, or who converted with regard to the convert, or who were freed with regard to the maidservant, when they were more than three years and one day old, their marriage contract is one hundred dinars and they are not subject to a claim concerning their virginity. When they married, their presumptive status was that of a non-virgin.

A man who eats at the house of his father-in-law in Judea after betrothal and with-out witnesses to attest to the fact that he was not alone with his betrothed is unable to make a claim concerning virginity after marriage because in accordance with the custom in Judea, the assumption is that he secluded himself with her, and the concern is that it was he who engaged in intercourse with her. For both a widow who is an Israelite woman and a widow who is the daughter of priests, her marriage contract is one hundred dinars. A court of priests would collect a marriage contract of four hundred dinars for a virgin daughter of a priest, twice the sum of the standard marriage contract for a virgin, and the Sages did not reprimand them.

There is a case of one who marries a woman and did not find her hymen intact, and she says: After you betrothed me I was raped, and his, i.e., her husband’s, field was inundated, meaning that it is his misfortune that she is not a virgin, as she was raped after betrothal. And he says: No; rather, you were raped before I betrothed you, and my transaction was a mistaken transaction. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible. Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives; rather, this woman assumes the presumptive status of one who engaged in intercourse when she was not yet betrothed and she misled him, until she brings proof supporting her statement.

In a case where she says: I am one whose hymen was ruptured by wood, i.e., she admits that her hymen is not intact but claims that it was not ruptured through intercourse, and the groom says: No; rather, you are one who was trampled by a man, and your hymen was ruptured through intercourse, Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible and her claim is accepted because she certainly knows what actually happened. Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives; rather, she retains the presumptive status of one who was trampled by a man, until she brings proof supporting her statement that her hymen was ruptured by wood.

If people saw a woman speaking to one man, but they did not recognize him, and they said to her: What is the nature [ tivo ] of this man? And she said to them: He is a man called so-and-so and he is a priest; Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives. Rather, she assumes the presumptive status of one who engaged in intercourse with a Gibeonite or with a mamzer, men of flawed lineage who disqualify her from marrying a priest, until she brings proof supporting her statement.

Similarly, if a single woman was pregnant, and people said to her: What is the nature of this fetus? And she says to them: It is from a man called so-and-so and he is a priest; Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is not based on the statement emerging from her mouth that we conduct our lives. Rather, she assumes the presumptive status of one who conceived from a Gibeonite or a mamzer, until she brings proof supporting her statement.

Rabbi Yosei said: There was an incident involving a young girl who descended to fill her jug with water from the spring, and she was raped, and the identity of the rapist was unknown. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: If the majority of the people of the city marry their daughters to members of the priesthood, this young girl may be married to a member of the priesthood.

Chapter 2

With regard to a woman who was widowed or divorced, and is now claiming payment of her marriage contract that is not before the court, and she says: You married me as a virgin, who is entitled to two hundred dinars, and he says: No; rather, I married you as a widow, who is entitled to one hundred dinars, then, if there are witnesses that she went out of her father’s house to her wedding with a hinnuma or with her hair uncovered, in a manner typical of virgins, payment of her marriage contract is two hundred dinars. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Even testimony that there was distribution of roasted grain, which was customary at weddings of virgins, constitutes proof that she is a virgin.

Several disputes between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua were cited previously with regard to the credibility accorded to the respective claims of parties to a dispute. Based on one of those disputes, the tanna adds: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: This field, which is currently in my possession, belonged to your father and I purchased it from him, that he is deemed credible, and his entire claim is accepted. The court accepts not only his admission that it once belonged to the other’s father, but also his statement that he purchased it. This is so, as the mouth that prohibited, i.e., claimed that the field had belonged to the other’s father, is the mouth that permitted, i.e., claimed that he purchased the field. Even if he had not admitted that it had belonged to the other’s father, the field would have remained in his possession. Therefore, his claim is accepted. However, if there are witnesses that the field belonged to his father, and the one who has the field in his possession says: I purchased it from him, he is not deemed credible and his claim is rejected.

With regard to the witnesses who said in their testimony to ratify their signatures in a document: We signed the document and this is our handwriting; however, we were compelled to sign, or we were minors when we signed, or we were disqualified witnesses, e.g., we are relatives of one of the parties, they are deemed credible. Since the document is ratified on the basis of their testimony, it is likewise invalidated on the basis of their testimony. However, if there are other witnesses who testify that it is their handwriting, or if their handwriting emerges on a document from another place, enabling confirmation of their signatures by comparing the two documents, then the witnesses who signed the document are not deemed credible. The document is not invalidated based on their testimony, because ratification of the document is not dependent on their testimony, as their signatures can be authenticated independently.

If this witness whose name is signed on a document says: This is my handwriting and this is the handwriting of my fellow witness, and that witness says: This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow witness, these witnesses are deemed credible and the document is ratified, as together they provide testimony authenticating both signatures. If this witness says: This is my handwriting, and that witness says: This is my handwriting, and neither testifies with regard to the signature of the other, they must add another witness with them who will authenticate the signatures of the two witnesses, as otherwise, each of the witnesses would be testifying with regard to half the sum in the document; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: They need not add another witness with them. Rather, a person is deemed credible to say: This is my handwriting. The testimony of the two signatories about their own signatures is sufficient.

With regard to a woman who said: I was a married woman and now I am a divorcée, she is deemed credible and permitted to remarry, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was married is the mouth that permitted, and established that she is divorced. However, if there are witnesses that she was a married woman, and she says: I am a divorcée, she is not deemed credible. Similarly, with regard to a woman who said: I was taken captive but I am pure, as I was not raped in captivity, she is deemed credible and permitted to marry a priest, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was taken captive is the mouth that permitted and established that she was not defiled. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says: I am pure, she is not deemed credible. And if witnesses came after she married, this woman need not leave her husband.

In a case where witnesses testify that there are two women who were taken captive, and this woman says: I was taken captive but I am pure, and that woman says: I was taken captive but I am pure, they are not deemed credible. And when this woman testifies about that woman that she is pure and vice versa, they are deemed credible.

And likewise, with regard to two men whose lineage is unknown, and this man says: I am a priest, and that man says: I am a priest, they are not deemed credible. And when this man testifies about that man that he is a priest and vice versa, they are deemed credible.

Rabbi Yehuda says: One does not elevate a man to priesthood on the basis of one witness. Two witnesses are required for that purpose. Rabbi Elazar says: When is that the ruling? In a case where there are challengers to his claim that he is a priest. However, in a case where there are no challengers, one elevates a man to priesthood on the basis of one witness. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy High Priest: One elevates a man to priesthood on the basis of one witness.

In the case of a woman who was imprisoned by gentiles due to a monetary offense committed by her husband, once she is released after he pays his debt, she is permitted to her husband, even if he is a priest. There is no concern that they violated her because their objective is to coerce the husband to pay his debt in exchange for her release. Were they to abuse her, it is possible that he would be unwilling to pay. However, if a woman was imprisoned due to a capital offense and sentenced to death, once she is released she is forbidden to her husband even if he is not a priest due to the concern that perhaps her captors violated her, and she acquiesced to one of them. With regard to a city that was conquered by an army laying siege, all the women married to priests located in the city are unfit and forbidden to their husbands, due to the concern that they were raped. And if they have witnesses, even if the witness is a slave, even if the witness is a maidservant, both of whom are generally disqualified as witnesses, they are deemed credible. And a person is not deemed credible to establish his status by his own testimony. Therefore, a woman is not deemed credible to claim that she was not violated. Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav said: I swear by this abode of the Divine Presence that my wife’s hand did not move from my hand from the time that the gentiles entered Jerusalem until they left, and I know for a fact that she was not defiled. The Sages said to him: A person cannot testify about himself. The legal status of one’s wife is like his own status in this regard. Therefore, your testimony is not accepted, and your wife is forbidden to you.

And these are deemed credible to testify in their majority with regard to what they saw in their minority. A person is deemed credible to say: This is my father’s handwriting, and to say: This is my teacher’s handwriting; and to say: This is my brother’s handwriting, even though he never saw their handwriting after reaching majority. § Similarly, one is deemed credible to say: I was reminded of the wedding of so-and-so, who went out with a hinnuma, or with her hair uncovered in a manner typical of virgins, and therefore, her marriage contract is two hundred dinars; and to say that so-and-so would leave school to immerse in order to partake of teruma, and that he would share teruma with us at the threshing floor and therefore he is a priest. Similarly, one is deemed credible to say: This place is a beit haperas, a field with a grave that was plowed, scattering the bones, and rendering the field a place of uncertain ritual impurity; and to say: Until here we would come on Shabbat and thereby determine the Shabbat boundary. However, a person is neither deemed credible to say: So-and-so had a path in this place; nor to say: So-and-so had a tract of land where they would perform the ritual of standing and sitting and deliver a eulogy in that place, thereby attesting that the land belongs to that person. The reason he is not deemed credible in those cases is that full-fledged testimony is required to remove property from the possession of its presumptive owner.

Chapter 3

These are the cases of young women for whom there is a fine paid to their fathers by one who rapes them: One who engages in intercourse with a mamzeret, or with a Gibeonite woman [ netina ], who are given [ netunim ] to the service of the people and the altar (see Joshua 9:27), or with a Samaritan woman [ kutit ]. In addition, the same applies to one who engages in intercourse with a female convert, or with a captive woman, or with a maidservant, provided that the captives were ransomed, or that the converts converted, or that the maidservants were liberated when they were less than three years and one day old, as only in that case do they maintain the presumptive status of a virgin. Similarly, one who engages in intercourse with his sister, i.e., he rapes her, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with his father’s brother’s wife after they divorced, or with a menstruating woman, there is a fine paid. Although there is karet for engaging in relations with any of the women enumerated in this list, one is liable to pay the fine because there is no court -imposed capital punishment. In cases where there is a court-imposed death penalty, the rapist would be exempt from paying the fine.

And these are the cases of young women who do not have a fine paid to their fathers when they are raped or seduced: One who has intercourse with a convert or with a captive woman or with a gentile maidservant, who were redeemed, converted, or emancipated when they were more than three years and one day old, as presumably they are no longer virgins. Rabbi Yehuda says: A captive woman who was redeemed remains in her state of sanctity even though she is an adult, as it cannot be stated that she certainly engaged in intercourse. The mishna resumes its list of the cases of young women who are not entitled to a fine when raped or seduced by the following men: In the case of one who engages in intercourse with his daughter, with his daughter’s daughter, with his son’s daughter, with his wife’s daughter, with her son’s daughter, or with her daughter’s daughter; they do not receive payment of a fine. That is due to the fact that he is liable to receive the death penalty, and that their death penalty is administered by the court, and anyone who is liable to receive the death penalty does not pay money, as it is stated: “And yet no harm follow, he shall be punished” (Exodus 21:22). This verse indicates that if a woman dies and the one who struck her is liable to receive the death penalty, he is exempt from payment.

With regard to a young woman who was betrothed and divorced, and then raped, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: She does not receive payment of a fine for her rape. Rabbi Akiva says: She receives payment of a fine for her rape and her fine is paid to herself, not her father, as since she was betrothed and divorced she is no longer subject to her father’s authority.

The seducer gives the father of his victim three things, and the rapist gives the father four. The mishna specifies: The seducer gives the father payments for humiliation, degradation, and the fine. A rapist adds an addition to his payments, as he also gives payment for the pain. What are the differences between the halakha of a rapist and that of a seducer? The rapist gives payment for the pain, and the seducer does not give payment for the pain. The rapist gives payment immediately, and the seducer does not pay those payments immediately but only when he releases her. The rapist drinks from his vessel [ atzitzo ], i.e., marries the woman he raped, perforce, and the seducer, if he wishes to release her, he releases her.

The mishna clarifies: How does the rapist drink from his vessel? Even if the woman he raped is lame, even if she is blind, and even if she is afflicted with boils, he is obligated to marry her and may not divorce her. However, if a matter of licentiousness is found in her, e.g., if she committed adultery, or if she is unfit to enter the Jewish people, e.g., if she is a mamzeret, he is not permitted to sustain her as his wife, as it is stated: “And to him she shall be as a wife” (Deuteronomy 22:29), from which it is inferred that she must be a woman who is legally suitable for him.

With regard to an orphan who was betrothed and divorced, Rabbi Elazar says: One who rapes her is obligated to pay the fine, as she is a virgin young woman, and one who seduces her is exempt from payment. Because she is an orphan, or because she was betrothed and divorced, she is independent, and by consenting to the seduction she forgoes her right to the fine.

What is humiliation? How is the payment for humiliation during rape or seduction assessed? It is all based on the one who humiliated and the one who was humiliated. The price will vary depending on the lineage of the family of the rape victim and the nature of the attacker. How is her degradation assessed? One considers her as though she were a maidservant sold in the marketplace, and assesses how much she was worth beforehand and how much she is currently worth, after the rape or seduction. The sum of the fine is equal for all people, and the principle is: Any payment that has a fixed sum by Torah law is equal for all people, regardless of the lineage and the physical state of the attacker or the victim.

Any place where there is sale by a father of his minor daughter as a Hebrew maidservant, there is no fine if she is raped. And any place where there is a fine, when a young woman is raped; there is no sale by the father. The Gemara specifies: A minor is subject to sale by her father, and she is not entitled to a fine if she is raped. A young woman is entitled to a fine if she is raped and is not subject to sale. A grown woman is neither subject to sale nor entitled to a fine.

One who says: I seduced the daughter of so-and-so, pays compensation for humiliation and degradation based on his own admission, but does not pay the fine. Similarly, one who says: I stole, pays the principal, the value of the stolen goods, based on his own admission, but does not pay the double payment and the payment four and five times the principal for the slaughter or sale of the sheep or ox that he stole. Likewise if he confessed: My ox killed so-and-so, or: My ox killed an ox belonging to so-and-so, this owner pays based on his own admission. However, if he said: My ox killed a slave belonging to so-and-so, he does not pay based on his own admission as that payment is a fine. This is the principle: Anyone who pays more than what he damaged, the payments are fines and therefore he does not pay based on his own admission. He pays only based on the testimony of others.

Chapter 4

In the case of a young woman who was seduced, the compensation for her humiliation and her degradation and her fine belong to her father. And the same applies to the compensation for pain in the case of a woman who was raped. If the young woman stood trial against the seducer or rapist before the father died, these payments belong to her father, as stated above. If the father died before he collected the money from the offender, the payments belong to her brothers. As the father’s heirs, they inherit the money to which he was entitled before he passed away. However, if she did not manage to stand in judgment before the father died, and she was subsequently awarded the money, the compensation belongs to her, as she is now under her own jurisdiction due to the fact that she no longer has a father. If she stood trial before she reached majority, the payments belong to her father, and if the father died, they belong to her brothers, who inherit the money notwithstanding the fact that she has become a grown woman since the trial. If she did not manage to stand in judgment before she reached majority, the money belongs to her. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if she stood trial in her father’s lifetime but did not manage to collect the payments before the father died, the brothers do not inherit this money, as it belongs to her. By contrast, with regard to her earnings and the lost items that she has found, although she has not collected them, e.g., she had yet to receive her wages, if the father died they belong to her brothers. These payments are considered the property of their father, as he was entitled to them before he passed away.

One who betroths his minor daughter to a man, and the man subsequently divorces her, and her father then betroths her to another, and she is widowed, the payment specified in her marriage contract, even from her second husband, is his, i.e., it belongs to the father. However, if her father married her off and her husband divorced her, and her father then married her to another man and she was widowed, even the payment specified in her marriage contract from her first marriage is hers. Rabbi Yehuda says that the payment specified in the first marriage contract belongs to the father. They said to him: If it was after he married her off, even the first time, her father no longer has authority over her.

In the case of a female convert whose daughter converted with her and later, as a young woman, the daughter engaged in licentious sexual relations when she was betrothed, she is executed by strangulation, not stoning, the method of execution that would be employed had she been born Jewish. She has neither the halakha of being executed at the entrance to her father’s house, as in the case of a woman who was born Jewish who committed this crime, nor does she receive one hundred sela if her husband defamed her by falsely claiming that she had committed adultery. The reason is that the verses state “Israel” (Deuteronomy 22:19, 21) with regard to these halakhot, indicating that these halakhot apply only to those born as Jews. However, if the daughter’s conception occurred when her mother was not yet in a state of sanctity, i.e., when she was still a gentile, but her birth took place when her mother was in a state of sanctity, as her mother converted during her pregnancy, this daughter is punishable by stoning if she committed adultery as a betrothed young woman. However, she has neither the halakha of being executed at the entrance to her father’s house, nor the right to one hundred sela if it turns out that her husband defamed her. If her conception and birth occurred when her mother was in a state of sanctity, i.e., after she converted, she is like a regular Jewish woman in all matters. If a young woman who is betrothed commits adultery and she has a father but does not have an entrance to her father’s house, i.e., if her father does not possess a house of his own, or if she has an entrance to her father’s house but does not have a father, as he has passed away, she is nevertheless executed via stoning, as the requirement that she is to be executed at the entrance to her father’s house is stated only for a mitzva but it is not an indispensable requirement.

A father has authority over his daughter with regard to her betrothal through money, through a marriage document, or through intercourse. Likewise, a father is entitled to items she has found, and to her earnings, and to effect the nullification of her vows, i.e., a father may nullify his daughter’s vows. And he accepts her bill of divorce on her behalf if she is divorced from betrothal before she becomes a grown woman. And although he inherits her property when she dies, e.g., property she inherited from her mother’s family, he does not consume the produce of her property during her lifetime. If the daughter married, the husband has more rights and obligations than her father had before the marriage, as he consumes the produce of her property during her lifetime, and he is obligated to provide her sustenance, her redemption if she is captured, and her burial upon her death. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the poorest man of the Jewish people may not provide fewer than two flutes and a lamenting woman, which it was customary to hire for a funeral, as these too are included in the duties of burial.

Even after she is betrothed, a daughter is always under her father’s authority until she enters her husband’s authority in marriage via the wedding canopy. If the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers to bring her to her husband and the wedding canopy, once she has been handed over she is under the husband’s authority. However, if the father went with the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers went with the husband’s messengers, she is still under the father’s authority, as he has not fully delivered her to the husband’s messengers. If her father sent her with his own messengers and the father’s messengers delivered the woman to the husband’s messengers, from that moment onwards she is under her husband’s authority.

A father is not obligated to provide his daughter’s sustenance. This exposition was expounded by Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya before the Sages in the vineyard of Yavne: Since the Sages instituted that after the father’s death, the sons inherit the sum of money specified in their mother’s marriage contract, and the daughters are sustained from their father’s estate, these the two halakhot are equated: Just as the sons inherit only after the father’s death, not during his lifetime, so too, the daughters are sustained from his property only after their father’s death.

If a husband did not write a marriage contract for his wife, a virgin collects two hundred dinars and a widow one hundred dinars upon divorce or the husband’s death, because it is a stipulation of the court that a wife is entitled to these amounts. If he wrote in her marriage contract that she is entitled to a field worth one hundred dinars instead of the two hundred dinars to which she is actually entitled, and he did not additionally write for her: All property I have shall serve as a guarantee for the payment of your marriage contract, he is nevertheless obligated to pay the full two hundred dinars; and he cannot say that she should take only a mortgaged field for payment of her marriage contract, as it is a stipulation of the court that all his property is held as surety for the entire sum.

Similarly, if he did not write for her in the marriage contract: If you are taken captive I will redeem you and restore you to me as a wife, and in the case of a priestess, i.e., the wife of a priest, who is prohibited to return to her husband if she has intercourse with another man even if she is raped, if he did not write: I will return you to your native province, he is nevertheless obligated to do so, as it is a stipulation of the court.

If a woman was taken captive, her husband is obligated to redeem her. And if he said: I hereby give my wife her bill of divorce and the payment of her marriage contract, and let her redeem herself, he is not permitted to do so, as he already obligated himself to redeem her when he wrote the marriage contract. If his wife was struck with illness, he is obligated to heal her, i.e., to pay for her medical expenses. In this case, however, if he said: I hereby give my wife her bill of divorce and the payment of her marriage contract, and let her heal herself, he is permitted to do so.

If the husband did not write for her in her marriage contract: Any male children you will have from me will inherit the money of your marriage contract in addition to their portion of the inheritance that they receive together with their brothers, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court and therefore takes effect even if it is not explicitly stated.

Likewise, if he omitted from the marriage contract the sentence: Any female children you will have from me will sit in my house and be sustained from my property until they are taken by men, i.e., until they are married, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it too is a stipulation of the court.

Similarly, if he omitted from the marriage contract the clause: You will sit in my house and be sustained from my property all the days you live as a widow in my house, he is nevertheless obligated as though he had written it, as it is a stipulation of the court. The mishna comments: The residents of Jerusalem would write in this manner, that a widow may remain in her husband’s house throughout her widowhood, and the residents of the Galilee would write in this manner as well, like the inhabitants of Jerusalem. In contrast, the residents of Judea would write: Until the heirs want to give you your marriage contract. Consequently, if the heirs wish, they may give her marriage contract to her and release her, and she must find her own living arrangements and provide for herself.

Chapter 5

Although they said as a principle that a virgin collects two hundred dinars as payment for her marriage contract and that a widow collects one hundred dinars, if the husband wishes to add even an additional ten thousand dinars, he may add it. If she is then widowed or divorced, whether from betrothal or whether from marriage, she collects the entire amount, including the additional sum. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: If she is widowed or divorced from marriage, she collects the total amount, but if she is widowed or divorced from betrothal, a virgin collects two hundred dinars and a widow one hundred dinars. This is because he wrote the additional amount for her in the marriage contract only in order to marry her. Rabbi Yehuda says a related halakha with regard to the marriage contract: If he wishes, he may write for a virgin a document for two hundred dinars as is fitting for her, and she may then write a receipt stating: I received one hundred dinars from you. Even though she has not actually received the money, the receipt serves as a means for her to waive half of the amount due to her for her marriage contract. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the financial commitment in the marriage contract is a right due to the wife, which she may waive if she chooses to do so. And similarly, for a widow he may write one hundred dinars in the contract and she may write a receipt stating: I received from you fifty dinars. However, Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited to do this, as anyone who reduces the amount of the marriage contract to less than than two hundred dinars for a virgin or one hundred dinars for a widow, this marital relationship amounts to licentious sexual relations because it is as if he did not write any marriage contract at all.

One gives a virgin twelve months from the time the husband asked to marry her after having betrothed her, in order to prepare herself with clothes and jewelry for the marriage. And just as one gives a woman this amount of time, so too does one give a man an equivalent period of time to prepare himself, as he too needs time to prepare for the marriage. However, in the case of a widow, who already has items available from her previous marriage, she is given only thirty days to prepare. If the appointed time for the wedding arrived and they did not get married due to some delay on the part of the husband, then the woman may partake of his food. And if her husband is a priest, she may partake of teruma, even if she is an Israelite woman. The tanna’im disagree about the permission granted to a priest to sustain his betrothed with teruma before she is married to him. Rabbi Tarfon says: He may give her all of her required sustenance from teruma. During her periods of impurity, e.g., menstruation, when she cannot partake of teruma, she may sell the teruma to a priest and use the proceeds to buy non-sacred food. Rabbi Akiva says: He must give her half of her needs from non-sacred food and half may be from teruma, so that she can eat from the non-sacred food when she is ritually impure.

The mishna continues: A priest who is a yavam, i.e., his brother died childless after betrothing a woman, does not enable his yevama to partake of teruma by virtue of her relationship with him. If she had completed six months of the twelve-month wait for marriage under the aegis of the husband, and then he died, and she waited six more months under the aegis of the yavam ; or even if she completed all of the necessary time under the aegis of the husband except for one day that she was under the aegis of the yavam ; or if she completed all of the necessary time under the aegis of the yavam except for one day that she was under the aegis of the husband, she still may not partake of teruma. This set of rulings, concerning the permission granted a betrothed woman whose wedding date has arrived to partake of teruma, is in accordance with the initial version of the mishna. However, a court that convened after them, in a later generation, said: A woman may not partake of teruma until she has actually entered the wedding canopy.

If one consecrates his wife’s earnings, meaning anything she produces, such as thread that she spins from wool, which, according to the Sages’ ordinance, belongs to her husband, she may work and sustain herself from her earnings, as the consecration is ineffective. However, there is a dispute with regard to the surplus, meaning any earnings she produces in excess of the amount she is required to produce for her husband. Rabbi Meir says: The surplus is consecrated property, and Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler says: The surplus is also non-sacred.

And these are tasks that a wife must perform for her husband: She grinds wheat into flour, and bakes, and washes clothes, cooks, and nurses her child, makes her husband’s bed, and makes thread from wool by spinning it. If she brought him one maidservant, i.e., brought the maidservant with her into the marriage, the maidservant will perform some of these tasks. Consequently, the wife does not need to grind, and does not need to bake, and does not need to wash clothes. If she brought him two maidservants, she does not need to cook and does not need to nurse her child if she does not want to, but instead may give the child to a wet nurse. If she brought him three maidservants, she does not need to make his bed and does not need to make thread from wool. If she brought him four maidservants, she may sit in a chair [ katedra ] like a queen and not do anything, as her maidservants do all of her work for her. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him a hundred maidservants, he can compel her to make thread from wool, since idleness leads to licentiousness. Consequently, it is better for a woman to be doing some kind of work. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who vows that his wife is prohibited from doing any work must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract, since idleness leads to idiocy.

With regard to one who vows that his wife may not derive benefit from marital relations with him, Beit Shammai say: He may maintain this situation for up to two weeks, but beyond that he must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract. Beit Hillel say: He must divorce her if it continues beyond one week. Apropos the husband’s obligation to his wife regarding marital relations, the Gemara mentions other aspects of this issue: Students may leave their homes and travel in order to learn Torah without their wives’ permission for up to thirty days, and laborers may leave their homes without their wives’ permission for up to one week. The set interval defining the frequency of a husband’s conjugal obligation to his wife stated in the Torah (see Exodus 21:10), unless the couple stipulated otherwise, varies according to the man’s occupation and proximity to his home: Men of leisure, who do not work, must engage in marital relations every day, laborers must do so twice a week, donkey drivers once a week, camel drivers once every thirty days, and sailors once every six months. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

A woman who rebels against her husband is fined; her marriage contract is reduced by seven dinars each week. Rabbi Yehuda says: Seven half-dinars [ terapa’ikin ] each week. Until when does he reduce her marriage contract? Until the reductions are equivalent to her marriage contract, i.e., until he no longer owes her any money, at which point he divorces her without any payment. Rabbi Yosei says: He can always continue to deduct from the sum, even beyond that which is owed to her due to her marriage contract, so that if she will receive an inheritance from another source, he can collect the extra amount from her. And similarly, if a man rebels against his wife, he is fined and an extra three dinars a week are added to her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehuda says: Three terapa’ikin.

If someone feeds his wife by means of a third party serving as a trustee, while the husband himself is not living with her for some reason, he may not give her less than two kav of wheat or four kav of barley a week for her sustenance. Rabbi Yosei said: Only Rabbi Yishmael, who was near Edom, allotted her barley. And he must give her half a kav of legumes, and half a log of oil, and a kav of dried figs or the weight of a maneh of fig cakes. And if he does not have these fruits, he must apportion for her a corresponding amount of fruit from elsewhere. And he must give her a bed, a soft mat, and a hard mat. And he must give her a cap for her head, and a belt for her waist, and new shoes from Festival to Festival, i.e., he must buy her new shoes each Festival. And he must purchase garments for her with a value of fifty dinars from year to year. The mishna comments: And he may not give her new clothes, which tend to be thick and warm, in the summer, nor worn garments in the rainy season, as these are too thin and she will be cold. Rather, he should give her clothes at a value of fifty dinars in the rainy season, and she covers herself with these same worn garments in the summer as well. And the leftover, worn clothes belong to her.

In addition to the above, he must give her another silver ma’a coin for the rest of her needs. And she eats with him from Shabbat evening to Shabbat evening. Although he may provide for her sustenance via a third party throughout the week, on Shabbat evening she has the right to eat together with him. And if he does not give her a silver ma’a coin for her needs, her earnings belong to her. And what is the fixed amount that she must earn for him? She must spin wool in the weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which are equivalent to ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee, or the weight of ten sela of the threads of the woof, which are easier to prepare, in Judea, which are equivalent to twenty sela according to the measurements used in the Galilee. And if she is nursing at the time, the required amount is reduced from her earnings and is added to the sum she receives for her sustenance. In what case is this statement, i.e., all these amounts and measurements, said? With regard to the poorest of Jews, i.e., these are the minimum requirements. However, in the case of a financially prominent man, all the amounts are increased according to his prominence.

Chapter 6

A lost object found by a wife and the wife’s earnings belong to her husband. And with regard to her inheritance, the husband enjoys the profits of this property in her lifetime. If she is humiliated or injured, the perpetrator is liable to pay compensation for her humiliation and her degradation, as relevant. This payment belongs to her. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: When it is an injury that is in a concealed part of the woman’s body, she receives two parts, i.e., two-thirds, of the payment for humiliation and degradation, and the husband receives one part, i.e., one-third, as the injury affects him as well. And when it is an injury that is in an exposed part of her body, he receives two parts, as he suffers public humiliation due to her condition, and she receives one part. His payment should be given to him immediately. And with her portion, land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the profits of that property.

In the case of one who pledges to set aside a sum of money for his son-in-law as part of a dowry, and his son-in-law dies before receiving the money, the terms of the dowry do not transfer to the brother, who is now the yavam of the widow. The Sages said: The father-in-law can say to the yavam : To your brother, I wanted to give this money, but to you I do not want to give it.

The mishna addresses another matter. If the woman had pledged to bring in for him one thousand dinars in cash as a dowry, he then pledges, in the marriage contract, that he will give her fifteen hundred dinars against them. That is, he writes in the marriage document that in the event of divorce or his death, he will pay her that greater amount. And against the appraisal of goods such as utensils and other movable items that are included in the dowry, he pledges one-fifth less than the amount of the evaluation. This is because movable property is generally assessed at a value one-fifth higher than the actual value, and he cannot earn any money from these items. If the appraisal is set at one hundred dinars and the property is actually worth one hundred dinars, then since the appraisal is conducted at market value he has a claim to property worth only one hundred dinars. Likewise, he may not record a decreased sum of property. His recorded appraisal of the movable property that she brings into the marriage is one hundred dinars only when she is giving thirty-one sela and one dinar, equal to 125 dinars. This is because the actual value is one-fifth less than the inflated evaluation, as explained. And similarly, he pledges four hundred dinars against her assets only when she is giving five hundred, based on the inflated assessment of their worth, such that the real value is four hundred dinars. In contrast, what the son-in-law pledges according to the amount of the dowry that the bride brings, he pledges one-fifth less in the marriage contract, which is the actual value of the property.

If she pledged to bring him money and not articles to serve as a dowry, her sela, i.e., four dinars, becomes six dinars with respect to the husband’s obligation in the marriage contract. This follows the standard outlined in the previous mishna: The groom increases his obligation by one half since he will profit from this money. Additionally, the groom accepts upon himself to give ten dinars to the account for her needs, for each and every hundred dinars that she brings. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Everything is in accordance with the regional custom.

With regard to one who marries off his daughter with the terms of the dowry unspecified, he must not give her less than fifty dinars. If the bride’s father pledged to bring her into the marriage bare, by saying that he refuses to give her anything, the husband should not say: When I bring her into my house, I will clothe her with my clothing, but not beforehand. Rather, he must clothe her while she is yet in her father’s house, and she enters the marriage with the clothing in hand. And similarly, with regard to a charity administrator who marries off an orphan girl, he must not give her less than fifty dinars. If there are sufficient resources in the charity fund, the charities provide even more for her, furnishing a dowry and her other needs according to her dignity.

With regard to a minor orphan girl whose mother or brothers married her off, even with her consent to a small dowry, she retains her rights to a proper dowry. And thus, if they wrote for her a dowry of one hundred or of fifty dinars, she may, upon reaching majority, exact from her mother, or brothers, or their respective estates the sum of money that is fit to be given to her as a dowry, which is one-tenth of the family’s estate. Even if she agreed to forgo part of this sum as a minor, she may collect it as an adult. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the father married off the first daughter before he died, a dowry should be given to the second daughter in the same manner that he gave one to the first daughter. And the Rabbis say: There is no ready standard, since sometimes a person is poor and then becomes wealthy, or a person is wealthy and then becomes poor, so a family’s allowance for dowries is subject to change. Rather, the court appraises the property and gives her the appropriate sum.

With regard to one who transfers money by means of a third party for his daughter to purchase a field after she marries, is the daughter allowed to assert control over the money? If she says after she marries: My husband is trustworthy for me, so give him the money to buy the property for me, her wishes are not honored. The third party should execute the agency that was entrusted in his power; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: The daughter has authority: And were it only a field and she wanted to sell it, it could be sold immediately. Just as she would have authority to control the field, she may control the money assigned for her. The mishna qualifies: In what case is this statement said? With respect to an adult woman. But with respect to a minor girl, any action of a minor girl is nothing from a legal standpoint; a minor would have no authority in this matter.

Chapter 7

With regard to one who vows and obligates his wife, prohibiting her from benefiting from him or his property, if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days, he must appoint a trustee [ parnas ] to support her. But if the vow will remain in effect for more than this amount of time, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the husband is an Israelite, then if his vow will remain in effect for up to one month, he may maintain her as his wife; and if it will be two months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. But if he is a priest, then he is given extra time: If the vow will remain in effect for up to two months, he may maintain her, and if it will be three months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The reason for this is that it is prohibited for a priest to marry a divorcée, including his own ex-wife, and therefore if he divorces her and later regrets his decision he will not be able to take her back.

One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to taste a particular type of produce, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he is an Israelite, then if the vow will remain in effect for one day he may maintain her as his wife, but if it will be two days he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And if he is a priest, then if the vow will be in effect for two days he may maintain her; for three days he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.

One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to adorn herself with a particular type of perfume, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei says that one must distinguish between different types of women: For poor women, this applies only when he did not establish a set amount of time for the vow, and for wealthy women, who are accustomed to adorning themselves more elaborately, if she is prohibited from doing so for thirty days, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.

With regard to one who vows and obligates his wife not to go to her father’s house, when her father is with her in the same city, if the vow is to be in effect up to one month, he may maintain her as his wife. If the vow is for two months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And when her father is in a different city, if the vow is to be in effect until at most one pilgrim Festival, i.e., until the next pilgrim Festival, he may maintain her as his wife. Although the wife often visits her parents during the Festival, she is capable of refraining one time. For three Festivals, however, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.

Additionally, one who vows and obligates his wife not to go to a house of mourning to console the mourners, or to a house of feasting for a wedding, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Why is this so? Because it is as if he were locking a door in front of her. And if he claimed he did so due to something else, meaning he is concerned about inappropriate conduct there, he is permitted to do so. If he said to her: The vow will be void on condition that you tell so-and-so what you told me, or what I told you, or on condition that she fill something up and pour it into the refuse, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara will explain all of these cases thoroughly.

And these are examples of women who may be divorced without payment of their marriage contract: A woman who violates the precepts of Moses, i.e., halakha, or the precepts of Jewish women, i.e., custom. The Mishna explains: And who is categorized as a woman who violates the precepts of Moses? This includes cases such as when she feeds him food that has not been tithed, or she engages in sexual intercourse with him while she has the legal status of a menstruating woman, or she does not separate a portion of dough to be given to a priest [ ḥalla ], or she vows and does not fulfill her vows. And who is considered a woman who violates the precepts of Jewish women? One who, for example, goes out of her house, and her head, i.e., her hair, is uncovered; or she spins wool in the public marketplace; or she speaks with every man she encounters. Abba Shaul says: Also one who curses his, i.e., her husband’s, parents in his presence. Rabbi Tarfon says: Also a loud woman. And who is defined as a loud woman? When she speaks inside her house and her neighbors hear her voice.

In the case of one who betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her, and it was subsequently discovered that there are vows incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed. This is because if the condition is not fulfilled, the betrothal is nullified. If he married her without specification and it was subsequently discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract, since he discovered a deficiency about which she had not initially informed him. However, this does not invalidate the betrothal, since he did not make any explicit condition. If he betrothed her on condition that she has no blemishes, and it was subsequently discovered that she did have blemishes, she is not betrothed. But if he married her without specification, and it was subsequently discovered that she had blemishes, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract. The mishna clarifies what qualifies as a blemish: All of the blemishes that are listed in tractate Bekhorot involving significant physical deformities that disqualify priests from service similarly disqualify betrothal of women, as a mistaken transaction.

If she has blemishes and she is still in her father’s house, as she has not yet gotten married, the father must bring proof that these blemishes appeared on her after she became betrothed, and therefore his field was flooded, i.e., it is the husband’s misfortune, since she developed the problem after the betrothal. But if she has already gotten married and entered the husband’s domain when her blemishes are discovered, the husband must bring proof that she had these blemishes before she was betrothed, and consequently the transaction of betrothal was a mistaken transaction. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. But the Rabbis say: In what case is this statement, that a husband can claim to have found blemishes in his wife, on account of which he wants to void the betrothal, said? With regard to hidden blemishes. But with regard to visible blemishes, he cannot claim that the betrothal was in error, as he presumably saw and accepted them before the betrothal. And if there is a bathhouse in the city, where all the women go to bathe, even with regard to hidden blemishes he cannot make this claim, because he examines her through the agency of his female relatives. He would have asked one of his relatives to look over the woman he is about to marry.

In the case of a man who developed blemishes after marriage, the court does not force him to divorce his wife. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to minor blemishes. However, with regard to major blemishes, which will be defined later in the Gemara, the court does force him to divorce her.

And these are the defects for which the court forces him to divorce her: One afflicted with boils; or one who has a polyp; or one who works as a gatherer, or one who works as a melder of copper, or one who works as a tanner of hides, all of whose work involves handling foul-smelling materials. Whether he had these defects before they got married, or whether they developed after they got married, the court forces them to divorce. And with regard to all of these, Rabbi Meir said: Even though he stipulated with her ahead of time that he suffers from this particular ailment or this is his line of work, she can nevertheless demand a divorce and say: I thought I could accept this issue but now I realize I cannot accept it. And the Rabbis say: If she initially agreed she must accept it against her will, apart from a situation in which her husband is afflicted with boils. In that case the Rabbis concede that he must divorce her, because the disease consumes his flesh when they engage in marital relations. The mishna relates an additional account: An incident occurred in Sidon involving a certain tanner who died childless, and he had a brother who was also a tanner. This brother was required to enter into levirate marriage with the widow. The Sages said: She can say: I could accept living with a tanner for your brother but I cannot accept it for you, and therefore he must perform ḥalitza with her.

Chapter 8

With regard to a woman to whom property was bequeathed before she was betrothed, and she was then betrothed, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that she may sell or give the property as a gift, and the transaction is valid. However, if the property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed, Beit Shammai say: She may sell it as long as she is betrothed, and Beit Hillel say: She may not sell it. Both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that if she sold it or gave it away as a gift, the transaction is valid. Rabbi Yehuda said that the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman herself through betrothal, will he not acquire the property from the moment of their betrothal? Why, then, is her transaction valid? Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property that she inherited after marriage, we are ashamed, because it is unclear why she cannot sell it, as it is hers; and you also seek to impose upon us a prohibition with regard to the old property that she owned beforehand? If the property was bequeathed to her after she was married, both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that if she sold the property or gave it away, the husband may repossess it from the purchasers. If she inherited the property before she was married and then was married, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold or gave the property away, the transaction is valid. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya said that the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman through marriage, will he not acquire the property? Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property we are ashamed, and you also seek to impose upon us a prohibition with regard to the old property?

Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between one type of property and another type of property: Property that is known to the husband she may not sell once she is married, and if she sold it or gave it away, the transaction is void. Property that is unknown to the husband she may not sell, but if she sold it or gave it away, the transaction is valid.

If money was bequeathed to a woman as an inheritance while she was married, land is acquired with it, and the husband consumes the produce of the land while the principal remains hers. If she inherited produce that is detached from the ground, it is considered like money; therefore, land is acquired with it and he consumes the produce of the land. With regard to produce that is attached to the ground, Rabbi Meir says: One evaluates how much the land is worth with the produce, and how much it is worth without the produce, and the difference between these sums is the surplus value that belongs to the woman. Land is then acquired with the surplus and he consumes the produce. And the Rabbis say: That which is attached to the ground is his, as he is entitled to the produce from her property and he may therefore eat from it. And that which is detached from the ground is hers, like all other money she brings to the marriage, and land is acquired with it and he consumes the produce.

Rabbi Shimon says: In a case where his right is superior upon her entrance to the marriage, his right is inferior upon her exit if he divorces her. Conversely, in a case where his right is inferior upon her entrance, his right is superior upon her exit. How so? With regard to produce that is attached to the ground, if she married while owning such produce, upon her entrance it is his, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and upon her exit, when he divorces her, it is hers, as it is considered part of her property. But in the case of produce that is detached from the ground, upon her entrance it is hers, and if such produce is detached before their divorce, upon her exit it is his, as he was already entitled to all the produce of her property.

If elderly slaves or maidservants were bequeathed to her, they are sold and land is acquired with them, and the husband consumes the produce of the land. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She need not sell these slaves and maidservants, because they are assets of her paternal family, and it would be shameful to the family if they were sold to others. Likewise, if old olive trees or grapevines were bequeathed to her, they are sold and land is acquired with them, and he consumes the produce. Rabbi Yehuda says: She need not sell them, because they are assets of her paternal family. With regard to one who pays expenditures for his wife’s property in an effort to improve it, if he paid a large amount in expenditures and ate only a small amount of produce before he divorced her, or if he paid a small amount in expenditures and ate a large quantity of produce, that which he spent he has spent, and that which he ate he has eaten. Therefore, none of it need be returned. However, if he paid expenditures for the property and did not eat any part of it, he takes an oath with regard to how much he paid and then takes his expenditures.

When a married man dies childless, his brother, the yavam, is obligated to perform levirate marriage or release the widow, the yevama, through a ceremony known as ḥalitza. With regard to a widow waiting for her yavam who had property bequeathed to her, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that she may sell or give this property away, and the transaction is valid. If this woman died, what should they do with her marriage contract and with the property that comes and goes with her, i.e., her usufruct property? Beit Shammai say: Since she was not yet remarried, the husband’s heirs, such as his brothers or father, divide the property with her father’s heirs. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status, and therefore the marriage contract is in the possession of the husband’s heirs, as they are responsible for its payment. As for the property that comes and goes with her, it is in the possession of the heirs of the woman’s father, as it belongs to the woman.

If his deceased brother left money as part of his estate, land to be used as a lien on her marriage contract is acquired with it, and the yavam consumes the produce. Similarly, if the deceased brother left produce that is detached from the ground, land is acquired with it and the yavam consumes the produce. If he left behind produce that is attached to the ground, Rabbi Meir says: One evaluates the properties to determine how much they are worth with the produce, and how much they are worth without the produce. And as for the surplus, which is the value of the produce, land is acquired with it and the yavam consumes the produce. And the Rabbis say: Produce that is attached to the ground is his. Therefore, it is not used in the purchase of land, but the yavam may eat it. As for the produce that is detached from the ground, which is not mortgaged to her marriage contract, whoever takes possession first has acquired it. If the yavam takes possession of the property first, he has acquired it and may use it as he wishes, but if she is first, land is acquired with it and he consumes the produce. After the yavam has married her, her legal status is that of his wife in every sense, except that the responsibility for payment of her marriage contract is carried out through mortgaging the property of her first husband, not that of the yavam.

Therefore, the yavam may not say to her: Your marriage contract is placed on the table. He may not set aside a designated sum of money for this payment. Rather, all of the first husband’s property is mortgaged for her marriage contract as long as he has not divorced her. And similarly, in general a man may not say to his wife: Your marriage contract is placed on the table. Rather, all his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract. If the yavam divorced her after performing levirate marriage, she has only her marriage contract, as she does not retain any rights to the rest of her first husband’s property. If he subsequently remarried her, she is like all women, and she has nothing but her marriage contract. In this case, the property of her first husband is no longer pledged for the payment of her marriage contract.

Chapter 9

One who writes for his wife in a document the declaration: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, thereby relinquishing his rights to her possessions, may nevertheless consume the produce of her property in her lifetime. And if she dies before him, he inherits from her. If this is so, if he still retains his rights, why would he write for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property? The result of this declaration is that if she sold or gave away her property, the transaction is binding, and he cannot claim it. If he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property or with its produce, he may not consume the produce of her property during her lifetime, but if she dies he still retains the right to inherit from her. Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce. Although he has waived his rights to consume the produce itself, it becomes her usufruct property, whose yield belongs to him. He remains entitled to the produce of the produce until he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property, or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce forever. If he writes for her: I have no legal dealings or involvement with your property or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce, in your lifetime and after your death, he may not consume the produce of her property in her lifetime. And if she dies, he does not inherit from her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she dies, he does inherit from her, because he stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, a husband inherits from his wife by Torah law, and whoever stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.

With regard to one who died and left behind a wife, and a creditor to whom he owed money, and heirs, all of whom claim payment from his property, and he had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others, Rabbi Tarfon says: The deposit or the loan will be given to the weakest one of them, i.e., the one most in need of the money. Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment. If the halakha is that it belongs to one party, one follows the halakha and leaves aside considerations of mercy. Rather, the halakha is that the money will be given to the heirs, as all people who wish to exact payment from orphans require an oath before they collect their debt, but the heirs do not require an oath. They therefore have a more absolute right than the others to their father’s property.

If the deceased left behind produce that was detached from the ground, whoever first took possession of them as compensation for what was owed, whether the creditor, the wife, or the heirs, acquired the produce. If the wife acquired this produce and it was worth more than the payment of her marriage contract, or the creditor acquired this produce and it was worth more than the value of his debt, what should be done with the surplus? Rabbi Tarfon says: It will be given to the weakest one of them, either the creditor or the wife, depending on the circumstances. Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment. Rather, it will be given to the heirs, as all people who wish to exact payment from orphans require an oath before they collect their debt, but the heirs do not require an oath.

If there is one who establishes his wife as a storekeeper in his store, or if he appointed her as a steward to handle his property and workers, this one, i.e., the husband, can administer an oath to her, having her state that she did not appropriate any of his possessions, whenever he wants. Rabbi Eliezer says: He can administer an oath even with regard to the products of her spindle and for her dough, which are matters related to the household, and not her function as a storekeeper.

If one wrote to his wife in the marriage contract: I do not have the right to administer a vow or an oath upon you, he cannot administer an oath to her.However, he can administer an oath to her heirs, and to those who come on her authority, either as her representatives or because they purchased her marriage contract. If the husband wrote: I do not have the right to administer a vow or an oath upon you, or upon your heirs, or upon those who come on your authority, he cannot administer an oath to her; not to her, nor her heirs, nor those who come on her authority. But the husband’s heirs can administer an oath to her, and to her heirs, and to those who come on her authority. If he wrote: Neither I, nor my heirs, nor those who come on my authority have the right to administer a vow or an oath upon you, or upon your heirs, or upon those who come on your authority, he cannot administer an oath to her or to them; not he, nor his heirs, nor those who come on his authority may administer an oath, not to her, nor to her heirs, nor to those who come on her authority.

If a woman who was exempted from an oath by her husband went from her husband’s grave, immediately after her husband’s death, to her father’s house, without handling her late husband’s property, or in a case where she returned to her father-in-law’s house and did not become a steward over the property at all throughout this period, then the heirs cannot administer an oath to her with regard to her actions in their father’s lifetime, as the husband exempted her from an oath to the heirs. And if she became a steward, the heirs may administer an oath to her about the future, i.e., anything she did with the property after the death of her husband, but they cannot administer an oath to her with regard to what took place in the past, during her husband’s lifetime.

A woman who vitiates her marriage contract by acknowledging that she has received partial payment can collect the rest of her marriage contract only by means of an oath. Similarly, if one witness testifies that her marriage contract is paid, she can collect it only by means of an oath. In any case where she seeks to claim her marriage contract from the property of orphans, or from liened property that has been sold to a third party, or when not in her husband’s presence, she can collect it only by means of an oath.

The mishna elaborates: With regard to a woman who vitiates her marriage contract, how so, how does this situation arise? If her marriage contract was a thousand dinars, and her husband said to her: You already received your marriage contract, and she says: I received only one hundred dinars, she has made a partial admission and can collect her marriage contract only by means of an oath. If one witness testifies that her marriage contract is paid, how so? If her marriage contract was a thousand dinars, and her husband said to her: You already received your marriage contract, and she says: I did not receive payment, and one witness testifies about the marriage contract that it is paid, she can collect it only by means of an oath. From liened property, how so? If while they were married the husband sold his property to others, and she comes to collect her marriage contract from the purchasers, she can collect it only by means of an oath. She may seize property from the purchasers because her husband’s obligation undertaken in the marriage contract predates his obligation in the document of sale. From the property of orphans, how so? If the husband died and left his property to orphans, and she comes to collect her marriage contract from the orphans, she can collect it only by means of an oath. Or when not in his presence, how so? If he went to a country overseas and sent her a bill of divorce, so that she collects her marriage contract when not in his presence, she can collect it only by means of an oath. Rabbi Shimon says: Whenever she claims payment of her marriage contract, the heirs administer an oath to her. And if she does not claim payment of her marriage contract, the heirs do not administer an oath to her.

In a case where a woman produced a bill of divorce and it was unaccompanied by a marriage contract, and she demands that her husband pay her marriage contract, she collects payment of her marriage contract, and he cannot claim that he already paid it. If she produced a marriage contract, and it was unaccompanied by a bill of divorce, and she says: My bill of divorce was lost, and he says: Just as your bill of divorce was lost, so too my receipt for the payment of your marriage contract was lost; and likewise, in a case of a creditor who produced a promissory note after the Sabbatical Year, unaccompanied by a document that prevents the Sabbatical Year from forgiving an outstanding debt [ prosbol ], and demanded payment of the debt, these debts may not be collected. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: From the time of danger and onward, after the ruling authorities banned the performance of mitzvot, people would destroy a bill of divorce or a prosbol immediately after they were signed, a woman collects payment of her marriage contract without a bill of divorce, and a creditor collects debts owed to him without a prosbol. The assumption is that due to the circumstances these documents were written but were not preserved. If a woman had two bills of divorce and two marriage contracts as a result of her divorce and remarriage to the same man, the fact that she is in possession of these documents proves that she was never paid for her first marriage contract, and she collects two marriage contracts. If she was in possession of two marriage contracts and only one bill of divorce; or if she had one marriage contract and two bills of divorce; or if she had a marriage contract, a bill of divorce, and witnesses to her husband’s death after their remarriage, she collects payment of only one marriage contract. This is because there is a presumption that one who divorces his wife and remarries her, remarries her with the intention of using her first marriage contract, and she agrees that she collects payment of only the original document. This is the presumption, unless he wrote another marriage contract for her. In the case of a minor who was married off by his father, the wife’s marriage contract that the minor wrote is valid even after the husband comes of age. He cannot excuse himself by saying that it was drafted when he was a minor, as it is on this condition, the terms of this marriage contract, that he maintained her as his wife upon his maturity. Similarly, in the case of a convert whose wife converted with him, the marriage contract that she had as a gentile is valid, for on this condition he maintained her as his wife.

Chapter 10

In the case of one who was married to two women and died, the first woman he married precedes the second in collecting the payment specified in her marriage contract if there are insufficient funds to pay both, because her document is dated earlier. So too, if the wives died after their husband before they received payment for their marriage contracts, the heirs of the first wife precede the heirs of the second wife in collecting these payments. If he married a first woman and she subsequently died, and he then married a second woman and he subsequently died, the second wife and her heirs precede the heirs of the first wife. This is because the marriage contract of the second wife is considered a debt that the estate of the deceased is required to pay, whereas the claim of the heirs of the first wife is based on the stipulation in the marriage contract that male children inherit their mother’s marriage contract. Heirs receive their share of the estate only from property that remains after all debts have been settled.

In the case of one who was married to two women and the women died, and subsequently he died, and the orphans of one of the wives are now seeking to collect the payment specified in their mother’s marriage contract, i.e., the marriage contract concerning male children, but there is only enough in the estate to pay the value of the two marriage contracts, the marriage contract concerning male children cannot be collected, and the sons distribute the estate equally among themselves according to the biblical laws of inheritance. If there was a surplus of a dinar left there, in the estate, beyond the value of the two marriage contracts, then these sons collect their mother’s marriage contract and those sons collect their mother’s marriage contract, and the remaining property valued at a dinar is divided equally among all the sons. If the orphans who are entitled to receive the marriage settlement of greater value say: We inflate the value of our father’s property by a dinar, i.e., we agree to evaluate the property we will receive for our mother’s marriage settlement at a value higher than the market value so that there will be a dinar left in the estate after the two marriage contracts have been paid, so that they can collect their mother’s marriage contract, the court does not listen to them. Rather, the value of the property is appraised in court, and the distribution of the estate is based on that evaluation.

If there was potential inheritance there, meaning that there was no surplus of a dinar in the existing properties of the estate, but there was property that was expected to be paid to the estate and which would increase the overall value of the estate so that there would be a surplus of a dinar after the payment of the marriage contracts, these properties are not considered to be in the possession of the estate in determining the total value of the estate. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if there is property that does not serve as guarantee for a loan, i.e., movable property, there in the estate, it does not have any impact on the value of the estate. The marriage contracts concerning male children are not collected unless there is property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land, exceeding the value of the two marriage contracts by at least one additional dinar.

In the case of one who was married to three women and died and the marriage contract of this wife was for one hundred dinars and the marriage contract of this second wife was for two hundred dinars, and the marriage contract of this third wife was for three hundred, and all three contracts were issued on the same date so that none of the wives has precedence over any of the others, and the total value of the estate is only one hundred dinars, the wives divide the estate equally. If there were two hundred dinars in the estate, the one whose marriage contract was for one hundred dinars takes fifty dinars, while those whose contracts were for two hundred and three hundred dinars take three dinars of gold each, which are the equivalent of seventy-five silver dinars. If there were three hundred dinars in the estate, the one whose marriage contract was for one hundred dinars takes fifty dinars, the one whose contract was for two hundred dinars takes one hundred dinars, and the one whose contract was for three hundred dinars takes six dinars of gold, the equivalent of one hundred and fifty silver dinars. Similarly, three individuals who deposited money into a purse, i.e., invested different amounts of money into a joint business venture: If they incurred a loss or earned a profit, and now choose to dissolve the partnership, they divide the assets in this manner, i.e., based upon the amount that each of them initially invested in the partnership.

In the case of one who was married to four women and died, the woman he married first precedes the woman he married second in claiming her marriage contract, the second precedes the third, and the third precedes the fourth. And the first wife takes an oath to the second that she has taken nothing from the jointly owned properties of the estate in an unlawful manner, and the second takes an oath to the third, and the third to the fourth. The fourth wife is paid her share without having to take an oath. Ben Nanas says: Should she gain this advantage merely because she is last? After all, she too is being paid from property that would otherwise go to the orphans. Rather, she too is not paid without an oath. However, if all of the marriage contracts were issued on the same day, whichever wife’s marriage contract precedes that of another, even by a single hour, has acquired the right to be paid first. And so, the practice in Jerusalem was that they would write the hours when the documents had been signed on the documents, in order to enable the document holder to demonstrate that his or her document preceded that of another. If all the contracts were issued in the same hour and there is only one hundred dinars from which to pay all of them, all of the women divide the money equally.

In a case of one who was married to two women and sold his field, and the wife whom he married first wrote to the purchaser: I do not have any legal dealings or involvement with you, then the second wife, who did not relinquish her claim to repossess this property, may appropriate the field from the purchaser as payment of her marriage contract. This is because the property was liened for the payment of her marriage contract before it was sold to this purchaser. Then, the first wife can appropriate the field from the second as payment for her marriage contract, since her marriage contract predates that of the second wife. The purchaser can then appropriate the field from the first wife, due to the fact that she relinquished her rights vis-à-vis the purchaser. They continue to do so according to this cycle [ ḥalila ] until they agree on a compromise between them. And so too, with regard to a creditor, and so too, with regard to a female creditor.

Chapter 11

A widow is sustained from the property of orphans. Her earnings belong to them, and they are not obligated to see to her burial. Her heirs, who inherit her marriage contract, are obligated to see to her burial.

A widow, whether widowed from betrothal or from marriage, sells her husband’s property when not in court. Rabbi Shimon says: A widow from marriage sells when not in court, but a widow from betrothal may sell only in court, because she does not receive sustenance from her husband’s property. She receives only her marriage contract, and anyone who does not receive sustenance may sell only in court.

If a woman sold all or part of her marriage contract, or if she mortgaged all or part of her marriage contract, or if she gave away as a gift all or part of her marriage contract to another, then she sells the remainder only in court. And the Rabbis say: She sells even four or five times, and she is not obligated to sell everything at one time. And despite selling several times, she sells for her sustenance even when not in court, and she writes in the bill of sale: I sold this for my sustenance.And a divorcée, who does not receive sustenance, sells only in court.

In the case of a widow whose marriage contract was worth two hundred dinars and she sold property that was worth one hundred dinars for two hundred dinars, or if she sold property worth two hundred dinars for one hundred dinars, she has received payment of her marriage contract and can demand nothing more. If her marriage contract was worth one hundred dinars and she sold property worth one hundred dinars and a dinar for one hundred dinars, the sale is void because she sold property that did not belong to her. Even if she says: I will return the additional dinar to the heirs, the sale is nevertheless void. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Actually, the sale is valid. It is not considered an invalid sale until there is an error so extreme that had there been no mistake, there would have remained in the field an area required for sowing nine kav of seed, the smallest area of land worth working. In that case, the orphans can reasonably claim that they are unwilling to give up on the land that belongs to them. However, if the error is less than this, it is enough if she returns the remainder to the orphans. And in the case of a garden, the sale is void if, had there been no error, there would have remained an area required for sowing a half- kav of seed, as this is the smallest size of garden worth working. Or, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, an area required for sowing a quarter- kav of seed. If her marriage contract was worth four hundred dinars, and she sold property to this one for one hundred dinars, and she sold property to that one for one hundred dinars, and again to a third one, and she sold property to the last one worth one hundred dinars and a dinar for only one hundred dinars, the sale of the last property is void, as the price she charged was below the market value. And all of the others, their sale is valid, as they were sold for the correct price.

The halakha with regard to the assessment of the judges of the value of a piece of property in order to sell it is as follows: Where they decreased the price by one-sixth of its market value or added one-sixth to its market value, their sale is void. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Their sale is valid. If it were so that the sale is void, then what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? However, if they made a document of inspection, i.e., an announcement that people should come to inspect the field and bid on the property, then even if they sold property worth one hundred dinars for two hundred dinars, or sold property worth two hundred dinars for one hundred dinars, their sale is valid, as the transaction was agreed upon and done publicly.

An orphan girl who was married off by her mother or brother before reaching the age of majority may refuse to continue living with her husband upon reaching the age of majority, thereby retroactively annulling their marriage. In the case of one who refuses to continue living with her husband in this manner; and in the case of a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative by rabbinic law; and in the case of a sexually underdeveloped woman [ ailonit ], who is incapable of bearing children, each of these women is not entitled to payment of a marriage contract; and they are not entitled to remuneration for the produce that the husband consumed; and they are not entitled to sustenance; and they are not entitled to their worn clothes that were brought in to the marriage as part of their dowry and became worn out during the marriage. If, from the start, he married her with the understanding that she is an ailonit, then she is entitled to payment of a marriage contract. In the case of a widow who married a High Priest; or a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza and later married a common priest; or a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [ mamzeret ] who married an Israelite; or a Gibeonite woman who married an Israelite; or a Jewish woman who married a Gibeonite or a mamzer, although each of these unions is prohibited by Torah law, the woman is still entitled to payment of a marriage contract.

Chapter 12

One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter from another man for five years, is obligated to sustain her daughter for five years. If, in the course of those five years they were divorced and the woman was married to another man, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter for five years, he too is obligated to sustain her for five years. The first husband may not say: When she comes to me, I will sustain her. Rather, he brings her sustenance to her, to the place where her mother lives. And likewise, both of them may not jointly say: We will sustain the girl as one in a partnership. Rather, one sustains her, providing her with food, while the other gives her the monetary value of the sustenance.

If the daughter was married during this period, her husband provides her with the sustenance customarily provided by a husband for his wife, and the two men obligated to sustain her due to agreements with her mother provide her with the monetary value of the sustenance. If the two husbands of the mother died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she, their wife’s daughter, whom they agreed to sustain, is sustained even from liened property that was sold. This is due to the fact that her legal status is like that of a creditor, given that he is contractually obligated to support her. The perspicacious ones would write an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years only as long as you are with me. Then they would not be obligated to sustain a girl who is not their daughter when they are no longer married to the girl’s mother.

In the case of a widow who said: I do not want to move from my husband’s house, but instead I wish to remain there, the heirs are not able to say to her: Go to your father’s house and we will sustain you. Rather, they sustain her in her husband’s house and they give her living quarters befitting her dignity. However, if she said: I do not want to move from my father’s house, and you should bring me my support there, the heirs are able to say to her: If you are living with us, you will have sustenance from us, but if you are not living with us, you will not have sustenance from us. If she argued that she does not wish to live in her deceased husband’s house because she is young, and they, the heirs, are also young, and it is improper for them to be living in the same house together, then they sustain her and she stays in her father’s house.

As long as a widow is living in the house of her father and is being supported by her husband’s heirs, she may always collect payment of her marriage contract, even after many years. As long as she is living in the house of her husband, she may collect payment of her marriage contract until twenty-five years later, at which point she may no longer collect the payment. This is because there is enough time in twenty-five years for her to do favors and give to others, thereby spending the resources of the orphans, until what she has spent equals the value of her marriage contract. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who said it in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And the Rabbis say the opposite: As long as she is residing in the house of her husband she may always collect payment of her marriage contract, since during this time the heirs are caring for her and she is therefore embarrassed to sue them for payment of her marriage contract. However, as long as she is in the house of her father she may collect payment of her marriage contract until twenty-five years later, and if by then she has not sued for it, it is assumed that she has waived her rights to it. If she died, her heirs mention her marriage contract up until twenty-five years later.

Chapter 13

There were two prominent judges who issued decrees in Jerusalem, Admon and Ḥanan ben Avishalom. Ḥanan states two matters about which the Sages disagreed; Admon states seven. The mishna elaborates: With regard to the case of one who went overseas and his wife is demanding sustenance, claiming that her husband left her without funds and she is seeking a ruling that would provide for her from her husband’s property, Ḥanan says: She takes an oath at the end of their marriage, i.e., when she learns that her husband died. The oath is to the effect that he did not leave her any funds when he departed overseas, as she is claiming full payment of her marriage contract. And she does not take an oath at the outset of his trip overseas, when she demands support soon after his departure. The sons of High Priests disagreed with Ḥanan’s opinion and said: She takes an oath both at the outset and at the end. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said: The halakha is in accordance with their statement, i.e., that of the sons of the High Priests. Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said that Ḥanan spoke well: She takes an oath only at the end.

In the case of a husband who went overseas, and someone arose and sustained his wife in his absence, and upon the husband’s return the provider demands from him the money he spent on his wife, Ḥanan says: He has lost his money, i.e., the husband is not obligated to repay him, as the provider acted of his own free will and was not instructed to do so by the husband. The sons of High Priests disagreed with Ḥanan’s opinion and said: The man swears how much he spent on behalf of the woman, and he takes that sum from the husband. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said that the halakha is in accordance with their statement. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said: Ḥanan spoke well in this case, as this man is like one who placed his money on the horn of a deer in midflight, i.e., he has no reasonable expectation of reimbursement.

Admon states a dissenting opinion to that of the Rabbis in seven cases. The mishna elaborates: With regard to one who died and left behind both sons and daughters, when the estate is large the sons inherit the property and the daughters are provided with sustenance from it. And with regard to a small estate, which is insufficient to provide for both the sons and the daughters, the daughters are provided with sustenance and the sons have neither inheritance nor sustenance, and therefore, if they have no other means with which to support themselves, they must go round begging at the doors. Admon says: Because I am a male, will I lose out? Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon.

The mishna cites another case involving a dispute between Admon and the Rabbis. With regard to one who claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the other admits to the claim of pitchers but not the oil, Admon says: Since he made a partial admission to the claim, he takes an oath swearing that he owes only what he has admitted to and no more. And the Rabbis say: The partial admission in this case is not of the same type as the claim, as the claim specified oil and the admission referred to pitchers. Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon.

The mishna states another case involving a ruling of Admon. With regard to one who promises and apportions money for his son-in-law as a dowry, and he went bankrupt, and he now claims that he does not have the money to fulfill his financial obligations, the betrothed woman can be left to sit unwed in her father’s house until her head turns white. If the groom does not wish to marry without a dowry he cannot be forced to do so, as the father failed to fulfill his promise. Admon says that she can say: Had I apportioned the money myself and broken my promise, I would agree to sit until my head turns white. However, now that my father was the one who apportioned the dowry, what can I do? Either marry me or release me by a bill of divorce. Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon.

With regard to one who contests ownership of a field, claiming that a field under the control of someone else actually belongs to him, and the claimant himself is signed as a witness on the bill of sale to that other person, Admon says: His signature does not disprove his claim of ownership of the property, as it is possible that the claimant said to himself: The second person is easier for me, as I can reason with him, but the first owner, who sold the field to the current holder, is more difficult to deal with than him. The claimant might have been afraid to protest against the first one, who is perhaps violent, and therefore he was even willing to sign as a witness to transfer the field to the control of someone more amenable to his ensuing protest. And the Rabbis say: He has lost his right to contest ownership, as he signed a bill of sale that states that the field belongs to the present holder. If he established that field as a marker for another field, everyone agrees that he has lost his right. In other words, if the claimant wrote a document concerning another field and in that document he listed the first field as a boundary marker and described it as belonging to someone else, even Admon concedes that he has lost his right, as he had no reason to say it belonged to someone else other than his belief this was in fact the case.

With regard to one who went overseas and in the meantime the path leading to his field was lost, e.g., the path he used to reach his land was taken over by the owner of the field through which it passed, so that its exact position is now unknown, Admon says: Let him go to his field by the shortest possible route. And the Rabbis say: Let him buy himself a path from an owner of a neighboring field at whatever price he can, even if it is one hundred dinars [ maneh ], or let him fly through the air.

With regard to one who produces a promissory note against another, and this borrower produced a bill of sale dated after the promissory note that states that the lender sold him a field of his, Admon says that the borrower can say: Were I really indebted to you, you should have collected your loan when you sold me the field, and you would not have needed to sell it. And the Rabbis say: This is no proof, as it is possible that this lender was perspicacious, as he sold the borrower the land for a good reason, because now he can take the field as collateral from him in lieu of the outstanding loan.

With regard to two people who each produced a promissory note of a monetary debt against the other, Admon says: The one holding the note with the later date can say to the first: If I owed you money, how is it that you are borrowing from me? You should have sued to collect your debt. This is proof that your document is a forgery. And the Rabbis say: This one collects his promissory note, and that one collects his promissory note.

Eretz Yisrael is divided into three separate lands with regard to marriage: Judea, Transjordan, and the Galilee. If a man marries a woman in one of these lands he may not remove her from one town to another town in another of these lands or from one city to another city, i.e., he cannot compel her to move to another land. However, in the same land one may remove her from one town to another town or from one city to another city. However, even within the same land one may not force his wife to move from a town to a city, nor from a city to a town. The mishna adds: One may remove his wife from a noxious residence to a pleasant residence, even if it is in another land. However, one may not compel his wife to move from a pleasant residence to a noxious residence. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may also not remove her from a noxious residence to a pleasant residence, because a pleasant residence tests the individual, i.e., one accustomed to certain environments can suffer even in more comfortable living quarters.

All may force their family to ascend to Eretz Yisrael, i.e., one may compel his family and household to immigrate to Eretz Yisrael, but all may not remove others from Eretz Yisrael, as one may not coerce one’s family to leave. Likewise, all may force their family to ascend to Jerusalem, and all may not, i.e., no one may, remove them from Jerusalem. Both men and women may force the other spouse to immigrate to Eretz Yisrael or to move to Jerusalem. The mishna lists other halakhic distinctions between various geographic locations: If one married a woman in Eretz Yisrael and divorced her in Eretz Yisrael, and the currency of the sum in the marriage contract was not specified, he gives her the sum of her marriage contract in the currency of Eretz Yisrael. If one married a woman in Eretz Yisrael and divorced her in Cappadocia, where the currency holds greater value, he gives her the currency of Eretz Yisrael. If one married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in Eretz Yisrael, he likewise gives her the currency of Eretz Yisrael. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He gives her the currency of Cappadocia. Everyone agrees that if one married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in Cappadocia, he gives her the currency of Cappadocia.

Mishnah Nedarim

Chapter 1

When an individual takes a vow, he renders an object forbidden to himself or to others as though it were a sacrificial offering; this parallels the act of consecrating an offering, which also renders an item forbidden for personal use by means of a verbal declaration. The most direct expression of a vow is when an individual says: This object is forbidden to me, or to others, like an offering. Additionally, the mishna states that all substitutes for the language of vows are like vows. Consequently, if one states that an object is forbidden to him like a konam instead of like an offering [ korban ], the vow takes effect, as konam is a substitute term for the word korban (see 10a). Similarly, substitutes for the language of dedications are like dedications, substitutes for the language of oaths are like oaths, and substitutes for the language of nazirite vows are like nazirite vows. Therefore, if one declared a ḥerekh instead of a dedication [ ḥerem ], a shevuta instead of an oath [ shevua ], or proclaimed that he was becoming a nazik instead of a nazirite [ nazir ], his statement takes effect. With regard to one who says to another: I am avowed from you, or: I am separated from you, or: I am distanced from you, and he then says: That which I eat of yours, or: That which I taste of yours, even though he did not explicitly state that he is taking a vow or specify the nature of the vow, the object of his vow is nevertheless forbidden. His intention is understood based on his incomplete statement, known as an intimation of a vow, and his vow therefore takes effect. However, if he says: I am ostracized from you, which does not clearly declare any matter to be prohibited, Rabbi Akiva was uncertain about this halakha but was inclined to rule stringently about this and consider it a vow prohibiting the speaker from deriving benefit from his fellow. The mishna continues to explain the rules of intimations of vows. If an individual states that he accepts an obligation upon himself like the vows of the wicked, he has vowed with regard to becoming a nazirite, or bringing an offering, or taking an oath. This is considered a real formulation of a vow, just as the wicked customarily take vows. If he says: Like the vows of the virtuous, he has not said anything, because virtuous people do not generally take vows. If he says: Like their gift offerings, he has vowed with regard to becoming a nazirite or bringing an offering.

In the case of one who says to another that a certain object is konam, konaḥ, or konas, these expressions are substitutes for the term offering [ korban ], and the vow takes effect. Ḥerek, ḥerekh and ḥeref ; these are substitutes for the term indicating a dedication [ ḥerem ] to the Temple treasury. Nazik, naziaḥ, and paziaḥ ; these are substitutes for the term naziriteship [ nazir ]. Shevuta, shekuka, or one who vows with the term mota, these are substitutes for the term oath [ shevua ].

If one says to another: That which I eat of yours shall be considered laḥullin, it is interpreted as though he said: La ḥullin, not non-sacred, and the food is thereby forbidden to him. Similarly, if he said that food shall be considered not valid or not dekhi, i.e., not ritually pure, or if he said the food shall be considered an offering that has become ritually impure, left over [ notar ], or piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, it is forbidden. If one says that food shall be considered like the lamb of the daily offering, like the animals designated as offerings and kept in special enclosures, like the wood of the altar, like the fires on the altar, like the altar, like the Sanctuary, or like Jerusalem, or if he took a vow with any of the accessories of the altar, although he did not explicitly mention that the food should be like an offering, it is considered a vow that associates a different item with an offering. Rabbi Yehuda says: One who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem, instead of saying that it shall be considered like Jerusalem, has not said anything.

With regard to one who says: An offering, a burnt-offering, a meal-offering, a sin-offering, a thanks-offering, or a peace-offering, and adds: That which I eat of yours, the vow takes effect and the food is forbidden. Rabbi Yehuda renders the food permitted in all these cases. If one says: The offering, like an offering, or an offering, and adds: That which I will eat of yours, the food is forbidden. If he says: That which I will not eat of your shall be for an offering, Rabbi Meir renders the food forbidden. One who says to another: It is konam for me for my mouth to speak with you, or: It is konam for me for my hand to work with you, or: It is konam for me for my foot to walk with you, it is prohibited for him to speak with, work with, or walk with the other individual.

Chapter 2

And these are the vows in which the one who takes the vow attempts to create a prohibition on an item by associating it with an item in an ineffective manner, rendering the vow void and leaving the item permitted: If one says: That which I will eat of yours will be non-sacred [ ḥullin ]; or: That which I will eat of yours will be like pig meat; or: Like an object of idol worship; or: Like the hides of animal offerings whose hearts were removed as a form of idol worship, and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from those animals; or: Like animal carcasses and animals with a wound that will cause them to die within twelve months [ tereifot ]; or: Like non-kosher repugnant creatures and non-kosher creeping animals; or: Like the ḥalla of Aaron, the first priest, or like his teruma ; in all these cases, the food is permitted. Although none of these items may be eaten, they are forbidden by Torah law, not by means of a vow. Therefore, it is impossible to extend their prohibition to other items by means of a vow that associates them with those items. With regard to a man who says to his wife: You are hereby to me like my mother, i.e., deriving benefit from you should be forbidden to me like engaging in sexual intercourse with my mother, dissolution is broached with him by suggesting a different extenuation, i.e., a halakhic authority suggests other, extenuating circumstances that enable the dissolution of the vow. Although this vow does not take effect either, as engaging in sexual intercourse with one’s mother is prohibited by Torah law, by rabbinic law this is treated like an actual vow and requires dissolution by a halakhic authority, so that he will not take genuine vows lightly. With regard to one who says: Sleeping is forbidden for me as if it were an offering [ konam ], thereby prohibiting himself from sleeping; or: Speaking is konam for me; or: Walking is konam for me; or one who says to his wife: Engaging in sexual intercourse with you is konam for me, if he violates the vow he is in violation of the prohibition “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3). If one says: I take an oath that I will not sleep, or: That I will not speak, or: That I will not walk, this activity is prohibited to him.

As taught earlier (10a), one of the primary methods of taking a vow is by invoking an offering. The mishna provides several examples where invoking the term korban is not effective. If one says: An offering [ korban ] that I will not eat of yours, or: This offering [ ha korban ] that I will eat of yours, or: That which I will not eat of yours is not an offering [ la korban ], the food is permitted. If one says: An oath that I will not eat of yours, or: This is an oath that I will eat of yours [ she’okhal lekha ], or: Not an oath that I will not eat of yours, the food is forbidden. This rule, that oaths can render actions, which do not have actual substance, either prohibited or obligatory, is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows, which do not take effect with regard to matters that do not have actual substance. And there is also a stringency of vows vis-à-vis oaths. How so? With regard to one who said: Making a sukka is konam for me, or: Taking a lulav is konam for me, or: Donning phylacteries is konam for me, in the case of vows, the items are rendered forbidden, and he may not perform the mitzva until the vow is dissolved. However, in the case of similar oaths, these items are permitted, as one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot.

There is a vow within a vow. It is possible to impose an additional prohibition, by means of a vow, on an item that is already forbidden by means of a vow. But there is no oath within an oath. If one takes an oath twice with regard to the same action, the second oath does not take effect. How so? If one said: I am hereby a nazirite if I eat, and then repeated: I am hereby a nazirite if I eat, and then he ate, he is obligated to observe naziriteship for thirty days for each and every one of the vows, as both vows took effect. However, if he said: I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, and repeated: I hereby take an oath that I will not eat, and then he ate, he is liable to bring an offering for only one violation of an oath.

Unspecified vows are treated stringently, but their specification, if specification is necessary, is treated leniently. How so? If one said: This item is prohibited to me like salted meat, or: This item is prohibited to me like the wine used for libations, if he vowed in reference to meat or libations of a peace-offering, i.e., if he claimed that his intention was that the item will be forbidden to him like the salted meat of an offering, or like wine that is used for libations on the altar, it is forbidden, as he associated the item of the vow with an item forbidden by means of a vow, i.e., the offering. If he claims that he vowed in reference to meat or libations of idol worship, i.e., that the item will be like the salted meat of an offering for an idol, or like wine that is used for libations as idol worship, it is permitted, as the item of the vow was associated with an item forbidden by the Torah. By enabling the one who took the vow to later clarify his intent, the vow is treated leniently. And if the vow was without specification, i.e., the one who took the vow did not specify whether his intention was to associate the item with an offering for Heaven or to associate the item with idol worship, it is forbidden. Similarly, if one said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, if his intention was that it would be like a dedication to Heaven, which is a form of consecration, it is forbidden. And if his intention was that it would be like a dedication to priests, whereby one pledges his asset as a gift to priests, it is permitted, as this type of gift is not forbidden at all. And if he said it without specification, it is forbidden. Likewise, if he said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like tithes, if he took a vow with the intention that it would be like the animal tithe, it is forbidden, as the item of the vow was associated with an item forbidden by a vow. And if his intention was that it will be like the tithe of the granary, i.e., grain that is given to the Levites and has no sanctity, it is permitted. And if he said it without specification, it is forbidden. Similarly, if he said: This item is hereby forbidden to me like teruma, if he took a vow with the intention that it would be like the collection of the Temple treasury chamber [ terumat halishka ], which is a tax for the communal offerings, it is forbidden, his vow was associated with an item forbidden by a vow. And if his intention was that it would be like teruma of the granary that is given to the priests, it is permitted, as teruma is not an item forbidden by a vow. And if the vow was taken without specification, it is forbidden. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: Unspecified teruma in Judea is forbidden. However, in the Galilee it is permitted, as the people of the Galilee are unfamiliar with the collection of the chamber. When they say teruma they are referring to the teruma allotted to the priests, which is familiar to them. Conversely, unspecified dedications in Judea are permitted, but in the Galilee they are forbidden, as the people of the Galilee are unfamiliar with dedications allotted to the priests, so when they say dedication they are referring to dedication to Heaven.

One who took a vow by associating an item with a dedication [ ḥerem ], saying: This item is hereby forbidden to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, and then said: I took a vow only with the intention that it would be like a sea net [ ḥermo shel yam ] that is used to catch fish; or one who took a vow by associating an item with an offering, and then said: I took a vow only with reference to offerings to kings, i.e., a gift for a king, not an offering to God. Or one who said: I am hereby an offering myself [ atzmi ], and then said: I took a vow only with reference to a bone [ etzem ] that I set aside for myself to vow with, as atzmi means both myself and my bone, i.e., he set aside a bone so as to pretend to take a vow upon himself; or one who said: Deriving benefit from me is konam for my wife, and then said: I took a vow only with regard to my first wife whom I divorced, not with regard to my current wife. For all of the above vows, those who took them do not need to request of a halakhic authority to dissolve them, as the speaker interpreted the vows in a manner that caused them not to take effect at all. However, if they requested dissolution, apparently due to their being uncertain of their explanations, the court punishes them and treats them stringently and the vows are not dissolved. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: These vows are not treated stringently. Rather, dissolution is broached with them by suggesting a different extenuation, i.e., the halakhic authority suggests extenuating circumstances that undermine the vow but do not pertain to its wording. And we teach them that they should not take this kind of vow in the future, in order that they will not take vows lightly.

Chapter 3

The Sages dissolved four types of vows without the requirement of a request to a halakhic authority: Vows of exhortation, vows of exaggeration, vows that are unintentional, and vows whose fulfillment is impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control. The mishna explains: Vows of exhortation are those by which one encourages another using vow terminology that is exaggerated. How so? One was selling an item and said: I will not lower the price for you to less than a sela, as that is konam, forbidden as if it were an offering, for me. And the other one, the buyer, says: I will not raise my payment to you to more than a shekel, as that is konam for me. In this case, one may assume that both want to complete the deal at three dinars, and they did not intend to vow but only exaggerated for purposes of bargaining. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Even one who wants to take a vow prohibiting another from benefiting from him, but only in order that he should eat with him, not intending to take an actual vow, should say to him at the outset: Any vow that I take in the future is void. And this statement is effective, provided that he remembers at the time of the vow that his intent at the beginning of the year was to render it void.

Vows of exaggeration that the Sages dissolved without a request to a halakhic authority, as described in the first mishna in the chapter, include the following examples. If one said concerning a certain item: It is konam for me if I did not see on this road as many people as those who ascended from Egypt, or if he said: It is konam for me if I did not see a snake as large as the beam of an olive press, in these cases the speaker did not intend to vow but used hyperbole to demonstrate a point, and it is understood by others that the expression is not to be taken literally. What are examples of vows that are unintentional that are dissolved, as taught at the beginning of the chapter? One who vows: This loaf is forbidden to me as if it were an offering [ konam ] if I ate or if I drank, and then he remembers that he ate or drank. Or, one who vows: This loaf is konam for me if I will eat or if I will drink, and he then forgets and eats or drinks. Also, one who said: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife because she stole my purse or she hit my son, and then it became known that she had not hit him or it became known that she had not stolen. The mishna lists another example of an unintentional vow: One who saw people entering his courtyard and eating figs, and because he did not want them to do so he said: The figs are forbidden to you like an offering. And then it was found that his father and brother were in the group, and there were others with them as well, and certainly he did not intend to take a vow prohibiting his father and brother from eating the figs. In such a case, Beit Shammai says: They, his father and brother, are permitted to eat the figs, and those others that were with them are prohibited from doing so. And Beit Hillel says: Both these and those are permitted to eat the figs, as will be clarified in the Gemara.

What are examples of vows impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control. They are not binding and do not require dissolution.

One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [ ḥaramin ]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. Beit Shammai say: One may vow in such a case, although he has no intention that his words be true, using every means of taking a vow or making a prohibition in order to mislead those people, except for by taking of an oath, due to its more stringent nature. And Beit Hillel say: One may mislead them even by taking an oath. Beit Shammai say: When negotiating with a robber, one should not initiate by taking a vow for him unless the robber does not believe his claim, in which case he may take a vow to reinforce his words. And Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate by taking a vow to him. Beit Shammai say: One may take a vow only about that which the robber compels him to take a vow but may not add to it. And Beit Hillel say: One may take a vow even about that which he does not compel him to take a vow. The mishna explains the previous statement: How so? If the extortionist said to him that he should say: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife if the vow is not true, and he said: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife and my children, Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted to benefit from him, since the extortionist demanded that he take that vow, but his children, whom he added of his own accord, are prohibited from benefiting from their father. And Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted to benefit from him.

If one sees his property in danger of being destroyed, and takes a vow stating, for example: These saplings are like an offering if they are not cut down, or: This garment is like an offering if it is not burned, these items are consecrated if the saplings remain standing or if the garment is not burned. In addition, they are subject to the possibility of redemption just as other items consecrated for maintenance of the Temple may be redeemed. But if one said: These saplings are like an offering until they are cut down, or: This garment is like an offering until it is burned, then they are not subject to the possibility of redemption.

In the case of one who takes a vow that he will not derive benefit from seafarers, he is permitted to benefit from those who live on dry land. But if he takes a vow not to derive benefit from those who live on dry land, he is also prohibited from deriving benefit from seafarers, because seafarers are included within the category of those who live on dry land. The mishna now defines seafarers: Not like those that travel by ship from Akko to Jaffa, which is a short trip, but rather one who customarily departs [ lefaresh ] to distant locations, e.g., foreign countries.

One who takes a vow not to derive benefit from those who see the sun is prohibited from deriving benefit even from the blind, although they see nothing. This is because he meant only to include all those that the sun sees, i.e., shines upon with light.

One who takes a vow not to derive benefit from those that have dark heads [ sheḥorei harosh ] is prohibited from deriving benefit from those that are bald, although they have no hair at all, and from the elderly who have white hair. This is because the term is not to be understood in its simple meaning but rather in a broader manner. But he is permitted to derive benefit from women and from children, because only men are called: Those with dark heads.

One who takes a vow not to derive benefit from those that are born [ yeludim ] is permitted to derive benefit from those who will be born [ noladim ] after the time of the vow. But if one takes a vow not to derive benefit from those who will be born, he is also prohibited from deriving benefit from those that are already born at the time of the vow. Rabbi Meir permits deriving benefit even from those that are already born at the time of the vow because he holds that the one taking the vow was precise in prohibiting only those that will be born. And the Rabbis say: He intended to include with this expression only one whose nature is to be born. Therefore, both those who will be born and those who were already born are included in the vow.

One who takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who rest on Shabbat is forbidden to him is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, and he is also prohibited from deriving benefit from Samaritans [ Kutim ] because they are also Shabbat observers. One who takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who eat garlic on Shabbat night is forbidden to him is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, and he is also prohibited from benefiting from Samaritans. However, if one takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who ascend to Jerusalem is forbidden to him, he is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, but he is permitted to benefit from Samaritans because they do not ascend to Jerusalem, but rather, to Mount Gerizim.

If one says: The property of the descendants of Noah is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, he is permitted to derive benefit from a Jew but prohibited from deriving benefit from the nations of the world. If one says: The property of the offspring of Abraham is forbidden to me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, he is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew but permitted to derive benefit from the nations of the world. If one says: The property of a Jew is forbidden to me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, he may purchase items from a Jew for more than the market price and may sell items to a Jew for less than the market price, so that he does not derive benefit from the transactions. If one says: Benefit from me is forbidden to a Jew, he may purchase items from a Jew for less than the market price and may sell items to a Jew for more than the market price, so that he does not derive benefit from the transactions. But although this would be permitted, they do not listen to him, i.e., people will generally not agree to deal with him in a manner that causes them a loss in every transaction. If one says: The property of a Jew is forbidden to me, and for that reason I will not benefit from them, and my property is forbidden to a Jew and they will not benefit from me, in this case he may benefit from the nations of the world but not from a Jew, and a Jew may not benefit from him. If one says: Benefiting from those who are uncircumcised is konam for me, he is permitted to derive benefit from uncircumcised Jews because they are not regarded as uncircumcised, but he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the circumcised of the nations of the world. Conversely, if he said: Benefiting from those who are circumcised is konam for me, he is prohibited from deriving benefit even from uncircumcised Jews and he is permitted to derive benefit from the circumcised of the nations of the world, as the term uncircumcised is used only to name the nations of the world, as it is stated: “For all the nations are uncircumcised, but all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart” (Jeremiah 9:25), and it says: “And this uncircumcised Philistine shall be” (I Samuel 17:36), and it says: “Lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph” (II Samuel 1:20). These verses indicate that ordinary gentiles are referred to as uncircumcised, regardless of whether they are actually circumcised. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: The foreskin is repulsive, as is evident from the fact that the wicked are disgraced through it, as it is stated: “Behold, the days come, says the Lord, that I will punish all them that are circumcised in their uncircumcision: Egypt, and Judah, and Edom, and the children of Ammon, and Moab, and all that have the corners of their hair polled, that dwell in the wilderness; for all the nations are uncircumcised, but all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart” (Jeremiah 9:25), which indicates that there is an element of disgrace associated with the foreskin. Rabbi Yishmael says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that thirteen covenants were sealed with regard to it, for the word covenant appears thirteen times in the biblical passage that discusses circumcision (Genesis, chapter 17). Rabbi Yosei says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that it overrides the strict halakhot of Shabbat, as circumcision is performed even if the eighth day following the birth of a son occurs on Shabbat, despite the fact that circumcision violates the prohibition of labor on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Great is the mitzva of circumcision, as is evident from the fact that the punishment of Moses the righteous for not circumcising his son when he was capable of doing so was not postponed for even a full hour (see Exodus 4:24–26). Rabbi Neḥemya says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that it overrides the prohibitions associated with leprosy. If leprosy is found on the foreskin of an infant, although it is generally prohibited to cut the afflicted area, it is permitted to do so to perform the mitzva of circumcision. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that despite all the mitzvot that Abraham our Patriarch did, he was not called wholehearted until he circumcised himself, as it is stated at the time that the mitzva was given to him: “Walk before Me and you should be wholehearted” (Genesis 17:1). Alternatively, so great is the mitzva of circumcision that if not for it the Holy One, Blessed be He, would not have created His world, as it is stated: “Thus says the Lord: If My covenant be not with day and night, I would not have appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:25), and the covenant that exists day and night is the covenant of circumcision, as it is always found on the person’s body.

Chapter 4

The difference between one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow [ hamuddar hana’a meḥaveiro ] and one for whom benefit from his food is forbidden by vow concerns only setting foot on the other person’s property and borrowing from that person utensils that one does not use in preparation of food but for other purposes. Those two benefits are forbidden to the former but permitted to the latter. Therefore, with regard to one for whom benefit from another’s food is forbidden by vow, that person may not lend him utensils used in the preparation of food, e.g., a sieve, or a strainer, or a millstone, or an oven. However, he may lend him a garment, or a finger ring, or a cloak, or nose rings, as these are not used in the preparation of food. However, he may not lend them to one for whom benefit from him is forbidden by vow. And with regard to any item that one does not use in the preparation of food, in a place where one rents items of that kind, that item is forbidden. Meaning, one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow is prohibited from borrowing this type of item from the one who vowed and imposed the prohibition. This is because one can use the money saved by borrowing the item rather than renting it to purchase food.

With regard to one prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another, if that other person chooses, he may contribute the half-shekel to the Temple on his behalf, and repay his debt, and return his lost item to him, and the one prohibited from benefiting is not considered to have benefited from him. In a place where one takes payment for returning a lost item, that benefit should fall into the category of consecrated Temple property.

The mishna proceeds to list other tasks that one may perform for someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him. And he separates his teruma and his tithes, provided that it is with the knowledge and consent of the owner of the produce. And he sacrifices for him the bird nests, i.e., pairs of birds, pigeons and turtledoves, of zavin (see Leviticus 15:13–15); the bird nests of zavot (see Leviticus 15:28–30); the bird nests of women after childbirth (see Leviticus 12:6–8); sin-offerings; and guilt-offerings. And he teaches him midrash, halakhot, and aggadot, but he may not teach him Bible. However, he may teach his sons and daughters Bible. And with regard to one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow, that other person may feed his wife and children, although the one who is bound by the vow is obligated in their support and benefits when another supports them. And he may not feed his animal, whether it is a kosher animal or whether it is a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Eliezer says: He may feed the non-kosher animal, and he may not feed the kosher animal. The Rabbis said to him: What is the difference between kosher and non-kosher animals in this respect? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: The kosher animal’s being belongs to Heaven, and the animal’s body is the property of its owner, as he can eat it. Therefore, the owner benefits directly when another feeds his animal. And a non-kosher animal, both its being and its body belong to Heaven, as it is prohibited for its owner to eat its meat. The Rabbis said to him: The non-kosher animal too, its being belongs to Heaven, and its body is the property of its owner, because if the owner chooses, he sells it to gentiles or feeds it to dogs.

In the case of one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow and he enters his house to visit him, he stands there but does not sit. And that other person heals him with a cure of the nefesh but not a cure of mamon. And with regard to another person who is prohibited from deriving benefit from him, one may bathe with him in a large bath [ ambati ], in which his presence does not affect the other person. However, he may not bathe with him in a small bath, as his presence moderates the temperature of water if it is too hot or too cold, thereby benefiting the other person. And he may sleep with him in one bed. Rabbi Yehuda says: That is permitted during the days of summer, but he may not sleep with him in one bed during the rainy season, i.e., the winter, because he benefits him by warming the bed. And he may recline with him on a divan even during the rainy season, as no benefit is involved. And he may eat with him at the same table, but not from a common platter from which several people eat, as if one leaves food on the platter, the other derives benefit from him. However, he may eat with him from a platter that returns to the host, as everyone takes a small portion and leaves food on the platter. No benefit is derived. Since there is enough food for everyone, none of the diners receives part of another’s portion. One may neither eat with him from the large vessel of food placed before the laborers, nor may he work with him in the same row in a vineyard; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He may work in the same row with him provided that he is at a distance from him. If he is close, the other would derive forbidden benefit from him.

In the case of one for whom benefit from another is forbidden, before, i.e., a year other than the Sabbatical Year, he may neither enter the field of that other person, nor eat from the produce that leans out of the field, even if he does not enter the field. And during the Sabbatical Year, when the produce of the trees is ownerless, he may not enter his field; however, he may eat from the growths that lean out of the field, as the produce does not belong to the other person. If one vowed before the Sabbatical Year that benefit from another’s food is forbidden for him, he may enter his field; however, he may not eat of the produce. And during the Sabbatical Year, he may enter the field and may eat the produce.

In the case of one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow, that other person may neither lend an item to him nor borrow an item from him. Similarly, he may neither lend money to him nor borrow money from him. And he may neither sell an item to him nor purchase an item from him. One said to another: Lend me your cow. The other person said to him: My cow is not available. The one seeking to borrow the cow responded angrily: Plowing my field with this cow is konam forever. If it was his typical manner to plow the field himself, then it is prohibited for him to plow his field with that cow but it is permitted for every other person. If it is not his typical manner to plow the field himself, and he has others plow for him, it is prohibited for him and for every other person to plow his field with that cow, because his intent was to render benefit from plowing with this cow forbidden.

In the case of one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow and who does not have anything to eat, the one from whom benefit is forbidden goes to the shopkeeper and says to him: So-and-so vowed that benefit from me is forbidden for him and I do not know what I will do. After grasping his intent, the shopkeeper gives food to the one for whom benefit is forbidden, and then the shopkeeper comes and takes payment for the food from that one who spoke to him. Similarly, if the house of one for whom benefit is forbidden by a vow was to be built, his fence to be erected, or his field to be harvested, and laborers were required but he had no money to hire them, the one from whom benefit is forbidden goes to the laborers and says to them: Benefit from me is forbidden by vow to so-and-so and I do not know what I will do. And the laborers perform those tasks with him, and come and take payment for their labor from that person who approached them.

If the one who vowed to render benefit from him forbidden and the one for whom benefit is forbidden were traveling together along the road and the one for whom benefit is forbidden does not have anything to eat, the one who from whom benefit is forbidden gives food to one other person as a gift, and it is permitted for that person for whom benefit is forbidden to eat the food because it no longer belongs to the one from whom benefit is forbidden. If there is no other person with them, the one who vowed places the food on the nearest rock or on the nearest fence and says: These food items are hereby rendered ownerless and are available to anyone who wants them. Then that person for whom benefit is forbidden takes and eats the food. Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so.

Chapter 5

Partners who vowed not to derive benefit from one another are prohibited from entering into a courtyard that they jointly own, since each one has a portion in it and benefits from the share owned by the other, thereby leading to a violation of the vow. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: It is permitted for both to use the courtyard, as it can be said that since each has a portion in the courtyard; this one enters into his own portion and that one enters into his own portion. And all agree that they are both prohibited from setting up a mill or an oven in the jointly owned courtyard, or to raise chickens in it. If only one of the partners was prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the other, he may not enter the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: He can say to the partner: I am entering into my own portion and I am not entering into your portion. And the court forces the one who took such a vow to sell his portion so that he does not cause the other to transgress.

If someone from the marketplace is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from one of the partners, he may not enter a courtyard of the partners, since it belongs partly to the one from whom he may not benefit. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: He can say to him: I am entering into the portion of another resident of the courtyard and I am not entering your own portion since it does not belong entirely to you.

With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he has a bathhouse or an olive press in the city that is leased out and available for public use, if the one who took the vow has a right to profits from usage in the property, i.e., he retains some rights in the property and has not leased them out completely, it is forbidden for the one who took the vow to use it. If he has no right of usage in the property, it is permitted. With regard to one who says to another: Entering your house is konam for me, or: Purchasing your field is konam for me, then if he, i.e., the owner of the house or field, dies or sells the house to another, it is permitted for the one who took the vow to enter the house or purchase the field, as it is no longer in the possession of the prior owner. But if he said: Entering this house is konam for me, or: Purchasing this field is konam for me, then even if the owner dies or sells it to another, it is forbidden.

If someone says to another: I am hereby forbidden to you like an item dedicated to the Temple, then the one prohibited by the vow is prohibited from benefiting from the possessions of the one who took the vow. If someone says: You are hereby forbidden to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, then the one who took the vow is prohibited from benefiting from the possessions of the other. If he says: I am hereby forbidden to you and you are hereby forbidden to me like an item dedicated to the Temple, both are prohibited from benefiting from the possessions of the other. But it is permitted for both of them to benefit from the objects belonging to those who ascended from Babylonia, i.e., common property of the nation as a whole, which is not considered to be the property of any individual. But it is prohibited for them to benefit from objects of that city, which are considered to be jointly owned by all its residents.

And what are examples of objects belonging to those who ascended from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, and the Temple Courtyards, and the water cistern in the middle of the road. And what are objects of that city? For example, the city square, and the bathhouse, and the synagogue, and the ark which houses the Torah scrolls, and the Torah scrolls. And one who writes, i.e., signs, his portion of the shared objects of that city over to the Nasi. Rabbi Yehuda says: This is the halakha with regard to both one who writes his portion over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person. Rabbi Yehuda adds: What is the difference between one who writes it over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person? That one who writes it to the Nasi need not formally confer possession of the item, whereas one who writes it over to a common person must confer possession to him. And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one must confer possession, and they specifically mentioned the Nasi only so as to speak in the present, addressing situations that were prevalent. Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee do not have to write their portion over to the Nasi because their fathers already wrote it for them, declaring that all the public property belongs to him.

With regard to one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he does not have anything to eat, the other may give the food to someone else as a gift and he is then permitted to eat it. The mishna recounts: An incident occurred involving someone in the city of Beit Ḥoron whose father had vowed not to derive benefit from him, and the son was marrying off his own son and wanted his father to be able to participate in the wedding meal. And he therefore said to another: The courtyard where the wedding will take place and the wedding meal are given before you as a gift, but only so that my father will come and eat with us at the meal. The recipient said: If they are mine, they are all hereby consecrated to Heaven, i.e., the Temple, and are forbidden to everyone. The son said to him in anger: And did I give you my property so that you should consecrate it to Heaven? He, the recipient, said to him: You gave me your property only so that you and your father would eat and drink and thereby appease each other, and the sin of transgressing the vow would be hung on his, i.e., my, head, as I enabled the transgression. The Sages therefore said: Any gift that is not so absolute so that if the recipient were to consecrate the gift it would be consecrated, is not a gift. In other words, in order for it to be a gift, the recipient must have the ability to consecrate it.

Chapter 6

In the case of one who vows that cooked foods are forbidden to him, he is permitted to eat roasted and boiled foods, as they are not defined as cooked. If one said: Cooked food is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it, he is prohibited from tasting a loose cooked food but is permitted to taste a thick one, which people do not generally refer to as a cooked food. And he is likewise permitted to eat a turemuta egg and the remutza gourd, as they are not considered cooked foods either.

In the case of one who vows that food cooked in a dish is forbidden to him, he is prohibited from deriving benefit only from food that is cooked by boiling it in a dish. However, if one said: That which enters into a dish is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it, he is prohibited from tasting anything cooked in a dish.

One who vows that pickled food is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating only pickled vegetables, as that is what people usually mean when referring to pickled food. However, if he says: Pickled food is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it, he is prohibited from tasting all pickled foods. Similarly, one who vows that boiled food is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating only boiled meat, as that is the common meaning of the expression boiled food. On the other hand, if he says: Boiled food is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it, he is prohibited from eating all boiled foods. One who vows that roasted food is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating only roasted meat; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. However, if one says: Roasted food is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it, he is prohibited from eating all roasted foods. One who vows that salted food is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating only salted fish, as that is the common meaning of the expression salted food. If, on the other hand, he says: Salted food is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it, he is prohibited from eating all salted foods.

If one says: Fish or fishes are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, he is prohibited from eating all of them, whether large fish or small, whether salted or unsalted, whether raw or cooked. But he is permitted to taste minced sardines and to taste fish brine, as these are not included in the common meaning of the word fish. One who vows that tzaḥana, a concoction of whole and chopped fish, is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating minced sardines as well, but he is permitted to eat fish brine and fish gravy [ morays ]. One who vows that minced sardines are forbidden to him is prohibited from eating fish brine and from eating fish gravy.

One who vows that milk is forbidden to him is permitted to partake of whey [ kum ], the liquid that separates from milk when it is made into cheese. But Rabbi Yosei prohibits him from partaking of whey. If one vows that whey is forbidden to him, he is permitted to partake of milk. Abba Shaul says: One who vows that cheese is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating it whether it is salted or unsalted.

One who vows that meat is forbidden to him is permitted to eat gravy and sediments of boiled meat [ kifa ]. But Rabbi Yehuda maintains that he is prohibited from eating them. Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident where one took such a vow and Rabbi Tarfon prohibited us from even eggs that were cooked with meat. The Rabbis said to him: Indeed so, but when is this the halakha? When he says: This meat is forbidden to me, referring to a specific piece of meat. This is because in the case of one who vows that an item is forbidden to him, and it becomes mixed into another item, if the latter contains an amount of the forbidden food that gives it flavor, i.e., the forbidden food can be tasted in the permitted food, the mixture is forbidden. However, if one vows that meat in general is forbidden to him, without specifying a particular piece, only the meat itself is forbidden, not the gravy, sediments, or eggs cooked with that meat.

Likewise, one who vows that wine is forbidden to him is permitted to eat a cooked dish that has the flavor of wine. However, if he said: Wine is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it, and the wine fell into a cooked dish, if the dish contains an amount of the wine that gives it flavor, it is forbidden. One who vows that grapes are forbidden to him is permitted to partake of wine. One who vows that olives are forbidden to him is permitted to partake of oil. However, if one said: Olives and grapes are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste these items, he is prohibited from tasting them and the wine and oil that emerge from them.

One who vows that dates are forbidden to him is permitted to eat date honey. One who vows that late grapes are forbidden to him is permitted to eat vinegar of late grapes. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: In the case of any food that the name of its derivative is called after its name, i.e., the liquid that emerges from it bears its name, e.g., date honey or vinegar of late grapes, and one vows that the item itself, e.g., the grape, is forbidden to him, he is also prohibited from consuming the liquid that emerges from it. But the Rabbis permit this.

One who vows that wine is forbidden to him is permitted to partake of apple wine, i.e., cider, as the unspecified term wine refers only to grape wine. One who vows that oil is forbidden to him is permitted to partake of sesame oil, as the unspecified term oil refers only to olive oil. One who vows that honey is forbidden to him is permitted to eat date honey, as the unspecified term honey refers only to bee honey. One who vows that vinegar is forbidden to him is permitted to partake of vinegar of late grapes, as vinegar is typically made from wine. One who vows that leeks are forbidden to him is permitted to eat kaflutot, a type of leek. One who vows that vegetables are forbidden to him is permitted to eat wild field vegetables, as this type of vegetable has a modifier and is not referred to by the unspecified term vegetable.

One who vows that cabbage is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating ispargus, as that is a type of cabbage. However, one who vows that ispargus is forbidden to him is permitted to eat cabbage. One who vows that pounded beans are forbidden to him is prohibited from eating pounded bean stew [ mikpa ]. However, Rabbi Yosei rules that he is permitted to eat it.One who vows that pounded beans are forbidden to him is prohibited from eating pounded bean stew. However, Rabbi Yosei rules that he is permitted to eat it. One who vows that pounded bean stew is forbidden to him is permitted to eat pounded beans according to all opinions. One who vows that stew is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating the garlic of the stew. However, Rabbi Yosei rules that he is permitted to eat the garlic. One who vows that garlic is forbidden to him is permitted to eat stew. One who vows that lentils are forbidden to him is prohibited from eating ashishim, a dish made from lentils. However, Rabbi Yosei permits it. It is agreed by all opinions that one who vows that ashishim is forbidden to him is permitted to eat lentils. If one says: Ḥitta, wheat in singular form, or ḥittim, wheat in plural form, are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, he is prohibited from eating wheat, whether as flour or bread. If one says: Pounded bean or pounded beans are konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, he is prohibited from eating them, whether raw or cooked. Rabbi Yehuda says that if one says: Pounded bean or ḥitta is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste them, he is permitted to chew them raw, as that is not the normal way to eat them, and therefore was not included in the intention of the vow.

Chapter 7

For one who vows that vegetables are forbidden to him, it is permitted for him to eat gourds, as people typically do not include gourds in the category of vegetables; and Rabbi Akiva prohibits him from eating gourds. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: But doesn’t a person say to his agent: Purchase vegetables for me, and the agent, after failing to find vegetables, returns with gourds and says: I found only gourds? This indicates that gourds are not considered vegetables. Rabbi Akiva said to them: The matter is so, and that proves my opinion; or perhaps, does the agent return and say: I found only legumes? Rather, it is apparent that gourds are included in the category of vegetables, although they differ from other vegetables, and therefore, the agent purchases gourds and explains that he found only gourds. And legumes are not included in the category of vegetables, and that is why the agent dispatched to purchase vegetables would not purchase legumes at all. And for one who vows that vegetables are forbidden to him, it is prohibited to eat the fresh cowpea, which is considered a vegetable, and it is permitted to eat dry cowpea, which is not a vegetable.

For one who vows that grain [ dagan ] is forbidden to him, it is prohibited to eat the dry cowpea, because, like grain, its final stage of production involves being placed in a pile; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: It is prohibited for him to partake of only the five species of grain: Wheat, barley, oats, spelt, and rye, as that is the connotation of the term dagan in the Torah. Rabbi Meir says: For one who vows that grain is forbidden to him, and therefore he will refrain from eating grain [ tevua ], it is prohibited for him to eat from only the five species of grain. However, for one who vows that grain is forbidden to him, and therefore he will refrain from eating grain [ dagan ], it is prohibited to eat all produce whose final stage of production involves being placed in a pile, e.g., dry cowpea, and it is permitted for him to eat fruits of the tree and vegetables.

For one who vows that a garment is forbidden to him, it is permitted to wear sackcloth, and to wear a sheet, and to wear a coarse curtain [ ḥamila ], as these are not in the category of garments. For one who said: Wool is konam for me and I will therefore not place it upon myself, it is permitted for him to cover himself with wool fleece, which is not considered a garment, and it is prohibited for him to wear only a woolen fabric. For one who said: Flax is konam for me and I will therefore not place it upon myself, it is permitted for him to cover himself with uncombed flax in bundles, and it is prohibited for him to wear only a flaxen fabric. Rabbi Yehuda says: Everything is determined according to the one who vows. If one was bearing a burden of wool and linen, and was sweating, and its smell was unpleasant for him, and in reaction, he said: Wool and linen are konam for me and I will therefore not place them upon myself, it is permitted for him to cover himself with wool and linen garments, but it is prohibited for him to sling them over his shoulder behind him as a burden. The circumstances of his vow make it clear that he intends to forswear carrying wool and linen as a burden rather than the wearing of them as a garment.

For one who vows that a house is forbidden to him, entry is permitted for him in the upper story of the house; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: An upper story is included in the house, and therefore, entry is prohibited there as well. However, for one who vows that an upper story is forbidden to him, entry is permitted in the house, as the ground floor is not included in the upper story.

For one who vows that a bed is forbidden to him, it is permitted to lie in a dargash, which is not commonly called a bed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: A dargash is included in the category of a bed. Everyone agrees that for one who vows that a dargash is forbidden to him, it is permitted to lie in a bed. For one who vows that the city is forbidden to him, it is permitted to enter the Shabbat boundary of that city, the two-thousand-cubit area surrounding the city, and it is prohibited to enter its outskirts, the seventy-cubit area adjacent to the city. However, for one who vows that a house is forbidden to him, it is prohibited to enter only from the doorstop and inward.

For one who says: This produce is konam upon me, or it is konam upon my mouth, or it is konam to my mouth, it is prohibited to partake of the produce, or of its replacements, or of anything that grows from it. If he says: This produce is konam for me, and for that reason I will not eat it, or for that reason I will not taste it, it is permitted for him to partake of its replacements or of anything that grows from it. This applies only with regard to an item whose seeds cease after it is sown. However, with regard to an item whose seeds do not cease after it is sown, e.g., bulbs, which flower and enter into a foliage period and repeat the process, it is prohibited for him to partake even of the growths of its growths, as the original, prohibited item remains intact.

For one who says to his wife: Your handicraft is konam upon me, or it is konam upon my mouth, or it is konam to my mouth, it is prohibited to benefit from her handicraft, and from their replacements and anything that grows from them. However, if he said to his wife: Your handicraft is konam for me only in the sense that I will not eat from your handicraft, or that I will not taste from your handicraft, it is permitted for him to benefit from their replacements and anything that grows from them. This applies only with regard to an item whose seeds cease after it is sown. However, with regard to an item whose seeds do not cease after it is sown, it is prohibited for him to benefit even from the growths of their growths.

If the husband said: From that which you prepare, I will not eat until Passover, or, with that which you prepare, I will not cover myself until Passover, then, if she prepared it before Passover, it is permitted for him to eat or to cover himself with them after Passover. If, however, he said: From that which you prepare until Passover, I will not eat, or from that which you prepare until Passover, I will not cover myself, then, if she prepared it before Passover, it is prohibited for him to eat or cover himself with it after Passover.

If he said to her: Benefit from me until Passover if you go to your father’s house from now until the festival of Sukkot is forbidden for you, and she went to his house before Passover, it is prohibited for her to derive benefit from him until Passover. If she derived benefit from him before Passover and went to visit her father after Passover, she is liable for violating the prohibition of: He shall not profane his word (Numbers 30:3), as the condition was fulfilled and she violated the vow retroactively. If the husband vowed: Benefit from me is konam for you until the Festival if you go to your father’s house from now until Passover, then if she went to his house before Passover, it is prohibited for her to derive benefit from him until the Festival, and it is permitted for her to go to her father’s house after Passover, as that time period is not included in his stipulation.

Chapter 8

If one vows: Wine is forbidden to me as if it were an offering [ konam ], and for that reason I will not taste it today, he is prohibited from drinking wine only until the conclusion of that day at nightfall, and not for a twenty-four hour period. If one vows not to drink wine this week, he is prohibited from drinking wine for the entire remainder of the week. And as Shabbat is considered part of the week that passed, i.e., it is the end of the week, he is prohibited from drinking wine on the upcoming Shabbat. If one vows not to drink wine this month, wine is forbidden to him for the entire remainder of the month; and as the New Moon of the following month is considered part of the next month, he is permitted to drink wine on that day. If he vowed not to drink wine this year, he is prohibited from drinking wine for the entire remainder of the year; and as Rosh HaShana is considered to be part of the upcoming year, not the current one, he is permitted to drink wine on that day. If he vowed not to drink wine during this seven-year Sabbatical cycle, wine is forbidden to him for the entire remainder of the seven-year cycle; and as the Sabbatical Year is considered part of the cycle that passed, he is prohibited from drinking wine during the upcoming Sabbatical Year. All this applies if he said that he would not drink wine on this day or this week, but if he said that wine is forbidden to him for one day, or one week, or one month, or one year, or one seven-year cycle, he is prohibited from drinking wine from the day and time he took the vow to the same time the next day, or week, etc.

If he takes a vow that wine is forbidden to him until Passover, it is forbidden to him until Passover arrives. If he said: Until it will be Passover, it is forbidden to him until Passover ends, as he may have intended for the vow to apply as long as it was still Passover (Rosh). If he said: Until before Passover, Rabbi Meir says: It is forbidden to him until Passover arrives. Rabbi Yosei says: It is forbidden to him until it ends.

If one takes a vow that something is forbidden to him until the grain harvest, or until the grape harvest, or until the olive harvest, it is forbidden to him only until the arrival of that season. This is the principle: With regard to any occasion whose time is fixed, and one said: Until it arrives, it is forbidden to him until the specified occasion arrives. If he said: Until it will be, it is forbidden to him until the specified occasion ends. And with regard to any occasion whose time is not fixed, i.e., it does not fall on a precise date, whether he said: Until it will be, or: Until it arrives, it is forbidden to him only until the specified occasion arrives.

If he said: Until the summer [ kayitz ], or: Until it will be summer, the vow remains in effect until the people begin to bring fruit into their houses in baskets. If he said: Until the summer has passed, the vow remains in effect until the people set aside [ yakpilu ] the knives [ hamaktzuot ] with which the figs are cut after being harvested, and return them to their place of storage. If one takes a vow until the harvest, the vow remains in effect until people begin to harvest. This is referring to the wheat harvest but not the barley harvest. As for the exact date of this event, all is determined according to the place where he took his vow. If he was on a mountain, it is assumed that he referred to the time of the harvest on the mountain, and if he was in a valley, it is assumed that he meant the time of the harvest in the valley.

If one takes a vow until the rains, or until there are rains, the vow remains in effect until the second rain of the rainy season falls. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Until the time of the second rainfall arrives, even if rain does not fall. If one takes a vow until the rains end, the vow remains in effect until the entire month of Nisan has ended; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: Until Passover has passed. In the case of one who said: Wine is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it for the entire year, if the year was extended, i.e., it was declared to be a leap year, he is prohibited from drinking wine during the year and its intercalated month. If he vowed until the beginning of the month of Adar, the vow remains in effect until the beginning of the first Adar. Similarly, if he says that his vow applies until the end of Adar, the vow remains in effect until the end of the first Adar. Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of one who says: Wine is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it until it will be Passover, it is understood that this individual intended for his vow to apply only until the night of Passover, i.e., until the time when it is customary for people to drink wine in order to fulfill the mitzva of drinking the four cups, but he did not intend to prevent himself from being able to fulfill this mitzva.

Similarly, if he said: Meat is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it until it will be the fast of Yom Kippur, he is prohibited from eating meat only until the eve of [ leilei ] the fast. This is because it is understood that this individual intended for his vow to apply only until the time when it is customary for people to eat meat in the festive meal before the fast, and he did not intend to prevent himself from being able to participate in that meal. Rabbi Yosei, his son, says: One who vows: Garlic is konam for me, and for that reason I will not taste it until it will be Shabbat, it is prohibited for him to eat garlic only until the eve of Shabbat, as it is understood that this individual intended for his vow to apply only until the time when it is customary for people to eat garlic.

In the case of one who says to another: Benefiting from you is konam for me, i.e., I am prohibited from deriving benefit from you, if you do not come and take for your son one kor of wheat and two barrels of wine as a gift, this other individual can dissolve his vow without the consent of a halakhic authority. This is because he can say to him: Did you say your vow for any reason other than due to my honor, in order to convince me to accept a gift for my son? This is my honor, that I refrain from accepting the gift, and consequently the vow is annulled. And, so too, in the case of one who says to another: Benefiting from me is konam for you, i.e., you are prohibited from deriving benefit from me, if you do not come and give my son one kor of wheat and two barrels of wine, Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited for the other individual to benefit from the speaker until he gives the gifts to his son. However, the Rabbis say: Even this individual who took the vow can dissolve his own vow without the consent of a halakhic authority. This is because he can say to him: I hereby consider it as though I have received the gift. If an individual was urging another to marry the daughter of his sister, and in order to deflect the pressure, the other man said: Benefiting from me is konam for her forever, i.e., she is prohibited from deriving any benefit from me forever, and, so too, if there is one who divorces his wife and says: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife forever, these women are permitted to derive benefit from him, as this man intended to take this vow only for the purpose of prohibiting marriage between them, but not to prohibit all forms of benefit. Similarly, if one was urging another to eat with him, and the latter said: Entering your house is konam for me, as is tasting even a drop of cold liquid of yours, the individual who took the vow is nevertheless permitted to enter his house and to drink a cold beverage of his. This is because this individual intended to take this vow only for the purpose of eating and drinking a meal, but not to prohibit himself from entering the house entirely or from drinking in small quantities (Commentary on Nedarim ).

Chapter 9

Rabbi Eliezer says: When halakhic authorities are approached with regard to the dissolution of a vow, they may broach dissolution with a person who took a vow by raising the issue of how taking the vow ultimately degraded the honor of his father and mother, asking him the following: Had you known that your parents would experience public shame due to your lax attitude toward your vow, would you still have taken the vow? But the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and prohibit broaching dissolution of a vow with this particular question. To support the opinion of the Rabbis, Rabbi Tzadok said: Instead of broaching dissolution with him by raising the issue of the honor of his father and mother, let them broach dissolution with him by raising the issue of the honor of the Omnipresent. They should point out that a vow taken in the name of God lessens the honor of God, so they could ask him: If you had known that your vow would diminish the honor of God, would you have taken your vow? And if so, if this is a valid method of broaching dissolution, there are no vows. Nevertheless, the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Eliezer with regard to a vow concerning a matter that is between him and his father and mother, that they may broach dissolution with him by raising the issue of the honor of his father and mother, as in this case the extenuation is connected to this particular vow.

And Rabbi Eliezer further said: They may broach dissolution by asking about a new situation, but the Rabbis prohibit it. How might they broach dissolution by asking about a new situation? If one said: It is forbidden to me like an offering [ konam ] that I will therefore not derive benefit from so-and-so, and that person later became a scribe [ sofer ], and the one who took the vow now requires his services, or if the one forbidden by the vow was marrying off his son and prepared a feast for all the residents of his town, and the one that had taken the vow said: Had I known that he would become a scribe, or that he would be marrying off his son in the near future, I would not have vowed. The mishna cites another example of a new situation. If one said: Entering this house is konam for me, and that house became a synagogue, and he said: Had I known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed, in this and all such cases Rabbi Eliezer permits the halakhic authority to use this as a basis for the dissolution of the vow, and the Rabbis prohibit it.

As a continuation of the opinion of the Rabbis in the previous mishna that they may not broach dissolution of a vow based on a new situation, Rabbi Meir says: There are matters that are, at first glance, like a new situation but are not in fact like a new situation, and the Rabbis do not concede to him. How so? For example, one said: Marrying so-and-so is konam for me, as her father is evil, and they told him that her father died, or that he repented. Or he said: Entering this house is konam for me, as there is a bad dog inside it, or a snake inside it, and they told him that the dog died, or that the snake was killed. This is at first glance perceived like a new situation, and yet it is not in fact like a new situation, and this claim may be used to broach dissolution. But the Rabbis do not concede to him.

And Rabbi Meir further said: The halakhic authorities may broach dissolution with him from that which is written in the Torah, and they may say to him: Had you known that through your vow you are transgressing the prohibition “you shall not take vengeance” (Leviticus 19:18) and the prohibition “nor bear any grudge” (Leviticus 19:18), and the prohibition “you shall not hate your brother in your heart” (Leviticus 19:17), and “you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), as well as “and your brother should live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), as he, the one prohibited by the vow, is poor and now you are not able to provide him with a livelihood due to your vow, would you have vowed in that case? If he said in reply: Had I known that it is so, that my vow involved all these prohibitions, I would not have vowed; it is dissolved.

The halakhic authorities may broach dissolution with a man by raising the issue of his wife’s marriage contract. If one takes a vow that would require him to divorce his wife, e.g., he prohibits her from deriving benefit from him, his vow may be dissolved by asking him whether he had considered how difficult it would be to pay her marriage contract. The mishna relates: And an incident occurred with regard to one who vowed against his wife deriving benefit from him, and her marriage contract was worth four hundred dinars. And he came before Rabbi Akiva, and he obligated him to give her the payment of her marriage contract. He said to Rabbi Akiva: My teacher, my father left eight hundred dinars as our inheritance, of which my brother took four hundred and I took four hundred. Isn’t it enough for my wife to take two hundred and I will have two hundred? Rabbi Akiva said to him: Your claim is not accepted, as even if you sell the hair on your head, you must give her the full payment of her marriage contract. He said to him: Had I known that it was so, that I would have to give her all my property, I would not have vowed. And Rabbi Akiva permitted her to derive benefit from him.

If one vowed that certain food or drink or all food and drink be forbidden to him, the halakhic authorities may broach dissolution by raising the issue of Festivals and Shabbatot. They ask him whether he realized at the time he stated his vow that he would have to uphold it on these festive days as well. At first they said that on those days that he did not intend to include in his vow, that item is permitted, but on all the rest of the days, food and drink ar e still forbidden by his vow, until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that a vow that is partially dissolved is dissolved entirely.

How so? In the case of one who said to a group of people: I will not benefit from all of you as it is konam for me, if benefit from one of them was permitted for whatever reason, benefit from all of them is permitted. However, if one said: I will not benefit from this one and from that one as it is konam for me, then if benefit from the first one was permitted for whatever reason, benefit from all of them is permitted. But if benefit from the last one was permitted, benefit from the last one alone is permitted, but benefit from all the others is forbidden, as the benefit from each is considered to have been prohibited by a separate vow. If benefit from the middle one was permitted, then from him and below, i.e., all those enumerated after him, benefit is permitted; from him and above, i.e., those listed before him, benefit is forbidden. The mishna gives another example of interconnected vows: If one stated: I will not benefit from this one, as if he were an offering, and from that one, as if he were an offering, then an extenuation enabling the dissolution of a vow is required for each and every one, as they have the status of separate vows.

The mishna gives another example of a vow that was partially dissolved. If one stated in a vow: Wine is konam for me and I will not taste it, as wine is bad for the intestines, and they said to him: But aged wine is good for the intestines, then the vow is dissolved with regard to aged wine. And not only with regard to aged wine is it dissolved, but with regard to all types of wine, since a vow that has been partially dissolved is entirely dissolved. Likewise, if one stated in a vow: Onions are konam for me and I will not taste them, as onions are bad for the heart, and they said to him: But the kuferi onion is good for the heart, then, in this case too, it is dissolved with regard to kuferi onions, and not only with regard to kuferi onions is it dissolved, but with regard to all types of onions. The mishna relates that an incident of this kind occurred, and Rabbi Meir dissolved the vow with regard to all types of onions.

The halakhic authorities may broach dissolution for a person by raising the issue of his own honor and the honor of his children. For example, if he took a vow that resulted in his needing to divorce his wife, they may say to him: Had you known that tomorrow people will say about you: This is the habit [ veset ] of so-and-so, that he divorces his wives due to vows, and they will say about your daughters: They are daughters of divorce, or they will ask: What did their mother see to divorce, thereby giving them a bad reputation. And if the man who vowed said: Had I known it was so, I would not have vowed, it is dissolved.

The mishna continues: If a man said: Marrying ugly so-and-so is konam for me, and she is in fact beautiful, or if, in vowing not to marry her, he called her black, and she is in fact white, or if, in vowing not to marry her, he called her short, and she is in fact tall, he is permitted to her. Not because she was ugly and became beautiful, black and became white, or short and became tall, but rather, because the vow was mistaken from the outset. The Gemara relates: And an incident occurred with regard to one who vowed against deriving benefit from the daughter of his sister, as he did not wish to marry her. And they brought her into the house of Rabbi Yishmael and he beautified her. When she was later brought before the one who took the vow, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: My son, did you vow that you would not derive benefit from this woman? He said to him: No, and Rabbi Yishmael permitted her to him, as he demonstrated that the vow had been made in error. At that time Rabbi Yishmael wept and said: The daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty makes them ugly. And when Rabbi Yishmael died, the daughters of Israel raised a lamentation, saying: Daughters of Israel, weep for Rabbi Yishmael. And it likewise states about Saul, who also concerned himself with the welfare of the daughters of Israel: “Daughters of Israel, weep over Saul, who clothed you in scarlet with other delights, who put ornaments of gold upon your apparel” (II Samuel 1:24).

Chapter 10

With regard to a betrothed young woman, her father and her husband together nullify her vows. If the father nullified her vow and the husband did not nullify it, or if the husband nullified it and the father did not nullify it, then the vow is not nullified. And needless to say, it is not nullified if one of them ratified the vow.

If the father of a betrothed young woman dies, his authority does not revert to the husband, and the husband cannot nullify the young woman’s vows by himself. However, if the husband dies, his authority reverts to the father, who can now nullify her vows on his own. In this matter, the power of the father is enhanced relative to the power of the husband. In another matter, the power of the husband is enhanced relative to the power of the father, as the husband nullifies vows during the woman’s adulthood, once they are fully married, whereas the father does not nullify her vows during her adulthood.

If she took a vow as a betrothed woman and then was divorced on the same day, and she was again betrothed on the same day to another man, or even to one hundred men, one after the other, on a single day, her father and her last husband nullify her vows. This is the principle: With regard to any young woman who has not left her father’s jurisdiction and entered into her own jurisdiction for at least one moment, through full marriage or reaching majority, her father and her final husband nullify her vows.

The practice of Torah scholars is to ensure that a woman about to be married should not be encumbered by any vows. A father, before his daughter would leave him through marriage, would say to her: All vows that you vowed in my house are hereby nullified. And similarly, the husband, before she would enter his jurisdiction, i.e., while they were still betrothed, would say to her: All vows that you vowed before you entered my jurisdiction are hereby nullified. This was necessary because once she enters his jurisdiction he cannot nullify the vows she made before that.

With regard to a grown woman who waited twelve months after her betrothal and the time arrived for her betrothed to marry her, or a widow who waited thirty days and the time arrived for her betrothed to marry her, Rabbi Eliezer says: Since her husband is already obligated to provide for her sustenance, as he is obligated to have married her by then, he can nullify her vows by himself, as if he were fully married to her. But the Rabbis say: The husband does not nullify her vows on his own until she enters his jurisdiction.

With regard to a widow waiting for her yavam to perform levirate marriage, whether she is waiting for one yavam, if her late husband had only one brother, or whether she is waiting for two or more yevamin, if he had several brothers, Rabbi Eliezer says: A yavam can nullify her vows. Rabbi Yehoshua says: If she is waiting for one yavam, he can nullify her vows, but not if she is waiting for two. Rabbi Akiva says: A yavam cannot nullify her vows, regardless of whether she is waiting for one yavam or for two or more. The mishna then elaborates: Rabbi Eliezer said: Just as with regard to a woman he acquired for himself through betrothal, he nullifies her vows, so too with regard to a woman acquired for him from Heaven, i.e., the yevama, isn’t it logical that he should be able to nullify her vows? Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you say that a husband can nullify the vows of a woman he acquired for himself, over whom others have no authority, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to a woman acquired for him from Heaven, over whom others have authority? If there are two yevamin, each yavam has equal authority with regard to her vows. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Akiva, your statement applies in a situation with two yevamin, but how do you reply to Rabbi Eliezer in the case of one yavam? Rabbi Akiva said to him: A yevama is not the full-fledged wife of the yavam in the in the way that a betrothed woman is her husband’s full-fledged wife, and the yavam is not empowered to nullify vows at all.

One who says to his wife: All vows that you will vow from now until I arrive from such and such a place are hereby ratified, has not said anything, i.e., the vows are not ratified. However, if he states that all vows that she will take until then are hereby nullified, Rabbi Eliezer said: They are nullified, while the Rabbis say: They are not nullified. Rabbi Eliezer said in explanation: If one can nullify vows that have reached the status of a prohibition, i.e., that have already taken effect, shall he not be able to nullify vows that have not reached the status of a prohibition? The Rabbis said to him in response: The verse states: “Every vow, and every binding oath to afflict the soul, her husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it” (Numbers 30:14). This teaches: That which has reached the status of eligibility for ratification, i.e., a vow that she has already taken, has reached the status of eligibility for nullification. However, a vow that has not reached the status of eligibility for ratification has not reached the status of eligibility for nullification either, and it cannot be nullified.

The nullification of vows can be performed all day on the day on which the vow was heard. There is in this matter both a leniency, extending the nullification period, and a stricture, curtailing that period. How so? If a woman took a vow on Shabbat evening, her father or husband can nullify the vow on Shabbat evening, and on Shabbat day until dark. This is an example of extending the nullification period. However, if she took a vow with nightfall approaching, her father or husband can nullify the vow only until nightfall, since, if it became dark and he had not yet nullified her vow, he cannot nullify it anymore. This is an example of a curtailed nullification period.

Chapter 11

And these are the vows that he, the husband or father, can nullify: The first category consists of matters that involve affliction for the woman who took the vow. For example, if a woman vowed: If I bathe, or: If I do not bathe; if she vowed: If I adorn myself [ etkashet ], or: If I do not adorn myself. Rabbi Yosei said: These are not vows of affliction.

Rather, these are vows of affliction: For example, if she said: The produce of the entire world is konam for me as if it were an offering, he can nullify the vow, as it certainly involves affliction. If, however, she said: The produce of this country is konam for me, he cannot nullify the vow, as it does not involve affliction, since he may still bring her produce from another country. Similarly, if she said: The produce of this storekeeper is konam for me, he cannot nullify her vow, as he may still bring her produce from another storekeeper. But if he can obtain his sustenance only from him, that particular storekeeper, he can nullify the vow. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

If a woman vowed: The property of other people is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, her husband cannot nullify her vow, but nevertheless, if she is poor, she may benefit from the agricultural gifts that must be left for the poor: Gleanings, i.e., isolated stalks that fell during the harvest; forgotten sheaves; and produce of the corners [ pe’a ] of the field that the owner is obligated to leave for the poor. Enjoyment of these gifts is not considered as benefit derived from people, as these gifts are not given voluntarily out of the kindness of the donors, but in the performance of a mitzva. If one said: I will not let priests and Levites benefit from me, as that is konam for me, they can take the priestly and Levitical gifts from him against his will. If, however, he said: I will not let these specific priests and these specific Levites benefit from me, as that is konam for me, they are taken by others.

If a woman said: I will not produce anything for my father, as that is konam for me, or: For your father, or: For my brother, or: For your brother, her husband cannot nullify such vows, as they do not fall under the category of vows that adversely affect the relationship between him and her. By contrast, if she said: I will not produce anything for you, including the work that she is obligated to do for him according to the terms of her marriage contract, as that is konam for me, her husband need not nullify the vow at all. It is automatically void, since she is obligated to perform those tasks. Rabbi Akiva says: He should nevertheless nullify the vow, as perhaps she will exceed the required amount of work and do more for him than is fitting for him to receive. If she does more than the fixed amount of work that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband, the vow will be valid with respect to the excess to which he is not entitled, and he might inadvertently come to benefit from something that is forbidden to him. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri also says that he should nullify the vow, but for a different reason: Perhaps he will one day divorce her, at which point the vow will take effect and she will then be forbidden to him forever, i.e., he will be unable to remarry her, lest he come to benefit from her labor.

If a man’s wife took a vow and he thought that it was his daughter who had taken a vow, or if his daughter took a vow and he thought that it was his wife who had taken a vow, or if his wife vowed to be a nazirite and he thought that she had vowed to bring an offering, or if she vowed to bring an offering and he thought that she had vowed to be a nazirite, or if she took a vow that figs are forbidden to her and he thought that she had taken a vow that grapes are forbidden to her, or if she took a vow that grapes are forbidden to her and he thought that she had taken a vow that figs are forbidden to her, and he nullified any of these vows, in each case, when he realizes his error with regard to the vow, he must repeat the action and nullify the vow a second time.

If a woman said: Tasting these figs and grapes is konam for me, and her husband upheld her vow with regard to figs, the entire vow is upheld, but if he nullified it with regard to figs it is not nullified until he also nullifies the vow with regard to grapes. If she said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, these are viewed as two separate vows; if the husband upholds one of the vows it has no effect on the other one.

If a man’s wife or daughter took a vow and he failed to nullify the vow on the day he heard it, but afterward he said: I know that there are vows, but I don’t know that there are those who can nullify them, i.e., he was unaware of the possibility of nullifying vows, he can nullify the vow of his wife or his daughter on the day he learned that he can nullify vows. If, however, he said: I know there are those who can nullify vows, but I refrained from nullifying the vow that I heard because I do not know that this is considered a vow, Rabbi Meir says he cannot nullify the vow at this point, but the Rabbis say that even in this case he can nullify the vow on the day that he learned of his mistake.

With regard to one who vows that benefit from him is forbidden to his son-in-law, but he nevertheless wishes to give his daughter, i.e., the wife of that same son-in-law, money, then, though he cannot do so directly, as anything acquired by a woman belongs to her husband, he should say to her: This money is hereby given to you as a gift, provided that your husband has no rights to it, but the gift includes only that which you pick up and place in your mouth.

The Torah states: “But every vow of a widow, and of her that is divorced, with which she has bound her soul, shall stand against her” (Numbers 30:10). How so? If a widow or divorced woman said: I am hereby a nazirite after thirty days, then even if she was married within thirty days, her new husband cannot nullify her vow. If she took a vow while she was under the jurisdiction of her husband, he can nullify the vow for her. How so? If she said when she was still married: I am hereby a nazirite for after thirty days, and her husband nullified the vow, then even if she was widowed or divorced within the thirty- day period, the vow is nullified. If she took a vow on that, i.e., one, day and was divorced on that same day, then even if her husband took her back as his wife on that same day, he cannot nullify her previous vows. This is the principle: Once she has left and gone into her own jurisdiction for even a single hour, then after they are remarried her husband can no longer nullify any vow she uttered during their first marriage.

There are nine young women whose vows are upheld and cannot be nullified: If she took a vow when she was a grown woman and she is an orphan; if she took a vow when she was a young woman, and has reached her majority, and she is an orphan; if she took a vow when she was a young woman who had not yet reached her majority, and she is an orphan; if she took a vow when she was a grown woman and her father died; if she took a vow when she was a young woman, and she became a grown woman, and her father died; if she took a vow when she was a young woman who had not reached her majority, and her father died; if she took a vow when she was a young woman, and her father died, and after her father died she reached her majority; if she took a vow when she was a grown woman and her father is still alive; and if she took a vow when she was a young woman, and she became a grown woman, and her father is still alive. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to even one who married off his minor daughter, and she was widowed or divorced and she returned to him, and according to her age she still is in the category of a young woman, her vows cannot be nullified.

If a woman said to her husband: Deriving benefit from my father or from your father is konam for me if I will prepare anything for you; or if she said: Deriving benefit from you is konam for me if I will prepare anything for my father or for your father, the husband can nullify this vow.

Initially the Sages would say that three women are divorced even against their husbands’ will, and nevertheless they receive payment of what is due to them according to their marriage contract. The first is the wife of a priest who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, i.e., she claims that she had been raped, so that she is now forbidden to her husband. The second is a woman who says to her husband: Heaven is between me and you, i.e., she declares that he is impotent, a claim she cannot prove, as the truth of it is known only to God. And the third is a woman who takes a vow, stating: I am removed from the Jews, i.e., benefit from sexual intercourse with any Jew, including my husband, is forbidden to me. They subsequently retracted their words and said that in order that a married woman should not cast her eyes on another man and to that end ruin her relationship with her husband and still receive payment of her marriage contract, these halakhot were modified as follows: A priest’s wife who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, must bring proof for her words that she was raped. As for a woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, the court must act and deal with the matter by way of a request, rather than force the husband to divorce his wife. And with regard to a woman who says: I am removed from the Jews, her husband must nullify his part, i.e., the aspect of the vow that concerns him, so that she should be permitted to him, and she may engage in sexual intercourse with him, but she is removed from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her she is forbidden to all.

Mishnah Nazir

Chapter 1

One becomes a nazirite by taking a nazirite vow, in which he simply declares himself a nazirite, as detailed in the Torah (Numbers 6:1–21). Additionally, all substitutes for the language of nazirite vows are like nazirite vows and are binding. Furthermore, intimations of nazirite vows, i.e., incomplete statements that are understood from context to be meant as nazirite vows, are considered binding nazirite vows. Consequently, one who says: I will be, without further clarification, is a nazirite, as this is his implied intention. Or, if he said: I will be beautiful, he is a nazirite. The substitutes for the language of nazirite vows are as follows: If one says: I will be a nazik, a nazi’aḥ, or a pazi’aḥ, he is a nazirite. If one says: I am hereby like this, I am hereby a hair curler, I am hereby growing my hair; or: It is incumbent upon me to grow long hair, he is a nazirite. If one says: An obligation is hereby incumbent upon me with regard to birds, Rabbi Meir says: He is a nazirite. A nazirite brings two bird-offerings if he inadvertently becomes ritually impure from a corpse (Numbers 6:10), and it is understood that the individual used this indirect phrase to take a vow of naziriteship. And the Sages say: He is not a nazirite.

If one said: I am hereby a nazirite and therefore will refrain from grape seeds, or: I am hereby a nazirite and therefore will refrain from grape skins, or: From shaving, or: From impurity, he is a nazirite. And all details of naziriteship are incumbent upon him. Not only does the prohibition he mentioned take effect, he is bound by all of the strictures of naziriteship. If one said: I am hereby like Samson, like the son of Manoah, like the husband of Delilah, like the one who tore off the doors of Gaza, like the one whose eyes were gouged out by the Philistines, he is a nazirite like Samson, whose halakhot are explained in the next mishna (see Judges, chapters 13–16). What is the difference between a permanent nazirite and a nazirite like Samson, both of whom remain nazirites forever? In the case of a permanent nazirite, if his hair grows too heavy for him, he lightens it by cutting some hair with a razor, and he then brings three animals as a sin-offering, a burnt-offering, and a peace-offering, like one who completes his term of naziriteship. And if he becomes ritually impure, he brings the offering for impurity brought by a regular nazirite who became impure. By contrast, in the case of a nazirite like Samson, if his hair grows heavy he may not lighten it, since he is entirely prohibited from cutting his hair. And if he becomes impure, he does not bring an offering for impurity.

In the case of unspecified naziriteship, where one does not state how long he wishes to be a nazirite, the term lasts for thirty days. If one said: I am hereby a nazirite for one long term, or: I am hereby a nazirite for one short term, or even if one said: I am hereby a nazirite from now until the end of the world, in all these cases he is a nazirite for thirty days. If one said: I am hereby a nazirite and one day, or: I am hereby a nazirite and one hour, or: I am hereby a nazirite for one and a half, he becomes a nazirite for two consecutive terms of naziriteship. When he says: I am hereby a nazirite, he accepts upon himself one thirty-day term of naziriteship. When he subsequently adds an additional amount of time, e.g., an extra day, he thereby accepts upon himself an additional term of naziriteship, and the minimal term of naziriteship is thirty days. One who says: I am hereby a nazirite for thirty days and one hour, becomes a nazirite for thirty-one days, as there is no naziriteship for hours but only for full days.

If one says: I am hereby a nazirite like the hair of my head, or: Like the dust of the earth, or: Like the sand of the sea, he is a nazirite forever. He has accepted a separate term of naziriteship for every hair or particle of dust or sand, which in practice means that he will be a nazirite forever. And he shaves his hair once every thirty days. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This nazirite does not shave his hair once every thirty days, as he has accepted upon himself one long term of naziriteship lasting for as many days as there are hairs or particles of dust or sand. And who is the nazirite who shaves his hair once every thirty days? One who says: It is hereby incumbent upon me to observe naziriteships like the hair of my head, or: Like the dust of the earth, or: Like the sand of the sea. Since he used the plural term naziriteships, it is clear that he is accepting distinct terms of naziriteship.

If one says: I am hereby a nazirite in accordance with the capacity of the house, or: The capacity of the basket, one checks with him what he had in mind. If he said: My intention was to take a nazirite vow for one long term of naziriteship, he is a nazirite for only thirty days, in accordance with the ruling of the mishna that the words long or short are of no account when used in a nazirite vow (7a). And if he said: I took a nazirite vow without specification, it is assumed that he meant to accept upon himself terms of naziriteship corresponding to the number of items that fit into the basket, and the smallest items normally placed in baskets are used for this evaluation. Consequently, one views the basket as though it were full of mustard seeds, which are extremely small, and he is a nazirite for his entire life.

If one says: I am hereby a nazirite from here until such and such a place, one estimates how many days it takes to walk from here until such and such a place. If it is less than thirty days, he is a nazirite for thirty days, since this is the minimum term of naziriteship. And if not, i.e., if it takes more than thirty days to walk that distance, he is a nazirite in accordance with the number of days it takes to walk to that place.

If one says: I am hereby a nazirite in accordance with the number of days in a solar year, he counts 365 consecutive naziriteships, in accordance with the number of days in a solar year. Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident where someone took this vow and observed 365 consecutive terms of naziriteship. Once he completed all these terms of naziriteship, he died.

Chapter 2

If one says: I am hereby a nazirite and therefore will refrain from dried figs and from cakes of dried figs, Beit Shammai say: His statement renders him a full-fledged nazirite, and his addition: From dried figs, is insignificant, as this fruit is not included in the prohibitions of a nazirite, which include only products of the grapevine. And Beit Hillel say: He is not a nazirite, since he did not accept naziriteship upon himself. Rabbi Yehuda said: Even when Beit Shammai said that this vow takes effect, they said that only in a case where one said that he meant: They are hereby forbidden to me as an offering. In that case it is as though he took a vow rendering the figs forbidden to him. However, Beit Shammai concede that although the vow takes effect, it is not a vow of naziriteship.

If one said: This cow said: I am hereby a nazirite if I stand up; or if he said: This door says: I am hereby a nazirite if I am opened, Beit Shammai say he is a nazirite, and Beit Hillel say he is not a nazirite. Rabbi Yehuda said: Even when Beit Shammai say that the vow is effective, they say so only with regard to one who said: This cow is hereby forbidden to me as an offering if it stands up. In that case it is as if he took a vow that the cow is forbidden. However, Beit Shammai concede that although the vow takes effect, it is not a vow of naziriteship.

If they poured one a cup of wine and he said: I am hereby a nazirite and therefore will refrain from it, he is a full-fledged nazirite who must observe all the halakhot of naziriteship. An incident occurred with regard to a certain woman who was intoxicated from wine, and they poured a cup for her and she said: I am hereby a nazirite and therefore will refrain from it. The Sages said: This woman did not intend to accept naziriteship but rather, meant to say: It is hereby forbidden to me as an offering. She vowed against deriving benefit from that cup alone, since she did not want to drink any more.

If one says: I am hereby a nazirite on the condition that I will be allowed to drink wine and may become ritually impure from corpses, i.e., he wishes to be a nazirite only with respect to the growth of his hair, he is a full-fledged nazirite and is prohibited from engaging in all of the behaviors forbidden to a nazirite, including consuming products of the vine and contracting impurity from a corpse. If one stated a vow of naziriteship and then said: I know that there is naziriteship, but I do not know that a nazirite is prohibited from wine, he is prohibited in all the prohibitions of naziriteship. But Rabbi Shimon permits him, since he holds that naziriteship takes effect only if the person accepts all the relevant prohibitions. If one said: I know that a nazirite is prohibited from wine, but I thought that the Sages would permit me to drink wine because I cannot live without wine, or: I thought that the Sages would allow me to contract impurity from corpses because I bury the dead, he is permitted and the vow of naziriteship does not take effect, but Rabbi Shimon prohibits him.

If one says: I am hereby a nazirite and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite, meaning he will also pay for the offerings that a nazirite brings when he cuts his hair; and another heard and said: And I too am a nazirite and it is incumbent upon me to shave a nazirite, the other is also a nazirite and is obligated to pay for the offerings of a nazirite. If they were perspicacious and wish to limit their expenses, they shave each other. They may each pay for the other’s offerings, so that their additional vows will not cost them anything. And if not, if this arrangement did not occur to them and each brought his own offerings, they shave other nazirites, i.e., they must pay for the offerings of other nazirites.

If one says: It is incumbent upon me to shave half a nazirite, i.e., he is vowing to pay half the costs of a nazirite’s offerings, and another heard and said: And I, it is incumbent upon me to shave half a nazirite, this one shaves a whole nazirite and that one shaves a whole nazirite, i.e., each pays the full cost of a nazirite’s offerings; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir, since there is no such entity as half a nazirite. And the Rabbis say: This one shaves half a nazirite and that one shaves half a nazirite; they may join together to pay for the offerings of one nazirite.

If one said: I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and a son was born to him, he is a nazirite. If a daughter, a tumtum, or a hermaphrodite [ androginos ] is born to him, he is not a nazirite, since a son was not born to him. However, if he says: I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a child, then even if a daughter, a tumtum, or a hermaphrodite is born to him, he is a nazirite.

However, if his wife miscarried he is not a nazirite, since his wife did not give birth to a live child. Rabbi Shimon says: Since it is possible that the fetus was viable, in which case his vow of naziriteship takes effect, he should say the following: If this fetus was viable in terms of its development but died due to other causes, I am hereby an obligatory nazirite in fulfillment of my vow; and if it was not viable, I am hereby a voluntary nazirite. He then proceeds to observe naziriteship. If, subsequent to this, his wife gave birth again, he is a nazirite, since the unattributed opinion in the mishna holds that the condition of his vow has now been fulfilled. Rabbi Shimon says, following his earlier ruling: He must now accept upon himself an additional naziriteship and he should say: If the first fetus was viable then my naziriteship for the first child was obligatory, and this naziriteship is voluntary; and if the first child was not viable, then the naziriteship for the first one was voluntary and this naziriteship is obligatory.

In a case where one said: I am hereby a nazirite now, and I will be a nazirite when I will have a son, and he began counting his own term of naziriteship, i.e., his first vow, and afterward in the middle of this naziriteship period a son was born to him, he first completes his own initial term of naziriteship and afterward he counts the term of naziriteship he vowed on the condition of the birth of his son. However, if he reversed the order and said: I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and I am hereby a nazirite, and he began counting his own term of naziriteship and afterward, during this period, a son was born to him, he sets aside his own term of naziriteship and counts that which he vowed on condition of the birth of his son, and afterward he completes his own term of naziriteship.

In the case of one who said: I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and he added: I am hereby a nazirite from now for one hundred days, and he then began observing the one hundred days of his naziriteship, if a son is born to him up to seventy days from the start of his naziriteship he has not lost anything. He pauses from the observance of the naziriteship of one hundred days and observes the thirty-day term for his son. He then completes the thirty or more days left of his initial naziriteship. However, if his son is born after seventy days, this negates the first seventy days, and he must observe a full hundred days after he completes the naziriteship for his son. The reason is that here, he is unable to merely complete the remaining days of his initial naziriteship after shaving at the completion of the naziriteship for his son, since shaving cannot be performed after a period of less than thirty days.

Chapter 3

One who said: I am hereby a nazirite, without specifying how long his term of naziriteship would last, shaves his hair on the thirty-first day after the start of his naziriteship, as an unspecified term of naziriteship lasts thirty days. And if he shaved on the thirtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he explicitly said: I am hereby a nazirite for thirty days, then, if he shaved on the thirtieth day, he has not fulfilled his obligation. Since the naziriteship would have been for thirty days even without him stating: For thirty days, this addition is understood to indicate that he will observe naziriteship for a full thirty days.

One who accepted two terms of naziriteship shaves at the close of the first naziriteship on the thirty-first day, and at the close of the second term on the sixty-first day. Since his second term of naziriteship begins after shaving on the thirty-first day, the sixty-first day of the first term is the thirty-first day of his second term. And if he shaved for the first term on the thirtieth day, he shaves for the second term on the sixtieth day, which is the thirty-first day after the start of his second term of naziriteship. And if he shaved for the second term on day sixty less one, he has fulfilled his obligation, as this is the thirtieth day of his second term. And this testimony was attested to by Rabbi Pappeyas, who heard from his teachers with regard to one who vowed to observe two terms of naziriteship, that if he shaved for the first term on the thirtieth day, he shaves for the second term on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved for the second term on the day sixty less one, he has fulfilled his obligation, because the thirtieth day of the first term of naziriteship counts as part of his tally of the second term.

One who said: I am hereby a nazirite, without further specification, if he became ritually impure through contact with a corpse on the thirtieth day of his term of naziriteship, it negates the entire tally, and he must start his naziriteship afresh. Rabbi Eliezer says: It negates only seven days, which he must observe until his purification, after which he brings his offerings. If he said: I am hereby a nazirite for thirty days, and he became impure on the thirtieth day, everyone agrees that it negates the entire tally.

If he said: I am hereby a nazirite for one hundred days, if he became impure on the one hundredth day, it negates the entire tally. Rabbi Eliezer says: It negates only thirty days, and he observes the final thirty days again. If he became impure on the one hundred and first day before bringing his offerings, it negates only thirty days, but does not negate all of the observed days. Rabbi Eliezer says: It negates only seven days.

One who took a vow of naziriteship while in a cemetery, even if he was there for a full thirty days without leaving, those days he spent in the cemetery do not count as part of his tally, since his naziriteship has not yet gone into effect. And he therefore does not bring the three offerings of impurity, brought by a nazirite when rendered ritually impure by contact with a corpse, despite having been in a cemetery. If he left the cemetery and entered it again, those days do count as part of his tally, meaning the naziriteship takes effect, and he does bring the offerings of impurity for reentering the cemetery. Rabbi Eliezer says: This halakha does not apply to one who entered the cemetery on the very day that he left it, as it is stated with regard to the halakhot of a ritually impure nazirite: “But the first days shall be void” (Numbers 6:12), which indicates that he does not bring the offerings until he will have “first days” of purity, during which he observed his naziriteship.

One who vowed many days of naziriteship while outside Eretz Yisrael, and completed his naziriteship, and afterward came to Eretz Yisrael, in order to bring the offerings at the end of his naziriteship, Beit Shammai say: He must be a nazirite for thirty days, so that he has observed a term of naziriteship in ritual purity in Eretz Yisrael, and Beit Hillel say: He is a nazirite from the beginning, that is, he must observe his entire naziriteship again. The mishna cites a related story: An incident occurred with regard to Queen Helene, whose son had gone to war, and she said: If my son will return from war safely, I will be a nazirite for seven years. And her son returned safely from the war, and she was a nazirite for seven years. And at the end of seven years, she ascended to Eretz Yisrael, and Beit Hillel instructed her, in accordance with their opinion, that she should be a nazirite for an additional seven years. And at the end of those seven years she became ritually impure, and was therefore required to observe yet another seven years of naziriteship, as ritual impurity negates the tally of a nazirite. And she was found to be a nazirite for twenty-one years. Rabbi Yehuda said: She was a nazirite for only fourteen years and not twenty-one.

In a case of one who had two sets of witnesses testifying about him that he had taken a vow of naziriteship for a certain period, and these witnesses testify that he took a vow of naziriteship for two terms, and these witnesses testify that he took a vow of naziriteship for five terms. Beit Shammai say: The testimony is divided, i.e., the testimonies contradict each other, and since the testimonies are in conflict they are both rejected entirely and there is no naziriteship here at all. And Beit Hillel say: The testimonies are not completely in conflict with each other, as two terms are included in five terms, and the unanimous testimony, that he is a nazirite for two terms, is accepted.

Chapter 4

With regard to one who said: I am hereby a nazirite, and another heard this vow and said: And I, and a third person added: And I, they are all nazirites. If the vow of the first was dissolved by a halakhic authority, they are all dissolved. However, if the vow of the last individual was dissolved by a halakhic authority, the vow of the last individual alone is dissolved, and all the others remain bound by their nazirite vows. If someone said: I am hereby a nazirite, and another heard and said: My mouth is like his mouth and my hair is like his hair, he is a nazirite. If one said: I am hereby a nazirite, and his wife heard him and said: And I, he can nullify her vow of naziriteship if he so chooses (see Numbers 30:7–16). But his vow remains intact, as his naziriteship is not dependent on hers. However, if the wife said: I am hereby a nazirite, and her husband heard and said: And I, he cannot nullify her vow of naziriteship, as he would thereby be nullifying his own vow, which he made dependent on hers, and he does not have the ability to nullify his own vow.

If he said to his wife: I am hereby a nazirite, and you, i.e., you shall be a nazirite as well, and she said: Amen, in acceptance of this vow, he can nullify her vow, and his vow remains intact. However, if the wife said: I am hereby a nazirite, and you, and he said: Amen, he cannot nullify her vow.

With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite, and she transgressed her vow since she was drinking wine and rendering herself ritually impure by contact with the dead, she incurs the forty lashes for each of the Torah prohibitions she transgressed. If her husband nullified her vow, and she did not know that her husband had nullified her vow, and she was drinking wine and rendering herself impure by contact with the dead, she does not incur the forty lashes, as she is no longer a nazirite. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if she does not incur the forty lashes by Torah law, she should incur lashes for rebelliousness [ makat mardut ], an extrajudicial punishment imposed by the Sages, for her intention to commit a transgression, since she believed that it was prohibited to her.

With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and separated her animals for her offerings of purity at the end of her term, and afterward her husband nullified her vow, which means that she is not in fact a nazirite, what becomes of these animals? If the animal was his, it shall go out and graze among the flock until it becomes blemished, like regular non-consecrated animals. And if the animal was hers, different halakhot apply to the various offerings: The animal she set aside as a sin-offering must be left to die by being shut in an enclosed area and deprived of food and water, as will be explained in the Gemara. And the animal separated for a burnt-offering is sacrificed on the altar as a burnt-offering, as in any case one may bring a voluntary burnt-offering. As for the one designated for a peace-offering, it is sacrificed as a voluntary peace-offering. And this peace-offering is eaten for only one day, in accordance with the halakha of the nazirite’s peace-offering, despite the fact that regular peace-offerings may be eaten for two days. But the offering does not require bread, i.e., loaves and wafers, unlike that of a nazirite. If she had unallocated funds, i.e., she had separated money for her offerings but had not stated which coins were designated for which offering, all the money will be earmarked for communal gift offerings. If she had allocated funds, i.e., she had decided which coins were for the payment of each offering, even if she had not yet purchased the animals, the money for the sin-offering is taken and cast into the Dead Sea, i.e., it must be destroyed, either by being thrown into the sea or by some other means. One may not benefit from it, as it possesses a measure of sanctity, but one also does not misuse property consecrated to the Temple with it. In other words, if one did derive benefit from this money he is not liable to bring an offering for misusing consecrated property. As for the money for the burnt-offering, a burnt-offering is brought with those coins, and one who benefits from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property, as it is sacred since it can be used toward the purchase of a gift offering. Similarly, with regard to the money for a peace-offering, a peace-offering is brought with those coins, and it is eaten for one day and does not require bread.

The previous mishna discussed the case of a husband who nullified his wife’s vow after she separated her offerings of naziriteship. This mishna deals with a husband who nullified his wife’s naziriteship after she had completed her term and brought her offerings to the Temple. If the blood from one of her naziriteship offerings was sprinkled on the altar on her behalf, the husband cannot nullify her vow at this point. Rabbi Akiva says: Even before the sprinkling of the blood, he cannot nullify the vow as soon as any one of the animals for her offerings has been slaughtered on her behalf. The mishna continues: In what case is this statement, that he can no longer nullify the vow, said? It is when she is bringing the offerings for her shaving of ritual purity, when she has completed her term of naziriteship without becoming ritually impure (see Numbers 6:18). However, if she is sacrificing the offerings for her shaving of impurity, when she became ritually impure during her term of naziriteship, after which she restarts her naziriteship (see Numbers 6:9), her husband can nullify her vow. The reason is that he can say: I do not want a downcast [ menuvvelet ] wife, who does not drink wine. She would have to refrain from wine for a lengthy period if she were to begin her naziriteship anew. Rabbi Meir says: He can nullify her vow even at the stage of her shaving of purity, after she has begun sacrificing her offerings, as he can say: I do not want a shaven wife, and a nazirite is obligated to shave after bringing his or her offerings.

A man can vow that his minor son should be a nazirite, i.e., a father can declare his son a nazirite, but a woman cannot vow that her son should be a nazirite. How so; what are the details of this naziriteship? If the son shaved his hair, thereby demonstrating his rejection of the vow imposed by his father; or if his relatives shaved him; or if the son objected by saying that he has no desire for this naziriteship; or if his relatives objected on his behalf, the naziriteship is canceled. If this son who canceled the naziriteship had animals separated for his offerings, the one set aside for the sin-offering must die, and the burnt-offering is sacrificed as a burnt-offering, and the peace-offering is sacrificed as a peace-offering. And the peace-offering is eaten for one day, like the peace-offering of a nazirite, rather than the two days of a regular peace-offering, and it does not require bread, i.e., the loaves that accompany a nazirite’s peace-offering. If he had unallocated funds, they will be allocated for communal gift offerings. If he had allocated funds for his offerings, the money for the sin-offering is taken and cast into the Dead Sea, as one may not benefit from it ab initio, but if he benefits from it, he is not liable to bring an offering for misuse of consecrated property. With the money for the burnt-offering they bring a burnt-offering; it is prohibited to derive benefit from those coins and if he benefits from it, he is liable to bring an offering for misuse of consecrated property. With the money for the peace-offering they bring a peace-offering, and it is eaten for one day and does not require bread.

A man can shave, i.e., bring the offerings at the close of his term of naziriteship, by using offerings originally designated for his father’s naziriteship, but a woman cannot shave by means of the offerings for her father’s naziriteship. How so; how is this halakha applied? It applies to one whose father was a nazirite and separated unallocated money for his naziriteship, i.e., he did not state which coins were for which of his offerings, and he died before buying the animals, and the son said after his father’s death: I am hereby a nazirite on the condition that I will shave by means of the money that my father set aside. Rabbi Yosei said: In that case these coins are allocated for communal gift offerings, and the son may not use them, as this is not the case of the halakha that a son can shave by using his father’s naziriteship. Rather, who is the son who can shave by using his father’s naziriteship? This is referring to a son and his father who were both nazirites during his father’s lifetime, and his father separated unallocated money for his naziriteship and died; this is the one who may shave by using his father’s naziriteship.

Chapter 5

Beit Shammai say: Consecration that one performs in error nevertheless renders property consecrated, and Beit Hillel say it is not consecrated. How so; what is considered an act of erroneous consecration? If one said: A black bull that will emerge from my house first is consecrated, and a white bull emerged first, Beit Shammai say it is consecrated and Beit Hillel say it is not consecrated.

Similarly, if one said: A gold dinar that will come up first in my hand is consecrated, and when he reached into his pocket a dinar of silver came up, Beit Shammai say it is consecrated and Beit Hillel say it is not consecrated. Likewise, if one said: A barrel of wine that will come up first in my hand when I enter the cellar is consecrated, and a barrel of oil came up in his hand instead, Beit Shammai say it is consecrated and Beit Hillel say it is not consecrated.

With regard to one who took a vow of naziriteship, who then regretted his vow and stopped observing the prohibition against drinking wine, and later requested of a halakhic authority to dissolve his vow, and the authority ruled that he is bound by his vow, finding no reason to dissolve it, he counts the term of naziriteship from the time that he vowed, including the days when he acted as though the vow were dissolved. In a case where he requested of a halakhic authority to dissolve his vow and the authority dissolved it, if he had an animal separated as a nazirite offering it shall go out and graze among the flock. On the basis of this halakha, and continuing their discussion in the previous mishna, Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: Don’t you concede with regard to this case that it is an erroneous act of consecration, and yet the halakha is that it shall go out and graze among the flock? This shows that you too accept the principle that an erroneous act of consecration does not take effect. Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: Don’t you concede with regard to one who was separating the animal tithe from his herd, i.e., passing his animals before him single file and consecrating every tenth one as a tithe, that if he erred and called the ninth animal: Tenth; and the tenth: Ninth; and the eleventh: Tenth, that each of them is consecrated? This proves that an erroneous act of consecration does take effect. Beit Hillel said to them: It is not the rod that consecrates it. The touch of the rod does not consecrate the animal, nor does the fact that he said: Tenth, by mistake. Not all errors cause the tithe to be consecrated, and the proof is as follows: And what would be the halakha if he had erred and placed the rod on the eighth or on the twelfth, and labeled them: Tenth? Can it be suggested that perhaps he performed anything of consequence? The halakha is that the eighth or twelfth animal cannot be consecrated as tithe. Rather, why is the ninth or eleventh animal consecrated? There is a specific reason for this halakha, as the same verse that consecrated the tenth also consecrated the ninth and the eleventh. It is a Torah edict that the consecration takes effect with regard to those two animals. Therefore, one cannot infer from this case that an erroneous act of consecration takes effect.

With regard to one who took a vow of naziriteship and went to bring his animal which he set aside for his nazirite offering and discovered that it was stolen, and due to the need to separate an additional animal now regrets having taken his vow, if he took a vow of naziriteship before his animal was stolen, he is a nazirite, as a vow cannot be dissolved as the result of a later event. But if he took a vow of naziriteship after his animal was stolen, he is not a nazirite, as it is retroactively established that his vow was taken in error from the outset, as he relied on an animal he did not possess. And this was the error that Naḥum the Mede erred when he failed to distinguish between an event that occurred before the vow was taken and an event that occurred afterward. The incident in question was as follows: When nazirites were ascending from the exile to sacrifice their offerings, and they found the Temple destroyed, Naḥum the Mede said to them: If you had known that the Temple would be destroyed, would you have taken a vow of naziriteship? They said to him: Certainly not, as there is no remedy for a naziriteship in this case. And Naḥum the Mede dissolved the vow for them. And when the matter came before the Rabbis, they said: His ruling is incorrect. Rather, whoever took a vow of naziriteship before the Temple was destroyed, like these nazirites from the exile, he is a nazirite, as he committed no error at the time of his vow, and one cannot dissolve vows based a new situation. However, one who stated his vow after the Temple was destroyed is not a nazirite, as he vowed based on an erroneous assumption.

If there were people walking along the way, and one other person was approaching them, and one of those walking said: I am hereby a nazirite if this person approaching us is so-and-so. And another one of them said: I am hereby a nazirite if this is not so-and-so, while a third member of the group said: I am hereby a nazirite if one of you two is a nazirite, and a fourth said: I am hereby a nazirite if neither of you is a nazirite, and another added: I am hereby a nazirite if both of you are nazirites. Finally, the last person said: I am hereby a nazirite if all you who spoke before me are nazirites. Beit Shammai say that they are all nazirites, as by saying: I am hereby a nazirite, they have accepted naziriteship upon themselves even if their statements turn out to be incorrect. Beit Shammai maintain that a vow of naziriteship taken in error is considered a valid vow of naziriteship. And Beit Hillel say: Only he whose statement was not fulfilled is a nazirite. And Rabbi Tarfon says: Not a single one of them is a nazirite, including those whose statements were correct. Rabbi Tarfon maintains that a vow of naziriteship must be pronounced in an explicit manner, without any hint of uncertainty. In this case, none of them knew for sure the identity of the person coming toward them, and therefore they could not be certain they were nazirites at the time of their vows.

If the person approaching them turned back so that his identity was never discovered, not one of them is a nazirite. The matter was never clarified, and the halakha is lenient in cases of uncertain naziriteship. Rabbi Shimon says that the halakha is stringent with regard to an uncertainty of this kind, and therefore they should proceed as follows in order to avoid any uncertainty: Each of those who took a vow should say: If it was in accordance with my statement, I am hereby an obligatory nazirite, as my condition was fulfilled, and if not, I am hereby a voluntary nazirite, and in this manner they are all nazirites either way.

Someone saw a kosher animal with characteristics of both a domesticated animal and a non-domesticated animal [ koy ], and said: I am hereby a nazirite if this is a non-domesticated animal; and another individual said: I am hereby a nazirite if this is not a non-domesticated animal; and a third person said: I am hereby a nazirite if this is a domesticated animal; and a fourth said: I am hereby a nazirite if this not a domesticated animal. The mishna continues: A fifth person added: I am hereby a nazirite if this is a non-domesticated animal and a domesticated animal, and a sixth person said: I am hereby a nazirite if this is neither a non-domesticated animal nor a domesticated animal. Someone who heard all the above statements said: I am hereby a nazirite if one of you is a nazirite, and another one stated: I am hereby a nazirite if not one of you is a nazirite, and a final person said: I am hereby a nazirite if all of you are nazirites. In this case, they are all nazirites.

Chapter 6

Three types of actions are prohibited for a nazirite: The contraction of ritual impurity from a corpse, and the shaving of one’s hair, and eating or drinking any substances that emerge from the vine. The mishna adds: And all products that emerge from the vine combine with one another to the amount that renders a nazirite liable to receive lashes. And he is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk of the grapes. An initial version of the mishna says that a nazirite is liable to receive lashes only if he drinks a quarter - log of wine. Rabbi Akiva says: Even if he soaked his bread in wine and the two together contain enough to combine to the amount of an olive-bulk, he is liable.

And furthermore, a nazirite is liable to receive lashes for consuming wine by itself, and for grapes by themselves, and for ḥartzannim by themselves, and for zaggim by themselves, as each of these is forbidden separately by the Torah. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: He is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk that includes at least two ḥartzannim and one zag, in accordance with the verse “From ḥartzannim to zag ” (Numbers 6:4), where the first term is in the plural and the second in the singular. The mishna discusses the meaning of these terms: Which parts are ḥartzannim and which are zaggim? The ḥartzannim are the outside parts, the skin of the grape, while the zaggim are the inner parts, the seeds. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: The opposite is the case and this is the mnemonic so that you should not err: It is like a bell [ zog ] worn by an animal, in which the outer part, which corresponds to the skin of a grape, is called zog, and the inner portion of the bell, the clapper, which corresponds to the seeds in a grape, is called inbal.

A naziriteship of unspecified length lasts for thirty days. If a nazirite shaved his hair during that period, or if he was shaved by bandits [ listim ] against his will, this negates thirty days of his naziriteship, which he must count afresh. With regard to a nazirite who shaved his hair, whether he did so with scissors or with a razor, or if he pulled out [ sifsef ] any amount, he is liable. A nazirite may shampoo [ ḥofef ] his head and separate [ mefaspes ] his hairs manually, without concern that hairs might fall out. However, he may not comb his hair. Rabbi Yishmael says: A nazirite may not shampoo his hair with earth because this causes the hair to fall out.

A nazirite who was drinking wine all day is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If people said to him during the course of the day: Do not drink, do not drink, and nevertheless he continues to drink, he is liable for each and every time he was warned. If a nazirite kept shaving all day, he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If they said to him: Do not shave, do not shave, and he shaves, he is liable for each and every time he was warned. If he became ritually impure from a corpse many times all day, he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If they said to him: Do not become impure, do not become impure, and he continues to become impure, he is liable for each and every time he was warned.

Three types of actions are prohibited for a nazirite: Contracting ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, and shaving his hair, and eating or drinking any substances that emerge from the vine. There is a greater stricture with regard to the prohibitions of impurity and shaving than that of substances that emerge from the vine, as impurity and shaving negate his naziriteship, i.e., he must add thirty days to his term of naziriteship or start it afresh. But if he eats or drinks that which emerges from the vine, this does not negate his naziriteship. Conversely, there is a greater stricture with regard to substances that emerge from the vine than with regard to impurity and shaving, as in the case of products that emerge from the vine nothing is exempted from its general prohibition in certain circumstances, i.e., there are no exceptions. But with regard to impurity and shaving certain cases are exempted from their general prohibition. For example, there are the cases of obligatory shaving, e.g., a leper who was purified during his naziriteship, and of a corpse with no one to bury it [ met mitzva ]. A nazirite may tend to the burial of a met mitzva, despite the fact that he will thereby contract ritual impurity from a corpse. The mishna adds: And there is a greater stricture with regard to impurity than with regard to shaving, as a nazirite’s impurity negates all his days of naziriteship and begins his term afresh, and he is liable to bring an offering for it, before starting his new term of naziriteship. But shaving negates only thirty days at most, and he is not liable to bring an offering for it.

With regard to the shaving of ritual impurity performed by a nazirite who became impure during his naziriteship, how is it performed? The priest would sprinkle the waters of purification on him on the third and the seventh days after he contracted his impurity, as performed for all those who contracted impurity imparted by a corpse. And he shaves his hair on the seventh day and brings his offerings on the eighth day. And if he shaved on the eighth day he brings his offerings on that day, this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: What is the difference between this ritual and that of a leper? A leper also shaves on the seventh day and sacrifices his offerings on the eighth. However, if a leper shaves on the eighth day he brings his offerings on the ninth day, not on the day of his shaving. Rabbi Akiva said to him: The purification of this impure nazirite depends on his days, as he immerses on the seventh day like all those who contract impurity imparted by a corpse, which means he is already ritually pure on the eighth day. But with regard to a leper, his purification depends on his shaving. Any immersion performed earlier is of no account, and must be repeated. And a leper brings his offering only if the sun has set following his immersion. Since offerings are not sacrificed at night, the bringing of his offering is postponed until the following day.

With regard to a nazirite’s shaving of purity after the completion of his term of naziriteship, how is it performed? He would bring three animals: One for a sin-offering, one for a burnt-offering, and one for a peace-offering. And he slaughters the peace-offering and shaves his hair after he slaughters them. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Elazar says: He would shave only after he slaughtered the sin-offering, as the sin-offering precedes the other offerings in all places, and therefore he sacrifices the sin-offering first. He shaves his hair after he slaughters this offering. And if he shaved after the sacrifice of any one of the three of them, he has fulfilled his obligation after the fact.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If a nazirite brought three animals without specifying which of them was for which offering, the one that is fit for a sin-offering, i.e., a female sheep in its first year, is sacrificed as a sin-offering; that which is fit for a burnt-offering, a male sheep in its first year, is sacrificed as a burnt-offering; and that which is fit for a peace-offering, a ram, i.e., a male sheep over the age of one year, is sacrificed as a peace-offering. After the nazirite shaved off his hair, he would take the hair of his consecrated head and throw it under the pot in which the peace-offering was cooked, where it would burn. And if the nazirite shaved in the rest of the country, i.e., outside the Temple, he would not throw the hair under the pot. In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to the shaving of purity. However, with regard to the shaving of impurity, i.e., shaving that accompanied his guilt-offering and sin-offering of birds after his term of naziriteship was interrupted by impurity, he would not throw his hair under the pot in which his offerings were cooked, as the Torah stated this requirement only for a pure nazirite. Rabbi Meir says: Everyone throws his hair under the pot, including a pure nazirite who shaved outside the Temple and an impure nazirite, except for an impure nazirite who shaved in the rest of the country. In that case alone he refrains from throwing his hair to be burned beneath his offering.

The nazirite would cook the peace-offering or overcook it, i.e., cook it thoroughly. The priest takes the cooked foreleg from the ram, and one unleavened loaf from the basket, and one unleavened wafer, and places them on the palms of the nazirite and waves them, as described in the Torah (Numbers 6:19–20). And afterward the nazirite is permitted to drink wine and to contract ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. Rabbi Shimon says: Once the blood of one of the offerings has been sprinkled on the nazirite’s behalf, the nazirite is permitted to drink wine and to contract ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. The rest of the ritual is not indispensable for his purification.

As taught earlier (45a) the nazirite shaves after having brought one, or all, of his offerings. This mishna discusses what the halakha is if the offering was found to be invalid after the nazirite had shaved. If a nazirite shaved based upon the requisite offering, and afterward the offering was found to be invalid for any reason, his shaving is invalid and his offerings do not count toward the fulfillment of his obligation. If he shaved based upon the sin-offering, that was found to have been sacrificed not for its own sake, which invalidates the offering, and afterward he brought his other offerings for their own sake, his shaving is invalid and his other offerings do not count toward the fulfillment of his obligation. If he shaved based upon the requisite burnt-offering or having brought the requisite peace-offering, and these were offered not for their own sake, and afterward he brought his remaining offerings for their own sake, his shaving is invalid and his offerings do not count toward the fulfillment of his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who shaved based upon a burnt-offering or a peace-offering that was sacrificed not for its own sake, that offering, which was performed incorrectly, does not count toward the fulfillment of his obligation; however, his other offerings do count. And everyone agrees that if he shaved based upon all three of them, i.e., he brought all three offerings, without specifying which offering he is basing his shaving upon, and even one of them was found valid, his shaving is valid, but he must bring the other offerings in order to fulfill his obligation.

With regard to one on whose behalf the blood of one of his nazirite offerings was sprinkled on the altar, and he became ritually impure before bringing the rest of his offerings, Rabbi Eliezer says: His impurity negates the entire tally, and he remains a nazirite. And the Rabbis say: Let him bring the rest of his offerings and be purified. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: An incident occurred involving Miriam of Tarmod who was a nazirite, that the blood of one of her offerings was sprinkled on her behalf, and they came and told her that her daughter was mortally ill. And she went and found that her daughter was dead, and thereby contracted impurity. And the Rabbis said: Let her bring the rest of her offerings and be purified.

Chapter 7

A High Priest and a nazirite may not become ritually impure even to bury their deceased relatives. However, they become impure to bury a corpse with no one to bury it [ met mitzva ]. If one of them comes across the corpse of a Jew, and there is nobody else available to bury it, he must bury the body. If a High Priest and a nazirite were walking along the way and they found a met mitzva, and one of them can tend to the burial by himself, Rabbi Eliezer says: Let the High Priest become impure, and do not let the nazirite become impure. And the Rabbis say: Let the nazirite become impure, and do not let even a common priest become impure. Rabbi Eliezer said to the Rabbis: It is preferable to let the priest become impure, as he does not bring an offering for his impurity, and do not let the nazirite become impure, as he brings an offering for his impurity. The Rabbis said to him: On the contrary, let the nazirite become impure, as his sanctity is not permanent, and do not let a priest become impure, as his sanctity is permanent.

A nazirite shaves for having become impure from these following sources of ritual impurity: For having become impure with impurity imparted by a corpse; and for impurity imparted by an olive-bulk of a corpse; and for impurity imparted by an olive-bulk of fluid [ netzel ] from a corpse; and for impurity imparted by a full ladle [ tarvad ] of dust from a corpse; and for impurity imparted by the spine; and for impurity imparted by the skull; and for impurity imparted by a limb from a corpse or for impurity imparted by a limb severed from a living person, upon either of which there is a fitting quantity of flesh; and for impurity imparted by a half- kav of bones from a corpse; and for impurity imparted by a half- log of blood. And a nazirite shaves in each of these cases for becoming impure by coming into contact with them; and for becoming impure by carrying them; and for becoming impure by their tent, i.e., if he was positioned like a tent over them, or if he entered a tent that contains them, or if they served as a tent over him. And as for a bone that is a barley-grain-bulk, he shaves for becoming impure by coming into contact with it and by carrying it. However, he is not rendered impure with the impurity imparted in a tent, i.e., by being under the same roof as the bone. For all of these occurrences, a nazirite shaves, and a priest sprinkles the ashes of the red heifer on him on the third and on the seventh days to purify him from the impurity imparted by a corpse. And he negates all the previous days he counted toward his naziriteship, and he begins counting his term of naziriteship again only after he becomes pure and brings his offerings.

The previous mishna listed the sources of ritual impurity for which a nazirite must shave. This mishna adds: However, the nazirite does not shave for these: The hanging branches over a corpse, i.e., a tree overhanging a body that a nazirite passes, but it is uncertain which branches are over a corpse; and the projecting stones from fences when the place of the impurity is unknown; and a beit haperas, a place that contained a grave and was plowed. In the latter case, the entire area around the grave is impure from a corpse due to an uncertainty, as it might contain human bones. The mishna continues its list: And the land of the nations, i.e., a nazirite left Eretz Yisrael for another land. The Sages decreed that all land outside of Eretz Yisrael is ritually impure. And the grave cover; and the grave walls upon which the cover rests; and a quarter- log of blood from a corpse; and a tent; and a quarter- kav of bones of a corpse; and vessels that are touching a corpse. And if the nazirite is in the days of his counting, i.e., the seven days a leper must count after purification from his leprosy; or in his days of full leprosy, when he is a full-fledged leper, for these the nazirite does not shave. This is the case even if he is rendered impure by one of the sources listed in the previous mishna. And in those cases listed that involve ritual impurity from a corpse, one sprinkles the purification water upon him on the third and on the seventh days of his purification, and he does not negate the earlier days of his naziriteship, but they are considered part of his naziriteship term. And he starts counting the rest of his naziriteship to complete his term immediately after his purification, and he has no obligation to sacrifice an offering of impurity for these sources of ritual impurity. Actually they said an ancient tradition that these days of the impurity of the zav (Leviticus 15:1–15) and the zava (Leviticus 15:25–30) and the days of the confinement of a leper before he is confirmed as a full-fledged leper (Leviticus 13:4–5) count for him toward the period of his naziriteship.

Rabbi Eliezer said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: With regard to any ritual impurity from a corpse for which a nazirite must shave, one is liable due to the prohibition of entering the Temple after contracting that impurity. If someone who became impure from one of those sources of impurity enters the Temple, he violates the prohibition against an impure individual entering the sacred space. And with regard to any impurity from a corpse for which a nazirite does not shave, one is likewise not liable due to the prohibition of entering the Temple after contracting it. Rabbi Meir said: This impurity from a corpse that does not obligate a nazirite to shave should not be more lenient than the impurity of a creeping animal. The Torah clearly states that one rendered impure from a creeping animal is prohibited from entering the Temple (see Leviticus 5:2–3). The mishna continues to address the sources of ritual impurity for which a nazirite must shave. Rabbi Akiva said: I discussed this matter before Rabbi Eliezer and suggested the following a fortiori inference: If, with regard to a bone that is a barley-grain - bulk, which does not render a person impure in a tent, a nazirite must nevertheless shave for touching it or carrying it, then in the case of a quarter- log of blood, which is more stringent in that it renders a person impure in a tent, is it not logical that a nazirite should shave for touching it or carrying it? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: What is this, Akiva? One cannot argue by means of an a fortiori inference here, in this particular case. However, Rabbi Eliezer did not provide a reason for this response. Rabbi Akiva continued: And when I came and presented these matters before Rabbi Yehoshua, he said to me: You spoke well, i.e., your logic is flawless, but they indeed said that this is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, which cannot be refuted by means of an a fortiori inference.

Chapter 8

With regard to two nazirites, where one other person said to them: I saw one of you become impure, but I do not know which one of you it was, they must each complete their naziriteship terms, shave their hair, and both together bring an offering of ritual impurity and an offering of purity, due to the uncertainty. And one of them says to the other: If I am the impure one, the offering of impurity is mine and the offering of purity is yours; and if I am the pure one, the offering of purity is mine and the offering of impurity is yours. And because of the uncertainty they each count a further thirty days of naziriteship and both together bring an offering of purity. And one of them says: If I am the previously impure one, that offering of impurity sacrificed earlier was mine, and the offering of purity was yours; and this offering sacrificed now is my offering of purity. And if I am the previously pure one, the offering of purity brought earlier was mine, and the offering of impurity was yours; and this current offering is your offering of purity. The previous mishna described how two nazirites sacrifice offerings of impurity and purity, in a situation in which one of them has become impure but they do not know which one. This mishna discusses what must be done if one of them dies before bringing his offerings. Rabbi Yehoshua said: The surviving nazirite asks someone in the marketplace, a non-nazirite, to vow to be a nazirite corresponding to him, i.e., under the same conditions as his own naziriteship, so that he can bring offerings together with him. And he says to him as follows: If I was impure, you are hereby a nazirite immediately; and if I was pure, you are hereby a nazirite after thirty days. And they both proceed to count thirty days and bring an offering of impurity and an offering of purity. And the nazirite who was defined as having uncertain impurity says: If I am the impure one, the offering of impurity is mine and the offering of purity is yours; and if I am the pure one, the offering of purity is mine and the offering of impurity we brought shall be of uncertain status. And they subsequently count another thirty days and bring an offering of purity, and the first nazirite says: If I was the impure one, the offering of impurity that we sacrificed at the end of the first thirty days was mine, and the offering of purity we brought then was yours; and this offering I am bringing now is my offering of purity. And if I was the pure one, and the deceased nazirite was impure, the offering of purity we brought thirty days ago was mine, and the offering of impurity we brought earlier was of uncertain status, and this is your offering of purity. Ben Zoma said to Rabbi Yehoshua: And who will listen to him to vow to be a nazirite corresponding to him? How can one design a halakha on the assumption that a non-nazirite will agree to be a nazirite for a lengthy term? Rather, a different procedure is available: After thirty days of naziriteship he brings a bird sin-offering and an animal burnt-offering, and says: If I was impure, the sin-offering is for my obligation as an impure nazirite, and the burnt-offering is a regular gift offering. And if I was pure, the burnt-offering is for my obligation as a pure nazirite, and the sin-offering is of uncertain status. And he counts another thirty days, and brings an offering of purity, and says: If I was impure, the first burnt-offering I brought should be considered a gift offering, and this one I am bringing now is for my obligation. And if I was pure, the first burnt-offering I brought is for my obligation as a pure nazirite, and this one I am bringing now is a gift offering. And these, i.e., the sin-offering and peace-offering I am sacrificing now, comprises the rest of my offerings that I was obligated to bring earlier. Rabbi Yehoshua said: According to your opinion, it turns out that this nazirite brings his offerings in halves, i.e., in stages. If he was pure, he brings his burnt-offering thirty days before the rest of his offerings. However, the Rabbis agreed with ben Zoma, and disregarded the concern about splitting up the offerings.

In the case of a nazirite who, on the first day of his naziriteship, was impure from a corpse as a matter of uncertainty and was also a confirmed leper as a matter of uncertainty, i.e., it was uncertain whether or not he had leprosy, how can he fulfill the shaving obligations of a pure nazirite and an impure leper? The problem facing this nazirite is that a leper must shave both when he begins his purification process and at the close of it, one week later. However, a nazirite is prohibited from shaving. Additionally, a leper may not partake of sacrificial food, but a nazirite may. Therefore, he may partake of sacrificial food sixty days after he may have become impure, when the uncertainty with regard to leprosy will have been clarified. He shaves for the first time for his leprosy after thirty days, and for the second time thirty days later, the shaving of the end of the purification process; at which point he brings the offerings of a purified leper and may partake of sacrificial food. But he may drink wine and become impure from the dead, effectively ending his naziriteship, only after 120 days. This is because he might have been a full-fledged leper, which means that his shavings count toward his leprosy, not his naziriteship. Consequently, after the first sixty days he must observe another thirty days of naziriteship and shave again. Even then he has yet to fulfill all his obligations, as he might have been impure from a corpse, which means his shaving after ninety days was for his impurity. He must therefore remain a nazirite for another thirty days, before shaving one final time at the end of 120 days to fulfill his naziriteship obligation. The mishna notes: The reason that he cannot shave for his leprosy after seven days and perform the second shaving of a leper seven days later is because the shaving of leprosy overrides the prohibition of the shaving of a nazirite only when his status as a leper is definite. However, when his status as a leper is uncertain, the shaving does not override his naziriteship, and therefore he must wait thirty days before each of his shavings for leprosy.

Chapter 9

Gentiles do not have naziriteship, i.e., the halakhot of naziriteship do not apply to gentiles. They are not subject to the prohibitions of a nazirite, nor does one accept their offerings at the end of naziriteship. However, women and Canaanite slaves do have naziriteship. The mishna adds: There is a greater stringency in the case of women than in the case of slaves, as a master may force his slave to drink wine, shave his hair, or become ritually impure from a corpse, despite the slave’s vow of naziriteship, but a husband cannot force his wife to transgress her naziriteship. The previous mishna taught that the naziriteship of women includes a stringency that does not apply to slaves. This mishna adds: There is a greater stringency in the case of slaves than in the case of women, as a man can nullify the vows of his wife but he cannot nullify the vows of his slave, despite the fact that he can prevent him from fulfilling them in practice. Similarly, if he nullified the naziriteship of his wife it is permanently nullified, and it remains nullified even if she is later divorced or widowed. Conversely, if he nullified the naziriteship of his slave by forcing him to violate the terms of his vow of naziriteship, when the slave is emancipated he completes his naziriteship. In a case where a slave took a vow of naziriteship but was prevented by his master from fulfilling the terms of his vow, the Sages engaged in a dispute what the halakha would be if he permanently left his master’s presence, i.e., he ran away without being emancipated. Rabbi Meir says: He may not drink wine. Since the slave is free in practice, his vow goes into effect. And Rabbi Yosei says: He may drink wine, as he is not emancipated.

With regard to a nazirite who shaved for the conclusion of his naziriteship, and it later became known to him that during his naziriteship he was ritually impure from a corpse, if it was a known impurity, i.e., people were aware of the impurity when he became impure, he negates his entire naziriteship. And if it was ritual impurity imparted by a grave in the depths, one that was unknown at the time, he does not negate his naziriteship. If he discovered he was impure before he shaved, he negates his naziriteship in either case. The mishna asks: How does one differentiate between a known and an unknown impurity? If a nazirite descended to immerse in a cave, and a corpse was found floating at the mouth of the cave, he is impure, as an openly visible corpse is a known impurity. What, then, is an impurity of the depths? This is referring to a case where the corpse was found sunk into the ground of the cave in such a manner that it was unknown. However, even here the circumstances of the case must be taken into account. If one descended not descend to immerse himself in the water, as he was ritually pure, but to cool himself, he remains pure. If he was impure and entered the water to purify himself from the impurity from a corpse, he is impure. The reason is that something that has the presumptive status of impurity remains impure, and something that has the presumptive status of purity is pure, as there is a basis for the matter. It is reasonable that items or people retain their presumptive status.

One who finds a corpse for the first time, i.e., he discovers a single corpse in a place that was not previously established as a cemetery, if the corpse is lying in the usual manner of Jewish burial, he removes it from there and also its surrounding earth. It is assumed that this corpse was buried there alone. There is no concern that this area is a cemetery and therefore the corpse may not be moved, nor does one take into account the possibility that another corpse may be buried in the vicinity. Similarly, if he found two corpses, he removes them and their surrounding earth. In a case where he found three corpses, if there is a space between this corpse and that corpse of four to eight cubits, in a standard design, this is a graveyard. There is a concern that this might be an ancient cemetery. One must therefore examine from that spot outward for twenty cubits. If one finds another corpse at the end of twenty cubits, he examines from that spot outward twenty cubits, as there is a basis for anticipating the matter. It is likely that he has stumbled upon an ancient gravesite. He is not permitted to relocate the corpses, despite the fact that if he had found the single corpse by itself at first he could have removed it and its surrounding earth.

Any case of uncertainty with regard to leprous sores is initially deemed pure until it is established that it is a case of ritual impurity. Once it has been determined to be a case of impurity, uncertainty concerning it is deemed impure. This mishna discusses another case that includes the statement: There is a basis to anticipate the matter. One examines a man who experienced a gonorrhea-like discharge [ zav ] in seven ways, as long as he has not been confirmed as having a gonorrhea-like discharge [ ziva.] With regard to an individual’s second such discharge, before he has been established as a greater zav, one examines to see whether there may have been a particular trigger of his discharge. One examines him with regard to food and with regard to drink, in case the discharge might have been the result of overeating or excess drinking; with regard to a burden, as it might have been caused by the weight of a heavy burden; and with regard to jumping, in case he jumped and this led to the discharge; and with regard to sickness; and with regard to an arousing sight; and with regard to the thought of a woman. Once he has been confirmed as having a ziva, after two definite discharges of ziva, one no longer examines him in this way, as any discharge is deemed impure. If one experiences three discharges of ziva, he is obligated to bring an offering following his purification. Accordingly, his discharge that was due to circumstances beyond his control, i.e., for one of the seven reasons listed above, and his discharge about which it is uncertain if it is ziva, and even his semen, which is not usually considered the discharge of a zav, are all impure. Why is this so? It is because there is a basis for anticipating the matter. Once he has the status of a zav, it can be assumed that subsequent discharges are of ziva as well. The Sages similarly taught: With regard to one who strikes another with heavy blows, and doctors assessed that he would die as a result of the beating, but his health improved from what it was, so that they then determined that he would not die from his injuries, and afterward his condition worsened and he died, the one who struck him is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, as it is assumed that the victim’s death was caused by the assault. Rabbi Neḥemya says: He is exempt, because there is a basis for anticipating the matter. Since the victim began to recover during his illness, it is reasonable to assume that his death was caused by a factor other than the assault.

The tractate concludes with an aggadic statement about nazirites. Samuel the prophet was a nazirite, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Nehorai, as it was stated that when Hannah, his mother, prayed for a son, she vowed: “And no mora shall come upon his head” (I Samuel 1:11). How is it derived that mora is an expression of naziriteship? It is stated with regard to Samson: “And no razor [ mora ] shall come upon his head, for the child shall be a nazirite to God” (Judges 13:5), and it is stated: “And no mora,” with regard to Samuel. Just as the term “ mora ” that is stated with regard to Samson means that he was a nazirite, so too the term “ mora ” that is stated with regard to Samuel indicates that he was a nazirite. Rabbi Yosei said: But doesn’t the word “ mora ” mean nothing other than the fear of flesh and blood? The word should be read as though it were written with an alef, and not a heh, so that it means fear. Rabbi Nehorai said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “And Samuel said: How can I go; if Saul hears it he will kill me” (I Samuel 16:2). This verse indicates that there was fear of flesh and blood upon Samuel. Consequently, the term mora must be understood in accordance with its plain meaning of a razor. If so, Samuel was indeed a nazirite.

Mishnah Sotah

Chapter 1

With regard to one who issues a warning to his wife not to seclude herself with a particular man, so that if she does not heed his warning she will assume the status of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [ sota ], Rabbi Eliezer says: He issues a warning to her based on, i.e., in the presence of, two witnesses for the warning to be effective. If two witnesses were not present for the warning, she is not a sota even if two witnesses saw her seclusion with another man. And the husband gives the bitter water to her to drink based on the testimony of one witness who saw the seclusion, or even based on his own testimony that he himself saw them secluded together, as Rabbi Eliezer holds that only the warning requires witnesses, not the seclusion. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He both issues a warning to her based on two witnesses and gives the bitter water to her to drink based on the testimony of two witnesses.

The mishna asks: How does he issue a warning to her in an effective manner? If he says to her in the presence of two witnesses: Do not speak with the man called so-and-so, and she nevertheless spoke with him, she is still permitted to her home, i.e., she is permitted to engage in sexual intercourse with her husband, and if she is the wife of a priest she is still permitted to partake of teruma. However, if after he told her not to speak with so-and-so, she entered into a secluded place and remained with that man long enough to become defiled, i.e., sufficient time to engage in sexual intercourse, she is forbidden to her home from that moment until she undergoes the sota rite. And likewise, if she was the wife of a priest she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, as she was possibly disqualified by her infidelity, so long as her innocence is not proven by means of the bitter water. And if her husband dies childless before she drinks the bitter water, she perform ḥalitza with her late husband’s brother and may not enter into levirate marriage, as, if she had been unfaithful, levirate marriage is forbidden.

And these are women who, despite being married to priests, are prohibited from partaking of teruma due to suspicion of adultery: A woman who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, i.e., she admitted to having committed adultery with another man; and in a case where witnesses came forth and testified that she is defiled; and a woman who says after a warning and seclusion: I will not drink the bitter water of a sota ; and in a case where her husband does not want to force her to drink the water even after she secluded herself with another man after his warning; and in a case where her husband engaged in sexual intercourse with her on the way to bringing her to the Temple to drink the bitter water, as in such a case the water will not be effective in evaluating whether she was unfaithful, due to the husband’s own prohibited act. The mishna details the procedure for administering the drinking of the bitter water of a sota. What does her husband do with her after she secluded herself with the man about whom she had been warned? He brings her to the court that is found in that location, and the court provides him with two Torah scholars to accompany him, lest he engage in sexual intercourse with her on the way to the Temple, which is not only prohibited but will also prevent the bitter water from evaluating her. Rabbi Yehuda says: Her husband is trusted with regard to her, so there is no need to provide scholars to accompany him.

The mishna details the next stage of the process. They would bring her up to the Sanhedrin that was in Jerusalem, and the judges would threaten her in order that she admit her sin. And this was done in the manner that they would threaten witnesses testifying in cases of capital law. In those cases, the judges would explain to the witnesses the gravity of their testimony by stressing the value of human life. Here too, the judges would attempt to convince the woman to admit her sin, to avoid the loss of her life. And additionally, the judge would say to her: My daughter, wine causes a great deal of immoral behavior, levity causes a great deal of immoral behavior, immaturity causes a great deal of immoral behavior, and bad neighbors cause a great deal of immoral behavior. The judge encouraged her to admit her sin by explaining to her that he understands that there may have been mitigating factors. The judge then continues: Act for the sake of His great name, so that God’s name, which is written in sanctity, shall not be erased on the water. If the woman admits to having committed adultery, the scroll upon which the name of God is written will not be erased. And additionally, the judge says in her presence matters that are not worthy of being heard by her and all her father’s family, in order to encourage her to admit her sin, as the Gemara will explain.

If after the judge’s warning she says: I am defiled, she writes a receipt for her marriage contract. That is, she writes a receipt indicating that she has no claims on her husband with regard to the sum written in her marriage contract, as a woman who admits to adultery forfeits her right to this payment. And she is then divorced from her husband. But if after the warning she maintains her innocence and says: I am pure, they bring her up to the Eastern Gate, which is at the opening of the Gate of Nicanor, because three rites were performed there: They give the sota women the bitter water to drink, and they purify women who have given birth (see Leviticus 12:6–8), and they purify the lepers (see Leviticus 14:10–20). The mishna continues describing the sota rite. And the priest grabs hold of her clothing and pulls them, unconcerned about what happens to the clothing. If the clothes are torn, so they are torn; if the stitches come apart, so they come apart. And he pulls her clothing until he reveals her heart, i.e., her chest. And then he unbraids her hair. Rabbi Yehuda says: If her heart was attractive he would not reveal it, and if her hair was attractive he would not unbraid it.

If she was dressed in white garments, he would now cover her with black garments. If she was wearing gold adornments, or chokers [ katliyot ], or nose rings, or finger rings, they removed them from her in order to render her unattractive. And afterward the priest would bring an Egyptian rope fashioned from palm fibers, and he would tie it above her breasts. And anyone who desires to watch her may come to watch, except for her slaves and maidservants, who are not permitted to watch because her heart is emboldened by them, as seeing one’s slaves reinforces one’s feeling of pride, and their presence may cause her to maintain her innocence. And all of the women are permitted to watch her, as it is stated: “Thus will I cause lewdness to cease out of the land, that all women may be taught not to do after your lewdness” (Ezekiel 23:48).

The mishna teaches lessons that can be derived from the actions and treatment of a sota. With the measure that a person measures, he is measured with it. For example, she, the sota, adorned herself to violate a transgression, the Omnipresent therefore decreed that she be rendered unattractive; she exposed herself for the purpose of violating a transgression, as she stood in places where she would be noticed by potential adulterers, so the Omnipresent therefore decreed that her body be exposed publicly; she began her transgression with her thigh and afterward with her stomach, therefore the thigh is smitten first and then the stomach, and the rest of all her body does not escape punishment.

The mishna provides additional examples of people who were treated by Heaven commensurate with their actions. Samson followed his eyes, therefore he was punished measure for measure, as the Philistines gouged out his eyes, as it is stated: “And the Philistines laid hold on him, and put out his eyes” (Judges 16:21). Absalom was excessively proud of his hair, and therefore he was hanged by his hair. And furthermore, because he engaged in sexual intercourse with ten of his father’s concubines (see II Samuel 15:16 and 16:22), therefore ten spears [ loneviyyot ] were put, i.e., thrust, into him, as it is stated: “And ten young men that bore Joab’s armor compassed about and smote Absalom, and slew him” (II Samuel 18:15). And because he stole three times, committing three thefts of people’s hearts: The heart of his father, as he tricked him by saying that he was going to sacrifice offerings; the heart of the court, as he tricked them into following him; and the heart of the Jewish people, as it is stated: “So Absalom stole the hearts of the men of Israel” (II Samuel 15:6), therefore three spears were embedded into his heart, as it is stated: “Then said Joab: I may not tarry like this with you. And he took three spears in his hand, and thrust them through the heart of Absalom, while he was yet alive” (II Samuel 18:14).

The mishna continues: And the same is so with regard to the reward of good deeds; a person is rewarded measure for measure. Miriam waited for the baby Moses for one hour at the shore of the Nile, as it is stated: “And his sister stood afar off, to know what would be done to him” (Exodus 2:4). Therefore the Jewish people delayed their travels in the desert for seven days to wait for her when she was smitten with leprosy, as it is stated: “And Miriam was confined outside of the camp seven days; and the people journeyed not until Miriam was brought in again” (Numbers 12:15). Joseph merited to bury his father, resulting in a display of great honor to his father, and there was none among his brothers greater than he in importance, for he was viceroy of Egypt, as it is stated: “And Joseph went up to bury his father; and with him went up all the servants of Pharaoh, the Elders of his house, and all the Elders of the land of Egypt, and all the house of Joseph, and his brethren, and his father’s house; only their little ones, and their flocks, and their herds, they left in the land of Goshen. And there went up with him both chariots and horsemen; and it was a very great company” (Genesis 50:7–9). Who, to us, had a greater burial than Joseph, as it was none other than Moses who involved himself in transporting his coffin. Moses merited to be the only person involved in the transportation of Joseph’s bones to be buried in Eretz Yisrael, and there was none among the Jewish people greater than he, as it is stated: “And Moses took the bones of Joseph with him” (Exodus 13:19). Who had a greater burial than Moses, as no one involved himself in his burial other than the Omnipresent Himself, as it is stated: “And He buried him in the valley in the land of Moab over against Beth Peor; and no man knows of his sepulcher unto this day” (Deuteronomy 34:6). The mishna comments: Not only with regard to Moses did the Sages say that God takes part in his burial, but also with regard to all the righteous individuals, as it is stated: “Your righteousness shall go before you and the glory of the Lord shall gather you in” (Isaiah 58:8).

Chapter 2

The husband of the sota would bring his wife’s meal-offering to the priest in an Egyptian wicker basket made of palm branches, and he would place the meal-offering in her hands for her to hold throughout the ritual in order to fatigue her. This might lead her to confess her guilt and not drink the water of a sota unnecessarily. The mishna lists differences between this meal-offering and other meal-offerings. Generally, all meal-offerings, from their beginnings, i.e., the moment they are consecrated, and until their ends, i.e., the moment they are sacrificed, must be in a service vessel. But in the case of this one, its beginning is in a wicker basket and only at its end, immediately before it is offered, is it placed in a service vessel. All other meal-offerings require oil and frankincense, and this one requires neither oil nor frankincense. Furthermore, all other meal-offerings are brought from wheat, and this one is brought from barley. Although in fact the omer meal-offering is also brought from barley, it is still different in that it was brought as groats, i.e., high-quality meal. The meal-offering of the sota, however, is brought as unsifted barley flour. Rabban Gamliel says: This hints that just as her actions of seclusion with another man were the actions of an animal, so too her offering is animal food, i.e., barley and not wheat.

The priest would bring an earthenware drinking vessel [ peyalei ] and he would pour into it half a log of water from the basin in the Temple. Rabbi Yehuda says: The priest would pour only a quarter - log of water. Just as Rabbi Yehuda minimizes the writing, as he requires that less be written on the scroll of the sota than do the Rabbis, so too he minimizes the amount of water to be taken from the basin for the erasing of the text. The priest would enter the Sanctuary and turn to his right. And there was a place there, on the Sanctuary floor, with an area of a cubit by a cubit, and a marble tablet [ tavla ] was there, and a ring was fastened to the tablet to assist the priest when he would raise it. And the priest would take loose dust from underneath it and place the dust into the vessel with the water, so that the dust would be visible upon the water, as it is stated: “And the priest shall take holy water in an earthen vessel; and of the dust that is on the floor of the Tabernacle the priest shall take, and put it into the water” (Numbers 5:17).

When the priest comes to write the scroll of the sota that is to be placed in the water, from what place in the Torah passage concerning the sota (Numbers 5:11–31) does he write? He starts from the verse: “If no man has lain with you, and if you have not gone astray to defilement while under your husband, you shall be free from this water of bitterness that causes the curse” (Numbers 5:19); and continues: “But if you have gone astray while under your husband, and if you are defiled, and some man has lain with you besides your husband” (Numbers 5:20). And then he does not write the beginning of the following verse, which states: “Then the priest shall cause the woman to swear with the oath of cursing, and the priest shall say to the woman” (Numbers 5:21), but he does write the oath recorded in the continuation of the verse: “The Lord shall make you a curse and an oath among your people when the Lord will cause your thigh to fall away, and your belly to swell. And this water that causes the curse shall go into your bowels, and cause your belly to swell, and your thigh to fall away” (Numbers 5:21–22); but he does not write the conclusion of the verse: “And the woman shall say: Amen, amen” (Numbers 5:22). Rabbi Yosei says: He does not interrupt the verses but rather writes the entire passage without any omissions. Rabbi Yehuda says: He writes nothing other than curses recorded in the final verses cited above: “The Lord shall make you a curse and an oath among your people when the Lord will cause your thigh to fall away, and your belly to swell. And this water that causes the curse shall go into your bowels, and cause your belly to swell, and your thigh to fall away.” And he does not write the conclusion of the verse: “And the woman shall say: Amen, amen.”

The priest does not write the scroll of the sota upon a wooden tablet, and not upon paper made from grass, and not upon diftera, a hide that is only partially processed, as it is salted and treated with flour but not gallnuts; rather, it must be written only on a scroll of parchment, as it is stated: “And the priest shall write these curses in a scroll” (Numbers 5:23). And the scribe may not write with gum [ komos ], and not with iron sulfate [ kankantom ], nor with any substance that makes a mark and cannot be completely erased, but only with ink made from soot, as it is stated in the continuation of the same verse: “And he shall blot them out into the water of bitterness” (Numbers 5:23). This indicates that the scroll must be written with a writing that can be erased in water.

With regard to what does she say: “Amen, amen” (Number 5:22), twice, as recorded in the verse? The mishna explains that it includes of the following: Amen on the curse, as she accepts the curse upon herself if she is guilty, and amen on the oath, as she declares that she is not defiled. She states: Amen if I committed adultery with this man about whom I was warned, amen if I committed adultery with another man. Amen that I did not stray when I was betrothed nor after I was married, nor as a widow waiting for my yavam to perform levirate marriage, since a woman at that stage is prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse with any men, nor when married through levirate marriage to the yavam ; amen that I did not become defiled, and if I did become defiled, may all these curses come upon me. Rabbi Meir says that “amen, amen” means: Amen that I did not become defiled in the past, amen that I will not become defiled in the future.

All agree that he may stipulate with her through this oath neither with regard to what she did before becoming be-trothed to him, nor with regard to what she will do after she becomes divorced from him. Similarly, if a husband divorced his wife, and while divorced she secluded herself with another man and became defiled, and afterward her husband took her back and remarried her, and he then warned her about a specific man, and she secluded herself, and she is now about to drink the water of the sota, he cannot stipulate with her that she take an oath that she did not become defiled during the period in which she was divorced. This is because her husband would become forbidden to her only if she had married another man after being divorced, not if she merely committed an act of promiscuity. This is the principle: In every case where if she would engage in sexual intercourse with someone else she would not become forbidden to her husband due to this act, he may not stipulate with her that her oath include that act. The oath can include only cases in which she would be rendered forbidden to him.

Chapter 3

He would take her meal-offering out of the Egyptian wicker basket made of palm leaves in which it was lying and would put it into a service vessel and then place it on her hand. And the priest would then place his hand underneath hers and wave it together with her.

The priest waved it and brought it near to the southwest corner of the altar, removed a handful from it, and burned the handful; and the remainder was eaten by the priests. The priest would force the woman to drink the bitter water of a sota, and afterward he would sacrifice her meal-offering. Rabbi Shimon says: The priest would sacrifice her meal-offering and afterward he would force her to drink, as it is stated: “And the priest shall take a handful of the meal-offering, as the memorial part of it, and burn it upon the altar, and afterward he shall make the woman drink the water” (Numbers 5:26). But Rabbi Shimon concedes that if the priest first forced her to drink and afterward sacrificed her meal-offering, it is still valid.

If before the scroll was erased she said: I will not drink, the scroll that was written for her is sequestered, and her meal-offering is burned and scattered over the place of the ashes, and her scroll is not fit to give to another sota to drink. If the scroll was erased and afterward she said: I am defiled, the water is poured out, and her meal-offering is scattered in the place of the ashes. If the scroll was already erased and she said: I will not drink, she is forced to drink against her will.

When a guilty woman drinks she does not manage to finish drinking before her face turns green and her eyes bulge, and her skin becomes full of protruding veins, and the people standing in the Temple say: Remove her, so that she does not render the Temple courtyard impure by dying there. The mishna limits the scope of the previous statement: If she has merit, it delays punishment for her and she does not die immediately. There is a merit that delays punishment for one year, there is a larger merit that delays punishment for two years, and there is a merit that delays punishment for three years. From here Ben Azzai states: A person is obligated to teach his daughter Torah, so that if she drinks and does not die immediately, she will know that some merit she has delayed punishment for her. Rabbi Eliezer says: Anyone who teaches his daughter Torah is teaching her promiscuity [ tiflut ]. Rabbi Yehoshua says: A woman desires to receive the amount of a kav of food and a sexual relationship [ tiflut ] rather than to receive nine kav of food and abstinence. He would say: A foolish man of piety, and a conniving wicked person, and an abstinent woman [ perusha ], and those who injure themselves out of false abstinence; all these are people who erode the world.

Rabbi Shimon says: Merit does not delay the punishment of the bitter water of a sota, and if you say that merit does delay the punishment of the water that causes the curse, as stated earlier by the Rabbis (20a), you weaken [ madhe ] the power of the bitter water before all the women who drink the water, who will no longer be afraid of it, as they will rely on their merit to save them. And you defame the untainted women who drank the water and survived, as people say: They are defiled but it is their merit that delayed the punishment for them. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Merit delays the punishment of the water that causes the curse, but a woman whose punishment is delayed does not give birth and does not flourish; rather, she progressively deteriorates. Ultimately she dies by the same death as a sota who dies immediately.

If the meal-offering of the sota is rendered impure before it has been sanctified in the service vessel, its status is like that of all the other meal-offerings that are rendered impure before being sanctified in a service vessel, and it is redeemed. But if it is rendered impure after it has been sanctified in the service vessel, its status is like that of all the other meal-offerings that are rendered impure after being sanctified in a service vessel, and it is burned. And these are the sota women whose meal-offerings are burned if they have already been sanctified in a service vessel: A woman who confesses and says: I am defiled, and therefore prohibited to you; and a woman with regard to whom witnesses came and testified that she is defiled; and a woman who says: I will not drink the bitter water of a sota, even if she does not confess her guilt; and a woman whose husband changed his mind and does not want to force her to drink; and a woman whose husband engaged in sexual intercourse with her on the way to the Temple.

And all the women who are married to priests, their meal-offerings are always burned, as the verse states: “And every meal-offering of a priest shall be completely burned; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16). An Israelite woman who is married to a priest, her meal-offering is burned; and the daughter of a priest who is married to an Israelite, her meal-offering is eaten. The mishna asks a general question: What are the differences between a priest and the daughter of a priest? The meal-offering of the daughter of a priest is eaten by the priests, but the meal-offering of a priest is not eaten. The daughter of a priest can become disqualified from marrying a priest and from partaking of teruma by engaging in sexual intercourse with someone forbidden to her, but a priest does not become desacralized by engaging in sexual intercourse with a woman forbidden to him. The daughter of a priest may become impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, but a priest may not become impure with impurity imparted by a corpse except for the burial of his seven closest relatives. A priest may eat from offerings of the most sacred order, but the daughter of a priest may not eat from offerings of the most sacred order.

What are the halakhic differences between a man and a woman? A man lets his hair grow and rends his garments when he is a leper, but a woman does not let her hair grow or rend her garments when she is a leper. A man can vow that his minor son shall be a nazirite, obligating the son to remain a nazirite even during his adulthood, but a woman cannot vow that her son shall be a nazirite. A man can shave at the culmination of his naziriteship by using offerings originally designated for his father’s naziriteship, i.e., if one’s father was also a nazirite and he died having already designated offerings for the culmination of his naziriteship; but a woman cannot shave at the culmination of her naziriteship by using offerings designated for her father’s naziriteship. A man can betroth his daughter to another man while she is a minor, but a woman cannot betroth her daughter even while she is a minor. A man can sell his daughter as a maidservant while she is a minor, but a woman cannot sell her daughter as a maidservant even while she is a minor. A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked. A man is hanged after he is stoned for certain transgressions, but a woman is not hanged. A man is sold for his committing an act of theft in order to pay his debt, but a woman is not sold for her committing an act of theft.

Chapter 4

With regard to a betrothed woman who secluded herself with another man after being warned by her betrothed, and a widow waiting for her brother-in-law [ yavam ] to perform levirate marriage who secluded herself with another man after being warned by her yavam, they neither drink the bitter water nor collect payment of their marriage contracts. The reason they are not entitled to payment of their marriage contracts is that the betrothed woman became forbidden to her betrothed or the widow became forbidden to her yavam due to her own actions of entering into seclusion with the paramour. And the fact that they do not drink the bitter water is as it is stated: “This is the law of jealousy, when a wife, while under her husband, goes astray, and is defiled” (Numbers 5:29). The verse excludes a betrothed woman and a widow awaiting her yavam ; since they are not yet married, neither is considered as “under her husband.” The mishna delineates cases where the woman’s marriage was prohibited in the first place: With regard to a widow who was married to a High Priest, or a divorcée or ḥalutza who was married to a common priest, or a mamzeret or Gibeonite woman who was married to a Jew of unflawed lineage, or a Jewish woman of unflawed lineage who was married to a mamzer or a Gibeonite, all of these women neither drink the bitter water nor collect payment of their marriage contracts, as the sota ritual applies only to permitted marriages.

And the following women neither drink the bitter water nor collect payment of their marriage contracts: A woman who confesses and says: I am defiled, and a woman with regard to whom witnesses came and testified that she is defiled, and a woman who says: I will not drink the bitter water, even if she does not confess her guilt. However, a woman whose husband said: I will not have her drink, and a woman whose husband engaged in sexual intercourse with her on the way to the Temple, collect payment of their marriage contracts even though they do not drink the bitter water, as it is due to the husbands that they do not drink. If the husbands of sota women died before their wives drank the bitter water, Beit Shammai say: They collect payment of their marriage contracts and they do not drink the bitter water. And Beit Hillel say: They either drink the bitter water or they do not collect payment of their marriage contracts.

A woman who was pregnant with the child of another man at the time of her marriage and a woman who was nursing the child of another man at the time of her marriage neither drink the bitter water nor collect payment of their marriage contracts. This is because by rabbinic law they may not marry for twenty-four months after the baby’s birth, and therefore these also constitute prohibited marriages. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He can separate from her, and remarry her after the time of twenty-four months has elapsed, and therefore these are considered permitted marriages, and the women can drink the bitter water. A sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children [ ailonit ], and an elderly woman, and a woman who is incapable of giving birth for other reasons, neither collect payment of their marriage contracts nor drink the bitter water, as marrying a woman who cannot give birth constitutes a violation of the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. Rabbi Elazar says: He can marry another woman and procreate through her; therefore, these are considered permitted marriages, and women in these categories can drink the bitter water. And all other women either drink the bitter water or do not collect payment of their marriage contracts.

The wife of a priest drinks, and if she is found to be innocent of adultery, she is permitted to her husband. The wife of a eunuch also drinks. A husband can issue a warning to his wife forbidding her to seclude herself with any man, even with regard to all those men with whom relations are forbidden, e.g., her father or brother, with the exception of a minor and of one who is not a man, i.e., in a situation where a man suspects his wife of bestiality.

And these are the women to whom the court issues a warning in place of their husbands: One whose husband became a deaf-mute or became an imbecile, or was incarcerated in prison. The Sages said that the court warns her not in order to have her drink the bitter water if she disobeys the warning, but in order to disqualify her from receiving payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei says: The court’s warning also serves to have her drink, and when her husband is released from prison he has her drink.

Chapter 5

Just as the water evaluates her fidelity, so too, the water evaluates his, i.e., her alleged paramour’s, involvement in the sin, as it is stated: “And the water that causes the curse shall enter into her” (Numbers 5:24), and it is stated again: “And the water that causes the curse shall enter into her and become bitter” (Numbers 5:27). It is derived from the double mention of the phrase “and…shall enter” that both the woman and her paramour are evaluated by the water. Furthermore, prior to her drinking the water, just as she is forbidden to her husband, so too is she forbidden to her paramour, because in contrast to the verse stating: “Is defiled [ nitma’a ]” (Numbers 5:14), a superfluous conjoining prefix vav is added to a later verse, rendering the phrase: “And is defiled [ venitma’a ]” (Numbers 5:29). The addition indicates another prohibition, that of the woman to her paramour. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehoshua said: That was how Zekharya ben HaKatzav would interpret it, i.e., he also derived from the superfluous vav that the woman is forbidden to her paramour. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says an alternate source: The two times that the defilement of the wife is stated in the passage, namely: “And he warns his wife, and she is defiled” (Numbers 5:14), and the later verse: “When a wife, being under her husband, goes astray and is defiled” (Numbers 5:29), indicate that her defilement results in two prohibitions. One is that she is forbidden to her husband and one is that she is forbidden to her paramour.

On that same day that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya was appointed head of the Sanhedrin, Rabbi Akiva interpreted the verse: “And every earthen vessel into which any of them falls, whatever is in it shall be impure [ yitma ], and you shall break it” (Leviticus 11:33), as follows: The verse does not state: Is impure [ tamei ], but rather: “Shall be impure,” in order to indicate that not only does the vessel itself become ritually impure, but it can now render other items ritually impure. This teaches with regard to a loaf that has second- degree ritual impurity status due to its being placed inside an earthenware vessel that had first-degree impurity, that it can render other food with which it comes into contact impure with third- degree impurity status. After hearing Rabbi Akiva’s statement, Rabbi Yehoshua said: Who will remove the dirt from your eyes, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, so that you could live and see this? As you would say: In the future, another generation is destined to deem pure a loaf that contracted third- degree impurity, as there is no explicit verse from the Torah stating that it is impure. But now Rabbi Akiva, your disciple, brings a verse from the Torah indicating that it is impure, as it is stated: “Whatever is in it shall be impure.”

Furthermore, on that same day Rabbi Akiva interpreted the verses with regard to the Levite cities as follows: One verse states: “And you shall measure outside the city for the east side two thousand cubits… this shall be for them the open land outside the cities” (Numbers 35:5), and another verse states: “And the open land around the cities, which you shall give to the Levites, shall be from the wall of the city and outward one thousand cubits round about” (Numbers 35:4). It is impossible to say that the area around the cities given to the Levites was only one thousand cubits, as it is already stated: “Two thousand cubits.” And it is impossible to say that two thousand cubits were left for them, as it is already stated: “One thousand cubits.” How can these texts be reconciled? One thousand cubits are to be set aside as a tract of open land surrounding the city, and the two thousand cubits are mentioned not in order to be given to the Levites, but to indicate the boundary of the Shabbat limit, beyond which it is forbidden to travel on Shabbat. This verse thereby serves as the source for the two-thousand-cubit Shabbat limit. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says otherwise: One thousand cubits were given to the Levites as an open tract of land, that could not be planted or built upon, and two thousand cubits of additional land were given to the Levites for planting fields and vineyards.

Additionally, on that same day Rabbi Akiva interpreted the verse: “Then Moses and the children of Israel sang this song to the Lord, and said, saying” (Exodus 15:1), as follows: As there is no need for the verse to state the word “saying,” because it states the word “said” immediately prior to it, why must the verse state the word “saying”? It teaches that the Jewish people would repeat in song after Moses every single statement he said, as is done when reciting hallel. After Moses would recite a verse, they would say as a refrain: “I will sing to the Lord, for He is highly exalted” (Exodus 15:1). It is for this reason that the word “saying” is stated, in addition to the word “said.” Rabbi Neḥemya says: The people sang the song together with Moses as is done when reciting Shema, which is recited in unison after the prayer leader begins, and not as is done when reciting hallel.

On that same day Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hyrcanus taught: Job served the Holy One, Blessed be He, only out of love, as it is stated: “Though He will slay me, still I will trust in Him” (Job 13:15). And still, the matter is even, i.e., the verse is ambiguous, as there are two possible interpretations of the verse. Was Job saying: I will await Him, expressing his yearning for God; or should the verse be interpreted as saying I will not await Him. As the word “lo” can mean either “to him” or “not,” it is unclear which meaning is intended here. This dilemma is resolved elsewhere, where the verse states a clearer indication of Job’s intent: “Till I die I will not put away my integrity from me” (Job 27:5). This teaches that he acted out of love. Rabbi Yehoshua said: Who will remove the dirt from your eyes, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, so that you could live and see this? As you taught all your life that Job worshipped the Omnipresent only out of fear, as it is stated: “And that man was wholehearted and upright, and God-fearing, and shunned evil” (Job 1:1); but now Yehoshua ben Hyrcanus, the disciple of your disciple, has taught that Job acted out of love.

Chapter 6

In the case of one who warned his wife not to seclude herself with a particular man and she subsequently secluded herself with the man she was warned about, even if he heard about it from a flying bird, or any other source whatsoever, he must divorce his wife. However, he must still grant her the money accorded to her by her marriage contract because there is no actual proof of her seclusion with the man in question. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, who, as quoted in the first mishna of the tractate (2a), holds that there is no necessity for witnesses to testify with regard to the seclusion, and the woman becomes forbidden to her husband even in the absence of witnesses, by the husband’s word alone. Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees, as he did in the mishna (2a), and says: He does not divorce his wife in the absence of witnesses until the gossiping women who sit and spin thread by the light of the moon begin to discuss her behavior, as they share the gossip of the town. The Gemara earlier (6b) taught that a woman whose infidelity became subject to this public discussion can no longer be tested by the bitter water of a sota. Consequently, she must get divorced.

The mishna continues to list various possible testimonies concerning of such acts of seclusion. If one witness said: I saw that she became defiled during her seclusion by engaging in sexual intercourse with that other man, she does not drink the bitter water, but rather, he divorces her immediately. And furthermore, even if the one who testified was a slave or a maidservant, neither of whom is generally regarded as a valid witness, they are deemed credible to testify to the wife’s adultery even to the extent that their testimony disqualifies her from receiving her marriage contract and prevents her from drinking the bitter water. The mishna continues by listing women whose testimony is only partially accepted concerning this matter: Her mother-in-law, and her mother in-law’s daughter, and her rival wife, i.e., a second wife of the husband, and her yevama, i.e., her husband’s brother’s wife, and her husband’s daughter, all of whom are generally not deemed credible if they say anything incriminating pertaining to this woman due to the tumultuous relationships these women often have. They are all deemed credible to testify concerning the woman’s defilement while in seclusion, but are not deemed credible to the extent that their testimony will disqualify her from receiving her marriage contract; rather, it is deemed credible to the extent that she will not drink of the bitter water of a sota.

This ruling allowing one witness’s testimony with regard to defilement needs to be stated, as, by right, it should not have been deemed credible based on the following a fortiori inference: And just as if with regard to the first testimony concerning seclusion, which does not forbid her with an irrevocable prohibition, as the woman can be found innocent permitting her again to her husband by drinking the bitter water, is not established with fewer than two witnesses, since according to the mishna the testimony of seclusion requires two witnesses, then with regard to the final testimony concerning defilement, which forbids her to her husband with an irrevocable prohibition, is it not logical that it should also not be established with fewer than two witnesses? Therefore, to counter this derivation, the verse states: “And there be no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13), teaching that any testimony with regard to defilement that there is against her is sufficient, and two witnesses are not required. The Gemara asks: And from now that it is established that one witness suffices to testify with regard to defilement, an a fortiori inference can be made with regard to the first testimony of seclusion: And just as if concerning the final testimony of defilement, which forbids her with an irrevocable prohibition, yet it is established by one witness, then with regard to the first testimony, which does not forbid her with an irrevocable prohibition, is it not logical that it should be established with only one witness? Therefore, to counter this derivation, the verse states: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter [ davar ] in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and there, in the laws concerning monetary matters, it states: “At the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter [ davar ] be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15), teaching that just as the “matter” stated there is established “at the mouth of two witnesses,” so too, here the “matter” of her seclusion must be established “at the mouth of two witnesses.”

The mishna discusses the halakha in a case where two single witnesses contradict each other concerning her defilement. If one witness says: She was defiled, and another witness says: She was not defiled, or similarly in the case of those normally disqualified from bearing witness, if one woman says: She was defiled, and another woman says: She was not defiled, she would drink the bitter water of a sota, due to the uncertainty engendered by the contradictory testimonies. Similarly, if one witness says: She was defiled, and two witnesses say: She was not defiled, she would drink the bitter water. However, if two would say: She was defiled, and one says: She was not defiled, the testimony of the two witnesses is accepted and she would not drink the bitter water, and the husband must divorce her.

Chapter 7

These are recited in any language, not specifically Hebrew: The portion of the warning and the oath administered by the priest to a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [ sota ]; and the declaration of tithes, which occurs after the third and the sixth years of the seven-year Sabbatical cycle, when one declares that he has given his tithes appropriately; Shema ; and the Amida prayer; and Grace after Meals; and an oath of testimony, where one takes an oath that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue; and an oath on a deposit, where one takes an oath that he does not have possession of another’s deposit.

And these are recited only in the sacred tongue, Hebrew: The recitation of the verses that one recounts when bringing the first fruits to the Temple; and the recitations which form an element of the ritual through which a yavam frees a yevama of her levirate bonds [ ḥalitza ]; the blessings and curses that were spoken on Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal; the Priestly Benediction; and the blessing on the Torah recited by the High Priest on Yom Kippur; and the portion of the Torah read by the king at the assembly on Sukkot at the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year; and the portion recited during the ritual of a heifer whose neck is broken, when a person is found killed in an area that is between two cities, and the murderer is unknown; and the speech of a priest who is anointed for war when he addresses the nation before going out to battle.

How is it derived that the recitation when bringing the first fruits is recited specifically in Hebrew? When the Torah discusses this mitzva it states: “And you shall speak and say before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 26:5), and below, in the discussion of the blessings and curses, it states: “And the Levites shall speak and say” (Deuteronomy 27:14). Just as there, the Levites speak in the sacred tongue, so too here, the recitation is in the sacred tongue.

How is it derived that the recitation at a ḥalitza ceremony must be in Hebrew? The verse in the Torah portion discussing ḥalitza states: “And she shall speak and say” (Deuteronomy 25:9), and below it states: “And the Levites shall speak and say” (Deuteronomy 27:14). Just as there, the Levites speak in the sacred tongue, so too here, the recitation is in the sacred tongue. Rabbi Yehuda says: This can be derived from a different word in the verse: “And she shall speak and say: So shall it be done to the man that does not build up his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9). The word “so” indicates that her statement is ineffective unless she says it in these exact words.

How did the ceremony of the blessings and curses take place? When the Jewish people crossed the Jordan River they came to Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal, which are in Samaria along-side the city of Shechem, which is near the oaks of Moreh, as it is stated: “Are they not beyond the Jordan, behind the way of the going down of the sun, in the land of the Canaanites that dwell in the Arabah, over against Gilgal, beside the oaks of Moreh?” (Deuteronomy 11:30), and there it states: “And Abram passed through the land until the place of Shechem, until the oaks of Moreh” (Genesis 12:6). Just as the oaks of Moreh mentioned there with regard to Abraham are close to Shechem, so too, the oaks of Moreh mentioned here are close to Shechem. Six tribes ascended to the top of Mount Gerizim and six tribes ascended to the top of Mount Ebal, and the priests and the Levites and the Ark were standing at the bottom in the middle, between the two mountains. The priests were surrounding the Ark and the Levites were surrounding the priests, and all the rest of the Jewish people were standing on the mountains on this side and on that side, as it is stated: “And all Israel, and their elders and officers, and their judges, stood on this side of the Ark and on that side before the priests the Levites that bore the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord” (Joshua 8:33). The Levites then turned to face Mount Gerizim and opened with the blessing: Blessed be the man who does not make a graven or molten image (see Deuteronomy 27:15), and these people and those people, i.e., the two groups standing on either mountain, answered: Amen. Then they turned to face Mount Ebal and opened with the curse: “Cursed be the man who makes a graven or molten image” (Deuteronomy 27:15), and these people and those people answered: Amen. They continued in this manner until they completed reciting all of the blessings and curses. And afterward they brought the stones as commanded in the Torah, and they built the altar and plastered it with plaster, and they wrote on it all of the words of the Torah in seventy languages, as it is stated: “And you shall write on the stones all the words of this law clearly elucidated” (Deuteronomy 27:8), indicating that it was to be written in every language. And they then took the stones from there and came to Gilgal and slept in their lodging place.

How is the Priestly Benediction recited? In the country, i.e., outside the Temple, the priest recites the verses as three blessings, pausing between each verse while the people respond amen. And in the Temple, the priests recite all three verses as one blessing, after which the people respond: Blessed be the Lord, God, the God of Israel, from eternity to eternity, as is the customary response to blessings in the Temple. In the Temple, the priest utters the name of God as it is written in the Torah, i.e., the Tetragrammaton, and in the country they use its substitute name of Lordship. In the country, the priests lift their hands so they are aligned with their shoulders during the benediction. And in the Temple they lift them above their heads, except for the High Priest, who does not lift his hands above the frontplate. Since the Tetragrammaton is inscribed on it, it is inappropriate for him to lift his hands above it. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the High Priest lifts his hands above the frontplate, as it is stated: “And Aaron lifted up his hands toward the people and blessed them” (Leviticus 9:22).

How are the blessings of the High Priest recited on Yom Kippur? The synagogue attendant takes a Torah scroll and gives it to the head of the synagogue that stands on the Temple Mount, and the head of the synagogue gives it to the deputy High Priest, and the deputy High Priest gives it to the High Priest. And the High Priest stands; and receives the Torah scroll; and reads the Torah portion beginning with the verse: “After the death” (Leviticus 16:1–34), and the portion beginning with the verse: “But on the tenth” (Leviticus 23:26–32); and furls the Torah scroll; and places it on his bosom; and says: More than what I have read before you is written here. He then reads by heart the portion beginning with: “And on the tenth,” from the book of Numbers (see 29:7–11). And after the reading the High Priest recites the following eight blessings: A blessing concerning the Torah, and concerning the Temple service, and concerning thanksgiving, and concerning forgiveness for iniquity, and concerning the Temple, and concerning the Jewish people, and concerning the priests, and concerning Jerusalem, and the rest of the prayer.

How is the portion of the Torah that is read by the king recited at the assembly, when all the Jewish people would assemble? At the conclusion of the first day of the festival of Sukkot, on the eighth, after the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, they make a wooden platform for the king in the Temple courtyard, and he sits on it, as it is stated: “At the end of every seven years, in the Festival of the Sabbatical Year” (Deuteronomy 31:10). The synagogue attendant takes a Torah scroll and gives it to the head of the synagogue that stands on the Temple Mount. And the head of the synagogue gives it to the deputy High Priest, and the deputy High Priest gives it to the High Priest, and the High priest gives it to the king. And the king stands, and receives the Torah scroll, and reads from it while sitting. King Agrippa arose, and received the Torah scroll, and read from it while standing, and the Sages praised him for this. And when Agrippa arrived at the verse in the portion read by the king that states: “You may not appoint a foreigner over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15), tears flowed from his eyes, because he was a descendant of the house of Herod and was not of Jewish origin. The entire nation said to him: Fear not, Agrippa. You are our brother, you are our brother. And the king reads from the beginning of Deuteronomy, from the verse that states: “And these are the words” (Deuteronomy 1:1), until the words: “Hear, O Israel” (Deuteronomy 6:4). And he then reads the sections beginning with: “Hear, O Israel” (Deuteronomy 6:4–9), “And it shall come to pass, if you shall hearken” (Deuteronomy 11:13–21), “You shall tithe” (Deuteronomy 14:22–29), “When you have made an end of the tithing” (Deuteronomy 26:12–15), and the passage concerning the appointment of a king (Deuteronomy 17:14–20), and the blessings and curses (Deuteronomy 28), until he finishes the entire portion. The same blessings that the High Priest recites on Yom Kippur, the king recites at this ceremony, but he delivers a blessing concerning the Festivals in place of the blessing concerning forgiveness for iniquity.

Chapter 8

With regard to the priest who was anointed for war, at the time that he would speak to the nation, he would speak to them in the sacred tongue, Hebrew, as it is stated: “And it shall be, when you draw near to the battle, that the priest shall approach and speak to the people” (Deuteronomy 20:2). This priest identified in the verse is the priest anointed for war, the priest who is inaugurated specifically to serve this function. “And speak to the people”; he addresses them in the sacred tongue, Hebrew. The Torah dictates the priest’s address: “And he shall say to them: Hear Israel, you draw near today to battle against your enemies; let not your heart faint; fear not, nor be alarmed, and do not be terrified of them” (Deuteronomy 20:3). The priest expounds: “Against your enemies” and not against your brothers. This is not a war of the tribe of Judah against Simon and not Simon against Benjamin, such that if you fall into their hands your brothers will have mercy on you, as it is stated with regard to a war between Judah and Israel: “And the men that have been mentioned by name rose up, and took the captives, and with the spoil clothed all that were naked among them, and arrayed them, and shod them, and gave them to eat and to drink, and anointed them, and carried all the feeble of them upon donkeys, and brought them to Jericho, the city of palm trees, unto their brethren; then they returned to Samaria” (II Chronicles 28:15). Rather, you are marching to war against your enemies, and if you fall into their hands, they will not have mercy on you. The priest continues: “Let not your heart faint; fear not, nor be alarmed, and do not be terrified of them” (Deuteronomy 20:3). “Let not your heart faint” due to the neighing of horses and the sharpening of the enemy’s swords. “Fear not” due to the knocking of shields [ terisin ] and the noise of their boots [ calgassin ]. “Nor be alarmed” by the sound of trumpets. “Do not be terrified” due to the sound of shouts. The priest explains why the soldiers need not be terrified. “For the Lord your God is He that goes with you, to fight for you against your enemies, to save you” (Deuteronomy 20:4). Remember that they come to war championed by flesh and blood, and you are coming championed by the Omnipresent. The Philistines came championed by Goliath. What was his end? In the end, he fell by the sword, and they fell with him (see I Samuel, chapter 17). The Ammonites came championed by Shobach. What was his end? In the end, he fell by the sword, and they fell with him (see II Samuel, chapter 10). But as for you, you are not so, reliant upon the strength of mortals: “For the Lord your God is He that goes with you, to fight for you against your enemies, to save you”; this verse is referring to the camp of the Ark of the Covenant that accompanies them out to war.

The mishna continues its discussion of the speech given before battle. “And the officers shall speak to the people, saying: What man is there that has built a new house, and has not dedicated it? Let him go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man dedicate it” (Deuteronomy 20:5). He is sent home if he is one who builds a storehouse for straw, a barn for cattle, a shed for wood, or a warehouse. Similarly, it applies if he is one who builds, or if he is one who purchases, or if he is one who inherits, or if he is one to whom it is given as a gift. In all these instances, the man returns from the war encampment. The next verse states: “And what man is there that has planted a vineyard, and has not used the fruit thereof? Let him go and return unto his house, lest he die in the battle and another man use the fruit thereof” (Deuteronomy 20:6). He is sent home if he is one who plants a whole vineyard of many vines, or if he is one who plants as few as five fruit trees of another variety, and even if these five are from the five species. The produce need not be all of one species. The same applies if he is one who plants, or if he is one who layers the vine, bending a branch into the ground so that it may take root and grow as a new vine, or if he is one who grafts different trees onto one another. And it applies if he is one who purchases a vineyard, or if he is one who inherits a vineyard, or if he is one to whom the vineyard is given as a gift. The next verse states: “And what man is there that has betrothed a wife, and has not taken her? Let him go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man take her” (Deuteronomy 20:7). He is sent home if he is one who betroths a virgin, or if he is one who betroths a widow. This applies even if his yevama, his late brother’s wife, is a widow waiting for him as her yavam to perform levirate marriage; and even if he heard that his brother died in the war and the widow begins to wait for him only then, he returns and goes home. Each of these men, although they are exempt, still hear the address of the priest and the regulations of war at the local camp, and thereafter they return to their respective homes. However, they still support the war effort, and they provide water and food for the soldiers and repair the roads.

And these are the men who do not return to their homes: One who builds a gateway, or an enclosed veranda [ akhsadra ], or a balcony; or one who plants no more than four fruit trees or even five or more non-fruit bearing trees; or one who remarries his divorced wife. Nor is there an exemption for one who has betrothed a woman whom he is not permitted to marry: With regard to a widow betrothed to a High Priest (see Leviticus 21:7); a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ ḥalutza ], in lieu of entering into a levirate marriage, betrothed to a common priest (see Leviticus 21:13–15); a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman betrothed to an Israelite; or an Israelite woman betrothed to a mamzer or a Gibeonite (see Deuteronomy 23:3); such a man does not return to his home. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who rebuilds a house as it stood originally would not return. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even one who builds a new brick house in the Sharon would not return because these houses are not stable and are expected to collapse periodically.

These are the men who do not even move from their places because they do not even report to the camp: One who built a house and dedicated it within the year; one who planted a vineyard and used its fruit for less than a year; one who marries his betrothed and one who marries his yevama, his brother’s widow who must enter into a levirate marriage or perform ḥalitza, as it is stated: “When a man takes a new wife, he shall not go out with the army… he shall be free for his house one year, and shall cheer his wife whom he has taken” (Deuteronomy 24:5). The mishna interprets the verse as follows: “For his house”; this means his house that he built. “He shall be”; this term includes his vineyard. “And shall cheer his wife”; this is his wife. “Whom he has taken”; this phrase comes to include his yevama, who is considered his wife with respect to this halakha although he has not yet married her. Those who are exempt for these reasons do not even provide water and food to the soldiers, and they do not repair the roads.

The mishna continues its discussion of the speech given before battle. “And the officers shall speak further to the people, and they shall say: What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted? Let him go and return unto his house” (Deuteronomy 20:8). Rabbi Akiva says: “That is fearful and fainthearted” is to be understood as it indicates, that the man is unable to stand in the battle ranks and to see a drawn sword because it will terrify him. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: “That is fearful and fainthearted”; this is one who is afraid because of the sins that he has; he, too, returns. Therefore, the Torah provided him with all these additional reasons for exemption from the army so he can ascribe his leaving to one of them. In this way, the sinner may leave the ranks without having to publicly acknowledge that he is a sinner. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to one who has betrothed a woman forbidden to him, including a widow betrothed to a High Priest; a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ ḥalutza ] betrothed to a common priest; a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman betrothed to an Israelite; or a daughter of an Israelite betrothed to a mamzer or a Gibeonite; this man is he whom the verse calls “fearful and fainthearted.” He fears that his sin will jeopardize his safety in the war.

The mishna continues its discussion. The verse states: “And it shall be, when the officers conclude speaking to the people, that captains of legions shall be appointed at the head of the people” (Deuteronomy 20:9). The mishna adds: As well as at the rear of the people. The officers station guards [ zekifin ] in front of them, and other guards behind them, and they have iron rods [ kashilin ] in their hands. And with regard to anyone who attempts to turn back and flee from the war, the guard has license to beat [ lekape’aḥ ] his legs because the beginning of fleeing is a downfall on the battlefield, as it is stated: “Israel has fled before the Philistines, and there has been also a great slaughter among the people” (I Samuel 4:17), and likewise it says further on: “And the men of Israel fled from before the Philistines, and fell down slain in Mount Gilboa” (I Samuel 31:1).

The mishna adds: In what case are all of these statements, with regard to the various exemptions from war, said? They are said with regard to elective wars. But in wars whose mandate is a mitzva, everyone goes, even a groom from his room and a bride from her wedding canopy. Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case are all of these statements, with regard to the various exemptions from war, said? They are said with regard to wars whose mandate is a mitzva. But in obligatory wars, everyone goes, even a groom from his room and a bride from her wedding canopy.

Chapter 9

In certain cases of unsolved murder, the Torah prescribes a ritual performed with a heifer whose neck is broken. During the course of this ritual, the judges say a confession in the sacred tongue, Hebrew, as it is stated in the verse: “If one be found slain in the land which the Lord your God has given you to possess it, lying in the field, and it is not known who has smitten him; then your Elders and your judges shall come forth” (Deuteronomy 21:1–2). What is the procedure for this ritual? Three members of the High Court [Sanhedrin] that is in Jerusalem would go out to see the corpse. Rabbi Yehuda says: Five would go out, as it is stated: “Your Elders,” in the plural form, indicating at least two; and it is written: “And your judges,” in the plural form, indicating another two judges; and a court may not be comprised of an even number of judges because they need to be able to issue a majority ruling. Consequently, they add to them one more Elder.

If the corpse was found concealed in a pile of stones, or hanging on a tree, or floating on the surface of the water, then the judges would not break the neck of the heifer, as it is stated: “If one be found slain in the land” (Deuteronomy 21:1), and not concealed in a pile of stones; “lying” on the ground and not hanging on a tree; “in the field,” and not floating on the surface of the water. If a corpse was found close to the border of the country, or close to a city in which the majority of its inhabitants are gentiles, or close to a city that is without a rabbinical court of twenty-three judges, then the judges would not break the heifer’s neck. Additionally, the Elders measure the distance from the corpse only to a city that has a rabbinical court with twenty-three judges. If the slain person is found precisely between two cities, the inhabitants of the two of them bring two heifers total; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the inhabitants of Jerusalem do not bring a heifer whose neck is broken, even if Jerusalem is the city closest to the slain victim.

If the head of the corpse was found in one place and his body was found in a different place, they bring the head next to the body; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Akiva says: They bring the body next to the head.

From where on the body would they measure the distance? Rabbi Eliezer says: From his navel. Rabbi Akiva says: From his nose. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: From the place where he became a slain person, which is from the neck.

The mishna continues to describe the ritual. After they would take the measurement, the Elders of Jerusalem took their leave and went away. The Elders of the city that is closest to the corpse bring a heifer from cattle, which has not pulled a yoke. But a blemish does not disqualify it, because, unlike the description of the red heifer, the Torah does not state that it must be without blemish. And they bring it down to a stream that is eitan. Eitan in this context means as the word generally indicates, powerful. The stream must have a forceful flow. The mishna comments: Even if it is not forceful, it is a valid site for the ritual. And they break the neck of the heifer from behind with a cleaver. And with regard to its place, where the heifer was standing when its neck was broken, it is prohibited for that ground to be sown or to be worked, but it is permitted to comb flax there or to cut stones there.

The Elders of that city would then wash their hands in water in the place of the breaking of the neck of the heifer, and they would recite: “Our hands did not spill this blood, nor did our eyes see” (Deuteronomy 21:7). The mishna explains: But did it enter our minds that the Elders of the court are spillers of blood, that they must make such a declaration? Rather, they mean to declare that the victim did not come to us and then we let him take his leave without food, and we did not see him and then leave him alone to depart without accompaniment. They therefore attest that they took care of all his needs and are not responsible for his death even indirectly. And the priests recite: “Forgive, Lord, Your people Israel, whom You have redeemed, and suffer not innocent blood to remain in the midst of Your people Israel” (Deuteronomy 21:8). They did not have to recite the conclusion of the verse: “And the blood shall be forgiven for them,” as this is not part of the priests’ statement, but rather the Divine Spirit informs them: When you shall do so, the blood is forgiven for you.

If the killer is found before the heifer’s neck was broken, the heifer shall go out and graze among the herd. It is not considered sacred at all, and it may rejoin the other animals. If the killer is found from the time when the heifer’s neck was broken, even if the rest of the ritual has not yet been performed, it is prohibited to benefit from the animal, despite the killer having been found; it should be buried in its place. This is because the heifer initially came for uncertainty, as the killer was unknown, and it atoned for its uncertainty and left, i.e., it fulfilled its purpose of bringing atonement and is considered a heifer whose neck is broken in all regards. If the heifer’s neck was broken and afterward the killer was found, he is killed. The ritual does not atone for him.

If one witness says: I saw the killer, and one other witness says: You did not see him; or if a woman says: I saw, and another woman says: You did not see, they would break the neck of the heifer, as without clear testimony about the identity of the killer the ritual is performed. Similarly, if one witness says: I saw the killer, and two witnesses say: You did not see, they would break the neck of the heifer, as the pair is relied upon. If two witnesses say: We saw the killer, and one witness says to them: You did not see, they would not break the neck of the heifer, as there are two witnesses to the identity of the killer.

The mishna further states: From the time when murderers proliferated, the ritual of the heifer whose neck is broken was nullified. The ritual was performed only when the identity of the murderer was completely unknown. Once there were many known murderers, the conditions for the performance of the ritual were no longer present, as the probable identity of the murderer was known. From the time when Eliezer ben Dinai, who was also called Teḥina ben Perisha, came, they renamed him: Son of a murderer. This is an example of a publicly known murderer. The mishna teaches a similar occurrence: From the time when adulterers proliferated, the performance of the ritual of the bitter waters was nullified; they would not administer the bitter waters to the sota. And it was Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai who nullified it, as it is stated: “I will not punish your daughters when they commit harlotry, nor your daughters-in-law when they commit adultery; for they consort with lewd women” (Hosea 4:14), meaning that when the husbands are adulterers, the wives are not punished for their own adultery. From the time when Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida and Yosei ben Yehuda of Jerusalem died, the clusters ceased, i.e., they were the last of the clusters, as explained in the Gemara, as it is stated: “There is no cluster to eat; nor first-ripe fig that my soul desires” (Micah 7:1).

The mishna continues in the same vein: Yoḥanan the High Priest took away the declaration of the tithe. After his time, no one recited the passage about the elimination of tithes that had previously been said at the end of a three-year tithing cycle. He also nullified the actions of the awakeners and the strikers at the Temple. Until his days the hammer of smiths would strike in Jerusalem on the intermediate days of a Festival, but he banned the practice. And furthermore, in his days there was no need to inquire about doubtfully tithed produce [ demai ], as everyone was careful to tithe. This mishna continues with the list of items that were nullified.

From the time when the Sanhedrin ceased song was also nullified from the places of feasts, i.e., it was no longer permitted to sing at a feast where wine was served, as it is stated: “With song they shall not drink wine” (Isaiah 24:9).

From the time when the early prophets died the Urim VeTummim was nullified. From the time when the Second Temple was destroyed the shamir worm ceased to exist and also the sweetness of the honeycomb, as the verse says with regard to the laws of the Torah: “More to be desired are they than gold, indeed, than much fine gold; sweeter also than honey and the honeycomb” (Psalms 19:11). And men of faith ceased from being among the Jewish people, as it is stated: “Help, Lord, for the pious man is finished; for the faithful fail from among the children of men” (Psalms 12:2). Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that Rabbi Yehoshua testified: From the day the Temple was destroyed there is no day that does not include some form of curse. And since then the dew has not descended for blessing, and the taste has been removed from fruit. Rabbi Yosei says: Since then, the fat of fruit has also been removed.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since then, the lost purity has removed the taste and the aroma from fruit; the tithes that were not separated have removed the fat of the grain. And the Sages say: Promiscuity and witchcraft have consumed it all.

In the war [ pulemus ] of Vespasian the Sages decreed upon the crowns of bridegrooms, i.e., that bridegrooms may no longer wear crowns, and upon the drums, meaning they also banned the playing of drums. In the war of Titus they also decreed upon the crowns of brides, and they decreed that a person should not teach his son Greek. In the last war, meaning the bar Kokheva revolt, they decreed that a bride may not go out in a palanquin inside the city, but our Sages permitted a bride to go out in a palanquin inside the city, as this helps the bride maintain her modesty.

The mishna lists more things that ceased: From the time when Rabbi Meir died, those who relate parables ceased; from the time when ben Azzai died, the diligent ceased; from the time when ben Zoma died, the exegetists ceased; from the time when Rabbi Yehoshua died, goodness ceased from the world; from the time when Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel died, locusts come and troubles multiplied; from the time when Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya died, the sages ceased to be wealthy; from the time when Rabbi Akiva died, the honor of the Torah ceased; from the time when Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa died, the men of wondrous action ceased; from the time when Rabbi Yosei the Small died, the pious were no more. And why was he called the Small? Because he was the smallest of the pious, meaning he was one of the least important of the pious men. From the time when Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai died, the glory of wisdom ceased; from the time when Rabban Gamliel the Elder died, the honor of the Torah ceased, and purity and asceticism died. From the time when Rabbi Yishmael ben Pavi died, the glory of the priesthood ceased; from the time when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi died, humility and fear of sin ceased. Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir says: From the time when the Second Temple was destroyed, the ḥaverim and free men of noble lineage were ashamed, and their heads were covered in shame, and men of action dwindled, and violent and smooth-talking men gained the upper hand, and none seek, and none ask, and none inquire of the fear of Heaven. Upon whom is there for us to rely? Only upon our Father in Heaven. Rabbi Eliezer the Great says: From the day the Second Temple was destroyed, the generations have deteriorated: Scholars have begun to become like scribes that teach children, and scribes have become like beadles, and beadles have become like ignoramuses, and ignoramuses are increasingly diminished, and none ask and none seek. Upon whom is there to rely? Only upon our Father in Heaven. He also said: In the times of the approach of the Messiah, impudence will increase and high costs will pile up. Although the vine shall bring forth its fruit, wine will nevertheless be expensive. And the monarchy shall turn to heresy, and there will be no one to give reproof about this. The meeting place of the Sages will become a place of promiscuity, and the Galilee shall be destroyed, and the Gavlan will be desolate, and the men of the border shall go round from city to city to seek charity, but they will find no mercy. And the wisdom of scribes will putrefy, and people who fear sin will be held in disgust, and the truth will be absent. The youth will shame the face of elders, elders will stand before minors. Normal family relations will be ruined: A son will disgrace a father; a daughter will rise up against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. A man’s enemies will be the members of his household. The face of the generation will be like the face of a dog; a son will no longer be ashamed before his father. And upon what is there for us to rely? Only upon our Father in heaven. Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir says: Torah study leads to care in the performance of mitzvot. Care in the performance of mitzvot leads to diligence in their observance. Diligence leads to cleanliness of the soul. Cleanliness of the soul leads to abstention from all evil. Abstention from evil leads to purity and the elimination of all base desires. Purity leads to piety. Piety leads to humility. Humility leads to fear of sin. Fear of sin leads to holiness. Holiness leads to the Divine Spirit. The Divine Spirit leads to the resurrection of the dead.

Mishnah Gittin

Chapter 1

An agent who brings a bill of divorce [ get ] from a husband to his wife from a country overseas, i.e., from outside of Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael, is required to state the following formula when he hands over the bill of divorce: This bill of divorce was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. Rabban Gamliel says: Even one who brings a bill of divorce from Rekem or from Ḥeger, which are on the periphery of Eretz Yisrael, must make this declaration. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even one who brings a bill of divorce from the village of Ludim to Lod must also make this declaration, despite the fact that these places are only a short distance apart. The reason is that the village of Ludim was not part of the main area settled by Jews in Eretz Yisrael. And the Rabbis say that one is required to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, only if he brings a bill of divorce from a country overseas to Eretz Yisrael, and the same applies to one who delivers a bill of divorce from Eretz Yisrael to a country overseas. And likewise an agent who brings a bill of divorce from one region to another region within the overseas countries is also required to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: This halakha applies not only to an agent who brings a bill of divorce from one country to another, but even to one who takes it from one district [ hegmonya ] to another district in the same country.

Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to the borders of Eretz Yisrael, from Rekem eastward is considered to be part of the overseas country, and Rekem itself is like east of Eretz Yisrael, i.e., it is outside of Eretz Yisrael. From Ashkelon southward is outside of Eretz Yisrael, and Ashkelon itself is like south of Eretz Yisrael. Likewise, from Akko northward is outside of Eretz Yisrael, and Akko itself is like north of Eretz Yisrael. Rabbi Meir says: Akko is like Eretz Yisrael with regard to the halakhot of bills of divorce.

One who brings a bill of divorce from one place to another within Eretz Yisrael is not required to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. And if there are those who contest it, i.e., if the husband objects by saying that the bill of divorce is a forgery, it should be ratified through its signatories. The court must authenticate the signatures of the witnesses in order to ratify the document. With regard to one who brings a bill of divorce from a country overseas and is unable to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, if the bill of divorce has witnesses signed on it, it should be ratified through its signatories. The witnesses themselves or someone who recognizes their signatures should ratify it, in the manner of typical documents.

Both bills of divorce and bills of manumission are the same with regard to the halakhot of delivering the document from Eretz Yisrael to a country overseas and with regard to bringing it from a country overseas to Eretz Yisrael, i.e., the agents for both types of documents must declare that it was written and signed in their presence, and their statement is accepted. And this is one of the ways in which the halakhot of bills of divorce are equal to the halakhot of bills of manumission.

Any document that has a Samaritan witness signed on it is invalid, except for bills of divorce and bills of manumission. An incident occurred in which they brought a bill of divorce before Rabban Gamliel in the village of Otnai, and its witnesses were Samaritan witnesses, and he deemed it valid. With regard to all documents produced in gentile courts, even though their signatures are those of gentiles they are all valid, except for bills of divorce and bills of manumission. Rabbi Shimon says: Even these are valid, as these two types of documents are mentioned only when they are prepared by a common person, not in court.

With regard to one who says to another: Give this bill of divorce to my wife, or: Give this bill of manumission to my slave, if before the document reaches the woman or the slave the giver wishes to retract his decision, then with regard to both of them, he can retract. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One can retract his decision in the case of bills of divorce but not in the case of bills of manumission. The Rabbis explain the reason for their ruling: This is because one can act in a person’s interest in his absence, and therefore the agent acquires the document on behalf of the slave from the moment the owner hands the bill of manumission to the agent. But one can act to a person’s detriment only in his presence. The receipt of a bill of divorce is considered to be to a woman’s detriment, and therefore an agent cannot receive it for her without her consent. They explain further: The emancipation of a slave is in his interests, despite the fact that he receives sustenance from his master while a slave, as, if the master wishes not to sustain his slave he is allowed not to provide him with sustenance. This demonstrates that slavery is not in the interest of the slave, as he does not receive any guaranteed benefit. But if a husband wishes not to sustain his wife, he is not allowed to proceed in this manner. Consequently, marriage is in the interests of the woman. Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But even so, it is not in the interest of a slave to be emancipated, as, if his master is a priest, he disqualifies his slave from partaking of teruma by emancipating him, just as a husband who is a priest disqualifies his Israelite wife from partaking of teruma by divorcing her. The Rabbis said to him: It is permitted for a priest’s slave to partake of teruma not because he has a right to sustenance, but rather because he is his master’s acquisition. In the case of one who says: Give this bill of divorce to my wife, or: Give this bill of manumission to my slave, and then he dies, one does not give it after his death. The reason for this is that bills of divorce and manumission must be transferred by the husband or the master. Once he has died the document can no longer be given, and the agency he appointed for this purpose is likewise canceled. However, if he said: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so, and then he died, one does give the recipient the money after his death.

Chapter 2

With regard to one who brings a bill of divorce from a country overseas and says: The bill of divorce was written in my presence but it was not signed in my presence; or if he said: It was signed in my presence but it was not written in my presence; or: All of it was written in my presence and half of it was signed in my presence, i.e., he observed the signing of only one witness; or: Half of it was written in my presence and all of it was signed in my presence, in all these cases the document is invalid. If one agent bringing a bill of divorce says: It was written in my presence, and one other agent says: It was signed in my presence, it is invalid. If two agents say: It was written in our presence, and one says: It was signed in my presence, it is invalid. And Rabbi Yehuda deems the document valid. If one agent says: It was written in my presence, and two agents say: It was signed in our presence, it is valid.

If a bill of divorce was written during the day and signed on the same day; or if it was written at night and signed on that same night; or if it was written at night and signed on the following day, then it is valid. The new calendar day begins at night, so that in all of these cases the writing and the signing were performed on the same date. However, if it was written during the day and signed on that same night, it is invalid, as the writing and the signing were not on the same calendar day. Rabbi Shimon deems the bill of divorce valid. The mishna explains the ruling of Rabbi Shimon: As Rabbi Shimon would say: All documents that were written during the day and signed at night are invalid because the date recorded in the document is a day prior to the day the document takes effect, except for women’s bills of divorce. Since a bill of divorce is not used to collect money, it is of no concern if the date that appears on it is before the time when it was signed.

One may write a bill of divorce with any material that can be used for writing: With deyo, with paint [ sam ], with sikra, with komos, with kankantom or with anything that produces permanent writing. However, one may not write with other liquids, nor with fruit juice, nor with anything that does not produce permanent writing. Similarly, with regard to the document itself, one may write on anything, even on an olive leaf, or on the horn of a cow. And the latter is valid if he gives her the entire cow. Likewise, one may write a bill of divorce on the hand of a slave, and that is valid if he gives her the slave. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees and says: One may not write a bill of divorce on any living thing, nor may it be written on food.

One may not write a bill of divorce on anything that is attached to the ground. If one wrote it on something that was attached to the ground, and afterward he detached it, signed it, and gave it to her, then it is valid. Rabbi Yehuda deems a bill of divorce invalid unless its writing and its signing were performed when it was already detached. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: One may not write a bill of divorce on erased paper or on unfinished leather [ diftera ], because writing on these surfaces can be forged. And the Rabbis deem valid a bill of divorce that was written on either of these items.

Anyone is qualified to write a bill of divorce, even a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor. Additionally, a woman may write her own bill of divorce and give it to her husband so that he can present it to her. And a man may write his own receipt, which must be given to him by the woman to confirm that he has paid her the value of her marriage contract. This is because the ratification of a bill of divorce is only through its signatories, and it is irrelevant who wrote it. Anyone is fit to serve as an agent to bring a bill of divorce to a woman except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, or a blind person, or a gentile.

If a minor received the bill of divorce and then reached the age of majority, or one received it when he was a deaf-mute and then became able to hear, or one received it when he was blind and then became able to see, or one received it when he was an imbecile and then became halakhically competent, or one received it when he was a gentile and then converted, in all of these cases he is unfit to bring the bill of divorce. However, if one received it when he was able to hear, and then became a deaf-mute, and then again became able to hear; or if one received it when he was able to see, and then became blind, and then again became able to see; or one received it when he was halakhically competent, and then became an imbecile, and then again became halakhically competent, in all of these cases he is fit to bring the bill of divorce. This is the principle: Anyone who is halakhically competent in the beginning and in the end is fit, even if there was time in the interim when he was unfit.

There are instances in which a woman’s testimony that another woman’s husband has died is not deemed credible ( Yevamot 117a). If there is a presumption that due to their familial relationship the two women hate each other, there is concern that the woman is testifying falsely in order to harm the other woman. By doing so, she can cause the other woman to remarry. If her original husband then proves to be living, she will be required to leave her second husband. This mishna teaches: Even the women who are not deemed credible to testify on behalf of a woman and say: Her husband died, and she is permitted to remarry, are deemed credible to bring her bill of divorce. The relatives of the woman who are not deemed credible to testify that her husband has died are: Her mother-in-law; and her mother-in-law’s daughter; and her rival wife, i.e., another wife of her husband’s; and her yevama, i.e., her husband’s brother’s wife; and her husband’s daughter. The mishna explains: What is the difference between a bill of divorce and death, that certain women are deemed credible to testify about one but not the other? With regard to a bill of divorce, it is so that the writing proves that the husband is divorcing his wife, and the testimony is needed only to supplement the bill of divorce. Similarly, the woman herself may bring her own bill of divorce, provided that she is required by the court to state in its presence: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, as the Gemara will explain.

Chapter 3

Any bill of divorce that was not written for the sake of a specific woman is invalid. How so? In a case of a man who was passing through the marketplace and heard the sound of scribes who write bills of divorce dictating the text to their students: The man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from the place of such and such; and the man said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife, and he wishes to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is unfit for him to divorce his wife with it, as it was not written for the sake of any woman. Moreover, if one wrote a bill of divorce with which to divorce his wife but later reconsidered, and a resident of his town found him and said to him: My name is the same as your name, and my wife’s name is the same as your wife’s name, and we reside in the same town; give me the bill of divorce and I will use it; the bill of divorce is unfit for the second man to divorce his wife with it. Moreover, if one had two wives and their names were identical, and he wrote a bill of divorce to divorce the older one and then reconsidered, he may not divorce the younger one with it. Moreover, if he said to the scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever one of them that I will want and I will divorce her with it, this bill of divorce is unfit for him to divorce either wife with it.

With regard to a scribe who writes the standard part [ tofes ] of bills of divorce in advance, so that when one requests a bill of divorce, he will need to add only the details unique to this case, he must leave empty the place in the bill of divorce for the name of the man, and the place for the name of the woman, and the place for the date. If a scribe writes the standard part of loan documents, he must leave empty the place of the name of the lender, the place of the name of the borrower, the place of the amount of the money being loaned, and the place of the date. If the scribe writes the standard part of documents of sale of land, he must leave empty the place for the name of the purchaser, and the place for the name of the seller, the place for the amount of the money for which the land is being purchased, the place for the description of the field that is being purchased, and the place of the date when the sale occurs. This is necessary due to the ordinance, as the Gemara will explain. Rabbi Yehuda invalidates all of these documents if their standard parts were written in advance. Rabbi Elazar deems all of them valid except for bills of divorce, as it is stated in the Torah: “And he writes for her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), indicating that he must write the bill of divorce for her sake. Therefore, one may not write even the standard part of the bill of divorce in advance, as that would not qualify as writing the bill of divorce for her sake.

With regard to an agent who brings a bill of divorce and it was lost from him, if he finds it immediately then the bill of divorce is valid. But if not, then it is invalid, as it is possible that the bill of divorce that he found is not the same one that he lost, and this second bill of divorce belongs to someone else whose name and wife’s name are identical to the names of the husband and wife in the lost bill of divorce. However, if he found it in a ḥafisa or in a deluskema that he knows is his, or if he recognizes the actual bill of divorce, then it is valid. In the case of an agent who brings a bill of divorce to a woman, and when he had left the husband was elderly or sick, the agent gives her the bill of divorce based on the presumption that the husband is still alive, and there is no concern that in the meantime he has died, thereby canceling the bill of divorce. Similarly, with regard to an Israelite woman who is married to a priest and may therefore partake of teruma, and her husband went to a country overseas, she may continue to partake of teruma based on the presumption that her husband is still alive. Similarly, in the case of one who sends his sin - offering from a country overseas, the priests may offer it on the altar based on the presumption that the one who sent it is still alive.

Rabbi Elazar ben Perata said three statements before the Sages as testimony from previous generations, and they upheld his statements: He spoke concerning the residents of a town that was surrounded by a camp of besiegers [ karkom ]; and concerning the travelers in a ship that is cast about in the sea; and concerning one who is going out to be judged in a capital case; that they are all presumed to be alive. However, concerning the residents of a town that was conquered by a camp of besiegers; and the travelers on a ship that was lost at sea; and one who is going out to be executed after receiving his verdict; in these cases one applies to them the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead. How so? An Israelite woman married to a priest in one of these situations or a daughter of a priest married to an Israelite in one of these situations may not partake of teruma. The first woman may not do so because she may partake of teruma only while her husband is alive, and the second may not do so because she may partake of teruma only if he has died.

With regard to an agent who brings a bill of divorce in Eretz Yisrael, where his only responsibility is to transmit the bill of divorce to the wife, and the agent became sick, this agent may send it in the possession of another agent. But if the husband said to the agent: When you transmit the bill of divorce to my wife, take for me such and such an item from her that I left with her as a deposit, then he may not send it in the possession of another agent. This is because it is assumed that it is not the desire of the husband that his deposit be in the possession of another person whom he did not appoint as his agent.

With regard to an agent who is bringing a bill of divorce from a country overseas, who must attest to the fact that he witnessed the writing and signing of the bill of divorce, and he became sick and cannot complete his agency, he appoints another agent in court and sends him. And the first agent says before the court: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, and on the basis of this the court deems the bill of divorce to be valid. And the final agent does not need to say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. Rather, it is sufficient that he says: I am an agent of the court.

The mishna continues the discussion of the presumption that a person remains alive. With regard to one who lends money to a priest, or to a Levite, or to a poor person, with the understanding that he will separate their portion of the teruma and tithes from his produce on the basis of that money, i.e., he will subtract from the debt owed by the priest or Levite the value of the teruma and tithes separated from the produce, he may separate the teruma and tithes from his produce on the basis of that money with the presumption that they are still alive, and he need not be concerned that perhaps the priest or the Levite died in the interim, or that the poor person became rich and is no longer eligible to be given the poor man’s tithe. The priest or Levite benefits from this arrangement, as he receives his gifts up front in the form of a loan. The Israelite benefits in that he does not need to seek out a priest or Levite each time he has produce from which he must separate teruma and tithes. If in fact they died, then he must obtain permission from the heirs in order to continue the arrangement. However, if he lent money to the deceased, and he stipulated in the presence of the court that the debt would be repaid in this manner, then he does not need to obtain permission from the heirs.

With regard to one who sets aside produce with the understanding that he will separate terumot and tithes with it, so that when he has untithed produce he can render it fit by declaring that the teruma and tithes that must be separated will be from the produce that he had set aside for this purpose, or one who sets aside money with the understanding that he will separate and to redeem second tithe with it, then he may later separate the teruma or tithe with them, based on the presumption that the produce or the money are extant. He need not be concerned that perhaps the produce or money was lost in the meantime. If he discovers that they were lost, then he must be concerned that the produce or money that he set aside was lost, from the time until the same time, as will be explained in the Gemara, and he must separate teruma and tithes from the produce a second time; this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar. Rabbi Yehuda says: One checks the wine that is set aside to be used for separating terumot and tithes for other wine to see if it has turned to vinegar, which would render it unfit for this purpose, at three times during the year: When the east wind blows at the conclusion of the festival of Sukkot, and when the blossoms fall and the grape buds emerge and appear as small clusters, and at the time when water enters and fills the unripe grape. Since there is a change in the weather at these times, one should check to ensure that the wine has not turned to vinegar.

Chapter 4

In the case of one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife with an agent, and he reached the agent, or where he sent another agent after him, and he said to the agent delivering the bill of divorce: The bill of divorce that I gave you, it is void, then this bill of divorce is hereby void. Similarly, if the husband reached his wife before the bill of divorce reached her, or in a case where he sent an agent to her, and he said, or had the agent say, to his wife: The bill of divorce that I sent to you, it is void, then this bill of divorce is hereby void. However, if he stated this once the bill of divorce had entered her possession, he can no longer render it void, as the divorce had already taken effect.

The mishna relates that initially, a husband who wished to render the bill of divorce void would convene a court elsewhere and render the bill of divorce void in the presence of the court before it reached his wife. Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted an ordinance that one should not do this, for the betterment of the world. The Gemara will explain what this means. Initially, the husband would change his name and her name, from the names by which they were known where they formerly lived to the names by which they were known where the bill of divorce was written, and write the name of his city and the name of her city. One was not required to list all of the names by which the husband and the wife were known, but only the names in the place where the bill of divorce was being written. Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that the scribe should write in the bill of divorce: The man so-and-so, and any other name that he has, and: The woman so-and-so, and any other name that she has. The reason for this ordinance was for the betterment of the world, as perhaps the people of a different city would not recognize the name written in the bill of divorce, and would claim that this bill of divorce does not belong to her.

A widow can collect payment of her marriage contract from the property of orphans only by means of an oath that she did not receive any part of the payment of the marriage contract during her husband’s lifetime. The mishna relates: The courts refrained from administering an oath to her, leaving the widow unable to collect payment of her marriage contract. Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that she should take, for the benefit of the orphans, any vow that the orphans wished to administer to her, e.g., that all produce will become prohibited to her if she received any payment of her marriage contract, and after stating this vow, she collects payment of her marriage contract. The mishna lists additional ordinances that were instituted for the betterment of the world: The witnesses sign their names on the bill of divorce, even though the bill of divorce is valid without their signatures, for the betterment of the world, as the Gemara will explain. And Hillel instituted a document that prevents the Sabbatical Year from abrogating an outstanding debt [ prosbol ] for the betterment of the world, as the Gemara will explain.

In the case of a Canaanite slave that was captured, and Jews who had not owned him redeemed him, if he was redeemed to be a slave then he will be a slave. If he was redeemed to be a freeman then he will not be a slave. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Both in this case and in that case he will be a slave. In the case of a slave whose master set him aside as designated repayment [ apoteiki ] of a debt to other people from whom he borrowed money, and afterward he emancipated him, then according to the letter of the law the slave bears no responsibility for the debt. However, for the betterment of the world, his master is forced to make him a freeman, and the slave writes a promissory note for his value to pay the debt to the creditor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He does not write a promissory note; he only emancipates the slave.

In the case of one who is a half-slave half-freeman because only one of his two owners emancipated him, he serves his master one day and serves himself one day; this is the statement of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say: Through such an arrangement you have remedied his master, as his master loses nothing through this. However, you have not remedied the slave himself, as the slave himself remains in an unsustainable situation. It is not possible for him to marry a maidservant because he is already a half-freeman, as it is prohibited for a freeman to marry a maidservant. It is also not possible for him to marry a free woman, as he is still a half-slave. If you say he should be idle and not marry, but isn’t it true that the world was created only for procreation, as it is stated: “He did not create it to be a waste; He formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18)? Rather, for the betterment of the world his master is forced to make him a freeman, and the slave writes a promissory note accepting his responsibility to pay half his value to his master. And Beit Hillel ultimately retracted their opinion, to rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai, that a half-slave must be set free.

In a case of one who sells his slave to gen-tiles, or even to a Jew outside of Eretz Yisrael, the slave is emancipated. Since the slave, who is partially obligated in the fulfillment of mitzvot, would be restricted in his ability to fulfill them in his new situation, either because he would be under the authority of a gentile or because he will no longer be in Eretz Yisrael, the Sages penalized his original owner that he should become a freeman, so that if he succeeds in escaping his new owner, he is a full-fledged freeman. The captives are not redeemed for more than their actual monetary value, for the betterment of the world; and one may not aid the captives in their attempt to escape from their captors for the betterment of the world, so that kidnappers will not be more restrictive with their captives to prevent them from escaping. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: For the betterment of the captives, so that kidnappers will not avenge the escape of the captives by treating other captives with cruelty. And Torah scrolls, phylacteries, or mezuzot are not purchased from the gentiles when they acquire these objects, if they request more than their actual monetary value, for the betterment of the world, so as not to cause an increase in the theft of sacred Jewish ritual objects in order to sell them for large sums of money.

A man who divorces his wife due to her bad reputation, i.e., he heard that she had committed adultery, may not remarry her, even if it becomes clear that she did not in fact commit adultery. Similarly, if one divorces his wife due to a vow that she took, and he could not live with her under the conditions of her vow, he may not remarry her. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he divorces her due to any vow that the public was aware of, he may not remarry her, but if he divorces her due to a vow that the public was not aware of, he may remarry her. The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir says: If he divorces her due to any vow that requires investigation and dissolution by a halakhic authority, he may not bring remarry her, but if he divorces her due to a vow that does not require investigation and dissolution by a halakhic authority, and is dissolved even without that, he may bring remarry her. Rabbi Elazar said: They prohibited him from remarrying her in this case, where she stated a vow that requires dissolution by a halakhic authority, only due to that case, where she stated a vow that does not require dissolution by a halakhic authority. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: There was an incident in Tzaidan involving one man who said to his wife: It is konam, i.e., it is forbidden like an offering, if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her; and the Sages permitted him to remarry her for the betterment of the world.

With regard to one who divorces his wife because she is a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children [ ailonit ], meaning that after their marriage it became clear that she was sexually underdeveloped, Rabbi Yehuda says: He may not remarry her, and the Rabbis say: He may remarry her. If, after he divorced her, this ailonit married another man and had children from him, meaning that she was not actually an ailonit, and she is demanding payment of her marriage contract from her first husband, claiming that he unlawfully divorced her without paying her marriage contract as he claimed that she was an ailonit and their marriage was a mistaken transaction, Rabbi Yehuda said that he may say to her: Your silence is preferable to your speech, meaning that it is preferable for her to withdraw her claim. If she persists, he may say that he divorced her only because he believed her to be an ailonit, casting aspersions on the validity of the divorce and the status of her children. Therefore, it would be wise of her to withdraw her claim.

With regard to one who sells himself and his children as slaves to gentiles, he is not redeemed, but the children are redeemed after their father’s death, as there is no reason to penalize them. One who sells his field to a gentile must purchase and bring the first fruits from the field that he sold, for the betterment of the world.

Chapter 5

The court appraises land of superior quality [ iddit ] for payment to injured parties. And a creditor collects his debt from the debtor’s intermediate-quality land. And payment of a woman’s marriage contract is collected from her husband’s inferior-quality land. Rabbi Meir says: Payment of a woman’s marriage contract is also collected from intermediate-quality land.

Payment of a debt or other obligation is not collected from liened property that has been sold to a third party when the debtor still has unsold property, even when this unsold property is inferior-quality land. The creditor cannot collect his debt from liened property that the debtor has sold to another person as long as the debtor is still in possession of other property, even if the remaining assets are inferior to those to which the creditor would otherwise have been entitled. If one who owed money died and his children inherited his property, the father’s debt can be collected from the property of the orphans only from inferior-quality land.

The court does not appropriate liened property that has been sold to a third party for the consumption of produce or for the enhanced value of land. If one appropriated a field and sold it, and the buyer worked the land, enhanced it, and grew produce on it, and then the initial owner from whom the field had been stolen took back the land and the produce from the buyer, compensating him only for his expenses, then the buyer may go back to the seller, i.e., the robber, and collect his losses. He can collect the purchase price of the field even from property that the robber sold to another person. By contrast, the value of the produce and the enhancement in the value of the field, which resulted from his actions, may be collected only from the robber’s unsold property. And similarly, payment for the sustenance of a man’s wife and daughters cannot be collected from his liened property. One of the stipulations included in a marriage contract is that after the husband dies, his widow and daughters are entitled to sustenance from his estate. This sustenance cannot be collected from husband’s liened property that has been sold to another person, but only from his unsold property inherited by his heirs. All of these enactments were made for the betterment of the world. And it was further instituted that one who finds a lost item and returns it to its rightful owner is not required to take an oath that he did not keep any part of the lost item for himself. This ordinance was also instituted for the betterment of the world.

With regard to orphans who are living with a homeowner who takes care of all their needs and affairs, even if neither their father nor the court officially appointed him to this task, or if their father appointed a steward [ apotropos ] for them, this person is obligated to tithe their produce. With regard to a steward who was appointed by the orphans’ father, when he returns all of the property to the orphans upon their reaching adulthood, he takes an oath that he took nothing of theirs for himself. By contrast, if the court appointed him to serve as a steward for them, then he is not required to take such an oath. Abba Shaul says: The matters are reversed. A steward appointed by the court takes an oath, but a steward appointed by the orphans’ father is not required to do so. With regard to one who renders another’s food ritually impure, or one who mixes teruma with another’s non-sacred produce, or one who pours another’s wine as a libation before an idol, in each of these cases causing the other a monetary loss, if he acted unintentionally, he is exempt from paying for the damage. If he acted intentionally, he is liable to pay. If priests disqualified an offering with improper intention in the Temple, by expressing, while sacrificing the offering, the intention of sprinkling the blood of the offering, burning its fats on the altar, or consuming it, after its appointed time, and they did so intentionally, they are liable to pay the value of the offering to its owner, who must now bring another offering.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda testified before the Sages about the case of a deaf-mute woman who was married off by her father when she was a minor, so that her marriage took effect by Torah law. He said that she can be released from her marriage through a bill of divorce, whether as a minor or after she reaches adulthood. Although as a deaf-mute woman she is not legally competent to give her consent, the divorce is effective because divorce does not require the woman’s consent. And similarly, he testified about the case of the minor daughter of a non-priest who was orphaned from her father and then married off to a priest by her mother or brother, so that her marriage took effect by rabbinic law. He said that nevertheless she may partake of teruma, although by Torah law it is prohibited for one who is not in a priestly household to partake of teruma. And furthermore if this girl dies, then her husband inherits her estate. It is not said that because the validity of the marriage is by rabbinic law and not Torah law he is not entitled to inherit from her. And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda further testified about a stolen beam that was already built into a large building [ bira ], that the victim of the robbery receives only the value of the beam but not the beam itself, due to an ordinance instituted for the penitent. By Torah law, a robber is obligated to return any stolen item in his possession, provided that its form has not been altered. If one stole a beam and incorporated it into a building, then by Torah law he would have to destroy the building and return the beam. In order to encourage repentance, the Sages were lenient and allowed a robber to return the value of the beam. And lastly, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda testified about a sin-offering that was obtained through robbery but that was not publicly known to have been obtained in that manner. He said that it effects atonement for the robber who sacrifices it, for the benefit of the altar, as will be explained in the Gemara.

The law of Sicarii [ Sikarikon ] did not apply in Judea in the time that people were being killed in the war. From the time that people were being killed in the war and onward, the law of Sicarii did apply there. What is this law of Sicarii? If one first purchased land from a Sicarius, who extorted the field from its prior owners with threats, and afterward the buyer returned and purchased the same field a second time from the prior landowner, his purchase is void. The prior owner of the field can say that he did not actually mean to sell him the field. By contrast, if he first acquired the field from the prior owner and afterward he returned and purchased the same field from a Sicarius, his purchase stands. Similarly, if one first purchased from the husband the rights to use a field belonging to his wife, and afterward he returned and purchased the same field from the wife, so that if the husband were to predecease or divorce her, the purchaser would then own it fully, his purchase is void. The woman can claim that she did not wish to quarrel with her husband and to object to the transaction but that in truth she did not agree to the sale. By contrast, if he first acquired the field from the wife, and afterward he returned and purchased the same field from the husband, his purchase stands. This is the initial version of this mishna. Later, the court of those who came after the Sages who composed that mishna said: With regard to one who purchased a field from a Sicarius, he must give the prior owner one-fourth of the field’s value. When does this apply? At a time when the prior owner is unable to purchase the field himself. But if he is able to purchase it himself, he precedes anyone else. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi later convened a court, and they counted their votes and determined that if the field remained before, i.e., in the possession of, the Sicarius for twelve months, whoever first purchases the field acquires possession of it, but he must give the prior owner one-fourth of the field’s value.

The following enactments were also made for the betterment of the world: A deaf-mute may express his wishes through gestures [ romez ]; that is to say, he can signal that he wishes to buy or sell a certain item, and the purchase or sale is valid. And similarly he may respond to others through gestures; that is to say, he can signal that he agrees to a transaction initiated by another party, and the transaction is valid. And ben Beteira says: Signals are not necessary, as even if he expresses his wishes to buy or sell through lip movements [ kofetz ] or responds to others through lip movements, the transaction is valid. These halakhot apply to transactions involving movable property. It was similarly enacted that a purchase made by young children [ paotot ] is a valid purchase, and a sale made by them is a valid sale. These halakhot apply to transactions involving movable property.

Having mentioned a series of enactments instituted by the Sages for the sake of the betterment of the world, the Gemara continues: These are the matters that the Sages instituted on account of the ways of peace, i.e., to foster peace and prevent strife and controversy: At public readings of the Torah, a priest reads first, and after him a Levite, and after him an Israelite. The Sages instituted this order on account of the ways of peace, so that people should not quarrel about who is the most distinguished member of the community. Similarly, the Sages enacted that a joining of courtyards is placed in an old house where it had regularly been placed on account of the ways of peace, as will be explained in the Gemara. The Sages enacted that the pit that is nearest to the irrigation channel that supplies water to several pits or fields is filled first on account of the ways of peace. They established a fixed order for the irrigation of fields, so that people would not quarrel over who is given precedence. Animals, birds, or fish that were caught in traps are not acquired by the one who set the traps until he actually takes possession of them. Nevertheless, if another person comes and takes them, it is considered robbery on account of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yosei says: This is full-fledged robbery. Similarly, a lost item found by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is not acquired by him, since he lacks the legal competence to effect acquisition. Nevertheless, taking such an item from him is considered robbery on account of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yosei says: This is full-fledged robbery. If a poor person gleans olives at the top of an olive tree and olives fall to the ground under the tree, then taking those olives that are beneath it is considered robbery on account of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yosei says: This is full-fledged robbery. One does not protest against poor gentiles who come to take gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the produce in the corner of the field, which is given to the poor [ pe’a ], although they are meant exclusively for the Jewish poor, on account of the ways of peace.

A woman may lend utensils to her friend who is suspect with regard to eating produce that grew in the Sabbatical Year after the time that such produce must be removed from the house and may no longer be eaten. The utensils that she may lend her include: A winnow, a sieve, a mill, and an oven. Lending her such utensils is not considered aiding in the commission of a transgression. But she may not select the grain from the chaff or grind wheat with her, i.e., she may not actively assist her in the performance of a sin. The wife of a ḥaver, one who is devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, especially the halakhot of ritual purity, teruma, and tithes, may lend the wife of an am ha’aretz, one who is not scrupulous in these areas, a winnow and a sieve, and she may even select, grind, and sift with her. But once the wife of the am ha’aretz pours water into the flour, thereby rendering it susceptible to ritual impurity, the wife of the ḥaver may not touch anything with her, because one may not assist those who commit transgressions. And all of the allowances mentioned in the mishna were stated only on account of the ways of peace. And one may assist gentiles who work the land during the Sabbatical Year, but one may not assist Jews who do this. Similarly, one may extend greetings to gentiles on account of the ways of peace.

Chapter 6

With regard to one who says to another: Receive this bill of divorce for my wife, or: Deliver this bill of divorce to my wife as my agent, if the husband seeks to retract his designation and cancel the agency, he can retract it until the document reaches his wife’s possession. However, in the case of a woman who said to an agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me, and the husband handed the bill of divorce to her agent, if the husband seeks to retract his decision to divorce his wife upon receipt of the bill of divorce by the agent, he cannot retract it. Once the bill of divorce is transferred to her agent, its legal status is like that of a bill of divorce that was handed directly to her, and the divorce takes effect immediately. Therefore, if the husband said to the agent whom the woman designated to receive the bill of divorce: I do not want [ ee ifshi ] for you to receive the bill of divorce for her; rather, deliver it and give it to her, then if the husband seeks to retract his designation and cancel the agency, he can retract it until it reaches his wife’s possession. Since the husband does not agree to have the divorce take effect upon receipt by his wife’s agent, he changes the designation of the agent and designates him as his own agent for delivery. Therefore, the divorce takes effect only when the bill of divorce reaches his wife’s possession. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even a woman who did not instruct the agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me but says: Take my bill of divorce for me, thereby designates the agent as an agent of receipt on her behalf. Therefore, if after handing the bill of divorce to the agent the husband seeks to retract his decision and cancel the agency, he cannot retract it.

A woman who said to an agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me, requires two sets of witnesses to confirm that she was divorced when the agent received the bill of divorce. She requires two witnesses who say: In our presence she said to the agent: Receive my bill of divorce on my behalf, and two who say: In our presence the agent received the bill of divorce and tore it. This testimony is effective even if two people are the first pair of witnesses and the same two are the latter pair of witnesses, or if there is one witness from the first pair of witnesses and one witness from the latter pair, and one additional witness joins with them as the second witness in both testimonies. With regard to a betrothed young woman, she and her father are each eligible to receive her bill of divorce, and the divorce takes effect at the moment that either of them receives the bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda said: Two hands do not have the right to acquire an item on behalf of one person as one. Rather, her father alone receives her bill of divorce on her behalf. And there is another principle: Any female who is unable to safeguard her bill of divorce is unable to be divorced.

In the case of a minor girl who said to an agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her possession. Therefore, if the husband seeks to retract his decision before his wife receives the bill of divorce, he can retract it, as a minor does not designate an agent. Consequently, the agent is not an agent for receipt, and the divorce does not take effect when the husband hands the document to the agent. The agent is an agent for delivery, and the divorce takes effect when the bill of divorce enters the wife’s possession. And if her father said to the agent: Go out and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce on her behalf, then if the husband seeks to retract his decision, he cannot retract it. As a father can receive the bill of divorce on behalf of his minor daughter, he can designate an agent for receipt, and the divorce takes effect when the husband hands the document to the agent. With regard to one who says to an agent: Give this bill of divorce to my wife in such and such a place, if the agent deviated and gave it to her in another place the divorce is invalid. However, if he said to the agent: Give this bill of divorce to my wife, she is in such and such a place, without explicitly instructing the agent to give her the document there, and he gave it to her in another place the divorce is valid. With regard to the woman who when designating her agent for receipt said to her agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, and he received it for her in another place, the divorce is invalid; and Rabbi Elazar deems it valid. If she said to him: Bring me my bill of divorce from such and such a place, and he brought it for her from another place, it is valid. Because he is an agent for delivery, the woman is not particular where he receives the bill of divorce, as the divorce takes effect only when the bill of divorce reaches her possession.

An Israelite woman married to a priest partakes of teruma. If she says to an agent: Bring me my bill of divorce, designating him as an agent for delivery, she continues to partake of teruma until the bill of divorce reaches her possession. However, if she says: Receive my bill of divorce for me, thereby designating him as an agent for receipt, it is immediately prohibited for her to partake of teruma. Since the divorce takes effect when the husband hands the bill of divorce to the agent, the concern is that the agent encountered the husband nearby. If the woman said to the agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, then even if he received it elsewhere, she continues to partake of teruma until the bill of divorce reaches that place. Rabbi Elazar prohibits her from partaking of teruma immediately.

With regard to a husband who says to two people: Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife, or: Divorce her, or: Write a letter and give it to her, they should write the document and give it to her. In each of those cases his intent is clear. He is instructing them to effect her divorce. However, one who said: Release her, or: Sustain her, or: Treat her according to the law [ nimus ], or: Treat her appropriately, said nothing, as none of these expressions clearly expresses his desire to divorce his wife. At first the Sages would say: In the case of one who is taken out in a neck chain [ kolar ] to be executed and who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, these people should write the document and give it to his wife even though there was no explicit instruction to give it to her. They then said: Even with regard to one who sets sail and one who departs in a caravan to a far-off place and says: Write a bill of divorce to my wife, his intention is to write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if one who is dangerously ill gives that instruction, they write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife.

With regard to one who was thrown into a pit and thought that he would die there, and he said that anyone who hears his voice should write a bill of divorce for his wife, and he specified his name, her name, and all relevant details, those who hear him should write this bill of divorce and give it to his wife, even though they do not see the man and do not know him. A healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say to give it to her, presumably sought to mock her. Since he told them to write the bill of divorce and not to give it, it is not a valid bill of divorce. The mishna relates: There was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own initiative, taking his own life, it is a valid bill of divorce, as it is clear that he anticipated his death and instructed those listening to write the bill of divorce with the intent of giving it to her. However, if the wind forced him to fall, it is not a valid bill of divorce, as there was no clear intent to give her the bill of divorce.

If a man said to two people: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, or if a man said to three people: Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife, these people should write the document themselves and give it to her. If he said to three people: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, these people should tell others, and those others will write the document, because he designated the three people as a court. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And it is that halakha that Rabbi Ḥanina of Ono brought up from prison in the name of Rabbi Akiva, who was incarcerated there: I received a tradition from my teachers that in a case where a man says to three people: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, that these people should tell others and those others will write the document, because he designated the three people as a court. Rabbi Yosei said: We said [ nomeinu ] to the agent, Rabbi Ḥanina of Ono: We too received a tradition. However, it is a different one, that even if a man said to the High Court [Sanhedrin] in Jerusalem: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, that the members of the court should learn to write, and should write the document themselves, and give it to his wife. If a man said to ten people: Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife, one of the ten writes the bill of divorce and two sign it. If he said: All of you write the document, one of them writes the bill of divorce and all of them sign it. Therefore, if one of them died, then this is a bill of divorce that is null and void, as he directed all of them to participate in the process.

Chapter 7

In the case of one who was afflicted with temporary insanity [ kordeyakos ] and said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, he said nothing, because he was not lucid at the time. If he said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, when he was lucid, and was then afflicted with temporary insanity and he retracted his previous statement and said: Do not write it, his latter statement is considered to be nothing, i.e., it is not halakhically valid. The mishna continues: In a case where the husband became mute, and two people said to him: Shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife, and he nodded his head indicating his agreement, they examine him with various questions three times. If he responded to questions that have a negative answer: No, and responded to questions that have a positive answer: Yes, indicating his competence, they shall write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife based on the nod of his head.

If people said to the husband: Shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife? And he said to them: Write the document, and those people told the scribe to write it, and he wrote it and instructed the witnesses to sign it, and they signed it; even if they wrote it, and signed it, and gave it to him, and he then gave it to his wife, the bill of divorce is void unless he himself says to the scribe: Write the document, and he himself says to the witnesses: Sign the document.

If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce if I die from this illness, or: This is your bill of divorce after my death, then it is as if he said nothing, since a bill of divorce is valid only if it takes effect before the husband’s death. But if the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die, then this is a valid bill of divorce, because once he dies, the bill of divorce retroactively applies from when he made this statement. If the husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, then it is uncertain whether his primary intention was for the bill of divorce to take effect that day, in which case it is a valid bill of divorce, or if his primary intention was that it should take effect after his death and is therefore not valid. The halakha is that there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or not a valid bill of divorce. And if he dies without children his wife must perform ḥalitza, since perhaps the bill of divorce is not valid and she is bound by the levirate bond and may not remarry without first performing ḥalitza. But she may not enter into levirate marriage, since perhaps the bill of divorce is valid, and it is prohibited for a divorcée to marry her brother-in-law. If he said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and he recovered, and he arose and walked in the market, but then became ill again and died, the court assesses him. If he died because of the first illness then this is a valid bill of divorce, as his conditional statement was fulfilled, but if not, i.e., if he was cured from the first illness and died from another illness, then it is not a valid bill of divorce.

If a woman’s ill husband gave her a bill of divorce, and made a condition that it should take effect from today if he dies from his illness, then she may be secluded with him only in the presence of two witnesses, lest they end up engaging in sexual intercourse. This applies to being secluded in the presence of not only valid witnesses; it is permitted for her to be secluded with him even in the presence of a slave or even in the presence of a maidservant, except for the wife’s personal maidservant. And it is prohibited for the wife to be secluded in the presence of the latter because she is accustomed to her maidservant, and there is concern that she will engage in sexual intercourse with her husband even though the maidservant is present. What is the halakhic status of the wife during these days between when the bill of divorce was given but before the condition has been fulfilled with the death of the husband? Rabbi Yehuda says: She is like a married woman with regard to all of her matters, and she remains forbidden to other men. Rabbi Yosei says: It is uncertain whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.

If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, then she is divorced and must give two hundred dinars in order to fulfill the condition of the bill of divorce. If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me money from now until the conclusion of thirty days, if she gives the money to him within thirty days she is divorced. And if not she is not divorced. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat [ itztaliti ], and she lost his coat, so that she could not give it to him. And the Rabbis said that she must give him the value of the coat, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is divorced.

If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father, or: On the condition that you will nurse, i.e., breastfeed, my son, without specifying a time period, how long is she required to nurse him in order to fulfill the condition? She is required to nurse the baby for two years from his birth, which is the length of time generally designated for nursing. Rabbi Yehuda says: The time for nursing is only eighteen months. If the baby son died or the husband’s father died, this is a valid bill of divorce, even though the condition was not fulfilled. But if the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve my father for two years, or: On the condition that you will nurse my son for two years, and the son died before she nursed him for two years, or the father said: I do not want you to serve me, then even if the father did not say this in anger and she did everything she was expected to do, it is not a valid bill of divorce because the condition was not fulfilled. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In a case like this it is a valid bill of divorce. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated a principle: If there is any hindrance to the fulfillment of the condition that does not result from her, then it is a valid bill of divorce.

If a resident of the region of Judea intending to embark on a journey to the Galilee said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back from now until the conclusion of thirty days, and when he was going from Judea to the Galilee he reached Antipatris and he returned immediately, his condition is void and his wife is not divorced, even if he subsequently returns to the Galilee for longer than thirty days. The reason for this is because he reached the Galilee and returned to Judea within the time he had allotted. Similarly, if a resident of the region of the Galilee intending to embark on a journey to Judea said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back from now until the conclusion of thirty days, and he was going from the Galilee to Judea, and he reached Kefar Otnai and returned immediately, his condition is void and his wife is not divorced, even if he subsequently returns to Judea for longer than thirty days. Similarly, if a resident of Eretz Yisrael intending to embark on a journey to a country overseas said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back from now until the conclusion of thirty days, and he was going to a country overseas, and he reached Akko and returned immediately, his condition is void and his wife is not divorced, even if he subsequently travels to a country overseas for longer than thirty days. If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if at any time I will depart from your presence for thirty consecutive days, then even if he was continually going and coming, going and coming, since he was not secluded with her during these thirty days, this is a valid bill of divorce.

If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not come back from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within twelve months, it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is because the bill of divorce cannot take effect after the husband’s death. As a result, she is bound by a levirate bond if her husband has no children. By contrast, if he said to her: This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not come back from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within twelve months, this is a valid bill of divorce. This is because the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively. Since he did not return within the year the condition was fulfilled.

If a husband said to others: If I do not come back from now until the conclusion of twelve months, write and give a bill of divorce to my wife, and they wrote a bill of divorce during the twelve months and gave it to her after twelve months had elapsed, it is not a valid bill of divorce because he instructed them to write the bill of divorce only after twelve months had elapsed. Similarly, if he said to others: Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife if I do not come back from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and they wrote it during the twelve months but gave it to her after the twelve months, it is not a valid bill of divorce because he instructed them to write the bill of divorce only after twelve months had elapsed, when it was clear that he did not come back. Rabbi Yosei disagrees and says: In a case like this, it is a valid bill of divorce, as he did not tell them when to write the bill of divorce. Rather, he stipulated only the time of giving. If they wrote the bill of divorce after twelve months had elapsed, and gave it after twelve months had elapsed, but in the interim the husband died, if the giving of the bill of divorce occurred before the husband’s death this is a valid bill of divorce. But if the husband’s death occurred before the giving of the bill of divorce it is not a valid bill of divorce. And if it is not known which occurred first, this is a case where the Sages said there is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.

Chapter 8

In a case of one who throws a bill of divorce to his wife, and she is in her house or in her courtyard at the time, then she is divorced as though he placed the bill of divorce in her hand. If he threw it to her in his house or in his courtyard, even if the bill of divorce is with her in the bed, she is not divorced. If he threw the bill of divorce into her lap, or into her basket [ kaltah ], she is divorced, even if she was in her husband’s house at the time.

If he said to his wife: Take this promissory note, and it was a bill of divorce, or she found it behind him and he did not tell her what it was but she reads what is written in it and discovers that it is her bill of divorce, it is not a valid bill of divorce until he says to her: This is your bill of divorce. If he gave it to her in her hand and she was sleeping, and he then woke her, and when she reads what is written in it, she finds that it is her bill of divorce, it is not a valid bill of divorce until he says to her: This is your bill of divorce. If the woman was standing in the public domain and her husband took the bill of divorce and threw it to her, if it fell closer to her, she is divorced, and if it fell closer to him, she is not divorced. If it is equally balanced, there is uncertainty as to whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced.

And the same halakhot apply with regard to betrothal. And the same halakhot apply with regard to a debt. If his creditor said to him: Throw the payment for my debt to me, and he threw it to him and the money fell closer to the creditor, the creditor acquired the payment. The debtor is absolved of his obligation to pay even if the money did not reach the creditor’s hand, e.g., it was stolen or lost after it was thrown and before the creditor was able to take it. If it fell closer to the debtor and the money was lost, the debtor is still obligated to pay. If it was equally balanced and was lost, the two of them divide it, i.e., the debtor owes half of the amount. If a woman was standing on top of the roof and her husband was standing below, and he threw a bill of divorce to her, once the bill of divorce reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. If he was above on the roof and she was below, and he threw it to her, once it leaves the area of the roof, even if the wording was erased or the document was burned before it fell to the ground, she is divorced.

Beit Shammai say: A man may send, i.e., divorce, his wife with an outdated bill of divorce, and Beit Hillel prohibit him from doing so. And what is an outdated bill of divorce? Any case where he was secluded with her after he wrote it for her and before he gave it to her.

If he wrote the date on the bill of divorce using a calendrical system that counts years in the name of a kingdom that is not legitimate, or he wrote the date in the name of the kingdom of Medea, or in the name of the Greek Empire, after it ceased to exist, or he wrote the date counting to the building of the Temple, or counting to the destruction of the Temple, in all these case, the bill of divorce is not valid. In the time of the mishna, the local government was particular that documents be dated with the official government date. Therefore, the Sages instituted that this must be done in bills of divorce as well. If one deviates from this practice, the rabbinic dictates of bills of divorce have been violated, and the bill of divorce is invalid. If he was in the east and he wrote the location in the bill of divorce as in the west, or if he was in the west and he wrote the location in the bill of divorce as in the east, the bill of divorce is not valid. If he divorced her with this bill of divorce and she remarried, she must leave both this first husband and that second husband, and she needs a bill of divorce from this husband and that husband. And she does not receive payment of her marriage contract, and not the profits from her properties that her husband consumed, and she does not have a claim to receive sustenance, and she does not have a claim to worn clothes that belonged to her, but which her husband used. She cannot demand these items, not of this husband and not of that husband. If she took any of these items from this husband or from that husband, she must return what was taken. And the child that was born from this husband or from that husband that was conceived after she married the second husband is a son born from an adulterous relationship [ mamzer ]. And neither this husband nor that husband, if they are priests, is permitted to become ritually impure by her when she dies, which a husband may ordinarily do for his wife. And neither this husband nor that husband have the rights to objects she finds, or to her earnings, or to the annulment of her vows. If she was an Israelite woman, then through these two marriages she becomes disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, due to the prohibition against a priest marrying a zona. If she was the daughter of a Levite, through these two marriages she becomes prohibited from partaking of the tithe that is given to Levites. If she was the daughter of a priest, she becomes prohibited from partaking of teruma, even after she returns to the house of her father the priest. And the heirs of this husband and the heirs of that husband do not inherit the rights to collect payment of her marriage contract if she dies. And if the husbands die, the brother of this first husband and the brother of that second husband perform ḥalitza, since she was betrothed to the second one as well, and they do not consummate the levirate marriage. The mishna proceeds to teach an additional halakha concerning a bill of divorce written not in accordance with its halakhot : If he changed his name, i.e., he wrote a different name in the bill of divorce, or he changed her name, or if he changed the name of his city or the name of her city, and she remarried on the basis of this bill of divorce, then she must leave both this first husband and that second husband. And all of those above-mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well.

The mishna teaches another halakha associated with the previous halakhot : With regard to all of those cases in which they said that a man who died without children and left behind a widow who is, to the man’s brother, one of those with whom relations are forbidden, e.g., she is his wife’s sister, not only is there no levirate bond for her, but the rival wives of the brother who died are also permitted to marry without either levirate marriage or ḥalitza. The mishna discusses another case: These rival wives went and married another man without ḥalitza, and these widows with whom relationships were forbidden were found to be sexually underdeveloped women incapable of bearing children [ ailonit ]. Therefore, it became clear, retroactively, that the marriage to the dead brother was never valid, and accordingly, the rival wives were never exempt from the obligation of levirate marriage due to their being the rival wives of a forbidden relationship. Consequently, the rival wives were forbidden to marry anyone else without ḥalitza, and the rival wives must leave both this man whom they remarried, and that yavam, i.e., they cannot enter into levirate marriage with him. And all of those above-mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well.

Similarly, with regard to one who marries his yevama, and her rival wife went and got married to another man, and it was found that this yevama was a sexually underdeveloped woman, the rival wife must leave this man whom she remarried and that yavam, i.e., she cannot enter into levirate marriage with him. Because the yevama was a sexually underdeveloped woman, the obligation of levirate marriage never applied to her, and her levirate marriage did not exempt her rival wife. And all of those aforementioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well.

The mishna now discusses another case: A scribe wrote a bill of divorce for a man, so that the man could divorce his wife with it; and he wrote a receipt for the woman, for her to give to her husband upon receiving payment of her marriage contract, verifying that she received the payment. And the scribe erred and gave the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man, and not knowing what was written in the documents that were in their possession, they gave what they received from the scribe to each other. The woman gave her husband a bill of divorce and the husband gave his wife a receipt, and consequently, there was no divorce at all. And after some time, the bill of divorce is in the possession of the man, and the receipt is in the possession of the woman, and they discover that the divorce never actually transpired. If the woman had remarried another man, she must leave this, the first husband, and that, the second husband. And all of those above-mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well. Rabbi Elazar says: If the bill of divorce is immediately [ le’altar ] in the husband’s possession, this is not a valid bill of divorce, since he clearly never gave it to her. But if it is in his possession after some time, then this is a valid bill of divorce, since it is not in the power of the first husband to eliminate the right of the second husband. The assumption is that the husband did in fact give her the bill of divorce in the correct manner, but at some point, he took it back from her. If one wrote a bill of divorce to divorce his wife, and reconsidered and did not give it to her, Beit Shammai say: Although merely writing the bill of divorce does not dissolve the marriage, by doing so he disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. And Beit Hillel say: Even if he gave the bill of divorce to her conditionally and the condition was not fulfilled, and therefore the bill of divorce did not take effect, he did not disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood. A woman is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood only if the divorce takes effect.

With regard to one who divorces his wife, and afterward she spent the night with him at an inn [ befundaki ], Beit Shammai say: She does not require a second bill of divorce from him, and Beit Hillel say: She requires a second bill of divorce from him, since they may have engaged in sexual intercourse at the inn and thereby betrothed her once again. When did they say this halakha? When she was divorced following the state of marriage. Beit Hillel concede that when she was divorced following the state of betrothal, she does not require a second bill of divorce from him, due to the fact that he is not accustomed to her. Therefore, there is no concern that they engaged in sexual intercourse, even though they spent the night together at the inn. If a woman was married by her second husband on the basis of receiving a bare bill of divorce, i.e., a folded and tied bill of divorce that is missing signatures, she must leave both this, the first husband, and that, the second husband. And all of those previously mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier mishna (79b) apply to her in this case as well.

With regard to a bare bill of divorce; anyone, even those who are disqualified from bearing witness, can complete it, i.e., sign it in addition to the primary witnesses, so that it will not remain bare. This is the statement of ben Nannas. Rabbi Akiva says: Not all who are disqualified from bearing witness can complete it. Rather, only relatives who are fit to testify in another case. Rabbi Akiva permits only the inclusion of witnesses who would ordinarily be valid witnesses, but who are invalid here because they are relatives of either the husband and wife or the other witnesses. And what is a bare bill of divorce? It is any bill of divorce where the number of its folds is more than the number of its witnesses. In a folded and tied bill of divorce, the bill of divorce is folded and the folds are then tied. Instead of having two witnesses sign at the bottom of the document, witnesses would sign on each tied fold. A bare bill of divorce has more folds than signatures, i.e., some folds lack signatures.

Chapter 9

With regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except [ ella ] for so-and-so, Rabbi Eliezer permits her to remarry based on this divorce. And the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as their bond is not entirely severed by this divorce, and she is therefore still considered his wife. What should he do so the divorce may take effect? He should take it from her and hand it to her again, and he should say to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. If he wrote his qualification inside the bill of divorce, even if he then erased it, the bill is invalid since it was not written in a valid manner.

If a man says to his wife while handing her a bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, except to marry my father or to marry your father, to marry my brother or to marry your brother, to marry a slave or to marry a gentile, or to marry anyone to whom she cannot legally become betrothed, the divorce is valid. Since these men cannot betroth her anyway, his qualification is meaningless. If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, except for when doing so violates the following: The prohibition against a widow being married to a High Priest; the prohibition against a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ ḥalutza ] being married to a common priest; a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman being married to an Israelite man; an Israelite woman being married to a mamzer or to a Gibeonite man; or marrying anyone to whom she can legally become betrothed, even if this betrothal would be a transgression, such as in the aforementioned cases; in all of these cases the divorce is invalid. His statement renders it a partial divorce, as the woman is still not permitted to marry any man who is eligible to betroth her.

The basic, essential, element of a bill of divorce is: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. Rabbi Yehuda says that there is also another essential sentence: And this that you shall have from me is a scroll of divorce, and a letter of leave, and a bill of dismissal to go to marry any man that you wish. And the basic element of a bill of manumission for a maidservant is: You are hereby a free woman, or: You are hereby your own.

Three bills of divorce are invalid ab initio, but if the woman marries another man on the basis of one of these bills of divorce the lineage of the offspring from this marriage is unflawed. In other words, she is not considered to be a married woman who engaged in sexual intercourse with another man, which would impair the lineage of their child. These three bills are: A bill of divorce that the husband wrote in his handwriting but has no signatures of witnesses on the document at all, a case where there are signatures of witnesses on the document but there is no date written on it, and a case where there is a date written on it, but it contains only one witness. These are the three invalid bills of divorce with regard to which the Sages said: And if she marries, the lineage of the offspring is unflawed. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even though there are no signatures of witnesses on the document, but he handed it to her in the presence of two witnesses, it is a valid bill of divorce. And on the basis of this bill of divorce the woman can collect the amount written for her in her marriage contract even from liened property, as Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the witnesses sign the bill of divorce only for the betterment of the world. If no witnesses sign a bill of divorce the husband can contest its validity at any time by denying that he wrote it. Nevertheless, the witnesses’ signatures are not an essential part of a bill of divorce.

With regard to a case of two men who sent their wives two identical bills of divorce with an agent, as both their names and their wives’ names are identical, and the two bills of divorce were mixed up, the agent should hand both bills of divorce to this wife and both of them to that wife, so that each wife definitely receives her bill of divorce, although it is unclear which one is hers. Therefore, if one of the bills of divorce was lost before it was given to both women, the other is void, because it is unknown which bill of divorce was meant for which woman. With regard to five husbands who wrote a general wording in the bill of divorce, i.e., who wrote one common bill of divorce for their wives with a single formula, writing that so-and-so divorces his wife so-and-so, and so-and-so divorces so-and-so, and the witnesses signed below, in this case all of these bills of divorce that were combined into one bill are valid; and the bill must be handed to each and every wife individually, so they will all be divorced by it. If the scribe was writing a separate formula in the bill of divorce for each and every couple, and the witnesses signed below, the formula with which the witnesses’ signatures are read is valid. In other words, the formula directly underneath which they signed is valid, and the others are not valid.

With regard to two bills of divorce that a scribe wrote on the same paper one next to the other, and the signatures of two Hebrew witnesses, i.e., witnesses who signed in Hebrew from right to left, extend from underneath this bill of divorce on the right to underneath that bill of divorce on the left, and the signatures of two Greek witnesses, i.e., who signed in Greek from left to right, extend from underneath that bill of divorce on the left to underneath this bill of divorce on the right, the bill of divorce with which the names of the first two witnesses are read [ nikra’in ] is valid. The other bill of divorce is invalid, as it is not considered signed by these witnesses. If one witness signed in Hebrew from right to left, and one witness signed beneath him in Greek from left to right, and underneath that signature one witness signed in Hebrew, and beneath him one witness signed in Greek, with the signatures extending from underneath this bill of divorce to underneath that bill of divorce, both bills of divorce are invalid.

If a scribe left out part of the bill of divorce and wrote it in the second column, i.e., the bill of divorce is written in two columns on one paper, and the signatures of the witnesses are beneath the second column, it is a valid bill of divorce. If the witnesses signed at the top of the column, on the side, or on the back of an ordinary, non-folded bill of divorce, it is invalid. If the scribe placed the top of this bill of divorce next to the top of that bill of divorce so that both are written in the same column but with the text in opposite directions, and the witnesses signed in the middle, between the bills of divorce, both bills of divorce are invalid. If he placed the end of this bill of divorce next to the end of that bill of divorce, and the witnesses signed in the middle between them, the bill of divorce with which the witnesses’ signatures are read, i.e., the bill that is written in the same direction as the signatures, is valid. If he placed the top of this bill of divorce next to the end of that bill of divorce, and the witnesses signed in the middle, the bill of divorce at the end of which the witnesses are read, i.e., the upper bill of divorce, is valid.

With regard to a bill of divorce that was written in Hebrew and its witnesses signed in Greek, or that was written in Greek and its witnesses signed in Hebrew, or in which one witness signed in Hebrew and one witness signed in Greek, or if a bill of divorce has the writing of a scribe, and the scribe identifies his handwriting, and one witness verifies his signature, it is valid as though two witnesses testified to ratify their signatures. As for the wording of the signature, if a witness signed: So-and-so, witness, without mentioning his father’s name, it is valid. Similarly, if he did not write his name and instead wrote: Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. If he wrote: So-and-so, son of so-and-so, but did not write the word witness, it is valid. And this is what the scrupulous people of Jerusalem would do, i.e., they would sign without the word witness. As for the names of the husband and wife, if the scribe wrote his surname [ ḥanikhato ] or nickname and her surname or nickname, it is valid. With regard to a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by the court to write and give his wife, if he was compelled by a Jewish court it is valid, but if he was compelled by gentiles it is invalid. But with regard to gentiles they may beat him at the request of the Jewish court and say to him: Do what the Jews are telling you, and it is a valid divorce.

If a rumor circulated in the city that an unmarried woman is betrothed, she is considered to be betrothed. Similarly, if a rumor circulated that a married woman is divorced, she is divorced, provided there is no valid alternative explanation [ amatla ] for the rumor. What is considered a valid explanation? For example, it is a case where there is a rumor that so-and-so divorced his wife but that the bill of divorce was given to her conditionally. It is therefore possible that the condition was not fulfilled and she is not actually divorced. Similarly, if there is a rumor that a woman was betrothed but that the man threw her betrothal, i.e., the money or document of betrothal, to her, and it is uncertain whether it was closer to her and uncertain whether it was closer to him, and therefore the status of their betrothal is likewise uncertain, this is considered a valid explanation.

Beit Shammai say: A man may not divorce his wife unless he finds out about her having engaged in a matter of forbidden sexual intercourse [ devar erva ], i.e., she committed adultery or is suspected of doing so, as it is stated: “Because he has found some unseemly matter [ ervat davar ] in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:1). And Beit Hillel say: He may divorce her even due to a minor issue, e.g., because she burned or over-salted his dish, as it is stated: “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her,” meaning that he found any type of shortcoming in her. Rabbi Akiva says: He may divorce her even if he found another woman who is better looking than her and wishes to marry her, as it is stated in that verse: “And it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes” (Deuteronomy 24:1).

Mishnah Kiddushin

Chapter 1

A woman is acquired by, i.e., becomes betrothed to, a man to be his wife in three ways, and she acquires herself, i.e., she terminates her marriage, in two ways. The mishna elaborates: She is acquired through money, through a document, and through sexual intercourse. With regard to a betrothal through money, there is a dispute between tanna’im : Beit Shammai say that she can be acquired with one dinar or with anything that is worth one dinar. And Beit Hillel say: She can be acquired with one peruta, a small copper coin, or with anything that is worth one peruta. The mishna further clarifies: And how much is the value of one peruta, by the fixed value of silver? The mishna explains that it is one-eighth of the Italian issar, which is a small silver coin. And a woman acquires herself through a bill of divorce or through the death of the husband. A woman whose husband, who had a brother, died childless [ yevama ], can be acquired by the deceased husband’s brother, the yavam, only through intercourse. And she acquires herself, i.e., she is released from her levirate bond, through ḥalitza or through the death of the yavam.

A Hebrew slave can be acquired by his master through money or through a document, and he can acquire himself, i.e., he is emancipated, through years, i.e., when he completes his six years of labor, or through the advent of the Jubilee Year, or through the deduction of money. The slave can redeem himself during the six years by paying for his remaining years of slavery. A Hebrew maidservant has one mode of emancipation more than him, as she acquires herself through signs indicating puberty. A slave who is pierced after serving six years is acquired as a slave for a longer period through piercing his ear with an awl, and he acquires himself through the advent of the Jubilee Year or through the death of the master.

A Canaanite slave is acquired by means of money, by means of a document, or by means of the master taking possession of him. And he can acquire himself, i.e., his freedom, by means of money given by others, i.e., other people can give money to his master, and by means of a bill of manumission if he accepts it by himself. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The slave can be freed by means of money given by himself, and by means of a bill of manumission if it is accepted by others, provided that the money he gives belongs to others, not to him. This is because the slave cannot possess property, as anything owned by a slave is considered his master’s.

A large domesticated animal is acquired by passing, when its current owner transfers it to a buyer by giving him the reins or the bit. And a small domesticated animal is acquired by lifting. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: A small domesticated animal can be acquired by pulling also, and there is no need to lift it.

Property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land or other items that are fixed in the earth, can be acquired by means of giving money, by means of giving a document, or by means of taking possession of it. Property that does not serve as a guarantee, i.e., movable property, can be acquired only by pulling. Property that does not serve as a guarantee can be acquired along with property that serves as a guarantee by means of giving money, by means of giving a document, or by means of taking possession of them. The movable property is transferred to the buyer’s possession when it is purchased together with the land, by means of an act of acquisition performed on the land. Generally, one is not obligated to take an oath concerning the denial of a claim with regard to land. The mishna continues: And in a legal dispute involving both land and movable property, if the defendant makes a partial admission of the claim with regard to the movable property, thereby rendering himself obligated to take an oath denying any responsibility for the remaining property, the movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning the land as well, despite the fact that one is generally not obligated to take an oath for a claim involving land.

The mishna discusses a transaction involving the barter of two items. With regard to all items used as monetary value for another item, i.e., instead of a buyer paying money to the seller, they exchange items of value with each other, once one party in the transaction acquires the item he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it. Therefore, if it is destroyed or lost, he incurs the loss. How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, once this party acquires the animal that he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it. The authority of the Temple treasury effects acquisition by means of money to the seller. And the authority, i.e., the mode of acquisition, of a commoner [ hedyot ] is by possession. Furthermore, one’s declaration to the Most High, i.e., when one consecrates an item through speech, is equivalent to transferring an item to a common person, and the item is acquired by the Temple treasury through his mere speech.

With regard to all mitzvot of a son with regard to his father, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all mitzvot of a father with regard to his son, both men and women are obligated to perform them. The mishna notes an additional difference between the obligations of men and women in the performance of mitzvot: With regard to all positive, time-bound mitzvot, i.e., those which must be performed at specific times, men are obligated to perform them and women are exempt. And with regard to all positive mitzvot that are not time bound, both men and women are obligated to perform them. And with regard to all prohibitions, whether they are time-bound or whether they are not time-bound, both men and women are obligated to observe them, except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of your head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, which are derived from the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27), and a prohibition that concerns only priests: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse (see Leviticus 21:1). These mitzvot apply only to men, not women, despite the fact that they are prohibitions.

With regard to the placing of hands on the head of an offering, and the waving of certain offerings, and the bringing near of meal-offerings to the corner of the altar, and the removal of a handful from meal-offerings, and the burning of sacrificial parts on the altar, and the pinching of bird-offerings, and the collecting of blood of offerings in a vessel, and the sprinkling of blood, these apply to men and not to women. All these mitzvot apply specifically to men and not to women, except for the meal-offering of a sota, and the meal-offering of a nazirite woman, which these women wave.

Any mitzva that is dependent on the land [ aretz ] applies only in Eretz Yisrael, and any mitzva that is not dependent on the land applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael. This is apart from the mitzvot of orla and diverse kinds, which apply even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Rabbi Eliezer says: This is the halakha even with regard to the prohibition to eat from the new crop before the omer offering has been brought on the sixteenth of Nisan.

Anyone who performs one mitzva has goodness bestowed upon him, his life is lengthened, and he inherits the land, i.e., life in the World-to-Come. And anyone who does not perform one mitzva does not have goodness bestowed upon him, his life is not lengthened, and he does not inherit the land of the World-to-Come. Anyone who is engaged in the study of Bible, and in the study of Mishna, and in the desired mode of behavior, i.e., he performs labor and generally acts in an appropriate manner, will not be quick to sin, as it is stated: “And a threefold cord is not quickly broken” (Ecclesiastes 4:12). One who is involved in all three of these activities will not sin easily. And anyone who does not engage in the study of Bible, nor the study of Mishna, nor the desired mode of behavior, is not part of society, i.e., he is not considered a civilized person at all.

Chapter 2

A man can betroth a woman by himself or by means of his agent. Similarly, a woman can become betrothed by herself or by means of her agent. A man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman, either by himself or by means of his agent. In the case of one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with this date, and adds: Be betrothed to me with that one, then if one of the dates is worth one peruta she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed, since he mentioned betrothal in connection with each date. But if he said: Be betrothed to me with this one, and with this one, and with this one, then even if all of them together are worth one peruta she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. If he gave her dates with the intention of betrothing her with them, and she was eating them one by one as she received them, she is not betrothed unless one of them is worth one peruta.

If a man said to a woman: Be betrothed to me with this cup of wine, and it was found to be a cup of honey; or if he said: With this cup of honey, and it was found to be a cup of wine; or if he said: With this dinar made of silver, and it was found to be made of gold; or if he said: With this dinar made of gold, and it was found to be made of silver; or if he said: On the condition that I am wealthy, and he was found to be poor; or if he said: On the condition that I am poor, and he was found to be wealthy, she is not betrothed in any of these cases. Rabbi Shimon says: If he misled her to her advantage by giving her something better than what he stated, or if his status was greater than he claimed, she is betrothed.

If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a priest, and he was found to be a Levite; or if he said: A Levite, and he was found to be a priest; or if he said: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a Gibeonite, a people prohibited by rabbinic law from marrying into the congregation, i.e., from marrying a Jew of fit lineage, and he was found to be a mamzer, who is prohibited by Torah law to marry into the congregation; or he said: A mamzer, and he was found to be a Gibeonite; or if he said: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a resident of a small town, and he was found to be a resident of a large city; or he said: A resident of a city, and he was found to be a resident of a town; or if he said: Be betrothed to me on the condition that my house is close to the bathhouse, and it was found to be far; or he said: Far from the bathhouse, and it was found to be close, she is not betrothed. Or if he said that she is betrothed to him on the condition that he has a grown daughter or a maidservant, and he does not have one, or on the condition that he does not have one and he has one; or on the condition that he has no sons, and he has sons, or on the condition that he has sons and he does not have sons, then she is not betrothed. And in all these cases, despite the fact that she later stated: I intended to become betrothed to him nevertheless, whether or not he fulfilled the condition, she is not betrothed. And similarly, if it was she who misled him by making the betrothal conditional upon a statement of hers that turned out to be incorrect, the betrothal will not take effect.

In the case of one who says to his agent: Go and betroth for me so-and-so in such and such a place, and the agent went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed, since he instructed that the betrothal take place in a particular location. But if he said: Go and betroth the woman for me, she is in such and such a place; and the agent betrothed her in a different place, she is betrothed, since he did not mean that the agent should betroth her specifically there, but was merely telling him where to find her.

In the case of one who betroths a woman on the condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and it was found that there were vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, she is not betrothed, since his condition was not fulfilled. If he married her without specification, and it was found that there were vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, the marriage takes effect. Nevertheless, he has the right to divorce her, and she is divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract, as it is assumed that he would not have married her had he known that she was limited by her vows. Similarly, if he betrothed her on the condition that there are no blemishes upon her, and she was discovered to have blemishes, she is not betrothed. In a case where he married her without specification and she was discovered to have blemishes, he has the right to divorce her, and she is divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract. As to what is defined as a blemish, the rule is that all the blemishes that disqualify priests from performing the Temple service, as detailed in tractate Bekhorot, also disqualify women from receiving their marriage contract in case of divorce.

In the case of one who betroths two women together with an item worth one peruta, so that the value of each woman’s share was not worth one peruta, or who betroths one woman with an item worth less than one peruta, despite the fact that he later sent the traditional gifts [ sivlonot ] of a groom to the bride, she is not betrothed, because he sent the gifts on account of the first betrothal, i.e., the item whose value to the woman was less than one peruta, and not to effect betrothal. And similarly, if there was a minor who betrothed a woman, and he sent her gifts after he became an adult, the assumption is that he sent them on account of his betrothal when he was still a minor, and since betrothal performed by a minor is of no account, she is not betrothed.

In the case of one who betroths a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister in one act of betrothal, by saying: You are both betrothed to me, neither of them is betrothed. And an incident occurred involving five women, and among them were two sisters, and one person gathered a basket of figs that were from their field, and the fruit was of the Sabbatical Year, and he said: You are hereby all betrothed to me with this basket, and one of them accepted it on behalf of all of them. And the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed.

With regard to a priest who betroths a woman with his portion of offerings, whether he did so with offerings of the most sacred order or whether he did so with offerings of lesser sanctity, she is not betrothed. One who betroths a woman with second tithe, whether unwittingly or intentionally, has not betrothed her; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did so unwittingly he has not betrothed her, but if he did so intentionally he has betrothed her. And with regard to one who betroths a woman with consecrated property belonging to the Temple treasury, if he does so intentionally he has betrothed her, and if he does so unwittingly he has not betrothed her; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says the opposite: If he does so unwittingly he has betrothed her, but if he does so intentionally he has not betrothed her.

With regard to one who betroths a woman with orla, i.e., fruit grown during a tree’s first three years, or with diverse kinds in a vineyard, i.e., grain and grapes planted together, or with an ox that is sentenced to be stoned, or with a heifer whose neck is broken, or with the leper’s birds which are designated for his offering, or with a nazirite’s hair, or with a firstborn donkey, or with meat cooked in milk, or with non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, if he betroths her with any of these items, the woman is not betrothed, since it is prohibited to derive benefit from any of these items. By contrast, if one sold them and betrothed a woman with the money received from their sale, she is betrothed, as in these cases one may derive benefit from the money he receives in exchange for the forbidden item.

With regard to one who betroths a woman with terumot, or with tithes, or with the foreleg, cheeks, and stomach of an animal, which are given as gifts to priests, or with the water of purification, which is sprinkled on an impure person during the purification rite for impurity imparted by a corpse, or with the ashes of purification, which were mixed with the water sprinkled on an impure person during the purification rite for impurity imparted by a corpse, in all of these cases she is betrothed, and this is so even if the man betrothing her is an Israelite, not a priest or a Levite.

Chapter 3

With regard to one man who says to another: Go and betroth so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man. And similarly, with regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after thirty days, and another man came and betrothed her within those thirty days, she is betrothed to the second man. This is a full-fledged betrothal, so that if she is an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest, she may partake of teruma. If the first man said to the woman: You are hereby betrothed to me from now, and only after thirty days shall the betrothal take effect, and another man came and betrothed her within those thirty days, there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed to each of them. Consequently, if she was the daughter of a non-priest betrothed to a priest, or the daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite, she may not partake of teruma. Since her betrothal is uncertain, the daughter of a non-priest cannot be considered the wife of a priest, and similarly a priest’s daughter who is doubtfully married to an Israelite loses her right to partake of teruma as the daughter of a priest.

With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me with this peruta on the condition that I will give you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed immediately and he shall give her the money. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I will give you a particular sum of money from now and until thirty days, if he gave the money to her within thirty days she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I have two hundred dinars, she is betrothed if he has this sum. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I will show you two hundred dinars, she is betrothed, and he shall show the money to her. And if he is a moneychanger and shows her money belonging to others on the moneychangers’ table, she is not betrothed, as his statement means that he will show her money of his own.

With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I possess tillable land of a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, provided that he possesses such land. If he said to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that I possess land in such and such a place, if he possesses land in that place she is betrothed, but if not she is not betrothed. If he said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will show you a beit kor of earth, she is betrothed, and he shall show her. And if he showed her land in a valley, i.e., a field that does not belong to him among other fields, she is not betrothed.

Rabbi Meir says: Any condition that is not doubled, i.e., which does not specify both the result of fulfilling the condition and the result of the condition remaining unfulfilled, like the condition Moses stipulated with the children of Gad and the children of Reuben who sought to settle on the eastern side of the Jordan, is not a valid condition and is not taken into account at all. As it is stated: “And Moses said to them, if the children of Gad and the children of Reuben pass over the Jordan with you, every man armed for battle before the Lord, and the land shall be subdued before you, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession” (Numbers 32:29). And it is written afterward: “But if they will not pass over armed with you, they shall receive a possession among you in the land of Canaan” (Numbers 32:30). Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: One cannot derive the requirements of conditions in general from that particular case, as with regard to the nullification of the condition of the children of Gad and Reuben it was necessary to state the matter, as otherwise, if the verse had not specified both sides of the condition, it might have been thought it meant that they will not inherit even in the land of Canaan. One might have thought that if the tribes of Gad and Reuben would not fulfill the condition, they would forfeit their right to inherit anywhere. It was therefore necessary to specify that they would not lose their portion in Eretz Yisrael. Consequently, it is possible that with regard to a standard condition, where no such misunderstanding is likely to take place, it is not necessary to mention both sides.

With regard to one who betroths a woman and later says: When I betrothed her I thought that she was the daughter of a priest, and it turned out that she is the daughter of a Levite, or if he claims that he thought she was the daughter of a Levite and she is actually the daughter of a priest, or if he claims that he thought she was poor and she is wealthy; or wealthy and she is poor, in all of these cases she is betrothed, because she did not mislead him, and no explicit condition was stated with regard to these matters. With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after I convert, or: After you convert, or if he was a Canaanite slave and says: After I am emancipated, or if she was a Canaanite maidservant and he says: After you are emancipated, or if he says to a married woman: After your husband dies, or to his wife’s sister: After your sister dies, or if he says to a woman awaiting levirate marriage or ḥalitza from a brother-in-law [ yavam ], who in the opinion of this tanna cannot be betrothed by another man: After your yavam performs ḥalitza for you, in all these cases she is not betrothed. Since he cannot betroth her at the present time, his attempt at betrothal is ineffective. And similarly, with regard to one who says to another: If your wife gives birth to a female the child is hereby betrothed to me, even if she becomes pregnant, or is pregnant but her pregnancy is not known, if she gives birth to a girl, that child is not betrothed to him. But if he said this when the wife of the other man was pregnant and her fetus was discernible at the time, i.e., her pregnancy was known, his statement is upheld, and therefore if she gives birth to a girl, the child is betrothed to him.

With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that I will speak in your favor to the authorities, e.g., to help her address some legal matter, or: On the condition that I will act for you as a laborer, if he spoke in her favor to the authorities or acted for her as a laborer, she is betrothed. But if not, she is not betrothed. With regard to one who betroths a woman and says to her that the betrothal is: On the condition that my father will want this betrothal, if his father wants it, she is betrothed; but if not, she is not betrothed. If the father dies, she is betrothed, despite the fact that he did not reveal his wishes. If the son dies, one instructs the father to say that he does not want the betrothal, so that the betrothal will never have taken effect, thereby enabling her to avoid the requirement of levirate marriage.

With regard to a man who said: I betrothed my minor daughter to someone but I do not know to whom I betrothed her, and one man came forward and said: I betrothed her, his claim is deemed credible. If two men stepped forward and this one said: I betrothed her, and that one said: I betrothed her, they must both give her a bill of divorce to render it permitted for her to marry anyone else. And if they so desire, one of them gives her a bill of divorce and the other one may marry her.

If a father says: I betrothed my minor daughter to someone, or: I betrothed her to someone and accepted her divorce when she was a minor girl, and she is still a minor girl at the time of this statement, he is deemed credible to render her forbidden to all other men as a married woman, or to a priest as a divorced woman. But if he says: I betrothed her to someone and accepted her divorce when she was a minor, and she is an adult woman at the time of his declaration, his statement is not deemed credible. Likewise, if he says: She was taken captive and I redeemed her, he is not deemed credible to disqualify her from marrying a priest whether she was a minor girl or an adult woman. With regard to one who said at the time of his death: I have children, in which case his wife does not require levirate marriage after his death, he is deemed credible. But if he said on his deathbed: I have brothers, indicating that it is prohibited for her to marry anyone else until one of his brothers performs ḥalitza with her after his death, he is not deemed credible. In the case of one who betroths his daughter to a man without specification, i.e., without specifying which daughter he meant, the grown women are not included among those who might be betrothed, since he does not have the right to betroth them.

With regard to one who has two groups of daughters from two women, i.e., one group of daughters from each wife, and he said: I betrothed my elder daughter to someone but I do not know if I meant the eldest of the older group of daughters, or the eldest of the younger group of daughters, or the youngest of the older group, who is nevertheless older than the eldest of the younger group, all the daughters are forbidden, except for the youngest of the younger group. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: Despite the uncertainty, they are all permitted except for the eldest of the older group, as one who says elder without further specification means the oldest of them all. Similarly, if one said: I betrothed my younger daughter, but I do not know if I meant the youngest of the younger group, or the youngest of the older group, or the eldest of the younger group who is younger than the youngest of the older group, they are all forbidden, except for the eldest of the older group. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: They are all permitted except for the youngest of the younger group.

With regard to one who says to a woman: I betrothed you, and she says: You did not betroth me, he is forbidden to her relatives, as his claim that he has betrothed her renders himself forbidden to her relatives. And she is permitted to his relatives, in accordance with her stance that she is not betrothed to him. If she says: You betrothed me, and he says: I did not betroth you, he is permitted to her relatives and she is forbidden to his relatives by the same reasoning. If a man says to a woman: I betrothed you, and she says: You betrothed only my daughter, he is forbidden to the relatives of the older woman, the mother, whom he claims to have betrothed, and the older woman is permitted to his relatives. He is permitted to the relatives of the younger woman, the daughter, as he maintains that he did not betroth her, and the younger woman is permitted to his relatives, since her mother’s statement is insufficient to render her forbidden.

Similarly, if he says: I betrothed your daughter, and she, the mother, says: You betrothed only me, he is forbidden to the relatives of the younger woman, and the younger woman is permitted to his relatives; he is permitted to the relatives of the older woman, and the older woman is forbidden to his relatives.

There is a principle with regard to the hala-khot of lineage: Any case where there is betrothal, i.e., where the betrothal takes effect, and the marriage involves no transgression by Torah law, the lineage of the offspring follows the male, his father. And in which case is this applicable? For example, this is the case with regard to the daughter of a priest; or the daughter of a Levite; or the daughter of an Israelite, who married a priest, a Levite, or an Israelite. In all these cases the child’s lineage is established by his father’s family. And any case where there is a valid betrothal and yet there is a transgression, the offspring follows the flawed parent. And in which case is this applicable? For example, this is the case of a widow who is married to a High Priest, or a divorced woman or a ḥalutza who is married to a common priest, or a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman who is married to an Israelite, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or to a Gibeonite. In these situations the child inherits the status of the blemished parent. And in any case where a woman cannot join in betrothal with a particular man, as the betrothal does not take effect, but she can join in betrothal with others, i.e., the woman is considered a member of the Jewish people and can marry other Jews, in these cases the offspring is a mamzer. And in which case is this applicable? This is one who engages in intercourse with any one of those with whom relations are forbidden that are written in the Torah. And in any case where a woman cannot join in betrothal with him or with others, the offspring is like her. He is not considered his father’s son at all, but has the same status as his mother. And in which case is this applicable? This is the offspring of a Canaanite maidservant or a gentile woman, as her child is a slave or a gentile like her. If he converts, he is not a mamzer.

Rabbi Tarfon says: Mamzerim can be purified, so that their offspring will not be mamzerim. How so? With regard to a mamzer who married a Canaanite maidservant, their offspring is a slave. If his master subsequently emancipates him, that son is found to be a freeman, rather than a mamzer. Rabbi Eliezer says: This method is not effective, as this son is a mamzer slave.

Chapter 4

There were ten categories of lineage, with varying restrictions on marriage, among the Jews who ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael with Ezra before the building of the Second Temple. They are as follows: Priests; Levites; Israelites; priests disqualified due to flawed lineage [ ḥalalim ]; converts, and emancipated slaves; mamzerim ; Gibeonites, i.e., the descendants of the Gibeonites who converted in the time of Joshua; children of unknown paternity [ shetuki ]; and foundlings. The mishna proceeds to detail their halakhot : With regard to priests, Levites, and Israelites, it is permitted for men and women in these categories to marry one another. With regard to Levites who are not priests, Israelites, ḥalalim, converts, and emancipated slaves, it is permitted for men and women in these categories to marry one another. With regard to converts, and emancipated slaves, mamzerim, and Gibeonites, children of unknown paternity [ shetuki ], and foundlings, it is permitted for all of the men and women in these categories to marry one another.

And these are the last two categories: A shetuki is any person who knows the identity of his mother but does not know the identity of his father. A foundling is anyone who was collected from the marketplace and doesn’t know the identity of his parents, neither that of his father nor that of his mother. These two categories are people whose status is uncertain; they may be mamzerim. Abba Shaul would call a shetuki by the label of beduki.

All those for whom it is prohibited to enter into the congregation, i.e., to marry a Jew of unflawed lineage, are permitted to marry into each other’s families. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits them from marrying anyone other than those who share their specific flaw. Rabbi Eliezer says: It is permitted for those with definite flaws to marry with those with definite flaws. For example, it is permitted for mamzerim and Gibeonites to marry each other. By contrast, it is prohibited for those with definite flaws, such as mamzerim, to marry with those whose flaws result from an uncertainty, such as a child of unknown paternity [ shetuki ] and a foundling; and it is prohibited for those whose flaws result from an uncertainty to marry with those with definite flaws; and it is prohibited for those whose flaws result from an uncertainty to marry with those whose flaws result from an uncertainty, such as a shetuki and a female shetuki. And these are the ones whose flaws result from an uncertainty: A shetuki, a foundling, and a Samaritan.

A priest who marries a woman who is the daughter of a priest must investigate with regard to her background, i.e., he must check previous generations of her family tree from both the maternal and paternal sides, for four mothers, which are eight. How so? He investigates the lineage of her mother, and the mother of her mother, and the mother of her mother’s father, and her mother, i.e., the mother of her mother’s fathers’ mother. And he also investigates the lineage of the mother of her father, and her mother, i.e., the mother of her father’s mother, and the mother of her father’s father, and her mother i.e., the mother of her father’s father’s mother. If he seeks to marry a Levite woman or an Israelite woman, he adds to these an investigation of mothers of one additional generation.

With regard to these investigations, one need not investigate from the altar and above. If his ancestors included a priest who served at the altar, one checks no further, as the court would have investigated his lineage before allowing him to participate in the Temple service. Nor do they check from the platform, used by Levites for singing in the Temple, and above, nor from the Sanhedrin and above, since only one whose lineage has been examined and who was found to be fit can be appointed to the Sanhedrin. And similarly, anyone whose ancestors held public posts, and anyone whose ancestors were charity collectors, may marry into the priesthood, and there is no need to investigate their lineage, since no one of flawed lineage would be appointed to those positions. Rabbi Yosei says: Even the descendants of one who had signed as a witness in the old court [ ba’arki ] of Tzippori do not need to have their lineage investigated. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Even the descendants of one who was written in the army list [ be’isteratya ] of the Jewish king do not need to have their lineage investigated.

The daughter of a male ḥalal is unfit to marry into the priesthood forever. In other words, all daughters of male descendants of a ḥalal are prohibited from marrying priests, as they have the status of ḥalalot. If there was an Israelite who married a ḥalala, his daughter is fit to marry into the priesthood, whereas if there was a ḥalal who married a Jewish woman, his daughter is unfit to marry into the priesthood. Rabbi Yehuda says: The daughter of a male convert is like the daughter of a male ḥalal, and she is also prohibited from marrying into the priesthood.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov disagrees and says: If there was an Israelite who married a female convert, his daughter is fit to marry into the priesthood, and similarly if there was a convert who married a Jewish woman, his daughter is fit to marry into the priesthood. But if there was a male convert who married a female convert, his daughter is unfit to marry into the priesthood. With regard to both converts and emancipated Canaanite slaves, their daughters are unfit to marry into the priesthood even up to ten generations. This halakha applies to the offspring until his mother is born Jewish. Rabbi Yosei says: Even if there was a male convert who married a female convert, his daughter is fit to marry into the priesthood.

One who says: This son of mine is a mamzer, e.g., if he claims that the son was born to one forbidden to him by a prohibition that carries the punishment of karet, he is not deemed credible to render him a mamzer. And even if both of them, the father and the mother, admit that a fetus in her womb is a mamzer, they are not deemed credible. Rabbi Yehuda says: They are deemed credible.

In a case of one who authorized his agent to betroth his daughter to a man that the agent would deem fit, and the father went and betrothed her to someone else, if his betrothal preceded that of the agent, his betrothal is a valid betrothal; and if the betrothal of his agent preceded his own, the betrothal of the agent is a valid betrothal. And if it is not known whose betrothal came first, both men who might have betrothed her give her a bill of divorce in order to render her permitted to marry someone else. And if they wish and agree between them, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries her. And similarly, with regard to a woman who authorized her agent to betroth her and she then went and betrothed herself to someone else, if her own betrothal preceded that of the agent, her betrothal is a valid betrothal, and if that of her agent preceded hers, the agent’s betrothal is a valid betrothal. And if they do not know whose betrothal came first, both men who may have betrothed her give her a bill of divorce. And if they wish, one may give a bill of divorce and the other marries her.

With regard to one who went overseas with his wife, and returned with his wife and children, and said: This is the woman who went overseas with me and these are her children, he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, since her lineage was already investigated at the time of their marriage, nor with regard to the lineage of the children. If he returned without the woman and said: My wife died and these are her children, he must bring proof that the children were born to his wife, but he does not need to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman.

If he left when he was unmarried and said upon his return: I married a woman overseas, and this is she, and these are her children, he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, but he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the children. If he said: I married a woman overseas and she died, and these are her children, he is required to bring proof with regard to both the lineage of the woman and the children.

A man may not be secluded with two women lest he sin with them, but one woman may be secluded with two men. Rabbi Shimon says: Even one man may be secluded with two women when his wife is with him, and in that situation he may even sleep in the same inn with two women, because his wife guards him from sinning with them. They further said that a man may be secluded with his mother, and with his daughter, and sleep alongside them with bodily contact without clothes, since there is no concern that they will engage in sexual intercourse. And when they, the son or daughter, have grown up, this one sleeps in her garment and that one sleeps in his garment, but they may share a bed.

A bachelor may not act as a teacher of children, nor may a woman act as a teacher of children. Rabbi Elazar says: Even one who does not have a wife may not act as a teacher of children.

Rabbi Yehuda says: A bachelor may not herd cattle, nor may two bachelors sleep with one covering, lest they transgress the prohibition against homosexual intercourse, but the Rabbis permit it. Anyone who has professional dealings primarily with women may not be secluded with women. There is more of a concern that such a man might sin due to his familiarity with the women. And a person may not teach his son a trade that necessitates frequent interaction with women, for the same reason. With regard to teaching one’s son a trade, Rabbi Meir says: A person should always teach his son a clean and easy trade and pray for success to the One to Whom wealth and property belong, as ultimately there is no trade that does not include both poverty and wealth, since a person can become rich from any profession. Poverty does not come from a particular trade, nor does wealth come from a particular trade, but rather, all is in accordance with a person’s merit. Therefore, one should choose a clean and easy trade, and pray to God for success. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Have you ever seen a beast or a bird that has a trade? And yet they earn their livelihood without anguish. But all these were created only to serve me, and I, a human being, was created to serve the One Who formed me. Is it not right that I should earn my livelihood without anguish? But I, i.e., humanity, have committed evil actions and have lost my livelihood. This is why people must work to earn a living. Abba Guryan of Tzadyan says in the name of Abba Gurya: A person may not teach his son the trades of a donkey driver, a camel driver, a pot maker, a sailor, a shepherd, or a storekeeper. The reason for all these is the same, as their trades are the trades of robbers; all of these professions involve a measure of dishonesty and are likely to lead to robbery. Rabbi Yehuda says in Abba Gurya’s name: Most donkey drivers are wicked, since they engage in deceit, and most camel drivers, who traverse dangerous places such as deserts, are of fit character, as they pray to God to protect them on their journeys. Most sailors are pious, since the great danger of the seas instills in them the fear of Heaven. The best of doctors is to Gehenna, and even the fittest of butchers is a partner of Amalek. Rabbi Nehorai says: I set aside all the trades in the world, and I teach my son only Torah, as a person partakes of its reward in this world and the principal reward remains for him in the World-to-Come, which is not true of other professions, whose rewards are only in this world. Furthermore, if a person comes to be ill, or old, or undergoes suffering, and is unable to be involved in his trade, behold, he dies in hunger. But with regard to the Torah it is not so, since one can study it under all circumstances. Rather, it preserves him from all evil and sin in his youth, and provides him with a future and hope in his old age. The mishna explains: With regard to his youth, what does it say about a Torah scholar? “But they that wait for the Lord shall renew their strength” (Isaiah 40:31). With regard to his old age, what does it say? “They shall still bring forth fruit in old age” (Psalms 92:15), and it likewise states with regard to Abraham our forefather: “And Abraham was old, well stricken in age; and the Lord had blessed Abraham in all things” (Genesis 24:1). We found that Abraham our forefather fulfilled the entire Torah before it was given, as it is stated: “Because that Abraham listened to My voice, and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws” (Genesis 26:5), which indicates that Abraham observed all the mitzvot of his own accord and was rewarded in his old age as a result.

Mishnah Bava Kamma

Chapter 1

There are four primary categories of damage: The category of Ox; and the category of Pit; and the category of Maveh, which, based on a discussion in the Gemara refers either to the tooth of an animal that causes damage or to a person who causes damage; and the category of Fire. Each of these categories is unique; therefore, the halakhot of one cannot be derived from another. The defining characteristic of the primary category of Ox is not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Maveh, and the defining characteristic of the primary category of Maveh is not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Ox. And the defining characteristics of this category of Ox and that category of Maveh, in which there is a living spirit that causes damage, are not similar to the defining characteristic of the category of Fire, in which there is no living spirit. The mishna continues: And the defining characteristics of this primary category of Ox and Maveh and that primary category of Fire, in which the typical manner of their components is to proceed from one place to another and cause damage, are not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Pit, in which the typical manner of its components is not to proceed from one place to another and cause damage; rather, it remains in place and the damage is caused by the injured party proceeding and encountering the obstacle. The common denominator of the components in all of these primary categories is that it is their typical manner to cause damage, and the responsibility for their safeguarding to prevent them from causing damage is incumbent upon you, the owner of the animal or generator of the fire or the pit. And when a component of any of these categories causes damage, the owner or generator of the component that caused the damage is obligated to pay restitution for damage with best -quality land.

With regard to anything for which I became responsible for safeguarding it to prevent it from causing damage, if it in fact causes damage, it is considered as if I actively facilitated that damage, and accordingly I must pay for it. In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused. One is liable only with regard to damage caused to property for which, were he to use it for a non-sacred purpose, he would not be liable for the misuse of consecrated property; with regard to damage caused to property that belongs to members of the covenant, i.e., Jews; and with regard to assigned property, the meaning of which the Gemara will explain. And one is liable for damage caused in any place except for a domain designated exclusively for the use of the one responsible for the damage. And one is liable for damage caused in a domain designated for the joint use of the injured party and the one liable for the damage. When an animal or item one is responsible to safeguard causes damage, the one liable for the damage caused by insufficiently safeguarding it is obligated to pay payments of restitution for damage with his best-quality land.

The determination of payment of damages is made by monetary appraisal. One pays with items worth money. This halakha applies before a court. And it is based upon the testimony of witnesses who are free men, i.e., men who are not Canaanite slaves, and who are members of the covenant, i.e., Jews. And women are included in the halakhot of damages in the same way as men. And both the injured party and the one liable for the damage are involved in the payment. The Gemara will explicate each of these principles.

There are five damage-causing acts that an animal can perform twice and remain innocuous even when its owner was warned each time to prevent it from doing so. After the third time, the animal is rendered forewarned. In such cases, the owner is liable to pay only half of the damages. And there are five damage-causing acts for which an animal is considered forewarned, at times even if it had never caused damage in that manner. In such cases the owner is liable to pay the full cost of the damage. An animal is not considered forewarned with regard to Goring, i.e., not for goring with its horns, nor for pushing with its body, nor for biting, nor for crouching upon items in order to damage them, nor for kicking. In these cases the animal is considered to be innocuous and its owner is liable for only half of the damages. Concerning acts of damage performed with the tooth, the animal is considered forewarned with regard to eating that which is fitting for it to eat. Concerning acts of damage performed with the foot, the animal is considered forewarned with regard to breaking items while walking. And there is a forewarned ox, which gored three times and each time his owner was warned to safeguard his ox from doing so. And there is an ox that causes damage to the property of the injured party while on the property of the injured party. And there is the person, i.e., any damage done by a person. In all of these cases the one who caused the damage is considered to be forewarned, resulting in the obligation to pay the full cost of the damage. The mishna presents the halakha for wild animals: The wolf; the lion; the bear; the leopard; the bardelas, the meaning of which the Gemara will discuss; and the snake. These are considered forewarned even if they had never previously caused damage. Rabbi Elazar says: When these animals are domesticated they are not considered forewarned. But the snake is always considered forewarned. What is the difference between the liability incurred for damage caused by an ox that is considered innocuous and the liability incurred for damage caused by an ox that is forewarned? The only differences are that for damage caused by an innocuous ox, the owner pays half the cost of the damage exclusively from proceeds of the sale of the body of the ox, and for a forewarned ox he pays the full cost of the damage from his higher property.

Chapter 2

The mishna in the previous chapter (15b) teaches that the owner of an animal is always forewarned with regard to the category of Trampling. The mishna elaborates: For what damage caused with the hoof is the animal deemed forewarned? It is deemed forewarned with regard to trampling objects and breaking them in the course of its walking. An animal is deemed forewarned with regard to walking in its typical manner and, by doing so, breaking objects as it proceeds. By contrast, if the animal was kicking while it was walking, or it transpired that pebbles were inadvertently propelled from under its feet and those pebbles broke vessels, cases of that kind do not fit precisely into the primary category of Trampling. In both of these cases the owner of the animal pays half the cost of the damage. If an animal trod upon a vessel and broke it and then a shard of that vessel fell upon a second vessel and broke it, the owner pays the full cost of the damage for the first vessel, as its action is classified under the primary category of Trampling, and he pays half the cost of the damage for the latter vessel, as the damage caused by the shard is tantamount to damage caused by pebbles inadvertently propelled by the foot of an animal. Chickens are deemed forewarned with regard to walking in their typical manner and breaking objects, and therefore, the owner of a chicken pays the full restitution for the damage done to any objects broken by his chicken. If there was a string [ delil ] tied to a chicken’s leg as an indication of ownership and it wrapped around a vessel and broke it, or if the chicken was hopping in an atypical manner and breaking vessels, its owner pays half the cost of the damage.

Within the context of the primary category of Eating, for what damage caused with the tooth is an animal deemed forewarned? It is deemed forewarned with regard to eating food items fit for its consumption. The domesticated animal is deemed forewarned with regard to eating fruits and vegetables. If the animal ate garments or vessels, the owner pays half the cost of the damage. As these are not items fit for its consumption, the animal is not deemed forewarned in this case. In what case is this statement applied, that one pays the full value of the food eaten by the animal? It is a case where the animal ate the food on the property of the injured party; but if the animal ate food in the public domain, the owner of the animal is exempt from liability. And even if the animal ate food in the public domain, if the animal derives benefit from eating another’s produce in the public domain, the owner pays for the benefit that it derives, just not for the full cost of the food. Under what circumstances does the owner of the animal pay for the benefit that it derives? If the animal ate produce in the public square in the area before the storefronts, the owner of the animal pays for the benefit that it derives. If the animal ate from food placed at the side of the public square, which is not a public thoroughfare, the owner of the animal pays for what it damaged, as the legal status of that area is like that of the property of the injured party. If the animal ate produce from the entrance of the store, its owner pays for the benefit that it derives, as the status of a store entrance is like that of the public domain. If the animal ate produce from inside the store, its owner pays for what it damaged.

With regard to a dog or a goat that jumped from a rooftop and broke vessels while doing so, their owners must pay the full cost of the damage to the vessels because these animals are deemed forewarned concerning to jumping. With regard to a dog that took a cake that had been baked directly on hot coals, and went to a stack of grain to eat it, and it ate the cake and at the same time ignited the stack of grain with a coal that it had taken along with the cake, the owner of the dog must pay the full cost of the damage for the cake, and he must pay for half the cost of the damage to the stack of grain.

Which type of ox is deemed innocuous and which is deemed forewarned? An ox is deemed forewarned in any case where witnesses testified about it that it gored on three different days. And it reverts back to its previous innocuous status from when it reverses its behavior and refrains from goring for three consecutive days; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: It is deemed forewarned in any case where witnesses testified that it gored three times, regardless of the number of days on which this behavior occurred. And it reverts back to its previous innocuous status in any case where children pet it and play with it and it does not gore them.

And what is the case of the ox that causes damage while on the property of the injured party, mentioned in an earlier mishna (15b) that listed animals that are forewarned? If the animal gored, pushed, bit, squatted upon, or kicked another animal in the public domain, the owner is liable to pay half the cost of the damage if the ox was innocuous, but if it acted while on the property of the injured party, Rabbi Tarfon says: He must pay the full cost of the damage, and the Rabbis say: He must pay half the cost of the damage, as in any other case classified as Goring. Rabbi Tarfon said to the Rabbis: If in a place where the Torah was lenient with regard to damage classified as Eating and with regard to Trampling, specifically in the public domain, as the owner is exempt from liability, nevertheless the Torah was strict with regard to these forms of damage if they occurred on the property of the injured party, requiring him to pay the full cost of the damage, then in a place where the Torah was strict with regard to cases of damage classified as Goring, specifically in the public domain, requiring the owner liable to pay for half the cost of the damage, is it not right that we should be strict with regard to this form of damage if it occurs on the property of the injured party to likewise require the owner of the animal to pay the full cost of the damage? The Rabbis said to him: Although there is an a fortiori inference being applied here, still it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, meaning that the halakha cannot be stricter with the inference than it is with the case that serves as the source of the inference. Therefore, just as one is liable to pay half the cost of the damage classified as Goring in the public domain, so too, for damage classified as Goring on the property of the injured party he is liable to pay only half the cost of the damage. Rabbi Tarfon said to them: If that is your opinion, then I as well will not derive an inference with regard to Goring from a different case of Goring. I will instead derive an inference with regard to Goring from Trampling: And if in a place where the Torah was lenient with regard to damage classified as Eating and Trampling, specifically in the public domain, as the owner is exempt from liability, nevertheless the Torah was strict with regard to damage classified as Goring, requiring him to pay half the cost of the damage, then in a place where the Torah was strict with regard to damage classified as Eating and Trampling, specifically on the property of the injured party as the animal’s owner is obligated to pay the full cost of the damage, is it not right that we should be equally strict with regard to damage classified as Goring and require payment of the full cost of the damage in this case as well? The Rabbis said to him: Here as well, it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, and therefore, just as one is liable to pay half the cost of the damage classified as Goring in the public domain, so too, for damage classified as Goring on the property of the injured party he will be liable to pay only half the cost of the damage, as ultimately your inference still depends on the fact that for Goring in the public domain one pays half the cost of the damage.

The legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned. Therefore, whether the damage was unintentional or intentional, whether he was awake while he caused the damage or asleep, whether he blinded another’s eye or broke vessels, he must pay the full cost of the damage.

Chapter 3

In the case of one who places a kad, a type of vessel, in the public domain and another person comes and stumbles on it and breaks it, the other person is exempt from paying for what he broke. And if the one who stumbled incurred damaged by it, the owner of the ḥavit, a type of vessel, is liable to pay restitution for his damage. If one’s jug broke in the public domain and another person slipped in the water from the jug and was injured from the fall, or if he was injured by the shards of the broken jug, the owner of the jug is liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a case where the owner of the jug acted with intent, he is liable, and in a case where he acted without intent, he is exempt.

In the case of one who pours water in the public domain, and another person in-curred damage due to it, the one who poured water is liable to pay for his damage. In the case of one who conceals a thorn or a piece of glass in his wall adjacent to the public domain, or one who puts up a fence of thorns, or one who puts up a fence that subsequently fell into the public domain, and others incurred damage due to any of these, he is liable to pay for their damage.

In the case of one who takes out his straw [ teven ] and his hay [ kash ] to the public domain to use afterward as fertilizer and another person incurred damage due to them, he is liable to pay for his damage, and whoever takes possession of the hay and straw first acquires them for himself. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to anyone who places obstacles in the public domain and they cause damage, he is liable to pay damages, and whoever takes possession of them first acquires them. In the case of one who turns over dung in the public domain and another person incurred damage due to it, the former is liable to pay for his damage.

In the case of two potters carrying pots who were walking one after the other in the public domain, and the first stumbled on a bump and fell, and the second stumbled over the first and fell too, the first is liable to pay for the damage incurred by the second.

If this person came in the public domain with his barrel, and that person came from the opposite direction with his cross beam, and this one’s jug was broken by that one’s cross beam, the one carrying the cross beam is exempt, because this one had permission to walk in the public domain, and that one also had permission to walk there. If they were walking in the same direction, so that the owner of the cross beam was walking first, in front, and the owner of a barrel last, behind him, and the barrel was broken by the cross beam, the owner of the cross beam is exempt, since the owner of the barrel saw him in front of him and should have been more careful. But if the owner of the cross beam stopped, causing the barrel to collide with the beam and break, the former is liable, since the latter had no way of anticipating that he would stop. And if he said to the owner of the barrel: Stop, he is exempt from liability for breaking the barrel. Conversely, if the owner of the barrel was walking first and the owner of the cross beam last, and the barrel was broken by the cross beam, the owner of the cross beam is liable. But if owner of the barrel stopped, the owner of the cross beam is exempt from liability for breaking the barrel. And if he said to the owner of the cross beam: Stop, the owner of the cross beam is liable. And similarly, these halakhot apply in a case where this one came with his lamp and that one came with his flax, and the lamp set fire to the flax.

With regard to two people who were walking in the public domain, or one who was running and another one who was walking, or who were both running, and they damaged one another, both of them are exempt.

With regard to one who was chopping wood in his private property and a chip flew off and caused damage in the public property, or one who was chopping wood in the public property and caused damage in the private property of another, or one who was chopping wood in his private property and caused damage in the private property of another, in all these cases he is liable.

With regard to two innocuous oxen that injured each other, the respective damages are evaluated, and if one amount is more than the other, the owner pays half the damages with regard to the difference. In other words, the owner of the ox that caused the greater damage pays the other owner half the difference. If both oxen were forewarned, the owner of the ox that caused the greater damage pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference. In a case where one of the oxen was innocuous and the other one was forewarned, if the forewarned ox caused greater damage to the innocuous ox than the reverse, the owner of the forewarned ox pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference. If the innocuous ox caused greater damage to the forewarned ox, its owner pays half the damage with regard to the difference. And similarly, with regard to two people who injured each other, the one who did greater damage pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference, since one is always considered forewarned with regard to damage he causes. If a person caused damage to a forewarned ox and the forewarned ox caused damage to the person, whichever side caused the greater damage pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference. In a case where a person caused damage to an innocuous ox and the innocuous ox caused damage to the person, if the person caused greater financial damage to the innocuous ox he pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference. If the innocuous ox caused greater damage to the person, its owner pays only half the damage with regard to the difference. Rabbi Akiva says: The owner of the innocuous ox that injured a person also pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference. Rabbi Akiva does not distinguish between an innocuous and a forewarned ox in a case where an ox injures a person.

With regard to an innocuous ox worth one hundred dinars that gored an ox worth two hundred dinars, and the carcass of the dead ox is not worth anything, its owner takes the entire ox that gored it, since it is worth half the value of the damage. With regard to an innocuous ox worth two hundred dinars that gored another ox worth two hundred, and the carcass is worth nothing, Rabbi Meir said: It is about this type of case that it is stated: “Then they shall sell the live ox, and divide its monetary value” (Exodus 21:35). Rabbi Yehuda said to him: And that is the halakha, yet your interpretation of the verse is incorrect. You have upheld the clause: “Then they shall sell the live ox and divide its monetary value,” which fits your interpretation of the case. But you have not upheld the latter clause of the verse: “And the dead they shall also divide,” since in the case you mentioned the carcass is worthless. Rather, to which case is the verse referring? It is the case of an ox worth two hundred dinars that gored another ox worth two hundred dinars, and the carcass is worth fifty dinars. In this case, this party takes half the value of the living ox, one hundred dinars, and half the value of the dead ox, twenty-five dinars; and that party also takes half the value of the living ox and half the value of the dead ox.

There are cases where one is liable for an act of damage caused by his ox, but exempt from liability for the same action if he performed it himself. Conversely, there are also cases where one is exempt from liability for the action of his ox, but liable for his own action. How so? If his ox caused a person humilation, he is exempt from paying compensation, but if he himself humiliated another, he is liable. Similarly, if his ox blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his slave’s tooth, he is exempt from having to emancipate the slave for this mutilation. But if he himself blinded his slave’s eye or knocked out his tooth, he is liable to emancipate him, as stated in the Torah (Exodus 21:26–27). By contrast, if his ox injured the owner’s father or his mother, he is liable to pay damages, but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is exempt from paying compensation. Similarly, if his ox set fire to a haystack on Shabbat, he is liable to pay damages. But if he himself set fire to a haystack on Shabbat, he is exempt from paying damages. He is exempt from payment in these cases due to the fact that he is liable to receive the death penalty for injuring his father or mother or for desecrating Shabbat.

With regard to an ox that was pursuing another ox, and the ox being pursued became injured, but there are no witnesses as to how it was injured, and this one, the owner of the injured ox, says to the owner of the pursuing ox: Your ox injured my ox, and you are liable to pay me damages, and that one, the owner of the pursuing ox, says in response: No; rather, it was hurt by a rock, and I am not liable, then in this case, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. As long as the owner of the injured ox cannot prove that the injury was inflicted by the pursuing ox, the owner of the pursuing ox is not liable. In a case where two oxen, belonging to two different owners, were pursuing one ox belonging to a third person, and that ox was injured by one of the pursuing oxen, and this one, the owner of one of the pursuing oxen, says to the owner of the other: It was your ox that caused the injury, and that one, the owner of the other pursuing ox, says: No, it was your ox that caused the injury, the two of them are exempt, since each of them rejects the claim of the injured party that his ox caused the injury. If both oxen belonged to one person, both are liable, as will be explained in the Gemara. If the pursuing oxen both belonged to one person, and were both innocuous, so that restitution is paid exclusively from proceeds of the sale of the belligerent ox, and one was large and the other one small, in this case, if the injured party says that the large ox caused the damage, and he is therefore entitled to receive restitution for half the damage from the value of the large ox, but the one liable for damage says: No; rather, the small ox caused the damage, and half of its value is not sufficient to cover half the damage; or, similarly, in a case where one ox is innocuous and one is forewarned, and the injured party says: The forewarned ox caused the damage, and the injured party is therefore eligible to receive full damages, but the one liable for damage says: No; rather, the innocuous ox caused the damage, in which case he is liable to pay only half the damage; in both of the above cases, the principle is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If the injured animals were two oxen, one large and the other one small, and the ones that caused the damage were also two oxen, one large and one small, and the injured party says: The large one injured the large one and the small one injured the small one, and the one liable for damage says: No; rather, the small one injured the large one, in which case, if half the value of the belligerent ox does not cover half the damage, he is not required to pay more, and the large one injured the small one; or, similarly, if one of the belligerent oxen was innocuous and one forewarned, and the injured party says: The forewarned ox injured the large one, and the innocuous ox injured the small one, and the one liable for damage says: No; rather, the innocuous ox injured the large one and the forewarned ox injured the small one; here too, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

Chapter 4

With regard to an innocuous ox that gored four or five other oxen one after the other, its owner shall pay the owner of the last one of them half of the damages from the proceeds of the sale of the belligerent ox; and if there is surplus value left in his ox after he pays that owner, he shall return it to the owner of the previous ox that was gored; and if there is still surplus value left in his ox after he pays that owner, he shall return it to the one prior to the previous one. The principle is that the owner of the latest of the oxen gored in succession gains. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says that the division of the compensation is as follows: With regard to an innocuous ox worth two hundred dinars that gored an ox worth two hundred dinars, thereby killing it, and the carcass is worthless, the injured party takes one hundred dinars, i.e., half the cost of the damage, from the proceeds of the sale of the belligerent ox, and the owner of the belligerent ox takes the remaining one hundred dinars. If the ox, after goring the first ox but before compensation had been paid, again gored another ox worth two hundred dinars, and the carcass is worthless, the owner of the last ox that was gored takes one hundred dinars, and with regard to payment for the previous goring, the owner of this ox that was gored takes fifty dinars, which is half the remaining value of the belligerent ox after one hundred dinars were paid to the last injured party, and the owner of that belligerent ox takes the remaining fifty dinars. If the ox, after goring the first two oxen but before compensation had been paid, again gored another ox worth two hundred dinars, and the carcass is worthless, the last injured party takes one hundred dinars, the previous one takes fifty dinars, and the first two, i.e., the first injured party and the owner of the belligerent ox, divide the remainder, each receiving one gold dinar, which is worth twenty-five silver dinars.

With regard to an ox that is forewarned with regard to its own species, as it already gored other oxen three times, but is not forewarned with regard to other species; or an ox that is forewarned with regard to people, but is not forewarned with regard to animals; or one that is forewarned with regard to small specimens of a species, but is not forewarned with regard to large specimens of that species; in all these cases, if the ox gores the type of animal or person with regard to which it is forewarned, its owner pays the full cost of the damage, and if it gores an animal or person with regard to which it is not forewarned, he pays half the cost of the damage. The Sages said before Rabbi Yehuda: What would be the halakha if this ox is forewarned with regard to Shabbatot but is not forewarned with regard to weekdays? He said to them: For damage it causes on Shabbatot its owner pays the full cost of the damage, and for damage it causes on weekdays, he pays half the cost of the damage. When is it rendered innocuous again after being forewarned with regard to Shabbat? It reverts to its innocuous status when its behavior reverts to normal, i.e., when it refrains from goring for three days of Shabbat, i.e., Shabbat in three successive weeks.

With regard to an ox of a Jew that gored a consecrated ox, and conversely, a consecrated ox that gored a non-sacred ox, i.e., an ox owned by a Jew, the owner of the ox is exempt from paying compensation, as it is stated: “And if one man’s ox hurts the ox of another” (Exodus 21:35). It is derived from the phrase “the ox of another” that one is liable only if it is a non-sacred ox, but not if it is a consecrated ox, which belongs to the Temple treasury, regardless of whether the latter was the ox that gored or the ox that was gored. With regard to an ox of a Jew that gored the ox of a gentile, the owner of the belligerent ox is exempt from liability. But with regard to an ox of a gentile that gored the ox of a Jew, regardless of whether the goring ox was innocuous or forewarned, the owner of the ox pays the full cost of the damage.

If an ox of a halakhically competent person gored an ox of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, all of whom are not considered halakhically competent, the owner is liable for damages. But if an ox of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor gored an ox of a halakhically competent person, the owner of the ox is exempt from liability. If an ox belonging to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor gored another ox and caused damage, the court appoints a steward for them and warns them with regard to the ox that gored in the presence of the steward. The ox is thereby rendered a forewarned ox, since the steward is considered its owner with regard to the requirement of the verse: “And warning has been given to its owner” (Exodus 21:29). If, after the ox was rendered forewarned in this manner, the deaf-mute regained his hearing, the imbecile became halakhically competent, or the minor reached the age of majority, the ox has thereby reverted to its status of innocuousness. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that the ox had the status of a forewarned ox only while it was under the custody of the steward. Rabbi Yosei says: It retains its previous status of being forewarned. If a stadium [ ha’itztadin ] ox, i.e., one that is trained to fight in a stadium, gores and kills a person, it is not liable to be put to death, as it is stated: “And if an ox gores a man or a woman” (Exodus 21:28). This is referring only to an ox that gores on its own initiative, but not to the case of an ox where others induced it to gore. Therefore, the owner of a stadium ox, which is trained to gore, is exempt from liability if it does.

With regard to an ox that gored a person and the person died, if the ox was forewarned its owner pays ransom, but if it was innocuous he is exempt from paying the ransom. And both this forewarned ox and that innocuous ox are liable to be put to death for killing a person. And the same halakha applies in a case where the animal killed a boy and the same applies in a case where it killed a girl. If the ox gored and killed a Canaanite slave or a Canaanite maidservant, its owner gives the victim’s master thirty sela, whether he was a slave worth one hundred maneh, i.e., one hundred silver dinars, or worth only one dinar.

If an ox was rubbing against a wall, and as a result the wall fell on a person and killed him; or if the ox intended to kill another animal but killed a person; or if it intended to kill a gentile but killed a Jew; or intended to kill a non-viable baby but killed a viable person; in all these cases the ox is exempt from being killed.

With regard to an ox belonging to a woman, and similarly an ox belonging to orphans, and an ox belonging to orphans that is in the custody of their steward, and a desert ox, which is ownerless, and an ox that was consecrated to the Temple treasury, and an ox belonging to a convert who died and has no heirs, rendering the ox ownerless; all of these oxen are liable to be put to death for killing a person. Rabbi Yehuda says: A desert ox, a consecrated ox, and an ox belonging to a convert who died are exempt from being put to death, since they have no owners.

With regard to an ox that is leaving court to be stoned for killing a person and its owner then consecrated it, it is not considered consecrated, i.e., the consecration does not take effect, since deriving benefit from the ox is prohibited and the ox is therefore worthless. If one slaughtered it, its flesh is forbidden to be eaten and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. But if its owner consecrated it before its verdict the ox is considered consecrated, and if he slaughtered it its flesh is permitted.

If the owner of an ox conveyed it to an unpaid bailee, or to a borrower, or to a paid bailee, or to a renter, and it caused damage while in their custody, they enter into the responsibilities and liabilities in place of the owner. Therefore, if it was forewarned the bailee pays the full cost of the damage, and if it was innocuous he pays half the cost of the damage. If the ox’s owner tied it with reins to a fence or locked the gate before it in an appropriate manner, but nevertheless the ox emerged and caused damage, whether the ox is innocuous or forewarned the owner is liable, since this is not considered sufficient precaution to prevent damage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says that if the ox is innocuous the owner is liable even if he safeguarded it appropriately, since the Torah does not limit the required safeguarding for an innocuous ox. But if the ox is forewarned, the owner is exempt from paying compensation for damage, as it is stated in the verse describing damage by a forewarned ox: “And the owner has not secured it” (Exodus 21:36), and this ox that was tied with reins or behind a locked gate was secured. Rabbi Eliezer says: An ox has no sufficient safeguarding at all other than slaughtering it with a knife; there is no degree of safeguarding that exempts the ox’s owner from liability.

Chapter 5

In the case of an innocuous ox that gored and killed a cow, and the cow’s fetus was found dead at its side, and it is not known whether the cow gave birth before the ox gored it and the fetus’s death is unrelated to the goring or whether it gave birth after the ox gored it and the fetus died on account of the goring, the owner of the ox pays half the cost of the damage for the cow and one-quarter of the cost of the damage for the offspring. Since it is uncertain whether the ox was responsible for the death of the fetus, in which case he would pay half the damages, its owner pays only half the amount for the fetus that he would ordinarily be required to pay, i.e., one-quarter. And likewise, there is uncertainty in the case of an innocuous cow that gored an ox, and the cow’s newborn offspring was found at its side dead or alive, and it is not known whether the cow gave birth before it gored the ox or whether the cow gave birth after it gored. When damage is caused by an innocuous animal, the liability of the owner is limited to the value of the animal that gored. Therefore, half the cost of the damage is paid from the value of the cow, as in the standard case of an innocuous animal. And if that does not suffice to pay for half the cost of the damage, one-quarter of the cost of the damage is paid from the offspring. Since it is uncertain whether the offspring was part of the cow at the time the cow gored, the owner pays only half of what he would pay if it were certain that it was part of the cow.

In the case of a potter who brought his pots into a homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the homeowner’s animal broke the pots, the homeowner is exempt. If the owner’s animal was injured by the pots, the owner of the pots is liable. But if the potter brought them inside with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable if his animal caused damage to the pots. Similarly, if someone brought his produce into the homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the homeowner’s animal ate them, the homeowner is exempt. If his animal was injured by them, e.g., if it slipped on them, the owner of the produce is liable. But if he brought his produce inside with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable for the damage caused by his animal to them.

Similarly, if one brought his ox into the homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the homeowner’s ox gored it or the homeowner’s dog bit it, the homeowner is exempt. If it gored the homeowner’s ox, the owner of the goring ox is liable. Furthermore, if the ox that he brought into the courtyard without permission fell into the owner’s pit and contaminated its water, the owner of the ox is liable to pay compensation for despoiling the water. If the homeowner’s father or son were inside the pit at the time the ox fell and the person died as a result, the owner of the ox pays the ransom. But if he brought the ox into the courtyard with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable for the damage caused. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The homeowner is not liable in any of the cases in the mishna, even if he gave his permission for the items to be brought into his premises, unless he explicitly accepts responsibility upon himself to safeguard them.

In the case of an ox that was intending to gore another ox but struck a pregnant woman, and her offspring, i.e., the fetuses, emerged due to miscarriage, the owner of the ox is exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring. But in the case of a person who was intending to injure another but struck a pregnant woman instead, and her offspring emerged due to miscarriage, he pays compensation for miscarried offspring. How does he pay compensation for miscarried offspring, i.e., how is their value assessed? The court appraises the value of the woman by calculating how much she would be worth if sold as a maidservant before giving birth, and how much she would be worth after giving birth. He then pays the difference in value to the woman’s husband. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If so, the consequences would be absurd, as when a woman gives birth her value increases. Rather, the court appraises how much the offspring are worth, and the one liable for the damage gives that amount to the husband. And if she does not have a husband, e.g., her husband died, he gives the money to his heirs. If the pregnant woman was a Canaanite maidservant and then she was emancipated, or a convert, and she was married to an emancipated Canaanite slave or to a convert who died without any heirs, the one who caused the damage is exempt from pay-ing compensation for miscarried offspring. This is because this payment is made specifically to the husband, not to the woman.

One who digs part of a pit on private property and opens its entrance in the public domain, or digs a pit in the public domain and opens its entrance on private property, or digs a pit on private property and opens its entrance on another person’s private property, is liable for damage caused by the pit in each case. In the case of one who digs a pit in the public domain and an ox or a donkey fell into it, he is liable. The halakha is the same for one who digs either a pit; a ditch, which is narrow and long; or a cave, which is rectangular and roofed; trenches and water channels. In all these cases he is liable. If so, why is the verse stated as referring to a pit, as it states: “And if a man shall open a pit” (Exodus 21:33)? To teach that just as a pit that has sufficient depth to cause death when falling into it is at least ten handbreadths deep, so too, any other excavations that have sufficient depth to cause death may be no less than ten handbreadths. If any of the types of excavations were less than ten handbreadths deep, and an ox or a donkey fell into one of them and died, the digger of the excavation is exempt. But if it was injured in it, not killed, he is liable to pay damages.

If a pit belonging to two partners was uncovered and the first partner passed by it and did not cover it, and then the second passed by it and did not cover it, the second is liable for any damage caused by means of the pit. The mishna lists several halakhot that pertain to damage classified as Pit: In the case of a pit that the first person who passed by covered after using it, and then the second came to use it and found it uncovered after the cover fell off or was damaged, and he did not cover it, the second one is liable for damage caused by the pit. If the owner covered the pit appropriately and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is exempt. If he did not cover the pit appropriately and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died, he is liable. If a man was digging or widening a pit, and an ox passing by fell forward into it in fright due to the sound of the digging, he is liable. If it fell backward into the pit due to the sound of the digging, he is exempt. If an ox and its accoutrements, i.e., the vessels it was carrying, fell into the pit and the vessels were broken, or if a donkey and its accoutrements fell in and the accoutrements were torn, the owner of the pit is liable for damage to the animal caused by the pit, but he is exempt from liability for damage caused to the vessels, by Torah edict. If an ox that was impaired by being deaf, or an ox that was an imbecile, or an ox that was very young fell into the pit, he is liable. If a boy or a girl, a Canaanite slave or a Canaanite maidservant fell in, he is exempt, since there is a Torah edict that the digger of a pit is liable only for damage caused to an animal.

The halakha is the same whether concerning an ox or whether concerning any other animal with regard to liability for falling into a pit, and with regard to keeping its distance from Mount Sinai at the time of the receiving of the Torah, when it was forbidden for any animal to ascend the mountain, and with regard to the payment of double the principal by a thief, and with regard to the mitzva of returning a lost item, and with regard to unloading its burden, and with regard to the prohibition of muzzling it while threshing, and with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, and with regard to the prohibition against its working on Shabbat. And similarly, undomesticated animals and birds are subject to the same halakhot as domesticated animals. If so, why are all of the above halakhot stated in the Torah only in reference to an ox or a donkey? Rather, the reason is that the verse speaks of a common scenario, from which the other cases may be derived.

Chapter 6

In the case of one who brought his flock of sheep into the pen and locked the door before it in a manner that is appropriate, and despite this sheep went out and caused damage in another person’s field by eating produce or trampling it, the owner is exempt, since he safeguarded the animals appropriately. If he did not lock the door before the sheep in a manner that is appropriate, and sheep went out and caused damage, the owner is liable, since his negligence led to the damage. If the owner locked the door appropriately but the wall of the pen was breached at night, or bandits breached it, and sheep subsequently went out and caused damage by eating or trampling, the owner of the sheep is exempt from liability. If the bandits themselves took the sheep out of the pen and the animals subsequently caused damage, the bandits are liable.

If the owner left the animal in the sun, causing it to suffer, or if he conveyed it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, who are not able to safeguard it, and the animal went out and caused damage, the owner is liable because he was negligent. If the owner conveyed the animal to a shepherd to care for it, the shepherd enters in his place and is responsible for the damage. If the animal fell into a garden and derives benefit from produce there, its owner pays for the benefit that it derives and not for other damage caused. If the animal descended into the garden in its usual manner and caused damage there, its owner pays for what it damaged. How does the court appraise the value of the damage when the owner pays for what it damaged? The court appraises a large piece of land with an area required for sowing one se’a of seed [ beit se’a ] in that field, including the garden bed in which the damage took place. This appraisal includes how much it was worth before the animal damaged it and how much is it worth now, and the owner must pay the difference. The court appraises not only the garden bed that was eaten or trampled, rather the depreciation in value of the bed as part of the surrounding area. This results in a smaller payment, as the damage appears less significant in the context of a larger area. Rabbi Shimon says: This principle of appraisal applies only in a case where the animal ate unripe produce; but if it ate ripe produce, the owner pays the value of the ripe produce. Therefore, if it ate one se’a of produce, he pays for one se’a, and if it ate two se’a, he pays for two se’a.

In a case of one who stacks his produce in another’s field without permission from the owner of that field, and an animal belonging to the owner of the field eats the produce, the owner of the field is exempt. And if the animal is injured by the produce, the owner of the stack is liable. But if he stacked them in that field with permission, the owner of the field is liable for damage caused to the produce.

One who sends a fire, i.e., places a burning object, in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is exempt for any damage later caused by the fire according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. If he sent it in the hand of a halakhically competent person, the halakhically competent person is liable, not the one who sent him. If one person brought the fire, and one other person subsequently brought the wood, causing the fire to spread, the one who brought the wood is liable for any damage caused. Conversely, if one person first brought the wood, and subsequently one other person brought the fire, the one who brought the fire is liable, since it was he who actually kindled the wood. If another came and fanned the flame, and as a result the fire spread and caused damage, the one who fanned it is liable, since he is the proximate cause of the damage. If the wind fanned the flames, all the people involved are exempt, since none of them actually caused the damage. If one sends forth a fire, i.e., allows it to escape, and it consumes wood, or stones, or earth, he is liable, as it is stated: “If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field, is consumed, the one who kindled the fire shall pay compensation” (Exodus 22:5), which teaches that he is liable also for destroying the field itself. If one kindled a fire that crossed a fence that is four cubits high, or if the fire crossed the public thoroughfare, or if the fire crossed a river, and in each case it caused damage on the other side, he is exempt from liability. In a case of one who kindles a fire on his own premises, up to what distance may the fire travel within his property for him to still bear liability for damage caused? Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria says: The court views his location where he kindled the fire as if it were in the center of a beit kor. Therefore, if the fire spreads and causes damage farther away than half a beit kor, the one who kindled the fire is exempt, since he could not anticipate that the fire would spread so far. Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable up to a distance of sixteen cubits, like the width of a public thoroughfare. Rabbi Akiva says: One is liable up to a distance of fifty cubits. Rabbi Shimon says: The verse states: “The one who kindled the fire shall pay [ shallem yeshallem ] compensation” (Exodus 22:5), to teach that everything is according to the fire.

With regard to one who kindles a stack of wheat or barley and there were vessels concealed inside the stack and they caught fire and burned together with the stack, Rabbi Yehuda says: The one who kindled the fire also pays compensation for what was inside the stack, but the Rabbis say: He pays compensation only for the stack of wheat or barley, as the case may be, and he is not responsible for that which was concealed within it. If there was a goat tied to the stack of grain, and there was a Canaanite slave nearby who was not tied to it, and both the goat and the slave were burned together with the stack and killed, the one who kindled the fire is liable to pay compensation for both. Conversely, if the slave was tied to the stack and there was a goat nearby that was not tied to it, and they were both burned together with it, the one who kindled the fire is exempt from payment for damage because he is liable to receive capital punishment for murder, and he is punished only for the greater transgression. And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and exempt one from payment for vessels concealed inside the stack in the field, concede to Rabbi Yehuda that if one sets fire to a building, he pays compensation for everything that was burned inside it, since it is the normal way of people to place items in houses.

In the case of a spark that emerged from under the hammer of a blacksmith and started a fire, causing damage, the blacksmith is liable for the damage caused. In the case of a camel that was laden with flax and was passing through the public domain, and its flax extended into a store and the flax caught fire from a lamp in the store belonging to the storekeeper, and as a result of the burning flax the camel set fire to the building together with all its contents, the owner of the camel is liable. But if the storekeeper placed his lamp outside, thereby causing the flax on the camel to catch fire, and consequently the building was set on fire, the storekeeper is liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a case where the lamp placed outside was a Hanukkah lamp, the storekeeper is exempt, since it is a mitzva for a Hanukkah lamp to be placed outside.

Chapter 7

The principle of double payment applies more broadly than the principle of fourfold or fivefold payment, as the principle of double payment applies both to the theft of something that is alive and to the theft of something that is not alive, but the principle of fourfold or fivefold payment applies only to the theft of an ox or a sheep, as it is stated: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep, and slaughter it or sell it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep” (Exodus 21:37). Having stated a limitation to the halakha of fourfold and fivefold payment, the mishna mentions a further limitation, which applies to all three types of payments. One who steals an item after a thief has already stolen it, i.e., one who steals a stolen item, does not pay the double payment to the thief or to the prior owner, nor does one who slaughters or sells an ox or a sheep after a thief has already stolen it pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Rather, he pays only the principal, i.e., the value of the item he stole.

The mishna lists a series of cases in which a thief is required to pay the fourfold or fivefold penalty. If one stole an animal, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered the animal or sold it, also based on the testimony of the same witnesses, or based on the testimony of two other witnesses, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. If one stole an animal and sold it on Shabbat, or if he stole it and sold it for idol worship, or if he stole it and slaughtered it on Yom Kippur, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. Although his sale or slaughter in these circumstances involved a sin, he is not liable to receive the death penalty for the sale and must consequently pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. If one stole an animal of his father’s and then slaughtered it or sold it, and afterward his father died and he inherited his father’s estate either on his own or in partnership with his brothers, or if he stole an animal and slaughtered it and afterward he consecrated it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. In the case of one who stole an animal and slaughtered it, not for the purpose of eating its meat, but to use it for medicinal purposes or to feed the meat to dogs, and likewise a thief who slaughters the animal to eat its meat but it was found to be an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ], or a thief who slaughters a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. Rabbi Shimon exempts the thief from the fourfold or fivefold payment in these last two cases, as he maintains that the legal status of an act of slaughter that is not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is not considered an act of slaughter.

If one stole an ox or a sheep, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered the animal or sold it, also based on the testimony of the same witnesses, and these witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses, these witnesses pay everything, i.e., not only the principal amount but also the fourfold or fivefold payment. This is in accordance with the Torah’s decree with regard to conspiring witnesses: “You shall do to him as he had conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). Since these witnesses attempted to obligate the alleged thief to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, they themselves must pay that full amount. With regard to one who stole an ox or a sheep, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered the animal or sold it, based on the testimony of two other witnesses, if both these witnesses and those witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses, the first set of witnesses, who testified about the theft of the animal, pay the alleged thief the double payment, which is what they had conspired to cause him to pay. And the last set of witnesses, who attested to the slaughter or sale of the animal, pay the alleged thief a twofold payment for a sheep or a threefold payment for an ox, which they had conspired to cause him to pay over and above the double payment. If only the witnesses in the last set were found to be conspiring witnesses, while the testimony about the theft remains intact, the thief pays the double payment to the animal’s owner and the second set of witnesses pay the alleged thief the twofold or threefold payment, the amount over and above the double payment, which is what they had conspired to cause him to pay. If only one individual from the last set of witnesses was found to be a conspiring witness, the second testimony is nullified, as it was not submitted by two valid witnesses, whereas the first testimony remains intact. If one individual from the first set of witnesses is found to be a conspiring witness, the entire testimony concerning the thief is nullified. The reason is that if there is no theft established by reliable testimony there is no liability for slaughtering the animal and there is no liability for selling it.

If one stole an ox or a sheep, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered or sold the stolen animal, as established based on the testimony of one witness or based on his own admission, i.e., he himself admitted that he performed these acts, without there being any witness testimony, he pays the double payment, but he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. If one stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbat, which is a capital offense, or if he stole an animal and slaughtered it for the purpose of idol worship, or if he stole his father’s animal and subsequently his father died, and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, or if he stole an animal and subsequently he consecrated it as an offering and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, in all these cases the thief pays the double payment, but he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of sacrificial animals for which the owner bears financial responsibility to replace with another animal if one of the original animals that one stole is lost or dies, the thief is obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment if he slaughters one of the animals. If it is a sacrificial animal for which the owner bears no financial responsibility, the thief is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment.

If a thief sold a stolen animal in a partial fashion, e.g., except for one one-hundredth of it, which he kept for himself; or if he had a partnership in owning the animal before stealing it; or in the case of a thief who slaughtered the stolen animal and it became non-kosher meat in his hand because he slaughtered it improperly; or in the case of a thief who ripped open the animal rather than slaughtering it halakhically; or in the case of a thief who tore loose the gullet or windpipe of the animal as he slaughtered it, rendering the slaughter invalid, in all these cases he pays the double payment but does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The fourfold or five-fold payment applies only if the animal is entirely sold or if it is slaughtered in accordance with the halakhic definition of animal slaughter. If one stole an animal in its owner’s domain, i.e., he took hold of it or established control over it but had not yet removed it from the owner’s premises, and then he slaughtered it or sold it outside of the owner’s domain; or if he stole an animal outside of the owner’s domain and slaughtered it or sold it in the owner’s domain; or if he stole an animal and slaughtered it or sold it, and all of this occurred outside the owner’s domain, in all of these cases, he must pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. But if he stole it and slaughtered or sold it, and all of this occurred in the owner’s domain, he is exempt from any of the fines for theft, as it is not considered theft until the stolen object is actually removed from the owner’s premises.

If the thief was in the process of leading the animal and leaving the owner’s premises, and it died while it was still in the owner’s domain, the thief is exempt from payment. If he lifted it up or led it out of the owner’s domain and then the animal died, he is liable for his theft. For an act to be considered theft, the thief must acquire the item by pulling it or moving it, which are ineffective forms of acquisition on the owner’s premises; or by lifting it up, which is effective even when performed in the owner’s domain. If the thief gave the animal as payment for the redemption of his firstborn son, or as payment to a creditor, or conveyed it for safeguarding to an unpaid bailee, or lent it to a borrower, or conveyed it for safeguarding to a paid bailee, or leased it to a renter, and he was leading out the animal and it died in the owner’s domain, the thief is exempt from payment. If that individual, following the thief’s instructions, lifted up the animal or led it out of the owner’s domain, and it subsequently died, the thief is liable for the theft. The thief is liable for instructing another to remove the animal for the purposes of payment of a debt, safekeeping, borrowing, or rental, as this is tantamount to the thief taking it with his own hands.

One may not raise small domesticated animals, i.e., sheep and goats, in settled areas of Eretz Yisrael, as they graze on people’s crops. But one may raise them in Syria, despite the fact that with regard to many other halakhot Syria is treated like Eretz Yisrael, and in the wilderness of Eretz Yisrael. One may not raise chickens in Jerusalem, due to the sacrificial meat that is common there. There is a concern that chickens will pick up garbage that imparts ritual impurity and bring it into contact with sacrificial meat, thereby rendering it ritually impure. And priests may not raise chickens anywhere in Eretz Yisrael, because of the many foods in a priest’s possession that must be kept ritually pure, e.g., teruma. Furthermore, one may not raise pigs anywhere, and a person may not raise a dog unless it is tied with chains. One may spread out traps [ nishovim ] for pigeons only if this was performed at a distance of at least thirty ris, which is 8,000 cubits, from any settled area, to ensure that privately owned pigeons are not caught in the traps.

Chapter 8

One who injures another is liable to pay compensation for that injury due to five types of indemnity: He must pay for damage, for pain, for medical costs, for loss of livelihood, and for humiliation. How is payment for damage assessed? If one blinded another’s eye, severed his hand, broke his leg, or caused any other injury, the court views the injured party as though he were a slave being sold in the slave market, and the court appraises how much he was worth before the injury and how much he is worth after the injury. The difference between these two sums is the amount that one must pay for causing damage. How is payment for pain assessed? If one burned another with a skewer [ beshapud ] or with a hot nail, or even if one burned another on his fingernail, which is a place where he does not cause a bruise that would affect the victim’s value on the slave market, the court evaluates how much money a person with a similar threshold for pain as the victim is willing to take in order to be made to suffer in this way. The one who burned the victim must then pay this amount. How is payment for medical costs assessed? If one struck another, then he is liable to heal him by paying for his medical costs. In a case where growths, e.g., blisters or rashes, appeared on the injured party, if the growths are due to the blow, the one who struck him is liable; if the growths are not due to the blow, the one who struck him is exempt. In a case where the wound healed, and then reopened, and again healed, and then reopened, the one who struck him remains liable to heal the injured party by paying for his medical costs, as it is apparent that the current wound resulted from the original injury. If the injury healed fully, the one who struck him is not liable to heal him by paying for any subsequent medical costs. How is payment for loss of livelihood assessed? The court views the injured party as though he were a watchman of cucumbers, and the one who caused him injury must compensate him based on that pay scale for the income that he lost during his convalescence. This indemnity does not take into account the value of the standard wages of the injured party because the one who caused him injury already gave him compensation for his hand or compensation for his leg, and that compensation took into account his professional skills. How is payment for humiliation assessed? It all depends on the stature of the one who humiliates the other and the one who is humiliated. One who humiliates a naked person, or one who humiliates a blind person, or one who humiliates a sleeping person is liable, but a sleeping person who humiliates another is exempt. If one fell from the roof onto another person, and thereby caused him damage and humiliated him, then the one who fell is liable for the indemnity of damage, since a person is always considered forewarned, and exempt from the indemnity of humiliation, as it is stated: “and putting out her hand, she takes hold of his private parts” (Deuteronomy 25:11); a person is not liable for humiliation unless he intends to humiliate the other person.

This halakha is a stringency with regard to a person who caused injury, compared to the halakha with regard to an ox that caused injury: The halakha is that the person pays compensation for damage, pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation; and if he caused a woman to miscarry he also pays compensation for miscarried offspring, as the verse states (see Exodus 21:22). But in the case of an ox that caused injury, the owner pays only compensation for damage, and he is exempt from paying compensation for miscarried offspring.

The mishna continues: One who strikes his father or his mother but did not cause them to have a bruise, and therefore is not liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, and one who injures another on Yom Kippur, the punishment for which is not court-imposed capital punishment, is liable to pay for all of the five types of indemnity. One who injures a Hebrew slave is liable to pay for all of the five types of indemnity. This is except for compensation for loss of livelihood suffered during the time that the injured slave belongs to the one that injured him. Since the right to the slave’s labor belongs to his master, his inability to work is his master’s loss. One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable to pay for all of the five types of indemnity. Rabbi Yehuda says: Canaanite slaves do not have humiliation, so the one who injures the slave pays only the other four types of indemnity.

The mishna continues: With regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous. In other words, no favorable outcome is possible for someone involved in an incident with one of these people, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured others, they are exempt. This is because they lack awareness and are not responsible for their actions. Similarly, with regard to a slave and a married woman, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured others, they are exempt, because they do not have money with which to pay compensation. But they pay compensation at a later time. The exemption is only temporary, as, if the woman becomes divorced or the slave becomes emancipated, and they then have their own money, they are liable to pay compensation.

The mishna continues: One who strikes his father or his mother and causes them to have a bruise, or one who injures another on Shabbat, is exempt from paying all of the five types of indemnity, because he is judged with losing his life. The court imposes capital punishment for these acts, so there is no additional monetary punishment. And one who injures his own Canaanite slave is exempt from paying all of the five types of indemnity, because his slave is his property.

One who strikes another must give him a sela. Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili that he must give him one hundred dinars. If he slapped another on the cheek, he must give him two hundred dinars. If he slapped him on the cheek with the back of his hand, which is more degrading than a slap with the palm, he must give him four hundred dinars. If he pulled his ear, or pulled out his hair, or spat at him and his spittle reached him, or if he removed the other’s cloak from him, or if he uncovered the head of a woman in the marketplace, in all of these cases, he must give the injured party four hundred dinars. This is the principle of assessing payment for humiliation caused to another: It is all evaluated in accordance with the honor of the one who was humiliated, as the Gemara will explain. Rabbi Akiva said: Even with regard to the poor among the Jewish people, they are viewed as though they were freemen who lost their property and were impoverished. And their humiliation is calculated according to this status, as they are the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and are all of prominent lineage. The mishna relates: And an incident occurred involving one who uncovered the head of a woman in the marketplace, and the woman came before Rabbi Akiva to request that he render the assailant liable to pay for the humiliation that she suffered, and Rabbi Akiva rendered the assailant liable to give her four hundred dinars. The man said to Rabbi Akiva: My teacher, give me time to pay the penalty, and Rabbi Akiva gave him time. The man then waited for her until she was standing by the opening of her courtyard, and he broke a jug in front of her, and there was the value of about an issar of oil inside the jug. The woman then exposed her own head and she was wetting [ metapaḥat ] her hand in the oil, and placing her hand on her head to make use of the oil. The man set up witnesses to observe her actions, and he came before Rabbi Akiva, and he said to him: Will I give four hundred dinars to this woman for having uncovered her head? By uncovering her head for a minimal benefit, she has demonstrated that this does not cause her humiliation. Rabbi Akiva said to him: You did not say anything, i.e., this claim will not exempt you. One who injures himself, although it is not permitted for him to do so, is nevertheless exempt from any sort of penalty, but others who injured him are liable to pay him. In this case as well, the man was liable to compensate the woman for shaming her, despite the fact that she did the same to herself. Similarly, one who cuts down his own saplings, although it is not permitted for him to do so, as this violates the prohibition of: “You shall not destroy” (see Deuteronomy 20:19), is exempt from any penalty, but others who cut down his saplings are liable to pay him.

Despite the fact that the assailant who caused damage gives to the victim all of the required payments for the injury, his transgression is not forgiven for him in the heavenly court until he requests forgiveness from the victim, as it is stated that God told Abimelech after he had taken Sarah from Abraham: “Now therefore restore the wife of the man; for he is a prophet, and he shall pray for you, and you shall live” (Genesis 20:7). And from where is it derived that if the victim does not forgive him that he is cruel? As it is stated: “And Abraham prayed to God; and God healed Abimelech, and his wife, and his maidservants; and they bore children” (Genesis 20:17). The mishna continues: With regard to one who says to another: Blind my eye, or: cut off my hand, or: break my leg, and he does so, the one who performed these actions is liable to pay for the damage, despite having been instructed to do so. Even if he explicitly instructed him: Do so on the condition that you will be exempt from payment, he is nevertheless liable. With regard to one who says to another: Tear my garment, or: break my jug, and he does so, he is liable to pay for the damage. But if he instructed him explicitly: Do so on the condition that you will be exempt from payment, he is exempt from payment. If one says to another: Do so, i.e., cause damage, to so-and-so on the condition that you will be exempt from payment, and he did so, he is liable, whether the instructions were with regard to the victim himself, or whether the instructions were with regard to his property.

Chapter 9

In the case of one who robs another of wood and fashions it into vessels, or one who robs another of wool and fashions it into garments, he pays the robbery victim according to the value of the goods at the time of the robbery, but he need not return the vessels or garments. He has acquired the stolen items because they had undergone a change. If one robbed another of a pregnant cow and it then gave birth while in his possession, or if one robbed another of a ewe that was laden with wool and the robber then sheared it, the robber pays the value of a cow that is ready to give birth or the value of a ewe that is ready to be shorn. He pays the value of the animal at the time of the robbery, and the calf or the wool remains his. If one robbed another of a cow, and it became pregnant in his possession, and it then gave birth; or if one robbed another of a ewe, and it became laden with wool in his possession, and he then sheared it, then the robber pays according to the value of the animal at the time of the robbery. This is the principle: All robbers pay according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery.

If one robbed another of an animal and it aged while in his possession, consequently diminishing its value, or if one robbed another of Canaanite slaves and they aged while in his possession, they have been changed. The robber therefore pays according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to Canaanite slaves, he says to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. If one robbed another of a coin and it cracked, thereby reducing its value; or if one robbed another of produce and it rotted; or if one robbed another of wine and it fermented, then he pays according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery. If he robbed another of a coin and it was invalidated by the government; or if he robbed another of teruma and it became ritually impure; or if he robbed another of leavened bread and Passover elapsed over it, and therefore it is prohibited to derive benefit from it; or if he robbed another of an animal and a sin was performed with it, thereby disqualifying it for use as an offering; or if the animal was disqualified from being sacrificed upon the altar for some other reason; or if the animal was going out to be stoned because it gored and killed a person at some point after the robbery, the robber says to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. In all of these cases, although the value of the stolen item has been diminished or altogether lost, since the change is not externally discernible, the robber returns the item in its current state.

If one gave items to craftsmen to fix and they damaged them, the craftsmen are liable to pay for the damage. For example, if one gave a chest, a box, or a cabinet to a carpenter to fix, and he damaged it, he is liable to pay. And a builder who committed to demolish a wall and while demolishing it he broke the stones, or who damaged them, is liable to pay. If he was demolishing on this side of the wall, and the wall fell from another side and caused damage, he is exempt from liability. But if a stone fell and caused damage due to the force of the blow, he is liable.

In the case of one who gives wool to a dyer and it was burned in the cauldron during the dyeing process, thereby completely ruining the wool so that there is no enhancement, only loss, the dyer gives the owner the value of his wool. If he dyed it unattractively [ ka’ur ] so that the dye is not absorbed well by the wool, if the enhancement, i.e., the amount that the value of the wool has increased by being dyed, exceeds the dyer’s expenses, the owner of the wool gives the dyer the expenses. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement. If the owner gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him and instead he dyed it black, or to dye it black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool. Rabbi Yehuda says: Here too, if the value of the enhancement exceeds the dyer’s expenses, the owner of the wool gives the dyer the expenses. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement.

One who robs another of an item having the value of at least one peruta and takes a false oath to the robbery victim claiming his innocence, and then later wishes to repent, must bring the money, which includes the principal together with an additional one-fifth payment, to the robbery victim, even if this necessitates following after him to a distant place like Medea. The robber may not give the payment to the robbery victim’s son to return it to the robbery victim, and neither may he give it to his agent, but he may give the payment to an agent of the court. And if the robbery victim dies, he returns it to his heirs.

If he gave the robbery victim the principal value of the stolen item but did not give him the additional one-fifth payment, or if the owner forgave him concerning the principal but did not forgive him concerning the additional one-fifth payment, or if he forgave him concerning this and concerning that, with the exception of the value of less than one peruta of the principal, he need not pursue him to repay the remaining debt. By contrast, if he gave the robbery victim the additional one-fifth payment but did not give him the principal, or if the robbery victim forgave him concerning the additional one-fifth payment but did not forgive him concerning the principal, or if he forgave him concerning this and concerning that, with the exception of the value of one peruta of the principal, he must pursue him to repay the remaining debt.

If the robber gave the robbery victim the principal and took a false oath to him concerning the additional one-fifth payment, asserting that he had already paid it, then the additional one-fifth is considered a new principal obligation. The robber pays an additional one-fifth payment apart from the additional one-fifth payment about which he had taken a false oath. If he then takes a false oath concerning the second one-fifth payment, he is assessed an additional one-fifth payment for that oath, until the principal, i.e., the additional one-fifth payment about which he has most recently taken the false oath, is reduced to less than the value of one peruta. And such is the halakha with regard to a deposit, as it is stated: “If anyone sins, and commits a trespass against the Lord, and he defrauds his counterpart with regard to a deposit, or with regard to a pledge, or with regard to a robbery, or if he exploited his counterpart; or he has found that which was lost, and deals falsely with it, and swears to a lie …he shall restore it in full, and shall add the fifth part more to it” (Leviticus 5:21–24). This one must pay the principal and an additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering. If the owner asked the bailee: Where is my deposit? And the bailee said to him: It was lost. And the owner said: I administer an oath to you, and the bailee said: Amen, therefore accepting the oath; and the witnesses testify about the bailee that he consumed it, then he must pay the principal. If the bailee admitted on his own that he had taken a false oath, then he must pay the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering.

If the owner asked the bailee: Where is my deposit, and the bailee said to him: It was stolen; and the owner said: I administer an oath to you, and the bailee said: Amen, therefore accepting the oath; and the witnesses testify about the bailee that he stole it, he must pay the payment of double the principal. If the bailee admitted on his own that he had taken a false oath, then he must pay the principal, the additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering.

The mishna continues: In the case of one who robs his father and the father demands that he return the stolen item, and he takes an oath to his father that he did not rob him; and then the father dies; and then the son admits that he robbed him and took a false oath, necessitating the return of the principal and the giving of the additional one-fifth payment to his father’s heirs, of which he is either one of several or the only one; what should he do? This son pays the principal and the additional one-fifth payment to his father’s sons or brothers, and brings a guilt-offering and does not keep his own share. And if he does not want to forfeit his share or where he does not have sufficient funds to pay the other heirs while forfeiting his share, he borrows money in the amount of the value of the stolen item and the creditors come and are repaid in part from his share in the stolen item.

In the case of one who says to his son in a vow: It is forbidden like an offering [ konam ], and for that reason you may not derive benefit from my property, if the father then dies the son inherits from him, because it is no longer the father’s property once he dies. The mishna continues: If the father stated in his vow that his son may not derive benefit from his property in his life and in his death, then even if the father then dies the son does not inherit from him, as the prohibition is still in effect. And instead of taking his inheritance, he returns his portion in the estate to his sons or to his brothers. And if he does not have sufficient funds to subsist without his inheritance, he borrows money in the amount of the value of his share in the inheritance and the creditors come and are repaid from his share.

With regard to one who robs a convert and takes a false oath denying having done so, and then the convert dies, the robber, in order to achieve repentance, pays the principal, i.e., the stolen item or, if it is no longer extant, its monetary value, and an additional one-fifth of its value to the priests, and presents a guilt-offering to the altar, as it is stated: “But if the man has no kinsman to whom restitution may be made for the guilt, the restitution for guilt that is made shall be the Lord’s, even the priest’s; besides the ram of the atonement, whereby atonement shall be made for him” (Numbers 5:8). If the robber was bringing the money and the guilt-offering up to Jerusalem and he died before paying the priests and bringing his offering, the money shall be given to the robber’s children, and the animal designated for the guilt-offering shall graze until it becomes blemished and consequently disqualified from being sacrificed. And the animal shall then be sold and the money received for it shall be allocated for communal gift offerings.

If the robber gave the money to the members of the priestly watch and then died before they sacrificed his guilt-offering, the heirs cannot remove the money from the priests’ possession, as it is stated: “And every man’s hallowed things shall be his; whatsoever any man gives to the priest, it shall be his” (Numbers 5:10). The mishna continues: If the robber gave the money to the priestly watch of Joiarib and then gave the guilt-offering to the priestly watch of Jedaiah, the following priestly watch, to sacrifice on his behalf, he has fulfilled his obligation. By contrast, if he first gave the guilt-offering to the priestly watch of Joiarib and then gave the money to the priestly watch of Jedaiah, if the animal designated for the guilt-offering is extant, then members of the priestly watch of Jedaiah, who received the money, should sacrifice it. But if it is no longer extant because the priestly watch of Joiarib had already sacrificed it, he should return and bring another guilt-offering; for one who brings his stolen item to the priests before he brings his guilt-offering has fulfilled his obligation, but one who brings his guilt-offering before he brings his stolen item has not fulfilled his obligation. Although he cannot sacrifice the offering before paying the principal, if he gave the principal but did not yet give the additional one-fifth payment, the lack of having given the additional one-fifth payment does not preclude sacrificing the offering.

Chapter 10

In the case of one who robs another of food and feeds it to his children, or who left a stolen item to them and then died, the children are exempt from paying the victim of the robbery after their father’s death. But if the stolen item was something that serves as a legal guarantee of a loan, the heirs are obligated to pay. One may not exchange larger coins for smaller ones from the trunk of customs collectors nor from the purse of tax collectors, and one may not take charity from them, as they are assumed to have obtained their funds illegally. But one may take money from the collector’s house or from money he has with him in the market that he did not take from his collection trunk or purse.

If customs collectors took one’s donkey and gave him a different donkey that was taken from another Jew in its stead, or if bandits took his garment and gave him a different garment that was taken from a Jew in its stead, these items are now his because the owners despaired of retrieving them when they were stolen, and they may therefore be acquired by another. In a case of one who salvages items from a river, or from a troop [ hagayis ] of soldiers, or from bandits, if the owners of the items despaired of retrieving them, they are his, i.e., they belong to the one who salvaged them. And so too, with regard to a swarm of bees, if the owners despaired of retrieving the bees, they are his, i.e., they belong to the one who found them. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka said: A woman or a minor, whose testimony is not generally accepted by the court, is deemed credible to say: It was from here that this swarm emerged, and it therefore belongs to a certain individual. And one may walk into another’s field in order to salvage his own swarm of bees that has relocated there, and if he damaged some property in the process, he must pay for what he has damaged. But if the bees settled on a branch of a tree, he may not cut off the other’s branch in order to take the bees, even on the condition that he will later give him the money for it. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: He may even cut off the branch and later give him the money for it as compensation.

In a case of one who recognizes his stolen vessels and scrolls in another’s possession, and a rumor had spread in the city that the former had been the victim of theft, the purchaser, i.e., the one in possession of these items, must take an oath to the victim as to how much money he spent on the purchase, and he then takes that sum of money in exchange for returning the items. And if no such rumor had spread, it is not in the purported victim’s power to assert that the items were stolen, and he is not entitled to demand their return, as I could say: The items were never stolen; rather, the purported victim sold them to another, and this individual who currently possesses the item purchased them from that other person.

In a situation where this individual came with his barrel of wine, and that individual came with his jug of honey, if the barrel of honey cracked and this first individual poured out his wine and salvaged the other’s honey, which is worth more than the wine, by collecting it into his wine barrel, the owner of the wine has the right to collect only his wage, i.e., compensation for the effort he put into salvaging the honey. He is not, however, entitled to compensation for the wine itself. But if the owner of the wine said: I will salvage your honey and you will pay me the value of my wine, the owner of the honey is obligated to pay him compensation for the wine. Similarly, if a river washed away his donkey and the donkey of another, and his donkey was worth one hundred dinars and the donkey of the other was worth two hundred, and the individual with the less valuable donkey abandoned his donkey and instead salvaged the donkey of the other, he has the right to collect only his wage, i.e., compensation for the effort he put into salvaging his fellow’s donkey. But if he said to the owner of the more valuable donkey: I will salvage your donkey and you will pay me the monetary value of mine in exchange, the owner of the more valuable donkey is obligated to pay the rescuer compensation for his donkey.

In a case of one who robs a field from an-other and thugs [ massikin ] subsequently take the field from the robber, the halakha is dependent upon the circumstances: If it is a regional disaster in which the thugs seize all the property in the region, the robber says to the owner of the field: That which is yours is before you, i.e., it is your prerogative to try to reclaim it from the thugs. No compensation is required since the thugs would have seized the property in any event. But if the thugs took that field alone due to the robber, the robber is obligated to provide the owner with a different field. If a river flooded a misappropriated field, the robber may say to its owner: That which is yours is before you, and no compensation is required. Since the field would have been flooded in any case, the robber has not caused the damage to the field, and is therefore exempt.

With regard to one who robs another or who borrowed money from him, or one with whom another had deposited an item, if any of these interactions took place in a settled area, he may not return the item to him in an unsettled area, where it is of little benefit to the owner and he cannot safeguard it. If the loan or deposit was given on the condition that the recipient may go out and return it to the owner in an unsettled area, he may return it to him in an unsettled area.

In the case of one who says to another: I robbed you, or: You lent me money, or: You deposited an item with me, and I do not know if I returned your property to you or if I did not return it to you, he is liable to pay the sum or item in question. But if he said to him: I do not know if I robbed you, or: I do not know if you lent me money, or: I do not know if you deposited an item with me, he is exempt from paying the sum or item in question.

In the case of one who stole a lamb from a flock and returned it without informing the owner that he had done so, and then it died or was stolen, the thief is liable to pay restitution for it. If the lamb’s owners did not know about the entire incident, i.e., they did not know that it was stolen and they did not know that it was returned, and they counted the flock of sheep and found it whole, the thief is exempt from paying.

One may not purchase wool, milk, and kids from the shepherds who tend the flocks of others, due to the concern that they have stolen these items from the owners of the flocks. And similarly, one may not purchase wood and produce from produce watchmen. But one may purchase from women woolen goods in Judea, and linen goods in the Galilee, and calves in the Sharon, as women in these locations often work with those commodities and it can be assumed that they are selling the items with the owner’s consent. And with regard to all these items, in a case where the seller told the buyer to conceal the purchase, it is prohibited, as there is good reason to suspect that the items are stolen. And one may purchase eggs and chickens from everywhere, as it is unlikely that one would steal and sell these commodities.

Strands of wool that the launderer removes from the garment belong to him, as it can be assumed that the customer is uninterested in them, but strands that the carder, i.e., one who prepares wool for use as a textile, removes belong to the customer, as it is assumed that the customer would want them, since the carder often removes a significant number of strands. A launderer takes three threads that were inserted at the edge of a garment, and they are his, but with regard to more threads than this, these additional threads belong to the customer. If these were black threads on a white garment, he takes all of them and they are his. As the removal of the threads improves the appearance of the garment, the customer does not want them. In the case of a tailor who left enough thread attached to the cloth that it could be used in order to sew with it, or if there was a patch of cloth that is three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths left from the cloth given to the tailor by the customer, these items belong to the customer. That which a carpenter removes with an adze belongs to him, because an adze removes only small shavings of wood, which the customer is uninterested in; but what he removes with an ax [ uvakashil ] belongs to the customer. And if he was doing his work in the domain of the customer, then even the sawdust belongs to the customer.

Mishnah Bava Metzia

Chapter 1

The early commentaries ask why this chapter, which discusses details of the halakhot of found items, precedes the second chapter, which discusses the fundamental halakhot of found items. Tosafot explain that as tractate Bava Metzia follows tractate Bava Kamma, the halakhot of found items are elucidated in this chapter as a continuation of the topics discussed in the last chapter of Bava Kamma, which discussed the division of items between litigants by means of an oath, which is also the ruling in the mishna here (see Shita Mekubbetzet ). The Rosh explains that because there is a suspicion of theft in this case, these matters are juxtaposed with the halakhot of theft, which are described at length in Bava Kamma. If two people came to court holding a garment, and this one, the first litigant, says: I found it, and that one, the second litigant, says: I found it; this one says: All of it is mine, and that one says: All of it is mine; how does the court adjudicate this case? This one takes an oath that he does not have ownership of less than half of it, and that one takes an oath that he does not have ownership of less than half of it, and they divide it. If this one says: All of it is mine, and that one says: Half of it is mine, since they both agree that half of the cloak belongs to one of them, the conflict between them is only about the other half. Therefore, the one who says: All of it is mine, takes an oath that he does not have ownership of less than three parts, i.e., three-fourths, of it, and the one who says: Half of it is mine, takes an oath that he does not have ownership of less than one-quarter of it. This one takes three parts, and that one takes one-quarter.

If two people were sitting in a riding position on the back of an animal, e.g., a donkey or camel, or one was sitting in a riding position on the animal and one was leading it by its halter, and this one says: All of it is mine, and that one says: All of it is mine, how does the court adjudicate this case? This one takes an oath that he does not have ownership of less than half of it, and that one takes an oath that he does not have ownership of less than half of it, and they divide it. When they admit to the validity of each other’s claims or when they each have witnesses attesting to their claims, they divide the disputed item without taking an oath, as an oath is administered only in a case where the parties have no other way to prove their claims.

If one was riding on an animal and saw a found item, and said to another person who was walking beside him: Give it to me, if the pedestrian took it and said: I have acquired it for myself, he has acquired it by means of lifting it, even though he did not see it first. But if, after giving it to the one riding the animal, he said: I acquired it for myself at the outset, he has said nothing and the rider keeps the item.

If one saw a found item and fell upon it, intending to thereby acquire it, but did not employ one of the formal modes of acquisition, and then another came and seized it, the one who seized it acquired it because he employed one of the formal modes of acquisition. If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, e.g., after a deer crippled by a broken leg, or after young pigeons that have not yet learned to fly, which can be caught easily, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. If the deer were running in its usual manner, or the young pigeons were flying, and he said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, he has said nothing, as one’s courtyard cannot effect acquisition of an item that does not remain there on its own.

With regard to the found item of one’s minor son or daughter, i.e., an ownerless item that they found; the found item of his Canaanite slave or maidservant; and the found item of his wife, they are his. By contrast, with regard to the found item of one’s adult son or daughter; the found item of his Hebrew slave or maidservant; and the found item of his ex- wife, whom he divorced, even if he has not yet given her payment of the marriage contract that he owes her, they are theirs.

With regard to one who found promissory notes, if they include a property guarantee for the loan he may not return them to the creditor, as, if he were to return them, the court would then use them to collect repayment of the debts from land that belonged to the debtor at the time of the loan, even if that land was subsequently sold to others. If they do not include a property guarantee, he returns them to the creditor, as in this case the court will not use them to collect repayment of the debt from purchasers of the debtor’s land. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: In both this case and that case he should not return the promissory notes to the creditor, as, if he were to return them, the court would in any event use them to collect repayment of the loan from purchasers of the debtor’s land.

If one found bills of divorce, or bills of manumission of slaves, or wills, or deeds of a gift, or receipts, he may not return these items to the one who is presumed to have lost them, as I say it is possible that they were written and then the writer reconsidered about them and decided not to deliver them.

If one found documents of appraisal of a debtor’s property for the purpose of debt collection; or documents concerning food, which were drawn up when one accepted upon himself to provide sustenance for another; documents of ḥalitza ; or documents of refusal of a girl upon reaching majority to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brothers married her as a minor after the death of her father; or documents of beirurin, a concept that will be explained in the Gemara; or any court enactment, e.g., a promissory note that has been authenticated by the court, in all of these cases, the finder must return the document to its presumed owner. If one found documents in a ḥafisa or in a deluskema, both of them types of containers, or if he found a roll of documents or a bundle of documents, he must return them. And how many documents are considered to be a bundle of documents? It is three that are tied together. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the documents make reference to loans of one person who borrowed money from three people, the finder must return them to the debtor, as they were presumably in his possession before being lost. If the documents make reference to loans of three people who borrowed money from one person, he must return them to the creditor, as they were presumably in his possession before being lost. If one found a document among his documents that were given to him by other people as a trustee, and he does not know what its nature is, i.e., he does not remember who gave it to him or whether the debt mentioned in it has been paid, the document is placed aside until Elijah the prophet comes and clarifies the issue through his prophecy. If there are cancellations of contracts [ simponot ] among them, he should do what is stated in the simponot.

Chapter 2

In a case where one discovers lost items, which found items belong to him, and for which items is one obligated to proclaim his find so that the owner of the lost items can come and reclaim them? These found items belong to him: If one found scattered produce, scattered coins, bundles of grain in a public area, round cakes of pressed figs, baker’s loaves, strings of fish, cuts of meat, unprocessed wool fleeces that are taken from their state of origin directly after shearing, bound flax stalks, or bound strips of combed purple wool, these belong to him, as they have no distinguishing marks that would enable their owners to claim them. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one finds any lost item in which there is an alteration, he is obligated to proclaim his find. How so? If he found a round cake of pressed figs with an earthenware shard inside it or a loaf of bread with coins inside it, he is obligated to proclaim his find, as perhaps the owner of the item inserted them as a distinguishing mark by means of which he could reclaim his property in case it became lost. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If one finds any anpurya vessels, since their shape is uniform and they are indistinguishable, he is not obligated to proclaim his find.

And for these found items, one is obligated to proclaim his find: If one found produce inside a vessel, or a vessel by itself; coins inside a pouch, or a pouch by itself; piles of produce; piles of coins, three coins stacked one atop another; bundles of grain in a secluded area; loaves of a homeowner, as each shapes his loaves in his own unique manner; wool fleeces that are taken from the house of a craftsman, as each craftsman processes the wool in his own unique manner; jugs of wine; or jugs of oil. If one finds any of these, he is obligated to proclaim his find.

If one found, behind a wooden fence or behind a stone fence, bound fledglings, or if he found them in the paths that run through fields, he may not touch them, as they were certainly placed there intentionally. In a case where one found a vessel in a garbage dump, if it is concealed, he may not touch it, as a person certainly concealed it there. If it is exposed, the finder takes the item and proclaims his find. If one found lost items in a heap of stone rubble or in an old wall, these belong to him. If one found lost items in a new wall from its midpoint and outward, they belong to him. If he found the items from its midpoint and inward, they belong to the homeowner. If the homeowner would rent the house to others on a regular basis and there was a steady turnover of residents, even if one found lost items inside the house, these belong to him. Since the owner of the lost items cannot be identified based on location, he will certainly despair of recovering his lost items.

If one found items without a distinguishing mark in a store, those items belong to him, as, since the store is frequented by the multitudes, the owner despairs of its recovery. If the items were found between the storekeeper’s counter and the storekeeper, the items belong to the storekeeper; since his customers do not typically have access to that area, presumably the items are his. If one found coins before a money changer, those coins belong to him. If the coins were found between the money changer’s chair and the money changer, those coins belong to the money changer, because his clients do not typically have access to that area. In the case of one who purchases produce from another or in a case where another sent him produce as a gift, and he found coins intermingled with the produce, those coins belong to him. If the coins were bundled, this serves as a distinguishing mark and the finder takes the coins and proclaims his find.

This mishna is an excerpt from a halakhic midrash concerning lost items, based on the verse: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering, and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother…And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it; you may not disregard it” (Deuteronomy 22:1, 3). The garment was also included in the generalization that one must return all of these items. And why did it emerge from the generalization that is should be specified? To draw an analogy to it and to say to you: What is notable about a garment? It is notable in that there are distinguishing marks concerning it and it has claimants asserting ownership, and its finder is obligated to proclaim his find. So too with regard to any item concerning which there are distinguishing marks and it has claimants asserting ownership, its finder is obligated to proclaim his find.

And until when is one who finds a lost item obligated to proclaim his find? He is obligated to do so until the moment that the neighbors will know of its existence; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is obligated to proclaim his find for three pilgrimage Festivals and for seven days after the last of the three pilgrimage Festivals, so that its owner will have time to go to his home, a trip lasting up to three days, and ascertain that he in fact lost the item, and he will return to Jerusalem, a trip lasting up to three days, and proclaim his loss for one day.

If a claimant accurately stated what type of item the lost item that was found by another is, but did not state, i.e., describe, its distinguishing marks, the finder shall not give it to him. And in the case of a swindler, even though he stated its distinguishing marks, the finder shall not give the lost item to him, as it is stated: “And if your brother be not near you, and you know him not, then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother claims [ derosh ] it [ oto ], and you shall return it to him” (Deuteronomy 22:2). Would it enter your mind that the finder would give it to him before he claims it? How can the finder return it if he does not know the identity of the owner? Rather, the verb derosh is not referring to the claim of the owner; it is referring to the scrutiny performed by the finder. You shall not return the lost item until you scrutinize [ shetidrosh ] your brother to determine whether he, the claimant, is a swindler or whether he is not a swindler. If one finds any living being that works and generates enough revenue to cover the costs of the food that it eats, it shall work and eat while in the finder’s possession. And any living being that does not work but it does eat shall be sold, as it is stated: “Then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother claims it, and you shall return it to him” (Deuteronomy 22:2), indicating that the finder must see how best to return it to him. Since the owner must repay the finder for his expenditures, if feeding the animal costs more than its value, the finder’s keep-ing the animal in his possession will prevent the owner from recovering it. What shall be done with the money received from the sale of the animal? Rabbi Tarfon says: The finder may use it; therefore, if the money is lost, he is liable to pay restitution for it. Rabbi Akiva says: He may not use the money; therefore, if it is lost, he is not liable to pay restitution for it.

If one found scrolls, he reads them once in thirty days in order to ventilate them and prevent mold. And if he does not know how to read, he rolls and unrolls them in order to ventilate them. But he shall not study passages in them for the first time, as he would leave the scroll exposed to the air for a lengthy period, thereby causing damage. And another person shall not read the scroll with him, as each might pull it closer to improve his vantage point, which could cause the scroll to tear. If one found a garment, he shakes it once in thirty days, and he spreads it out for its sake, to ventilate it, but he may not use it as a decoration for his own prestige. If one found silver vessels or copper vessels, he may use them for their own sake to prevent tarnish and rust, but he may not use them to the extent that he will erode them. If he finds gold vessels or glass vessels, which are not ruined by neglect, he may not touch them until Elijah will come and identify the owner. If a person found a sack or a basket or any other item that it is not his typical manner to take and carry because it is beneath his dignity, he shall not take it, as one need not demean himself in order to return a lost item.

Which is the item that is considered lost property? If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, as presumably the owners are nearby and are aware of the animals’ whereabouts. If one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that ran through the vineyards, that is lost property. In a case where one returned the lost animal and it fled, and he again returned it and it fled, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to return it each time, as it is stated: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). If in the course of tending to and returning the lost item, the finder was idle from labor that would have earned him a sela, he shall not say to the owner of the item: Give me a sela to compensate me for my lost income. Rather, the owner gives him his wage as if he were a laborer, a payment that is considerably smaller. If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. If there is no court there before whom can he stipulate his condition, his financial interests take precedence and he need not return the lost item.

If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it to its owner. If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and a priest found it, he may not become impure to return it. If his father said to him: Become impure; or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father, as one may not violate Torah law to honor his father. If one unloaded a burden from an animal collapsing under its weight and then later loaded it onto the animal, and later unloaded and loaded it again, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to continue unloading and loading, as it is stated: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it [ azov ta’azov ] with him” (Exodus 23:5). It is derived from the verse that one is obligated to perform the action as needed, even several times. If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, if it is your wish to unload the burden, unload it, in such a case the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: “You shall release it with him,” with the owner of the animal. If the failure of the owner to participate in unloading the burden was due to the fact he was old or infirm, the passerby is obligated to unload the burden alone. There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. Rabbi Shimon says: There is even a mitzva to load the burden. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: “Under its burden,” i.e., the obligation is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear.

If one finds his lost item and his father’s lost item, tending to his own lost item takes precedence. Similarly, if one finds his lost item and his teacher’s lost item, tending to his own lost item takes precedence. If one finds his father’s lost item and his teacher’s lost item, tending to his teacher’s lost item takes precedence, as his father brought him into this world, and his teacher, who taught him the wisdom of Torah, brings him to life in the World-to-Come. And if his father is a Torah scholar, then his father’s lost item takes precedence. If his father and his teacher were each carrying a burden and he wants to assist them in putting down their burdens, he first places his teacher’s burden down and thereafter places his father’s burden down. If his father and his teacher were in captivity, he first redeems his teacher and thereafter redeems his father. And if his father is a Torah scholar, he first redeems his father and thereafter redeems his teacher.

Chapter 3

In the case of one who deposits an animal or vessels with another, who is acting as an unpaid bailee, and they were stolen or they were lost, and the bailee paid the owner the value of the deposit, and did not wish to take an oath that he did not misappropriate the item and that he was not negligent in safeguarding it, that will effect who keeps the deposit if it is found or returned. The bailee may also choose to take the oath, as the Sages said: An unpaid bailee takes an oath, and he is thereby released from the liability to pay the owner. If the thief is later found, the thief pays the double payment. If the deposited item was a sheep or an ox and the thief slaughtered or sold it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. To whom does the thief pay? He gives the payment to the one who had the deposit in his possession when it was stolen, i.e., the bailee. When the bailee paid the owner for the stolen item, the owner granted the rights to the item to the bailee. Therefore, the bailee is entitled to any payment the thief presents for the item, be it compensation for the item’s value or a fine. In the case of a bailee who took an oath and did not wish to pay, if the thief is then found and required to pay the double payment, or if he slaughtered or sold the animal and is required to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, to whom does the thief pay? He gives the payment to the owner of the deposit, not the bailee.

In the case of one who rents a cow from another, and this renter then lends it to another person, and the cow dies in its typical manner, i.e., of natural causes, in the possession of the borrower, the renter takes an oath to the owner of the cow that the cow died in its typical manner, and the borrower pays the renter for the cow that he borrowed. A renter is exempt in a case of damage due to circumstances beyond his control, including death, but a borrower is liable to compensate the owner even for damage due to circumstances beyond his control. Rabbi Yosei said: How does the other party, i.e., the renter, do business with and profit from another’s cow? Rather, the value of the cow should be returned to the owner. The renter need not take an oath, but the borrower must compensate the owner of the cow.

If one said to two people: I robbed one of you of one hundred dinars, but I do not know from which of you I took the money, or if one said to two people: The father of one of you deposited one hundred dinars with me, but I do not know the father of which of you he is, then he gives one hundred dinars to this person and one hundred dinars to that person. This is because there is no way to determine which of them is entitled to the money, and he admitted his obligation at his own initiative.

In the case of two people who deposited money with one person, and this one deposited one hundred dinars and that one deposited two hundred dinars, and when they come to collect their deposit, this one says: My deposit was two hundred dinars, and that one says: My deposit was two hundred dinars, the bailee gives one hundred dinars to this one and one hundred dinars to that one. And the rest of the money, i.e., the contested one hundred dinars, will be placed in a safe place until Elijah comes and prophetically determines the truth. Rabbi Yosei said: If so, what did the swindler lose? He lost nothing by claiming the one hundred dinars that belongs to another, and he has no incentive to admit the truth. Rather, the entire deposit will be placed in a safe place until Elijah comes. As his fraud will cause him to lose even the one hundred dinars that he deposited, perhaps he will be discouraged from making a fraudulent claim.

And likewise, if two people deposited two vessels, one worth one hundred dinars and one worth one thousand dinars, and this one says: The expensive vessel is mine, and that one says: The expensive vessel is mine, the bailee gives the small vessel to one of them, and from the proceeds of the sale of the large vessel he gives the value of the small vessel to the other, and the rest of the money is placed in a safe place until Elijah comes. Rabbi Yosei said: If so, what did the swindler lose? Rather, the entire deposit, i.e., both vessels, are placed in a safe place until Elijah comes or one of them admits his deceit.

In the case of one who deposits produce with another, even if it is lost due to spoilage or vermin, the bailee may not touch it, as it is not his. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He sells it before the court, as by doing so he is like one returning a lost item to the owner, since through its sale he prevents the owner from losing the value of his produce.

In the case of one who deposits produce with another, and the bailee provides him with different produce in return, that bailee deducts from the produce that he returns an amount equal to the standard decrease of the produce. The decrease is calculated according to this formula: For wheat and for rice, he deducts nine half- kav per kor, which is 180 kav ; for barley and millet, he deducts nine kav per kor ; for spelt and flaxseed, he deducts three se’a, which total eighteen kav, per kor. The entire calculation is according to the measure, and the entire calculation is according to the time elapsed. This is the amount of produce that the bailee deducts per one kor of produce over the course of one year. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: And what do the mice care how much produce the bailee is safeguarding? Don’t they eat the same amount whether it is from much produce and whether it is from little produce? Rather, he deducts an amount equal to the standard decrease of just one kor of produce. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the deposit was a large measure, the bailee does not deduct the decrease from it, due to the fact that for different reasons it increases. Therefore, he returns the measure of produce that was deposited with him, because the increase offsets the decrease.

When the bailee returns liquids that were deposited with him, he deducts one-sixth of the amount for wine, to offset the decrease in volume due to absorption into the cask and evaporation. Rabbi Yehuda says: He deducts one-fifth. He deducts three log of oil for one hundred log : A log and a half for sediment that sinks to the bottom of the cask, and a log and a half for absorption into the cask. If it was refined oil, he does not deduct any of the oil for sediment because it was filtered. If the oil was stored in old casks that are already saturated, he does not deduct any of the oil for absorption. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even in a case of one who sells refined oil to another all the days of the year, this buyer accepts upon himself that the seller will deduct a log and a half of sediment for one hundred log, as that is the standard measure of sediment.

In the case of one who deposits a barrel with another, and the owners did not designate a specific place for the barrel to be stored in the bailee’s house, and the bailee moved it and it broke, if it broke while still in his hand, there is a distinction: If he moved the barrel for his purposes, he is liable to pay for the damage. If he moved the barrel for its own purposes, to prevent it from being damaged, he is exempt. If, after he replaced the barrel it broke, whether he initially moved it for his purposes or whether he moved it for its own purposes, he is exempt. But if the owners designated a specific place for the barrel, and the bailee moved it and it broke, whether it broke while still in his hand or whether it broke after he replaced the barrel, if he moved it for his purposes he is liable to pay, and if he moved it for its own purposes, he is exempt.

In the case of one who deposited coins with another, and that bailee bound it in a cloth and slung it behind him, or conveyed them to his minor son or daughter for safeguarding, or locked the door before them in an inappropriate, i.e., insufficient, manner to secure them, the bailee is liable to pay for the coins, as he did not safeguard the coins in the manner typical of bailees. But if he safeguarded the money in the manner that bailees safeguard items and it was nevertheless stolen, he is exempt.

In the case of one who deposits money with a money changer, if the money is bound, the money changer may not use it. Therefore, if it is lost he does not bear responsibility for it. If the money was unbound, the money changer may use it. Therefore, if it is lost he bears responsibility for it. If he deposited money with a homeowner, whether it is bound or whether it is unbound, the homeowner may not use it, as it never entered the mind of the depositor that the homeowner might use the money. Therefore, if the homeowner lost the money, he does not bear responsibility for it. If the bailee is a storekeeper, his status is like that of a homeowner; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the bailee is a storekeeper, his status is like that of a money changer.

With regard to one who misappropriates a deposit, Beit Shammai say: He is penalized for its decrease and its increase. If the value of the deposit decreases, the bailee is liable to pay in accordance with its value at the time of the misappropriation. If it increases in value, he is liable to pay in accordance with its value at the time of repayment. And Beit Hillel say: He pays in accordance with its value at the time of removal. Rabbi Akiva says: He pays in accordance with its value at the time of the claim. With regard to one who intends to misappropriate a deposit and voices that intent in the presence of witnesses, Beit Shammai say: He is liable to pay for any damage to the deposit from that point forward, and Beit Hillel say: He is liable to pay only if he actually misappropriates the deposit, as it is stated concerning a bailee: “Whether he has misappropriated his neighbor’s goods” (Exodus 22:7). If he tilted the deposited barrel and took from it a quarter - log of wine for his own use, and the barrel broke, then he pays only for that quarter - log. If he lifted the barrel and took from it a quarter - log of wine, and the barrel broke, since he acquired the barrel by lifting it, he pays the value of the entire barrel.

Chapter 4

There is a halakhic principle that when one purchases an item, the payment of the money does not effect the transaction. The transaction is effected only by means of the buyer’s physically taking the item into his possession, e.g., by pulling the item. Payment of money by the buyer creates only a moral obligation for the seller to sell him the item. When two types of currency are exchanged for each other, one of the types will have the status of the money being paid, and the other will have the status of the item being purchased. Handing over the former will not effect the transaction, while handing over the latter will. The mishna teaches: When one purchases gold coins, paying with silver coins, the gold coins assume the status of the purchased item and the silver coins assume the status of money. Therefore, when one party takes possession of the gold coins, the other party acquires the silver coins. But when one party takes possession of the silver coins, the other party does not acquire the gold coins. In an exchange of silver coins for copper coins, when one party takes possession of the copper coins, the other party acquires the silver coins. But when one party takes possession of the silver coins, the other party does not acquire the copper coins. In an exchange of flawed coins for unflawed coins, when one party takes possession of the flawed coins, the other party acquires the unflawed coins. But when one party takes possession of the unflawed coins, the other party does not acquire the flawed coins. In an exchange of an unminted coin for a minted coin, when one party takes possession of an unminted coin [ asimon ], the other party acquires a minted coin. But when one party takes possession of a minted coin, the other party does not acquire an unminted coin. In an exchange of a coin for movable property, when one party takes possession of the movable property the other party acquires the coin. But when one party takes possession of the coin, the other party does not acquire the movable property. This is the principle: With regard to those who exchange all forms of movable property, each acquires the property of the other, i.e., the moment that one of the parties to the exchange takes possession of the item that he is acquiring, e.g., by means of pulling, the other party acquires the item from the first party.

How so? If the buyer pulled produce from the seller, but the buyer did not yet give the seller their value in money, he cannot renege on the transaction, but if the buyer gave the seller money but did not yet pull produce from him, he can renege on the transaction, as the transaction is not yet complete. But with regard to the latter case, the Sages said: He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood, and from the generation of the dispersion, i.e., that of the Tower of Babel, will in the future exact payment from whoever does not stand by his statement. Just as the people of those generations were not punished by an earthly court but were subjected to divine punishment, so too, although no earthly court can compel the person who reneged to complete the transaction, punishment will be exacted at the hand of Heaven for any damage that he caused. Rabbi Shimon says: Anyone who has the money in his possession has the advantage. The Sages said it is only with regard to the seller that payment of money does not effect a transaction, so that if the buyer paid for the item and did not yet take possession of the purchase item, the seller can renege on the sale and return the money. By contrast, once the buyer paid for the item he cannot renege on his decision and demand return of his money, even if he did not yet take possession of the purchase item.

The measure of exploitation for which one can claim that he was exploited is four silver ma’a from the twenty-four silver ma’a in a sela, or one-sixth of the transaction. Until when is it permitted for the buyer to return the item? He may return it only until a period of time has passed that would allow him to show the merchandise to a merchant or to his relative who is more familiar with the market price of merchandise. If more time has elapsed he can no longer return the item, as the assumption is that he waived his right to receive the sum of the disparity. The mishna continues: Rabbi Tarfon ruled in Lod: Exploitation is a measure of eight silver ma’a from the twenty-four silver ma’a of a sela, one-third of the transaction. And the merchants of Lod rejoiced, as this ruling allowed them a greater profit margin and rendered the nullification of a transaction less likely. Rabbi Tarfon said to them: Throughout the entire day it is permitted to renege on the transaction and not merely for the period of time it takes to show the purchase item to a merchant or a relative. The merchants of Lod said to him: Let Rabbi Tarfon leave us as we were, with the previous ruling, and they reverted to following the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna with regard to both rulings.

Both the buyer and the seller are subject to the halakhot of exploitation. Just as the halakhot of exploitation apply to a layman, so do the halakhot of exploitation apply to a merchant. Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no exploitation for a merchant, as he is an expert in the market price of merchandise. The one upon whom the exploitation was imposed has the advantage. If he wishes, he can say to the other: Give me back my money and nullify the transaction, or he can say: Give me back the sum that you gained by exploiting me.

How much can the sela coin be eroded through usage, and its use in a transaction at its original value will still not constitute exploitation? Rabbi Meir says: The accepted depreciation is four issar, which is a rate of one issar per dinar, or one twenty-fourth of a dinar. And Rabbi Yehuda says: The accepted depreciation is four pundeyon, which is a rate of one pundeyon per dinar, or one-twelfth of a dinar. And Rabbi Shimon says: The accepted depreciation is eight pundeyon, which is a rate of two pundeyon per dinar, or one-sixth of a dinar.

The mishna continues: Until when is it permitted for one to return a worn coin once he realizes that it is defective? In the cities [ bakerakim ], one may return it only until a period of time has passed that would allow him to show it to a money changer, who is an expert in matters of coins. In the villages, where there is no money changer, one may return it only until Shabbat eves, when people purchase their Shabbat needs. Although these are the limits of how much a coin must be eroded in order for there to be exploitation, if the one who gave the coin to the aggrieved party recognized it, he must accept it back from him even after twelve months have passed no matter how little the erosion affected its value. And he has only a grievance against him, as the Gemara will explain. And one may give the slightly eroded coin for use in the desacralizing of second-tithe produce and he need not be concerned, as one who would refuse to accept a slightly eroded coin is merely a miserly soul, while the coin is in fact valid for any use.

The measure of exploitation is four silver ma’a from the twenty-four silver ma’a of a sela. And the smallest monetary claim in court for which a plaintiff can obligate a respondent to take an oath is two silver ma’a. And the smallest monetary admission for which that respondent takes the oath is an admission that one owes at least the value of one peruta. On a related note, the tanna adds that there are five halakhic situations involving perutot : The admission to part of a claim must be that one owes at least the value of one peruta, and a woman is betrothed with the value of one peruta. And one who derives benefit of the value of one peruta from consecrated property has misused consecrated property and is liable to bring an offering, and one who finds an item that has the value of one peruta is obligated to proclaim that he found it. And with regard to one who robs from another an item that has the value of one peruta and took an oath to him that he robbed nothing, when he repents and seeks to return the stolen item he must take it and follow its owner even to Medea. In that case, he may not return the item by means of a messenger; he must give it directly to its owner.

In this mishna, as in the previous one, the tanna enumerates several halakhot that share a common element. There are five halakhic situations where one-fifth is added to the value of the principal, and these are they: A non-priest who eats either teruma, or teruma of the tithe, which the Levite separates from the first tithe and gives to a priest, or teruma of the tithe of demai, or ḥalla, or first fruits; in each of these cases, he adds one-fifth when paying restitution to the priest who owned the produce. And one who redeems his own fruit of a fourth-year sapling or second-tithe produce adds one-fifth. One who redeems his own consecrated property adds one-fifth. One who derives benefit worth one peruta from consecrated property adds one-fifth. And one who robs the value of one peruta from another and takes a false oath in response to his claim adds one-fifth when paying restitution.

These are matters that are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation even if the disparity between the value and the payment is one-sixth or greater: Slaves, and documents, and land, and consecrated property. In addition, if they are stolen, these items are subject neither to payment of double the principal for theft nor to payment of four or five times the principal, if the thief slaughtered or sold a stolen sheep or cow, respectively. An unpaid bailee does not take an oath and a paid bailee does not pay if these items were stolen or lost. Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to sacrificial animals for which one bears responsibility to replace them, they are subject to the halakhot of exploitation, as this responsibility indicates a certain aspect of ownership. And those for which one does not bear responsibility to replace them, they are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even in the case of one who sells a Torah scroll, an animal, or a pearl, these items are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, as they have no fixed price. The Rabbis said to him: The early Sages stated that only these items listed above are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation.

Just as there is a prohibition against exploitation [ ona’a ] in buying and selling, so is there ona’a in statements, i.e., verbal mistreatment. The mishna proceeds to cite examples of verbal mistreatment. One may not say to a seller: For how much are you selling this item, if he does not wish to purchase it. He thereby upsets the seller when the deal fails to materialize. The mishna lists other examples: If one is a penitent, another may not say to him: Remember your earlier deeds. If one is the child of converts, another may not say to him: Remember the deeds of your ancestors, as it is stated: “And a convert shall you neither mistreat, nor shall you oppress him” (Exodus 22:20).

One may not intermingle produce bought from one supplier with other produce, even if he intermingles new produce with other new produce and ostensibly the buyer suffers no loss from his doing so. And needless to say, one may not intermingle new produce with old produce, in the event that the old produce is superior, as with grains, since intermingling lowers its value. Actually, they said: With regard to wine, they permitted one to mix strong wine with weak wine, because one thereby enhances it. One may not intentionally mix wine sediment with the wine, but one may give the buyer wine with its sediment; the seller is not required to filter the wine. One who had water mix with his wine may not sell it in the store, unless he informs the buyer that it contains water. And he may not sell it to a merchant, even if he informs him of the mixture, as, although he is aware that there is water mixed with the wine, it will be used for nothing other than deceit because the merchant will likely not inform the buyer that it is diluted. In a place where they are accustomed to place water into the wine to dilute it and everyone is aware of that fact, one may place water in the wine.

The prohibition against mixing different types of produce applies only to an individual selling the produce of his field. By contrast, a merchant may take grain from five threshing floors belonging to different people, and place the produce in one warehouse. He may also take wine from five winepresses and place the wine in one large cask [ pitom ], provided that he does not intend to mix low-quality merchandise with high-quality merchandise. Rabbi Yehuda says: A storekeeper may not hand out toasted grain and nuts to children who patronize his store, due to the fact that he thereby accustoms them to come to him at the expense of competing storekeepers. And the Rabbis permit doing so. And one may not reduce the price of sale items below the market rate. And the Rabbis say: If he wishes to do so, he should be remembered positively. One may not sift ground beans to remove the waste, lest he charge an inappropriately high price for the sifted meal, beyond its actual value; this is the statement of Abba Shaul. And the Rabbis permit doing so. And the Rabbis concede that one may not sift the meal only from the beans that are close to the opening of the bin to create the impression that the contents of the entire bin were sifted, as this is nothing other than deception. One may neither adorn a person before selling him on the slave market, nor an animal nor vessels that he seeks to sell. Rather, they must be sold unembellished, to avoid deceiving the buyer.

Chapter 5

The Torah states the prohibition against taking interest: “And if your brother becomes impoverished, and his hand falters with you, then you shall support him; whether a stranger or a native, he shall live with you. You shall not take from him interest [ neshekh ] or increase [ tarbit ]; you shall fear your God and your brother shall live with you. You shall not give him your money with neshekh and with marbit you shall not give him your food” (Leviticus 25:35–37). The mishna asks: Which is neshekh, and which is tarbit? Which is the case in which there is neshekh? With regard to one who lends another a sela, worth four dinars, for five dinars to be paid later, or one who lends another two se’a of wheat for three se’a to be returned later, this is prohibited, as it is taking interest [ noshekh ]. And which is the case in which there is tarbit? It is the case of one who enters into a transaction that yields an increase in the produce beyond his investment. How so? For example, one acquired wheat from another at the price of one kor of wheat for one gold dinar, worth twenty-five silver dinars, with the wheat to be supplied at a later date, and such was the market price of wheat at the time he acquired it. The price of one kor of wheat then increased and stood at thirty dinars. At that point, the buyer said to the seller: Give me all of my wheat now, as I wish to sell it and purchase wine with it. The seller said to him: Since it is ultimately wine that you want, not wheat, each kor of your wheat is considered by me to be worth thirty dinars, and you have the right to collect its value in wine from me. And in this case, the seller did not have wine in his possession. If wine then appreciates in value, the result will be an interest-bearing transaction, as the buyer collects from the seller wine worth more than the wheat for which he paid.

One who lends another money may not reside in the borrower’s courtyard free of charge, nor may he rent living quarters from him at less than the going rate, because this is interest. The benefit he receives from living on the borrower’s property constitutes the equivalent of an additional payment as interest on the loan. One may increase the price of rent to be received at a later date instead of at an earlier one, but one may not similarly increase the price of a sale. How so? If a courtyard owner rented his courtyard to a renter, and the owner said to the renter: If you give me the payment now, the rental is yours for ten sela a year, but if you pay on a monthly basis it will cost a sela for each month, equaling twelve sela a year. Such a practice is permitted, despite the fact that he charges more for a monthly payment. If a field owner sold his field to a buyer and said to him: If you give me the payment now, it is yours for one thousand dinars, but if you wait and pay me at the time of the harvest, it is yours for twelve hundred dinars, this transaction is prohibited as interest.

If one sold another a field and the buyer gave him some of the money, and the seller said to him: Whenever you wish, bring the outstanding money and take your field at that point, this is prohibited. If one lent money to another on the basis of the borrower’s field serving as a guarantee, and said to him: If you do not give me the money now and instead delay your payment from now until three years have passed, the field is mine, then after three years, the field is his. This is permitted even if the field is worth more than the amount of the loan. And this is what Baitos ben Zunin would do, with the consent of the Sages, when he lent money.

One may not establish a deal with a storekeeper for half the profits. It is prohibited for one to provide a storekeeper with produce for him to sell in his store, with half the profits going to the lender. In such an arrangement, the storekeeper himself is responsible for half of any loss from the venture, effectively rendering half of the produce as a loan to the storekeeper. The lender remains responsible for the other half of any loss, and the storekeeper provides a service by selling his produce for him. This service, if provided free of charge, is viewed as interest paid for the loan, and is prohibited. And similarly, one may not give a storekeeper money with which to acquire produce for the storekeeper to sell for half the profits. These activities are both prohibited unless the owner gives the storekeeper his wages as a salaried laborer hired to sell the produce, after which they can divide the remaining profits. One may not give eggs to another to place chickens on them in exchange for half the profits, and one may not appraise calves or foals for another to raise them for half the profits. These activities are both prohibited unless the owner gives the other wages for his toil and the cost of the food he gives to the animals in his temporary care. All this applies when the lender establishes a fixed minimum profit he insists on receiving regardless of what happens to the animals. But one may accept calves or foals to raise as a joint venture for half of the earnings, with one side providing the animals and taking full responsibility for losses, and the other providing the work and the sustenance, and the one raising them may raise them until they reach one-third of their maturation, at which point they are sold and the profits shared. And with regard to a donkey, it can be raised in this manner until it is large enough to bear a load.

One may appraise a cow or a donkey or any item that generates revenue while it eats and give it to another to feed it and take care of it in exchange for one-half the profits, with the one who cares for the animal benefiting from the profits it generates during the period in which he raises it. Afterward, they divide the profit that accrues due to appreciation in the value of the animal and due to the offspring it produces. In a place where it is customary to divide the offspring immediately upon their birth, they divide them, and in a place where it is customary for the one who cared for the mother to raise the offspring for an additional period of time before dividing them, he shall raise them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may appraise a calf together with its mother or a foal with its mother even though these young animals do not generate revenue while they eat. The costs of raising the young animal need not be considered. And one may inflate [ umafriz ] the rental fee paid for his field, and he need not be concerned with regard to the prohibition of interest, as the Gemara will explain.

One may not accept from a Jew sheep to raise or other items to care for as a guaranteed investment, in which the terms of the transaction dictate that the one accepting the item takes upon himself complete responsibility to repay its value in the event of depreciation or loss, but receives only part of the profit. This is because it is a loan, as the principal is fixed and always returned to the owner, and any additional sum the owner receives is interest. But one may accept a guaranteed investment from gentiles, as there is no prohibition of interest in transactions with them. And one may borrow money from them and one may lend money to them with interest. And similarly, with regard to a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [ ger toshav ], one may borrow money from him with interest and lend money to him with interest, since he is not a Jew. Also, a Jew may serve as a middleman and lend a gentile’s money to another Jew with the knowledge of the gentile, but not with the knowledge of a Jew, i.e., the middleman himself, as the Gemara will explain.

One may not set a price with a buyer for the future delivery of produce until the market rate is publicized, as, if he is paid for supplying produce at a later date in advance of the publication of the market rate for that type of produce, he may set a price that is too low. The money paid in advance is deemed a loan, and if the initial payment was lower than the later market value, delivery of the produce will constitute interest on the loan. Once the market rate is publicized, the seller may set a price, even if the produce is not yet in his possession. The reason for this is that even though this one, i.e., the seller, does not have any of the produce, that one, someone else, has it, and the seller could theoretically acquire the produce now at the price he set. If the seller was first among the reapers, having harvested his crop before the market rate was set, he may set a price with a buyer as he wishes for a stack of grain that is already in his possession, or for a large basket of grapes prepared for pressing into wine, or for a vat [ hama’atan ] of olives prepared for pressing into oil, or for the clumps [ habeitzim ] of clay prepared for use by a potter, or for plaster nearing the end of the manufacturing process at the point after he has sunk it, i.e., baked it, in the kiln. Although the market rate has yet to be set, the seller may nevertheless set a price now for their eventual delivery. The mishna continues: And he may set a price with a buyer for manure on any of the days of the year, as the manure will certainly be available and it is therefore viewed as if it is ready. Rabbi Yosei says: One may set the price of manure only if he already had a pile of manure in his dunghill to which the sale can immediately be applied, but the Rabbis permit it in all cases. And one may also set a price with a buyer at the highest rate, i.e., a large amount of produce sold for the lowest price, stipulating with the seller that the sale price match the lowest market rate for this product during the course of the year. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if he did not set a price with him beforehand at the highest rate, the buyer may say to the seller: Give me the produce at this rate or give me back my money. Since he did not formally acquire the produce, if the price changed he may withdraw from the transaction.

A person may lend wheat to his sharecroppers in exchange for wheat, for the purpose of seeding, meaning that he may lend them a quantity of wheat with which to seed the field, and at harvest time the sharecropper will add the amount of grain that he borrowed to the landowner’s portion of the yield. But he may not lend wheat for the sharecroppers to eat and be paid back with an equivalent quantity because this creates a concern about interest, as the price of wheat may rise. As Rabban Gamliel would lend wheat to his sharecroppers in exchange for wheat, for purposes of seeding, and if he lent it at a high price and the price then fell, or if he lent it at an inexpensive price and the price subsequently rose, in all cases he would take it back from them at the inexpensive price. But this was not because this is the halakha ; rather, he wanted to be stringent with himself.

A person may not say to another: Lend me a kor of wheat and I will give it back to you at the time the wheat is brought to the granary, as the wheat may increase in value, which would mean that when he gives him back a kor of wheat at the time the wheat is brought to the granary it is worth more than the value of the loan, and he therefore will have paid interest. But he may say to him: Lend me a kor of wheat for a short period of time, e.g., until my son comes or until I find the key, as there is no concern about a change in price during such a short interval of time. And Hillel prohibits the practice even in this case. And Hillel would similarly say: A woman may not lend a loaf of bread to another unless she establishes its monetary value, lest the wheat appreciate in value before she returns it, and they will therefore have come to transgress the prohibition of interest.

A person may say to another: Weed the wild growths from my field with me now, and I will weed your field with you at a later stage, or: Till my field with me today and I will till with you on a different day. But he may not say to him: Weed with me today and I will till with you a different day, or: Till with me today and I will weed with you, as due to the different nature of the tasks it is possible that one of them will have to work harder than the other did, which is a type of interest, since he repaid him with additional labor. All the dry days during the summer, when it does not rain, are viewed as one period, meaning that if they each agreed to work one day, the dry days are viewed as though they were all exactly equal in length, despite the slight differences between them. Similarly, all the rainy days are treated as one period. But he may not say to him: Plow with me in the dry season and I will plow with you in the rainy season. Rabban Gamliel says: There is a case of pre -paid interest, and there is also a case of interest paid later, both of which are prohibited. How so? If he had hopes of borrowing money from him in the future, and he sends him money or a gift and says: I am sending you this gift in order that you will lend to me, this is pre -paid interest. Similarly, if he borrowed money from him and subsequently returned his money, and he later sends a gift to him and says: I am sending you this gift in order to repay you for your money, which was idle with me, preventing you from earning a profit from it, this is interest paid later. Rabbi Shimon says: Not only is there interest consisting of payment of money or items, but there is also verbal interest. For example, the borrower may not say to the lender: You should know that so-and-so has come from such and such a place, when he is aware that this information is of significance to his creditor. Since his intention is to provide a benefit to the lender, he has effectively paid him an extra sum for the money he lent him, which constitutes interest.

And these people violate a prohibition of interest: The lender, and the borrower, and the guarantor, and the witnesses. And the Rabbis say: Also the scribe who writes the promissory note violates this prohibition. These parties to the transaction violate different prohibtions. Some are in violation of: “You shall not give him your money with interest” (Leviticus 25:37), and of: “Do not take from him interest or increase” (Leviticus 25:36), and of: “Do not be to him as a creditor” (Exodus 22:24), and of “Do not place interest upon him” (Exodus 22:24), and of: “And you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind, and you shall fear your God; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:14).

Chapter 6

With regard to one who hires artisans or laborers, and they deceived one another, they have nothing but a grievance against one another, and they have no financial claim against the deceptive party. If one hired a donkey driver or a potter to bring posts [ piryafarin ] for a canopy or flutes to play in honor of a bride or the dead, or if he hired laborers to bring up his flax from the retting tub, i.e., the container of water in which flax is placed in the first stage of the manufacture of linen, and likewise any matter that involves financial loss if not performed on time and the laborers reneged, if this occurred in a place where there is no other person to perform the task, he may hire replacements for a large fee at the expense of the first workers, or deceive them to get them to return to work.

The mishna states a related halakha : With regard to one who hires artisans or laborers to perform work and they reneged on the agreement midway through the work, they are at a disadvantage. They must ensure that the employer does not suffer a loss. Conversely, if the employer reneges, he is at a disadvantage. These two rulings are in accordance with the principle that whoever changes the terms accepted by both parties is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges on an agreement is at a disadvantage.

With regard to one who rents a donkey to lead it on a mountain but he led it in a valley, or one who rents a donkey to lead it in a valley but he led it on a mountain, even if this path is ten mil and that one is also ten mil, and the animal dies, he is liable. With regard to one who rents a donkey and it became ill or was seized for public service [ angarya ], the owner can say to the renter: That which is yours is before you, and he is not required to reimburse the renter or to supply him with another donkey. If the animal died or its leg broke, the owner is obligated to provide the renter with another donkey. With regard to one who rents a donkey to lead it on a mountain but he led it in a valley, if it slipped and injured itself he is exempt, but if it died of heatstroke he is liable, as it was the walk in the hotter valley that caused its death. With regard to one who rents a donkey to lead it in a valley but he led it on a mountain, if it slipped he is liable, because this was caused by the mountainous terrain, but if it died of heatstroke he is exempt. If it suffered from heatstroke due to the ascent, he is liable.

With regard to one who rents a cow and a plow in order to plow on the mountain but he plowed in the valley, if the plowshare, the cutting tool on the bottom part of the plow, breaks, he is exempt, as it was even more likely to break on mountainous terrain. In a case where he rents the cow and a plow to plow in the valley but he plowed on the mountain, if the plowshare breaks he is liable. If he hired the cow to thresh legumes but it threshed grain, and the cow slipped and broke its leg, he is exempt. If he hired it to thresh grain but it threshed legumes he is liable, because legumes are slippery.

With regard to one who rents a donkey in order to bring wheat on it, to transport it on its back, and he brought upon it an identical weight of barley, which is lighter than wheat, and the donkey was injured, he is liable. Similarly, if he hired it for transporting grain, and he brought straw of the same weight upon it, he is liable, because the extra volume is as difficult for the animal as the load itself. If he rented a donkey in order to bring on it a letekh, i.e., a measurement of volume, of wheat, but he brought a letekh of barley, he is exempt, as he brought the same volume of a lighter substance. And one who adds to a load a greater volume than he stipulated is liable. And how much must he add to the load for him to be liable? Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A se’a on a camel and three kav on a donkey.

All artisans and laborers who take raw materials to their homes are considered paid bailees for those items until they return them to the owner. And with regard to all those who said to the owner: I finished the work, and therefore take what is yours, i.e., this item, and bring money in its stead, from that point on each of them is considered an unpaid bailee. If one person says to another: Safeguard my property for me and I will safeguard your property for you, each of them is a paid bailee, as each receives the services of the other as payment for his safeguarding. If one says: Safeguard for me, and the other says to him: Place it before me, the second individual is an unpaid bailee.

One who lent to another based on collateral is a paid bailee for the collateral. Rabbi Yehuda says: One who lent another money is an unpaid bailee for the collateral, whereas one who lent another produce is a paid bailee. Abba Shaul says: It is permitted for a person to rent out a poor person’s collateral that was given to him for a loan, so that by setting a rental price for it he will thereby progressively reduce the debt, i.e., the lender will subtract the rental money he receives from the amount owed by the borrower, because this is considered like returning a lost item. The borrower profits from this arrangement, whereas if the lender does not use the collateral in this manner it provides benefit to no one.

With regard to one who was transporting a barrel from one place to another and he broke it, whether he was an unpaid bailee or a paid bailee, if he takes an oath that he was not negligent he is exempt from payment. Rabbi Eliezer says: Both this one, an unpaid bailee, and that one, a paid bailee, must take an oath to exempt themselves from payment, but I wonder whether both this one and that one can take an oath. In other words, this is the halakha that I heard from my teachers, but I do not understand their ruling.

Chapter 7

With regard to one who hires laborers and tells them to rise exceptionally early and to continue working until exceptionally late, if this is in a locale where laborers are not accustomed to rising so early or to continuing to work until so late, the employer is not permitted to compel them to do so. In a locale where employers are accustomed to feeding their laborers, the employer must feed them. If they are in a locale where an employer is accustomed to providing their laborers with sweet foods, he must provide such food. Everything is in accordance with the regional custom in these matters. There was an incident involving Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matya, who said to his son: Go out and hire laborers for us. His son went, hired them, and pledged to provide sustenance for them as a term of their employment, without specifying the details. And when he came back to his father and reported what he had done, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matya said to him: My son, even if you were to prepare a feast for them like that of King Solomon in his time, you would not have fulfilled your obligation to them, as they are the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Rather, before they begin engaging in their labor, go out and say to them: The stipulation that food will be provided is on the condition that you have the right to claim from me only a meal of bread and legumes, which is the typical meal given to laborers. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Matya’s son did not need to state this condition, as the principle is that everything is in accordance with the regional custom.

This mishna details the halakha that a laborer is permitted to eat from the produce with which he is working. And these laborers may eat by Torah law: A laborer who works with produce attached to the ground at the time of the completion of its work, e.g., harvesting produce; and a laborer who works with produce detached from the ground before the completion of its work, i.e., before it is sufficiently processed and thereby subject to tithes. And this is the halakha provided that they are working with an item whose growth is from the land. And these are laborers who may not eat: A laborer who works with produce attached to the ground not at the time of the completion of its work, i.e., while it is still growing; and a laborer who works with produce detached from the ground after the completion of its work, when it is sufficiently processed and therefore subject to tithes; and a laborer who works with an item whose growth is not from the land.

If a laborer was performing labor with his hands but not with his feet, or with his feet but not with his hands, e.g., pressing grapes, or even if he was performing labor only with his shoulder, this one may eat the produce of the field. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A laborer may not eat unless he performs labor with his hands and with his feet.

If a laborer was performing labor with figs he may not eat grapes; if he was performing labor with grapes he may not eat figs, as he may eat only the type of food with which he is working. This is the halakha even if he was employed to perform labor with both types of produce but is currently performing labor with only one of them. But he may hold himself back from eating until he reaches a place of good -quality grapes or figs and eat from these, as they are the same type of food. And with regard to all of these cases the Sages said that he may eat only at the time of work. But due to the obligation to restore lost property to its owners, i.e., so that workers would not neglect their task, they said that laborers may eat as they walk from one row of a vineyard or plantation to another row, and upon their return from the winepress. And with regard to a donkey, it is permitted to eat when it is being unloaded. This statement will be explained in the Gemara.

A laborer may eat cucumbers while he works, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar; or he may eat dates, and this is the halakha even if the amount he eats is equal in value to a dinar. Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma says: A laborer may not eat more than the value of his wages, but the Rabbis permit it, according to the strict letter of the law. But one teaches a person not to be a glutton and thereby close the opening to other job offers in his face. When people hear of his greed they will be reluctant to hire him.

A man can stipulate on his own behalf that he receive a certain increase in his wages instead of eating the produce with which he works, and similarly, he can stipulate this on behalf of his adult son or daughter, on behalf of his adult Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, or on behalf of his wife, with their agreement, because they have the basic level of mental competence, i.e., they are legally competent and can therefore waive their rights. But he cannot stipulate this on behalf of his minor son or daughter, nor on behalf of his minor Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, nor on behalf of his animal, as they do not have the basic level of mental competence.

In the case of one who hires a laborer to perform labor with his fourth-year fruit, such laborers may not eat the fruit. And if he did not inform them beforehand that they were working with fourth-year fruit, he must redeem the fruit and feed them. If his fig cakes broke apart and crumbled, so that they must be preserved again, or if his barrels of wine opened and he hired workers to reseal them, these laborers may not eat, as the work of the figs or wine had already been completed with regard to tithes, from which point a laborer may not eat them. And if he did not inform them, he must tithe the food and feed them.

The mishna adds: Watchmen of produce may eat the produce of the field or vineyard by local regulations, i.e., in accordance with the ordinances accepted by the residents of that place, but not by Torah law. There are four types of bailees, to whom different halakhot apply. They are as follows: An unpaid bailee, who receives no compensation for safeguarding the item; and the borrower of an item for his own use; a paid bailee, who is provided with a salary for watching over an item; and a renter, i.e., a bailee who pays a fee for the use of a vessel or animal. If the item was stolen, lost, or broken, or if the animal died in any manner, their halakhot are as follows: An unpaid bailee takes an oath over every outcome; whether the item was lost, stolen, or broken, or if the animal died, the unpaid bailee must take an oath that it happened as he described, and he is then exempt from payment. The borrower does not take an oath, but pays for every outcome, even in a circumstance beyond his control. And the halakhot of a paid bailee and a renter are the same: They take an oath over an injured animal, over a captured animal, and over a dead animal, attesting that the mishaps were caused by circumstances beyond their control, and they are exempt, but they must pay for loss or theft.

One wolf that approaches a flock and attacks is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, as the shepherd can drive it away, but an attack by two wolves is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. Rabbi Yehuda says: At a time of wolf attacks, when many wolves come out of hiding and pounce on animals at every corner, even an attack by one wolf is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. An attack by two dogs is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. Yadua the Babylonian says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If the two dogs came and attacked from one direction it is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, but if they attacked from two directions, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, as the shepherd cannot protect his flock from both of them at once. If bandits came, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. Likewise, with regard to an attack by a lion, a bear, a leopard, a cheetah, and a snake, these are each considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. When is an attack by one of the above considered beyond his control, which means that a paid bailee is exempt? It is when the dangerous beasts or bandits came of their own accord to the usual grazing spot. But if the shepherd led his flock to a place of groups of beasts or bandits, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, as he is at fault.

If the animal died in its normal manner, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control; if he afflicted it by overworking it or by negligent treatment and it died, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. If the animal ascended to the top of a cliff and fell down and died, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. If the shepherd himself brought it up to the top of a cliff and it fell down and died, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. The halakhot of bailees stated in the previous mishna apply to standard cases. The halakha is that in any case involving monetary matters the parties may agree to special terms. Therefore, an unpaid bailee may stipulate with the owner that he will be exempt from taking an oath if the item is lost, and similarly, a borrower may stipulate that he will be exempt from having to pay, and a paid bailee or a renter can stipulate that he will be exempt from taking an oath and from having to pay, as one can relinquish his monetary rights. With regard to matters that do not involve monetary claims, anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.

And any condition that is preceded by an action, i.e., the agreement is formulated with the promise of an action followed by a statement that this action will be carried out only under certain terms, the condition is void and the promise remains intact. The condition must be stated before the action. And with regard to any condition that one can ultimately fulfill, but he stipulated with him initially, i.e., in practice the action is performed first, followed by the fulfillment of the condition, nevertheless, because it was formulated in the proper manner, with the condition first, his condition is valid. If the condition cannot be fulfilled at all, once the action has been carried out the condition is void.

Chapter 8

In the case of one who borrowed a cow and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or he borrowed a cow and hired its owner with it, or he borrowed the services of the owner or hired him and afterward borrowed the cow; in all such cases, if the cow died, the borrower is exempt from liability. Although a borrower is generally liable to pay if a cow he borrowed dies, here he is exempt, as it is stated: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay” (Exodus 22:14). But if one first borrowed the cow and only afterward borrowed the services of the owner or hired him, and the cow died, he is liable to pay the owner for the cow. This is the halakha even if the owner was working for the borrower at the time, as it is stated: “If its owner is not with him, he shall pay” (Exodus 22:13).

There is one who borrowed a cow. He borrowed it for half of the day and rented it for the other half of the day; or he borrowed it for today and rented it for tomorrow; or he rented one cow and borrowed another one from the same person. And in one of the first two cases, the cow died and it is not clear during which period the cow died. Or in the last case, one of the cows died and it is not clear whether it had been the borrowed cow or the rented cow. If the lender then says: The borrowed cow is the one that died; or: It died on the day that it was being borrowed; or: It died during the period in which it was being borrowed, so that, according to his claim, the borrower is liable to pay for the cow, and the other one, the borrower, says: I do not know what happened, the borrower is liable to pay. If the renter says: The rented cow is the one that died; or: It died on the day that it was being rented; or: It died during the period in which it was being rented, and the other one, the owner of the cow, says: I do not know what happened, the renter is exempt. If this owner says with certitude: The borrowed cow is the one that died, and that renter says with certitude: The rented cow is the one that died, then the renter takes an oath that the rented cow is the one that died, and he is then exempt from liability. If this one says: I do not know what happened, and that one says: I do not know what happened, then they divide the disputed amount. The bailee is liable to pay for only half the value of the cow.

In the case of one who borrowed a cow, and the lender sent it to the borrower by the hand of his son, or by the hand of his slave, or by the hand of his agent, or by the hand of the borrower’s son, or by the hand of his slave, or by the hand of the agent of the borrower; and it died on the way, the borrower is exempt, because the period of borrowing begins only once the cow reaches his domain. The borrower said to the lender: Send it to me by the hand of my son, or by the hand of my slave, or by the hand of my agent, or by the hand of your son, or by the hand of your slave, or by the hand of your agent. Or, in a case where the lender said explicitly to the borrower: I am sending it to you by the hand of my son, or by the hand of my slave, or by the hand of my agent, or by the hand of your son, or by the hand of your slave, or by the hand of your agent; and the borrower said to him: Send it as you have said, and he then sent it, and it died on the way, then the borrower is liable to pay the lender the value of his cow. Since the borrower agreed to the cow’s being brought to him by the hand of another, he bears liability from the moment the cow was transferred into that person’s possession.

With regard to one who exchanges a cow for a donkey, such that by virtue of the cow owner’s act of acquisition on the donkey, the donkey’s erstwhile owner simultaneously acquires the cow, wherever it happens to be located, and afterward the cow is found to have calved; and similarly, with regard to one who sells his Canaanite maidservant, with the acquisition effected by the buyer giving him money, and afterward she is found to have given birth to a child, who will be a slave belonging to his mother’s master, at times it is uncertain whether the offspring was born before or after the transaction. If this seller says: The birth occurred before I sold the cow or maidservant, and so the offspring belongs to me, and that buyer says: The birth occurred after I purchased the cow or maidservant, and so the offspring belongs to me, they divide the value of the offspring between them. The mishna continues: There is a case of one who had two Canaanite slaves, one large, worth more on the slave market, and one small, worth less on the slave market, and similarly, one who had two fields, one large and one small. He sold one of them, and there was a dispute between the buyer and the seller concerning which one was sold. If the buyer says: I purchased the large one, and the other one, i.e., the seller, says: I do not know which I sold; the buyer is entitled to take the large one. If the seller says: I sold the small one, and the other one, i.e., the buyer, says: I do not know which one I purchased; the buyer is entitled to take only the small one. If this one says: The large one was sold, and that one says: The small one was sold, then the seller takes an oath that it was the small one that he sold, and then the buyer takes the small one. If this one says: I do not know which one was sold, and that one says: I do not know which one was sold, they divide the disputed amount between them.

In the case of one who sells his olive trees to another so he can chop them down and use them for their wood, and before he chopped them down they yielded olives, if the olives are of a quality that could provide the value of less than a quarter - log of oil per se’a of olives, these olives are the property of the new owner of the olive trees, i.e., the buyer. If they yielded olives that could provide the value of a quarter - log or more of oil per se’a of olives, and this one, the buyer, says: My olive trees yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, and that one, the seller, says: The nourishment from my land yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, then they divide the olives between them. In the event that a river swept away one’s olive trees and deposited them in the field of another, and they took root there and yielded olives, this one, i.e., the owner of the trees, says: My olive trees yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, and that one, i.e., the owner of the field, says: The nourishment from my land yielded the olives and so I have a right to them, then they divide the olives between them.

In the case of one who rents out a house in a town to another in the rainy season, the owner cannot evict the renter from the house from the festival of Sukkot until Passover. If the rental was in the summer, he must give thirty days’ notice before he can evict him. And for a house located in the cities [ uvakerakim ], both in the summer and in the rainy season he must give twelve months’ notice. And for shops that he rented out, both in towns and in cities, he must give twelve months’ notice. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: For a baker’s shop or a dyer’s shop, one must give three years’ notice.

If one rents out a house to another, the landlord bears the responsibility for providing the door, for providing the bolt, for providing the lock, and for providing every item in the house that is essential for normal living and requires the work of a craftsman to provide it. But with regard to an item that does not require the work of a craftsman, the renter is responsible to make it. The manure found in the courtyard of a rented house is the property of the landlord, and the renter has rights only to the ashes that come out of the oven and the stove, which can also be used as a fertilizer.

In the case of one who rents out a house to another for a year and then the year was intercalated, adding an additional month to that year, the fact that it was intercalated is to the benefit of the renter. Since the rental was defined in terms of a year, the additional month is automatically included, and the renter need not pay additional rent for it. If a landlord rented out a house to another for a year, with the price set as a certain sum for each of the months, and then the year was intercalated, the fact that it was intercalated is to the benefit of the landlord. An incident occurred in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another where they stated that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated. And this incident came to court before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said: The two expressions have contradictory implications, and it is uncertain which expression should be followed. Therefore, the landlord and the renter should divide the intercalary month between them, i.e., the renter should pay half a gold dinar for it.

In the case of one who rented out a house to another, and then the house fell, the landlord is obligated to provide the renter with another house. If the original house was small, the landlord may not construct a large house as a replacement, and if the original was large, he may not construct a small house as a replacement. If the original had one room, he may not construct the replacement with two rooms, and if the original had two rooms, he may not construct the replacement with one. He may not reduce the number of windows, nor add to them, except with the agreement of both of them.

Chapter 9

With regard to one who receives a field from another to cultivate, either as a tenant farmer, who, in exchange for the right to farm the land, gives a set amount of the produce to the owner, or as a sharecropper, who cultivates the land and receives a set proportion of the produce, the halakha is as follows: In a location where those cultivating the land were accustomed to cut the produce, this one must cut it as well. In a location where they were accustomed to uproot the produce, not to cut it with a sickle or a scythe, this one must uproot it as well. If they were accustomed to plow the land after harvesting the produce, this one must plow as well. All farming of the land shall be conducted in accordance with regional custom. Just as the halakha is that the owner of the field and the one cultivating it divide the produce, so too the halakha is that they divide the stubble and the straw. Just as the halakha is that the owner of the field and the one cultivating it divide the wine, so too the halakha is that they divide the branches pruned from the vines and the poles. And the two of them, i.e., the landowner and the one cultivating the field, both supply the poles.

In the case of one who receives a field from another to cultivate and it is an irrigated field or a field with trees, if the spring that irrigated the field dried up or the trees were cut down, he does not subtract from the produce he owes the owner as part of his tenancy, despite the fact that he presumably considered these factors when agreeing to cultivate the field. But if the cultivator said to the landowner explicitly: Lease me this irrigated field, or he said: Lease me this field with trees, and the spring dried up or the trees were cut down, he may subtract from the produce he owes as part of his tenancy.

With regard to one who receives a field from another as a contractor and then lets it lie fallow and does not work the land at all, the court appraises it by evaluating how much it was able to produce if cultivated, and he gives his share of this amount to the owner. The reason is that this is what a cultivator writes to the owner in a standard contract: If I let the field lie fallow and do not cultivate it, I will pay with best -quality produce.

With regard to one who received a field from another to cultivate and did not want to weed it, and he then said to the owner: What do you care if I neglect the land? You will not suffer a loss since I will give you the amount of produce I owe you for your granting me tenancy, regardless of the state of the field. Nevertheless, they do not listen to him. The reason is because the owner of the land can say to him: Tomorrow you will depart from the field, and it will grow weeds for me, which will remain there and disrupt the yield of the field for years to come.

With regard to one who receives a field from another to cultivate and it did not produce a sufficient crop to cover the expenses of its upkeep, if it has enough produce to form a pile he is obligated to take care of it and give the owner his share. Rabbi Yehuda says: What fixed measure is a pile? There is no inherent measure of produce that is considered significant, as it all depends on the size of the plot of land in question. Rather, the relevant issue is whether it has a crop equivalent to the measure of seeds for dropping in a field in order to sow it.

In the case of one who receives a field from another to cultivate and grasshoppers consumed it or it was wind blasted, if it is a regional disaster which affected all the fields in the area, the cultivator subtracts from the produce he owes as part of his tenancy. If it is not a regional disaster, the cultivator does not subtract from the produce he owes as part of his tenancy. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the cultivator received it from the owner for a fixed sum of money, whether this way, i.e., there is a regional disaster, or whether that way, i.e., there was no regional disaster, he does not subtract the produce he owes as part of his tenancy.

In the case of one who receives a field from another to cultivate in return for the payment of ten kor of wheat per year, and its produce was blighted by a crop disease or the like, the cultivator gives the owner the ten kor of wheat from it but does not have to provide him with high quality wheat. If the wheat stalks produced by the field were particularly good stalks of wheat, the cultivator may not say to the owner: I will buy regular wheat from the market; rather, he gives him from inside the field itself.

With regard to one who receives a field from another in order to plant it with barley, he may not plant it with wheat, as wheat weakens the field more than barley does. But if he receives it in order to plant wheat, he may plant it with barley if he wishes, but Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel forbids it. Similarly, if he receives it to plant it with grain he may not plant it with legumes, as they weaken the field more than grains do, but if he receives it in order to plant legumes he may plant it with grain, but Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel forbids it.

One who receives a field from another to cultivate for a few years, i.e., fewer than seven, may not plant flax in it, as flax greatly weakens the soil, and if a sycamore tree was growing in the field, he does not have rights to the beams fashioned from the branches of the sycamore tree. Therefore, he may not cut down its branches for his own use, as it takes many years for new ones to grow. If he received the field from him for seven years, in the first year he may plant flax in it, and he does have rights to the beams fashioned from the branches of the sycamore tree.

In the case of one who receives a field from another to cultivate for one Sabbatical cycle of seven years culminating with the Sabbatical Year for seven hundred dinars, the Sabbatical Year is included in the tally, despite the fact that he is unable to work the land during that year. If he received it from him to cultivate for seven years for seven hundred dinars, the Sabbatical Year is not included in the number, and he may keep the field for an additional year to take the place of the Sabbatical Year, during which he could not work the land.

The tanna addresses a different issue, the halakha of the payment of workers. A day laborer collects his wages from his employer all night following his work shift. A night laborer collects his wages all the following day, while an hourly laborer collects his wages all night and all day. With regard to a weekly laborer, a monthly laborer, a yearly laborer, or a laborer for a Sabbatical cycle of seven years, if he left upon the completion of his work in the day, he collects his wages all day; if he left at night, he collects his wages all night and all day.

Whether referring to a person’s wages that he receives or the renting of an animal or the renting of utensils, are all subject to the prohibition of: “On the same day you shall give him his wages” (Deuteronomy 24:15), and are subject to the prohibition of: “The wages of a hired laborer shall not remain with you all night until the morning” (Leviticus 19:13). When does he transgress these prohibitions? He transgresses them when the one owed the money claimed the payment from him. If he did not claim his payment from him the other does not transgress the prohibitions. If the one who owes the money transferred his payment by leaving instructions with a storekeeper or with a money changer to pay him, he does not transgress the prohibitions. The mishna discusses other related halakhot : If a hired laborer requests payment at the proper time and the employer claims he already paid him, the laborer takes an oath that he did not receive his wages and then takes the wages from the employer. If the time had passed, he does not take an oath and take the wages. If there are witnesses who testify that he claimed the money from him at the proper time, he takes an oath and takes the money. One who hires a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [ ger toshav ] is subject to the prohibition of: “On the same day you shall give him his wages,” but is not subject to the negative mitzva of: “The wages of a hired laborer shall not remain with you all night until the morning.”

With regard to one who lends money to another and the debtor fails to repay it at the end of the term of the loan, the creditor may take collateral from him to ensure payment only by means of an agent of the court, not of his own accord. And he may not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral, as it is stated: “When you lend your neighbor any manner of loan, you shall not go into his house to take his collateral. You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral to you outside” (Deuteronomy 24:10–11). If the debtor had two utensils of the same kind, the creditor takes one and leaves the other one in the debtor’s possession. And in addition, the creditor must return a pillow at night, as the debtor requires it for sleeping, and a plow, which is needed for his daytime work, by day. If the debtor died, he is not required to return it to the debtor’s heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even to the debtor himself he needs to return the collateral each day only until thirty days have passed, and from thirty days onward, the creditor can sell them in court, with the proceeds going toward payment of the debt. One who takes a millstone as collateral violates a prohibition, and he is liable for taking two vessels, i.e., both millstones in the pair, as it is stated: “He shall not take the lower or upper millstone as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:6). The tanna adds: Not only did the Sages say that it is prohibited to take the lower or upper millstone as collateral, but they also said that one may not take anything that people use in the preparation of food [ okhel nefesh ], as it is stated: “For he takes a man’s life [ nefesh ] as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:6).

Chapter 10

In the case of the house and the upper story belonging to two people, i.e., the lower story was owned by one individual, while the upper story belonged to someone else, that collapsed, the two of them divide the timber and the stones and the earth of the collapsed structure. And the court considers which stones were likely to break, those of the lower or upper story, and gives those broken stones to the one who presumably owned them. If one of them recognized some of his stones he may take them for himself, and they count toward his amount of stones, and the other party takes other stones accordingly. They do not divide the remaining stones equally.

If there was a house and an upper story owned by one person, and the upper story was rented out to another, if the floor of the upper story was broken, i.e., it fell in or collapsed, and the owner of the house does not want to repair it, the resident of the upper story can go down and live in the house below until the owner repairs the upper story for him. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to a house of two stories owned by two people, i.e., the lower level was owned by one and the upper level by the other, in which the ceiling collapsed; the owner of the lower story provides the ceiling of beams or stones, and the owner of the upper story provides the plaster.

In the case of the house and the upper story belonging to two different people, and that house and upper story collapsed, and the owner of the upper story told the owner of the house to build the lower story in order to enable him to rebuild the upper story, and he does not want to build it, the owner of the upper story may build the house and reside in it, until the other gives him his expenses for the construction of the house, and he then rebuilds his upper story. Rabbi Yehuda says: This one too, i.e., the owner of the upper story, who is meanwhile residing inside the property of the other, must pay him rent. Since he derived benefit by living in the house of the other, as he had no other place in which he could live, he must pay rent. This solution is therefore flawed. Rather, the owner of the upper story builds the house and the upper story, and he roofs the upper story, i.e., he completes the entire construction of the upper story, and he may then sit in the house, i.e., the lower story, until the other gives him his expenses for the building of the house, at which point he returns to his upper story. Since in any event he could have lived in the upper story, he is not considered to have derived any benefit by living in the lower story, and is not obligated to pay rent.

And likewise, in the case of an olive press that is built inside a cave in a rock, and one garden, belonging to another person, was planted on top of it, and the roof of the olive press broke, which caused the garden to collapse inward, in such a case, the owner of the garden may descend and sow below until the other one constructs for his olive press sturdy arches to support the roof, so that the owner of the garden can once again sow above him. The mishna continues: In the case of a wall or a tree that fell into the public domain and caused damage, the owner is exempt from having to pay, as it was an accident. If the court saw that the wall was shaky, or that the tree was tilting, and they gave him time to cut down the tree or to dismantle the wall, and then they fell down, if this occurred during the allotted time, he is exempt, but if they collapsed after the time given to him had elapsed, he is liable to pay, since he was warned against this very occurrence.

In the case of one whose wall was adjacent to another’s garden, and the wall fell, and the owner of the garden said to him: Clear away your stones, and the owner of the stones said to him: They are yours, as I hereby declare them ownerless, and you can take them for yourself; the court does not listen to him, since he cannot force the other to acquire the stones. If after the owner of the garden voluntarily accepted ownership of the stones upon himself, the owner of the wall said to him: Here you are, take your expenditures for the removal of the stones, and I will take the stones that are mine; the court does not listen to him, as they had already been acquired by the owner of the garden. The mishna continues: In the case of one who hires a laborer to do work with him with hay or with straw, and after he finished the task, the laborer said to the employer: Give me my wages, and the employer said to him: Take what you have worked with as your wages, i.e., take some of the hay or straw as payment, the court does not listen to him. Although debts can be paid with any item of value, even hay or straw, the wages of a laborer must be paid in accordance with the initial agreement between the laborer and the employer. But if after the laborer accepted upon himself to keep the hay or straw as payment, the employer changed his mind and said to him: Here you are, take your wages and I will take what is mine; the court does not listen to him, since the laborer had already acquired the hay. In the case of one who takes manure out to the public domain, in order for it to be transported to fertilize a field, he who takes it out from his property takes it out, and immediately, he who takes it to fertilize the field takes it to fertilize the field. They must relocate the manure immediately without allowing it to sit around in the public domain. Similarly, one may not soak clay in the public domain before it is kneaded, and one may not mold bricks in the public domain since this takes a long time and inhibits use of the public domain by others. But one may knead clay in the public domain, as this process does not take long, but not bricks. With regard to one who builds a structure, keeping the building materials in the public domain, he who brings the stones brings them, and immediately, he who builds the structure builds with them, and may not leave them there. And if the stones cause damage before he had a chance to build them into the structure, he must pay for what he damaged. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may even prepare his work thirty days beforehand; he may keep the building materials in the public domain for that duration.

In the case of two gardens that were located one above the other, i.e., a garden on a plateau that borders another garden below, and vegetables grew in-between, out of the wall of soil resulting from the difference in height between the two gardens, Rabbi Meir says: These vegetables belong to the owner of the upper garden. Rabbi Yehuda says: They belong to the owner of the lower one. Rabbi Meir said in explanation of his ruling: If the owner of the upper garden would want to dig and take his dirt and does so, no vegetables would grow here, as that wall made of soil would not exist. The vegetables therefore belong to him. In response, Rabbi Yehuda said: If the owner of the lower garden would want to fill his garden with dirt and does so, thereby raising its level, no vegetables would grow here, as that wall made of soil would not exist. The vegetables therefore belong to him. Rabbi Meir said: Since the two of them can object to each other, as they each have the ability to prevent the vegetable growth, nothing can be decided based on such considerations. Instead, the court considers from where this vegetable lives and derives nourishment, whether from above or from below. Rabbi Shimon said: Any vegetables that the owner of the upper garden can stretch out his hand and take, those vegetables are his, and the rest belong to the owner of the lower garden.

Mishnah Bava Batra

Chapter 1

Partners who wished to make a partition [ meḥitza ] in a jointly owned courtyard build the wall for the partition in the middle of the courtyard. What is this wall fashioned from? In a place where it is customary to build such a wall with non-chiseled stone [ gevil ], or chiseled stone [ gazit ], or small bricks [ kefisin ], or large bricks [ leveinim ], they must build the wall with that material. Everything is in accordance with the regional custom. If they build the wall with non-chiseled stone, this partner provides three handbreadths of his portion of the courtyard and that partner provides three handbreadths, since the thickness of such a wall is six handbreadths. If they build the wall with chiseled stone, this partner provides two and a half handbreadths and that partner provides two and a half handbreadths, since such a wall is five handbreadths thick. If they build the wall with small bricks, this one provides two handbreadths and that one provides two handbreadths, since the thickness of such a wall is four handbreadths. If they build with large bricks, this one provides one and a half handbreadths and that one provides one and a half handbreadths, since the thickness of such a wall is three handbreadths. Therefore, if the wall later falls, the assumption is that the space where the wall stood and the stones belong to both of them, to be divided equally.

And similarly with regard to a garden, in a place where it is customary to build a partition in the middle of a garden jointly owned by two people, and one of them wishes to build such a partition, the court obligates his neighbor to join in building the partition. But with regard to an expanse of fields [ babbika ], in a place where it is customary not to build a partition between two people’s fields, and one person wishes to build a partition between his field and that of his neighbor, the court does not obligate his neighbor to build such a partition. Rather, if one person wishes to erect a partition, he must withdraw into his own field and build the partition there. And he makes a border mark on the outer side of the barrier facing his neighbor’s property, indicating that he built the entire structure of his own materials and on his own land. Therefore, if the wall later falls, the assumption is that the space where the wall stood and the stones belong only to him, as is indicated by the mark on the wall. Nevertheless, in a place where it is not customary to build a partition between two people’s fields, if they made such a partition with the agreement of the two of them, they build it in the middle, i.e., on the property line, and make a border mark on the one side and on the other side. Therefore, if the wall later falls, the assumption is that the space where the wall stood and the stones belong to both of them, to be divided equally.

With regard to one who surrounds another on three sides, that is, he owns parcels of land on three sides of the other person’s field, and he built a partition on the first, the second, and the third sides, the court does not obligate the neighbor who owns the inner field to contribute to the construction of the partition if he does not wish to do so. Rabbi Yosei says: If he arose and built a partition on the fourth side of the field, the court imposes upon the owner of the inner field the responsibility to pay his share for all of the partitions.

In the case of a dividing wall in a jointly owned courtyard that fell, if one of the owners wishes to rebuild the wall, the court obligates the other owner to build the wall with him up to a height of four cubits. If after the wall was built one of the neighbors claims he alone constructed it and the other did not participate in its building, the latter is nevertheless presumed to have given his share of the money, unless the claimant brings proof that the other did not give his part. The court does not obligate the reluctant neighbor to contribute to the building of the wall higher than four cubits. But if the reluctant neighbor built another wall close to the wall that had been built higher than four cubits, in order to set a roof over the room that was thereby created, the court imposes upon him the responsibility to pay his share for all of the rebuilt wall, even though he has not yet set a roof over it. Since he has demonstrated his desire to make use of what his neighbor built, he must participate in the cost of its construction. If the builder of the first wall later claims that he did not receive payment from his neighbor, the neighbor is presumed not to have given his share of the money, unless he brings proof that he did in fact give money for the building of the wall.

The residents of a courtyard can compel each inhabitant of that courtyard to financially participate in the building of a gatehouse and a door to the jointly owned courtyard. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and says: Not all courtyards require a gatehouse, and each courtyard must be considered on its own in accordance with its specific needs. Similarly, the residents of a city can compel each inhabitant of that city to contribute to the building of a wall, double doors, and a crossbar for the city. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and says: Not all towns require a wall. With regard to this latter obligation, the mishna asks: How long must one live in the city to be considered like one of the people of the city and therefore obligated to contribute to these expenses? Twelve months. But if he bought himself a residence in the city, he is immediately considered like one of the people of the city.

The court does not divide a courtyard at the request of one of the joint owners unless there will be in it four by four cubits for this one and four by four cubits for that one, i.e., this minimum area for each of the joint owners. And the court does not divide a jointly owned field unless there is space in it to plant nine kav of seed for this one and nine kav of seed for that one. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court does not divide a field unless there is space in it to plant nine half- kav of seed for this one and nine half- kav of seed for that one. And the court does not divide a jointly owned garden unless there is space in it to plant a half- kav of seed for this one and a half- kav of seed for that one. Rabbi Akiva says that half that amount is sufficient, i.e., the area required for sowing a quarter- kav of seed [ beit rova ]. Similarly, the court does not divide a hall [ hateraklin ], a drawing room, a dovecote, a cloak, a bathhouse, an olive press, and an irrigated field unless there is enough for this one to use the property in the usual manner and enough for that one to use the property in the usual manner. This is the principle: Anything for which when it is divided, each of the parts is large enough to retain the name of the original item, the court divides it. But if the parts will not retain the original name, the court does not divide it. When does this rule apply? It applies when the joint owners do not both wish to divide the item; when only one of the owners wishes to divide the property, he cannot force the other to do so. But when both of them wish to divide the item, they may divide it, even if each of the owners will receive less than the amounts specified above. But in the case of sacred writings, i.e., a scroll of any of the twenty-four books of the Bible, that were inherited by two people, they may not divide them, even if both of them wish to do so, because it would be a show of disrespect to cut the scroll in half.

Chapter 2

A person may not dig a pit close to the pit of another, in order to avoid damaging the latter’s pit. And similarly, one may not dig a ditch, nor a cave, i.e., a covered pit, nor a water channel, nor a launderer’s pond, which is a pit used for washing clothes, unless he distanced all of these three handbreadths from the wall of another and he plasters lime on the place where there is water. And one must distance the solid residue of produce that has been pressed free of its oil, e.g., the refuse of olives from which oil has been squeezed, and animal manure, and salt, and lime, and rocks three handbreadths from the wall of another, as all these items produce heat and can damage the wall. Or, alternatively, he may plaster the wall with lime to prevent damage. One must likewise distance seeds, i.e., one may not plant seeds, and one may not operate the plow, and one must eliminate urine, three handbreadths from the wall of another. The mishna continues: And one must distance a mill from a neighbor’s wall by three handbreadths from the lower stone of the mill, which is four handbreadths from the smaller upper stone of the mill. And there must be a distance of three handbreadths from the protruding base [ hakalya ] of an oven until the wall, which is four handbreadths from the narrow upper rim [ hassafa ] of the oven.

A person may not set up an oven inside a house unless there is a space four cubits high above it, i.e., between the top of the oven and the ceiling, to avoid burning the ceiling, which serves as the floor of the residence above. If one was setting up an oven in the upper story, there must be a plaster floor beneath it, which serves as the ceiling of the lower story, at least three handbreadths thick, so that the ceiling below does not burn. And in the case of a stove the plaster floor must be at least one handbreadth thick. And if he causes damage in any case, he pays compensation for that which he damaged. Rabbi Shimon says: They said all of these measurements to teach only that if he causes damage he is exempt from paying, as he took all reasonable precautions.

A person may not open a bakery or a dye shop beneath the storeroom of another, and he may not establish a cattle barn there, as these produce heat, smoke, and odors, which rise and damage the items in the storeroom. The mishna comments: In truth, the halakha is that in the case of a storeroom of wine the Sages rendered it permitted to set up a bakery and a dye shop beneath, as the heat that rises does not damage the wine. But they did not render it permitted to establish a cattle barn, because its odor damages the wine. If a resident wants to open a store in his courtyard, his neighbor can protest to prevent him from doing so and say to him: I am unable to sleep due to the sound of people entering the store and the sound of people exiting. But one may fashion utensils in his house and go out and sell them in the market, despite the fact that he is not allowed to set up a store in the courtyard, and the neighbor cannot protest against him doing so and say to him: I am unable to sleep due to the sound of the hammer you use to fashion utensils, nor can he say: I cannot sleep due to the sound of the mill that you use to grind, nor can he say: I cannot sleep due to the sound of the children. It is permitted for one to make reasonable use of his own home.

One whose wall was close to the wall of another may not build another wall close to the neighbor’s wall unless he distances it four cubits from the wall of the neighbor. And one who desires to build a wall opposite the windows of a neighbor’s house must distance the wall four cubits from the windows, whether above, below, or opposite.

One must distance his ladder four cubits from a neighbor’s dovecote so that a mongoose will not be able to jump from the ladder to the dovecote and devour the birds. And one must distance his wall four cubits from a roof gutter, so that the neighbor can lean a ladder in the empty space to clean and repair the gutter. One must distance a dovecote fifty cubits from the city to prevent doves from eating seeds in the town. And a person should not establish a dovecote within his own property unless he has fifty cubits in each direction between the dovecote and the edge of his property. Rabbi Yehuda says that one must have surrounding the dovecote the area required for sowing four kor of seed on each side, which generally extends as far as a dove flies in a single flight. And if one bought the dovecote with the land, he has the acquired privilege of its use even if it has surrounding it only the area required for sowing a quarter- kav of seed [ beit rova ] around it, and he need not remove it from there.

With regard to a dove chick [ nippul ] that was found within fifty cubits of a dovecote, it belongs to the owner of the dovecote. If it was found beyond fifty cubits from a dovecote, it belongs to its finder. In a case where it was found between two dovecotes, if it was close to this one, it belongs to the owner of this dovecote; if it was close to that one, it belongs to the owner of that dovecote. If it was half and half, i.e., equidistant from the two dovecotes, the two owners divide the value of the chick.

One must distance a tree twenty-five cubits from the city, and in the cases of a carob tree and of a sycamore tree, which have a great many branches, they must be distanced fifty cubits. Abba Shaul says: Every barren tree must be distanced fifty cubits. And if the city preceded the tree, as one later planted the tree alongside the city, he cuts down the tree, and the city does not give money to the tree’s owner in compensation. And if the tree preceded the city, which expanded after one planted the tree until it reached the tree, he cuts down the tree and the city gives money to its owner. If it is uncertain whether this one was first or that one was first, he cuts down the tree and the city does not give money.

One must distance a permanent threshing floor fifty cubits from the city, so that the chaff will not harm the city’s residents. Furthermore, a person should not establish a permanent threshing floor even on his own property unless he has fifty cubits of open space in every direction. And one must distance a threshing floor from the plantings of another and from another’s plowed field far enough that it does not cause damage.

One must distance animal carcasses, and graves, and a tannery [ haburseki ], a place where hides are processed, fifty cubits from the city. One may establish a tannery only on the east side of the city, because winds usually blow from the west and the foul smells would therefore be blown away from the residential area. Rabbi Akiva says: One may establish a tannery on any side of a city except for the west, as the winds blowing from that direction will bring the odors into the city, and one must distance it fifty cubits from the city.

One must distance from vegetables water in which flax is steeped, because this water ruins them; and likewise one must distance leeks from onions, and mustard from bees. And Rabbi Yosei permits one not to do so in the case of mustard.

One must distance a tree twenty-five cubits from a cistern, and in the case of a carob and of a sycamore tree, whose roots extend farther, one must distance the tree fifty cubits. This is the halakha whether the cistern or tree is located above or to the side of the other. If the digging of the cistern preceded the tree, the owner of the tree cuts down the tree and the owner of the cistern pays him money. And if the tree preceded the cistern the owner of the tree need not cut down the tree. If it is uncertain whether this came first or that came first, the owner of the tree need not cut down the tree. Rabbi Yosei says: Even if the cistern preceded the tree, the owner of the tree need not cut down the tree. This is due to the fact that this one digs in his own property, and that one plants in his own property.

A person may not plant a tree near the field of another unless he distances it four cubits from the field. This is the case whether he is planting grapevines or any kind of tree. If there was a fence between them, this one may place, i.e., plant, his grapevines or trees close to the fence from here, and that one may place, i.e., plant, his produce close to the fence from there. If the roots were spreading into the field of another, the owner of the field may dig to a depth of three handbreadths even if he severs those roots, so that they do not impede his plow. If he was digging a cistern in that spot, or a ditch, or a cave, and he came upon the roots of his neighbor’s tree, he may cut downward normally, and the wood from the roots is his.

With regard to a tree that leans into the field of another, the neighbor may cut the branches to the height of an ox goad raised over the plow, in places where the land is to be plowed, so that the branches do not impede the use of the plow. And in the case of a carob tree and the case of a sycamore tree, whose abundance of branches cast shade that is harmful to plants, all the branches overhanging one’s property may be removed along the plumb line, i.e., along a line perpendicular to the boundary separating the fields. And if the neighbor’s field is an irrigated field, all branches of the tree are removed along the plumb line. Abba Shaul says: All barren trees are cut along the plumb line.

With regard to a tree that extends into the public domain, one cuts its branches so that a camel can pass beneath the tree with its rider sitting on it. Rabbi Yehuda says: One cuts enough branches that a camel loaded with flax or bundles of branches can pass beneath it. Rabbi Shimon says: One cuts all branches of the tree that extend into the public domain along the plumb line, so that they do not hang over the public area at all, due to ritual impurity.

Chapter 3

With regard to the presumptive ownership of houses; and of pits; and of ditches; and of caves, which are used to collect water; and of dovecotes; and of bathhouses; and of olive presses; and of irrigated fields, which must be watered by people; and of slaves; and all similar property that constantly, i.e., throughout the year, generates profits, their presumptive ownership is established by working and profiting from them for a duration of three years from day to day. If the one in possession of the property can prove that he worked and profited from it for the previous three full years, there is a presumption that it belongs to him, and would remain in his possession if another were to claim that the property belonged to him or to his ancestors. With regard to a non-irrigated field, i.e., one that is watered by rain, in which produce grows during certain seasons during the year, its presumption of ownership is established in three years, but they are not from day to day, since the fields are not worked and harvested continually throughout the three-year period. Rabbi Yishmael says: Three months of possession in the first year, three months of possession in the last year, and twelve months of possession in the middle, which are eighteen months, suffice to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to a non-irrigated field. Rabbi Akiva says: A month of possession in the first year, and a month of possession in the last year, and twelve months of possession in the middle, which are fourteen months, suffice to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to a non-irrigated field. Rabbi Yishmael said: In what case is this statement, that eighteen months are required for a non-irrigated field, said? It is said with regard to a white field [ bisdeh lavan ], i.e., a grain field. But with regard to a field of trees, once he gathered his produce, and then harvested his olives, and then gathered his figs, these three harvests are the equivalent of three years. Since he harvested three types of produce, this is equivalent to having possessed the field for three years.

There are three independent lands in Eretz Yisrael with regard to establishing presumptive ownership: Judea, and Transjordan, and the Galilee. If the prior owner of the field was in Judea and another took possession of his field in the Galilee, or if he was in the Galilee and another took possession of his field in Judea, the possessor does not establish presumptive ownership until the one possessing the field will be with the prior owner in one province. Rabbi Yehuda says: The Sages said that establishing presumptive ownership requires three years only in order that if the owner will be in Spain [ Aspamya ], and another possesses his field for a year, people will go and inform the owner by the end of the next year, and the owner will come back in the following year and take the possessor to court.

Any possession that is not accompanied by a claim explaining how the possessor became the owner is not sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership. How so? If the prior owner said to the possessor: What are you doing in my land? And the possessor said to him in response: I am in possession of the land because no person ever said anything to me about my being here, i.e., he states no valid claim as to why he would be the owner of the land, his mere use is not sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership. But if the possessor claimed: I am in possession of the land because you sold it to me, or: Because you gave it to me as a gift, or: Because your father sold it to me, or: Because your father gave it to me as a gift, these are valid claims to ownership. In these cases, his possession is sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership. And one who comes to claim the land based on inheritance does not need a claim explaining why his ancestors had a right to the land. Craftsmen who are in possession of items that they are repairing, and partners, and sharecroppers, and stewards [ veha’apotropin ] do not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to property in their possession, as their possession is not indicative of ownership. Similarly, a man does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to his wife’s property, and a wife does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to her husband’s property. And a father similarly does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to a son’s property, and a son does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to a father’s property. A husband and wife, or son and father, use each other’s property freely. Possession is therefore not indicative of ownership. The mishna continues: In what case is this statement, that one establishes the presumption of ownership after profiting from the property for a certain duration, with the exception of the above people, said? It is said in a case of one who has mere possession of the property, which does, in some cases, serve as proof of ownership. But in a case where another person gives one a gift, or there are brothers who divided their inheritance, or there is one who takes possession of the property of a convert who died without heirs and his property is now ownerless, as soon as one locked the door of the property, or fenced it or breached its fence even a bit, this is considered taking possession of the property, and it effects acquisition.

If there were two witnesses testifying on his behalf that he, the possessor of the land, worked and profited from a field for three years, and therefore has presumptive ownership, and they were found to be conspiring witnesses, as it was proven that they were not present to witness the matter about which they had testified, they must pay the true owner of the field the full value of the field that they attempted, through their testimony, to remove from his possession, as it is written in the Torah: “Then shall you do to him, as he had planned to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). If two witnesses testify that he worked and profited from the field during the first year, another two testify that he worked and profited from it during the second year, and another two testify that he worked and profited from it during the third, and all were found to be conspiring witnesses, payment of the value of the field to the owner is divided among them. If the testimony was given by three brothers, each of whom testify about one year, and another unrelated individual joined with each of the brothers as the second witness, these are three distinct testimonies and they are accepted by the court. If they were to be considered one testimony, it would not be accepted, as brothers may not testify together. But they are one testimony for the purpose of rendering them as conspiring witnesses, and the payment is divided among them.

These are uses of property that have the means to establish the presumption of ownership, and these are uses of property that do not have the means to establish the presumption of ownership: If one would stand an animal in a courtyard; or if one would place an oven, a millstone, or a stove there; or if one raises chickens in a courtyard, or places his fertilizer in a courtyard, these actions are not sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership. But if one constructed a partition ten handbreadths high to contain his animal, and similarly if he constructed a partition for his oven, and similarly if he constructed a partition for his stove, and similarly if he constructed a partition for his millstone; or if one brought chickens into the house, or if he fashioned a place in the ground for his fertilizer that is three handbreadths deep or three handbreadths high, these actions are sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership.

With regard to a spout protruding from one’s roof gutter draining water into another’s property, its owner has no means to establish an acquired privilege for its use, but he does have the means to establish an acquired privilege with regard to its place, as the Gemara will explain. With regard to a gutter pipe that traverses the length of the roof, one does have the means to establish an acquired privilege for its use. With regard to an Egyptian ladder, which is small and portable, one has no means to establish an acquired privilege for its use. But with regard to a Tyrian ladder, which is large and fixed in place, one does have the means to establish an acquired privilege for its use. With regard to an Egyptian window, one has no means to establish an acquired privilege for its use; but with regard to a Tyrian window, one does have the means to establish an acquired privilege for its use. What is the defining feature of an Egyptian window? It is any window that is so small that a person’s head is not able to fit inside it. Rabbi Yehuda says: If a window has a frame, even though a person’s head is not able to fit inside it, one does have the means to establish an acquired privilege for its use. With regard to a projection emerging from the wall of one’s house, overhanging a courtyard, one has the means to establish an acquired privilege for its use if it protrudes at least as far as a handbreadth, and the owner of the courtyard can protest its construction. If it protrudes less than a handbreadth, the owner of the house has no means to establish an acquired privilege for its use, and the owner of the courtyard cannot protest its construction.

A person may not open his windows, i.e., build an opening in a wall to use as a window, into a courtyard belonging to partners, i.e., a courtyard in which he is a partner. If he purchased a house in another, adjacent courtyard, he may not open the house into a courtyard belonging to partners. If he built a loft on top of his house, he may not open it into a courtyard belonging to partners. Rather, if he desired to build a loft, he may build a room within his house, or he may build a loft on top of his house, and open it into his house, not directly into the courtyard. A person may not open an entrance opposite another entrance or a window opposite another window toward a courtyard belonging to partners, so as to ensure that the residents will enjoy a measure of privacy. If there was a small entrance he may not enlarge it. If there was one entrance he may not fashion it into two. But one may open an entrance opposite another entrance or a window opposite another window toward the public domain. Similarly, if there was a small entrance he may enlarge it, and if there was one entrance he may fashion it into two.

One may not form an empty space be-neath the public domain by digging pits, ditches, or caves. Rabbi Eliezer deems it permitted for one to do so, provided that he places a covering strong enough that a wagon laden with stones would be able to tread on it without breaking it, therefore ensuring that the empty space will not cause any damage to those in the public domain. One may not extend projections or balconies [ ugzuztraot ] into the public domain. Rather, if he desired to build one he may draw back into his property by moving his wall, and extend the projection to the end of his property line. If one purchased a courtyard in which there are projections and balconies extending into the public domain, this courtyard retains its presumptive status, i.e., the owner has the acquired privilege of their use, and the court does not demand their removal.

Chapter 4

One who sells a house without specifying what is included in the sale has not sold the gallery, an extension built above or alongside the main building, and this is so even if the gallery is attached to the house and opens into it. Nor has he sold the room behind the house, even if it is accessible only from inside the house. He has also not sold the roof when it has a parapet ten handbreadths high, as such a roof is considered a separate entity and is therefore not included in the sale of the house. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the parapet has the form of a doorway, that is, if it consists of two upright posts with a beam crossing over them, then even if the parapet is not ten handbreadths high, the roof is not sold together with the house, unless it is specifically included in the sale.

One who sells a house without specification has sold neither the pit nor the cistern [ dut ], even if he writes for the buyer in the bill of sale that he is selling him the depth and the height of the house, as anything that is not part of the house, like pits and cisterns, must be explicitly mentioned in the contract or else they remain in the seller’s possession. And therefore the seller must purchase for himself a path through the buyer’s domain to reach whatever remains his, because he has sold the area of the house along with the house itself, and he no longer has permission to walk there. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: The seller need not purchase for himself a path through the buyer’s domain, as this is certainly included in what he has withheld for himself from the sale. And Rabbi Akiva concedes that when the seller says to the buyer in the bill of sale: I am selling you this house apart from the pit and the cistern, he need not purchase for himself a path through the buyer’s domain. Since the seller unnecessarily emphasized that the pit and the cistern are not included in the sale, he presumably intended to reserve for himself the right of access to them. If the seller kept the house, but sold the pit and the cistern to another, Rabbi Akiva says: The buyer need not purchase for himself a path through the seller’s domain to reach what he has bought. But the Rabbis say: He must purchase for himself a path through the seller’s domain.

One who sells a house has, as part of the sale, sold also the door, but not the key. He has sold the mortar that is fixed in the ground, but not the portable one. He has sold the immovable lower millstone [ ha’itzterobil ], but not the portable upper stone [ hakelet ], the funnel into which one pours the grain to be ground. And he has sold neither the oven nor the double stove, as they are deemed movable. When the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you it, and everything that is in it, all these components are sold as part of the sale of the house.

One who sells a courtyard without specifying what is included in the sale has sold with it the houses, pits, ditches, and caves found in the courtyard, but he has not sold the movable property. When the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you it and everything that is in it, all these components are sold along with the courtyard, even the movable property. Both in this case, where he executes the sale without specification, and in that case, where he adds the phrase that includes the movable property, he has not sold the bathhouse, nor has he sold the olive press that is in the courtyard, as each is an entity with a discrete purpose and not an integral part of the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer says: One who sells a courtyard without specifying what is included in the sale has sold only the airspace, i.e., the open space, of the courtyard, but nothing found in the courtyard, not even the houses.

One who sells an olive press without specifying what is included in the sale has sold with it the yam and the memel and the betulot, the immovable elements of the olive press. But he has not sold with it the avirim and the galgal and the kora, the movable utensils of the olive press. When the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you it and everything that is in it, all these components are sold along with the olive press, even the movable utensils. Rabbi Eliezer says: One who sells an olive press has sold the kora as well, as it is the most fundamental element of the olive press.

One who sells a bathhouse without specifying what is included in the sale has not sold with it the boards that are placed on the floor, nor has he sold the basins or the curtains [ habilaniyot ]. When the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you it and everything that is in it, all these components are sold along with the bathhouse. Both in this case, where he executes the sale without specification, and in that case, where he adds the phrase that he is selling everything that is in the bathhouse, he has not sold the tanks of water, nor has he sold the storerooms for wood, as an explicit sales agreement is required for these matters.

One who sells a city without specifying what is included in the sale has sold with it the houses, the pits, the ditches and caves, the bathhouses and the dovecotes, and the olive presses and beit hashelaḥin, as will be explained in the Gemara, but he has not sold the movable property in the city. But when the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you it and everything that is in it, even if there were cattle and Canaanite slaves in the city, all these entities are sold. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who sells a city has sold with it the santar, the meaning of which will be explained in the Gemara.

One who sells a field without specifying what is included in the sale has sold the stones in the field that are for its use, and the reeds in the vineyard that are for its use, and the produce that is still attached to the ground, and the cluster of reeds that occupy less than the area required for sowing a quarter-kav of seed [ beit rova ], and the watch station that is not plastered with clay, and the young carob tree that has not yet been grafted, and the untrimmed sycamore that is still young.

But he has not sold along with the field the stones that are not designated for use in the field, and not the reeds in the vineyard that are not designated for its use, and not the produce that is already detached from the ground. When the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you it and everything that is in it, all these components are sold along with the field. Both in this case, where he executes the sale without specification, and in that case, where he adds the phrase that he is selling everything that is in the field, he has not sold the cluster of reeds that occupy a beit rova or more, as they are considered a separate field, and he has not sold the watch station that is plastered with clay, and not the carob tree that has been grafted, and not the sycamore trunk. All of these entities are significant in their own right and have a status independent from that of the fields, and they are therefore not included in the sale of the field. In continuation of the previous mishna (68b) discussing one who sells a field, the mishna teaches that even if he says that he is selling it and everything that is in it, has sold neither the cistern, nor the winepress, nor the dovecote, whether it is abandoned or utilized, as these items are not part of the field itself. And the seller must purchase for himself a path through the buyer’s domain to reach whatever remains his. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that one who sells, sells generously; therefore, whatever is not explicitly excluded from the sale is assumed to be sold, and it is presumed that the seller did not retain for himself the right to the path that he requires to access his property. And the Rabbis say: The seller need not purchase a path through the buyer’s domain, as it is assumed that since the seller withholds these items for himself, he also reserves a path to reach them. And Rabbi Akiva concedes that when the seller says to the buyer in the bill of sale that he is selling the field apart from these things, i.e., the cistern and the winepress, he need not purchase for himself a path through the buyer’s domain. Since these items would have been excluded from the sale even if he had said nothing, it is assumed that he also meant to reserve for himself the right to access them. But if the seller kept the field but sold the cistern and winepress to another person, Rabbi Akiva says: The buyer need not purchase for himself a path through the seller’s domain to reach what he has bought, since a seller sells generously. But the Rabbis say: He must purchase for himself a path through the seller’s domain. In what case is this statement, that these items are excluded, said? It is said with regard to one who sells a field, but with regard to one who gives it away as a gift, it is assumed that he gives all of it, including everything found in the field. Similarly, with regard to brothers who divide their father’s estate among themselves, when they each acquire a field as part of their inheritance, they acquire all of it, including the items that would be excluded from a sale. So too, with regard to one who takes possession of the property of a convert, when he takes possession of a field, he takes possession of all of it. One who consecrates a field has consecrated all of it. Rabbi Shimon says: One who consecrates a field has not consecrated any of the items that are ordinarily excluded from a sale except for the grafted carob tree and the sycamore trunk.

Chapter 5

One who sells a ship has sold along with it the toren, and the nes, and the ogin, and all of the equipment that is used for directing it. But he has not sold the slaves who serve as oarsmen, nor the packing bags that are used for transporting goods, nor the antikei on the ship. And when one said to the buyer: You are purchasing it, the ship, and all that it contains, all of these latter elements are also sold. One who sold a wagon [ hakkaron ] has not sold the mules that pull the wagon. Similarly, if one sold the mules, he has not sold the wagon. One who sold a yoke [ hatzemed ] has not sold the oxen, and one who sold the oxen has not sold the yoke. Rabbi Yehuda says: The sum of money indicates what one has sold. How so? If the buyer said to the seller: Sell me your yoke for two hundred dinars, since it is a known matter that a yoke is not sold for two hundred dinars he clearly intended to purchase the oxen as well. And the Rabbis say: The sum of money is not proof.

One who sells a donkey has not sold its vessels, i.e., its equipment, with it. Naḥum the Mede says: He has sold its vessels. Rabbi Yehuda says: There are times when the vessels are sold, and there are times when they are not sold. How so? If the donkey was before him and its vessels were on it, and the buyer said to him: Sell me this donkey of yours, its vessels are sold. If the buyer said to him: Is the donkey yours; I wish to purchase it, its vessels are not sold.

One who sells a female donkey has sold its foal along with it. But one who sold a cow has not sold its young. One who sold a dunghill has sold its manure. One who sold a cistern has sold its water. One who sold a beehive has sold the bees in it, and likewise one who sold a dovecote has sold the doves. One who buys the produce of a dovecote from another, i.e., the doves that will hatch over the course of the year in a dovecote, must leave [ mafriaḥ ] the first pair of doves from the brood for the seller. If one buys the produce of a beehive, i.e., all the bees produced from a beehive over the course of the year, the buyer takes three swarms and then the seller renders the bees impotent, so that they will stop producing offspring and instead produce only honey. One who buys honeycombs must leave two combs. If one buys olive trees for felling, he must leave two shoots for the seller.

With regard to one who buys two trees in the field of another, this one has not acquired any ground, but only the trees. Rabbi Meir says: He has acquired the ground under them. The mishna states a halakha in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna : If the trees grew, the owner of the field may not cut down their branches, despite the fact that their shade damages his field. And that which grows out of the trunk is his, i.e., it belongs to the owner of the tree, but that which grows out of the roots belongs to the owner of the ground. And if the trees died, their owner has no rights to the ground where the trees had stood. If one bought three trees, he has acquired the ground along with them. If they grew, the owner of the field may cut down their branches, as he sold a specific piece of land along with the trees, not his entire field. And that which grows out of the trunk and out of the roots is his, i.e., it belongs to the owner of the trees. And if the trees died, the owner of the trees still has possession of the ground, as it was sold along with the trees.

One who sells the head of a large domesticated animal has not sold along with it the forelegs, as each part is considered important in its own right. All the more so, if one sold the forelegs he has not sold the head. Similarly, if one sold the windpipe and the lungs he has not sold the liver, despite the fact that they are sometimes attached, and if he sold the liver he has not sold the windpipe and lungs. But in the case of small domesticated animals, if one sold the head he has sold the forelegs, although if one sold the legs he has not sold the head. Likewise, if one sold the windpipe and lungs he has sold the liver, but if he sold the liver he has not sold the windpipe and lungs.

There are four basic cases with regard to sellers and buyers. If the seller sold him wheat and said that the wheat was good, and it is found to be bad, the buyer, but not the seller, can renege on the sale. If the seller sold him what he thought was bad wheat and it is found to be good, the seller can renege on the sale but the buyer cannot. If he sold bad wheat and it is found to be bad, or good wheat and it is found to be good, neither one of them can renege on the sale, as the condition of the sale was met. If the seller sold reddish-brown wheat and it is found to be white, or white wheat and it is found to be reddish-brown, and similarly, if he sold olive wood and it is found to be wood of a sycamore, or he sold wood of a sycamore and it is found to be wood of an olive tree, or if the seller sold him wine and it is found to be vinegar, or vinegar and it is found to be wine, in all of these cases both the seller and the buyer can renege on the sale. Since the sale was for a different item than that which was delivered, the transaction can be nullified even if there was no mistake with regard to the price.

This mishna discusses several methods of acquiring movable property. With regard to one who sells produce to another, if the buyer pulled the produce but did not measure it, he has acquired the produce through the act of acquisition of pulling. If he measured the produce but did not pull it, he has not acquired it, and either the seller or the buyer can decide to rescind the sale. If the buyer is perspicacious and wants to acquire the produce without having to pull it, and he wishes to do so before the seller could change his mind and decide not to sell, he rents its place, where the produce is located, and his property immediately effects acquisition of the produce on his behalf. With regard to one who buys flax from another, because flax is usually carried around this purchaser has not acquired it until he carries it from place to place and acquires it by means of the act of acquisition of lifting. Pulling the flax is ineffective. And if it was attached to the ground, and he detached any amount, he has acquired it, as the Gemara will explain.

With regard to one who sells food or drink that has an established price, such as wine and oil, to another, and the price rises or falls and the buyer or the seller wishes to renege on the sale, if the price changed before the measuring vessel is filled, the merchandise still belongs to the seller and he can cancel the sale. Once the measuring vessel is filled the merchandise belongs to the buyer, and the seller can no longer cancel the sale. And if there was a middleman [ sarsur ] between them and the barrel belonging to the middleman, being used to measure the merchandise, broke during the transaction and the merchandise is ruined, it broke for the middleman, i.e., he is responsible for the ruined merchandise. The mishna teaches an additional halakha with regard to sales: And anyone who sells wine, oil, or similar liquids is obligated, after he transfers the liquid into the buyer’s vessel, to drip for him three extra drops from the measure. After he drips those three drops, if he turned the barrel on its side and drained out the last bits of liquid that it contained, this belongs to the seller and he is not required to give these last drops to the buyer. And a storekeeper is not obligated to drip three drops, because he is too busy to do this constantly. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the sale occurs on Shabbat eve as nightfall arrives, one is exempt from dripping these three drops, as there is a need to complete the transaction before Shabbat begins.

With regard to one who sends his son to a storekeeper with a pundeyon, a coin worth two issar, in his hand, and the storekeeper measured oil for him for one issar and gave him the second issar as change, and the son broke the jug and lost the issar, the storekeeper must compensate the father, as he gave the jug and coin to one who is not halakhically competent. Rabbi Yehuda exempts him from liability, as he holds that the father sent his son in order to do this, i.e., to bring back the jug and coin. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda with regard to a case when the jug is in the hand of the child and the storekeeper measured the oil into it that the storekeeper is exempt if the child breaks the jug.

A wholesaler [ hassiton ] must clean his measuring vessels, which are used for measuring liquids such as oil and wine, once every thirty days, because the residue of the liquids sticks to the measure and reduces its capacity. And a homeowner who sells his goods must clean his measuring vessels only once every twelve months. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The matters are reversed. In the case of one who is constantly using his vessels for selling merchandise the residue does not adhere to the measuring vessel, and therefore a wholesaler must clean his measures only once a year. But in the case of a homeowner, who does not sell as often, the residue adheres to the measuring vessel; therefore, he must clean them every thirty days. A storekeeper, who constantly sells merchandise in small quantities, cleans his measuring vessels twice a week and cleans his weights once a week; and he cleans the pans of his scales after each and every weighing, to ensure that no merchandise has adhered to the pans, thereby increasing their weight.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement, that it is necessary to clean a measuring vessel, said? With regard to moist items, which are likely to adhere to the measuring vessels. But with regard to dry goods, which do not adhere to the measuring vessels, one does not need to clean his measuring vessels. And before adding the weights and merchandise the seller is obligated to let the pans of the scale that will hold the merchandise tilt an extra handbreadth for the buyer by adding a weight to that side. If the seller weighed for him exactly, i.e., with the scales equally balanced initially, instead of allowing the scales to tilt an extra handbreadth, he must give the buyer additional amounts [ geirumin ], an additional one-tenth in the case of liquids sold by weight, and an additional one-twentieth in the case of dry goods. The mishna continues to discuss the correct method of weighing: In a place where they were accustomed to measure merchandise in several stages with a small measuring vessel, one may not measure all the items at once with a single large measuring vessel. In a place where they measure with one large measuring vessel, one may not measure with several small measuring vessels. In a place where the custom is to level the top of the measuring vessel to remove substances heaped above its edges, one may not heap it, and where the custom is to heap it, one may not level it.

Chapter 6

With regard to one who sells produce to another that is sometimes purchased for consumption and sometimes for planting, and the buyer planted it and it did not sprout, and even if he had sold flaxseeds, which are only occasionally eaten, the seller does not bear financial responsibility for them, i.e., he is not required to compensate the buyer. Since the buyer did not specify that he purchased the produce in order to plant it, the seller can claim that he assumed the buyer intended to eat it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he had sold seeds for garden plants, which are not eaten at all, then the seller bears financial responsibility for them, as they were certainly purchased for planting.

When selling a significant quantity of produce or a number of items, there is a possibility that there will be a certain proportion of impurities in it or that some of the product will be of substandard quality. The mishna delineates what proportion is considered acceptable, for which a buyer may not demand compensation. With regard to one who sells produce, i.e., grain, to another, this buyer accepts upon himself that up to a quarter- kav of impurities may be present in each se’a of produce purchased. When purchasing figs, he accepts upon himself that up to ten infested figs may be present in each hundred figs purchased. When purchasing a cellar containing barrels of wine, he accepts upon himself that up to ten barrels of souring wine may be present in each hundred barrels purchased. When purchasing jugs of wine in the Sharon region, he accepts upon himself that up to ten inferior-quality jugs [ pitasot ] of wine may be present in each hundred jugs purchased.

If one sells wine to another and then it sours, the seller does not bear financial responsibility for its loss. But if it is known of this seller that his wine always sours, then this sale is a mistaken transaction, i.e., one based upon false assumptions, as the buyer intended to purchase wine that would maintain its quality; therefore, the seller must reimburse the buyer. And if the seller said to the buyer: It is wine that is spiced, which is preserved and of lasting quality, that I am selling to you, then he bears financial responsibility to provide him with wine that will keep until the festival of Shavuot. And if the seller said: I am selling you old wine, he is responsible to provide wine from the previous year. And if he said: I am selling you aged wine, he is responsible to provide wine that is from three years earlier.

With regard to one who sells a plot of land to another, with the buyer intending to build a bridal house for his son or a widowhood home for his daughter on that plot, and similarly, with regard to a contractor who receives a plot of land from another under a commission to build for the owner on that land a bridal house for his son, or a widowhood home for his daughter, the terms of the transaction are a matter of dispute. The mishna presents the dispute: In the latter case, the contractor must build a building that is at least four cubits by six cubits in size, and similarly, in the case of the sale, the seller must provide a plot of land that can accommodate a building of that size; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says: A structure of this size is a cowshed, and a bridal house or a widowhood home is larger than that. One who wants to construct a cowshed builds a structure at least four cubits by six cubits in size. The mishna delineates the standard dimensions for various other structures. A small house is six by eight cubits. A large house is eight by ten cubits. A banquet hall [ teraklin ] is ten by ten cubits. The standard height for each of these structures is equal to the sum of half its length and half its width. There is a proof of the matter; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The proportions are like the building of the Sanctuary; it was forty cubits wide and twenty cubits long and its height was thirty cubits, which is the sum of half the width and half the length.

One who has ownership of a cistern located beyond the house of another, i.e., the cistern can be accessed only by entering the property of the other, and also has access rights to that cistern, may enter the house to access his cistern only at a time when it is usual for people to enter, and may leave only at a time when it is usual for people to leave. And in addition, he may not bring his animal into the house and water it from his cistern; rather, he must fill a pail with water from the cistern and water his animal outside. And this one, the owner of the cistern, constructs for himself a lock on the entrance to the cistern to prevent the homeowner from drawing water from it, and that one, the homeowner, constructs for himself a lock.

One who has ownership of a garden located beyond the garden of another, and also has access rights to it, may enter his garden only at a time when it is usual for people to enter, and may leave only at a time when it is usual for people to leave. Furthermore, he may not bring merchants into his garden, and he may not enter the garden solely in order to use it as a passageway, to enter from it into another field. And the owner of the outer garden may sow the path leading to the inner garden. If the court gave him an access path from the side of the outer garden, with the agreement of both of them, he may enter at any time he wants, and leave at any time he wants, and may bring merchants into the inner garden. But he may still not enter the garden solely in order to enter from it into another field. In such a case, neither this one, the owner of the inner garden, nor that one, the owner of the outer garden, is permitted to plant that side path.

In the case of one who had a public thoroughfare passing through his field, and he appropriated it and instead gave the public an alternative thoroughfare on the side of his property, the halakha is that the thoroughfare that he gave them, he gave them, and they may use it. But the original thoroughfare that he took for himself has not reached him, i.e., he cannot appropriate it for his personal use. The standard width of a private path is four cubits. If a field owner sells the right to pass through his field to an individual, without specifying the width of the path, he must provide him with a path four cubits wide. The standard width of a public thoroughfare is sixteen cubits. The width of a king’s thoroughfare has no maximum measure, as the king may appropriate whatever width thoroughfare he wishes. The width of the path for the burial procession to a grave has no maximum measure. With regard to the practice of standing and comforting the mourners following a funeral, the judges of Tzippori said that the standard requisite size is the area required for sowing four kav of seed.

There is the case of one who sells a plot of land to another in order for him to construct for himself an underground catacomb, and similarly the case of a contractor who receives a plot of land from another under a commission to construct for him a catacomb. If the size of the catacomb was not specified, then he should make the inside of each burial chamber four cubits wide by six cubits long and open up into the chamber, by digging into its walls, eight burial niches [ kukhin ] in which the coffins will rest. Three niches should be opened up from the wall here, along the length of the chamber, and three from there, along the other side, and two niches from the wall facing the entrance. And these niches should be formed so that their length is four cubits and their height is seven handbreadths, and their width is six handbreadths. Rabbi Shimon says: He should construct the inside of each burial chamber six cubits wide by eight cubits long and open up into the chamber, by digging into its walls, thirteen burial niches. Four niches should be opened up from the wall here, along the length of the chamber, and four from there, along the other side, and three niches from the wall facing the entrance, and one from the right of the entrance and another one from the left. The mishna describes the general structure of the catacomb: And he must fashion a courtyard at the entrance of the burial chamber that should be six cubits by six cubits, which is equal to the combined length of the bier of the deceased and those who bury him, to ensure adequate room for the burial to take place. And he should open up two burial chambers into the courtyard, one from here and one from there, i.e., on opposite sides of the courtyard. Rabbi Shimon says: He should open up four burial chambers, one on each of the courtyard’s four sides. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Everything is dependent on the nature of the bedrock. If the bedrock is hard and strong it will be able to accommodate more niches, which will be more closely packed together, with less bedrock between them. If the bedrock is softer, fewer and more sparsely spaced niches should be formed.

Chapter 7

If one says to another: I am selling you a plot of earth of the size required for sowing one kor of seed [ beit kor ], and there on that plot there were crevices [ neka’im ] ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not measured together with the rest of the field. Rather, the buyer must be provided with land measuring a beit kor exclusive of those crevices or rocks. If the crevices or rocks measured less than ten handbreadths, they are measured together with the rest of the field. But if the seller said to the buyer: I am selling you a plot of earth that is about the size of a beit kor, then even if there on that plot there were crevices deeper than ten handbreadths or rocks higher than ten handbreadths, they are measured together with the rest of the field.

If one says to another: I am selling you a plot of earth the size of a beit kor, measured precisely with a rope, and he gave him even the slightest amount less than what was stipulated, the seller must deduct the difference from the purchase price of the field and return money to the buyer. If he gave him even the slightest amount more than what was stipulated, the buyer must return the difference to the seller. And if the seller said to the buyer that he is selling him a beit kor of land more or less, then even if he gave him a quarter -kav per se’a less than what was stipulated, or he gave him a quarter -kav per se’a more that what was stipulated, i.e., he gave him one twenty-fourth more or less than what was required, it is his. The sale is valid, since the seller told the buyer in advance that he was not committing himself to precise measurements. If the difference is greater than that amount, he must make a calculation, and the party that suffered a loss must be compensated. If the buyer received too much land, so that he must now compensate the seller, what does he return to him? He returns money, i.e., he pays the seller for the surplus land. And if the seller so wishes, the buyer returns the surplus land to him. Why then did the Sages say that he returns money to him? They said this in order to enhance the power of the seller, and enable him to demand payment for the surplus land, rather than accept its return. As, if the surplus in the field was an area required for sowing nine kav of seed, and in a garden an area required for sowing a half- kav of seed, or, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, an area required for sowing a quarter - kav of seed (see 11a), the buyer must return the land itself to the seller, and the seller cannot demand payment in money. And if the surplus is greater than a quarter- kav per se’a, it is not only the quarter - kav that he returns; rather, he returns all of the surplus. Since he is already required to make a refund, the refund must be made in the precise amount.

If the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you a plot of land of a certain size measured precisely with a rope more or less, thereby attaching to the sale two contradictory stipulations; in this case, the words: More or less, nullify the words: Measured precisely with a rope. Accordingly, if the surplus did not exceed a quarter- kav per se’a, the sale is valid as is. Similarly, if the seller says to the buyer: I am selling you a plot of land of a certain size more or less measured precisely with a rope, the words: Measured precisely with a rope, nullify the words: More or less, since the principle is that in all cases, one should attend to the final expression; this is the statement of ben Nanas. If one sells a field to another, telling him that he is selling him a field measuring a beit kor, with its particular demarcations and borders that the seller specifies for the buyer, the field’s measurement is not treated in as exacting a manner as in a standard sale. Therefore, if it later turns out that the field was not precisely a beit kor, but the difference is still less than one-sixth, the field is the buyer’s, and the sale is valid as is. But if the difference is greater, e.g., one-quarter or one-fifth, then, until it is calculated at one-sixth, the seller must deduct the difference from the purchase price and return money to the buyer.

If one says to another: I am selling you half a field, without specifying which half he is selling, an assessment is made of the field, which is then divided between them, and the buyer takes half of the seller’s field. If the seller says: I am selling you the half that is on the southern side of the field, an assessment is made of the northern and the southern sides of the field, which is then divided between them, and he takes the half on the southern side. And he accepts upon himself to provide the space for the fence between the two halves of the field out of his own property. He also accepts to provide out of his own property the space for the larger ditch and the smaller ditch, which are meant to keep animals out of the field. And how wide is the larger ditch? Six handbreadths. And how wide is the smaller ditch? Three handbreadths.

Chapter 8

There are family members who both inherit from and bequeath to each other upon their respective deaths; and there are those who inherit from certain relatives but do not bequeath to them; and there are those who bequeath to certain relatives but do not inherit from them; and there are those who, despite being relatives, do not inherit from nor bequeath to one another. The mishna lists those referred to above. And these both inherit and bequeath: A father with regard to his sons, and sons with regard to their father, and paternal brothers; all inherit from one another and bequeath to each other. A man with regard to his mother, and a man with regard to his wife, and sons of sisters, i.e., nephews born to the sisters of the deceased, all inherit from their respective relatives but do not bequeath to them. A woman with regard to her sons, and a woman with regard to her husband, and maternal uncles, all bequeath to their respective relatives but do not inherit from them. And maternal brothers, despite being blood relatives, do not inherit from each other nor do they bequeath to one another, as they are not considered relatives for the purpose of inheritance.

The order of precedence with regard to inheritances is this: The verse states: “If a man dies, and has no son, then you shall pass his inheritance to his daughter” (Numbers 27:8). This teaches that a son precedes a daughter. Additionally, all descendants of a son precede a daughter. A daughter precedes the brothers of the deceased. Additionally, the descendants of a daughter precede the brothers of the deceased. Brothers of the deceased precede the uncles of the deceased. Additionally, the descendants of the brothers precede the uncles. This is the principle: Concerning anyone who precedes another with regard to inheritance, his descendants precede the other as well, and a father who inherits precedes all of his descendants.

Zelophehad’s daughters took three portions of land in the inheritance of Eretz Yisrael: Their father’s portion that he received because he was among those who left Egypt; and his portion that he received with his brothers in the property of Hepher, their father; and an additional portion that he received from Hepher because he was a firstborn, and a firstborn takes two portions of inheritance from his father.

Both the son and the daughter of the deceased are included in the halakhot of inheritance. But the difference is that the firstborn son takes a double portion of the property of the father, and he does not take a double portion of the property of the mother. And another difference is that the daughters are sustained from the property of the father after he dies, as it is a mandatory condition of their mother’s marriage contract that they are to be sustained even before the estate is disbursed to the children, but the daughters are not sustained from the property of the mother, which is all inherited by the sons.

In a case of one who says: So-and-so, my firstborn son, will not take a double portion of my estate; or one who says: So-and-so, my son, will not inherit my estate among his brothers, he has said nothing, as he has stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah. With regard to one on his deathbed who apportions his property orally, granting it to his sons as a gift, and he increased the portion given to one of his sons and reduced the portion given to one son, or equated the portion of the firstborn to the portions of the other sons, his statement stands. But if he said that they will receive the property not as a gift but as inheritance, he has said nothing. If he wrote in his will, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, that he is granting them the property as a gift, his statement stands. In a case of one who says: So-and-so will inherit from me, in a case where there is a daughter, or: My daughter will inherit from me, in a case where there is a son, he has said nothing, as he has stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah concerning the order of inheritance. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: If he said this about one fit to inherit from him, his statement stands, but if it was about one for whom it was not fit to inherit from him, his statement does not stand. With regard to one who wrote a document granting his property to others as a gift and left his sons with nothing, what he did is done, i.e., it takes effect; but the Sages are displeased with him. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he did so because his sons were not acting properly, he is remembered positively.

One who says: This is my son, is deemed credible. One who says: This is my brother, is not deemed credible with regard to his other brothers’ obligation to share the inheritance with the subject of his statement. When one claims that this man is his brother, this claim is accepted with regard to the speaker’s own portion, and the man in question takes a share of their father’s inheritance with him, i.e., from his portion. If the man in question dies, the property he received from the father’s inheritance shall return to its place, i.e., to the possession of the brother who testified on his behalf, from whose portion he received a share. If property came into the man in question’s possession from somewhere else, other than from the father, and the man in question died, all of the brothers of the one who testified shall inherit with the one who testified, as according to his claim they too are the heirs of the deceased. With regard to one who died, and a will written by a person on his deathbed [ dayetikei ] is found bound to his thigh, which clearly indicates that it was written by him and was not forged, this is nothing. The will is not valid, as he did not give it to anyone, and he may have reconsidered. If he transferred ownership of the will to the designated recipient through another person, whether one of the heirs or whether not one of the heirs, his statement stands.

A healthy person who writes a document granting his property to his sons in his lifetime, but wishes to continue to derive benefit from it until his death, must write: I give the property from today and after my death. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: He need not write: From today and after my death; it is sufficient for him to write that the transfer will take effect after he dies. If one writes a document granting his property to his son from today and after his death, the father cannot sell the property because it is written as granted to the son, and the son cannot sell it because it is still in the possession of the father with regard to using the property and consuming its produce. If the father sold the property, it is sold to the purchaser inasmuch as he may use it and consume its produce until the father dies, at which point it belongs to the son. If the son sold it during his father’s lifetime, the purchaser has no right to use it until the father dies. In continuation of the case discussed in the previous mishna of a father who wrote a document granting his property to his son but reserved the rights to the produce during his lifetime, the mishna states that the father may detach produce from the land and feed the produce to whomever he wishes, and what he left detached at the time of his death belongs to all the father’s heirs, not only to this son. If a person died and left adult and minor sons, the adults are not provided for by using funds of the minors, and the minors are not sustained, i.e., they do not receive food, by using funds of the adults. Rather, they receive a share of the inheritance equally, and each son sees to his needs from his own share. If the adults married, the minors marry, as the Gemara will explain. But if the minors say: We are marrying in the same manner that you adults married during our father’s lifetime, the court does not listen to them. Rather, whatever their father gave the adults in his lifetime he gave them, and the minors do not have the right to receive more than their share of the inheritance.

Similarly, if the father left adult and minor daughters but no sons, in which case his daughters inherit the estate, the adults are not provided for by using funds of the minors, and the minors are not sustained by using funds of the adults. Rather, they receive a share of the inheritance equally, and each daughter sees to her needs from her share. If the adult daughters married, the minor daughters marry, as the Gemara will explain. But if the minors say: We are marrying in the same manner that you adults married during our father’s lifetime, the court does not listen to them. This following halakha is a stringency with regard to daughters’ inheritance vis-à-vis sons’ inheritance: The halakha is that the daughters are sustained by using funds of the sons, as stipulated in their mother’s marriage contract, but they are not sustained by using funds of the other daughters.

Chapter 9

In the case of one who died and left behind both sons and daughters, when the estate is large the sons inherit the estate and the daughters are provided with sustenance from it according to the stipulations of the deceased’s marriage contract with their mother. With regard to a small estate, which is insufficient to provide for both the sons and the daughters, the daughters are provided with sustenance. And if the sons, who receive in this case neither inheritance nor sustenance, have no other means with which to support themselves, they go and request charity at the doors. Admon says, rhetorically: I lost out just because I am male? Rather, he holds that the sons also receive sustenance. Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon.

With regard to one who left behind sons and daughters and a tumtum, whose halakhic status as male or female is indeterminate, the halakha is as follows: When the estate is large the males direct the tumtum to the females and exclude him from the inheritance, claiming that perhaps the tumtum is female. When the estate is small, the females direct the tumtum to the males and exclude him from receiving sustenance, claiming that perhaps the tumtum is male. With regard to one who says: If my wife gives birth to a male the offspring shall receive a gift of one hundred dinars, if she in fact gave birth to a male, the offspring receives one hundred dinars. If he says: If my wife gives birth to a female the offspring shall receive a gift of two hundred dinars, if she in fact gave birth to a female, the offspring receives two hundred dinars. If he says: If my wife gives birth to a male the offspring shall receive a gift of one hundred dinars and if she gives birth to a female the offspring shall receive a gift of two hundred dinars, and in fact she gave birth to both a male and a female, the male offspring receives one hundred dinars and the female offspring receives two hundred dinars. If she gave birth to a tumtum, the tumtum does not receive anything. If he said: Whatever offspring my wife gives birth to shall receive a gift of a certain sum, and she gave birth to a tumtum, the tumtum receives it. And if there is no heir other than the tumtum, the tumtum inherits all of the estate.

In the case of one who died and left behind adult and minor sons, if the adult sons enhanced the property, they enhanced it so that the profit goes to the middle, i.e., it is distributed among all the heirs. If the adult sons said from the outset: See that which our father left behind; we are going to engage in business with our share of the property and profit from it, then they enhanced the property for themselves. And similarly, with regard to a wife who enhanced the property of her deceased husband, she enhanced it so that the profit goes to the middle, i.e., it is divided between her and the heirs. If she said: See that which my husband left me; I am going to engage in business with my share and profit from it, then she enhanced the property for herself.

With regard to brothers who were also partners, and it occurred that one of them was summoned to public service, which is assessed per family, he was summoned from the middle, i.e., the profits or expenses of his service are divided among them. If one of the brothers became sick and sought treatment, the cost of the treatment is paid from his own resources. It was common practice for friends of a groom to give him gifts in order to help cover the expenses of the wedding feast. These gifts are known as gifts of groomsmen, and would be reciprocated in turn. While the groom and the groomsman were at times the recipient and the giver of the gifts, respectively, the gifts were at times provided by the father of the groomsman and received by the father of the groom. In the case of brothers, some of whom brought gifts of groomsmen in their father’s lifetime, which were provided by their father, when the gifts of groomsmen are reciprocated after the father’s death, when one of the brothers gets married, they are reciprocated to the middle, i.e., the gift is divided among the brothers. This is because gifts of groomsmen are a legal debt owed to the father, collectible in court. But with regard to one who sends his friend jugs of wine or jugs of oil, a reciprocal gift is not collectible in court, because they are considered acts of kindness.

With regard to one who sends presents [ sivlonot ] to his father-in-law’s house following his betrothal, even if he sent there the sum of ten thousand dinars and subsequently ate there a groom’s feast even worth the value of a single dinar, if for any reason the marriage is not effected, the presents are not collected in return by the formerly betrothed man. If he did not eat a groom’s feast there, the presents are collected, as they were not an unconditional gift. If he sent many presents with the stipulation that they return with her to her husband’s house, i.e., to his own house, after the wedding, these are collected if the marriage is not effected. If he sent a few presents for her to use while in her father’s house, they are not collected.

With regard to a person on his death-bed who wrote a deed granting all of his property to others, and he reserved for himself any amount of land, his gift stands even if he subsequently recovers. If he did not reserve for himself any amount of land, and he recovered, his gift does not stand, as the gift was conditional upon his death, since is it evident that he did not intend to leave himself without means of support. If one did not write in the deed that he was on his deathbed, and he then recovered and wished to retract the gift, and he says: I was on my deathbed, and since I recovered, I can retract the gift, but the recipients say: You were healthy, and the gift cannot be retracted, the giver must bring proof that he was on his deathbed in order to retract the gift. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant, and since the property is in the possession of the giver, the recipients must bring proof that they have the right to receive it.

With regard to one who divides his property between various recipients by means of verbal instruction, Rabbi Elazar says: Both in the case of one who is healthy and in the case of one who is dangerously ill, the halakha is as follows: Property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land, is acquired by means of money, by a deed of transfer, or by taking possession of it. And that which does not serve as a guarantee, i.e., movable property, can be acquired only by pulling. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Elazar: There was an incident involving the mother of the sons of Rokhel, who was sick, and who said: My brooch shall be given to my daughter, and it is valued at twelve hundred dinars. And this woman subsequently died, and the Sages upheld her statement. This indicates that a person on his deathbed can gift property without an act of acquisition. Rabbi Elazar said to them: That case was different; the sons of Rokhel should be buried by their mother, i.e., he cursed them. It is not possible to bring a proof from this incident, as these sons were wicked people. Consequently, when ruling in this matter the Sages did not act in accordance with the halakha, but allowed the mother of the sons of Rokhel to give this valuable piece of jewelry to their sister without an act of acquisition having been performed. Rabbi Eliezer says: On Shabbat, the verbal statement of a person on his deathbed stands, as he cannot write, and the Sages instituted that he can effect the transaction verbally lest the inability to do so exacerbate his condition. But a verbal instruction does not stand if stated on a weekday. Rabbi Yehoshua says: With regard to Shabbat, the Sages stated that his verbal instruction is sufficient, even though writing is prohibited. One can infer a fortiori that the same applies with regard to a weekday, when writing is permitted. Similarly, one can acquire property on behalf of a minor, but one cannot acquire property on behalf of an adult, since he can perform the act of acquisition himself; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua says: The Sages stated this halakha with regard to a minor, and one may infer a fortiori that this also applies with regard to an adult, who is able to perform the act of acquisition himself.

A house collapsed on a son and upon his father, or upon a certain person and upon those from whom he stands to inherit, and it is unknown who died first. If the son bore the responsibility to pay the marriage contract of his wife and to pay a creditor, and the son had no money with which to pay them except that which he might inherit from his father, and the father’s heirs say: The son died first and afterward the father died, and therefore the son did not inherit property from his father, and the creditors say: The father died first and afterward the son died, resulting in the son’s inheriting his father’s property, enabling the creditors to collect payment from the property even after the son’s death, there is a dispute with regard to how to rule. Since it cannot be determined who died first, Beit Shammai say: They divide the property between them so that the father’s heirs receive half of his property and the son’s creditors receive the other half. And Beit Hillel say: The property retains its previous ownership status. Since the last known owner of the property was the father, the property is given to the father’s heirs.

If the house collapsed upon a husband and upon his wife, and it is unknown who died first, if the wife did not have any children from her husband, then the following claims arise: The husband’s heirs say: The wife died first and was inherited by her husband, and afterward the husband died, and therefore the husband’s heirs inherit both his and her property. The wife’s heirs say: The husband died first and afterward the wife died, and her heirs inherit the property that she brought with her to the marriage and the payment of her marriage contract. Beit Shammai say: They divide the property under dispute between them. And Beit Hillel say: The guaranteed property that the wife brought with her to the marriage retains its previous ownership status. The sum of the marriage contract remains in the possession of the husband’s heirs, since the marriage contract is collected from the husband’s property. Property that is brought into and taken out of the marriage with her, i.e., usufruct property that remains in the wife’s possession during her marriage, remains in the possession of the heirs of the woman’s father.

If the house collapsed on a son and upon his mother, and it is unknown who died first, the following claims arise: The mother’s paternal family claims that the son died first, and therefore they inherit from the mother, and the son’s heirs claim that the mother died first and her son inherited from her, and therefore they inherit from the son. In this case, both these Sages and those Sages, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, concede that they divide the property between them. Rabbi Akiva said: In this case I concede that the property retains its previous ownership status. Ben Azzai said to Rabbi Akiva: We are already troubled by those cases where Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel are in disagreement. But do you come to bring upon us a disagreement with regard to the case where they agree?

Chapter 10

In an ordinary document, its witnesses are to sign inside it, i.e., on the written side of the paper. In a folded and tied document, its witnesses are to sign on the back of it. With regard to an ordinary document whose witnesses wrote their signatures on the back of it, and a tied document whose witnesses wrote their signatures inside of it, both of these are not valid. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: A tied document whose witnesses wrote their signatures inside of it is valid, because one can transform it into an ordinary document by untying it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Everything is in accordance with regional custom.

An ordinary document is rendered valid by its having at least two witnesses, and a tied document is rendered valid by its having at least three witnesses. With regard to an ordinary document in which a single witness wrote his signature, and a tied document in which only two witnesses wrote their signatures, they are both not valid. If it is written in a document that someone owes: One hundred dinars, which are twenty sela, which is internally inconsistent since there are twenty-five sela in a hundred dinars, the holder of the document has the right to claim only twenty sela, the lower of the two amounts. If it is written that he owes: One hundred dinars, which are thirty sela, the holder of the document has the right to claim only one hundred dinars, again the lower of the two amounts. If it is written that someone owes: Silver dinars that are, and the remainder of the text, where the number of dinars should be specified, was erased, the amount must be no less than two dinars, the lowest amount to which the plural word dinars can be referring. That is what the creditor can claim. Similarly, if it is written: Silver sela that are, and the remainder of the text was erased, the amount must be no less than two sela. And if it is written: Darics that are, and the remainder of the text was erased, the amount must be no less than two darics. If it is written in the document above, in an earlier place in the document, that someone owes one hundred dinars, and below, toward the end of the document, it is written that the amount owed is two hundred dinars, or if above it is written two hundred dinars and below one hundred dinars, everything follows the bottom amount. If so, why does one write the information in the upper part of the document at all? It is a safety measure, so that if one letter is erased from the lower part of the document, thereby rendering it illegible, the information can be learned from the upper part of the document.

A scribe may write a bill of divorce for a man who requests one, even if his wife is not with him to give her consent when he presents his request, as there is no possibility that he will misuse the document. And a scribe may write a receipt for a woman upon her request, attesting to the payment of her marriage contract, even if her husband is not with her to give his consent. This is true provided that the scribe recognizes the parties requesting the document, to prevent misrepresentation. And for both documents, the husband gives the scribe his wages. A scribe may write a promissory note for a debtor who requests one, even if the creditor is not with him when he requests the document, but a scribe may not write a promissory note for a creditor who requests it unless the debtor is with him and consents. And it is the debtor who gives the scribe his wages. A scribe may write a bill of sale for a seller of a field who requests one even if the purchaser is not with him when he presents his request, but a scribe may not write a bill of sale for a purchaser who requests it unless the seller is with him and consents. And it is the purchaser who gives the scribe his wages.

A scribe may not write documents of betrothal and documents of marriage except with the consent of both parties, the groom and the bride. And it is the groom who gives the scribe his wages. A scribe may not write contracts for sharecroppers and contractors except with the consent of both parties, i.e., the sharecropper or contractor and the one who hires him. And it is the sharecropper or contractor who gives the scribe his wages. A scribe may not write documents testifying to arbitration agreements or any other court enactment except with the consent of both parties to the litigation. And both parties give the scribe his wages. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The scribe writes two documents for the two parties, one for this one by himself, and one for that one by himself.

In the case of a debtor who repaid part of his debt and with the agreement of the creditor deposited the promissory note with a third party serving as a trustee to ensure that the creditor would not collect the full amount, and the debtor said to the trustee: If I have not given you the balance from now until such and such a day, give the creditor his promissory note, thereby enabling him to collect the full amount stated on the note, if the stipulated time arrived and the debtor did not give the balance to the trustee, Rabbi Yosei says: The trustee should give the promissory note to the creditor, in accordance with the debtor’s stipulation. Rabbi Yehuda says: The trustee should not give it, as the stipulation is void.

In the case of a creditor whose promissory note has become erased, he should produce witnesses who remember the details of the document to testify about it. And they come before the court, and they ratify his promissory note for him, stating: The promissory note of so-and-so was erased, and it stated that a loan for such and such an amount took place on such and such a date, and so-and-so and so-and-so were its witnesses. The ratification document is signed, and it may be used as a replacement for the erased document. In the case of a debtor who repaid part of his debt, Rabbi Yehuda says: The creditor should exchange the promissory note for a new one stating the current balance and tear up the first promissory note. Rabbi Yosei says: The creditor may keep the original promissory note, and he should write a receipt for the payment he has received and give it to the debtor as proof of his partial payment of the sum recorded in the old note. Rabbi Yehuda said with regard to this arrangement: It is found that this debtor must now guard his receipt against being destroyed by mice, as if he no longer has the receipt, he will have to pay the entire sum recorded in the promissory note. Rabbi Yosei said to him: This situation is fitting for him; it is better that this procedure be followed, and the strength of the claim of this creditor not be weakened.

In a case where there are two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bathhouse or an olive press as an inheritance, if the father had built these facilities for profit, i.e., to charge others for using them, the profit that accrues after the father’s death is shared equally by the two brothers. If the father had built them for himself and for the members of his household to use, the poor brother, who has little use for these amenities, cannot force the rich brother to convert the facilities to commercial use; rather, the rich brother can say to the poor brother: Go take servants for yourself, and they will bathe in the bathhouse. Or he can say: Go take olives for yourself, and come and make them into oil in the olive press. If there are two people who were living in one city, one named Yosef ben Shimon and the other also named Yosef ben Shimon, one cannot present a promissory note against the other, as the purported debtor can claim: On the contrary, it is you who owed me money; you repaid me and I returned this note to you upon payment. Nor can another, third person, present a promissory note against either of them, as each one can claim: It is not I but the other Yosef ben Shimon who owes you money. If a document is found among one’s documents stating: The promissory note against Yosef ben Shimon is repaid, and both men named Yosef ben Shimon owed this man money, the promissory notes of both of them are considered repaid, as it cannot be determined which debt was repaid and which is outstanding. What should two people with the same name in a single city do in order to conduct their business? They should triple their names by writing three generations: Yosef ben Shimon ben so-and-so. And if they have identical triple names, i.e., not only their fathers but their grandfathers had identical names, they should write an indication as to which one is referred to, such as: The short Yosef ben Shimon or the dark Yosef ben Shimon. And if they have identical indications, they should write: Yosef ben Shimon the priest, if one of them is a priest. In the case of one who says to his son before dying: One promissory note among the promissory notes in my possession is repaid, but I do not know which one, the promissory notes of all of those who owe him money are considered repaid, i.e., they are not valid for collection, as it cannot be determined which debt was repaid and which are outstanding. If there were found among his papers two promissory notes owed by one person, the one for the greater amount is considered repaid, and the one for the smaller amount is not considered repaid and can be collected; the debtor is favored in the case of an uncertainty. One who lends money to another with the assurance of a guarantor cannot collect the debt from the guarantor. But if the creditor said to the debtor: I am lending the money on the condition that I will collect the debt from whomever I wish, i.e., either the debtor or the guarantor, he can collect the debt from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the debtor has property of his own, then whether in this case, where the creditor stipulated this condition, or that case, where he did not, he cannot collect the debt from the guarantor. And so Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would say: If there is a guarantor for a woman for her marriage contract, from whom the woman can collect payment of her marriage contract instead of collecting it from the husband, and her husband was divorcing her, the husband must take a vow prohibiting himself from deriving any benefit from her, so that he can never remarry her. This precaution is taken lest the couple collude [ kenunya ] to divorce in order to collect payment of the marriage contract from this guarantor’s property, and then the husband will remarry his wife.

One who lends money to another by means of a promissory note can collect the debt from liened property that had been sold to others by the debtor after the loan was granted. One who lends money by means of witnesses, without recording the loan in a promissory note, can collect the debt only from unsold property. If one presents to a debtor a document in the handwriting of the debtor stating that he owes money to him, but without witnesses signed on the document, the creditor can collect only from unsold property. In the case of a guarantor whose commitment emerged after the signing of the promissory note, the creditor can collect the sum only from unsold property of the guarantor. The mishna relates: An incident occurred where such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael, and he said: The creditor can collect the sum from unsold property of the guarantor, but not from liened property that he has sold to others. Ben Nannas said to Rabbi Yishmael: The creditor cannot collect the sum from the guarantor at all, not from liened property that has been sold, nor from unsold property. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: Why not? Ben Nannas said to him: If one was strangling someone in the marketplace, demanding repayment of a loan, and another person found him doing so and said to the attacker: Leave him alone and I will give you the money he owes, the person who intervened is exempt from paying, as the creditor did not loan the money in the first place based on his trust of the one who intervened. Rather, who is a guarantor who is obligated to repay the loan he has guaranteed? One who tells the creditor before the loan takes place: Lend money to him, and I will give you the repayment, as in that case the creditor did loan the money based on his trust of the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael thereupon said: One who wants to become wise should engage in the study of monetary law, as there is no greater discipline in the Torah, and it is like a flowing spring. And, he added, one who wants to engage in the study of monetary law should attend to, i.e., become a disciple of, Shimon ben Nannas.

Mishnah Sanhedrin

Chapter 1

Cases concerning monetary law are adjudicated by three judges. Cases concerning robbery and personal injury are adjudicated by three judges. Cases concerning damage that one is responsible for because he or his property caused the damage are adjudicated by three judges as well. Likewise, cases concerning payment for half the damage, which is paid in the event that an ox whose owner has not been warned that it gored more than two times gores another animal (see Exodus 21:35); cases concerning payment of double the principal by a thief who was caught stealing (see Exodus 22:3); and cases concerning payment of four or five times the principal by a thief who slaughtered or sold a stolen ox or a lamb (see Exodus 21:37) are all adjudicated by three judges. Cases concerning one who rapes or one who seduces a virgin girl, and must therefore pay the girl’s father fifty silver shekels (see Deuteronomy 22:29, Exodus 22:15); and cases concerning a defamer who falsely asserts that his wife was not a virgin when she married him, and brings false witnesses who testify that she committed adultery while betrothed to him and who must therefore pay the girl’s father one hundred silver shekels as well as receive lashes (see Deuteronomy 22:13–19): All of these are adjudicated by three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Cases concerning a defamer are adjudicated by a court of twenty-three judges, which is the type of court authorized to judge cases of capital law, because this case includes the possibility of becoming a case of capital law. The husband brings witnesses that his wife committed adultery. If she is found guilty, she is liable to receive the death penalty. This punishment applies to the witnesses if they are exposed as conspiring witnesses.

Cases concerning the violation of prohibitions that render one liable to receive lashes are adjudicated by three judges. The Sages stated in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Cases concerning lashes are adjudicated by twenty-three judges. The intercalation of the month is performed by a panel of three judges. The intercalation of the year, meaning the decision to add an extra month to the year when necessary, is also decided by a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The deliberations begin with three judges, and they debate the matter with five judges, and they conclude the matter with seven judges, due to the significance of the decision. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concedes that if they concluded the matter with only three judges, the intercalation is valid and it is a leap year.

Both the laying of hands by the Sages and the breaking of the heifer’s neck in a case where a person was found murdered and it is not known who killed him (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9) are performed in front of a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says: These rituals are performed in front of five judges. Both ḥalitza, the ritual through which the yavam, a surviving brother of a married man who died without sons, frees the yevama, the widow, of her levirate bond in a case where the yavam does not wish to marry the yevama (see Deuteronomy 25:5–10), and the refusal of a girl before reaching majority to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brother married her off, are performed before a court of three judges. The halakha concerning fruit of a fourth-year sapling and second-tithe produce is that they are to be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. If this is impractical, the produce can be redeemed and the redemption money brought to Jerusalem, where it is used to purchase food and drink. Valuation of fruit of a fourth-year sapling or second-tithe produce in cases where their value is not known is performed by three judges. The valuation of consecrated property for purposes of redemption is performed by three judges, and the valuations that are movable property (see Leviticus 27:1–8) are performed by three judges. Rabbi Yehuda says: One of the three judges must be a priest. And the valuation of consecrated land is performed by nine judges and, in addition, one priest. And the valuation of a person for the purpose of a vow is performed in a similar manner to that of land.

Cases of capital law are judged by twenty-three judges. An animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality are judged by twenty-three judges, as it is stated: “And if a woman approaches any animal to lie with it, you shall kill the woman and the animal” (Leviticus 20:16), and it states: “And if a man lies with an animal, he shall be put to death and you shall kill the animal” (Leviticus 20:15). In cases of bestiality, the verse juxtaposes the execution of the animal to the execution of the person, and therefore the case of the animal is adjudicated in the same way as cases of capital law. Similarly, an ox that is to be stoned because it killed a person is judged by twenty-three judges, as it is stated: “But if the ox was wont to gore in time past, and warning has been given to its owner, but he did not guard it and it kills a man or a woman the ox shall be stoned and also its owner shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:29). From this verse it is derived that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox. The same halakha applies in the case of a wolf or a lion, a bear or a leopard, or a cheetah, or a snake that killed a person: Their death is decreed by twenty-three judges. Rabbi Eliezer says these dangerous animals do not need to be brought to court; rather, anyone who kills them first merits the performance of a mitzva. Rabbi Akiva says: Their death is decreed by twenty-three judges.

The court judges cases involving an entire tribe that sinned, or a false prophet (see Deuteronomy 18:20–22), or a High Priest who transgressed a prohibition that carries a possible death sentence, only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges, i.e., the Great Sanhedrin. And the king may bring the nation out to an optional war, i.e., a war that was not mandated by the Torah and is not a war of defense, only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. They may extend the city of Jerusalem or the courtyards of the Temple only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. And they may appoint a lesser Sanhedrin of twenty-three judges for the tribes only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. A city may be designated as an idolatrous city, i.e., a city whose residents all practice idolatry, and therefore according to Torah law all the residents must be killed and the city must be destroyed (see Deuteronomy 13:13–19), only in accordance with the ruling of a court of seventy-one judges. Additionally, the court may not designate a city as an idolatrous city if it is on the frontier, close to the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and three adjoining cities may not be designated as idolatrous cities. But the court may designate one city, or two adjoining cities, as idolatrous cities.

With regard to the number of judges in the different courts the mishna presents a halakhic midrash: The Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one judges, and a lesser Sanhedrin was composed of twenty-three. From where is it derived that the Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one judges? As it is stated: “Gather Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel, whom you know to be the Elders of the people and officers over them, and bring them into the Tent of Meeting, and they shall stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16), and together with Moses at the head of this body, there are a total of seventy-one. Rabbi Yehuda says: Moses was indeed at the head of the body, but he is not counted as part of the group. Consequently, a future Great Sanhedrin modeled after these Elders is to be composed of seventy judges. And from where is it derived that a lesser Sanhedrin is composed of twenty-three judges? As it is stated: “And the congregation shall judge between the assailant and the avenger… and the congregation shall save the manslayer from the hands of the avenger” (Numbers 35:24–25). Therefore, there must be a congregation, which consists of at least ten judges, that judges the accused and attempts to convict him, and there must be a congregation, also consisting of at least ten judges, which attempts to save the accused by finding him innocent. Together, there are twenty judges here. Before proceeding to derive the requirement for the final three judges, the mishna clarifies: And from where is it derived that a congregation consists of at least ten men? As it is stated concerning the spies: “How long shall I bear with this evil congregation that keep complaining about me?” (Numbers 14:27) There were twelve spies; excluding Joshua and Caleb, who did not complain, there would be ten men who are called: A congregation. Accordingly, the verses describing a congregation that attempts to convict the accused and a congregation that attempts to acquit him together add up to twenty judges. And from where is it derived to bring three more judges to the court? From the implication of that which is stated: “You shall not follow a multitude to convict” (Exodus 23:2), I would derive that I may not convict a person on the basis of a majority but I should follow the majority to exonerate. If so, why is it stated in the same verse: “To incline after a multitude,” from which it can be understood that the majority is followed in all cases? In order to resolve the apparent contradiction it must be explained: Your inclination after the majority to exonerate is not like your inclination after the majority to convict. Your inclination after the majority to exonerate can result in a verdict by a majority of one judge. But your inclination after the majority to convict a transgressor must be by a more decisive majority of at least two. Therefore, the court must have at least twenty-two judges. And since there is a principle that a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, as such a court may be unable to reach a decision, therefore they add another one to them, and there are twenty-three judges here. And how many men must be in the city for it to be eligible for a lesser Sanhedrin? One hundred and twenty. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Two hundred and thirty, corresponding to the ministers of tens, as outlined by Moses and Yitro in the wilderness (Exodus, chapter 18). That is to say, each member of the Sanhedrin can be viewed as a judge with responsibility for ten residents. If there are not enough men in the city to enable this calculation, it would not be honorable to appoint a Sanhedrin, as their members will each preside over less than the minimum of ten residents.

Chapter 2

The High Priest judges others if he is sufficiently wise, and others judge him when he transgresses. He testifies before the court and others testify concerning him. He performs ḥalitza with his brother’s widow and his brother performs ḥalitza with his wife; and his brother consummates levirate marriage with his wife. But he does not consummate levirate marriage with his brother’s widow, because it is prohibited for him to marry a widow (see Leviticus 21:14), and can therefore never fulfill the mitzva of levirate marriage, as a yevama is by definition a widow. If a relative of the High Priest dies, he does not follow the bier carrying the corpse, since it is prohibited for the High Priest to become ritually impure even for immediate relatives (see Leviticus 21:11). Rather, once the members of the funeral procession are concealed from sight by turning onto another street, he is revealed on the street they departed, and when they are revealed, then he is concealed, and in this way, he goes out with them until the entrance of the gate of the city, from where they would take out the corpse, since the dead were not buried in Jerusalem. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not emerge from the Temple at all for the burial of his relatives, as it is stated: “And from the Temple he shall not emerge and will not desecrate the Temple of his God; for the separateness of the oil of the anointment of his God is on him” (Leviticus 21:12). The mishna continues: And when he consoles others in their mourning when they return from burial, the way of all the people is that they pass by one after another and the mourners stand in a line and are consoled, and the appointed person stands in the middle, between the High Priest and the people. And when he is consoled by others in his mourning, all the people say to him: We are your atonement. And he says to them: May you be blessed from Heaven. And when they comfort him with the first meal after the burial of one of his relatives, all the people recline on the ground as if they are taking his mourning on themselves, and he reclines on the bench out of respect for his status as High Priest.

The mishna continues, enumerating the halakhot pertaining to the king in similar matters: The king does not judge others as a member of a court and others do not judge him, he does not testify and others do not testify concerning him, he does not perform ḥalitza with his brother’s widow and his brother does not perform ḥalitza with his wife, and he does not consummate levirate marriage with his brother’s widow and his brother does not consummate levirate marriage with his wife, as all these actions are not fitting to the honor of his office. Rabbi Yehuda says: These are not restrictions, but his prerogative: If he desired to perform ḥalitza or to consummate levirate marriage, he is remembered for good, as this is to the benefit of his brother’s widow. The Sages said to him: They do not listen to him if he desires to do so, as this affects not only his own honor but that of the kingdom. And no one may marry a king’s widow, due to his honor. Rabbi Yehuda says: Another king may marry the widow of a king, as we found that King David married the widow of King Saul, as it is stated: “And I have given you the house of your master and the wives of your master in your bosom” (II Samuel 12:8).

If a relative of the king dies, he does not emerge from the entrance of his palace [ palterin ], as it does not befit one of his stature to accompany the deceased. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he wishes to follow the bier, he follows it, as that is what we found with regard to King David, who followed the bier of Abner. As it is stated: “And King David followed the bier” (II Samuel 3:31). The Sages said to Rabbi Yehuda: The matter was only to appease the people, so that they should not suspect David of ordering Abner’s death. And when the people comfort the king with the meal of comfort, all the people recline on the ground, and he reclines on the dargash.

And the king brings out people for conscription in an optional war, i.e., a war that is not mandated by the Torah and is not a war of defense, on the basis of a court of seventy-one, and breaches fences of anyone in his way to create a pathway for himself for his various needs, and no one can protest his power. The pathway of the king has no measure, neither lengthwise nor widthwise, and one cannot protest that this pathway is wider than necessary. And all the people take spoils in war and give them to him, and he takes the first portion of the spoils. mishna The king “shall not add many wives for himself” (Deuteronomy 17:17), but only eighteen. Rabbi Yehuda says: He may add many wives for himself, provided that they are not like those who turn his heart away from reverence for God. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he wants to marry only one wife, if she turns his heart away, he should not marry her. If so, why is it stated: “He shall not add many wives for himself”? This teaches that even if his wives are like Abigail, who was righteous and prevented David from sin (see I Samuel, chapter 25), it is prohibited for him to have many wives. The king “shall not accumulate many horses for himself” (Deuteronomy 17:16), but only enough for his chariot in war and in peace. “Neither shall he greatly accumulate silver and gold for himself” (Deuteronomy 17:17), but only enough to provide his soldiers’ sustenance [ aspanya ]. And the king writes himself a Torah scroll for his sake, as stipulated in Deuteronomy 17:18. When he goes out to war, he brings it out with him. When he comes in from war, he brings it in with him. When he sits in judgment, it is with him. When he reclines to eat, it is opposite him, as it is stated: “And it shall be with him and he shall read it all the days of his life” (Deuteronomy 17:19).

One may not ride on the king’s horse, and one may not sit on his throne, and one may not use his scepter, and one may not see him when he is having his hair cut, nor when he is naked, nor when he is in the bathhouse, as it is stated: “You shall set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15), meaning, ensure that his fear should be upon you. All of these actions would lessen one’s fear of and reverence for the king.

Chapter 3

Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three. They are chosen in the following manner: This litigant chooses one for himself and that litigant chooses one for himself, and the two of them choose one more for themselves; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge for themselves. This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as judges or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them. This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one litigant disqualify the other’s witnesses? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from bearing witness for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as witnesses, he cannot disqualify them.

If one litigant says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha, are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract it, but must accept their verdict. Similarly, one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, which is done while grasping a sacred object, and the latter said to him: Instead of taking an oath, merely vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and demand that the other litigant take an oath, as he is obligated to do by Torah law. And the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer. Once he has agreed to accept a vow, which is of less severity than an oath, he cannot retract his agreement.

And these on the following list are the ones who are disqualified by the Sages from bearing witness due to their unseemly behavior, as they are considered wicked individuals guilty of monetary transgressions: One who plays with dice [ bekubbiyya ] for money, and one who lends money with interest, and those who fly pigeons, and merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, which may be eaten but may not be sold as an object of commerce. Rabbi Shimon said: Initially, people would call them: Gatherers of the produce of the Sabbatical Year. Once the tax collectors grew abundant they would then call them: Merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, as the Gemara will explain. Rabbi Yehuda said: When are the people listed above disqualified from bearing witness? It is when they have no occupation but this one. But if they have an occupation other than this one, although they also make money by these inappropriate means, they are fit to bear witness.

And these are the ones disqualified from bearing witness or from serving as judges due to their status as relatives of one of the litigants or of each other: One’s brother, and his paternal uncle, and his maternal uncle, and his sister’s husband, and the husband of his paternal aunt, and the husband of his maternal aunt, and his mother’s husband, and his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law, i.e., the husband of his wife’s sister. They themselves, all of these people, and also their sons, and their sons-in-law are considered relatives. And his stepson alone is disqualified, but not his stepson’s sons or sons-in-law. Rabbi Yosei says: This aforementioned halakha is Rabbi Akiva’s version of the mishna. But the initial version of the mishna reads as follows: His uncle and the son of his uncle, and anyone who is fit to inherit from him. Only paternal relatives, who are fit to inherit from him, are disqualified; maternal relatives, who do not inherit from him, are not disqualified from bearing witness about him or from adjudicating his case. And the halakha disqualifying a relative from bearing witness or serving as a judge is referring to anyone who is related to him at the time of the trial. If one was once a relative and became unrelated by the time of the trial, e.g., he married the daughter of one of the litigants, but she died or they were divorced, in this case he is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if his daughter died but her husband, the former son-in-law, has children from her, he is still considered a relative; the children cause them to remain related.

One who loves or one who hates one of the litigants is also disqualified. With regard to one who loves one of the litigants, this is referring to his groomsman. One who hates is referring to anyone who, out of enmity, did not speak with the litigant for three days. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: The Jewish people are not suspected of bearing false witness due to love or hate.

How do the judges examine the witnesses? They bring them into a room in the courthouse and intimidate them so that they will speak only the truth. And they take all the people, other than the judges, outside so that they should not tell the other witnesses the questions the judges ask and the answers the first witness gives, and they leave only the eldest of the witnesses to testify first. And they say to him: Say how exactly you know that this litigant owes money to that litigant, as the plaintiff claims. If he said: The defendant said to me: It is true that I owe the plaintiff, or if he says: So-and-so said to me that the defendant owes the plaintiff, the witness has said nothing and his testimony is disregarded. It is not valid testimony unless he says: The defendant admitted in our presence to the plaintiff that he owes him, e.g., two hundred dinars. By admitting to the debt in the presence of witnesses he renders himself liable to pay the amount that he mentioned. And afterward they bring in the second witness and examine him in the same manner. If their statements are found to be congruent the judges then discuss the matter. If the opinions of the judges are divided, as two judges say that the defendant is exempt from payment and one says he is liable to pay, he is exempt. If two say he is liable and one says he is exempt, he is liable. If one says he is liable and one says he is exempt, or even if two of the judges deem him exempt or two of them deem him liable, and the other one says: I do not know, the court must add more judges and then rule in accordance with the majority opinion. This is because the one who abstains is considered as though he is not a member of the court.

After the judges finish the matter and reach a decision, they bring in the litigants. The greatest of the judges says: So-and-so, you are exempt from paying; or: So-and-so, you are liable to pay. And from where is it derived that when the judge leaves the courtroom he may not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? About this it is stated: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets, but one who is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13).

Any time one of the litigants brings additional proof, he can overturn the verdict that was decided according to previous proofs. If one litigant said to the other: Bring all the proofs that you have from now until thirty days from now, if he found additional proof within thirty days, he can overturn the verdict. If he found it after thirty days, he cannot overturn the verdict anymore. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: He can still overturn the verdict, as what should this litigant, who sought and did not find additional proof within thirty days but found it after thirty days, have done? In a case where one litigant said to the other: Bring witnesses, and the latter said: I have no witnesses, and the former said to him: Bring a proof, and he said: I have no proof, and he later brought a proof or found witnesses, in this case, this proof or these witnesses are worth nothing. It is apparently a false proof or false testimony. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What should this litigant, who did not know that he has witnesses and ultimately found witnesses, or who did not know that he has a proof and ultimately found proof, have done? Therefore, he can still overturn the verdict. If at the beginning of the discussion in the court one did not bring witnesses or other evidence for his claims, but then he saw that he was about to be deemed liable to pay in the judgment, and said: Bring so-and-so and so-and-so, and they will testify on my behalf, or he pulled out a proof from under his belt [ pundato ], even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that this is worth nothing. If there was truth in the testimony of these witnesses or in this proof, he would not have hidden it until now.

Chapter 4

Both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to the requirement for inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses, as it is stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that all legal procedures must be uniform. Having stated the essential similarity between the two, the mishna enumerates the differences between them. What are the differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law? Cases of monetary law are judged by a court of three judges, and cases of capital law are judged by a court of twenty-three judges. In cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. And in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but it does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable. In cases of monetary law, the court directs, i.e., issues, the ruling based on a majority of one judge, either to exempt, or to find liable. But in cases of capital law, the court directs the judgment based on a majority of one judge to acquit and based on a majority of two judges to find liable. In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. In cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of monetary law, one who initially teaches a reason to find the accused liable may then teach a reason to exempt him, and one who initially teaches a reason to exempt him may then teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to find him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may not return and teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling only in the daytime. In cases of monetary law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day, whether to exempt the accused or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day to acquit the accused, but must wait until the following day to find him liable. Therefore, since capital cases might continue for two days, the court does not judge cases of capital law on certain days, neither on the eve of Shabbat nor the eve of a Festival.

In cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. In cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side, where the least significant judges sit. All are fit to judge cases of monetary law. But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; only priests, Levites, and Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood are fit to judge cases of capital law.

A Sanhedrin of twenty-three was arranged in the same layout as half of a circular threshing floor, in order that all the judges will see one another and the witnesses. And two judges’ scribes stand before the court, one on the right and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who find the accused liable and the statements of those who acquit the accused. Rabbi Yehuda says: There were three scribes. One writes only the statements of those who acquit the accused, one writes only the statements of those who find him liable, and the third writes both the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable, so that if there is uncertainty concerning the precise wording that one of the scribes writes, it can be compared to the words of the third scribe.

And three rows of Torah scholars sit before the judges, and each and every one among those sitting recognizes his place, i.e., they are seated in accordance with their stature. When the court must ordain an additional judge, e.g., if a judge dies during the proceedings or in the case of a court without a decisive majority (see 40a), the court ordains the greatest Torah scholar from the first row. As a seat in the first row is now vacant, one Torah scholar from the second row comes to the first row, and one Torah scholar from the third row comes to the second row, and the court selects another Torah scholar from among the assembled and they seat him in the third row. And this Torah scholar who moves from the second row to the first row would not sit in the place of the first Torah scholar, who joined the court, rather, he would sit in the place appropriate for him, i.e., at the end of that row, in accordance with his stature.

How does the court intimidate the witnesses in giving testimony for cases of capital law? They would bring the witnesses in and intimidate them by saying to them: Perhaps what you say in your testimony is based on conjecture, or perhaps it is based on a rumor, perhaps it is testimony based on hearsay, e.g., you heard a witness testify to this in a different court, or perhaps it is based on the statement of a trusted person. Perhaps you do not know that ultimately we examine you with inquiry and interrogation, and if you are lying, your lie will be discovered. The court tells them: You should know that cases of capital law are not like cases of monetary law. In cases of monetary law, a person who testifies falsely, causing money to be given to the wrong party, can give the money to the proper owner and his sin is atoned for. In cases of capital law, if one testifies falsely, the blood of the accused and the blood of his offspring that he did not merit to produce are ascribed to the witness’s testimony until eternity. The proof for this is as we found with Cain, who killed his brother, as it is stated concerning him: “The voice of your brother’s blood [ demei ] cries out to Me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10). The verse does not state: Your brother’s blood [ dam ], in the singular, but rather: “Your brother’s blood [ demei ],” in the plural. This serves to teach that the loss of both his brother’s blood and the blood of his brother’s offspring are ascribed to Cain. The mishna notes: Alternatively, the phrase “your brother’s blood [ demei ],” written in the plural, teaches that that his blood was not gathered in one place but was splattered on the trees and on the stones. The court tells the witnesses: Therefore, Adam the first man was created alone, to teach you that with regard to anyone who destroys one soul from the Jewish people, i.e., kills one Jew, the verse ascribes him blame as if he destroyed an entire world, as Adam was one person, from whom the population of an entire world came forth. And conversely, anyone who sustains one soul from the Jewish people, the verse ascribes him credit as if he sustained an entire world. The mishna cites another reason Adam the first man was created alone: And this was done due to the importance of maintaining peace among people, so that one person will not say to another: My father, i.e., progenitor, is greater than your father. And it was also so that the heretics who believe in multiple gods will not say: There are many authorities in Heaven, and each created a different person. And this serves to tell of the greatness of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as when a person stamps several coins with one seal, they are all similar to each other. But the supreme King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, stamped all people with the seal of Adam the first man, as all of them are his offspring, and not one of them is similar to another. Therefore, since all humanity descends from one person, each and every person is obligated to say: The world was created for me, as one person can be the source of all humanity, and recognize the significance of his actions. The court says to the witnesses: And perhaps you will say: Why would we want this trouble? Perhaps it would be better not to testify at all. But be aware, as is it not already stated: “And he being a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1)? It is a transgression not to testify when one can do so. And perhaps you will say: Why would we want to be responsible for the blood of this person? But be aware, as is it not already stated: “When the wicked perish, there is song” (Proverbs 11:10)?

Chapter 5

The court would examine the witnesses in capital cases with seven interrogations, i.e., interrogatory questions, and they are: In which seven-year period, that is, in which cycle of seven years within a jubilee did the event occur; in which year of the Sabbatical cycle did the event occur; in which month did the event occur; on which day of the month did the event occur; on which day of the week did the event occur; at which hour did the event occur; and in what place did the event occur. Rabbi Yosei says: The court would examine the witnesses with only three interrogations: On which day did the event occur, at which hour, and in what place. They would also ask: Do you recognize him as the man who committed the transgression? Did you warn him? They would then ask the witnesses about the particulars of the incident. For example, in the case of one who is an accused idol worshipper, they ask the witnesses: Whom, i.e., which idol, did he worship, and in what manner did he worship it, and so on.

With regard to all judges who increase the number of examinations, i.e., who add questions about the details of the event, this is praiseworthy, as this may clarify that the witnesses are lying. An incident occurred and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses by questioning them about the color and shape of the stems of figs in order to unearth a contradiction between the witnesses. The mishna explains: What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? With regard to interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. With regard to examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. Both with regard to interrogations and examinations, at a time when the witnesses contradict one another, their testimony is void.

The mishna clarifies: If one witness says the event occurred on the second of the month, and one witness says that the event occurred on the third of the month, this is not regarded as a contradiction and their testimony stands, since it is possible to say that this witness knows of the addition of a day to the previous month, and according to his tally the event occurred on the second of the month, and that witness does not know of the addition of a day to the previous month, and according to his tally the event occurred on the third of the month. Their testimony is not considered incongruent. By contrast, if this witness says the event occurred on the third of the month and one witness says the event occurred on the fifth of the month, their testimony is void, as this disparity cannot be attributed to a mere error. Therefore, their testimony is not congruent. Similarly, if one witness says that the event occurred at two hours, i.e., the second hour of the day from sunrise, and one witness says that the event occurred at three hours, their testimony stands, as one could reasonably err this amount in estimating the hour of the day. By contrast, if one says that the event occurred at three hours, and one says that the event occurred at five hours, their testimony is void. Rabbi Yehuda says: Also in this case their testimony stands, as one could reasonably err concerning even this length of time. Rabbi Yehuda adds: But if one says that the event occurred at five hours, and one says that the event occurred at seven hours, their testimony is void. Here the difference is recognizable to all, since at five hours the sun is in the east and at seven the sun is in the west, and one could not err concerning this. Therefore, their testimony is not congruent.

The mishna continues: And afterward, after the court examines the first witness, they bring in the second witness and examine him. If the statements of the witnesses are found to be congruent, the court begins to deliberate the matter. They open the deliberations with an appeal to anyone who can find a reason to acquit the accused. If one of the witnesses said: I can teach a reason to acquit him, or if one of the students sitting before the judges said: I can teach a reason to deem him liable, the judges silence him, i.e., both the witness and the student. The reason is that these people are not allowed to offer information such as this. But if one of the students said: I can to teach a reason to acquit him, they raise him to the seat of the court and seat him among them, and he would not descend from there the entire day, but would sit and participate in their deliberations. If the statement of that student has substance, the court listens to him. And if even the accused says: I can teach a reason to acquit me, the court listens to him and considers his statement, provided that his statement has substance.

And if the court found it fit to acquit him during the deliberations, as all or a majority of the judges agreed to acquit him, they excuse him. But if a majority does not find it fit to acquit him, they delay his verdict to the following day, and they then assign pairs of judges to discuss the matter with each other. They would minimize their food intake and they would not drink wine all day. And they would deliberate all night, and the following day they would arise early and come to court and then vote again and tally the votes of the judges. One who yesterday was of the opinion to acquit the defendant says: I said to acquit, and I acquit in my place, i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. And one who yesterday was of the opinion to deem him liable says: I said to deem him liable, and I deem him liable in my place. One who yesterday taught a reason to deem him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who yesterday taught a reason to acquit may not then teach a reason to deem him liable. If they erred in the matter, as one of the judges forgot what he had said the previous day, two judges’ scribes, who recorded the statements of the judges, remind him. If the court then found it fit to acquit him unanimously, they excuse him, and if not all of the judges determine to acquit, they stand to count the vote. If twelve judges vote to acquit him and eleven judges deem him liable, he is acquitted. The mishna continues: In a case where twelve judges deem him liable and eleven judges acquit; or even if eleven judges acquit and eleven deem him liable and one judge says: I do not know; or even if twenty-two judges acquit or deem him liable and one judge says: I do not know, the judge who said he does not know is disregarded, and the judges add additional judges to the court until they reach a definitive ruling. And how many judges do they add? They add pairs of two judges each time they do not reach a ruling until there are seventy-one judges, but no more than that. At that point, if thirty-six judges acquit and thirty-five judges deem him liable, he is acquitted. If thirty-six judges deem him liable and thirty-five judges acquit, they continue to deliberate the matter, these judges against those judges, until one of those who deems him liable sees the validity of the statements of those who acquit and changes his position, as the court does not condemn a defendant to death by a majority of one judge.

Chapter 6

When the trial has ended in a guilty verdict and the condemned man has been sentenced to be stoned, he is taken out to be stoned. The place of stoning was outside the court and a little beyond it, as it is stated with regard to a blasphemer: “Take out him who has cursed to outside the camp, and let all that heard him lay their hands upon his head, and let all the congregation stone him” (Leviticus 24:14). One man stands at the entrance to the court, with cloths [ vehasudarin ] in his hand, and another man sits on a horse at a distance from him but where he can still see him. If one of the judges says: I can teach a reason to acquit him, the other, i.e., the man with the cloths, waves the cloths as a signal to the man on the horse, and the horse races off after the court agents who are leading the condemned man to his execution, and he stops them, and they wait until the court determines whether or not the argument has substance. And even if he, the condemned man himself, says: I can teach a reason to acquit myself, he is returned to the courthouse, even four or five times, provided that there is substance to his words. If, after the condemned man is returned to the courthouse, the judges find a reason to acquit him, they acquit him and release him immediately. But if they do not find a reason to acquit him, he goes out to be stoned. And a crier goes out before him and publicly proclaims: So-and-so, son of so-and-so, is going out to be stoned because he committed such and such a transgression. And so-and-so and so-and-so are his witnesses. Anyone who knows of a reason to acquit him should come forward and teach it on his behalf.

When the condemned man is at a distance of about ten cubits from the place of stoning, they say to him: Confess your transgressions, as the way of all who are being executed is to confess. As whoever confesses and regrets his transgressions has a portion in the World-to-Come. For so we find with regard to Achan, that Joshua said to him: “My son, please give glory to the Lord, God of Israel, and make confession to Him” (Joshua 7:19). And the next verse states: “And Achan answered Joshua, and said: Indeed I have sinned against the Lord, God of Israel, and like this and like that have I done.” And from where is it derived that Achan’s confession achieved atonement for him? It is derived from here, as it is stated: “And Joshua said: Why have you brought trouble on us? The Lord shall trouble you this day” (Joshua 7:25). Joshua said to Achan as follows: On this day of your judgment you are troubled, but you will not be troubled in the World-to-Come. And if the condemned man does not know how to confess, either from ignorance or out of confusion, they say to him: Say simply: Let my death be an atonement for all my sins. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the condemned man knows that he was convicted by the testimony of conspiring witnesses, but in fact he is innocent, he says: Let my death be an atonement for all my sins except for this sin. The Sages who disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda said to him: If so, every person who is being executed will say that, to clear himself in the eyes of the public. Therefore, if the condemned man does not make such a statement on his own, the court does not suggest it to him as an alternative.

When the condemned man is at a distance of four cubits from the place of stoning, they take off his clothes. They cover a man’s genitals in the front, and a woman is covered both in the front and in the back; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. But the Rabbis say: A man is stoned naked, i.e., wearing only that cloth covering, but a woman is not stoned naked, but is stoned while clothed.

The place of stoning from which the condemned man is pushed to his death is a platform twice the height of an ordinary person. He is made to stand at the edge of the platform, and then one of the witnesses who testified against him pushes him down by the hips, so that he falls face up onto the ground. If he turned over onto his chest, with his face downward, the witness turns him over onto his hips. And if he dies through this fall to the ground, the obligation to stone the transgressor is fulfilled. And if the condemned man does not die from his fall, the second witness takes the stone that has been prepared for this task and places, i.e., casts, it on his chest. And if he dies with the casting of this first stone, the obligation to stone the transgressor is fulfilled. And if he does not die with the casting of this stone, then his stoning is completed by all of the Jewish people, i.e., by all the people who assembled for the execution, as it is stated: “The hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterward the hand of all the people” (Deuteronomy 17:7). The corpses of all those who are stoned are hung after their death; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: Only the corpse of the blasphemer, who has cursed God, and the corpse of the idol worshipper are hung. The corpse of a man is hung facing the people, but the corpse of a woman, out of modesty, is hung with facing the tree; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: the corpse of a man is hung, but the corpse of a woman is not hung. Rabbi Eliezer said to the Rabbis: Did Shimon ben Shataḥ not hang in Ashkelon women who were found guilty of witchcraft, proving that the corpse of a woman who is executed is also hung? They said to him: No proof can be brought from here, as he hanged eighty women on that day, and the halakha is that the same court may not judge even two people charged with capital transgressions on the same day. It is therefore clear that he was not acting in accordance with Torah law, but rather his execution of the eighty women was an extraordinary punishment necessitated by unusually pressing circumstances. How do they hang the corpse of one who was put to death by stoning? They sink a post into the earth with a piece of wood jutting out, forming a T-shaped structure. And the court appointee then places the dead man’s two hands one upon the other, ties them, and hangs him by his hands. Rabbi Yosei says: The post is not sunk into the ground; rather, it leans against a wall, and he hangs the corpse on it the way that butchers do with meat. The dead man hangs there for only a very short time, and then they immediately untie him. And if he was left hanging overnight, a prohibition is transgressed, as it is stated: “His body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but you shall bury him that day, for he that is hung is a curse of God” (Deuteronomy 21:23). That is to say: Were the corpse left hanging on the tree overnight, people would ask: For what reason was this one hung after he was put to death? They would be answered: Because he blessed God, a euphemism for blasphemy. And therefore the name of Heaven would be desecrated were the dead man’s corpse to remain hanging, reminding everybody of his transgression.

Rabbi Meir said: The phrase “for he that is hung is a curse [ kilelat ] of God” should be understood as follows: When a man suffers in the wake of his sin, what expression does the Divine Presence use? I am distressed [ kallani ] about My head, I am distressed about My arm, meaning, I, too, suffer when the wicked are punished. From here it is derived: If God suffers such distress over the blood of the wicked that is spilled, even though they justly deserved their punishment, it can be inferred a fortiori that He suffers distress over the blood of the righteous. And the Sages said not only this, that an executed transgressor must be buried on the same day that he is killed, but they said that anyone who leaves his deceased relative overnight with-out burying him transgresses a prohibition. But if he left the deceased overnight for the sake of the deceased’s honor, e.g., to bring a coffin or shrouds for his burial, he does not transgress the prohibition against leaving him unburied overnight. After the executed transgressor is taken down he is buried, and they would not bury him in his ancestral burial plot. Rather, two graveyards were established for the burial of those executed by the court: One for those who were killed by decapitation or strangled, and one for those who were stoned or burned.

Once the flesh of the deceased had decomposed, they would gather his bones and bury them in their proper place in his ancestral burial plot. And soon after the execution, the relatives of the executed transgressor would come and inquire about the welfare of the judges and about the welfare of the witnesses, as if to say: We hold no grudges against you, as you judged a true judgment. And the relatives of the executed man would not mourn him with the observance of the usual mourning rites, so that his unmourned death would atone for his transgression; but they would grieve over his passing, since grief is felt only in the heart.

Chapter 7

Four types of the death penalty were given over to the court, with which those who committed certain transgressions are executed. They are, in descending order of severity: Stoning, burning, killing by decapitation, and strangulation. Rabbi Shimon says: They are, in descending order of severity: Burning, stoning, strangulation, and killing. This execution, described in the previous chapter, is referring to the mitzva of those who are stoned, i.e., to the process of execution by stoning.

The mitzva of those who are burned, i.e., the process of execution by burning, is carried out in the following manner: The executioners submerge the condemned one in dung up to his knees so he cannot move, and they place a rough scarf within a soft one, so his throat will not be wounded, and wrap these scarves around his neck. This one, i.e., one of the witnesses, pulls the scarf toward himself, and that one, the other witness, pulls it toward himself, until the condemned one is forced to open his mouth, as he is choking. And another person then lights the wick and throws it into his mouth, and it goes down into his intestines and burns his intestines and he dies. Rabbi Yehuda says: But if this one who is condemned to death by burning accidentally died at their hands by strangulation, they have not fulfilled the mitzva of execution by burning for this person. Rather, the process is carried out in the following manner: One opens the mouth of the condemned person with prongs, against his will, and one lights the wick and throws it into his mouth, and it goes down into his intestines and burns his intestines and he dies. Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok said: An incident occurred with regard to a certain priest’s daughter who committed adultery, and they wrapped her in bundles of branches and burned her, contrary to the process described in the mishna. The Sages said to him: That court did not act properly; they did so because the court at that time was not proficient in halakha.

The mitzva of those who are killed, i.e., the process of execution by decapitation, is carried out in the following manner: The executioners cut off his head with a sword, the way that the monarchy does when a king sentences a person to death. Rabbi Yehuda says: This manner of execution is improper, as it degrades him. Rather, they place the head of the condemned on the block, and chop it off with a cleaver [ bekofitz ]. The Rabbis said to him: If you are concerned about his degradation, there is no death penalty more degrading than that. It is better for him to be executed in the manner described first. The mitzva of those who are strangled is carried out in the following manner: The agents of the court submerge the condemned one in dung up to his knees so he cannot move, and one of them places a rough scarf within a soft one, and wraps it around his neck. This one, i.e., one of the witnesses, pulls the scarf toward him, and that one, the other witness, pulls it toward him, until the soul of the condemned one departs.

These transgressors are those who are stoned to death: One who engages in intercourse with his mother; or with his father’s wife, even if she is not his mother; or with his daughter-in-law; or with a male; or with an animal; and a woman who engages in intercourse with an animal. And one who blasphemes, and one who engages in idol worship. And one who gives of his offspring to Molekh, and a necromancer, and a sorcerer. And one who desecrates Shabbat, and one who curses his father or his mother, and one who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, and an inciter who incites individuals to idol worship, and a subverter who incites an entire city to idol worship, and a warlock, and a stubborn and rebellious son. The mishna elaborates: One who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his mother who is also his father’s wife is liable to bring two sin-offerings for his intercourse with her: One due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s mother and one due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s father’s wife. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is liable to bring only one sin-offering, due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s mother. One who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his father’s wife while his father is married to her is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s father’s wife and one due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a married woman. He is liable due to the former prohibition both during his father’s lifetime and after his father’s death, and whether the relationship between the woman and his father is one of betrothal or one of marriage. Likewise, one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law during his son’s lifetime is liable to bring two sin-offerings for his intercourse with her: One due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter-in-law, and one due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a married woman. The former liability applies both during his son’s lifetime and after his son’s death, and whether the relationship between the woman and his son is one of betrothal or one of marriage. A man who engages in intercourse with a male or with an animal, and a woman who engages in intercourse with an animal, are executed by stoning. The animal is likewise stoned to death. The mishna asks: If the person sinned by doing this, how did the animal sin? Rather, because a calamity was caused to a person by it, therefore the verse states that it should be stoned, so that it does not cause another to sin. Alternatively, it is so that this animal will not pass through the marketplace, and those who see it will say: This is the animal because of which so-and-so was stoned, and its existence would shame his memory.

One who blasphemes, i.e., one who curses God, is not liable unless he utters the name of God and curses it. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said: On every day of a blasphemer’s trial, when the judges judge the witnesses, i.e., interrogate the witnesses, they ask the witnesses to use an appellation for the name of God, so that they do not utter a curse of God’s name. Specifically, the witnesses would say: Let Yosei smite Yosei, as the name Yosei has four letters in Hebrew, as does the Tetragrammaton. When the judgment is over, and the court votes to deem the defendant guilty, they do not sentence him to death based on the testimony of the witnesses in which they used an appellation for the name of God, without having ever heard the exact wording of the curse. Rather, they remove all the people who are not required to be there from the court, so that the curse is not heard publicly, and the judges interrogate the eldest of the witnesses, and say to him: Say what you heard explicitly. And he says exactly what he heard. And the judges stand on their feet and make a tear in their garments, as an act of mourning for the desecration of the honor of God. And they do not ever fully stitch it back together again. And the second witness says: I too heard as he did, but he does not repeat the curse explicitly. And the third witness, in the event that there is one, says: I too heard as he did. In this manner, the repetition of the invective sentence is limited to what is absolutely necessary.

One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering, and one who pours a libation in idol worship, and one who bows to an idol, and one who declares that he accepts an idol upon himself as a god, and one who says to an idol: You are my god. But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, or one who washes it, or one who rubs it with oil, or one who dresses it, or one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition. One who defecates before the idol known as Ba’al-Peor is liable to receive capital punishment, even though defecating is a degrading act, as that is its form of worship. Likewise, one who throws a stone at Mercury is liable to receive capital punishment, as that is its form of worship.

One who gives of his offspring to Molekh, for which one is executed by stoning, is not liable unless he hands over his child to the priests of Molekh and passes the child through the fire. If he handed over the child to the priests of Molekh but did not pass him through the fire, or if he passed him through the fire but did not hand him over to the priests of Molekh, he is not liable, unless he hands the child over to the priests of Molekh and passes him through the fire. The list of those liable to be executed by stoning includes those who practice various types of sorcery. The mishna describes them: A necromancer is a pitom from whose armpit the voice of the dead appears to speak. And a sorcerer is one from whose mouth the dead appears to speak. These, the necromancer and the sorcerer, are executed by stoning, and one who inquires about the future through them is in violation of a prohibition.

Also liable to be executed by stoning is one who desecrates Shabbat by performing a matter that for its intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting performance one is obligated to bring a sin-offering. One who curses his father or his mother is not liable to be executed by stoning unless he curses them with the name of God. If he cursed them with an appellation of the name of God, Rabbi Meir deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

One who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman is not liable to be executed by stoning unless she is a young woman, i.e., neither a minor nor an adult; a virgin; betrothed but not yet married; and she lives in her father’s home, having yet to move in with her husband. If two men engaged in intercourse with her, the first is liable to be executed by stoning, and the second is liable to be executed by strangulation. The second man is executed in this manner in accordance with the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with a married or non-virgin betrothed woman, as she was no longer a virgin when he engaged in intercourse with her.

With regard to the case of an inciter, listed among those liable to be executed by stoning, this is an ordinary person, not a prophet. And it is referring to one who incites an ordinary person and not a multitude of people. What does the inciter do? He says: There is an idol in such and such a place, which eats like this, drinks like this, does good for its worshippers like this, and harms those who do not worship it like this. The mishna states a principle with regard to the halakha of an inciter: With regard to all of those mentioned in the Torah who are liable to receive the death penalty, if there are no witnesses to their transgressions, the court does not hide witnesses in order to ensnare and punish them, except for this case of an inciter. The mishna elaborates: If the inciter said his words of incitement to two men, they are his witnesses, and he does not need to be warned before the transgression; they bring him to court and stone him. If he said his words of incitement to one man alone, that man’s testimony would not be sufficient to have the inciter executed. Therefore he says to the inciter: I have friends who are interested in this; tell them too. This way there will be more witnesses. The mishna continues: If the inciter is cunning, and he knows that he cannot speak in front of two men, the court hides witnesses for him behind the fence so that he will not see them, and the man whom the inciter had previously tried to incite says to him: Say what you said to me when we were in seclusion. And the other person, the inciter, says to him again that he should worship the idol. And he says to the inciter: How can we forsake our God in Heaven and go and worship wood and stones? If the inciter retracts his suggestion, that is good. But if he says: This idol worship is our duty; this is what suits us, then those standing behind the fence bring him to court and have him stoned. The halakha of an inciter includes one who says: I shall worship idols, or one of the following statements: I shall go and worship idols, or: let us go and worship idols, or: I shall sacrifice an idolatrous offering, or: I shall go and sacrifice an idolatrous offering, or: Let us go and sacrifice an idolatrous offering, or: I shall burn incense as an idolatrous offering, or: I shall go and burn incense, or: Let us go and burn incense, or: I shall pour an idolatrous libation, or: I shall go and pour a libation, or: Let us go and pour a libation, or: I shall bow to an idol, or: I shall go and bow, or: Let us go and bow. With regard to the case of the subverter listed among those liable to be executed by stoning, this is one who says to a multitude of people: Let us go and worship idols.

The warlock is also liable to be executed by stoning. One who performs a real act of sorcery is liable, but not one who deceives the eyes, making it appear as though he is performing sorcery, as that is not considered sorcery. Rabbi Akiva says in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: For example, two people can each gather cucumbers by sorcery. One of them gathers cucumbers and he is exempt, and the other one gathers cucumbers and he is liable. How so? The one who performs a real act of sorcery is liable, and the one who deceives the eyes is exempt.

Chapter 8

The Torah describes the punishment given to a son who steals money from his parents to eat a gluttonous meal of meat and wine in the company of lowly men. If his parents bring him to court for this act, he is exhorted to desist and is punished with lashes. If he repeats the same misdeed and is again brought to court by his parents within the same three-month period, he is considered a stubborn and rebellious son [ ben sorer umoreh ]. He is liable to receive the death penalty, which in this case is execution by stoning. From when does a stubborn and rebellious son become liable to receive the death penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son? From when he grows two pubic hairs, which are a sign of puberty and from which time he is considered an adult, until he has grown a beard around. The reference here is to the lower beard surrounding his genitals, and not the upper beard, i.e., his facial hair, but the Sages spoke in euphemistic terms. As it is stated: “If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son” (Deuteronomy 21:18), which indicates that the penalty for rebelliousness is imposed upon a son, but not upon a daughter; and upon a son, but not upon a fully grown man. A minor under the age of thirteen is exempt from the penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son, because he has not yet reached the age of inclusion in mitzvot.

From when is a stubborn and rebellious son liable? From when he eats a tarteimar of meat and drinks a half- log of Italian wine. Rabbi Yosei says: From when he eats a maneh of meat and drinks a log of wine. The mishna now lists a series of conditions concerning his eating and drinking. If he ate these items with a group assembled for the performance of a mitzva, or he ate them at a meal celebrating the intercalation of a month, or he ate the items when they had second tithe status, in Jerusalem, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son because each of these circumstances involves some aspect of a mitzva. If he ate the meat of unslaughtered animal carcasses or animals that had wounds that would have caused them to die within twelve months [ tereifot ] or repugnant creatures or creeping animals, or he ate untithed produce from which tithes and terumot were not separated, or first tithe from which its teruma was not separated, or second tithe outside Jerusalem or consecrated food that was not redeemed, each of which involves a transgression, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. The mishna summarizes: If he ate an item that involves performing a mitzva or an item that involves committing a transgression, or if he ate any food in the world but did not eat meat, or if he drank any beverage but did not drink wine, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless he actually eats meat and actually drinks wine, as it is stated: “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he does not listen to our voice; he… is a glutton [ zolel ] and a drunkard [ vesovei ]” (Deuteronomy 21:20). One is not called a glutton and a drunkard unless he eats meat and drinks wine. And although there is no explicit proof to the matter that the reference in the Torah is to meat and wine, there is an allusion to the matter in another verse, as it is stated: “Be not among wine drinkers [ besovei ], among gluttonous eaters [ bezolelei ] of meat” (Proverbs 23:20).

If he stole that which belonged to his father and ate on his father’s property, or he stole that which belonged to others and ate on the property of others, or he stole that which belonged to others and ate on his father’s property, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless he steals that which belonged to his father and eats on the property of others. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He does not become a stubborn and rebellious son unless he steals that which belonged to his father and that which belonged to his mother.

If his father wishes to have him punished but his mother does not wish that, or if his father does not wish to have him punished but his mother wishes that, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless they both wish that he be punished. Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not suited for his father, the two being an inappropriate match, as the Gemara will explain, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. If one of the parents was without hands, or lame, or mute, or blind, or deaf, their son does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, as it is stated: “Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him, and bring him out to the elders of his city and to the gate of his place. And they shall say to the elders of his city: This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he will not obey our voices; he is a glutton and a drunkard” (Deuteronomy 21:19–20). The Sages derive: “Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him,” but not people without hands, who cannot do this. “And bring him out,” but not lame people, who cannot walk. “And they shall say,” but not mutes. “This son of ours,” but not blind people, who cannot point to their son and say “this.” “He will not obey our voices,” but not deaf people, who cannot hear whether or not he declined to obey them. After he is brought before the elders of the city, he is admonished before three people and then they flog him for having stolen. If he sins again, he is judged by a court of twenty-three judges, but he is not stoned unless the first three judges before whom he had been flogged are present there, as it is stated: “This son of ours,” this is the son who was already flogged before you. If the rebellious son ran away before he was sentenced, and afterward, before he was caught, his lower beard grew around, he is exempt from the death penalty. Once his lower beard grows around his genitals, he can no longer be judged as a stubborn and rebellious son. But if he ran away only after he was sentenced, and afterward, by the time he was caught, his lower beard had already grown around, he is liable to receive the death penalty. Once he is sentenced to death his sentence remains in force.

A stubborn and rebellious son is sentenced to death not because of the severity of the transgression that he already committed but on account of his ultimate end, because a boy of his nature will grow up to lead an immoral life, and it is better that he should die while he is still innocent, before causing excessive harm, and not die after he becomes guilty. This is because the death of the wicked is beneficial to them, because they can no longer sin, and it is also beneficial to the world, which is now rid of those who do it harm. Conversely, the death of the righteous is detrimental to them, as they can no longer engage in the performance of mitzvot, and it is also detrimental to the world, as the righteous are now absent from it. By way of association, the mishna continues: The wine and sleep of the wicked are beneficial to them and beneficial to the world, as when they are sleeping or under the influence of wine, they do not cause harm to others. And, conversely, the wine and sleep of the righteous are detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, as wine and sleep prevent them from engaging in their good deeds. The dispersal of the wicked, so that they are not found in close proximity to each other, is beneficial to them, as they are less likely to provoke each other to sin, and it is beneficial to the world. The dispersal of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. The assembly of the wicked in one place is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the assembly of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world. The tranquility of the wicked is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the tranquility of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world.

A burglar who is found breaking into a house may be killed by the owner of the house with impunity (see Exodus 22:1). He too is sentenced on account of his ultimate end, as it is presumed that if the owner of the house would resist the burglar, the burglar would kill the owner of the house. If the burglar was breaking into a house, and in the course of doing so he broke a barrel, if there is blood -guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be liable for killing him, the burglar is liable to pay for the value of the barrel. An example of this is if a father broke into his son’s house, in which case it is presumed that even if the son resists his father, his father would never kill him, and therefore the son may not kill his father, and if he does so he is liable. If there is no blood -guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be exempt from punishment for killing him, the burglar is exempt from paying for the barrel.

And these are the ones who are saved from transgressing even at the cost of their lives; that is to say, these people may be killed so that they do not perform a transgression: One who pursues another to kill him, or pursues a male to sodomize him, or pursues a betrothed young woman to rape her. But with regard to one who pursues an animal to sodomize it, or one who seeks to desecrate Shabbat, or one who is going to engage in idol worship, they are not saved at the cost of their lives. Rather, they are forewarned not to transgress, and if they proceed to transgress after having been forewarned, they are brought to trial, and if they are found guilty, they are executed.

Chapter 9

And these are the transgressors who are burned in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: One who engaged in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, and one who is the daughter of a priest and who committed adultery. Included in the category of the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter and the resulting execution by burning, there are: His daughter, and the daughter of his daughter, and the daughter of his son. Likewise, the following are also included in this category: Intercourse with the daughter of his wife, even though she is not his daughter, and the daughter of her daughter, and the daughter of her son, as well as intercourse with his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The prohibition and punishment apply both in cases where a man marries a woman and then engages in intercourse with her daughter, and in cases where a man marries a woman and then engages in intercourse with her mother. And these are the transgressors who are killed by decapitation in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: The murderer; and the residents of an idolatrous city, all of whom engaged in idol worship. The mishna elaborates: In the case of a murderer who struck another with a stone or with iron, or held him in the water or in the fire, and the victim could not extricate himself from there and he died, the murderer is liable to be executed. If one pushed another into the water or into the fire and that person could have extricated himself from there but failed to do so, and he died, the one who pushed him is exempt from punishment by a court, as he caused the death but did not actually kill the victim. For the same reason, if one set a dog against another and the dog killed him, or if one set a snake against another and the snake killed him, the one who set the dog or the snake is exempt from punishment. If he imbedded the snake’s fangs into another and caused the snake to bite him and kill him, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to be executed, as he is a murderer, and the Rabbis exempt him, as they maintain that he indirectly caused the individual’s death. In the case of one who strikes another, whether he does so with a stone or with his fist, and the doctors assessed his condition, estimating that it would lead to death, and then his condition eased from what it was, and the doctors revised their prognosis and predicted that he would live, and thereafter his condition worsened and he died, the assailant is liable to be executed as a murderer. Rabbi Neḥemya says: He is exempt, as there is a basis for the matter of assuming that he is not liable. Since the victim’s condition eased in the interim, a cause other than the blow struck by the assailant ultimately caused his death.

If one intended to kill an animal, and he killed a person standing adjacent to it, or if he intended to kill a gentile, for whose murder he is not liable to be executed in court, and he killed a Jew, or if he intended to kill non-viable newborns, for whose murder one is not liable, and he killed a viable person, the assailant is exempt from execution, since his intent was to kill one for whose murder he is not liable. If one intended to strike another on his loins, and the blow was not powerful enough to kill him if it were to land on his loins, but instead the blow landed on his chest over the victim’s heart, and it was powerful enough to kill him when it landed on his chest over his heart, and the victim died as a result of the blow, the assailant is exempt from execution, as he did not intend to strike the victim a blow that would cause his death. If he intended to strike him on his chest over his heart and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his chest over his heart, and instead the blow landed on his loins, and it was not powerful enough to kill him when it landed on his loins, and nevertheless the victim died, the assailant is exempt. Although the assailant intended to kill the victim, the blow was not powerful enough to kill. Ostensibly, his death was not a result of the blow. If one intended to kill an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and instead the blow landed on a minor, and the blow was powerful enough to kill the minor and the minor died, the assailant is exempt. If one intended to kill a minor and the blow was powerful enough to kill a minor, and the blow landed on an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and nevertheless, the adult died, the assailant is exempt. But if one intended to strike another on his loins, and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his loins, and instead the blow landed on his chest over his heart, and he died, the assailant is liable, since in any event, his intent was to kill the victim and the blow was powerful enough to kill him wherever it struck him. If one intended to strike an adult and the blow was powerful enough to kill the adult, and the blow landed on a minor and he died, the assailant is liable. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, although he would be liable for killing either, he is exempt, because one is executed only if his action completely corresponded with his intent.

With regard to a murderer who was intermingled with others and it is not possible to identify the murderer, all of them are exempt from liability to be executed. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber [ lakippa ] where they will eventually die. With regard to all those liable to be executed with different court-imposed death penalties who became intermingled with each other and it cannot be determined which individual was sentenced to which death, they are all sentenced to the most lenient form of execution to which any of them was sentenced. In a case where those who are liable to be stoned were intermingled with those who are liable to be burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be executed by stoning, as burning is a more severe form of execution than stoning. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by burning, as stoning is a more severe form of execution than burning. Rabbi Shimon said to the Rabbis: If burning were not more severe than stoning, it would not have been administered to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery. A betrothed daughter of an Israelite who committed adultery is executed by stoning. If burning were not a more severe form of execution than stoning, it would not have been administered to the daughter of a priest who committed adultery, who would presumably receive a more severe punishment. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: If stoning were not more severe than burning it would not have been the death penalty administered to a blasphemer and to an idol worshipper, as their actions violate the very core of the Jewish faith. There is a parallel dispute: In a case where those who are liable to be killed by beheading were intermingled with those who are liable to be strangled, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be beheaded with a sword, as strangulation is a more severe form of execution than beheading. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by strangulation, as beheading is a more severe form of execution than strangulation.

One who is liable to be executed with two different court -imposed death penalties, as he violated two different capital transgressions, is sentenced to the more severe form of execution. If one violated one transgression for which he is liable to receive two death penalties, e.g., if one engaged in intercourse with his mother-in-law, who is also a married woman, he is sentenced to the more severe form of execution. Rabbi Yosei says: He is sentenced to the form of execution that he is liable to receive due to the first relationship that came upon him, i.e., if she was his mother-in-law before she was married, he is executed by burning; if she was married before she was his mother-in-law, he is punished by strangulation.

One who was flogged for violating a prohibition and then repeated the violation and was flogged again assumes the status of a forewarned transgressor. The court places him into the vaulted chamber [ lakippa ] and feeds him barley bread until his belly ruptures due to the low-quality food, and he dies. With regard to one who kills a person not in the presence of witnesses and it is impossible to judge him in court, the court places him into a vaulted chamber and feeds him sparing bread and scant water (see Isaiah 30:20).

With regard to one who steals a kasva, and one who curses with a sorcerer, and one who engages in intercourse with an Aramean woman, zealots strike him and kill him. Although the Torah does not say that one who performs one of these actions is liable to be executed, it is permitted for anyone who zealously takes the vengeance of the Lord to do so. In the case of a priest who performed the Temple service in a state of ritual impurity, his priestly brethren do not bring him to court for judgment; rather, the young men of the priesthood remove him from the Temple courtyard and pierce his skull with pieces of wood. In the case of a non-priest who performed the service in the Temple, Rabbi Akiva says: His execution is by strangulation, and the Rabbis say: He is not executed with a court-imposed death penalty; rather, he is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven.

Chapter 10

All of the Jewish people, even sinners and those who are liable to be executed with a court-imposed death penalty, have a share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And your people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land forever; the branch of My planting, the work of My hands, for My name to be glorified” (Isaiah 60:21). And these are the exceptions, the people who have no share in the World-to-Come, even when they fulfilled many mitzvot: One who says: There is no resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah, and one who says: The Torah did not originate from Heaven, and an epikoros, who treats Torah scholars and the Torah that they teach with contempt. Rabbi Akiva says: Also included in the exceptions are one who reads external literature, and one who whispers invocations over a wound and says as an invocation for healing: “Every illness that I placed upon Egypt I will not place upon you, for I am the Lord, your Healer” (Exodus 15:26). By doing so, he shows contempt for the sanctity of the name of God and therefore has no share in the World-to-Come. Abba Shaul says: Also included in the exceptions is one who pronounces the ineffable name of God as it is written, with its letters.

Three prominent kings mentioned in the Bible and four prominent commoners who are described in the Bible as men of great wisdom have no share in the World-to-Come. The three kings are: Jeroboam, son of Nebat, and Ahab, both of whom were kings of Israel, and Manasseh, king of Judea. Rabbi Yehuda says: Manasseh has a share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated concerning Manasseh: “And he prayed to Him, and He received his entreaty, and heard his supplication and brought him back to Jerusalem unto his kingdom” (II Chronicles 33:13), indicating that he repented wholeheartedly and effectively. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: He regretted his actions, and his repentance was effective to the extent that God restored him to his kingdom, but God did not restore him to his share in life in the World-to-Come. The four commoners are: Balaam, son of Beor; Doeg the Edomite; Ahithophel; and Gehazi.

The members of the generation of the flood have no share in the World-to-Come and will not stand in judgment at the end of days, as it is stated: “My soul shall not abide [ yadon ] in man forever” (Genesis 6:3); neither will they stand in judgment [ din ] nor shall their souls be restored to them. The members of the generation of the dispersion have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the Lord scattered them from there upon the face of all the earth” (Genesis 11:8), and it is written: “And from there did the Lord scatter them upon the face of all the earth” (Genesis 11:9). “And the Lord scattered them” indicates in this world; “and from there did the Lord scatter them” indicates for the World-to-Come. The people of Sodom have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the men of Sodom were wicked and sinners before the Lord exceedingly” (Genesis 13:13). “Wicked” indicates in this world; “and sinners” indicates for the World-to-Come. But they will stand in judgment and they will be sentenced to eternal contempt. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Both these, the people of Sodom, and those, the members of the generation of the flood, will not stand in judgment, as it is stated: “Therefore the wicked shall not stand in judgment, nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous” (Psalms 1:5). “Therefore the wicked shall not stand in judgment”; this is referring to the generation of the flood, about whom it is written: “The wickedness of man was great upon the earth” (Genesis 6:5). “Nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous”; these are the people of Sodom, about whom it is written: “And the men of Sodom were wicked and sinners” (Genesis 13:13). The Sages said to Rabbi Neḥemya: They will not stand in judgment for resurrection in the congregation of the righteous, but they will stand in judgment in the congregation of the wicked. The spies who spread an evil report of their visit to Canaan have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And those men who spread the evil report about the land died by plague before the Lord” (Numbers 14:37). “And…died” indicates in this world; “by plague” indicates for the World-to-Come. The members of the generation of the wilderness have no share in the World-to-Come and will not stand in judgment, as it is stated: “In this wilderness they shall be consumed, and there they shall die” (Numbers 14:35). “They shall be consumed” indicates in this world; “and there they shall die” indicates for the World-to-Come; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says: The members of the generation of the wilderness were essentially righteous, and about them the verse says: “Gather My pious together to Me, those that have entered into My covenant by offering” (Psalms 50:5). It is they who entered into the covenant with God and they will certainly be rewarded in the future. The assembly of Korah is not destined to arise for resurrection, as it is stated: “And the earth closed upon them” (Numbers 16:33), meaning in this world, and also: “And they perished from among the assembly” (Numbers 16:33), meaning in the World-to-Come; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says: About them the verse says: “The Lord kills and makes alive; He lowers to the grave, and raises” (I Samuel 2:6), indicating that the assembly of Korah has a share in the World-to-Come. The ten tribes are not destined to return to Eretz Yisrael, even during the messianic era, as it is stated: “And He cast them into another land, as it is this day” (Deuteronomy 29:27). Just as the day passes never to return, so too, the ten tribes go into exile and do not return; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says: “As it is this day,” meaning just as the day darkens and then the sky brightens the next day, with regard to the ten tribes as well, although it is dark for them now, so it is destined to brighten for them.

The residents of an idolatrous city have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Certain men, wicked persons, are gone out from your midst, and have subverted the inhabitants of their city, saying: Let us go and let us worship other gods” (Deuteronomy 13:14). And idol worshippers are not executed as residents of an idolatrous city unless its subverters are from that city and from that tribe, and unless most of the inhabitants of the city are subverted, and unless men subvert the inhabitants of the city. If it occurs that women or children subvert the inhabitants of the city, or that a minority of the inhabitants of the city were subverted, or that its subverters were from outside the city and were neither residents of that city nor members of that tribe, these idol worshippers are judged as individuals. And to judge the inhabitants of a city one requires two witnesses and forewarning for each and every one who engaged in idol worship. This is a stringency with regard to individuals who worship idols that is more stringent than the halakha with regard to multitudes who worship idols: As the individuals who worship idols are executed by stoning; therefore, since there is a stringency with regard to their mode of execution, their property is spared and is inherited by their heirs. And the multitudes are executed by the sword; therefore, since there is a leniency with regard to their mode of execution, their property is eliminated.

From the verse: “You shall smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword” (Deuteronomy 13:16), it is derived that the caravan of donkeys and the caravan of camels that move from place to place, these donkey or camel drivers save the city. If they were residing in the city for a period, they could join the minority of permanent residents who were not subverted to idol worship in order to create a majority and prevent the destruction of the city and its contents. It is stated: “Destroy it utterly, and all that is in it and its animals, with the edge of the sword” (Deuteronomy 13:16). From here, the Sages stated: The property of the righteous, who did not engage in idol worship, that is inside the city is destroyed with the rest of the city and its contents; but the property of the righteous that is outside the city is spared. And the property of the wicked, whether it is inside the city or whether it is outside the city, these items are destroyed.

“And you shall gather all of its spoils into the midst of its square” (Deuteronomy 13:17). If the city has no square, one creates a square for the city in order to fulfill the mitzva as it is written. If there was a square outside of the city, they bring it inside the city by expanding the city wall to include the square. It is stated in the continuation of the verse: “And you shall burn it with fire, both the city and all its spoils, entirely for the Lord your God.” The mishna infers: “Its spoils,” but not the spoils of Heaven. From here the Sages stated: The consecrated property in it, which was no longer the property of its inhabitants, must be redeemed, and terumot are neither eaten nor burned; rather they must be left to decay. And second tithe and sacred scrolls that were in the city must be interred. With regard to the phrase: “Entirely [ kalil ] for the Lord your God,” Rabbi Shimon says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, says: If you implement judgment on an idolatrous city, I ascribe you credit as though you have sacrificed an entirely [ kalil ] burnt offering before Me. It is written: “And it shall be a heap forever” (Deuteronomy 13:17), meaning: The idolatrous city shall not be converted even into gardens and orchards; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: From the end of that verse: “It shall not be built again,” it is derived: To restore it to the way it was before destruction, it may not be built; but it may be converted into gardens and orchards. The next verse states: “And there shall cleave nothing of that which was devoted to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18). This teaches that as long as the wicked exist in the world, there is wrath in the world; once the wicked are eliminated from the world, wrath leaves the world.

Chapter 11

These are the transgressors who are strangled in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: One who strikes his father or his mother, and one who abducts a Jewish person, and a rebellious elder according to the court, and a false prophet, and one who prophesies in the name of idol worship, and one who engages in intercourse with a married woman, and conspiring witnesses who testify that the daughter of a priest committed adultery, even though were she guilty, she would be executed by burning. And her paramour is also executed via strangulation as in any case where a man engages in intercourse with a married woman. One who strikes his father or his mother is not liable to be executed unless he wounds one of them. This is a stringency with regard to one who curses his father that is more severe than the halakha with regard to one who strikes his father, as one who curses his father or his mother after his or her death is liable, but one who strikes one of them after his or her death is exempt, as he did not cause a wound. gemara The Sages taught in a baraita that it is written: “For any man who curses his father and his mother shall be put to death, he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him who curses his father and his mother shall die; he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him” (Leviticus 20:9). This is referring to one who curses his parents even after their death, as one might have thought: Since one is liable for striking and one is liable for cursing, just as one who strikes is liable only when his father or mother are alive, so too, one who curses is liable only when they are alive. One who abducts a Jewish person is not liable to be executed unless he brings the abductee into his domain. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is not liable unless he brings him into his domain and exploits him, as it is stated: “If a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall die” (Deuteronomy 24:7). The phrase “exploited him” indicates using him for labor. With regard to one who abducts his own son and sells him, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. If one abducted one who is a half-slave half-freeman, i.e., a Canaanite slave who belonged to two owners and was emancipated by one of them, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

A rebellious elder according to the court, who does not observe the ruling of the court, is executed by strangulation, as it is stated: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment …and you shall arise and ascend unto the place that the Lord your God shall choose…and you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you…and the man that shall do so intentionally, not to listen…and that man shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:8–12). There were three courts there in Jerusalem. One convenes at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one convenes at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, and one convenes in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. An elder who issues a ruling contrary to the ruling of his colleagues and his colleagues come to that court that is at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and the elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court says it to them. And if not, they come to those judges who are convened at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, which is a more significant tribunal. And the elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court says it to them. And if not, these judges and those judges come to the High Court, the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges that is in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, from which Torah emerges to the entire Jewish people, as it is stated: “And you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you from that place that the Lord shall choose and you shall observe to perform according to all that they shall teach you” (Deuteronomy 17:10). They are the ultimate arbiters who establish the halakha that is binding. If they ruled contrary to the ruling of the elder and the elder then returned to his city, and nevertheless, he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment. But if he instructed others to act on the basis of his ruling that stands contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is liable to be executed, as it is stated: “And the man that shall do so intentionally not to listen” (Deuteronomy 17:12), meaning that one is not liable unless he instructs others to act. A student who is not yet an elder, i.e., he has not been ordained, who instructs others to act contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, is exempt, as a ruling given prior to ordination is not a valid ruling. It follows that his stringency is his leniency. The stringency imposed upon the student that he is not sanctioned to issue rulings results in the leniency that if he instructs others to act on the basis of his ruling that is contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is exempt.

With regard to the rulings of the rebellious elder the mishna states: There is greater stringency with regard to traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah than with regard to matters of Torah. If one states: There is no mitzva to don phylacteries, and his intention is in order to have others violate matters of Torah, he is exempt from punishment as a rebellious elder. One who disputes matters written explicitly in the Torah is not considered an elder and a Torah scholar, and therefore does not assume the status of a rebellious elder. If, however, he disputed a matter based on rabbinic tradition, e.g., he stated that there should be five compartments in the phylacteries of the head, in order to add an extra compartment to the four established according to traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah, he is liable.

One does not execute the rebellious elder, neither in the court that is in his city, nor in the court that is in Yavne, although that was the seat of the Sanhedrin after the destruction of the Second Temple. Rather, one takes him up to the High Court in Jerusalem. And they guard him in incarceration until the pilgrimage Festival, and the court executes him during the pilgrimage Festival, as it is stated: “And all the nation shall hear, and fear, and no longer sin intentionally” (Deuteronomy 17:13); this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda says: One does not delay administering justice to this individual. Rather, the court executes him immediately, and the judges write reports and dispatch agents to all the places, informing them: So-and-so is liable to be punished with the court -imposed death penalty for disobeying the court.

The false prophet mentioned in the Torah includes one who prophesies that which he did not hear from God and one who prophesies that which was not said to him, even if it was said to another prophet. In those cases, his execution is at the hand of man, through strangulation imposed by the court. But with regard to one who suppresses his prophecy because he does not want to share it with the public, and one who contemptuously forgoes the statement of a prophet and refuses to heed it, and a prophet who violated his own statement and failed to perform that which he was commanded to do, his death is at the hand of Heaven, as it is stated: “And it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall not hearken unto My words that he shall speak in My name, I will exact it of him” (Deuteronomy 18:19).

One who prophesies in the name of idol worship and says: This is what the idol said, even if he approximated the correct halakha in the name of the idol to deem ritually impure that which is ritually impure and to deem ritually pure that which is ritually pure, is executed by strangulation. In the case of one who engages in intercourse with a married woman once she entered her husband’s domain for the purposes of marriage, even if the marriage was not yet consummated, as she did not yet engage in intercourse with him, one who engages in intercourse with her is executed by strangulation. Before marriage, one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to be executed by stoning. And conspiring witnesses who testified that the daughter of a priest committed adultery are executed by strangulation, even though were she guilty, she would be executed by burning. And her paramour is also executed by strangulation, as in any case where one engages in intercourse with a married woman. As all those who are rendered conspiring witnesses are led to their deaths via the same mode of execution with which they conspired to have their victim executed, except for conspiring witnesses who testified that the daughter of a priest and her paramour committed adultery. In that case, although the priest’s daughter who commits adultery is executed by burning, the conspiring witnesses who sought to have her executed are executed by strangulation, as is the paramour whom they also conspired to have executed.

Mishnah Makkot

Chapter 1

How are witnesses rendered conspiring witnesses? This applies in a case where two witnesses came before the court and said: We testify with regard to so-and-so, who is a priest, that he is the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza, a yevama who performed the rite of ḥalitza to free herself from the levirate bond. Those testimonies render him a ḥalal (see Leviticus 21:6–7), one disqualified from the priesthood due to flawed lineage. If a second set of witnesses testifies in court and renders the first set conspiring witnesses, one does not say with regard to each of the conspiring witnesses: This witness shall be rendered the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza in his stead. Rather, he receives forty lashes as punishment for his false testimony. Likewise, in a case where two witnesses came before the court and said: We testify with regard to so-and-so that he is liable to be exiled to a city of refuge for unwittingly killing another (see Numbers 35:11), and a second set of witnesses testifies in court and renders the first set conspiring witnesses, one does not say with regard to each of the conspiring witnesses: This witness shall be exiled in his stead. Rather, he receives forty lashes. In the case of witnesses who said: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that he divorced his wife and did not give her payment of her marriage contract, and they were then rendered conspiring witnesses, the question arises with regard to the manner in which the sum of their payment is calculated. It is not possible to render the witnesses liable to pay the entire sum of the marriage contract, as they can claim: But isn’t it so that either today or tomorrow, i.e., at some point in the future, he may divorce his wife or die and ultimately he will be liable to give her payment of her marriage contract? That being the case, the witnesses did not conspire to render him liable to pay a sum that he would otherwise not be liable to pay. The sum of their payment is calculated as follows: The court assesses how much money another person would be willing to give in order to purchase the rights to this woman’s marriage contract, cognizant of the uncertainty that if she was widowed or divorced the purchaser will receive payment of the marriage contract but if she dies, her husband will inherit from her, and the one who purchased her marriage contract will receive nothing. In the case of witnesses who said: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that he owes another person one thousand dinars that he borrowed on the condition that he is to give the money back to him from now until thirty days have passed, and the borrower says that he borrowed that sum but it was on the condition that he is to give the money back to him from now until ten years have passed, and they were rendered conspiring witnesses, here too, it is not possible to render the witnesses liable to pay the entire sum. Rather, the court estimates how much money a person would be willing to give so that he would keep a loan of one thousand dinars in his possession, and one calculates the difference between that sum in a situation where he would be required to give the money back from now until thirty days have passed, and that same sum in a situation where he would be required to give the money back from now until ten years have passed. That difference is the sum that the testimony of the conspiring witnesses sought to have the borrower lose; therefore, it is the sum that they must pay.

If witnesses said: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that he is liable to pay another person two hundred dinars, and they were found to be conspiring witnesses, they are flogged, and they pay the money they sought to render him liable to pay. Why do they receive two punishments? It is due to the fact that the source that brings them to liability to receive lashes is not the source that brings them to liability for payment; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Anyone who pays as punishment for a transgression is not flogged for that same transgression.

Likewise, if witnesses said: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that he is liable to receive forty lashes, and they were discovered to be conspiring witnesses, they are flogged with eighty lashes; one set of lashes due to violation of the prohibition: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13), and one set of lashes due to the verse: “And you shall do to him as he conspired” (Deuteronomy 19:19), which is the punishment for conspiring witnesses; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They are flogged with only forty lashes, due to the verse “And you shall do to him as he conspired.” When punishing conspiring witnesses based on the verse: “As he conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19), one divides the punishment of money among them, but one does not divide the punishment of lashes among them; each receives thirty-nine lashes. The mishna elaborates: How so? If the witnesses testified about someone that he owes another person two hundred dinars and they were then found to be conspiring witnesses, the witnesses divide the sum among themselves and pay a total of two hundred dinars. But if they testified about someone that he was liable to receive forty lashes and they were then found to be conspiring witnesses, each and every one of the witnesses receives forty lashes.

Witnesses are not rendered conspiring witnesses until the witnesses who come to render them conspiring impeach the witnesses themselves and not merely their testimony. How so? A set of witnesses said: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that he killed a person, and they attested to the precise time and place that the murder took place. Then, a second set of witnesses came to court and said to them: How can you testify about this event? This person who was killed, or this person who killed, was with us, i.e., with the second set of witnesses, on that day in such and such place, which is not the location identified by the first set of witnesses. In that case, although the second set of witnesses contradicted the testimony of the first set, these first witnesses are not rendered conspiring witnesses. But if the second set of witnesses came to court and said to them: How can you testify about that event? You were with us on that day in such and such place. In this case, these first witnesses are rendered conspiring witnesses, and are executed on the basis of their, i.e., the second set’s, testimony.

If other witnesses, i.e., a third set, came and corroborated the testimony of the first set of witnesses, and the second set of witnesses testified that this third set of witnesses were also with them elsewhere that day and rendered them conspiring witnesses, and similarly, if yet other witnesses, i.e., a fourth set, came and corroborated the testimony of the first set of witnesses and the second set rendered them conspiring witnesses, even if one hundred sets of witnesses were all rendered conspiring witnesses by the same second set of witnesses, all of them are executed on the basis of their testimony, as the authority of two witnesses is equivalent to the authority of numerous witnesses. Rabbi Yehuda says: This situation where a set of witnesses renders all the others conspiring witnesses is a conspiracy [ istatit ], as there is room for suspicion that they simply decided to impeach all witnesses who offer that testimony, and it is only the first set alone that is executed.

The conspiring witnesses are executed only if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after the verdict of the accused is concluded. This is in contrast to the opinion of the Sadducees, as the Sadducees say: Conspiring witnesses are executed only if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after the accused is killed on the basis of their testimony, as it is stated: “A life for a life” (Exodus 21:23; see Deuteronomy 19:21). The Rabbis said to the Sadducees: But wasn’t it already stated: “And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19), and this latter verse indicates that his accused brother is alive? And if so, why is it stated: “A life for a life”? One might have thought that if they are rendered conspiring witnesses from the moment the judges accepted their testimony in court, they will be executed, even though no verdict was concluded. Therefore, the verse states: “A life for a life,” teaching that they are executed only if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after the verdict of the accused will be concluded, from the moment that the court is on the verge of taking his life.

It is written: “At the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he who is to die be executed” (Deuteronomy 17:6). The question is: If the testimony is valid with two witnesses, why did the verse specify that it is valid with three? Rather, it is to juxtapose and liken three to two: Just as three witnesses can render the two witnesses conspiring witnesses, so too, the two witnesses can render the three wit-nesses conspiring witnesses. And from where is it derived that two witnesses can render even one hundred witnesses conspiring witnesses? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “Three witnesses.” Since the verse is obviously discussing witnesses, the term witnesses is superfluous, as it could have stated: Two or three. The term “witnesses” teaches that two witnesses can render a set of witnesses conspiring witnesses irrespective of their number. Rabbi Shimon says that three witnesses are mentioned in the verse in order to teach: Just as two witnesses who testified that a person is liable to be executed are not killed for this testimony unless both of them are found to be conspiring witnesses, so too, three witnesses who testified together are not killed unless all three of them are found to be conspiring witnesses. And from where is it derived that the same halakha applies even to one hundred witnesses? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “Three witnesses.” The superfluous term “witnesses” teaches that the status of all witnesses who come to court as a single set of witnesses is that of one testimony with regard to this halakha. Rabbi Akiva says: The third witness mentioned in this verse does not come for the judges to be lenient concerning him; rather, its mention comes for the judges to be stringent concerning him and to render his halakhic status like that of these two witnesses who testified with him. One could claim that since the testimony of the third witness is superfluous, as the testimony of the other two witnesses sufficed, the third witness and any other witnesses beyond the first two should be exempt. Therefore, the verse teaches that since he testified with them and was rendered a conspiring witness with them, he too is executed. One can learn a moral from this halakha : And if the verse punished one who associates with transgressors with a punishment like the one received by the transgressors, even though his role in the transgression is ancillary, all the more so will God pay a reward to one who associates with those who perform a mitzva like the reward of those who perform the mitzva themselves, even though his role in performing the mitzva is ancillary.

The mishna cites another derivation based on the juxtaposition of two to three: And just as with regard to two witnesses, if one of them is found to be a relative or is otherwise disqualified, their entire testimony is voided, as it is no longer the testimony of two witnesses, so too, with regard to three witnesses who came to testify as one set, if one of them is found to be a relative or is otherwise disqualified, their entire testimony is voided, even though two valid witnesses remain. From where is it derived that the same halakha applies even in the case of one hundred witnesses? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “Witnesses.” Rabbi Yosei says: In what case is this statement, that if one of the three witnesses is disqualified the entire testimony is voided, said? It is said with regard to cases of capital law, which are adjudicated stringently. But with regard to cases of monetary law, which are adjudicated more leniently, even if one of the witnesses is disqualified, the testimony will be validated with the testimony of the rest of the witnesses, and if it is sufficient the case can be adjudicated on that basis. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees and says: If one of the three witnesses is disqualified the entire testimony is voided in both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law. And when does one disqualified witness void the entire testimony? Only when the witnesses forewarned them before they performed the transgression, thereby demonstrating their desire to fill the role of witnesses in that case. But when they did not forewarn them, what shall two brothers do in a case where they, together with others, saw someone who killed a person? Will the murderer escape punishment because two relatives happened to be there at the time of the murder and their presence voids the entire testimony? No, the testimony is voided by the presence of relatives or disqualified witnesses only when their intent was to testify. If that was not their intent, they do not void the testimony.

In a case where there were two witnesses observing an individual violating a capital transgression from this window in a house, and two observing him from that window in a house, and one person was forewarning the transgressor in the middle between the two sets of witnesses, the halakha depends on the circumstances. In a situation where some of the witnesses observing from the two windows see each other, the testimony of all these witnesses constitutes one testimony, but if they do not see each other, the testimony of these witnesses constitutes two independent testimonies. Therefore, as two independent sets of witnesses, if one of the sets was found to be a set of conspiring witnesses, while the testimony of the other set remained valid, both he, the one accused of violating the capital transgression, and they, the conspiring witnesses, are executed, and the second set, whose testimony remained valid, is exempt. Rabbi Yosei says: Transgressors are never executed unless his two witnesses are the ones forewarning him, as it is stated: “At the mouth of two witnesses… he who is to be put to death shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:6), from which it is derived that it is from the mouths of the two witnesses that the accused must be forewarned, and forewarning issued by someone else is insufficient. Alternatively, from the phrase “at the mouth of two witnesses” one derives that the judges must hear the testimony directly from the witnesses, and the Sanhedrin will not hear testimony from the mouth of an interpreter.

This mishna continues to discuss the matter of testimony in the case of one who is liable to be executed. Concerning one whose verdict was delivered and he was sentenced to death and he fled, and he then came before the same court that sentenced him, they do not overturn his verdict and retry him. Rather, the court administers the previous verdict. Consequently, in any place where two witnesses will stand and say: We testify with regard to a man called so-and-so that his verdict was delivered and he was sentenced to death in the court of so-and-so, and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person shall be executed on the basis of that testimony. The mishna continues: The mitzva to establish a Sanhedrin with the authority to administer capital punishments is in effect both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael. A Sanhedrin that executes a transgressor once in seven years is characterized as a destructive tribunal. Since the Sanhedrin would subject the testimony to exacting scrutiny, it was extremely rare for a defendant to be executed. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: This categorization applies to a Sanhedrin that executes a transgressor once in seventy years. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: If we had been members of the Sanhedrin, we would have conducted trials in a manner whereby no person would have ever been executed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In adopting that approach, they too would increase the number of murderers among the Jewish people. The death penalty would lose its deterrent value, as all potential murderers would know that no one is ever executed.

Chapter 2

These are the people who are exiled: Anyone who kills a person unintentionally. Whether one is liable to be exiled depends on the particular circumstances of the case: If one was rolling a roller to smooth the covering of mortar that he applied to seal his roof and the roller fell upon a person and killed him, or if one was lowering a barrel from the roof and it fell on a person and killed him, or if he was descending a ladder and he fell on a person and killed him, in all of these cases, he is exiled. But if one was pulling a roller toward him and it fell from his hands upon a person and killed him, or if one was lifting a barrel and the rope was severed and it fell upon a person and killed him, or if one was climbing a ladder and he fell upon a person and killed him, that unintentional murderer is not exiled. This is the principle: Any murderer who kills unintentionally through his downward motion is exiled, and one who kills not through his downward motion is not exiled. If the blade of an ax or hatchet was displaced from its handle, and it flew through the air and killed a person, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He is not exiled, and the Rabbis say: He is exiled. If part of a tree that is being split flew through the air and killed a person, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The murderer is exiled, and the Rabbis say: He is not exiled.

One who threw a stone into the public domain and killed a person is exiled. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: If after the stone left his hand the other person placed his head out into the public domain and received a blow from the stone, he is exempt, as when he cast the stone into the public domain there was no one there. In the case of one who threw the stone into his courtyard and killed a person, if the victim had permission to enter into there, the murderer is exiled, but if not, he is not exiled, as it is stated with regard to the cities of refuge: “And as one who goes with his neighbor into the forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5), from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a forest, the victim and the assailant both have equal permission to enter there, so too, with regard to all places that the victim and the assailant have permission to enter there, the killer is liable. This serves to exclude the courtyard of the homeowner, where the victim and the assailant do not both have permission to enter there. Since the victim had no right to enter his courtyard, the unintentional murderer is exempt from exile. Abba Shaul says: Another halakha can be derived from that verse: Just as the cutting of wood that is mentioned in the verse is optional, so too, all those liable to be exiled are examples of cases where the unintentional murderer was engaged in an activity that is optional. This serves to exclude a father who strikes his son, and a teacher who oppresses his student, and an agent of the court deputized to flog transgressors. If, in the course of performing the mitzva with which they are charged, they unintentionally murdered the son, the student, or the person being flogged, respectively, they are exempt.

The father is exiled to a city of refuge due to his unintentional murder of his son. And the son is exiled due to his unintentional murder of his father. Everyone is exiled due to their unintentional murder of a Jew, and a Jew is exiled due to his unintentional murder of any of them, except for the unintentional murder of a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [ ger toshav ]. And a ger toshav is exiled only due to his unintentional murder of a ger toshav. A blind person who unintentionally murdered another is not exiled; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: He is exiled. The enemy of the victim is not exiled, as presumably it was not a completely unintentional act. Rabbi Yosei says: Not only is an enemy not exiled, but he is executed by the court, because his halakhic status is like that of one who is forewarned by witnesses not to perform the action, as presumably he performed the action intentionally. Rabbi Shimon says: There is an enemy who is exiled and there is an enemy who is not exiled. This is the principle: In any case where an observer could say he killed knowingly, where circumstances lead to the assumption that it was an intentional act, the enemy is not exiled, even if he claims that he acted unintentionally. And if it is clear that he killed unknowingly, as circumstances indicate that he acted unintentionally, he is exiled, even though the victim is his enemy.

To where are the unintentional murderers exiled? They are exiled to cities of refuge, to three cities that were in the east bank of the Jordan and to three cities that were in the land of Canaan, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: “Three cities shall you give beyond the Jordan and three cities shall you give in the land of Canaan; they shall be cities of refuge” (Numbers 35:14). The mishna comments: Until the three cities of refuge that were in Eretz Yisrael were selected, an unintentional murderer would not be admitted to the three that were in the east bank of the Jordan, even though the latter three were already selected by Moses (see Deuteronomy 4:41), as it is stated: “Six cities of refuge shall they be” (Numbers 35:13), from which it is derived that they do not become cities of refuge until all six of them admit unintentional murderers as one.

The mishna continues: And roads were aligned for them from this city, i.e., all cities, to that city, i.e., they would pave and straighten the access roads to the cities of refuge, as it is stated: “Prepare for you the road, and divide the borders of your land, which the Lord your God causes you to inherit, into three parts, that every murderer may flee there” (Deuteronomy 19:3). And the court would provide the unintentional murderers fleeing to a city of refuge with two Torah scholars, due to the concern that perhaps the blood redeemer, i.e., a relative of the murder victim seeking to avenge his death, will seek to kill him in transit, and in that case they, the scholars, will talk to the blood redeemer and dissuade him from killing the unintentional murderer. Rabbi Meir says: The unintentional murderer also speaks [ medabber ] on his own behalf to dissuade the blood redeemer, as it is stated: “And this is the matter [ devar ] of the murderer, who shall flee there and live” (Deuteronomy 19:4), indicating that the murderer himself speaks.

Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Initially, either one who killed another unintentionally or one who killed another intentionally would hurry and flee to the cities of refuge, and the court in his city would send for him and would bring him from there to stand trial. For one who was found liable to receive the death penalty in court for intentional murder, the court would execute him, and for one who was not found liable to receive the death penalty, e.g., if they deemed that the death occurred due to circumstances beyond his control, they would free him. For one who was found liable to be exiled, the court would restore him to his place in the city of refuge, as it is stated: “And the congregation shall judge between the murderer and the blood redeemer… and the congregation shall restore him to his city of refuge, that he fled there” (Numbers 35:24–25), indicating that he had been in a city of refuge before his trial. The Torah states that an unintentional murderer is required to remain in the city of refuge to which he fled until the death of the High Priest. The mishna elaborates: With regard to High Priests, who were appointed in several different manners, one anointed with the anointing oil, which was the method through which High Priests were consecrated until the oil was sequestered toward the end of the First Temple period; and one consecrated by donning multiple garments, the eight vestments unique to the High Priest, which was the practice during the Second Temple period; and one who received a temporary appointment due to the unfitness of the serving High Priest, who departed from his anointment with the restoration of the serving High Priest to active service, their deaths facilitate the return of the murderer from the city of refuge to his home. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the death of a priest anointed for war to address the soldiers (see Deuteronomy 20:1–7) facilitates the return of the murderer. The mishna continues: Therefore, the mothers of High Priests would provide those exiled to cities of refuge with sustenance and garments so that they would not pray that their sons would die.

The more comfortable their lives in the city of refuge, the less urgency they would feel to leave, and the less likely it would be that they would pray for the death of the High Priests. If, after the unintentional murderer’s verdict was decided and he was sentenced to exile, the High Priest died, he is not exiled, as the death of the High Priest exempts him from exile. If it was before his verdict was decided that the High Priest died and they appointed another in his place, and thereafter his verdict was decided, he returns from exile with the death of the second High Priest. If the verdict of a murderer was decided at a time when there was no High Priest, and likewise in the cases of one who unintentionally killed a High Priest and in the case of a High Priest who killed unintentionally, the unintentional murderer never leaves the city of refuge. And one who is exiled may not leave the city at all, either for testimony relating to a mitzva, or for testimony relating to monetary matters, or for testimony relating to capital matters. And even if the Jewish people require his services, and even if he is the general of the army of Israel like Joab ben Zeruiah, he never leaves the city of refuge, as it is stated: “And the congregation shall restore him to his city of refuge, that he fled there” (Numbers 35:25), from which it is derived: There shall be his dwelling, there shall be his death, there shall be his burial. The mishna continues: Just as an unintentional murderer is admitted to the city of refuge, so is he admitted to its outskirts, located within the Shabbat boundary. Once he entered the outskirts of the city, the blood redeemer may not kill him. In a case where a murderer emerged beyond the Shabbat boundary of the city of refuge and the blood redeemer found him there, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It is a mitzva for the blood redeemer to kill him, and it is optional for every other person to do so. Rabbi Akiva says: It is optional for the blood redeemer, and every other person is liable for killing him. The previous mishna teaches that the halakhic status of the outskirts of the city is like that of the city itself in terms of the unintentional murderer being provided refuge there. The mishna adds: With regard to a tree that stands within the Shabbat boundary of a city of refuge, whose boughs extend outside the boundary, or a tree that stands outside the boundary and its boughs extend inside the boundary, the status of the tree, whether it is considered inside or outside the boundary, in all cases follows the boughs. If an unintentional murderer, exiled to a city of refuge, unintentionally killed a person in the same city, he is exiled from that neighborhood where he resided to another neighborhood within that city. And a Levite who is a permanent resident of a city of refuge and unintentionally killed a person is exiled from that city to another city.

Similarly, in the case of a murderer who was exiled to a city of refuge and the people of the city sought to honor him due to his prominence, he shall say to them: I am a murderer. If the residents of the city say to him: We are aware of your status and nevertheless, we wish to honor you, he may accept the honor from them, as it is stated: “And this is the matter [ devar ] of the murderer” (Deuteronomy 19:4), from which it is derived that the murderer is required to say [ ledabber ] to them that he is a murderer. He is not required to tell them any more than that. The unintentional murderers would pay a fee to the Levites as rent for their living quarters in the cities of refuge, which were Levite cities; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: They would not pay a fee to them, but would reside rent free, as they are required to live there by Torah law. They also disagreed with regard to the status of the unintentional murderer when he returns home after the death of the High Priest. He returns to the same public office that he occupied prior to his exile; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not return to the office that he occupied.

Chapter 3

After enumerating in tractate Sanhedrin those liable to be executed and in the previous chapter those liable to be exiled, the mishna proceeds to enumerate those liable to receive lashes. These are the people who are flogged by Torah law for violating a prohibition: One who engages in intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with the wife of his father’s brother, or with a menstruating woman. Likewise, one is flogged in the case of a widow who married a High Priest, a divorcée or a ḥalutza who married an ordinary priest, a mamzeret, i.e., a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship, or a Gibeonite woman who married a Jew of unflawed lineage, and a Jewish woman of unflawed lineage who married a Gibeonite or a mamzer, i.e., a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship. The mishna elaborates: If a woman was both a widow and a divorcée, as after she was widowed she remarried and was divorced, a High Priest is liable to receive two sets of lashes for marrying her due to the violation of two different prohibitions, that of his marrying a widow and that of his marrying a divorced woman. If a woman was both a divorcée and a ḥalutza, from two different men, an ordinary priest who marries her is liable to receive only one set of lashes, due to the violation of one prohibition alone.

The mishna continues enumerating those liable to receive lashes: A ritually impure person who ate sacrificial food and one who entered the Temple while ritually impure. And one who eats the forbidden fat of a domesticated animal; or blood; or notar, leftover flesh from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption; or piggul, an offering invalidated due to intent to sprinkle its blood, burn its fats on the altar, or consume it, beyond its designated time; or one who partakes of an offering that became impure, is flogged. And one who slaughters a sacrificial animal or sacrifices it on an altar outside the Temple courtyard, and one who eats leavened bread on Passover, and one who eats on Yom Kippur and one who performs labor on Yom Kippur, and one who blends the anointing oil for non-sacred use, and one who blends the incense that was burned on the altar in the Sanctuary for non-sacred use, and one who applies the anointing oil, and one who eats unslaughtered animal or bird carcasses, or tereifot, which are animals or birds with a condition that will lead to their death within twelve months, or repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, is liable to receive lashes. If one ate untithed produce, i.e., produce from which terumot and tithes were not separated; or first-tithe produce whose teruma of the tithe was not taken; or second-tithe produce or sacrificial food that was not redeemed; he is liable to receive lashes. With regard to the measure for liability for eating forbidden food, the mishna asks: How much does one need to eat from untithed produce and be liable to receive lashes? Rabbi Shimon says: If one ate any amount of untithed produce he is liable to receive lashes. And the Rabbis say: He is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk, which is the minimum measure characterized as eating. Rabbi Shimon said to them: Do you not concede to me with regard to one who eats an ant of any size that he is liable to receive lashes? The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: He receives lashes for eating an ant of any size due to the fact that it is an intact entity in the form of its creation, and that is what the Torah prohibited. Rabbi Shimon said to them: One kernel of wheat is also in the form of its creation, and therefore one should be liable to receive lashes for eating any intact entity.

In the case of a priest who eats first fruits before the one who brought the fruits to the Temple recited over those fruits the Torah verses that he is obligated to recite (see Deuteronomy 26:3–10); and one who ate offerings of the most sacred order outside the curtains surrounding the Tabernacle courtyard, or outside the Temple courtyard; and one who ate offerings of lesser sanctity or second-tithe produce outside the wall of Jerusalem; and also one who breaks the bone of a ritually pure Paschal offering; in all these cases he is flogged with forty lashes. But one who leaves the flesh of the ritually pure Paschal offering until the morning of the fifteenth of Nisan, and one who breaks a bone of a ritually impure Paschal offering, is not flogged with forty lashes.

With regard to one who takes the mother bird with her fledglings, thereby violating the Torah prohibition: “You shall not take the mother with her fledglings; you shall send the mother, and the fledglings you may take for yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:6–7), Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged for taking the mother bird, and does not send the mother, and the Rabbis say: He sends the mother and is not flogged, as this is the principle: With regard to any prohibition that entails a command to arise and perform a mitzva, he is not liable to receive lashes for its violation.

One who creates a bald spot upon his head, and one who rounds the edge of his head by shaving the hair adjacent to the ear, and one who mars the edge of his beard, and one who cuts one incision in a display of mourning over the dead, are all liable to receive lashes. If he cut one incision over five dead people, or five incisions over one dead person, he is liable to receive lashes for each and every one. For rounding the edges of his head, one is liable to receive two sets of lashes, one from here, the hair adjacent to one ear, and one from there, the hair adjacent to the other ear. For marring the edges of his beard there are two edges from here, on one side of his face, and two from there, on the other side, and one from below, on his chin. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he removed the hair on all the edges of his beard in one action, he is liable to receive only one set of lashes for all of them. And one is liable for marring the edges of his beard only if he removes the hair with a razor. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if he removed the hair with tweezers [ malket ] or with a plane [ rehitni ], he is liable to receive lashes.

One who imprints a tattoo, by inserting a dye into recesses carved in the skin, is also liable to receive lashes. If one imprinted on the skin with a dye but did not carve the skin, or if one carved the skin but did not imprint the tattoo by adding a dye, he is not liable; he is not liable until he imprints and carves the skin, with ink, or with kohl [ keḥol ], or with any substance that marks. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: He is liable only if he writes the name there, as it is stated: “And a tattoo inscription you shall not place upon you, I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:28).

A nazirite who was drinking wine all day is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If onlookers said to him: Do not drink, do not drink, forewarning him several times, and he drinks after each forewarning, he is liable to receive lashes for each and every drink.

If the nazirite was rendering himself impure through exposure to corpses all day, he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If they said to him: Do not render yourself impure, do not render yourself impure, and he renders himself impure after each forewarning, he is liable for each and every incident. If the nazirite was shaving his hair all day, he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If they said to him: Do not shave, do not shave, and after each forewarning he shaves, he is liable for each and every time he shaves. If a person was wearing a garment consisting of diverse kinds of wool and linen all day, he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If they said to him: Do not wear it, do not wear it, and he removes it and dons it after each forewarning, he is liable for each and every time that he dons the garment.

Apropos the case where one receives several sets of lashes for performing a single action, the mishna continues: There is one who plows a single furrow and is liable to receive lashes for violating eight prohibitions. How so? For plowing with an ox and a donkey, in violation of the prohibition: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Deuteronomy 22:10); and they are consecrated, and therefore he is guilty of misuse of consecrated property; and he is plowing diverse kinds in a vineyard; and it is during the Sabbatical Year, when it is prohibited to work the land; and it is on a Festival, when plowing is a prohibited labor; and he is both a priest and a nazirite and is performing the plowing in a place of impurity imparted by a corpse, which is prohibited for both a priest (see Leviticus 21:1) and a nazirite (see Numbers 6:6). Ḥananya ben Ḥakhinai says: If he was wearing a garment consisting of diverse kinds of wool and linen while plowing he is also flogged for violating that prohibition. The Sages said to him: That is not a prohibition in the same category as the others, as it is not connected to the act of plowing. Ḥananya ben Ḥakhinai said to them: According to that criterion, the fact that he is a nazirite is also not in the same category, as a nazirite and a priest are not flogged for plowing; rather, they are flogged for contracting impurity imparted by a corpse.

With how many lashes does one flog a person sentenced to receive lashes? One flogs him with forty lashes less one, as it is stated: “And he shall strike him before him, in accordance with his wickedness, by number. Forty he shall strike him, he shall not add” (Deuteronomy 25:2–3). The mishna joins the end of the first verse and the beginning of the second, forming the phrase: “By number, forty,” which is interpreted as: A sum adjacent to forty. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged with a full forty lashes. And where is he flogged the extra lash? As the mishna proceeds to explain, the thirty-nine lashes are divided into three and administered in three places on the body of the person being flogged; according to Rabbi Yehuda there is one lash that remains. That lash is administered between his shoulders.

One assesses the number of lashes that the one being punished is capable of withstanding only with a number of lashes fit to be divided into three equal groups. If the assessment was that he can survive twenty lashes, he is flogged with eighteen. Likewise, if doctors assessed concerning him that he is able to receive forty lashes and survive, and he is then flogged some of those forty lashes, and then they assessed him again and concluded that he cannot receive forty lashes and survive, he is exempt from the additional lashes. If the doctors initially assessed concerning him that he is able to receive only eighteen lashes, and once he was flogged eighteen times they assessed that he is able to receive forty, he is exempt from receiving additional lashes. If one performed a transgression that involves two prohibitions, and they assessed concerning him a single assessment of the number of lashes that he could withstand in punishment for both transgressions, he is flogged in accordance with their assessment and is exempt from any additional lashes. And if not, if he was assessed with regard to the lashes that he could withstand for one transgression, he is flogged and is allowed to heal, and then is flogged again for violating the second prohibition.

How do they flog him? He ties the two hands of the person being flogged on this side and that side of a post, and the attendant of the congregation takes hold of his garments to remove them. If they were ripped in the process, they were ripped, and if they were unraveled, they were unraveled, and he continues until he bares his chest. And the stone upon which the attendant stands when flogging is situated behind the person being flogged. The attendant of the congregation stands on it with a strap in his hand. It is a strap of calf hide, and is doubled, one into two, and two into four, and two straps of donkey hide go up and down the doubled strap of calf hide.

The length of its handle is one handbreadth, and the width of the straps is one handbreadth, and the strap must be long enough so that its end reaches the top of his abdomen, i.e., his navel, when he is flogged from behind. And the attendant flogs him with one-third of the lashes from the front of him, on his chest, and two one-third portions from behind him, on his back. And he does not flog him when the one receiving lashes is standing, nor when he is sitting; rather, he flogs him when he is hunched, as it is stated: “And the judge shall cause him to lie down, and strike him” (Deuteronomy 25:2), which indicates that the one receiving lashes must be in a position that approximates lying down. And the attendant flogging the one receiving lashes flogs [ makeh ] him with one hand with all his strength,

and the court crier recites the verses: “If you do not observe to perform all the words of this law that are written in this book, that you may fear this glorious and awesome name, the Lord your God. And the Lord will make your plagues [ makkotekha ] outstanding, and the plagues of your descendants, and even great plagues, and of long continuance, and severe sicknesses, and of long continuance” (Deuteronomy 28:58–59). And then he returns to the beginning of the verse. He also recites: “And you shall observe the matters of this covenant, and do them, that you may make all that you do to prosper” (Deuteronomy 29:8), and concludes with the verse: “And He is merciful and shall atone for transgression, and destroys not; and many a time does He turn His anger away, and does not stir up all His wrath” (Psalms 78:38), and then returns to the beginning of the verse that starts: “If you do not observe to perform.” If the one being flogged dies at the hand of the attendant, the latter is exempt, because he acted at the directive of the court. If the attendant added for him an additional lash with a strap and he died, the attendant is exiled to a city of refuge on his account, as an unwitting murderer. If the one being flogged involuntarily sullies himself, due to fear or pain, whether with excrement or with urine, he is exempt from further lashes. Rabbi Yehuda says that the threshold of shame for men and women is different: The man is exempted if he sullies himself with excrement, and the woman is exempted even with urine.

All those liable to receive karet who were flogged are exempted from their punishment of karet, as it is stated: “And your brother shall be debased before your eyes” (Deuteronomy 25:3), indicating: Once he is flogged he is as your brother, as his sin has been atoned and he is no longer excised from the Jewish people; this is the statement of Rabbi Ḥananya ben Gamliel. And Rabbi Ḥananya ben Gamliel says: And if for one who performs one transgression his soul is taken for it, as one’s soul can be uprooted from the world for one transgression, for one who performs a single mitzva, it is all the more so the case that his soul will be given to him, as the reward for performing mitzvot is greater than the punishment for performing transgressions. Rabbi Shimon says: It is derived from its own place in the Torah, as it is stated at the conclusion of the passage discussing intercourse with forbidden relatives, which is punishable with karet : “And the souls that perform them shall be excised” (Leviticus 18:29), and it states toward the beginning of that chapter: “That a person shall perform and live by them” (Leviticus 18:5). It is inferred that with regard to one who sits and did not perform a transgression, God gives him a reward like that received by one who performs a mitzva. Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that as the verse states: “Only be steadfast to not eat the blood, as the blood is the soul” (Deuteronomy 12:23), it can be derived a fortiori : And if with regard to the blood, which a person’s soul loathes, one who abstains from its consumption receives a reward for that action, as it is written in a subsequent verse: “You shall not eat it, so that it shall be good for you and for your children after you” (Deuteronomy 12:25); then concerning robbery and intercourse with forbidden relatives, which a person’s soul desires and covets, one who abstains from their performance and overcomes his inclination, all the more so that he and his descendants and the descendants of his descendants until the end of all generations will merit a reward.

Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akashya says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, sought to confer merit upon the Jewish people; therefore, He increased for them Torah and mitzvot, as each mitzva increases merit, as it is stated: “It pleased the Lord for the sake of His righteousness to make the Torah great and glorious” (Isaiah 42:21). God sought to make the Torah great and glorious by means of the proliferation of mitzvot.

Mishnah Shevuot

Chapter 1

With regard to oaths on an utterance of the lips, there are two types that are actually four types. The Torah specifies only two types of oaths whose violation renders one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering to atone for his transgression (see Leviticus 5:4): Where a person takes an oath to perform some action, and where he takes an oath to refrain from performing some action. With regard to both types, the Torah explicitly mentions liability only for an oath pertaining to one’s future behavior. Nevertheless, the Sages derive that one is also liable for a violation of both types of oaths when they pertain to one’s past behavior. Accordingly, although only two types are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, the Sages derive that there are actually four types. The mishna lists similar groups of halakhot. With regard to cases of awareness of the defiling of the Temple by entering it while one is ritually impure, or defiling its sacrificial foods by partaking of them while one is ritually impure, there are two types that are actually four. It is prohibited for an impure person to enter the Temple (see Numbers 19:20) or to partake of its sacrificial foods (see Leviticus 7:19–20). If one transgressed either prohibition during a lapse of awareness, then upon becoming aware of his transgression, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering (see Leviticus 5:2). The Torah specifies that one is liable to bring the offering only in the case in which he had a lapse of awareness of the fact that he was impure. The Sages derive that one is liable not only in these two cases, but also where he was aware of his personal status but had a lapse of awareness concerning the identity of the place he was entering or the status of the foods he ate. With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are two types that are actually four. On Shabbat, it is prohibited to transfer an item from domain to domain. The Torah explicitly refers to only two cases, both of which involve an item being transferred from a private domain to a public domain: Where the transfer is made by a person who remains in the public domain, and where the transfer is made by a person who remains in the private domain. The Sages derive that liability is incurred in these cases also if the item is transferred from the public domain to the private domain. Although only two types are mentioned by the Torah, the Sages derive that there are actually four types. With regard to shades of leprous marks on a person’s skin, there are two types that are actually four. The Torah specifies that if a leprous mark appears on a person’s skin, the afflicted person must undergo a process of purification and then bring various offerings. Part of the classification of these types of leprosy is based on their shade of white. Two types of marks are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, and the Sages derive that each of these two types has a secondary mark.

The mishna returns to the subject of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods. It elaborates on which offerings atone for different cases of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods: In cases in which one had awareness, i.e., he knew he was ritually impure and was aware of the sanctity of the Temple or foods involved at the beginning, i.e., before he transgressed, and had awareness at the end, i.e., after the transgression, but had a lapse of awareness of one of those two components in between, while he actually transgressed, this person is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. For cases in which one had awareness at the beginning, transgressed during a lapse of awareness, and still had no awareness at the end, the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur, and Yom Kippur itself, suspend any punishment that he deserves until he becomes aware of his transgression; and then to achieve atonement he brings a sliding-scale offering.

For cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but had awareness at the end, the goat whose blood presentation is performed outside the Sanctuary, i.e., the goat of the additional offerings of Yom Kippur, and Yom Kippur itself, atone, as it is stated with regard to the offerings brought on Yom Kippur: “One goat for a sin-offering aside from the sin-offering of the atonements” (Numbers 29:11). The verse juxtaposes the internal and external goats together to teach that for that which this one atones, that one atones. Just as the internal goat, i.e., the one whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, atones only for a case in which there was awareness of the components of the transgression at some point, i.e., at the beginning, so too, the external goat, i.e., the goat of the additional offerings of Yom Kippur, atones only for a case in which there was awareness at some point, i.e., at the end.

And for cases in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, the goats brought as sin-offerings for the additional offerings of the Festivals and the goats brought as sin-offerings for the additional offerings of the New Moons atone. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The goats of the Festivals atone for cases in which one never had awareness of the transgression, but the goats of the New Moons do not. But if so, for what do the goats of the New Moons atone? They atone for a ritually pure person who unwittingly partook of ritually impure sacrificial food. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to all the goats offered as additional offerings, those of the New Moons, Festivals, and Yom Kippur, their atonement, i.e., the atonement that they effect, is the same; they all atone for the defiling of the Temple by entering it while impure, or for the defiling of its sacrificial foods by partaking of them while impure. Rabbi Shimon would say, delineating his opinion as the mishna expresses it above: The goats of the New Moons atone for a ritually pure person who unwittingly partook of ritually impure sacrificial food. And with regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, the goats of the Festivals atone for cases in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, and the goats of the additional offerings of Yom Kippur atone for cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end. The Rabbis said to him: What is the halakha with regard to whether goats consecrated for different days may be sacrificed, this one in place of that one? For example, if a goat was initially consecrated to be sacrificed as part of the Yom Kippur additional offerings, may it be sacrificed as part of the Festival additional offerings instead? Rabbi Shimon said to them: They may be sacrificed. They said to him: Since, according to you, their atonement is not the same, how could they possibly be sacrificed, this one in place of that one? Rabbi Shimon said to them: They can be interchanged, since ultimately all of them come to atone for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon a tradition of his opinion that differs from the way the mishna expresses it above: The goats of the New Moons atone for a ritually pure person who unwittingly partook of ritually impure sacrificial food. The goats of the Festivals exceed them, as they atone both for a pure person who partook of impure sacrificial food and also for cases of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end. The goats of Yom Kippur further exceed them, as they atone both for a ritually pure person who partook of ritually impure sacrificial food and for cases of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end; and they also atone for cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end. The Rabbis said to him: What is the halakha with regard to whether goats consecrated for different days may be sacrificed, this one in place of that one? Rabbi Shimon said to them: Yes, they can be interchanged. They said to him: If what you say is so, granted that the goats of Yom Kippur may be sacrificed on the New Moons, but how could the goats of the New Moons be sacrificed on Yom Kippur when they will need to effect atonement for that which they were not consecrated for? Rabbi Shimon said to them: They can all be interchanged, since ultimately all of them come to atone for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, even if each one atones for a different case.

And for the intentional defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, both the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur, and Yom Kippur itself, atone. The mishna delineates how atonement is effected for other transgressions: For all other transgressions that are stated in the Torah, whether they are the minor ones or the major ones, whether they were intentional or unwitting, whether one became aware of them before Yom Kippur or did not become aware of them until after Yom Kippur, whether they involve a positive mitzva or a prohibition, whether the transgressors are subject to excision from the World-to-Come [ karet ] or to one of the court -imposed death penalties, the scapegoat sent to Azazel on Yom Kippur atones.

Israelites and priests and the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, achieve atonement from the scapegoat equally. What is the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed priest? The difference is only that the priests achieve atonement for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods through the bull that the High Priest offers on Yom Kippur, whereas the Israelites achieve atonement for defiling caused by them through the goats that are sacrificed on Yom Kippur. Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, just as the blood of the goat, whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, atones for Israelites, so too, the blood of the bull of the High Priest, whose blood presentation is also performed inside the Sanctuary, atones for the priests. And for all other transgressions, just as the confession made over the scapegoat atones for Israelites, so too, the confession made over the bull atones for the priests.

Chapter 2

With regard to cases of awareness of the defiling of the Temple by entering it while one is ritually impure, or defiling its sacrificial foods by partaking of them while one is ritually impure, there are two types that are actually four. How so? If one became ritually impure and he was aware that he was impure, but afterward his impurity was hidden from him, though he remembered that he was partaking of sacrificial food, which is forbidden to one who is in a state of ritual impurity; this is one of the four types of awareness of impurity. If the fact that he was partaking of sacrificial food was hidden from him, though he remembered the ritual impurity that he had contracted; this is the second of the four types of awareness of impurity. And the same halakha applies if both this and that were hidden from him, both the fact that he was impure and the fact that he was partaking of sacrificial food. In all these cases, if he partook of the sacrificial food and was unaware either that he was impure, or that the food was sacrificial food, or both, and after he partook of it he became aware of that which he had forgotten, he is required to bring a sliding-scale offering. In this type of offering, the sinner sacrifices an animal, bird, or meal-offering, depending on his financial status. And similarly with regard to entering the Temple: If one became ritually impure and he was aware that he was impure, but afterward his impurity was hidden from him, though he remembered that he was entering the Temple, which is prohibited for one who is in a state of ritual impurity; this is the third of the four types of awareness of impurity. If the fact that he was entering the Temple was hidden from him, though he remembered the ritual impurity that he had contracted; this is the fourth type of awareness of impurity. And the same halakha applies if both this and that were hidden from him, both the fact that he was impure and the fact that he was entering the Temple. In all these cases, if he entered the Temple and was unaware either that he was impure, or that he was entering the Temple, or both, and after he left he became aware of what was hidden from him, he is required to bring a sliding-scale offering.

As for the boundaries of the Temple with regard to the halakhot of impurity, the same halakha applies to one who enters the area that was part of the original Temple courtyard and to one who enters the later addition to the Temple courtyard, because the additional section is sanctified with the full sanctity of the Temple courtyard. The mishna notes: As, additions can be made to the city of Jerusalem or to the Temple courtyards only by a special body comprising the king, a prophet, the Urim VeTummim, and the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges, and with two thanks-offerings and with a special song. Once the addition to the courtyard is made by this body and this process, it is given the full sanctity of the original courtyard area. The mishna provides certain details of the consecration ceremony. And the court would move forward, and two thanks-offerings would be brought after them, and all of the Jewish people would follow behind them. When they would reach the end of the place that they desired to consecrate, the inner thanks-offering would be eaten and the outer one would be burned. The details of this ceremony will be described in the Gemara. And with regard to any addition to the Temple that was not made with all these ceremonial procedures, one who enters there while ritually impure is not liable to bring an offering if his entry was unwitting, nor to be punished with karet, excision from the World-to-Come, if his entry was intentional.

The first part of the mishna discussed one who became ritually impure before entering the Temple. The mishna proceeds to consider a case involving one who was ritually pure when he entered the Temple but who became impure while in the Temple courtyard, and afterward, his impurity was hidden from him but he remembered that he was standing in the Temple, or the fact that he was standing in the Temple was hidden from him but he remembered his impurity, or both this fact and that fact were hidden from him. In all these cases, if he bowed down, or he tarried in the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down even though he did not actually bow, or he went out by way of a longer route when he could have taken a shorter route, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. But if he left the Temple via the shortest way, he is exempt. This mitzva that the ritually impure must be sent out of the Temple is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which, as is taught elsewhere in the Mishna ( Horayot 8b), the Sanhedrin is not liable to bring an offering for an erroneous ruling. A communal bull sin-offering is brought because of the unwitting transgression of a prohibition involving an action by the Jewish people resulting from an erroneous halakhic decision handed down by the Sanhedrin. But if the Sanhedrin mistakenly ruled that one who became impure while in the Temple may leave by way of a longer route, they do not bring this offering, as it is brought only for an erroneous ruling on a matter that requires the bringing of a fixed sin-offering, and not a sliding-scale offering, for its unwitting violation.

And which is the positive mitzva with regard to a menstruating woman for which, as is taught in Horayot there, the Sanhedrin is liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling? If a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and during the course of their act of intercourse she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, and unwittingly he immediately withdrew from her and did not wait until his penis became flaccid, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman, because his withdrawal from her is as pleasant to him as his entry. If the Sanhedrin mistakenly ruled that one may withdraw immediately, they bring a bull offering for their erroneous ruling.

Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to the sliding-scale offering the verse states: “Or if a person touches any impure thing, whether it is the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher creeping animal, and it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:2). A precise reading of this verse indicates that in a case where one has a lapse of awareness that he had contracted ritual impurity by touching a creeping animal, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for having defiled the Temple or the sacrificial food, but he is not liable to bring such an offering in a case where he has a lapse of awareness that he is entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial food. Similarly, Rabbi Akiva says: The verse states: “And it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2), thereby teaching that in a case when one has a lapse of awareness that he had contracted ritual impurity, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, but one is not liable to bring such an offering in a case when he has a lapse of awareness that he is entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial food. Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse states: “And it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:2), and it states: “And it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:3), twice, in order to render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering both in a case where one has a lapse of awareness that he had contracted ritual impurity and in a case where one has a lapse of awareness that he is entering the Temple.

Chapter 3

With regard to oaths attesting to the truth about an utterance, which, when violated, render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, there are two types that are actually four types. The initial two oaths, which relate to utterances about the future and are explicitly prohibited in the Torah, are: On my oath I will eat, or: On my oath I will not eat. These are expanded to four, to include oaths concerning utterances about the past: On my oath I ate, or: On my oath I did not eat. If one says: On my oath I will not eat, and he then ate any amount, even less than an olive-bulk, he is liable; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable, leading you to say that this person is liable? Rabbi Akiva said to them: And where do we find one who speaks and is liable to bring an offering for it, as this oath taker merely speaks, i.e., takes an oath, and brings an offering for it? If one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring only one offering, because an oath to refrain from eating includes refraining from drinking. If he said: On my oath I will not eat and I will not drink, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring two offerings.

If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate wheat bread and barley bread and spelt bread, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread or barley bread or spelt bread, and then he ate all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one.

If he said: On my oath I will not drink, and then he drank several kinds of liquids, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not drink wine or oil or honey, and then he drank all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one.

If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate foods that are inedible or drank liquids that are not potable, he is exempt. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since he is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat them and an oath cannot take effect where another oath is in force. But if he said: It is konam for my wife to derive benefit from me if I ate today, and he had eaten carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, his wife is prohibited from deriving benefit from him.

If one unwittingly takes a false oath about the past or breaks an oath he made about the future, both if it is an oath that addresses matters that concern oneself and if it is an oath that addresses matters that concern others, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for an oath on an utterance. And likewise, an oath on an utterance may address both tangible matters and intangible matters. How so? Examples of oaths about future actions that concern others are if one said: On my oath I will give so-and-so a particular item, or: On my oath I will not give it to him. Examples of such oaths about the past are if one said: On my oath I gave another a particular item, or: On my oath I did not give it to him. Examples of oaths about the future that address intangible matters are where one said: On my oath I will sleep, or: On my oath I will not sleep. Examples of such oaths about the past are where one said: On my oath I slept, or: On my oath I did not sleep. Other examples of oaths about intangible matters are when one takes an oath, saying: I will throw a stone into the sea, or: I will not throw it, or: I threw it, or: I did not throw it. Rabbi Yishmael says: One is liable only for an oath on an utterance taken about the future, as it is stated: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4). The Torah refers explicitly only to oaths about what one will do in the future. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, and one is liable only for oaths explicitly mentioned in the verse, then I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? Rabbi Yishmael said to him: The halakha in these cases is derived by amplification of the meaning of the verse. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If the verse is amplified for this, i.e., to extend the halakha of an oath on an utterance to matters that do not involve doing evil or good, the verse is amplified for that, i.e., oaths about the past.

If one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he does not refrain, he is exempt from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance. If he takes an oath to perform a mitzva and he does not perform it, he is also exempt, though it would have been fitting to claim that he is liable to bring the offering, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira. The mishna explains: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said: What? If, with regard to an oath concerning an optional matter, for which one is not under oath from Mount Sinai, he is liable for breaking it, then with regard to an oath about a mitzva, for which he is under oath from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he would be liable for breaking it? The Rabbis said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for breaking an oath concerning an optional action, where the Torah rendered one liable for a negative oath not to perform it like for a positive oath to perform it, shall you also say one is liable with regard to breaking an oath concerning a mitzva, where the Torah did not render one liable for a negative oath like for a positive oath, since if one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and did not refrain, he is exempt.

If one says: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and he then says again: On my oath I will not eat it, and again: On my oath I will not eat it, and he then ate it, he is liable only once. Once the first oath had taken effect, the subsequent oaths could not, as a prohibition cannot take effect where another prohibition is already in place. This is an oath on an utterance, for which one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally breaking it, and for unwittingly breaking it one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. For an oath taken in vain, one is liable to receive lashes when it is taken intentionally, and one is exempt when it is taken unwittingly.

Which oath is an oath taken in vain, mentioned in the previous mishna (27b)? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true, for example, one says about a stone column that it is made of gold, or about a man that he is a woman, or about a woman that she is a man. Another type of oath taken in vain is when one takes an oath about a matter that is impossible, e.g., if he says: If I did not see a camel flying through the air, or: If I did not see a snake as large as the beam of the olive press. In the case of one who said to witnesses: Come and testify for me, and they replied: On our oath we will not testify for you, that is an oath taken in vain, because it involves taking an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva. Other examples of this include an oath not to build a sukka, or not to take a lulav, or not to don phylacteries. This type of oath is an oath taken in vain, for which one is liable to receive lashes if he takes the oath intentionally, and for which he is exempt if he takes it unwittingly.

If one said: On my oath I will eat this loaf, and later said: On my oath I will not eat it, the first oath is an oath on an utterance, and the second is an oath taken in vain, as he took an oath to perform an action that would violate his previous oath. If he ate it, he violated the prohibition against taking an oath in vain. If he did not eat it, he violated the prohibition against breaking an oath on an utterance.

As opposed to the halakhot of an oath of testimony, which will be discussed in the following chapter, the halakhot of an oath on an utterance apply to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives, to those who are fit to testify and to those who are disqualified, whether the oath is taken in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, i.e., when one takes an oath on his own, at his own initiative. And for violating an oath intentionally one is liable to receive lashes, and for doing so unwittingly he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

Liability for an oath taken in vain applies to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives, to those who are fit to bear witness and to those who are disqualified, whether the oath is taken in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, and also when one takes an oath on his own. And for violating an oath intentionally one is liable to receive lashes, and for doing so unwittingly he is exempt. With regard to both this, an oath on an utterance, and that, an oath taken in vain, even if he is administered the oath by others, he is liable. For example, if one said: If I did not eat today, or: I did not don phylacteries today, and another said to him: I administer an oath to you that your statement is true, and the former said: Amen, he is liable if the statement was false.

Chapter 4

The oath of testimony is practiced with regard to men but not with regard to women, with regard to non-relatives of the litigants but not with regard to relatives, with regard to those fit to testify but not with regard to those unfit to testify due to a transgression that they performed. And the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify. The oath of testimony is practiced both in the presence of a court and not in the presence of a court, when the potential witness takes the oath on his own. But if the oath is administered by others and those denying that they witnessed the incident in question neither take an oath nor answer amen to the administered oath, they are not liable until they deny any knowledge of the incident in question in court. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether one of the witnesses takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, the witnesses are not liable until they deny any knowledge of the incident in question before the litigants in court.

And one is liable for the act of taking a false oath with intent and for an unwitting act of taking a false oath, i.e., he is unaware of the liability for taking a false oath, provided that he takes the oath with intent in terms of the testimony, i.e., he takes an oath that he has no knowledge of the matter even though he knows that he witnessed the incident. But witnesses are not liable for taking the oath if they were unwitting in terms of the testimony, i.e., they believe that they have no knowledge of the matter. And what are they liable for by taking a false oath with intent? They are liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

Liability to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony, how so? In a case where the plaintiff said to two individuals: Come and testify on my behalf, and they replied: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, i.e., we do not have any knowledge of the matter you speak of, or in a case where they said to him: We do not know any testimony on your behalf, and he said to them: I administer an oath to you, and they said: Amen; if it was determined that they lied, these two witnesses are liable. If he administered an oath to them five times outside the court, and they came to court and admitted that they had knowledge of the incident in question and testified, they are exempt. But if they denied knowledge of the incident in court as well, they are liable for each and every one of the oaths administered to them outside the court. If he administered an oath to them five times before the court, and they denied knowledge of the incident, they are liable for taking only one false oath. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason for this ruling? Since once they denied that they had any knowledge of the incident they can no longer retract that denial and admit that they have knowledge of the matter. Therefore, there was only one oath of testimony, and there is no liability for the remaining oaths.

If both of the witnesses denied knowledge of the incident together, both of them are liable. If they denied knowledge one after the other, the first who denied knowledge is liable, and the second is exempt, as once the first witness denies knowledge of the incident, the second is an individual witness, whose testimony is not decisive. If one of the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident, and the other one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, the one who denies knowledge of the incident is liable. If there were two sets of witnesses that took the oath of testimony, and the first set denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set denied knowledge of the matter, both of the sets are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them, as even after the first set denies knowledge of the incident, the second remains capable of providing decisive testimony.

In a case where the plaintiff said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf that I have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, and an outstanding loan, and a stolen item, and a lost item, and they lied in reply: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, they are liable for taking only one false oath of testimony. But if they lied in reply: On our oath we do not know that you have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, and an outstanding loan, and a stolen item, and a lost item, they are liable for each and every one of the components of the claim. It is as though they took a separate oath with regard to each of the details of the claim. In a case where the plaintiff said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that I have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt, and they lied in reply: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, they are liable for taking only one false oath of testimony. But if they lied in reply: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf that you have in the possession of so-and-so wheat, and barley, and spelt, they are liable for each and every one of the components of the claim.

In a case where the plaintiff said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf that I have in the possession of so-and-so an outstanding payment for damage; or an outstanding payment for half the damage, which the owner pays for damage caused by his innocuous ox goring another animal; or with regard to an outstanding payment of double the principal that a thief must pay the owner of the stolen item; or with regard to an outstanding payment of four or five times the principal that a thief pays when he stole a sheep or an ox, respectively, and then slaughtered or sold it; or in a case where the plaintiff said: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that so-and-so raped my daughter; or, he seduced my daughter; or, that my son struck me; or, that another injured me; or, that he set my stack of grain on fire on Yom Kippur; if in any of these cases the witnesses took an oath falsely denying any knowledge of the matter on behalf of the plaintiff, these witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

In a case where the plaintiff said to two witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that I am a priest, or that I am a Levite, or that I am not the son of a priest and a divorced woman, or that I am not the son of a priest and a ḥalutza, or that so-and-so is a priest, or that so-and-so is a Levite, or that he is not the son of a priest and a divorced woman, or that he is not the son of a priest and a ḥalutza ; in all these cases the witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony, because these do not involve monetary claims. Likewise, if the plaintiff said to them: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that so-and-so raped his daughter, or that he seduced his daughter, or that my son injured me, or that another person wounded me on Shabbat, or that he set my stack of grain on fire on Shabbat; in all these cases these witnesses are exempt, as each case is punishable with the death penalty, and therefore they are cases that do not involve monetary payment.

If one said to witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf that so-and-so said he is going to give me two hundred dinars and he did not give them to me, and they take false oaths that they have no knowledge of the matter, they are exempt from liability to bring an offering for taking a false oath of testimony, as one is liable for taking a false oath of testimony only in a case involving a monetary claim like a deposit in the sense that were the witnesses to testify, the individual would be liable to pay. In the case of a promise to give a gift he could claim that he merely reconsidered.

If one said to witnesses: I administer an oath to you that when you will know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf, these witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony even if they do not testify, due to the fact that the oath preceded their knowledge of the relevant testimony.

If one stood in the synagogue and said for all to hear: I administer an oath to you that if you know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf, these witnesses are exempt until he directs his demand to specific individuals.

If one said to two people: I administer an oath to you, so-and-so and so-and-so, that if you know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf, and they respond: On our oath we do not know any testimony relevant to you, and they know testimony relevant to him, not based on an incident they witnessed but based on hearsay testimony, which is not valid testimony, or if one of the witnesses is found to be a relative or disqualified, these witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony because they are unfit witnesses.

If the plaintiff sent the demand for their testimony by means of his slave, or in a case where the defendant said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you that if you know any testimony relevant to the plaintiff that you will come and testify on his behalf, and they took a false oath that they have no knowledge of the matter, these witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony until they will hear the demand to testify directly from the mouth of the plaintiff.

The mishna discusses the formula of an oath of testimony. If the plaintiff said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf, or even if he said: I command you, or I bind you, although he did not employ an unequivocal formula of an oath, these witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony. If one administered the oath to the witnesses in the name of heaven and in the name of earth, these witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony, as that is not an oath in the name of God. If one administered the oath to the witnesses in the name of alef dalet, i.e., Adonai ; in the name of yod heh, the Tetragrammaton; in the name of the Almighty [ Shaddai ]; in the name of the Lord of Hosts [ Tzevaot ]; in the name of the Gracious and Compassionate One; in the name of He Who is Slow to Anger; in the name of He Who is Abounding in Loving-kindness; or in the name of any of the appellations of God, even though he did not mention the ineffable name of God, these witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony. One who curses God employing any of these names or appellations of God is liable to be executed through stoning; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis deem him exempt, as they hold that one is liable for cursing God only if he employs the ineffable name of God. One who curses his father or his mother employing any of these names or appellations of God is liable to be executed through stoning; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis deem him exempt, as they hold that one is liable for cursing his father and his mother only if he employs the ineffable name of God. One who curses himself or another employing any of these names or appellations of God violates a prohibition. If one says: The Lord God shall strike you (see Deuteronomy 28:22), and likewise if one says: God shall strike you if you do not come to testify, that is a curse that is written in the Torah, and in such a case one is certainly liable if he fails to testify. If one says to the witnesses: God shall not strike you, or: God shall bless you, or: God shall benefit you if you come and testify, Rabbi Meir deems him liable, as one may infer from that statement that if he fails to testify God will strike him, or will not bless or benefit him. And the Rabbis deem him exempt because the curse is not explicitly stated.

Chapter 5

One who takes a false oath denying that he is in possession of an item that another deposited with him is liable to return the item with an additional one-fifth of its value and to bring a guilt-offering (see Leviticus 5:20–26). The halakhot of an oath on a deposit apply to men and to women, to non-relatives and to relatives, i.e., even if the owner of the deposit and the purported bailee are related, to those fit to serve as witnesses and to those disqualified from doing so. These halakhot apply when the oath is taken in the presence of a court and when taken not in the presence of a court, as long as the oath is taken on his own, i.e., stated by the defendant himself. But if the oath is administered by others, he is not liable unless he denies the claim in court; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Both when the defendant takes an oath on his own and when the oath is administered by others, once he has falsely denied the claim against him, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering and to pay restitution and an additional one-fifth, even if the oath was not administered in the presence of a court. And one is liable to bring an offering for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit and for unwittingly taking a false oath about the intentional misappropriation of the deposit, i.e., if one knowingly took a false oath but was unaware that he is liable to bring an offering for taking the oath. But he is not liable for unwittingly taking a false oath by itself, where he mistakenly thought that he did not owe anything. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? He must bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels.

The mishna continues: What is the case of an oath on a deposit? It is where the claimant said to the defendant: Give me my deposit, which is in your possession, and the defendant replied: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession; or the defendant said to him: Nothing of yours is in my possession, the claimant responded: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen. In either case this defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if he lied. If the claimant administered an oath to him five times, whether in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, and the defendant falsely denied each claim, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for each and every denial. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason? It is due to the fact that he is able to retract and confess after each oath and repay the claimant. Since he did not do so, each oath is considered a separate denial of a monetary claim.

If five people were suing him and they said to him: Give us back our deposit that is in your possession, and the defendant says: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds to each claimant: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim that he denied. Rabbi Eliezer says: He is not liable for his oath concerning each claim unless he says: On my oath, at the end of the denial, i.e., he says: Nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, on my oath, so that it is clear that he is taking an oath to each one. Rabbi Shimon says: He is not liable for his oath concerning each claim unless he says: On my oath, to each and every claimant, i.e., he says: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and on my oath nothing of yours, to each claimant separately. In a case where the claimant said: Give me back my deposit, and pledge, stolen item, and lost item that are in your possession, and the defendant responds: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your deposit, or pledge, stolen item, or lost item, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. In a case where the claimant said: Give me back my wheat, and barley, and spelt that are in your possession, if the defendant responds: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your wheat, barley, or spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Rabbi Meir says: Even if the defendant says: On my oath I do not have in my possession your grain of wheat, or grain of barley, or grain of spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim.

The mishna continues: If one accuses another: You raped or you seduced my daughter, and the other says: I did not rape and I did not seduce your daughter, to which the father replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, the defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if it is a false oath. Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since one does not pay a fine based on his own admission. Had he confessed he would have been exempt from paying the fine; he is therefore not liable for his denial. The Rabbis said to him: Even though he does not pay the fine based on his own admission, he does pay compensation for humiliation and compensation for degradation resulting from her being raped or seduced, which are monetary claims and not fines, based on his own admission. He is therefore liable for a false oath, as he denied a monetary claim.

Similarly, in a case where one person accuses another: You stole my ox, and the defendant says: I did not steal your ox, if the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, he is liable to pay for the ox due to the theft and to bring a guilt-offering if he lied, since by his oath he is denying that he owes the value of the ox that he would have to pay if he admitted to stealing it. But in a case where the claimant accuses the defendant of stealing the ox and slaughtering or selling it, and the defendant says: I stole the ox, but I did not slaughter or sell it, and this is a lie, if the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, then the defendant is exempt from the fivefold payment for slaughtering or selling another’s ox, since it is a fine. If the claimant says: Your ox killed my ox, and the defendant lies and says: It did not kill your ox, to which the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, then he is liable for his false oath. But if the claimant says: Your ox killed my Canaanite slave and you are therefore liable to pay me a fine of thirty shekels, and he lies and says: It did not kill your slave, to which the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, then he is exempt, because payment for the slave is a fine. If the claimant said to him: You injured me and caused me a wound, and the defendant says: I did not injure you and I did not cause you a wound, to which the claimant replies: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, he is liable. But if one’s Canaanite slave said to him: You knocked out my tooth, or: You blinded my eye, and you are therefore required to emancipate me, and he says: I did not knock out your tooth, or: I did not blind your eye, to which the slave replies: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering even though he lied, since the obligation to emancipate one’s slave in these cases is a penalty. This is the principle: For any claim that the defendant would have to pay based on his own admission, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath concerning that claim. And for any claim that he would not pay based on his own admission but would pay only by the testimony of witnesses, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for taking a false oath concerning that claim.

Chapter 6

By Torah law, the oath imposed by the judges upon one who admits to part of a claim is administered only when the claim is for the value of at least two silver ma’a, and the defendant’s admission is for the value of at least one peruta. And furthermore, if the admission is not of the same type as the claim, i.e., the defendant admitted to a debt that the claimant did not claim, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath. How so? If the claimant said to the defendant: I have two silver ma’a in your possession, and the latter responded: You have only one peruta, a coin made from copper, in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath (see 39b). But if the claimant said: I have two silver ma’a and one peruta in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only one peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath. If the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt, as he denies the entire claim. But if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim. If the claimant said: My late father had one hundred dinars in your possession, and I am now claiming them, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as he is like one returning a lost item, since he could have easily denied the entire claim.

The mishna discusses other cases where the defendant denies an entire claim. In a case where one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, I acknowledge that claim; and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is exempt. But if he responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, i.e., he denies that a debt ever existed, he is liable to pay, as he already admitted that he owed him the amount. In a case where the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant said to him: Yes, to which the claimant responded: Give the money to me only in the presence of witnesses, then if the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is liable to pay, as he is required to give it to him in the presence of witnesses, and he cannot prove that he did so.

The mishna resumes discussion of the oath imposed by the court in a case where the defendant admits to a part of a claim. If the claimant said: I have a litra, i.e., a specific weight, of gold in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a litra of silver in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as his admission relates to a different item than that which the claim relates to. But if the claimant said: I have a gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar, or a tereisit, or a pundeyon, or a peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type; they are all coins. Since the claim concerns money, the difference between the different types of coins is disregarded, as the claim is essentially referring to the monetary value, not to a specific type of coin. If the claimant said: I have a kor of grain in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a half- kor of legumes in my possession, he is exempt. But if the claimant said: I have a kor of produce in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a half- kor of legumes in my possession, he is liable, as legumes are included in produce. If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. According to Rabban Gamliel, one who admits to a part of the claim is liable to take an oath even if the admission is not of the same type as the claim. With regard to one who claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter then admitted that he owes him pitchers, i.e., the jugs themselves, but not the oil, Admon says: Since he admitted to him with regard to a part of the claim, and his admission was of the same type as the claim, i.e., the claim included both containers and oil and he admitted to owing him containers, he must take an oath. And the Rabbis say: The partial admission in this case is not of the same type as the claim, as he completely denied owing him oil. Rabban Gamliel said: I see the statement of Admon as correct. If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or conversely, he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath, as oaths are not taken concerning claims involving land. If he admitted to part of the claim about the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim about the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the entire claim, as property that does not serve as a guarantee, i.e., movable property, binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that the oath about the movable property can be extended to require him to take an oath concerning the land as well.

One does not take an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor. And the court does not administer an oath to a minor. But one does take an oath to a minor, or to a representative of the Temple treasury with regard to consecrated property.

And these are items concerning which one does not take an oath by Torah law: Canaanite slaves, and financial documents, and land, and consecrated property. In a case where these items are stolen, there is no payment of double the principal, nor is there payment of four or five times the principal in a case where one stole a consecrated animal and slaughtered or sold it. An unpaid bailee who lost one of these items does not take an oath that he was not negligent in safeguarding it, and a paid bailee does not pay for the loss or theft of one of these items. Rabbi Shimon says there is a distinction between different types of consecrated property: With regard to consecrated property for which one bears the financial responsibility to compensate the Temple treasury in the event of their loss, such as in a case where he vowed to bring an offering and then set aside an animal to be sacrificed in fulfillment of the vow, one takes an oath concerning them, as they are considered his own property. But with regard to consecrated property for which he does not bear the financial responsibility for their loss, one does not take an oath concerning them.

Rabbi Meir says: There are certain items that are physically on the land but are not treated like land from a halakhic perspective, and the Rabbis do not concede to him concerning this point. How so? If one makes the claim: I assigned you ten grapevines laden with fruit to safeguard, and the other one says: They are only five vines, Rabbi Meir deems the defendant liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim, and although the claim concerned grapevines, the primary aspect of the claim was the grapes. And the Rabbis say: The halakhic status of anything that is attached to the land is like the land itself, and therefore he is exempt from taking an oath. One takes an oath only concerning an item that is defined by size, by weight, or by number. How so? If the claimant says: I transferred to you a house full of produce, or: I transferred to you a pouch full of money, and the other person says: I do not know how much you gave me, but what you left in my possession you may take, and the amount in the house or pouch at that time is less than that claimed by the claimant, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath, as the amounts in the claim and the admission are undefined. But if this party says that the house was full up to the ledge, and that party says that it was full up to the window, the defendant is liable to take an oath, as the dispute relates to a defined amount.

There is a case of one who lends money to another on the basis of collateral, and the collateral was lost while in the possession of the creditor, and the creditor says to the debtor: I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and that collateral was worth a shekel, i.e., a half-sela. Therefore, you owe me a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says in response to that claim: That is not the case. Rather, you lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral, and the collateral was worth a sela ; I owe you nothing. In this case, the debtor is exempt from payment. There is a case of a creditor who claims: I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and it was worth a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says: That is not the case; rather, you lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral, and the collateral was worth three dinars, i.e., three-quarters of a sela. In this case, the debtor is liable to take an oath, due to the fact that he responded to the claim of the creditor with a partial admission. If in that case the debtor said: You lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth two sela, so now you owe me a sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case; rather, I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth a sela. Here, the creditor is exempt. If in that case the debtor said: You lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth two sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case; rather, I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth five dinars. Here, the creditor is liable to take an oath due to the fact that he responded to the claim of the debtor with a partial admission. And who takes the oath? The one in whose possession the deposit had been located, i.e., the creditor, who took collateral from the debtor. The Sages instituted this provision lest this party, i.e., the debtor, take an oath and the other party, i.e., the creditor, produce the deposit and prove the oath false.

Chapter 7

All those who take an oath that is legislated by the Torah take an oath and do not pay. By Torah law, one takes an oath only in order to exempt himself from a monetary claim. And these litigants take a rabbinically instituted oath and receive possession of the disputed funds or property, i.e., their claim is upheld by means of the oath, even though they are not in possession of the property in question: A hired worker who claims that he has not received his wages; and one who was robbed and sues the person who robbed him; and one who was injured, who claims compensation from the person who injured him; and one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath. When a person suspected of taking false oaths is liable to take an oath in order to exempt himself, the claimant takes an oath instead and receives payment. And a storekeeper relying on his ledger also takes an oath and is paid. How does this halakha apply to the hired worker? The case is where one says to his employer: Give me my wages that are still in your possession. The employer says: I already gave them to you. And that worker says: I have not received them. In such a case, the worker takes an oath that he has not received his wages, and he receives payment from his employer. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission on the part of the employer. How so? The case is where the worker said to him: Give me my wages, fifty silver dinars, which are still in your possession. And the employer says: You have already received one golden dinar, which is worth twenty-five silver dinars. Since the employer has admitted that he owes part of the sum, the worker takes an oath and is paid the whole sum.

How does this halakha apply to one who was robbed? The case is where witnesses testified about the defendant that he entered the claimant’s house to seize collateral from him without the authority to do so. The claimant said: You took items that belong to me. And the defendant said: I did not take them. The claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his claim. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission on the part of the defendant. How so? The case is where the claimant said to him: You took two items. And he says: I took only one. Since the defendant admits that he took one item from the house, the claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his whole claim.

How does this halakha apply to one who was injured? The case is where witnesses testified about the injured person that he entered into the domain of the defendant whole but left injured, and the claimant said to the defendant: You injured me. And the defendant says: I did not injure you. The injured party takes an oath and receives compensation. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission. How so? The case is where the claimant said to the defendant: You injured me twice. And the other says: I injured you only once. In such a case, the injured party takes an oath that he was injured twice and receives compensation for both injuries.

How does this halakha apply to one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath and therefore is not permitted to take the oath? One is considered suspect with regard to oaths if he has been found to have taken a false oath, whether it was an oath of testimony, or whether it was an oath on a deposit, or even an oath taken in vain, which is a less severe prohibition. There are also categories of people who by rabbinic decree are considered suspect with regard to oaths: If one of the litigants was a dice player, or one who lends with interest, or among those who fly pigeons, or among the vendors of produce of the Sabbatical Year, then the litigant opposing him takes an oath and receives payment of his claim. If both litigants were suspect, the oath returned to its place. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, and will be explained in the Gemara. Rabbi Meir says: Since neither can take an oath, they divide the disputed amount.

And how does this halakha apply to the storekeeper relying on his ledger? This ruling is not referring to the case where a storekeeper says to a customer: It is written in my ledger that you owe me two hundred dinars. Rather, it is referring to a case where a customer says to a storekeeper: Give my son two se’a of wheat, or: Give my laborers a sela in small coins. And later the storekeeper says: I gave it to them; but they say: We did not receive it. In such a case, where the father or employer admits that he gave those instructions and it is also recorded in the storekeeper’s ledger, the storekeeper takes an oath that he gave the son the wheat or paid the laborers, and he receives compensation from the father or employer; and the laborers take an oath that they were not paid and receive their wages from the employer. Ben Nannas said: How is it that both these and those come to take an oath in vain? One of them is certainly lying. Rather, the storekeeper receives his compensation without taking an oath, and the laborers receive their wages without taking an oath.

If one said to a storekeeper: Give me produce valued at a dinar, and he gave him the produce. And later the storekeeper said to him: Give me that dinar you owe me, and the customer said to him: I gave it to you, and you put it in your wallet [ be’unpali ], the customer shall take an oath that he gave him the dinar. If, after he gave the storekeeper the money, the customer said to him: Give me the produce, and the storekeeper said to him: I gave it to you and you transported it to your house, the storekeeper shall take an oath that he has already filled the order, and he is exempt from supplying the produce. Rabbi Yehuda says: Whoever has the produce in his possession has the advantage, and his claim is accepted without his taking an oath. Similarly, if one said to a money changer: Give me small coins valued at a dinar, and he gave him the coins, and subsequently the money changer said to him: Give me the dinar, and the customer said to him: I gave it to you, and you put it in your wallet; the customer shall take an oath that he paid. If the customer gave the money changer the dinar, and then said to him: Give me the coins, and the money changer said to him: I gave them to you and you cast them into your purse, the money changer shall take an oath. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not a money changer’s way to give even an issar until he receives a dinar. Therefore, the fact that the customer received the coins indicates that the money changer already received his payment.

These cases of taking an oath are just like other cases where the Sages said that one takes an oath and receives payment. The mishna (see Ketubot 87a) teaches: A woman who vitiates her marriage contract by acknowledging receipt of partial payment may collect the remainder only by taking an oath; or if one witness testifies that her marriage contract has been paid, she may collect it only by taking an oath. She may collect it from liened property that has been sold to a third party, or from the property of orphans, only by taking an oath, and a woman who collects it from her husband’s property when not in his presence may collect it only by taking an oath. And likewise, orphans may collect a loan with a promissory note inherited from their father only by taking an oath. Orphans who wish to collect payment of money owed to their father must take the following oath: On our oath our father did not direct us on his deathbed not to collect with this promissory note, and our father did not say to us that this note was paid, and we did not find among our father’s documents a record showing that this promissory note was paid. After taking that oath, they may collect the money. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Even if the son was born after the father’s death, he needs to take an oath in order to receive the money owed to his father. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death: This promissory note has not been paid, the son collects the debt without having to take an oath.

And these people are sometimes required to take an oath that they do not owe anything even when there is no explicit claim against them: Partners, sharecroppers, stewards [ apotropin ], a woman who does business from home, where she manages the property of orphans, and the member of the household appointed to manage the household’s affairs. For example, in a case where one of these people said to one of the people whose property he or she manages: What is your claim against me? If the other replied: It is simply my wish that you take an oath to me that you have not taken anything of mine, the former is liable to take that oath. Once the partners or the sharecroppers have divided the common property, each taking his share, then one side may not require an oath of the other absent a definite claim. But if an oath was imposed upon him due to some other situation, that oath can be extended to impose upon him any other oath, i.e., it can be extended to apply to any other of their disputes. The mishna adds: And the Sabbatical Year abrogates the obligation to take an oath about a debt, just like it abrogates a debt.

Chapter 8

There are four types of bailees, to whom different halakhot apply. They are as follows: An unpaid bailee, who receives no compensation for safeguarding the item in his care; and a borrower, who receives an item on loan for his own use without paying a rental fee; a paid bailee, who is paid a salary for safeguarding the deposited item; and a renter, i.e., one who pays a fee for the use of an item or animal. In the event that one of these bailees is unable to return the deposited item to its owner, the halakha with regard to liability is dependent upon what happened to the item, and upon the type of bailee: An unpaid bailee takes an oath attesting to the fact that he was not negligent with the care of the item and is then exempt from liability for everything, meaning for all types of damage, whether the item was lost, stolen, damaged, or if the animal died. Conversely, a borrower does not have the option of taking an oath, and pays for everything, whether the item was stolen, lost, damaged, or the animal died, even if it was by unavoidable accident. The halakhot of a paid bailee and a renter are the same: They take an oath concerning an injured animal, and concerning a captured one, and concerning a dead animal, attesting to the fact that these mishaps were not caused by negligence, but rather by unavoidable accident, and then are exempt from liability. But they must pay if the deposit cannot be returned due to loss or theft, even if these were not caused by negligence.

The mishna clarifies: If the owner of an ox said to an unpaid bailee: Where is my ox? And the unpaid bailee said to him: It died, but the truth was that it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; or if the bailee responded: It was injured, but the truth was that it died or was captured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was captured, but the truth was that it died or was injured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was stolen, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or lost; or if he responded: It was lost, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or stolen, in any of the above cases, if the owner of the ox then said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the unpaid bailee said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering, despite the fact that he took a false oath. The reason is that his false oath did not render him exempt from liability to pay.

If the owner says to an unpaid bailee: Where is my ox? And the unpaid bailee said to him: I do not know what you are talking about, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the unpaid bailee said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering, since he would not have been liable to pay in any of these cases. But if the owner said to the unpaid bailee: Where is my ox? And the unpaid bailee said to him: It is lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the unpaid bailee said: Amen, and then witnesses testify that the bailee consumed it, he pays the owner the principal, since he took the ox for himself. But if there were no witnesses, but after he took the oath he admitted of his own accord that he stole the ox and took a false oath, then he pays the owner the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and he brings a guilt-offering to achieve atonement, as in any other case where one takes a false oath with regard to a deposit. Similarly, if the owner said to the unpaid bailee: Where is my ox? And the unpaid bailee said to him: It was stolen, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the unpaid bailee said: Amen, and then witnesses testify that the bailee stole it, he pays double the principal. If he admitted of his own accord that he stole it, then he is exempt from double payment for theft, but pays the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and brings a guilt-offering to achieve atonement.

If the owner of an ox said to someone in the marketplace, i.e., a stranger who was not a bailee: Where is my ox that you stole? And the accused says: I did not steal it, and then witnesses testify that the accused did steal it, he pays the double payment. If he slaughtered or sold it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. If the accused saw witnesses that were approaching to testify against him, and at that point he said: I admit that I stole the animal but I did not slaughter or sell it, he pays only the principal.

If the owner said to a borrower: Where is my ox? And the borrower said to him: It died, but the truth was that it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was injured, but the truth was that it died or was captured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was captured, but the truth was that it died or was injured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was stolen, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or lost; or if he responded: It was lost, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or stolen, in any of the above cases, if the owner of the ox said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the borrower said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing an offering for his false oath, since the oath did not render him exempt from liability to pay. He would have been liable to pay in any case.

But if the owner said to the borrower: Where is my ox? And the borrower said to him: I do not know what you are talking about, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the borrower said: Amen, the borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering, as he took an oath that would render him exempt from liability to pay. If an owner said to a paid bailee or a renter: Where is my ox? And the latter said to him: It died, but the truth was that it was injured or captured; or if he said: It was injured, but the truth was that it died or was captured; or if he said: It was captured, but the truth was that it died or was injured; or if he said: It was stolen, but the truth was that it was lost; or if he said: It was lost, but the truth was that it was stolen, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and he said: Amen, the paid bailee or renter is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering. If the paid bailee or renter said: It died or was injured or captured, but the truth was that it was stolen or lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and he said: Amen, the paid bailee or renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering. If the paid bailee or renter said: It was lost or stolen, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and he said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering. This is the principle: Anyone who changes from one claim of liability to another claim of liability or from one claim of exemption to another claim of exemption or from a claim of exemption to a claim of liability is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering. If he changes from a claim of liability to a claim of exemption, he is liable. This is the principle: Anyone who takes an oath to be lenient with himself is liable; if he takes an oath to be stringent with himself, he is exempt.

Mishnah Eduyot

Chapter 1

Shammai says: “For all women [who begin to menstruate] it suffices [to reckon their impurity from] the time [of their discovering it].” And Hillel says: “[Their impurity is reckoned backwards] from the [last] examination to the [previous] examination, even if this covers many days.” But the Sages say: “Neither according to the opinion of this one nor according to the opinion of this one, but [they are considered impure for] the past twenty four hours when this lessens the period from the [last] examination to the [previous] examination, and for the period from the [last] examination to the [previous] examination when this lessens the past twenty-four hours.” Any woman who has a regular period, it suffices [to reckon her impurity from] her set time. She who uses testing-cloths [when she has sexual relations], behold this is like an examination: it lessens either the period of the [past] twenty four hours or the period from the [last] examination to the [previous] examination.

Shammai says: “[Dough] of a kav or more is subject to the law of hallah.” And Hillel says: “Of two kavs or more.” But the Sages say: “Neither according to the opinion of this one nor according to the opinion of this one, but [dough of] a kav and a half is subject to the law of hallah.” And after they increased the measures they said: “[Dough of] five quarters is subject. Rabbi Yose said: “Five are exempt, five and more are liable.”

Hillel says: “A hin full of drawn water renders the mikweh unfit.” (However, man must speak in the language of his teacher.) And Shammai says: “Nine kavs.” But the Sages say: “Neither according to the opinion of this one nor according to the opinion of this one;” But when two weavers from the dung-gate which is in Jerusalem came and testified in the name of Shemaiah and Avtalion, “Three logs of drawn water render the mikweh unfit,” the Sages confirmed their statement.

And why do they record the opinions of Shammai and Hillel for naught? To teach the following generations that a man should not [always] persist in his opinion, for behold, the fathers of the world did not persist in their opinion.

And why do they record the opinion of a single person among the many, when the halakhah must be according to the opinion of the many? So that if a court prefers the opinion of the single person it may depend on him. For no court may set aside the decision of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number. If it was greater than it in wisdom but not in number, in number but not in wisdom, it may not set aside its decision, unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number.

Rabbi Judah said: “If so, why do they record the opinion of a single person among the many to set it aside? So that if a man shall say, ‘Thus have I received the tradition’, it may be said to him, ‘According to the [refuted] opinion of that individual did you hear it.’”

Beth Shammai says: “A quarter-kav of any bones, even from two limbs or from three.” And Beth Hillel says: “A quarter-kav of bones from a corpse, either from [the bones which form] the greater portion of the [body’s] build, or from the greater portion of the number [of the body’s bones]. Shammai says: “Even from a single bone.”

Vetches of terumah: Beth Shammai says, “They must be soaked and rubbed in purity, but can be given for food in impurity.” And Beth Hillel says: “They must be soaked in purity, but can be rubbed and given for food in impurity.” Shammai says: “They must be eaten dry.” Rabbi Akiva says: “All actions in connection with them [can be carried out] in impurity.”

One who changes for a sela copper coins from second tithe: Beth Shammai says: “Copper coin for the whole sela.” And Beth Hillel say: “Silver for one shekel and copper coin for one shekel.” Rabbi Meir says: “Silver and fruits may not be substituted for silver.” But the sages allow it.

One who exchanges a sela from second tithe in Jerusalem: Beth Shammai says: “Copper coin for the whole sela.” And Beth Hillel says: “Silver for one shekel and copper coin for one shekel.” The disputants before the Sages say: “Silver for three denars and copper coin for one denar.” Rabbi Akiva says: “Silver for three denars and for the fourth silver, copper coin.” Rabbi Tarfon says: “Four aspers in silver.” Shammai says: “He must leave it in the shop and eat on the credit thereof.”

A bride’s stool from which the covering-boards have been taken: Beth Shammai pronounces it [liable to become] unclean, And Beth Hillel pronounce it not [liable to become] unclean. Shammai says: “Even the framework of a stool [by itself is liable to become] unclean.” A stool which has been set in a baker’s trough: Beth Shammai pronounces it [liable to become] unclean, And Beth Hillel pronounces it not [liable to become] unclean. Shammai says: “Even one made therein [is liable to become unclean].”

These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai:A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.

Whoever is half a slave and half a free man should work one day for his master and one day for himself, according to Beth Hillel. Beth Shammai said to them: “You have set matters in order with regards to his master, but you have not set matters in order with regards to himself. He is not able to marry a slave-woman, nor is he able [to marry] a woman who is free. Is he to refrain [from marrying]? [How can he] for is it not the case that the world was created in order for people to be fruitful and multiply? For it is said, “He did not create it to be a waste; but formed it for inhabitation” (Isaiah 45:18). But for the rightful ordering of the world his master is compelled to make him free, and he writes out a bond for half his value.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.

A vessel of earthenware can protect everything [in it from contracting impurity], according to Beth Hillel. But Beth Shammai says: “It protects only food and liquids and [other] vessels of earthenware.” Beth Hillel said to them: “Why?” Beth Shammai said to them: “Because it is [itself] impure with respect to an ignoramus, and no impure vessel can screen [against impurity].” Beth Hillel said to them: “And did you not pronounce pure the food and liquids inside it?” Beth Shammai said to them: “When we pronounced pure the food and liquids inside it, we pronounced them pure for him [the ignoramus] only, but when you pronounced the vessel pure you pronounced it pure for yourself and for him.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.

Chapter 2

Rabbi Hanina, chief of the priests, testified concerning four matters:Through all their days the priests never refrained from burning meat which had been defiled by an “offspring” of impurity with meat which had been made impure by a “father” of impurity, although they were [thereby] increasing its impurity by a [higher] impurity. Rabbi Akiba added: “Through all their days the priests never shrank from lighting oil which had been rendered unfit by a tevul yom in a lamp made impure by one who was made impure by a corpse, although they were [thereby] increasing its impurity by a [higher] impurity.”

Rabbi Hanina, chief of the priests, said: “All my days I never saw a hide taken out to the place of burning.” Rabbi Akiba said: “From his words we infer that whoever flays the hide of the firstborn beast and it is found to be trefah, the priests may enjoy the use of the hide.” But the Sages say: “[A testimony which consists of] ‘we didn’t see’ is not a proof; rather the hide must be taken out to the place of burning.

He also testified concerning a small village in the vicinity of Jerusalem in which there was an old man who used to lend to all the people of the village and write out [the bond] in his own handwriting and others signed it. And when the fact was brought before the Sages they pronounced it legal. Hence, incidentally, you may infer that a wife may write her own bill of divorcement, and a husband may write his own receipt; for the legality of a document depends only on those who sign it. And [he testified] concerning a needle which was found in flesh of a [sacrifice], that the knife and the hands [which had been employed on the flesh] are clean, but the flesh itself is defiled; and if it was found in the excrement, all are clean.

Rabbi Yishmael declared three things before the Sages in the vineyard at Yavneh: Concerning an egg which was beaten together, and placed on vegetables of terumah that it acts as a connection; but if it was in the form of a helmet it does not act as a connection. And concerning an ear of corn in the harvesting, the top of which reached the standing corn that if it can be reaped together with the standing corn, it belongs to the owner; and if not, it belongs to the poor. And concerning a small garden which was surrounded by a row of vines that if it has space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on one side, and space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on the other side, it may be sown with seed; but if not, it may not be sown with seed.

They stated three things before Rabbi Yishmael, and he pronounced none of them either unlawful or lawful; and Rabbi Joshua ben Matya explained them.One who lances an abscess on the Sabbath: if it was to make an opening he is liable; if it was to bring out the pus, he is exempt. And concerning one who hunts a snake on the Sabbath: that if he was occupied with it in order that it should not bite him, he is innocent; but if that he might use it as a remedy, he is guilty. And concerning Ironian stewpots: that they do not contract impurity when under the same tent as a corpse; but become impure if they are carried by a zav. Rabbi Eliezer ben Zadok says: “Even if they are carried by a zav they remain pure, because they are unfinished.”

Rabbi Yishmael said three things, and Rabbi Akiba disagreed with him.Garlic or unripe grapes or green ears of grain were being crushed [on the eve of the Sabbath] while it is yet day: Rabbi Yishmael says: “He may finish crushing after it grows dark.” But Rabbi Akiba says: “He may not finish.”

They said three things before Rabbi Akiva, two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer and one in the name of Rabbi Joshua. Two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer:A woman may go out [on the Sabbath adorned] with a “golden-city”; And they that fly pigeons are unfit to bear evidence. And one in the name of Rabbi Joshua: If there was a creeping thing in the mouth of a weasel when it walked over loaves of terumah, and it is doubtful whether it touched them or whether it did not touch them, that about which there is doubt remains pure.

Rabbi Akiba declared three things; about two they agreed with him, and about one they disagreed with him.About a lime-burner’s sandal, that it is liable to contract midras impurity; And about the remains of a [broken] oven, that they must be four handbreadths high [in order to retain impurity], whereas they used to say three and [when he said four] they agreed with him. And about one they disagreed with him About a stool, from which two of its covering-boards had been removed, the one beside the other, which Rabbi Akiba pronounces able to contract impurity, but the Sages declare unable to contract impurity.

He used to say: the father transmits to the son beauty, strength, wealth, wisdom and years. And the number of generations before Him, that shall be their appointed end: For it is said, “calling the generations from the beginning” (Isaiah 41:4) Although it is said, “And shall serve them, and they shall afflict them four hundred years” (Genesis 15:13), it is also said, “And in the fourth generation they shall come hither again” (Genesis 15:16).

Also he used to say that there are five things that last twelve months:The judgment of the generation of the flood [continued] twelve months; The judgment of Job [continued] twelve months; The judgment of the Egyptians [continued] twelve months; The judgment of Gog and Magog in the time to come [will continue] twelve months; The judgment of the wicked in gehinom [continues] twelve months, for it is said, and “It will be from one month until its [same] month” (Isaiah 66:23). Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: “[As long as] from Passover to Shavuoth, for it is said, “And from one Sabbath until its [next] Sabbath” (ibid.).

Chapter 3

[In the case of] all things which cause defilement in a “tent”, if they [the pieces of the corpse] were divided and brought into the house, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas pronounces [everything under the same roof-space] clean, but the Sages pronounce it unclean. How so? He who touches as much as two halves of an olive [in quantity] of an animal’s carcass or carries them; or in the case of a [human] corpse, he who touches as much as half an olive and stands over as much as half an olive; or touches as much as half an olive and as much as half an olive is above him; or if he stands over as much as two halves of an olive; or if he stands over as much as half an olive and as much as half an olive is above him Rabbi Dosa b. Harkinas pronounces him clean, and the Sages pronounce him unclean. But if he touches as much as half an olive [in quantity] and another thing was over him and over as much as half an olive; or if he stood over as much as half an olive and another thing was over him and over as much as half an olive, he is clean. Rabbi Meir said: “Also in this case Rabbi Dosa pronounces him clean and the sages pronounce him unclean. In all such cases a man is unclean unless there is an act of touching and also an act of carrying, or an act of carrying and also [the fact of] being under the same roof-space.” This is the general rule: in whatever case the means of causing defilement are of one category, he is unclean; if they are of two categories, he is clean.”

Food which is in separate pieces does not combine together [to receive impurity], according to Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas. But the Sages say: “It does combines together.” One may exchange [ produce of] second tithe for uncoined metal, according to Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “One may not so exchange it.” The hands [alone] need to be immersed for the waters of purification according to Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “If his hands have become unclean his whole body becomes unclean.”

The insides of a melon and the discarded leaves of a vegetable of terumah: Rabbi Dosa permits [their] use to non-priests, and the Sages forbid it. Five ewes, their fleeces weighing each a mina and a half, are subject to [the law of] the first of the fleece, according to Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “Five ewes [are subject] whatever [their fleeces weigh].”

All mats are [liable to become] impure by “corpse” impurity, the words of Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “[Also by] “midras” impurity. All network is unsusceptible to impurity except a [network] girdle, the words of Rabbi Dosa. But the Sages say: “They are all liable to uncleanness, except those used by wool dealers [for carrying raw wool].”

A sling whose pocket is woven is susceptible to impurity. If it is of leather, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas pronounces it not susceptible to impurity, and the Sages pronounce it susceptible to impurity. If its finger-hold is broken off, it is not susceptible to impurity; [But if the] string-handle [only] is broken off it is susceptible to impurity.

A female captive may eat of terumah, according to the words of Rabbi Dosa b. Harkinas. But the Sages say: “There is a female captive who may eat, and there is a female captive who may not eat. How is this so? The woman who said: ‘I was taken captive but [nonetheless] I am pure’, she may eat; because the mouth that forbade is the same mouth that permit. But if there are witnesses [who declare] that she was made a captive, and she says: ‘[nonetheless] I am pure’, she may not eat.”

Four cases of doubt Rabbi Joshua pronounces impure, and the Sages pronounce them pure. How is this so? If the impure person stands and the pure person passes by him; or if the pure person stands and the impure person passes by him; or if impurity is in the private domain and something pure is in the public domain; Or if something pure is in the private domain and something impure is in the public domain; If it is doubtful [in all of these case] whether one touched or did not touch the other, or if it is doubtful whether one formed a tent over the other or did not form a tent over the other, or if it is doubtful whether one moved or did not move the other Rabbi Joshua pronounces such a case impure, and the Sages pronounce it pure.

Three things Rabbi Zadok pronounces [liable to receive] impurity and the Sages pronounce them not [liable to receive]: The nail of the money-changer; And the chest of grist makers; And the nail of a stone dial. Rabbi Zadok pronounces [liable to receive] impurity and the Sages pronounce them not [liable to receive].

Four things Rabban Gamaliel pronounces susceptible to impurity, and the Sages pronounce them not susceptible to impurity.The covering of a metal basket, if it belongs to householders; And the hanger of a strigil; And metals vessels which are still unshaped; And a plate that is divided into two [equal] parts. And the Sages agree with Rabban Gamaliel in the case of a plate that was divided into two parts, one large and one small, that the large one is susceptible to impurity and the small one is not susceptible to impurity.

In three cases Rabban Gamaliel was strict like the words of Beth Shammai.One may not wrap up hot food on a festival for the Sabbath; And one may not join together a lamp on a festival; And one may not bake [on festivals] thick loaves but only wafer-cakes. Rabban Gamaliel said: “In all their days, my father’s house never baked large loaves but only wafer-cakes.” They said to him: “What can we do with regards to your father’s house, for they were strict in respect to themselves but were lenient towards Israel to let them bake both large loaves and even charcoal-roasted loaves.”

Also he declared three decisions of a lenient character:One may sweep up [on a festival] between the couches, And put spices [on the coals] on a festival; And roast a kid whole on the night of Passover. But the sages forbid them.

Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah allows three things and the Sages forbid them:His cow used to go out with the strap which she had between her horns; One may curry cattle on a festival; And one may grind pepper in its own mill. Rabbi Judah says: one may not curry cattle on a festival, because it may cause a wound, but one may comb them. But the Sages say: one may not curry them, and one may not even comb them.

Chapter 4

The following cases are [examples] of the lenient rulings of Beth Shammai and of the rigorous rulings of Beth Hillel.An egg which is laid on a festival Beth Shammai says: it may be eaten, and Beth Hillel says: it may not be eaten. Beth Shammai says: yeast as much as an olive [in quantity], and leavened food as much as a date, and Beth Hillel says: as much as an olive [in quantity] in both cases.

A beast which was born on a festival all agree that it is permitted; and a chicken which was hatched from the egg all agree that it is forbidden. He who slaughters a wild animal or a bird on a festival Beth Shammai says: he may dig with a pronged tool and cover up [the blood], but Beth Hillel says: he may not slaughter unless he has had earth made ready. But they agree that if he did slaughter he should dig with a pronged tool and cover up [the blood, and] that the ashes of a stove count as being prepared for the holiday.

Beth Shammai says: [produce pronounced] ownerless with respect to the poor [only] is counted as ownerless. But Beth Hillel says: it is not counted as ownerless unless it is made ownerless also with respect to the rich, as in the year of release (shmittah). If all the sheaves of the field were of one kav each and one was of four kavs, and it was forgotten, Beth Shammai says: it does not count as forgotten, And Beth Hillel says: it counts as forgotten.

A sheaf which was close to a wall or to a stack or to the herd or to [field] utensils, and was forgotten, Beth Shammai says: it does not count as forgotten, And Beth Hillel says: it counts as forgotten.

A vineyard of the fourth year Beth Shammai says: it is not subject to the law of the fifth nor to the law of removal. And Beth Hillel says: it is subject to the law of the fifth and to the law of removal. Beth Shammai says: it is subject to the law of fallen grapes and to the law of gleanings, and the poor redeem them for themselves. And Beth Hillel says: all of it goes to the winepress.

A barrel of pickled olives: Beth Shammai says: one need not perforate it, And Beth Hillel say: one must perforate it. But they agree that if it was perforated and the dregs stopped it up, it is not liable to receive impurity. One who had anointed himself with clean oil and [then] became unclean, and he went down and immersed himself, Beth Shammai says: although he still drips [oil], it is clean. And Beth Hillel says: [only while there remains] enough for anointing a small limb. And if from the beginning it was unclean oil, Beth Shammai says: [it is unclean as long as there remains] enough for anointing a small limb, And Beth Hillel says: [even if there remains as much] as a moist liquid. Rabbi Judah says in the name of Beth Hillel: [provided it remains] moist [itself] and [can also] moisten [other things].

A woman is betrothed by a denar or the value of a denar, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: by a perutah or the value of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? One-eighth of an Italian issar. Beth Shammai says: one may dismiss his wife with an old bill of divorcement, But Beth Hillel forbids it. What is an old bill of divorcement? Whenever he was secluded with her after he has written it for her. One who divorces his wife and she [afterwards] spends a night with him at the [same] inn: Beth Shammai says: she does not require a second bill of divorcement from him. But Beth Hillel says: she requires a second bill of divorcement from him. When [does she require a second bill of divorcement]? When she was divorced after marriage. But if she was divorced after betrothal she does not require from him a second bill of divorcement, since he is not [yet] familiar with her.

Beth Shammai permits the rival wives [of a deceased brother to be married] to the [surviving] brothers; But Beth Hillel forbids them. If they have performed halitzah, Beth Shammai pronounce them unfit to [marry into] the priesthood, But Beth Hillel pronounced them fit. If they have married their brother-in-law, Beth Shammai pronounce them fit [to marry into the priesthood], But Beth Hillel pronounced them unfit. And although these pronounce unfit and these pronounce fit, Beth Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from [the daughters of] Beth Hillel, nor did Beth Hillel refrain from marrying women from [the daughters of] Beth Shammai. And in the case of all matters of purity and impurity in respect to which these pronounce pure and these pronounce impure, they did not refrain from preparing foods requiring a condition of purity each by means of [the vessels of] the other.

[In the case of] three brothers, of whom two were married to two sisters and one was unmarried, if one of the husbands of the sisters died and the unmarried one betrothed her (maamar), and afterwards his other brother died, Beth Shammai says: his wife remains with him, and the other [widow] is released on the grounds of [the law forbidding] the wife’s sister. But Beth Hillel says: he should put away his wife with a get and halitzah, and the wife of his brother [he should put away] with halitzah. This is the case of which they said: woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife!

One who takes a vow not to have intercourse with his wife: Beth Shammai says: [after] two weeks [he must divorce her and pay her kethubah], And Beth Hillel say: after one week. A woman has a miscarriage on the eve of the eighty first [day]: Beth Shammai exempt her from bringing the offering, And Beth Hillel do not exempt her. [With regards to the rules of] tzitzit (fringes) on linen sheet: Beth Shammai exempts, And Beth Hillel does not exempt. A basket of [fruit set aside for] the Sabbath: Beth Shammai exempts it [from tithes]. And Beth Hillel does not exempt it.

One who vowed [to keep] a longer naziriteship [than ordinary] and he completed his naziriteship and afterwards came to the [holy] land: Beth Shammai says: [he must be] a nazirite [only] thirty days, But Beth Hillel says: [he must be] a nazirite [the full time vowed as] in the beginning. One who has two groups of witnesses who testify about him, these testifying that he vowed two naziriteships and these testifying that he vowed five: Beth Shammai says: their testimony is divided, and there is no [obligation to perform] naziriteship. But Beth Hillel says: within the five, two are included, so that he must be a nazirite twice.

A man who was set beneath the gap: Beth Shammai says: he does not cause the impurity to pass over. But Beth Hillel says: a man is hollow, and the upper side causes the impurity to pass over.

Chapter 5

Rabbi Judah says: there are six instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and stringent rulings by Beth Hillel.The blood of a carcass: Beth Shammai pronounces it clean, And Beth Hillel pronounces it unclean. An egg found in a [bird’s] carcass: if the like of it were sold in the market, it is permitted, and if not, it is forbidden, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. And Beth Hillel forbids it. But they agree in the case of an egg found in a trefa [bird] that it is forbidden since it had its growth in a forbidden condition. 3+4) The blood of a non-Jewish woman and the blood of purity of a leprous woman: Beth Shammai pronounces clean; And Beth Hillel says: [it is] like her spittle and her urine. One may eat fruits of the seventh year with an expression of thanks and without an expression of thanks [to the owner of the field], according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: one may not eat with an expression of thanks. Beth Shammai says: a waterskin [is liable to become impure only if it is] tied up and remains unimpaired. And the school of Hillel says: even if it is not tied up.

Rabbi Yose says: there are six instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and stringent rulings by Beth Hillel.A fowl may be put on a table [together] with cheese but may not be eaten [with it], according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: it may neither be put on [the table together with it] nor eaten [with it]. Olives may be given as terumah for oil and grapes for wine, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: they may not be given. One who sows seed [within] four cubits of a vineyard: Beth Shammai says: he has caused one row [of vines] to be prohibited. But Beth Hillel says: he has caused two rows to be prohibited. Flour paste [flour that had been mixed with boiling water]: Beth Shammai exempts [from the law of hallah]; But Beth Hillel pronounces it liable. One may immerse oneself in a rain-torrent, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai; But Beth Hillel say: one may not immerse oneself [therein]. One who became a proselyte on the eve of Passover: Beth Shammai says: he may immerse himself and eat his Passover sacrifice in the evening. But Beth Hillel says: one who separates himself from uncircumcision is as one who separates himself from the grave.

Rabbi Yishmael says: there are three instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and strict rulings by Beth Hillel.The book of Ecclesiastes does not defile the hands, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai; But Beth Hillel say: it defiles the hands. Water of purification which has done its duty: Beth Shammai pronounces it pure, But Beth Hillel pronounces it impure. Black cumin: Beth Shammai pronounces it not liable to become impure, But Beth Hillel pronounces it liable to become impure. So, too, with regard to tithes.

Rabbi Eliezer says: there are two instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and strict rulings by Beth Hillel.The blood of a woman after childbirth who has not immersed herself, Beth Shammai says: [it is] like her spittle and her urine. But Beth Hillel says: it causes impurity whether wet or dry. However, they agree in the case of the blood of a woman who gave birth when she had non-menstrual discharge, that it causes defilement whether wet or dry.

[In the case of] four brothers of whom two were married to two sisters, if those married to the sisters died, behold, these should perform halitzah and not enter into levirate marriage (with the brothers-in-law). If they went ahead and married them, they must put them away (divorce them). Rabbi Eliezer says in the name of Beth Shammai: they may keep them. But Beth Hillel say: they must put them away.

Akavia ben Mahalalel testified concerning four things. They said to him: Akavia, retract these four things which you say, and we will make you the head of the court in Israel. He said to them: it is better for me to be called a fool all my days than that I should become [even] for one hour a wicked man before God; So they shouldn’t say: “he withdrew his opinions for the sake of power.” He used to pronounce impure the hair which has been left over [in leprosy], And green (yellow) blood (of vaginal discharge); But the Sages declared them clean. He used to permit the wool of a first-born animal which was blemished and which had fallen out and had been put in a niche, the first-born being slaughtered afterwards; But the sages forbid it. He used to say: a woman proselyte and a freed slave-woman are not made to drink of the bitter waters. But the Sages say: they are made to drink. They said to him: it happened in the case of Karkemith, a freed slave-woman who was in Jerusalem, that Shemaiah and Avtalion made her drink. He said to them: they made her drink an example (and not the real water). Whereupon they excommunicated him; and he died while he was under excommunication, and the court stoned his coffin. Rabbi Judah said: God forbid [that one should say] that Akavia was excommunicated; for the courtyard is never locked for any man in Israel who was equal to Avavia ben Mahalalel in wisdom and the fear of sin. But whom did they excommunicate? Eliezer the son of Hanoch who cast doubt against the laws concerning the purifying of the hands. And when he died the court sent and laid a stone on his coffin. This teaches that whoever is excommunicated and dies while under excommunication, his coffin is stoned.

At the time of his death he said to his son, “Retract the four opinions which I used to declare.” He (the said to him, “Why did not you retract them?” He said to him, “I heard them from the mouth of the many, and they heard [the contrary] from the mouth of the many. I stood fast by the tradition which I heard, and they stood fast by the tradition which they heard. But you have heard [my tradition] from the mouth of a single individual and [their tradition] from the mouth of the many. It is better to leave the opinion of the single individual and to hold by the opinion of the many.” He said to him, “Father commend me to your colleagues.” He said to him, “I will not commend you.” He said to him, “Have you found in me any wrong?” He said, “No; your own deeds will cause you to be near, and your own deeds will cause you to be far.”

Chapter 6

Rabbi Judah ben Bava testified concerning five things:That women who are minors are made to declare an annulment of their marriage; That a woman is allowed to re-marry on the evidence of one witness; That a rooster was stoned in Jerusalem because it had killed a human being; And about wine forty days old, that it was used as a libation on the altar; And about the morning tamid offering, that it is offered at the fourth hour.

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia ben Elinathan, a man of Kefar Habavli, testified concerning a limb [separated] from a corpse that it is impure; whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: they declared [this] only of a limb from a living [man]. They said to him: is not there an inference from the minor to the major (kal vehomer): If in the case of a living man [who is himself pure] a limb severed from him is impure, how much more in the case of a corpse [which is itself impure] should a limb severed from it be impure! He said to them: they have [nevertheless] declared it only of a limb from a living man. Another answer: The impurity of living men is greater than the impurity of corpses, because a living man causes that on which he lies and sits to become capable of making impure a man and clothing, and [he causes also] what is over him to transfer impurity to foods and liquids- which is defilement that a corpse does not cause.

1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying.Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?

Chapter 7

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testified concerning the redemption (lamb) of a firstborn donkey, that if it died, the priest receives nothing, Whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: the owner must bear the responsibility as with the five selas [in the case] of a [firstborn] son. But the Sages say: he bears no responsibility any more than in the case of the redemption of second tithes.

Rabbi Zadok testified concerning brine of unclean locusts that it is clean, Whereas the first mishnah [said]: unclean locusts that have been preserved together with clean locusts do not make their brine unfit.

Rabbi Zadok testified concerning flowing water which exceeded in quantity dripping water; that it was valid. There was such a case at Birath Hapilya, and when the case came before the Sages they declared it valid.

Rabbi Zadok testified concerning flowing water which was made to run in a stream through nut-leaves, that it was valid. There was such a case at Ahaliyya, and when the case came before [the Sages in] the Chamber of Hewn Stone they declared it valid.

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Yakim, a man of Hadar, testified concerning a jar of ashes of a red heifer which was put over a creeping thing, that they were unclean. Whereas Rabbi Eliezer had pronounced them clean. Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who had vowed two naziriteships, that if he cut his hair after the first one on the thirtieth day, he could cut his hair after the second one on the sixtieth day; and if he cut his hair on the fifty-ninth day he has also fulfilled his duty, for the thirtieth day counts towards the required number.

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias testified concerning the offspring of a peace-offering, that it can be brought as a peace-offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer says that the offspring of a peace-offering cannot be brought as a peace-offering. But the sages say: it can be brought. Rabbi Papias said: “I testify that we had a cow, which was a peace-offering, and we ate it at Passover, and its offspring we ate as a peace-offering at the [next] festival.

They testified concerning the boards of bakers, that they are impure (they can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares them pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified concerning an oven which was cut into rings and sand was put between the rings that it is impure (can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares it pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified that the year may be intercalated throughout the whole of Adar, whereas they used to say: only until Purim. They testified that the year may be intercalated conditionally. There was such a case with Rabban Gamaliel who went to receive permission from the governor in Syria and he delayed in coming back; and they intercalated the year on condition that rabban gamaliel should approve; and when he came back he said: I approve, and the year was intercalated.

Menahem ben Signai testified concerning the ledge attached to an olive-boiler’s cauldron, that it is [liable to become] impure; and concerning that of dyers, that it is not [liable to become] impure, whereas they used to say the reverse.

Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement; And concerning a minor, daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah, and if she died her husband inherited from her; And concerning a stolen beam that had been built into a palace, that it might be restored by the payment of its value; And concerning a sin-offering that had been stolen, and this was not known to many, that it caused atonement because of the welfare of the altar.

Chapter 8

Rabbi Joshua ben. Bathyra testified concerning the blood of carcasses that it was pure. Rabbi Shimon ben Bathyra testified concerning the ashes of purification, that if a defiled person had touched part of them he had defiled the whole of them. Rabbi Akiva added in regard to the fine flour, the incense, the frankincense, and the coals, that if a tevul yom had touched part of them he had made the whole of them unfit.

Rabbi Judah ben Baba and Rabbi Judah the priest testified concerning a minor, the daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah as soon as she entered the bridal chamber even though she had not engaged in marital intercourse. Rabbi Yose the priest and Rabbi Zechariah ben Hakatzav testified concerning a young girl who had been taken as collateral (by gentiles) in Ashkelon, and that her family had distanced her, even though her witnesses testified that she had not secluded herself [with any Man] and that she had not been defiled. The Sages said to them: if you believe that she had been taken as collateral, believe also that she did not seclude herself [with any man] and that she was not defiled; and if you do not believe that she did not seclude herself and that she was not defiled, neither believe that she had been taken as collateral.

Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra testified concerning the widow of [a man belonging to] a family of doubtful lineage (an issa), that she was fit to marry into the priesthood, [And that those of] a family of doubtful lineage are fit to declare who was unclean and who clean, who was to be put away and who was to be brought near. Rabban Gamaliel said: we accept your testimony, but what can we do since Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai ordained that courts should not be commissioned for this purpose? The priests would listen to you concerning those who might be put away, but not concerning those who might be brought near!

Rabbi Yose ben Yoezer, a man of Zereda, testified concerning the ayal-locust, that it is pure; And concerning liquid in the slaughter-house (of the Temple), that it is pure; And that one who touches a corpse is impure. And they called him “Yose the permitter”.

Rabbi Akiva testified in the name of Nehemiah, a man of Beth Deli, that a woman is allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Joshua testified concerning bones found in the wood-shed that the Sages said: one may gather them, bone by bone, and they are all clean.

Rabbi Eliezer said: I have heard that when they were building the Temple [complex] they made curtains for the Temple and curtains for the Temple-courts; but in the case of the Temple they built from the outside, and in the case of the Temple-court they built from the inside. Rabbi Joshua said: I have heard that sacrifices may be offered even though there is no Temple, and that the most holy sacrifices may be eaten even though there are no curtains, and the less holy sacrifices and second tithes even though there is no wall [around Jerusalem]; because the first sanctification sanctified both for its own time and for the time to come.

Rabbi Joshua said: I have received a tradition from Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher [heard it] from his teacher, as a halakhah [given] to Moses from Sinai, that Elijah will not come to pronounce unclean or to pronounce clean, to put away or to bring near, but to put away those brought near by force and to bring near those put away by force. The family of Beth Tzriphah was on the other side of the Jordan and Ben Zion put it away by force; and yet another family was there, and Ben Zion brought it near by force. It is such as these that Elijah will come to pronounce unclean or to pronounce clean, to put away or to bring near. Rabbi Judah says: to bring near, but not to put away. Rabbi Shimon says: to conciliate disputes. And the Sages say: neither to put away nor to bring near, but to make peace in the world, for it is said, “Behold I send to you Elijah the prophet”, etc., “and he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children and the heart of the children to their fathers” (Malachi 3:23-2.

Mishnah Avodah Zarah

Chapter 1

On the three days before the festivals of gentiles the following actions are prohibited, as they would bring joy to the gentile, who would subsequently give thanks to his object of idol worship on his festival: It is prohibited to engage in business with them; to lend items to them or to borrow items from them; to lend money to them or to borrow money from them; and to repay debts owed to them or to collect repayment of debts from them. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may collect repayment of debts from them because this causes the gentile distress. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: Even though he is distressed now, when he repays the money, he is happy afterward that he is relieved of the debt, and therefore there is concern that he will give thanks to his object of idol worship on his festival.

Rabbi Yishmael says: On the three days before the festivals of gentiles and on the three days after them, it is prohibited to engage in business with those gentiles. And the Rabbis say: It is prohibited to engage in business with them before their festivals, but it is permitted to engage in business with them after their festivals.

And these are the festivals of gentiles: Kalenda, Saturnalia, and Kratesis, and the day of the festival of their kings, and the birthday of the king, and the anniversary of the day of the death of the king. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Every death that includes public burning is a festival that includes idol worship, and any death that does not include public burning is not a festival that includes idol worship. But in the case of the day of shaving his, i.e., a gentile’s, beard and his locks, and the day of his ascent from the sea, and the day that he left prison, and also in the case of a gentile who prepared a wedding feast for his son and celebrates on that day, engaging in business is prohibited only on that day and with that man.

In the case of a city in which there is active idol worship, it is permitted to engage in business transactions with gentiles who live outside of the city. If the idol worship is outside the city, it is permitted to engage in business within the city. What is the halakha with regard to traveling there, a place where a pagan festival is being celebrated? When the road is designated only for that place, it is prohibited to use the road, as onlookers will assume that the traveler intends to join the festival. But if one were able to travel on it to arrive at another place, it is permitted to use the road to reach the place that is observing the festival. With regard to a city in which idol worship is practiced and in which there are stores that are adorned for the sake of idol worship and there are others that are not adorned, this was in fact an incident that occurred in Beit She’an, and the Sages said: With regard to the adorned shops, it is prohibited to buy from them, but in the case of those that are not adorned it is permitted.

These are the items that it is prohibited to sell to a gentile at any time of year, as they are used specifically for idol worship: Itzterubalin, benot shuaḥ, petotarot, frankincense, and a white rooster. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is permitted to sell a white rooster to a gentile provided that it is sold along with other types of roosters. But when it is sold by itself, one should cut off its toe and sell it to the gentile, because they do not sacrifice a defective animal to their object of idol worship. And with regard to all remaining items, without specification it is permitted to sell them, but with specification it is prohibited to sell them. Rabbi Meir says: Even in the case of a good palm tree, ḥatzav, and naklav, it is prohibited to sell them to gentiles.

In a place where the residents were accustomed to sell small domesticated animals to gentiles, one may sell them. In a place where they were not accustomed to sell them, one may not sell them. But in every place, one may not sell them large livestock, calves, or foals, whether these animals are whole or damaged. The Sages prohibited these sales lest a Jew’s animal perform labor for the gentile on Shabbat in violation of an explicit Torah prohibition, as explained in the Gemara. Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of a damaged animal because it is incapable of performing labor, and ben Beteira permits the sale of a horse for riding, because riding a horse on Shabbat is not prohibited by Torah law.

One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. One may not build with them a basilica [ basileki ], a tribunal [ gardom ], a stadium [ itztadeyya ], or a platform. But one may build with them small platforms [ bimmusiot ] and bathhouses. Even in this case, once he reaches the arched chamber in the bath where the gentiles put up objects of idol worship, it is prohibited to build it.

And one may not fashion jewelry for an object of idol worship, and this applies to jewelry such as necklaces [ katla’ot ], nose rings, and rings. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one fashions them in exchange for payment, it is permitted. The mishna returns to the issue of selling items to gentiles: One may not sell to a gentile any item that is attached to the ground, but one may sell such an item once it is severed from the ground. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not necessary to sever the item from the ground; rather, one may sell it on the condition that it be severed. One may not rent a house to a gentile in Eretz Yisrael, and needless to say one may not rent fields to them, as explained in the Gemara. And in Syria one may rent houses to gentiles, but one may not rent fields. And outside of Eretz Yisrael one may sell houses and rent fields to gentiles; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: In Eretz Yisrael one may rent houses to gentiles but one may not rent fields. And in Syria one may sell houses to them and rent fields, and outside of Eretz Yisrael one may sell both these, houses, and those, fields.

Even in a place with regard to which the Sages said that it is permitted for a Jew to rent a house to a gentile, they did not say that one may rent it for use as a residence, because the gentile will bring objects of idol worship into it, as it is stated: “You shall not bring an abomination into your house” (Deuteronomy 7:26), and this is still considered the house of a Jew. And for the same reason, in every place, one may not rent a bathhouse to a gentile, since it is called by the name of the owner, and onlookers will think that the Jew is operating it on Shabbat.

Chapter 2

One may not keep an animal in the inns [ befundekaot ] of gentiles because they are suspected of bestiality. Since even gentiles are prohibited from engaging in bestiality, a Jew who places his animal there is guilty of violating the prohibition: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). And a woman may not seclude herself with gentiles because they are suspected of engaging in forbidden sexual relations. And any person may not seclude himself with gentiles because they are suspected of bloodshed. A Jewish woman may not deliver the child of a gentile woman, because in doing so she is delivering a child who will engage in idol worship. But one may allow a gentile woman to deliver the child of a Jewish woman. Similarly, a Jewish woman may not nurse the child of a gentile woman, but one may allow a gentile woman to nurse the child of a Jewish woman while the gentile woman is on the Jewish woman’s property.

The mishna discusses the issue of accepting certain professional services from a gentile. One may be treated by gentiles, provided that it is monetary treatment, but not personal treatment. And one may not have his hair cut by them anywhere, due to the danger that the gentile will kill him with the razor; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: In the public thoroughfare, it is permitted to have one’s hair cut by a gentile, but not when the Jew and gentile are alone together.

This mishna discusses the halakhic status of various items that belong to gentiles. These are items that belong to gentiles and are prohibited to Jews, and their prohibition is that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited: Wine, and vinegar belonging to gentiles that was originally wine, and Hadrianic earthenware, and hides with a tear opposite the heart. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A hide is prohibited only when the tear around its heart is circular, but if it is elongated it is permitted, as gentiles will sacrifice a heart only when it has been removed by a circular laceration. Meat that enters the house of idol worship is permitted, and meat that exits this house is prohibited, because it is considered as offerings to the dead, i.e., to idols; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. With regard to those going to a festival of idolatry [ tarput ], it is prohibited to engage in business with them. And with regard to those who are coming from it, it is permitted to engage in business with them.

Wineskins and jugs belonging to gentiles, which have a Jew’s wine contained in them, are prohibited to Jews, and their prohibition is that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Their prohibition is not that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Residual grape seeds and grape skins belonging to gentiles, which are left behind after the grapes are crushed for wine, are prohibited, and their prohibition is that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Moist grape residues are prohibited, but dry residues are permitted. Fish stew [ murayes ] and cheese of Beit Unyaki belonging to gentiles are prohibited, and their prohibition is that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Their prohibition is not that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yishmael asked Rabbi Yehoshua a series of questions while they were traveling along the road. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: For what reason did the Sages prohibit the cheeses of gentiles? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Because gentiles curdle cheese with the stomach contents of an unslaughtered animal carcass, and as the carcass of an unslaughtered animal is not kosher, cheese that is curdled with it is likewise prohibited. In response, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: But aren’t the stomach contents of a burnt-offering subject to a more stringent prohibition than the stomach contents of an unslaughtered animal carcass? And yet they said: A priest who is open-minded [ shedato yafa ] with regard to what he eats may swallow [ shorefah ] the stomach contents of a burnt-offering while they are raw, and the other Sages did not agree with him. But the Sages said: One may not derive benefit from the stomach contents of a burnt-offering ab initio, and if one did derive benefit from them, he is not liable for misusing consecrated property. According to both opinions, deriving benefit from the stomach contents of a burnt-offering is not prohibited by Torah law. Since the halakha with regard to a burnt-offering is more stringent than that of an animal carcass, why would deriving benefit from the carcass be prohibited, while deriving benefit from the burnt-offering is permitted? Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Yishmael: The cheese of gentiles is prohibited because they curdle it in the stomach contents of calves used for idol worship. Since it is prohibited to derive benefit from such calves, cheese curdled in their stomach contents is also prohibited. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: If that is so, why didn’t the Sages prohibit deriving any benefit from the cheese, instead of merely prohibiting its consumption? Instead of answering Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Yehoshua diverted his attention to another matter and said to him: Yishmael, how do you read the following verse in the Song of Songs (1:2)? Do you read it as: For Your love [ dodekha ] is better than wine, or as: For your love [ dodayikh ] is better than wine? The first version, which is in the masculine form, would be a reference to God, whereas the second version, in the feminine, would be a reference to the Jewish people. Rabbi Yishmael said to him that it should be read in the feminine: For your love [ dodayikh ] is better than wine. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The matter is not so, as another verse teaches with regard to it: “Your ointments [ shemanekha ] have a goodly fragrance” (Song of Songs 1:3). This phrase, which appears in the next verse, is written in the masculine form, and therefore it is determined that the preceding verse can also be understood in the masculine form.

This mishna lists items belonging to gentiles which it is prohibited to consume, but from which it is permitted to derive benefit. And these are items that belong to gentiles and are prohibited, but their prohibition is not that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited: Milk that was milked by a gentile and a Jew did not see him performing this action, and their bread and oil. The mishna notes that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and his court permitted the oil of gentiles entirely. The mishna resumes its list: And boiled and pickled vegetables, whose usual manner of preparation involves adding wine and vinegar to them, and minced tarit fish, and brine that does not have a kilbit fish floating in it, and ḥilak, and a sliver of ḥiltit, and salkondit salt (see 39b); all these are prohibited, but their prohibition is not that of item from which deriving benefit is prohibited.

And these are permitted for consumption: Milk that was milked by a gentile and a Jew watched him doing so; and honey; and grape clusters [ davdevaniyyot ] which, despite the fact that they are dripping juice, are not subject to the halakhot of susceptibility to ritual impurity caused by contact with that liquid; and pickled vegetables whose usual manner of preparation does not involve adding wine and vinegar to them; and tarit fish that is not minced; and brine that has fish in it; and the leaf of a ḥiltit plant; and rolled olive cakes [ geluskaot ]. Rabbi Yosei says: Overripe olives are prohibited. Locusts that come from a salesman’s basket are prohibited, whereas those that come from the storeroom [ heftek ] are permitted; and likewise with regard to the portion of the produce designated for the priest [ teruma ], as will be explained in the Gemara.

Chapter 3

All statues are forbidden, i.e., it is prohibited to derive benefit from them, because they are worshipped at least once a year; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The only type of statue that is forbidden is any statue that has in its hand a staff, or a bird, or an orb, as these are indications that this statue is designated for idolatry. If the statue is holding a different item, it may be assumed that the statue was fashioned for ornamental purposes and not for worship. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is prohibited to derive benefit even from any statue that has any item whatsoever in its hand.

In the case of one who finds unidentifiable fragments of statues, these are permitted, i.e., one may derive benefit from them. If one found an object in the figure of a hand or in the figure of a foot, these are forbidden, as objects similar to those are worshipped.

In the case of one who finds vessels, and upon them is a figure of the sun, a figure of the moon, or a figure of a dragon, he must take them and cast them into the Dead Sea and not derive any benefit from them, as they are assumed to be objects of idol worship. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Those figures that are upon respectable vessels are forbidden. Those that are upon disgraceful vessels are permitted. Rabbi Yosei says: When one encounters an idol, he should grind the idol and throw the dust to the wind or cast it into the sea. The Rabbis said to him: What is the good of that? That also gives a Jew benefit from the idol, as it becomes fertilizer for his crops, and deriving any kind of benefit is prohibited, as it is stated: “And nothing of the proscribed items shall cleave to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18).

A wise gentile, Proclus ben Plospus, once asked a question of Rabban Gamliel in the city of Akko when he was bathing in the bathhouse of the Greek god Aphrodite. Proclus said to him: It is written in your Torah: “And nothing of the proscribed items shall cleave to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18). For what reason do you bathe before an idol in the bathhouse of Aphrodite? Rabban Gamliel said to him: One may not answer questions related to Torah in the bathhouse. And when he left the bathhouse, Rabban Gamliel gave him several answers. He said to him: I did not come into its domain; it came into my domain. The bathhouse existed before the statue dedicated to Aphrodite was erected. Furthermore, people do not say: Let us make a bathhouse as an adornment for Aphrodite; rather, they say: Let us make a statue of Aphrodite as an adornment for the bathhouse. Therefore, the main structure is not the Aphrodite statue, but the bathhouse. Rabban Gamliel continued: Alternatively, there is another answer: Even if people would give you a lot of money, you would not enter before your object of idol worship naked, or as one who experienced a seminal emission who comes to the bathhouse to purify himself, nor would you urinate before it. This statue stands upon the sewage pipe and all the people urinate before it. There is no prohibition in this case, as it is stated in the verse only: “Their gods” (see Deuteronomy 12:2), which indicates that a statue that people treat as a deity is forbidden, but one that people do not treat with the respect that is due to a deity is permitted.

With regard to the halakha in the case of the gentiles who worship the mountains and the hills, the mountains and hills are permitted, but what is upon them is forbidden. It is not prohibited to derive benefit from the mountains and hills themselves, and they can be used for planting, harvesting, and the like. But if gentiles coated them with gold or silver, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the coating, as it is stated: “The graven images of their gods shall you burn with fire; you shall not covet the silver or the gold that is on them, nor take it for yourself, lest you be snared by it; for it is an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 7:25). Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says with regard to the verse: “You shall destroy all the places where the nations that you are to dispossess served their gods, upon the high mountains, and upon the hills, and under every leafy tree” (Deuteronomy 12:2): The mitzva to destroy objects of idol worship applies to “their gods, upon the high mountains,” but not to the mountains themselves that are their gods. Similarly it applies to “their gods…upon the hills,” but not to the hills themselves that are their gods. The mishna asks: And for what reason, then, is an ashera forbidden? Doesn’t the verse also state: “And under every leafy tree,” which indicates that the mitzva to destroy objects of idol worship does not apply to the trees themselves? The mishna answers: It is because it is the product of human involvement and did not grow by itself, and the halakha is that anything that is the product of human involvement is forbidden. Rabbi Akiva says: I will explain and decide the matter before you. The verse does not indicate limitations to the halakhic definition of idols; rather, it is simply giving indicators of prevalent idolatrous practice: Everywhere that you find a high mountain, or an elevated hill, or a leafy tree, know that there is idol worship there.

In the case of one whose house was adjacent to a house of idol worship and the dividing wall fell, it is prohibited to rebuild it. What should he do? He should withdraw into his own property four cubits and build the wall there. In talmudic times, external walls to homes were often built in two parts, with a functional space between them. If the space between the two parts of the wall belonged to him and to the house of idol worship, the area is treated as half and half with regard to withdrawing into his property before rebuilding the wall; he may build the wall four cubits from the middle of that space. The stones of the fallen wall, its wood, and its dust, transmit impurity like a creeping animal, i.e., one who touches them becomes impure like one who touches a creeping animal, as it is stated: “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house, and be accursed like it; you shall detest it [ shakketz teshakketzennu ], and you shall abhor it; for it is a proscribed item” (Deuteronomy 7:26). The term shakketz is used in a different form, shekketz, with regard to creeping animals. Rabbi Akiva says: Those items transmit impurity like a menstruating woman, as it is stated: “You will put them far away as a menstruating woman; you shall say to it: Go away” (Isaiah 30:22). Just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity by carrying, as one who moves a menstruating woman, even without touching her, becomes impure, so too, objects of idol worship transmit impurity by carrying.

With regard to idol worship there are three types of houses, each with its own halakhot. A house that one built initially for the purpose of idol worship is forbidden, i.e., it is prohibited to derive benefit from such a house. If one plastered a house or cemented it for the purpose of idol worship, and he thereby added a layer to the walls of the house, one removes that which he added, and the rest of the house is permitted. If one brought an object of idol worship into a house temporarily and then removed it, the house is then permitted. With regard to idol worship there are three types of stones, each with its own halakhot. A stone that one initially hewed for use in a platform [ bimos ] for an idol is forbidden. If one plastered a stone or cemented it for the sake of idol worship, one removes that which he plastered or cemented and the stone is permitted. If one erected an object of idol worship upon a stone and subsequently removed it, the stone is then permitted. There are three types of trees that were used as part of idolatrous rites [ ashera ]: A tree that one initially planted for the sake of idol worship is forbidden, and one may not derive benefit from any part of the tree. If one lopped off part of the trunk of a tree or trimmed its branches for the sake of idol worship, i.e., to worship that which would regrow there, and the tree’s trunk or limbs regrew, one removes that which has regrown and burn it. The remainder of the tree is then permitted. If one erected an object of idol worship beneath a tree and subsequently removed it, it is permitted to derive benefit from the tree. Which tree is deemed forbidden as an ashera? Any tree that has an object of idol worship beneath it. Rabbi Shimon says: Any tree that people worship. And there was an incident in Tzaidan involving a tree that people would worship, and Jews found beneath it a heap of stones. Rabbi Shimon said to them: Examine this heap of stones. And they examined it and found in it an idolatrous image. Rabbi Shimon said to them: Since it is the image that they worship, we can permit use of the tree to those who wish to derive benefit from it.

With regard to an ashera, one may not sit in its shade, but if one sat in its shade he remains ritually pure. And one may not pass beneath it, and if one passed beneath it he is ritually impure. If the tree was robbing the public, i.e., if its branches extended over public property, and one passed beneath it, he remains pure. One may plant vegetables underneath an ashera during the rainy season, as the vegetables do not benefit from its shade; on the contrary, the tree’s foliage prevents the vegetables from being properly irrigated by the rain. But one may not plant vegetables under an ashera during the summer, as the shade benefits them. And lettuce may not be planted there at all, neither in the summer nor in the rainy season, because shade is always beneficial to lettuce. Rabbi Yosei says: One may not plant vegetables under an ashera even during the rainy season, because the tree’s foliage [ shehaneviyya ] falls upon them and serves as fertilizer for them.

If one took wood from an ashera, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. In a case where one kindled a fire in an oven with the wood, if it is a new oven and by kindling the fire he hardened the oven and made it stronger for use in the future, then the oven must be shattered. Since forbidden items were used in the process of forming the oven, one may not derive benefit from the use of the forbidden items. But if it is an old oven it may be cooled; it is prohibited to use the oven only while it is still hot. If one baked bread with wood from the ashera as the fuel, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the bread. If this bread was intermingled with other bread, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all the bread. Rabbi Eliezer says: One must take the benefit and cast it into the Dead Sea. In other words, one is not required to destroy all of the loaves. Instead, one should designate money equal in value to the wood that he used from the ashera, and he should destroy this money to offset the benefit he derived from the forbidden wood. The Rabbis said to him: There is no monetary redemption for objects that are forbidden due to idol worship. Once the bread becomes forbidden, it cannot be redeemed by having the value of the forbidden wood cast into the Dead Sea. If one took wood from an ashera for use as a weaving shuttle [ karkor ], it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. If one wove a garment with it, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the garment. If the garment was intermingled with other garments, and those other garments were intermingled with others, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all of them. Rabbi Eliezer says: One must take the benefit and cast it into the Dead Sea. The Rabbis said to him: There is no monetary redemption for objects that are forbidden due to idol worship.

How does one revoke the idolatrous status of an ashera? If a gentile trimmed dry wood or pruned green wood from the tree for his own benefit, or if he removed from it a stick, or a rod, or even a leaf, he has thereby revoked its idolatrous status, as he has proven that he no longer worships it. If a gentile shaved down the tree for its own sake, to improve its appearance, it remains prohibited to derive benefit from it. If he shaved it down not for its own sake, it is permitted.

Chapter 4

Rabbi Yishmael says: Three stones that are adjacent to each other at the side of Mercury [ Markulis ] are prohibited, as that idol was worshipped by tossing stones toward it, which then became part of the idol. But if there are only two stones, then they are permitted. And the Rabbis say: Those stones that are adjacent to Mercury and appear to have fallen from it are prohibited. But those stones that are not adjacent to it are permitted.

If one found money, a garment, or vessels at the head of Mercury, these are permitted. If one found vine branches laden with clusters of grapes, or wreaths made of stalks, or containers of wine, oil, or flour, or any other item the likes of which is sacrificed on the altar there, it is prohibited.

In the case of an object of idol worship that had a garden or a bathhouse, one may derive benefit from them when it is not to the advantage of the idol worship, i.e., when he does not pay for his use, but one may not derive benefit from them when it is to their advantage, i.e., if one is required to pay for his use. If the garden or bathhouse belonged jointly to the place of idol worship and to others, one may derive benefit from them, both when it is to their advantage and when it is not to their advantage.

A gentile’s object of idol worship is prohibited immediately, i.e., as soon as it is fashioned for that purpose, but a Jew’s object of idol worship is not prohibited until it is actually worshipped. A gentile can revoke the status of his object of idol worship and the status of the idol of another gentile, but a Jew cannot revoke the status of the object of idol worship of a gentile. One who revokes the status of an object of idol worship thereby revokes the status of its accessories. But if he revokes the status of its accessories, its accessories alone are rendered permitted, but the object of idol worship itself remains prohibited.

How does a gentile revoke the status of an object of idol worship? If he cut off the tip of its ear, or the tip of its nose, or its fingertip; or if he crushed it, even though he did not remove any part of it, in all these cases he thereby revoked its status as an object of idol worship. If he spat before the idol, urinated before it, dragged it on the ground, or threw excrement at it, the status of this idol is not revoked, as this is only a temporary display of scorn, and afterward the gentile might continue to worship the idol. If the gentile sold it or mortgaged it, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He thereby revoked its status. And the Rabbis say that he did not revoke its status.

With regard to an object of idol worship that was abandoned by its worshippers, if it was abandoned in peacetime, it is permitted, as it was evidently abandoned by choice and this constitutes an implicit revocation of its status as an object of idol worship. If it was abandoned in wartime, it is prohibited, as it was not abandoned by choice. With regard to the stone platforms of kings upon which idols are placed in honor of the kings, these are permitted, due to the fact that the idol is placed on these platforms only at the time that the kings pass by.

The gentiles asked the Jewish Sages who were in Rome: If it is not God’s will that people should engage in idol worship, why does He not elimi-nate it? The Sages said to them: Were people worshipping only objects for which the world has no need, He would eliminate it. But they worship the sun and the moon and the stars and the constellations. Should He destroy His world because of the fools? The gentiles said to the Sages: If so, let Him destroy those objects of idol worship for which the world has no need and leave those objects for which the world has a need. The Sages said to them: If that were to happen, we would thereby be supporting the worshippers of those objects for which the world has need, as they would say: You should know that these are truly gods, as they were not eliminated from the world, whereas the others were eliminated.

One may purchase from a gentile a winepress in which the grapes have been trodden on, despite the fact that the gentile takes grapes in his hand from the winepress and places them on the pile that remains to be trodden on. And the gentile’s touch does not render the juice of the grapes wine used for a libation in idol worship, which is forbidden, until it descends into the collection vat, because until then it does not have the status of wine. Once the wine descended into the collection vat, that which is in the vat is prohibited, and the rest, which did not yet descend into the vat, is permitted.

One may tread on grapes together with the gentile in the winepress, but one may not harvest grapes with him. After the harvest the grapes are brought to the winepress, which is ritually impure. This would render the grapes impure, and it is prohibited to render produce of Eretz Yisrael impure. In the case of a Jew who produces his wine in a state of ritual impurity, one may not tread on grapes nor harvest them with him, as it is prohibited to assist transgressors. But once he has produced his wine, one may take the barrels to the winepress with him, as the wine is already impure. And one may also bring the barrels from the winepress together with him. Similarly, in the case of a baker who makes his bread in a state of ritual impurity, one may not knead or arrange the dough in the shape of bread together with him, so as not to assist in a transgression. But one may take the bread with him to the bread merchant [ lapalter ].

In the case of a gentile who was found standing next to the wine collection vat, if there is a loan owed by the owner of the wine vat to the gentile, the wine is prohibited. Since the gentile maintains that he has a right to the owner’s property he has no compunctions about touching the wine. But if there is no loan owed by the owner of the wine vat to the gentile, the wine is permitted, as it is assumed that the gentile did not touch the wine that was not his. If a gentile fell into the wine collection vat and emerged from it, or if he measured the wine in the winepress with a pole without touching it with his hands, or if he cast a hornet out of the wine by means of a pole and the pole touched the wine, or where the gentile was removing the foam that was on the top of a fermenting barrel of wine; with regard to all these cases there was such an incident. And the Sages said that the wine may be sold to gentiles, as it is permitted to derive benefit from the wine, but not to drink it. And Rabbi Shimon deems the wine permitted even for drinking. In a case where a gentile took the barrel of wine and threw it, in his anger, into the wine collection vat, this was an incident that occurred and the Sages deemed the wine fit for drinking.

In the case of a Jew who renders the wine of a gentile permitted by treading the gentile’s grapes so that the wine can be sold to Jews, and although a Jew has not yet paid for the wine he then places the wine in the gentile’s domain in a house that is open to a public thoroughfare until he sells it, the halakha depends on the circumstances. If this occurs in a city in which there are both gentiles and Jews, the wine is permitted, as the gentile does not touch the wine lest the Jews see him doing so. If this occurs in a city in which all its inhabitants are gentiles, the wine is prohibited unless a Jew sits and safeguards the wine. But the watchman is not required to sit and guard the wine constantly; even if he frequently leaves the place and comes in again later, the wine is permitted. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: The domain of gentiles is all one, as the Gemara will explain.

In the case of a Jew who renders the wine of a gentile permitted by treading the gentile’s grapes so that the wine can be sold to Jews, and he then places the wine in the gentile’s domain until he sells it, the halakha depends on the circumstances. If that one, the gentile, writes for the Jew: I received money from you in payment for the wine, even though he did not yet receive the actual payment, the wine is permitted. This is because the wine is considered the Jew’s property and the gentile does not venture to touch it. But if the Jew desires to remove the wine and the gentile does not allow him to do so until the Jew gives him the money due to him, this was an incident that occurred in Beit She’an and the Sages deemed the wine prohibited. In this case the gentile believes that he has a lien upon the wine, and therefore he has no compunctions about touching it.

Chapter 5

In the case of a gentile who hires a Jewish laborer to work with wine used for an idolatrous libation with him, his wage is forbidden, i.e., it is prohibited for the Jew to derive benefit from his wage. If the gentile hired him to do other work with him, even if he said to him while he was working with him: Transport the barrel of wine used for a libation for me from this place to that place, his wage is permitted, i.e., the Jew is permitted to derive benefit from the money. With regard to a gentile who rents a Jew’s donkey to carry wine used for a libation on it, its rental fee is forbidden. If he rented it to sit on it, even if a gentile placed his jug of wine used for a libation on it, its rental fee is permitted.

In the case of wine used for a libation that fell on grapes, one rinses them and they are permitted. But if the grapes were cracked, they are forbidden. In a case where the wine fell on figs or on dates, if there is sufficient wine in them to impart flavor, they are forbidden. And there was an incident involving Boethus ben Zunen, who transported dried figs in a ship, and a barrel of wine used for a libation broke and fell on them, and he asked the Sages as to the halakha, and the Sages deemed the figs permitted. This is the principle: Anything that benefits from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it, i.e., the forbidden item contributes a positive taste to it, is forbidden, and anything that does not benefit from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it is permitted, such as forbidden vinegar that fell onto split beans, as the flavor imparted by the vinegar does not enhance the taste of the beans.

With regard to a gentile who was transporting barrels of wine from one place to another place together with a Jew, if the wine was under the presumption of being supervised, it is permitted. But if the Jew notified him that he was going far away, the wine is forbidden if the Jew left for a sufficient amount of time for the gentile to bore a hole [ sheyishtom ] in the barrel, seal it again with plaster, and for the plaster to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The wine is forbidden only if it was sufficient time for the gentile to open the barrel by removing the stopper altogether, stop it again by making a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.

With regard to one who placed his wine in a wagon or on a ship with a gentile, and went on his way by a shortcut [ bekappendarya ], such that the gentile does not know when the Jew will encounter him, even if the Jew entered the city and bathed, the wine is permitted, because the gentile would not use the wine for a libation, for fear the owner might catch him at it. If the Jew informed the gentile that he was going away for a long period of time, the wine is forbidden if it was sufficient time for the gentile to bore a hole in the barrel, seal it again with plaster, and for the plaster to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is forbidden only if it was sufficient time for him to open the barrel by removing the stopper altogether, stop it again, and for the new stopper to dry. With regard to one who left a gentile in his shop, even if the Jew went out and came in and was not there all the time, the wine is permitted. But if the Jew informed the gentile that he was going away for a long period of time, the wine is forbidden if it was sufficient time for the gentile to bore a hole in the barrel, seal it again with plaster, and for the plaster to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The wine is forbidden only if it was sufficient time for him to open the barrel, stop it again, and for the new stopper to dry.

If a Jew was eating with a gentile at the table, and left jugs [ laginin ] of wine on the table and a jug on the side table [ hadulebaki ], and he left it and went out, what is on the table is forbidden, as it is likely that the gentile handled it, whereas what is on the side table is permitted. But if the Jew said to the gentile: Mix water with the wine and drink, even the jug that is on the side table is forbidden. Similarly, open barrels are forbidden, but sealed barrels are permitted unless the Jew was out of the room for sufficient time for the gentile to open the barrel by removing the stopper, and stop it again by making a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.

In the case of a military unit [ boleshet ] that entered a city, if it entered during peacetime, then after the soldiers leave the open barrels of wine are forbidden, but the sealed barrels are permitted. If the unit entered in wartime, both these barrels and those barrels are permitted, because in wartime there is no time to pour wine for libations, and one can be certain that the soldiers did not do so.

With regard to Jewish craftsmen to whom a gentile sent a barrel of wine used for a libation in lieu of their wage, it is permitted for them to say to him: Give us its monetary value instead. But once it has entered into their possession, it is prohibited for them to say so, as that would be tantamount to selling the wine to the gentile and deriving benefit from it. In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a gentile, if he fixed a price before he measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, deriving benefit from the money paid for the wine is permitted. It is not tantamount to selling wine used for a libation, as the gentile purchased the wine before it became forbidden, and the money already belonged to the Jew. But if the Jew measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, thereby rendering it forbidden, before he fixed a price, the money paid for the wine is forbidden. In a case where a Jew took a funnel and measured wine into a gentile’s jug, and then measured wine with the same funnel into a Jew’s jug, if there is a remnant of wine left in the funnel, the wine measured into the Jew’s jug is forbidden, as some of the wine that was measured into the gentile’s jug is mixed in it. In the case of one who pours wine from one vessel into another vessel, the wine left in the vessel from which he poured is permitted, but the wine in the vessel into which he poured is forbidden.

Wine used for a libation is forbidden, and any amount of it renders other wine forbidden if they are mixed together. Wine used for a libation that became mixed with wine, or water that was used for an idolatrous libation that became mixed with ordinary water, renders the mixture forbidden with any amount of the forbidden wine or water; but wine used for a libation that became mixed with water, or water used for a libation that became mixed with wine renders the mixture forbidden only if the forbidden liquid is sufficient to impart flavor to the mixture, i.e., for the wine to flavor the water or for the water to dilute the wine to an extent that can be tasted. This is the principle: A substance in contact with the same type of substance renders the mixture forbidden with any amount of the forbidden substance, but a substance in contact with a different type of substance renders the mixture forbidden only in a case where it imparts flavor to it.

These following items are themselves forbidden, and any amount of them renders other items with which they become mixed forbidden: Wine used for a libation; and objects of idol worship; and hides with a tear opposite the heart, indicating the idolatrous practice of sacrificing hearts of live animals. And this halakha also applies to an ox that has been condemned to be stoned (see Exodus 21:28), from which it is prohibited to derive benefit even before its sentence is carried out; and it applies to a heifer whose neck is broken when a person is found killed in an area between two cities and the murderer is unknown (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9), which is likewise forbidden from the time it is taken down to the river to be killed. In these cases, if the animal becomes mixed in a herd of similar animals, all of the animals in the herd are forbidden. And this halakha also applies to birds designated for the purification of a leper (Leviticus 14:1–6), and the shorn hair of a nazirite (Numbers 6:18), and a firstborn donkey (Exodus 13:13), and meat that was cooked in milk (Exodus 23:19), and the scape-goat of Yom Kippur (Leviticus 16:7–10), and the meat of a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. All of these are forbidden themselves, and any amount of them renders a mixture forbidden.

In the case of wine used for a libation that fell into a wine cistern, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all of the wine in the cistern, even if the volume of the wine used for a libation was tiny in comparison to the volume of the wine in the cistern. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: All of the wine in the cistern may be sold to a gentile, and the money paid for it is permitted except for the value of the wine used for a libation that is included in it.

In the case of a stone winepress that a gentile lined with pitch and then poured wine onto the pitch to neutralize its flavor, one may cleanse it and it is pure, i.e., wine pressed in it is permitted. And if the winepress is fashioned of wood, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One may cleanse it, but the Rabbis say: One must peel off the pitch completely. And if the winepress is of earthenware, even if one peeled off the pitch, this press is forbidden.

One who purchases cooking utensils from the gentiles must prepare them for use by Jews in the following manner: With regard to those utensils whose manner of preparation is to immerse them in a ritual bath, as they require no further preparation, he must immerse them accordingly. With regard to those utensils whose manner of preparation is to purge them with boiling water, as those utensils are used with boiling water, e.g., pots, he must purge them accordingly. With regard to those whose manner of preparation is to heat until white-hot in the fire, as they are used for grilling, he must heat them until white-hot in the fire. Therefore, with regard to the spit [ hashappud ] and the grill [ veha’askela ], he must heat them until white-hot in the fire. With regard to the knife, he must polish it and it is rendered pure.

Pirkei Avot

Chapter 1

Moses received the Torah at Sinai and transmitted it to Joshua, Joshua to the elders, and the elders to the prophets, and the prophets to the Men of the Great Assembly. They said three things: Be patient in [the administration of] justice, raise many disciples and make a fence round the Torah.

Shimon the Righteous was one of the last of the men of the great assembly. He used to say: the world stands upon three things: the Torah, the Temple service, and the practice of acts of piety.

Antigonus a man of Socho received [the oral tradition] from Shimon the Righteous. He used to say: do not be like servants who serve the master in the expectation of receiving a reward, but be like servants who serve the master without the expectation of receiving a reward, and let the fear of Heaven be upon you.

Yose ben Yoezer (a man) of Zeredah and Yose ben Yohanan [a man] of Jerusalem received [the oral tradition] from them [i.e. Shimon the Righteous and Antigonus]. Yose ben Yoezer used to say: let thy house be a house of meeting for the Sages and sit in the very dust of their feet, and drink in their words with thirst.

Yose ben Yochanan (a man) of Jerusalem used to say: Let thy house be wide open, and let the poor be members of thy household. Engage not in too much conversation with women. They said this with regard to one’s own wife, how much more [does the rule apply] with regard to another man’s wife. From here the Sages said: as long as a man engages in too much conversation with women, he causes evil to himself, he neglects the study of the Torah, and in the end he will inherit gehinnom.

Joshua ben Perahiah and Nittai the Arbelite received [the oral tradition] from them. Joshua ben Perahiah used to say: appoint for thyself a teacher, and acquire for thyself a companion and judge all men with the scale weighted in his favor.

Nittai the Arbelite used to say: keep a distance from an evil neighbor, do not become attached to the wicked, and do not abandon faith in [divine] retribution.

Judah ben Tabbai and Shimon ben Shetach received [the oral tradition] from them. Judah ben Tabbai said: do not [as a judge] play the part of an advocate; and when the litigants are standing before you, look upon them as if they were [both] guilty; and when they leave your presence, look upon them as if they were [both] innocent, when they have accepted the judgement.

Shimon ben Shetach used to say: be thorough in the interrogation of witnesses, and be careful with your words, lest from them they learn to lie.

Shemaiah and Abtalion received [the oral tradition] from them. Shemaiah used to say: love work, hate acting the superior, and do not attempt to draw near to the ruling authority.

Abtalion used to say: Sages be careful with your words, lest you incur the penalty of exile, and be carried off to a place of evil waters, and the disciples who follow you drink and die, and thus the name of heaven becomes profaned.

Hillel and Shammai received [the oral tradition] from them. Hillel used to say: be of the disciples of Aaron, loving peace and pursuing peace, loving mankind and drawing them close to the Torah.

He [also] used to say: one who makes his name great causes his name to be destroyed; one who does not add [to his knowledge] causes [it] to cease; one who does not study [the Torah] deserves death; one who makes [unworthy] use of the crown [of learning] shall pass away.

He [also] used to say: If I am not for myself, who is for me? But if I am for my own self [only], what am I? And if not now, when?

Shammai used to say: make your [study of the] Torah a fixed practice; speak little, but do much; and receive all men with a pleasant countenance.

Rabban Gamaliel used to say: appoint for thyself a teacher, avoid doubt, and do not make a habit of tithing by guesswork.

Shimon, his son, used to say: all my days I grew up among the sages, and I have found nothing better for a person than silence. Study is not the most important thing, but actions; whoever indulges in too many words brings about sin.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: on three things does the world stand: On justice, on truth and on peace, as it is said: “execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates” (Zechariah 8:16).

Chapter 2

Rabbi Said: which is the straight path that a man should choose for himself? One which is an honor to the person adopting it, and [on account of which] honor [accrues] to him from others. And be careful with a light commandment as with a grave one, for you did know not the reward for the fulfillment of the commandments. Also, reckon the loss [that may be sustained through the fulfillment] of a commandment against the reward [accruing] thereby, and the gain [that may be obtained through the committing] of a transgression against the loss [entailed] thereby. Apply your mind to three things and you will not come into the clutches of sin: Know what there is above you: an eye that sees, an ear that hears, and all your deeds are written in a book.

Rabban Gamaliel the son of Rabbi Judah Hanasi said: excellent is the study of the Torah when combined with a worldly occupation, for toil in them both keeps sin out of one’s mind; But [study of the] Torah which is not combined with a worldly occupation, in the end comes to be neglected and becomes the cause of sin. And all who labor with the community, should labor with them for the sake of Heaven, for the merit of their forefathers sustains them (the community), and their (the forefather’s) righteousness endures for ever; And as for you, [God in such case says] I credit you with a rich reward, as if you [yourselves] had [actually] accomplished [it all].

Be careful [in your dealings] with the ruling authorities for they do not befriend a person except for their own needs; they seem like friends when it is to their own interest, but they do not stand by a man in the hour of his distress.

He used to say: do His will as though it were your will, so that He will do your will as though it were His. Set aside your will in the face of His will, so that he may set aside the will of others for the sake of your will. Hillel said: do not separate yourself from the community, Do not trust in yourself until the day of your death, Do not judge your fellow man until you have reached his place. Do not say something that cannot be understood [trusting] that in the end it will be understood. Say not: ‘when I shall have leisure I shall study;’ perhaps you will not have leisure.

He used to say: A brute is not sin-fearing, nor is an ignorant person pious; nor can a timid person learn, nor can an impatient person teach; nor will someone who engages too much in business become wise. In a place where there are no men, strive to be a man.

Moreover he saw a skull floating on the face of the water. He said to it: because you drowned others, they drowned you. And in the end, they that drowned you will be drowned.

He used to say: The more flesh, the more worms; The more property, the more anxiety; The more wives, the more witchcraft; The more female slaves, the more lewdness; The more slaves, the more robbery; [But] the more Torah, the more life; The more sitting [in the company of scholars], the more wisdom; The more counsel, the more understanding; The more charity, the more peace. If one acquires a good name, he has acquired something for himself; If one acquires for himself knowledge of Torah, he has acquired life in the world to come.

Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai received [the oral tradition] from Hillel and Shammai.He used to say: if you have learned much Torah, do not claim credit for yourself, because for such a purpose were you created. Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai had five disciples and they were these: Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah, Rabbi Yose, the priest, Rabbi Shimon ben Nethaneel and Rabbi Eleazar ben Arach. He [Rabbi Johanan] used to list their outstanding virtues: Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus is a plastered cistern which loses not a drop; Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah happy is the woman that gave birth to him; Rabbi Yose, the priest, is a pious man; Rabbi Simeon ben Nethaneel is one that fears sin, And Rabbi Eleazar ben Arach is like a spring that [ever] gathers force. He [Rabbi Yohanan] used to say: if all the sages of Israel were on one scale of the balance and Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus on the other scale, he would outweigh them all. Abba Shaul said in his name: if all the sages of Israel were on one scale of the balance, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus also with them, and Rabbi Eleazar ben Arach on the other scale, he would outweigh them all.

He [Rabban Yohanan] said unto them: go forth and observe which is the right way to which a man should cleave? Rabbi Eliezer said, a good eye; Rabbi Joshua said, a good companion; Rabbi Yose said, a good neighbor; Rabbi Shimon said, foresight. Rabbi Elazar said, a good heart. He [Rabban Yohanan] said to them: I prefer the words of Elazar ben Arach, for in his words your words are included. He [Rabban Yohanan] said unto them: go forth and observe which is the evil way which a man should shun? Rabbi Eliezer said, an evil eye; Rabbi Joshua said, an evil companion; Rabbi Yose said, an evil neighbor; Rabbi Shimon said, one who borrows and does not repay for he that borrows from man is as one who borrows from God, blessed be He, as it is said, “the wicked borrow and do not repay, but the righteous deal graciously and give” (Psalms 37:21). Rabbi Elazar said, an evil heart. He [Rabban Yohanan] said to them: I prefer the words of Elazar ben Arach, for in his words your words are included.

They [each] said three things: Rabbi Eliezer said: Let the honor of your friend be as dear to you as your own; And be not easily provoked to anger; And repent one day before your death. And [he also said:] warm yourself before the fire of the wise, but beware of being singed by their glowing coals, for their bite is the bite of a fox, and their sting is the sting of a scorpion, and their hiss is the hiss of a serpent, and all their words are like coals of fire.

Rabbi Joshua said: an evil eye, the evil inclination, and hatred for humankind put a person out of the world.

Rabbi Yose said: Let the property of your fellow be as precious unto you as your own; Make yourself fit to study Torah for it will not be yours by inheritance; And let all your actions be for [the sake of] the name of heaven.

Rabbi Shimon said: Be careful with the reading of Shema and the prayer, And when you pray, do not make your prayer something automatic, but a plea for compassion before God, for it is said: “for he is gracious and compassionate, slow to anger, abounding in kindness, and renouncing punishment” (Joel 2:13); And be not wicked in your own esteem.

Rabbi Elazar said: Be diligent in the study of the Torah; And know how to answer an epicuros, And know before whom you toil, and that your employer is faithful, for He will pay you the reward of your labor.

Rabbi Tarfon said: the day is short, and the work is plentiful, and the laborers are indolent, and the reward is great, and the master of the house is insistent.

He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say: It is not your duty to finish the work, but neither are you at liberty to neglect it; If you have studied much Torah, you shall be given much reward. Faithful is your employer to pay you the reward of your labor; And know that the grant of reward unto the righteous is in the age to come.

Chapter 3

Akabyah ben Mahalalel said: mark well three things and you will not come into the power of sin: Know from where you come, and where you are going, and before whom you are destined to give an account and reckoning. From where do you come? From a putrid drop. Where are you going? To a place of dust, of worm and of maggot. Before whom you are destined to give an account and reckoning? Before the King of the kings of kings, the Holy One, blessed be he.

Rabbi Hanina, the vice-high priest said: pray for the welfare of the government, for were it not for the fear it inspires, every man would swallow his neighbor alive. R. Hananiah ben Teradion said: if two sit together and there are no words of Torah [spoken] between them, then this is a session of scorners, as it is said: “nor sat he in the seat of the scornful…[rather, the teaching of the Lord is his delight]” (Psalms 1:1); but if two sit together and there are words of Torah [spoken] between them, then the Shekhinah abides among them, as it is said: “then they that feared the Lord spoke one with another; and the Lord hearkened and heard, and a book of remembrance was written before Him, for them that feared the Lord and that thought upon His name” (Malachi 3:16). Now I have no [scriptural proof for the presence of the Shekhinah] except [among] two, how [do we know] that even one who sits and studies Torah the Holy One, blessed be He, fixes his reward? As it is said: “though he sit alone and [meditate] in stillness, yet he takes [a reward] unto himself” (Lamentations 3:28).

Rabbi Shimon said: if three have eaten at one table and have not spoken there words of Torah, [it is] as if they had eaten sacrifices [offered] to the dead, as it is said, “for all tables are full of filthy vomit, when the All-Present is absent” (Isaiah 28:8). But, if three have eaten at one table, and have spoken there words of Torah, [it is] as if they had eaten at the table of the All-Present, blessed be He, as it is said, “And He said unto me, ‘this is the table before the Lord’” (Ezekiel 41:22).

Rabbi Hananiah ben Hakinai said: one who wakes up at night, or walks on the way alone and turns his heart to idle matters, behold, this man is mortally guilty.

Rabbi Nehunia ben Hakkanah said: whoever takes upon himself the yoke of the Torah, they remove from him the yoke of government and the yoke of worldly concerns, and whoever breaks off from himself the yoke of the Torah, they place upon him the yoke of government and the yoke of worldly concerns.

Rabbi Halafta of Kefar Hanania said: when ten sit together and occupy themselves with Torah, the Shechinah abides among them, as it is said: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalm 82:1). How do we know that the same is true even of five? As it is said: “This band of His He has established on earth” (Amos 9:6). How do we know that the same is true even of three? As it is said: “In the midst of the judges He judges” (Psalm 82:1) How do we know that the same is true even of two? As it is said: “Then they that fear the Lord spoke one with another, and the Lord hearkened, and heard” (Malachi 3:16). How do we know that the same is true even of one? As it is said: “In every place where I cause my name to be mentioned I will come unto you and bless you” (Exodus 20:21).

Rabbi Elazar of Bartotha said: give to Him of that which is His, for you and that which is yours is His; and thus it says with regards to David: “for everything comes from You, and from Your own hand have we given you” (I Chronicles 29:14). Rabbi Jacob said: if one is studying while walking on the road and interrupts his study and says, “how fine is this tree!” [or] “how fine is this newly ploughed field!” scripture accounts it to him as if he was mortally guilty.

Rabbi Dostai ben Rabbi Yannai said in the name of Rabbi Meir: whoever forgets one word of his study, scripture accounts it to him as if he were mortally guilty, as it is said, “But take utmost care and watch yourselves scrupulously, so that you do not forget the things that you saw with your own eyes” (Deuteronomy 4:9). One could [have inferred that this is the case] even when his study proved [too] hard for him, therefore scripture says, “that they do not fade from your mind as long as you live” (ibid.). Thus, he is not mortally guilty unless he deliberately removes them from his heart.

Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa said: anyone whose fear of sin precedes his wisdom, his wisdom is enduring, but anyone whose wisdom precedes his fear of sin, his wisdom is not enduring. He [also] used to say: anyone whose deeds exceed his wisdom, his wisdom is enduring, but anyone whose wisdom exceeds his deeds, his wisdom is not enduring.

He used to say: one with whom men are pleased, God is pleased. But anyone from whom men are displeased, God is displeased. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said: morning sleep, midday wine, children’s talk and sitting in the assemblies of the ignorant put a man out of the world.

Rabbi Elazar of Modiin said: one who profanes sacred things, and one who despises the festivals, and one who causes his fellow’s face to blush in public, and one who annuls the covenant of our father Abraham, may he rest in peace, and he who is contemptuous towards the Torah, even though he has to his credit [knowledge of the] Torah and good deeds, he has not a share in the world to come.

Rabbi Ishmael said: be suppliant to a superior, submissive under compulsory service, and receive every man happily.

Rabbi Akiva said: Merriment and frivolity accustom one to sexual licentiousness; Tradition is a fence to the Torah; Tithes a fence to wealth, Vows a fence to abstinence; A fence to wisdom is silence.

He used to say: Beloved is man for he was created in the image [of God]. Especially beloved is he for it was made known to him that he had been created in the image [of God], as it is said: “for in the image of God He made man” (Genesis 9:6). Beloved are Israel in that they were called children to the All-Present. Especially beloved are they for it was made known to them that they are called children of the All-Present, as it is said: “you are children to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:1). Beloved are Israel in that a precious vessel was given to them. Especially beloved are they for it was made known to them that the desirable instrument, with which the world had been created, was given to them, as it is said: “for I give you good instruction; forsake not my teaching” (Proverbs 4:2).

Everything is foreseen yet freedom of choice is granted, And the world is judged with goodness; And everything is in accordance with the preponderance of works.

He used to say: everything is given against a pledge, and a net is spread out over all the living; the store is open and the storekeeper allows credit, but the ledger is open and the hand writes, and whoever wishes to borrow may come and borrow; but the collectors go round regularly every day and exact dues from man, either with his consent or without his consent, and they have that on which they [can] rely [in their claims], seeing that the judgment is a righteous judgment, and everything is prepared for the banquet.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said: Where there is no Torah, there is no right conduct; where there is no right conduct, there is no Torah. Where there is no wisdom there is no fear of God; where there is no fear of God, there is no wisdom. Where there is no understanding, there is no knowledge; where there is no knowledge, there is no understanding. Where there is no bread, there is no Torah; where there is no Torah, there is no bread. He used to say: one whose wisdom exceeds his deeds, to what may he be compared? To a tree whose branches are numerous but whose roots are few, so that when the wind comes, it uproots it and overturns it, as it is said, “He shall be like a bush in the desert, which does not sense the coming of good. It is set in the scorched places of the wilderness, in a barren land without inhabitant” (Jeremiah 17:6). But one whose deeds exceed his wisdom, to what may he be compared? To a tree whose branches are few but roots are many, so that even if all the winds in the world come and blow upon it, they cannot move it out of its place, as it is said, “He shall be like a tree planted by waters, sending forth its roots by a stream. It does not sense the coming of heat, its leaves are ever fresh. It has no care in a year of drought; it does not cease to yield fruit” (ibid, 17:8).

Rabbi Eliezer Hisma said: the laws of mixed bird offerings and the key to the calculations of menstruation days these, these are the body of the halakhah. The calculation of the equinoxes and gematria are the desserts of wisdom.

Chapter 4

Ben Zoma said:Who is wise? He who learns from every man, as it is said: “From all who taught me have I gained understanding” (Psalms 119:99). Who is mighty? He who subdues his [evil] inclination, as it is said: “He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty; and he that rules his spirit than he that takes a city” (Proverbs 16:32). Who is rich? He who rejoices in his lot, as it is said: “You shall enjoy the fruit of your labors, you shall be happy and you shall prosper” (Psalms 128:2) “You shall be happy” in this world, “and you shall prosper” in the world to come. Who is he that is honored? He who honors his fellow human beings as it is said: “For I honor those that honor Me, but those who spurn Me shall be dishonored” (I Samuel 2:30).

Ben Azzai said: Be quick in performing a minor commandment as in the case of a major one, and flee from transgression; For one commandment leads to another commandment, and transgression leads to another transgression; For the reward for performing a commandment is another commandment and the reward for committing a transgression is a transgression.

He used to say: do not despise any man, and do not discriminate against anything, for there is no man that has not his hour, and there is no thing that has not its place.

Rabbi Levitas a man of Yavneh said: be exceeding humble spirit, for the end of man is the worm. Rabbi Yohanan ben Berokah said: whoever profanes the name of heaven in secret, he shall be punished in the open. Unwittingly or wittingly, it is all one in profaning the name.

Rabbi Ishmael his son said: He who learns in order to teach, it is granted to him to study and to teach; But he who learns in order to practice, it is granted to him to learn and to teach and to practice. Rabbi Zadok said: do not make them a crown for self-exaltation, nor a spade with which to dig. So too Hillel used to say, “And he that puts the crown to his own use shall perish.” Thus you have learned, anyone who derives worldly benefit from the words of the Torah, removes his life from the world.

Rabbi Yose said: whoever honors the Torah is himself honored by others, and whoever dishonors the Torah is himself dishonored by others.

Rabbi Ishmael his son said: he who refrains himself from judgment, rids himself of enmity, robbery and false swearing; But he whose heart is presumptuous in giving a judicial decision, is foolish, wicked and arrogant.

He used to say: judge not alone, for none may judge alone save one. And say not “accept my view”, for they are free but not you.

Rabbi Jonathan said: whoever fulfills the Torah out of a state of poverty, his end will be to fulfill it out of a state of wealth; And whoever discards The torah out of a state of wealth, his end will be to discard it out of a state of poverty.

Rabbi Meir said: Engage but little in business, and busy yourself with the Torah. Be of humble spirit before all men. If you have neglected the Torah, you shall have many who bring you to neglect it, but if you have labored at the study of Torah, there is much reward to give unto you

Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: he who performs one commandment acquires for himself one advocate, and he who commits one transgression acquires for himself one accuser. Repentance and good deeds are a shield against punishment. Rabbi Yochanan Hasandlar said: every assembly which is for the sake of heaven, will in the end endure; and every assembly which is not for the sake of heaven, will not endure in the end.

Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua said: let the honor of your student be as dear to you as your own, and the honor of your colleague as the reverence for your teacher, and the reverence for your teacher as the reverence of heaven.

Rabbi Judah said: be careful in study, for an error in study counts as deliberate sin. Rabbi Shimon said: There are three crowns: the crown of torah, the crown of priesthood, and the crown of royalty, but the crown of a good name supersedes them all.

Rabbi Nehorai said: go as a [voluntary] exile to a place of Torah and say not that it will come after you, for [it is] your fellow [student]s who will make it permanent in your hand and “and lean not upon your own understanding” (Proverbs 3:5).

Rabbi Yannai said: it is not in our hands [to explain the reason] either of the security of the wicked, or even of the afflictions of the righteous. Rabbi Mathia ben Harash said: Upon meeting people, be the first to extend greetings; And be a tail unto lions, and not a head unto foxes.

Rabbi Jacob said: this world is like a vestibule before the world to come; prepare yourself in the vestibule, so that you may enter the banqueting-hall.

He used to say: more precious is one hour in repentance and good deeds in this world, than all the life of the world to come; And more precious is one hour of the tranquility of the world to come, than all the life of this world.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Do not try to appease your friend during his hour of anger; Nor comfort him at the hour while his dead still lies before him; Nor question him at the hour of his vow; Nor strive to see him in the hour of his disgrace.

Shmuel Hakatan said: “If your enemy falls, do not exult; if he trips, let your heart not rejoice, lest the Lord see it and be displeased, and avert his wrath from him” (Proverbs 24:17).

Elisha ben Abuyah said: He who learns when a child, to what is he compared? To ink written upon a new writing sheet. And he who learns when an old man, to what is he compared? To ink written on a rubbed writing sheet. Rabbi Yose ben Judah a man of Kfar Ha-babli said: He who learns from the young, to what is he compared? To one who eats unripe grapes, and drinks wine from his vat; And he who learns from the old, to what is he compared? To one who eats ripe grapes, and drinks old wine. Rabbi said: don’t look at the container but at that which is in it: there is a new container full of old wine, and an old [container] in which there is not even new [wine].

Rabbi Elazar Ha-kappar said: envy, lust and [the desire for] honor put a man out of the world.

He used to say: the ones who were born are to die, and the ones who have died are to be brought to life, and the ones brought to life are to be judged; So that one may know, make known and have the knowledge that He is God, He is the designer, He is the creator, He is the discerner, He is the judge, He the witness, He the complainant, and that He will summon to judgment. Blessed be He, before Whom there is no iniquity, nor forgetting, nor respect of persons, nor taking of bribes, for all is His. And know that all is according to the reckoning. And let not your impulse assure thee that the grave is a place of refuge for you; for against your will were you formed, against your will were you born, against your will you live, against your will you will die, and against your will you will give an account and reckoning before the King of the kings of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He.

Chapter 5

With ten utterances the world was created. And what does this teach, for surely it could have been created with one utterance? But this was so in order to punish the wicked who destroy the world that was created with ten utterances, And to give a good reward to the righteous who maintain the world that was created with ten utterances.

[There were] ten generations from Adam to Noah, in order to make known what long-suffering is His; for all those generations kept on provoking Him, until He brought upon them the waters of the flood. [There were] ten generations from Noah to Abraham, in order to make known what long-suffering is His; for all those generations kept on provoking Him, until Abraham, came and received the reward of all of them.

With ten trials was Abraham, our father (may he rest in peace), tried, and he withstood them all; to make known how great was the love of Abraham, our father (peace be upon him).

Ten miracles were wrought for our ancestors in Egypt, and ten at the sea. Ten plagues did the Holy one, blessed be He, bring upon the Egyptians in Egypt and ten at the sea. [With] ten trials did our ancestors try God, blessed be He, in the Wilderness, as it is said, “and they have tried Me these ten times and they have not listened to my voice” (Numbers 14:22).

Ten wonders were wrought for our ancestors in the Temple: [1] no woman miscarried from the odor of the sacred flesh; [2] the sacred flesh never became putrid; [3] no fly was ever seen in the slaughterhouse; [4] no emission occurred to the high priest on the Day of Atonement; [5] the rains did not extinguish the fire of the woodpile; [6] the wind did not prevail against the column of smoke; [7] no defect was found in the omer, or in the two loaves, or in the showbread; [8] the people stood pressed together, yet bowed down and had room enough; [9] never did a serpent or a scorpion harm anyone in Jerusalem; [10] and no man said to his fellow: the place is too congested for me to lodge overnight in Jerusalem.

Ten things were created on the eve of the Sabbath at twilight, and these are they: [1] the mouth of the earth, [2] the mouth of the well, [3] the mouth of the donkey, [4] the rainbow, [5] the manna, [6] the staff [of Moses], [7] the shamir, [8] the letters, [9] the writing, [10] and the tablets. And some say: also the demons, the grave of Moses, and the ram of Abraham, our father. And some say: and also tongs, made with tongs.

[There are] seven things [characteristic] in a clod, and seven in a wise man: A wise man does not speak before one who is greater than he in wisdom, And does not break into his fellow’s speech; And is not hasty to answer; He asks what is relevant, and he answers to the point; And he speaks of the first [point] first, and of the last [point] last; And concerning that which he has not heard, he says: I have not heard; And he acknowledges the truth. And the reverse of these [are characteristic] in a clod.

Seven kinds of punishment come to the world for seven categories of transgression:When some of them give tithes, and others do not give tithes, a famine from drought comes some go hungry, and others are satisfied. When they have all decided not to give tithes, a famine from tumult and drought comes; [When they have, in addition, decided] not to set apart the dough-offering, an all-consuming famine comes. Pestilence comes to the world for sins punishable by death according to the Torah, but which have not been referred to the court, and for neglect of the law regarding the fruits of the sabbatical year. The sword comes to the world for the delay of judgment, and for the perversion of judgment, and because of those who teach the Torah not in accordance with the accepted law.

Wild beasts come to the world for swearing in vain, and for the profanation of the Name. Exile comes to the world for idolatry, for sexual sins and for bloodshed, and for [transgressing the commandment of] the [year of the] release of the land. At four times pestilence increases: in the fourth year, in the seventh year and at the conclusion of the seventh year, and at the conclusion of the Feast [of Tabernacles] in every year. In the fourth year, on account of the tithe of the poor which is due in the third year. In the seventh year, on account of the tithe of the poor which is due in the sixth year; At the conclusion of the seventh year, on account of the produce of the seventh year; And at the conclusion of the Feast [of Tabernacles] in every year, for robbing the gifts to the poor.

There are four types of character in human beings: One that says: “mine is mine, and yours is yours”: this is a commonplace type; and some say this is a sodom-type of character. [One that says:] “mine is yours and yours is mine”: is an unlearned person (am haaretz); [One that says:] “mine is yours and yours is yours” is a pious person. [One that says:] “mine is mine, and yours is mine” is a wicked person.

There are four kinds of temperaments: Easy to become angry, and easy to be appeased: his gain disappears in his loss; Hard to become angry, and hard to be appeased: his loss disappears in his gain; Hard to become angry and easy to be appeased: a pious person; Easy to become angry and hard to be appeased: a wicked person.

There are four types of disciples: Quick to comprehend, and quick to forget: his gain disappears in his loss; Slow to comprehend, and slow to forget: his loss disappears in his gain; Quick to comprehend, and slow to forget: he is a wise man; Slow to comprehend, and quick to forget, this is an evil portion.

There are four types of charity givers. He who wishes to give, but that others should not give: his eye is evil to that which belongs to others; He who wishes that others should give, but that he himself should not give: his eye is evil towards that which is his own; He who desires that he himself should give, and that others should give: he is a pious man; He who desires that he himself should not give and that others too should not give: he is a wicked man.

There are four types among those who frequent the study-house (bet midrash):He who attends but does not practice: he receives a reward for attendance. He who practices but does not attend: he receives a reward for practice. He who attends and practices: he is a pious man; He who neither attends nor practices: he is a wicked man.

There are four types among those who sit before the sages: a sponge, a funnel, a strainer and a sieve.A sponge, soaks up everything; A funnel, takes in at one end and lets out at the other; A strainer, which lets out the wine and retains the lees; A sieve, which lets out the coarse meal and retains the choice flour.

All love that depends on a something, [when the] thing ceases, [the] love ceases; and [all love] that does not depend on anything, will never cease. What is an example of love that depended on a something? Such was the love of Amnon for Tamar. And what is an example of love that did not depend on anything? Such was the love of David and Jonathan.

Every dispute that is for the sake of Heaven, will in the end endure; But one that is not for the sake of Heaven, will not endure. Which is the controversy that is for the sake of Heaven? Such was the controversy of Hillel and Shammai. And which is the controversy that is not for the sake of Heaven? Such was the controversy of Korah and all his congregation.

Whoever causes the multitudes to be righteous, sin will not occur on his account; And whoever causes the multitudes to sin, they do not give him the ability to repent. Moses was righteous and caused the multitudes to be righteous, [therefore] the righteousness of the multitudes is hung on him, as it is said, “He executed the Lord’s righteousness and His decisions with Israel” (Deut. 33:21). Jeroboam, sinned and caused the multitudes to sin, [therefore] the sin of the multitudes is hung on him, as it is said, “For the sins of Jeroboam which he sinned, and which he caused Israel to sin thereby” (I Kings 15:30).

Whoever possesses these three things, he is of the disciples of Abraham, our father; and [whoever possesses] three other things, he is of the disciples of Balaam, the wicked. A good eye, a humble spirit and a moderate appetite he is of the disciples of Abraham, our father. An evil eye, a haughty spirit and a limitless appetite he is of the disciples of Balaam, the wicked. What is the difference between the disciples of Abraham, our father, and the disciples of Balaam, the wicked? The disciples of Abraham, our father, enjoy this world, and inherit the world to come, as it is said: “I will endow those who love me with substance, I will fill their treasuries” (Proverbs 8:21). But the disciples of Balaam, the wicked, inherit gehinnom, and descend into the nethermost pit, as it is said: “For you, O God, will bring them down to the nethermost pit those murderous and treacherous men; they shall not live out half their days; but I trust in You” (Psalms 55:24).

Judah ben Tema said: Be strong as a leopard, and swift as an eagle, and fleet as a gazelle, and brave as a lion, to do the will of your Father who is in heaven. He used to say: the arrogant is headed for Gehinnom and the blushing for the garden of Eden. May it be the will, O Lord our God, that your city be rebuilt speedily in our days and set our portion in the studying of your Torah.

He used to say: At five years of age the study of Scripture; At ten the study of Mishnah; At thirteen subject to the commandments; At fifteen the study of Talmud; At eighteen the bridal canopy; At twenty for pursuit [of livelihood]; At thirty the peak of strength; At forty wisdom; At fifty able to give counsel; At sixty old age; At seventy fullness of years; At eighty the age of “strength”; At ninety a bent body; At one hundred, as good as dead and gone completely out of the world.

Ben Bag Bag said: Turn it over, and [again] turn it over, for all is therein. And look into it; And become gray and old therein; And do not move away from it, for you have no better portion than it.

Ben He He said: According to the labor is the reward.

Chapter 6

The sages taught in the language of the mishnah. Blessed be He who chose them and their teaching. Rabbi Meir said: Whoever occupies himself with the Torah for its own sake, merits many things; not only that but he is worth the whole world. He is called beloved friend; one that loves God; one that loves humankind; one that gladdens God; one that gladdens humankind. And the Torah clothes him in humility and reverence, and equips him to be righteous, pious, upright and trustworthy; it keeps him far from sin, and brings him near to merit. And people benefit from his counsel, sound knowledge, understanding and strength, as it is said, “Counsel is mine and sound wisdom; I am understanding, strength is mine” (Proverbs 8:14). And it bestows upon him royalty, dominion, and acuteness in judgment. To him are revealed the secrets of the Torah, and he is made as an ever-flowing spring, and like a stream that never ceases. And he becomes modest, long-suffering and forgiving of insult. And it magnifies him and exalts him over everything.

Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said: every day a bat kol (a heavenly voice) goes forth from Mount Horeb and makes proclamation and says: “Woe unto humankind for their contempt towards the Torah”, for whoever does not occupy himself with the study of Torah is called, nazuf (the rebuked. As it is said, “Like a gold ring in the snout of a pig is a beautiful woman bereft of sense” (Proverbs 11:22). And it says, “And the tablets were the work of God, and the writing was the writing of God, graven upon the tablets” (Exodus 32:16). Read not haruth [‘graven’] but heruth [ ‘freedom’]. For there is no free man but one that occupies himself with the study of the Torah. And whoever regularly occupies himself with the study of the Torah he is surely exalted, as it is said, “And from Mattanah to Nahaliel; and Nahaliel to Bamoth” (Numbers 21:19).

One who learns from his fellow one chapter, or one halakhah, or one verse, or one word, or even one letter, is obligated to treat him with honor; for so we find with David, king of Israel, who learned from Ahitophel no more than two things, yet called him his master, his guide and his beloved friend, as it is said, “But it was you, a man mine equal, my guide and my beloved friend” (Psalms 55:14). Is this not [an instance of the argument] “from the less to the greater” (kal vehomer)? If David, king of Israel who learned from Ahitophel no more than two things, nevertheless called him his master, his guide and his beloved friend; then in the case of one who learns from his fellow one chapter, or one halakhah, or one verse, or one word, or even one letter, all the more so he is under obligation to treat him with honor. And “honor’” means nothing but Torah, as it is said, “It is honor that sages inherit” (Proverbs 3:35). “And the perfect shall inherit good” (Proverbs 28:10), and “good” means nothing but Torah, as it is said, “For I give you good instruction; do not forsake my Torah” (Proverbs 4:2).

Such is the way [of a life] of Torah: you shall eat bread with salt, and rationed water shall you drink; you shall sleep on the ground, your life will be one of privation, and in Torah shall you labor. If you do this, “Happy shall you be and it shall be good for you” (Psalms 128:2): “Happy shall you be” in this world, “and it shall be good for you” in the world to come.

Do not seek greatness for yourself, and do not covet honor. Practice more than you learn. Do not yearn for the table of kings, for your table is greater than their table, and your crown is greater than their crown, and faithful is your employer to pay you the reward of your labor.

Greater is learning Torah than the priesthood and than royalty, for royalty is acquired by thirty stages, and the priesthood by twenty-four, but the Torah by forty-eight things. By study, Attentive listening, Proper speech, By an understanding heart, By an intelligent heart, By awe, By fear, By humility, By joy, By attending to the sages, By critical give and take with friends, By fine argumentation with disciples, By clear thinking, By study of Scripture, By study of mishnah, By a minimum of sleep, By a minimum of chatter, By a minimum of pleasure, By a minimum of frivolity, By a minimum of preoccupation with worldly matters, By long-suffering, By generosity, By faith in the sages, By acceptance of suffering. [Learning of Torah is also acquired by one] Who recognizes his place, Who rejoices in his portion, Who makes a fence about his words, Who takes no credit for himself, Who is loved, Who loves God, Who loves [his fellow] creatures, Who loves righteous ways, Who loves reproof, Who loves uprightness, Who keeps himself far from honors, Who does not let his heart become swelled on account of his learning, Who does not delight in giving legal decisions, Who shares in the bearing of a burden with his colleague, Who judges with the scales weighted in his favor, Who leads him on to truth, Who leads him on to peace, Who composes himself at his study, Who asks and answers, Who listens [to others], and [himself] adds [to his knowledge], Who learns in order to teach, Who learns in order to practice, Who makes his teacher wiser, Who is exact in what he has learned, And who says a thing in the name of him who said it. Thus you have learned: everyone who says a thing in the name of him who said it, brings deliverance into the world, as it is said: “And Esther told the king in Mordecai’s name” (Esther 2:22).

Great is Torah for it gives life to those that practice it, in this world, and in the world to come, As it is said: “For they are life unto those that find them, and health to all their flesh” (Proverbs 4:22), And it says: “It will be a cure for your navel and marrow for your bones” (ibid. 3:8) And it says: “She is a tree of life to those that grasp her, and whoever holds onto her is happy” (ibid. 3:18), And it says: “For they are a graceful wreath upon your head, a necklace about your throat” (ibid. 1:9), And it says: “She will adorn your head with a graceful wreath; crown you with a glorious diadem” (ibid. 4:9) And it says: “In her right hand is length of days, in her left riches and honor” (ibid. 3:1, And it says: “For they will bestow on you length of days, years of life and peace” (ibid. 3:2).

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: Beauty, strength, riches, honor, wisdom, [old age], gray hair, and children are becoming to the righteous, and becoming to the world, As it is said: “Gray hair is a crown of glory (beauty); it is attained by way of righteousness” (Proverbs 16:31), And it says: “The ornament of the wise is their wealth” (ibid. 14:24), And it says: “The glory of youths is their strength; and the beauty of old men is their gray hair” (ibid. 20:29), And it says: “Grandchildren are the glory of their elders, and the glory of children is their parents” (ibid. 17:6), And it says: “Then the moon shall be ashamed, and the sun shall be abashed. For the Lord of Hosts will reign on Mount Zion and in Jerusalem, and God’s Honor will be revealed to his elders” (Isaiah 24:23). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya said: these seven qualities, which the sages have listed [as becoming] to the righteous, were all of them fulfilled in Rabbi and his sons.

Rabbi Yose ben Kisma said: Once I was walking by the way when a man met me, and greeted me and I greeted him. He said to me, “Rabbi, where are you from?” I said to him, “I am from a great city of sages and scribes”. He said to me, “Rabbi, would you consider living with us in our place? I would give you a thousand thousand denarii of gold, and precious stones and pearls.” I said to him: “My son, even if you were to give me all the silver and gold, precious stones and pearls that are in the world, I would not dwell anywhere except in a place of Torah; for when a man passes away there accompany him neither gold nor silver, nor precious stones nor pearls, but Torah and good deeds alone, as it is said, “When you walk it will lead you. When you lie down it will watch over you; and when you are awake it will talk with you” (Proverbs 6:22). “When you walk it will lead you” in this world. “When you lie down it will watch over you” in the grave; “And when you are awake it will talk with you” in the world to come. And thus it is written in the book of Psalms by David, king of Israel, “I prefer the teaching You proclaimed to thousands of pieces of gold and silver” (Psalms 119:72), And it says: “Mine is the silver, and mine the gold, says the Lord of Hosts” (Haggai 2:8).

Five possessions did the Holy Blessed One, set aside as his own in this world, and these are they:The Torah, one possession; Heaven and earth, another possession; Abraham, another possession; Israel, another possession; The Temple, another possession. 1a) The Torah is one possession. From where do we know this? Since it is written, “The Lord possessed (usually translated as ‘created’) me at the beginning of his course, at the first of His works of old” (Proverbs 8:22)., 2a) Heaven and earth, another possession. From where do we know this? Since it is said: “Thus said the Lord: The heaven is My throne and the earth is My footstool; Where could you build a house for Me, What place could serve as My abode? (Isaiah 66:1) And it says: “How many are the things You have made, O Lord; You have made them all with wisdom; the earth is full of Your possessions” (Psalms 104:24). 3a) Abraham is another possession. From where do we know this? Since it is written: “He blessed him, saying, “Blessed by Abram of God Most High, Possessor of heaven and earth” (Genesis 15:19). 4a) Israel is another possession. From where do we know this? Since it is written: “Till Your people cross over, O Lord, Till Your people whom You have possessed” (Exodus 15:16). And it says: “As to the holy and mighty ones that are in the land, my whole desire (possession) is in them” (Psalms 16:3). 5a) The Temple is another possession. From where do we know this? Since it is said: “The sanctuary, O lord, which your hands have established” (Exodus 15:17”, And it says: “And He brought them to His holy realm, to the mountain, which His right hand had possessed” (Psalms 78:54).

Whatever the Holy Blessed One created in His world, he created only for His glory, as it is said: “All who are linked to My name, whom I have created, formed and made for My glory” (Isaiah 43:7), And it says: “The Lord shall reign for ever and ever” (Exodus 15:18). Said Rabbi Hananiah ben Akashya: It pleased the Holy Blessed One to grant merit to Israel, that is why He gave them Torah and commandments in abundance, as it is said, “The Lord was pleased for His righteousness, to make Torah great and glorious” (Isaiah 42:21).

Mishnah Horayot

Chapter 1

If a court erroneously issued a ruling permitting the Jewish people to violate one of all the mitzvot that are stated in the Torah, and an individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling, then whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it with them, or whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it after them, or whether the judges did not perform the transgression and he performed it alone, in all these cases the individual is exempt from bringing an offering. This is due to the fact that he associated his action with the ruling of the court. If the court issued a ruling and one of the judges knew that they erred, despite the fact that the majority ruled against his opinion, or if he was a student and he was qualified to issue halakhic rulings, and that judge or student proceeded and performed that transgression on the basis of its ruling, then whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it with them, or whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it after them, or whether the judges did not perform the transgression and he performed it alone, in all these cases, the judge or the student is liable to bring an offering. This is due to the fact that he did not associate his action with the ruling of the court. This is the principle: One who associates his action with himself is liable, and one who associates his action with the ruling of the court is exempt.

In a case where the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling and they discovered that they erred and reversed their decision, whether they brought their atonement offering for their erroneous ruling or whether they did not bring their atonement offering, and an individual who was unaware of the new ruling proceeded and performed a transgression on the basis of their first ruling, Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt from bringing an offering, and Rabbi Elazar says: There is uncertainty with regard to his status and he is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering. Which is the case of uncertainty for which one is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering? If one sat inside his house and performed the transgression he is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering, as he could have learned of the change in the court’s ruling. If he went to a country overseas and is relying on the initial ruling, he is exempt. Rabbi Akiva said: I concede in that case of one who went overseas that he is closer to exemption than he is to liability. Ben Azzai said to him: In what way is this person who went overseas different from one who sits in his house? Rabbi Akiva said to him: The difference is that with regard to one who sits in his house it would have been possible for him to hear of the court’s reversal, but with regard to that person who went overseas, it would not have been possible for him to hear of the court’s reversal.

The mishna explains for which type of unwitting transgression based on the ruling of the court there is liability to bring an offering. In a case where the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling to abolish the entire essence of a mitzva, not only a detail thereof, e.g., they said: There is no prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, or there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, or there is no prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, these judges are exempt, as this is an error based on ignorance, not an erroneous ruling. If the judges issued a ruling to nullify part of a mitzva and to sustain part of that mitzva, these judges are liable. How so? An example of this is if the judges said: There is a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge is exempt. When the woman sees a discharge of blood for one or two days during the eleven days between the end of one menstrual period and the expected start of another, the blood is assumed to not be menstrual blood. If after the second day, the next day passes without any discharge of blood, she may immerse immediately and she is ritually pure. The judges ruled erroneously that it is permitted to engage in intercourse with her on the day that she is observing a clean day, even without the day having passed and her having immersed. Another example is if they said: There is a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, but one who carries out objects from the private domain to the public domain is exempt. Another example is if they said: There is a prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, but one who bows to the idol but does not sacrifice an offering is exempt. In all of these cases, these judges are liable, as it is stated: “And the matter is hidden” (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is derived that there is liability only if a matter, a single detail, is hidden, but not if the entire essence of a mitzva is hidden.

If the court issued a ruling, and one of the judges knew that they erred and he said to them: You are mistaken; or if the most distinguished [ mufla ] member of the court was not there for that session of the Sanhedrin, or if one of the judges was disqualified from serving as a judge, e.g., because he was a convert, or a child born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [ mamzer ], or a Gibeonite, or an old man no longer able to father children, this court is exempt, because they have not rendered a full-fledged ruling. This is derived by means of a verbal analogy, as “assembly” is stated here with regard to a court that issues an erroneous ruling: “And if the entire assembly of Israel shall act unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:13), and “assembly” is stated there with regard to the halakha of one who commits murder unwittingly: “And the assembly shall judge between the one who struck and the blood redeemer” (Numbers 35:24). Just as in the “assembly” stated there, with regard to the unwitting murderer, all the judges must be fit to issue rulings, so too, in the “assembly” stated here, with regard to the court that issued an erroneous ruling; the court will not be liable unless all the judges will be fit to issue rulings. If the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling unwittingly and the entire congregation performed a transgression unwittingly on the basis of their ruling, the court brings a bull, as it is stated in the Torah with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering. If the court issued the erroneous ruling intentionally, as they knew that their ruling was incorrect, and the congregation performed a transgression unwittingly on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the congregation brings a female lamb or a female goat as an individual sin-offering. If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally, i.e., with the knowledge that the ruling of the court was erroneous, these people are exempt from bringing an offering.

If the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling and the entire congregation or a majority thereof performed a transgression on the basis of their ruling, the judges bring a bull as an unwitting communal sin-offering. And if the erroneous ruling involved idol worship, the judges bring a bull and a goat, as it is written in the Torah (see Numbers 15:24); this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not the court that brings the offering, it is the people. Twelve tribes, each of which performed a transgression, bring twelve bulls, i.e., each tribe brings one, and for idol worship they bring twelve bulls and twelve goats, as each tribe is a congregation. Rabbi Shimon says: They bring thirteen bulls; and for idol worship they bring thirteen bulls and thirteen goats, a bull and a goat for each and every tribe and a bull and a goat for the court. The mishna continues: If the judges of the court issued a ruling, and at least seven tribes, or a majority of each of those tribes, performed a transgression on the basis of their ruling, the judges bring a bull; and for idol worship they bring a bull and a goat. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The seven tribes that sinned bring seven bulls, i.e., each tribe brings one bull, and each of the rest of the tribes, i.e., those that did not sin, brings one bull on the basis of the sin of the other tribes, as even those who did not sin bring an offering on the basis of the actions of the sinners. Rabbi Shimon says: When seven tribes sin eight bulls are brought as offerings, one bull for each and every tribe and one bull for the court. And for idol worship, eight bulls and eight goats are brought, one bull and one goat for each and every tribe and one bull and one goat for the court. If the court of one of the tribes issued a ruling and the majority of that tribe performed a transgression on the basis of its ruling, that tribe is liable to bring an offering and the rest of all the tribes are exempt; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: One is liable to bring an offering for an unwitting communal sin only for rulings of the High Court alone, as it is stated: “And if the entire assembly of Israel shall act unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is derived that there is liability only for a ruling of the assembly, i.e., the court, of the entire people, but not for a ruling of the assembly of that particular tribe.

Chapter 2

In a case where an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, issued an erroneous ruling for himself permitting performance of an action prohibited by Torah law, if he issued the ruling unwittingly and then unwittingly performed the transgression in accordance with his ruling, he is liable to bring a bull as a sin-offering for an unwitting transgression by the anointed priest. If he issued the ruling unwittingly, and performed the transgression intentionally, or if he issued the ruling intentionally and performed the transgression unwittingly, he is exempt from liability to bring any offering, as there is a principle: The legal status of the ruling of an anointed priest for himself is like that of the ruling of the court for the general public. Therefore, the High Priest is liable to bring the bull as a sin-offering for his unwitting transgression in a case when the court would be liable to bring the bull as a communal sin-offering for an unwitting transgression performed by the general public.

If the anointed priest issued a ruling by himself and performed a transgression by himself, he achieves atonement by himself by bringing a bull as his sin-offering. If he issued a ruling with the general public, i.e., the Sanhedrin, and performed a transgression with the general public, i.e., the Jewish people, he achieves atonement with the general public. As, the court is not liable unless the judges issue a ruling to nullify part of a commandment and to sustain part of that commandment, and likewise with regard to the ruling of the anointed priest. And the court and the priest are not liable for a ruling with regard to idol worship unless they issue a ruling to nullify part of that commandment and to sustain part of it.

The court is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of the action by the general public on the basis of that ruling. And likewise, the anointed priest is liable only for an erroneous ruling and his unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling. And the court and the priest are liable for a ruling with regard to idol worship only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of the action on the basis of that ruling. The court is not liable to bring an offering for absence of awareness of the matter unless they issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. And likewise the anointed priest is liable only for such a ruling. Neither is the court liable to bring a sin-offering for idol worship unless the judges issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

The court is not liable to bring a bull as an unwitting communal sin-offering for issuing a ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or a prohibition related to the defiling of the Temple by one being there while ritually impure, or the defiling of its sacrificial foods by one partaking of them while ritually impure. There is a positive mitzva to remove impure people from the Temple, and there is a prohibition against entering the Temple while in a state of ritual impurity. And one does not bring a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or a prohibition related to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. But the court is liable to bring a bull for a positive mitzva or for a prohibition that is related to a menstruating woman, and one brings a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or for a prohibition that is related to a menstruating woman. What is the positive mitzva that is related to a menstruating woman? Distance yourself from the menstruating woman. If a man engages in intercourse with a woman and she begins menstruating, he is required to separate from her. And what is the prohibition? Do not engage in intercourse with a woman whom you know is a menstruating woman.

The court is not liable for issuing a ruling with regard to hearing of a voice, i.e., a false oath of testimony taken by a witness who refuses to testify on behalf of a litigant who demands that he testify, or for an utterance of the lips, i.e., a false oath stated about some matter, or for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. And the status of the king is like that of the court, and he is exempt from bringing an offering in those cases; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: The king is liable in all of those cases except for the case of hearing of a voice, and even in that case, his exemption is not intrinsic to the mitzva. Rather, it is for technical reasons, as the king neither judges others nor do others judge him; he does not testify nor do others testify against him. Therefore, a demand that he testify is not applicable.

In summation: For all mitzvot that are in the Torah for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, the individual brings a ewe or female goat for their unwitting transgression, and the king brings a male goat for their unwitting transgression, and an anointed priest and a court who issued an erroneous ruling bring a bull. And for unwittingly engaging in idol worship, the individual, and the king, and the anointed priest bring a female goat, and the court brings a bull and a goat: A bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering.

With regard to a provisional guilt-offering, the individual and the king are liable, and an anointed priest and a court are exempt. With regard to a definite guilt-offering, the individual, the king, and the anointed priest are liable, and a court is exempt. For hearing of a voice, i.e., a false oath of testimony, and for a false oath on an utterance of the lips, and for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, a court is exempt, and the individual, the king, and the anointed priest are liable. But an anointed High Priest is not liable for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. And what offering are they liable to bring? It is a sliding-scale offering based on their financial circumstances, as delineated in the Torah (see Leviticus 5:1–13). Rabbi Elazar says: The king brings a goat.

Chapter 3

In the case of an anointed priest who sinned on the basis of his own erroneous halakhic ruling and thereafter moved on from his anointment, e.g., if he was disqualified due to a blemish that befell him before he brought his sin-offering, and likewise in the case of a king [ nasi ] who sinned and thereafter moved on from his prominence before he had brought an offering, an anointed priest brings a bull despite the fact that he is no longer the High Priest, and the king brings a goat, as he would have done during his reign.

In the case of an anointed priest who moved on from his anointment and thereafter sinned, and likewise the king who moved on from his prominence and thereafter sinned, an anointed priest brings a bull, which he would have brought while he was High Priest, and the status of the king is like that of a commoner [ kehedyot ].

If a king or High Priest sinned before they were appointed, and thereafter they were appointed, the status of these people is like that of commoners; they bring the sin-offering of an individual. Rabbi Shimon says: If it became known to them, before they were appointed as king or High Priest, that they had sinned, they are liable to bring the sin-offering of an individual, but if it became known to them after they were appointed as king or High Priest they are completely exempt. Who is the nasi? This is a king, as it is stated: “When a nasi sins, and performs any one of all the mitzvot of the Lord his God that shall not be performed, unwittingly, and he is guilty” (Leviticus 4:22), referring to one who has only the Lord his God over him and no other authority. That is only the king.

And who is the anointed priest? It is the High Priest who is anointed with the anointing oil, not the High Priest consecrated by donning multiple garments, i.e., one who served after the anointing oil had been sequestered, toward the end of the First Temple period. The difference between a High Priest anointed with the anointing oil and one consecrated by donning multiple garments unique to the High Priest is only that the latter does not bring the bull that comes for the transgression of any of the mitzvot. And the difference between a High Priest currently serving in that capacity and a former High Priest who had temporarily filled that position while the High Priest was unfit for service is only with regard to the bull brought by the High Priest on Yom Kippur and the tenth of an ephah meal-offering brought by the High Priest daily. Each of these offerings is brought only by the current High Priest, and not by a former High Priest. Both this High Priest currently serving and that former High Priest are equal with regard to performing the rest of the Yom Kippur service, and they are both commanded with regard to marrying a virgin (see Leviticus 21:13), and it is prohibited for both to marry a widow (see Leviticus 21:14), and they may not render themselves impure with impurity imparted by a corpse even in the event that one of their relatives dies (see Leviticus 21:11), and they may not grow their hair long and they may not rend their garments as expressions of mourning (see Leviticus 21:10), and when they die they restore the unwitting murderer to his home from the city of refuge (see Numbers 35:25).

A High Priest rends his garments from below when he is in mourning, and an ordinary priest rends his garments from above like a non-priest. A High Priest sacrifices offerings as an acute mourner, i.e., on the day of the death of one of his close relatives, but he may not eat from those offerings. And an ordinary priest who is an acute mourner neither sacrifices offerings nor eats from those offerings.

Any mitzva that is more frequent than another mitzva precedes that other mitzva if the opportunity to fulfill one of them coincides with an opportunity to fulfill the other. And anyone who is more sanctified than another precedes that other person. If the bull of the anointed priest and the bull of the congregation, which are brought for absence of awareness of the matter, are pending, the bull of the anointed priest precedes the bull of the congregation in all its actions, i.e., its sacrificial rites.

The man precedes the woman when there is uncertainty with regard to which of them to rescue or to return a lost item to first. And the woman precedes the man with regard to which of them to provide with a garment first, because her humiliation is great, or to release from captivity first, due to the concern that she will be raped. When they are both subject to degradation, i.e., there is also concern that the man will be raped in captivity, the release of the man precedes the release of the woman.

A priest precedes a Levite. A Levite precedes an Israelite. An Israelite precedes a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [ mamzer ], and a mamzer precedes a Gibeonite, and a Gibeonite precedes a convert, and a convert precedes an emancipated slave. When do these halakhot of precedence take effect? In circumstances when they are all equal in terms of wisdom. But if there were a mamzer who is a Torah scholar and a High Priest who is an ignoramus, a mamzer who is a Torah scholar precedes a High Priest who is an ignoramus, as Torah wisdom surpasses all else.

Mishnah Zevachim

Chapter 1

All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their own sake, i.e., during the slaughtering the slaughterer’s intent was to sacrifice a different offering, are fit, and one may continue their sacrificial rites and partake of their meat where that applies. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who is therefore required to bring another offering. This is the halakha with regard to all offerings except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. In those cases, if the owner sacrificed them not for their own sake, they are unfit. But there is a difference between the two exceptions. The Paschal offering is unfit only when sacrificed not for its sake at its appointed time, on the fourteenth day of Nisan after noon, while the sin offering is unfit any time that it is sacrificed not for its sake. Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. According to his opinion, the correct reading of the mishna is: The Paschal offering is unfit only at its appointed time, while the sin offering and the guilt offering are unfit at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said in explanation: The sin offering is brought for performance of a transgression and the guilt offering is brought for performance of a transgression. Just as a sin offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake, so too, the guilt offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.

Yosei ben Ḥoni says: Not only are the Paschal offering and the sin offering unfit when slaughtered not for their sake, but also other offerings that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a sin offering are unfit. Shimon, brother of Azarya, says that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is greater than theirs, they are fit; if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is less than theirs, they are unfit. How so? Offerings of the most sacred order, e.g., sin offerings and burnt offerings, that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, e.g., peace offerings, are unfit. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit. Likewise, there is a distinction between different offerings of lesser sanctity. The firstborn animal and the animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering are fit, as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn animal or for the sake of an animal tithe are unfit.

With regard to the Paschal offering that one slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth of Nisan, the day when the Paschal offering should be slaughtered in the afternoon, if he did so not for its sake, Rabbi Yehoshua deems it fit as though it were slaughtered on the thirteenth of Nisan. An animal consecrated as a Paschal offering that was slaughtered not at its designated time for the sake of a different offering is fit for sacrifice as a peace offering. Ben Beteira deems it unfit as though it were slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth. Shimon ben Azzai said: I received a tradition from seventy-two elders, as the Sanhedrin deliberated and decided on the day that they installed Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya at the head of the yeshiva and ruled that all the slaughtered offerings that are eaten that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. Based on that version, ben Azzai added to the halakha cited in the first mishna only the burnt offering, which is not eaten, and the Rabbis disagreed and did not concede to him.

With regard to the Paschal offering and the sin offering, where one slaughtered them not for their sake, or where he collected their blood in a vessel, conveyed this blood to the altar, or sprinkled this blood on the altar not for their sake, or where he performed one of these sacrificial rites for their sake and not for their sake, or not for their sake and for their sake, in all these cases the offerings are unfit. How are these rites performed for their sake and not for their sake? In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a peace offering. How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and for the sake of a Paschal offering. The offering is unfit because a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent in four matters: In the performance of the sacrificial rites of slaughtering the animal, in collecting the blood, in conveying the blood, and in sprinkling the blood. Rabbi Shimon deems the offering fit if the prohibited intent was during the rite of conveying the blood, as he would say: It is impossible to sacrifice an offering without slaughtering the animal, or without collection of the blood, or without sprinkling the blood, but it is possible to sacrifice an offering without conveying the blood to the altar. How so? If one slaughters the animal alongside the altar and sprinkles the blood, the blood does not need to be conveyed. Therefore, the rite of conveying the blood is not significant enough to cause the offering to be disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing it. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to one who conveys the blood in a situation where he is required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it disqualifies the offering. If he conveys the blood in a situation where he is not required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it does not disqualify the offering.

Chapter 2

With regard to all slaughtered offerings, if the one who collected their blood was a non-priest; or a priest who was an acute mourner, i.e., one whose relative has died and has not yet been buried; or one who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed; or one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, e.g., a zav or leper after the seventh day of the purification process; or a priest lacking the requisite priestly vestments; or one who did not wash his hands and feet from the water in the Basin prior to performing the Temple service; or an uncircumcised priest; or a ritually impure priest; or if the one who collected the blood was sitting; or if he was standing not on the floor of the Temple but upon vessels, or upon an animal, or upon the feet of another, he has disqualified the offering. If he collected the blood with his left hand, he disqualified the blood for offering. In this last case, Rabbi Shimon deems it fit. If the blood spilled on the floor before the priest managed to collect it into a vessel, and the priest then collected it from the floor into a vessel, it is disqualified. If the priest placed the blood upon the ramp leading up to the altar, or if he placed it on the wall of the altar in an area that is not opposite the base of the altar, i.e., in those parts of the altar where there is no foundation; or if he placed the blood that is to be placed below the red line that runs along the middle of the altar, e.g., the blood of a burnt offering, above the red line, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed above the red line, e.g., the blood of a sin offering, below the red line; or if he placed the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary, i.e., on the golden altar or in the Holy of Holies, outside the Sanctuary on the external altar, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary, in all these cases the offering is disqualified. Nevertheless, there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of these offerings.

With regard to one who slaughters the offering with intent to sprinkle its blood outside the Temple or to sprinkle part of its blood outside the Temple, to burn its sacrificial portions outside the Temple or to burn part of its sacrificial portions outside the Temple, to partake of its meat outside the Temple or to partake of an olive-bulk of its meat outside the Temple, or to partake of an olive-bulk of the skin of the tail outside the Temple, in all of these cases the offering is disqualified, and there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of it. But if one had intent to sprinkle its blood the next day or part of its blood the next day, to burn its sacrificial portions the next day or to burn part of its sacrificial portions the next day, to partake of its meat the next day or to partake of an olive-bulk of its meat the next day, or to partake of an olive-bulk of the skin of the tail the next day, the offering is piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it.

This is the principle: With regard to anyone who slaughters the animal, or who collects the blood, or who conveys the blood, or who sprinkles the blood, with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, e.g., the meat of the offering, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, if his intent was to partake of or to burn the measure of an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it, provided that the permitting factor, the blood, is sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.

How is the permitting factor sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one slaughtered the animal in silence with no specific intent, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered it with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood in silence; or if one slaughtered the animal and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, that is the case where one sacrifices the permitting factor in accordance with its mitzva. How is the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one slaughtered the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time, and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area; or if one slaughtered the animal and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area, these are cases in which the permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with the mitzva. Similarly, in the case of the Paschal offering and the sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake, and one collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered the Paschal offering or sin offering with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood not for their sake; or that one slaughtered the Paschal offering or sin offering and collected and conveyed and sprinkled their blood not for their sake, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.

If one performed one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to eat an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. Rabbi Yehuda said that this is the principle: In any case where the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for burning or partaking of it. And if the intent with regard to the area preceded the intent with regard to the time, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. And the Rabbis say: In both this case and that case, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for karet for burning or partaking of it. If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together.

Chapter 3

With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter of an offering is valid ab initio when performed even by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals. And this is the halakha even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure. Therefore, these unfit individuals can disqualify the offering with prohibited intent, e.g., if one of them intended to partake of the offering beyond its designated time or outside its designated area. And with regard to all of them, in a case where they collected the blood with the intent to offer it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should again collect the blood and sprinkle it on the altar.

If the priest fit for Temple service collected the blood in a vessel and gave the vessel to an unfit person, that person should return it to the fit priest. If the priest collected the blood in a vessel in his right hand and moved it to his left hand, he should return it to his right hand. If the priest collected the blood in a sacred vessel and placed it in a non-sacred vessel, he should return the blood to a sacred vessel. If the blood spilled from the vessel onto the floor and he gathered it from the floor, it is valid. If an unfit person placed the blood upon the ramp or on the wall of the altar that is not opposite the base of the altar, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary outside the Sanctuary or the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary, then if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should again collect the blood and sprinkle it on the altar.

In the case of one who slaughters an offering with the intent to eat, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, e.g., the portions of the offering consumed on the altar, or with the intent to burn, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, e.g., the meat of the offering, the offering is fit, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit. One who slaughters an offering with the intent to eat, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does partake of it, or with the intent to burn, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does burn it on the altar, but his intent was to partake or burn less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit. If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is fit, because eating and burning do not join together.

In the case of one who slaughters an offering with the intent to eat, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an olive-bulk from the hide, or from the gravy, or from the spices that amass at the bottom of the pot together with small amounts of meat, or from a tendon in the neck, or from the bones, or from the tendons, or from the horns, or from the hooves, the offering is fit and one is not liable to receive karet for it, neither due to the prohibition of piggul, if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to partake of the offering beyond its designated time, nor due to the prohibition of leftover meat beyond the designated time, nor due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure.

In the case of one who slaughters sacrificial female animals with the intent to eat the fetus of those animals or their placenta outside the designated area, he has not rendered the offering piggul. Likewise, in the case of one who pinches doves, i.e., slaughters them for sacrifice by cutting the napes of their necks with his fingernail, with the intent to eat their eggs that are still in their bodies outside the designated area, he has not rendered the offering piggul. This is because the fetus, the placenta, and the eggs are not considered part of the body of the animal or the bird. For the same reason, one who consumes the milk of sacrificial female animals or the eggs of doves is not liable to receive karet for it, neither due to the prohibition of piggul, nor due to the prohibition of notar, nor due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure.

If one slaughters the animal in order to leave its blood or its sacrificial portions for the next day, or to remove them outside the designated area, but not in order to sacrifice them the next day, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. In the case of one who slaughters the animal in order to place the blood upon the ramp or on the wall of the altar that is not opposite the base of the altar, or in order to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, or the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary outside the Sanctuary, or the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary; and likewise, if he slaughtered the animal with the intent that ritually impure people will partake of it, or that ritually impure people will sacrifice it, or that uncircumcised people will partake of it, or that uncircumcised people will sacrifice it; and likewise, with regard to the Paschal offering, if he had intent during the slaughter to break the bones of the Paschal offering, or to eat from the meat of the Paschal offering partially roasted, or to mix the blood of an offering with the blood of unfit offerings, in all these cases, although he intended to perform one of these prohibited acts, some of which would render the offering unfit, the offering is fit. The reason is that intent does not render the offering unfit except in cases of intent to eat or to burn the offering beyond its designated time and outside its designated area, and in addition, the Paschal offering and the sin offering are disqualified by intent to sacrifice them not for their sake.

Chapter 4

Beit Shammai say: With regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar, even those that require that the blood be sprinkled on two opposite corners of the altar so that it will run down each of its four sides, in a case where the priest placed the blood on the altar with only one placement, he facilitated atonement. And in the case of a sin offering, which requires four placements, one on each of the four corners of the altar, at least two placements are necessary to facilitate atonement. And Beit Hillel say: Even with regard to a sin offering, in a case where the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement after the fact. Therefore, since the priest facilitates atonement with one placement in all cases other than a sin offering according to Beit Shammai, and even in the case of a sin offering according to Beit Hillel, if he placed the first placement in its proper manner, and the second with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, he facilitated atonement. Since the second placement is not indispensable with regard to achieving atonement, improper intent while performing that rite does not invalidate the offering. And based on the same reasoning, if he placed the first placement with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time and he placed the second placement with the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area, the second of which does not render an offering piggul, the offering is piggul, an offering disqualified by improper intention, and one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [ karet ] for its consumption. This is because the intent that accompanied the second placement does not supersede the piggul status of the offering.

All this applies to those offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar. But with regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the inner altar, if the priest omitted even one of the placements, it is as though he did not facilitate atonement. Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner, and one placement in an improper manner, i.e., with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is disqualified, as it is lacking one placement; but there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of the offering, as the improper intention related to only part of the blood that renders the offering permitted for consumption, and an offering becomes piggul only when the improper intention relates to the entire portion of the offering that renders it permitted for consumption.

And these are the items for which one is not liable to receive karet due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. One is liable to receive karet only if he partakes of an item that was permitted for consumption or for the altar by another item. As for the items listed here, either nothing else renders them permitted for consumption or for the altar, or they themselves render other items permitted. They are as follows: The handful of flour, which permits consumption of the meal offering; the incense, which is burned in its entirety, without another item rendering it permitted for the altar; the frankincense, which is burned together with the handful of the meal offering; the meal offering of priests, from which no handful of flour is removed and which is burned in its entirety (see Leviticus 6:16); the meal offering of the anointed priest, which is sacrificed by the High Priest each day, half in the morning and half in the evening; the blood, which permits all the offerings; and the libations that are brought by themselves as a separate offering and do not accompany an animal offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The same halakha applies even with regard to libations that are brought with an animal offering. With regard to the log of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper, Rabbi Shimon says: One is not liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, because it is not permitted by any other item. And Rabbi Meir says: One is liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, as the blood of the guilt offering of the leper permits its use, as only after the blood’s sacrifice is the oil sprinkled and given to the priests. And the principle is: With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul.

The mishna elaborates: The burnt offering, its blood permits its flesh to be burned on the altar and its hide to be used by the priests. The bird burnt offering, its blood permits its flesh and its skin to be burned on the altar. The bird sin offering, its blood permits its meat for consumption by the priests. Bulls that are burned, e.g., the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and goats that are burned, e.g., the goats sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, their blood permits their sacrificial portions to be sacrificed on the altar. Rabbi Shimon says: Those bulls and goats are not subject to piggul because their blood is presented in the Sanctuary, and in the case of any offering whose blood is not presented on the external altar like that of a peace offering, with regard to which the halakha of piggul was stated in the Torah, one is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul.

With regard to offerings consecrated by gentiles for sacrifice to God, one is not liable for eating them, neither due to violation of the prohibition of piggul if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, nor due to violation of the prohibition of notar, nor due to violation of the prohibition against eating the meat while ritually impure. And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is exempt; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yosei deems him liable. Even with regard to those items enumerated in the previous mishna (42b) for which one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, e.g., the handful, the frankincense, and the incense, one is, nevertheless, liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of notar, and due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure, except for the blood. Rabbi Shimon deems one liable for an item whose typical manner is such that one eats it. But with regard to the wood, the frankincense, and the incense, one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition against eating a consecrated item while ritually impure.

The slaughtered offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters, and one must have all of these matters in mind: For the sake of the particular type of offering being sacrificed; for the sake of the one who sacrifices the offering; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of the aroma; for the sake of the pleasing of God, i.e., in fulfillment of God’s will; and, in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, for the sake of atonement for the sin. Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is valid, as it is a stipulation of the court that he should not state any intent ab initio. This is necessary because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite, and therefore if the one who slaughters the animal is not careful and states the wrong intent, the offering would be disqualified through his improper intent.

Chapter 5

What is the location of the slaughtering and consumption of offerings? The principle is that with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard. Specifically, with regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter is in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the staves of the Ark in the Holy of Holies, and upon the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and on the golden altar. Concerning all those sprinklings, failure to perform even one placement of their blood disqualifies the offering. As to the remainder of the blood, which is left after those sprinklings, a priest would pour it onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does not disqualify the offering.

With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard, and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling upon the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and upon the golden altar, and failure to perform even one placement of their blood disqualifies the offering. As for the remainder of the blood that is left after those sprinklings, a priest would pour it onto the western base of the external altar, but if he did not pour the remainder it does not disqualify the offering. These, the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, and those, the bulls and the goats that are burned, are then burned in the place of the ashes, a place outside of Jerusalem where the priests would bring the ashes from the altar.

These are the halakhot of the communal and the individual sin offerings. These are the communal sin offerings: Goats of the New Moon and of the Festivals. Their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard, and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires four placements on the four corners of the altar. How did the priest do so? He ascended the ramp of the altar and turned right to the surrounding ledge and he continued east, and he came to the southeast corner and sprinkled the blood of the sin offering there and then to the northeast corner and sprinkled the blood there, and then to the northwest corner and sprinkled the blood there, and the southwest corner, where he performed the fourth sprinkling and descended from the altar. He would pour the remainder of the blood on the southern base of the altar. And the meat portions of the offering are eaten within the curtains, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, by the males of the priesthood. And they are eaten prepared in any form of food preparation, on the day the offering is sacrificed and during the night that follows, until midnight.

The burnt offering is an offering of the most sacred order. Its slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard and the collection of its blood in a service vessel is in the north, and its blood requires two placements that are four, and it requires flaying of its carcass and the cutting of the sacrificial animal into pieces, and it is consumed in its entirety, with the exception of its hide, by the fire of the altar.

These are the halakhot of communal peace offerings and guilt offerings. These are guilt offerings: The guilt offering for robbery, brought by one from whom another demanded payment of a debt and he denied it and took a false oath (see Leviticus 5:20–26); the guilt offering for unwitting misuse of consecrated property (see Leviticus 5:14–16); the guilt offering of an espoused maidservant, brought by one who engaged in sexual intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave (see Leviticus 19:20–22); the guilt offering of a nazirite who became impure via contact with a corpse (see Numbers 6:12); the guilt offering of a leper, brought for his purification (see Leviticus 14:12); and the provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering (see Leviticus 5:17–18). Concerning all of these, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard and collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires two placements that are four. And the meat portions of the offering are eaten within the curtains, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, by male priests. And they are eaten prepared in any manner of food preparation, on the day the offering was sacrificed and during the night that follows, until midnight.

The thanks offering and nazirite’s ram are offerings of lesser sanctity. Their slaughter is anywhere in the Temple courtyard, and their blood requires two placements that are four, and they are eaten throughout the city of Jerusalem, by every person, i.e., any ritually pure Jew, prepared in any manner of food preparation, on the day the offering was sacrificed and during the night that follows, until midnight. The status of the portion that is separated from them and given to the priests is similar to theirs; but the portion that is separated is eaten by the priests, by their wives, and by their children, and by their slaves.

Peace offerings are offerings of lesser sanctity. Their slaughter is anywhere in the Temple courtyard, and their blood requires two placements that are four, and they are eaten throughout the city of Jerusalem, by every person, i.e., any ritually pure Jew, prepared in any manner of food preparation, for two days and one night, i.e., the day on which they are slaughtered, the following day, and the intervening night. The status of the portion that is separated from them and given to the priests is similar to theirs; but the portion that is separated is eaten by the priests, by their wives, and by their children, and by their slaves.

The firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, and the Paschal offering are offerings of lesser sanctity. Their slaughter is anywhere in the Temple courtyard, and their blood requires one placement, provided that the priest places it so that the blood goes on the base of the altar. The halakha differs with regard to their consumption. The firstborn offering is eaten by the priests, and the animal tithe offer-ing is eaten by any person, i.e., any ritually pure Jew. And they are eaten throughout the city of Jerusalem, prepared in any manner of food preparation, for two days and one night. The Paschal offering is eaten only at night, and it is eaten only until midnight, and it is eaten only by its registrants, i.e., those who registered in advance to partake of the offering, and it is eaten only roasted, not prepared in any other manner.

Chapter 6

It was taught in the previous chapter that offerings of the most sacred order are to be slaughtered in the northern section of the Temple courtyard. With regard to offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered atop the altar, Rabbi Yosei says: Their status is as though they were slaughtered in the north, and the offerings are therefore valid. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: The status of the area from the halfway point of the altar and to the south is like that of the south, and offerings of the most sacred order slaughtered in that area are therefore disqualified. The status of the area from the halfway point of the altar and to the north is like that of the north. Handfuls were removed from the meal offerings in any place in the Temple courtyard and were consumed within the area enclosed by the curtains by males of the priesthood, prepared in any form of food preparation that he chooses, e.g., roasted or boiled, for one day and night, until midnight.

The sacrificial rite of a bird sin offering would be performed at the southwest corner of the altar. And if its sacrificial rite was performed in any place on the altar, the offering was deemed valid; but that corner was its designated place. And there were three matters for which the portion of that corner below the red line that served as the demarcation between the upper and lower portions of the altar served as the proper location, and there were three matters for which the portion of that corner above the red line served as their proper location. The following rites were performed below the red line: Sacrificing a bird sin offering, and bringing meal offerings near the altar before removal of the handful, and pouring out the remaining blood. And the following rites were performed above the red line: The wine libation that is brought together with animal offerings or as an offering by itself, and the water libation on the festival of Sukkot, and sacrificing a bird burnt offering when they were numerous and it was impossible to perform the rite in the east, i.e., the southeastern corner where the bird burnt offering was sacrificed.

All those who ascend the ramp to the altar ascend via the right side of the ramp toward the southeast corner and circle the altar until reaching the southwest corner and descend via the left side of the ramp, except for one who ascends for one of these three matters, where they would ascend directly to the southwest corner of the altar, and descend by turning on their heels and retracing the path by which they ascended rather than circling the altar.

The sacrifice of the bird sin offering, how was it performed? The priest would pinch off the bird’s head by cutting opposite its nape with his thumbnail and would not separate the bird’s head from its body. And he sprinkles from its blood on the wall of the altar below the red line. The remaining blood would be squeezed out from the body of the bird on the base of the altar. The altar has only its blood and the entire bird goes to the priests for consumption.

The sacrifice of the bird burnt offering, how was it performed? The priest ascended the ramp and turned to the surrounding ledge and came to the southeast corner of the altar. He would then pinch off the bird’s head by cutting at its nape with his thumbnail and separate the bird’s head from its body, and would squeeze out its blood on the wall of the altar. He took the head and neared the place of its pinching, i.e., its nape, to the altar in order to squeeze the blood from the head. He would then absorb the remaining blood with salt and throw the head onto the fire on the altar. He then arrived at the body and removed the crop and the feather attached to it and the innards that emerge with them and he tossed them to the place of the ashes. He then ripped the bird lengthwise and did not separate the two halves of the bird; but if he separated them, the offering is valid. He would then absorb the remaining blood with salt and throw the body of the bird onto the fire on the altar.

If he neither removed the crop, nor the feather and the innards that emerge with them, nor absorbed the blood with salt, with regard to any detail that he changed in the sacrificial rites after he squeezed out its blood, the offering is valid. If he separated the head from the body in sacrificing the sin offering, or if he did not separate the head from the body in sacrificing the burnt offering, the offering is disqualified. In a case where he squeezed out the blood of the head and did not squeeze out the blood of the body, it is disqualified. If he squeezed out the blood of the body and did not squeeze out the blood of the head, the offering is valid.

In the case of a bird sin offering that the priest pinched not for its sake, or if he squeezed out its blood not for its sake, or if he did so for its sake and then not for its sake, or not for its sake and then for its sake, it is disqualified, like all other sin offerings that are disqualified when performed not for their sake (see 2a). A bird burnt offering sacrificed not for its sake is valid; it is just that it did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. With regard to both a bird sin offering and a bird burnt offering where the priest pinched its nape or squeezed out its blood with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified. But there is no liability to receive karet for one who partakes of the offering. If his intent was to eat it or burn it beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for partaking of the offering, provided that the permitting factor, the blood, was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva. How is the permitting factor sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one pinched the nape in silence, i.e., with no disqualifying intent, and squeezed out its blood with the intent to partake of the parts typically eaten or to burn the portions that are to be burned on the altar, beyond its designated time; or in the case of one who pinched with the intent to partake of the offering or burn it on the altar beyond its designated time, and squeezed out its blood in silence; or in the case of one who pinched and squeezed out the blood with the intent to partake of the offering or burn it on the altar beyond its designated time, that is the case of a bird offering where the permitting factor is sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva. How is the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If the priest pinched the nape of the bird with the intent to partake of it or burn it outside its designated area and squeezed out its blood with the intent to partake of it or burn it beyond its designated time, or he pinched with the intent to partake of it or burn it beyond its designated time and squeezed out its blood with the intent to partake of it or burn it outside its designated area, or if the priest pinched and squeezed out the blood with the intent to partake of it or burn it outside its designated area, or in the case of a bird sin offering where one pinched its nape not for its sake and squeezed out its blood with the intent of consuming it or burning it beyond its designated time, or in a case where he pinched its nape with the intent to consume it or burn it beyond its designated time and squeezed out its blood not for its sake, or in a case where he pinched its nape and squeezed out its blood not for its sake, that is a case of a bird offering whose permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva. If one pinched the nape of the bird and squeezed out its blood with the intent to eat an olive-bulk of the offering outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified and it does not include liability to receive karet. Rabbi Yehuda disagreed and said that this is the principle: If the improper intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for eating it. And if the intent with regard to the area preceded the intent with regard to the time, the offering is disqualified and it does not include liability to receive karet. And the Rabbis say: In both this case where the intent with regard to time came first and that case where the intent with regard to area came first, the offering is disqualified and it does not include liability to receive karet. If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is valid, because eating and burning do not join together.

Chapter 7

If the priest sacrificed a bird sin offering in its designated place below the red line, and he sacrificed it according to the procedure of a sin offering with pinching, i.e., cutting from the nape with a fingernail, and sprinkling, and he sacrificed it for the sake of a sin offering, the offering is fit. This is the manner in which a priest is to sacrifice a sin offering ab initio. If the priest sacrificed the bird sin offering below the red line in the middle of the altar and according to the procedure of a sin offering, but he sacrificed it for the sake of a burnt offering; or if he sacrificed it according to the procedure of a burnt offering, even if he sacrificed it for the sake of a sin offering; or if he sacrificed it according to the procedure of a burnt offering for the sake of a burnt offering; in all these cases the sin offering is disqualified. If one sacrificed a bird sin offering above the red line according to the procedure of any of the offerings, it is disqualified, because he did not sacrifice it in its designated place.

A bird burnt offering that one sacrificed in its designated place above the red line according to the procedure of a burnt offering and for the sake of a burnt offering is fit. This is the manner in which a priest is to sacrifice a burnt offering ab initio. If he sacrificed a bird burnt offering above the red line according to the procedure of the burnt offering but for the sake of a sin offering, the offering is fit, but it did not satisfy the obligation of its owner. If the priest sacrificed a bird burnt offering according to the procedure of a sin offering for the sake of a burnt offering, or according to the procedure of a sin offering for the sake of a sin offering, the offering is disqualified. If he sacrificed it below the red line according to the procedure of any of the offerings, it is disqualified, because he did not sacrifice it in its designated place.

And all of the offerings enumerated in the previous mishna, even those that are disqualified and may not be eaten or sacrificed, still differ from carcasses of unslaughtered kosher birds in that they do not render one who swallows their meat ritually impure when the meat is in the throat. This is because the pinching of the napes of bird offerings, like the slaughter of animals, prevents them from assuming the status of a carcass. But nevertheless, since they are forbidden to the priests, one who derives benefit from any of them is liable for misusing consecrated property. This is the halakha in all cases except for the bird sin offering that one sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of the sin offering and for the sake of a sin offering. Since it was sacrificed properly and it is permitted for priests to partake of a fit sin offering, there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property.

In the case of a bird burnt offering that one improperly sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of the sin offering, and one did so for the sake of a sin offering, Rabbi Eliezer says: One who derives benefit from it is liable for misusing consecrated property, as it remains a burnt offering, whose meat is never permitted to the priests. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One who derives benefit from it is not liable for misusing consecrated property. Since the entire sacrificial process was conducted according to the procedure of a sin offering, the offering assumes the status of a sin offering in this regard. The mishna recounts the dispute between the tanna’im. Rabbi Eliezer said: And if in the case of a sin offering that was sacrificed for its sake, one is not liable for misusing it, and nevertheless, when one changed its designation and sacrificed it not for its sake, one is liable for misusing it, then in the case of a burnt offering, where one is liable for misusing it even when it was sacrificed for its sake, when one changed its designation and sacrificed it not for its sake is it not right that he is liable for misusing it? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, that a fortiori inference is not correct, as if you said with regard to a sin offering for which one changed its designation and sacrificed it for the sake of a burnt offering that there is liability for misuse, this is reasonable, because he changed its designation to an item for which there is liability for misuse. Would you say in the case of a burnt offering for which one changed its designation and sacrificed it for the sake of a sin offering that there is liability for misuse, as in that case he changed its designation to an item for which there is no liability for its misuse? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered in the south of the Temple courtyard and slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, will prove that the fact that one changed the offering’s designation to an item that is not subject to the halakhot of misuse is not a relevant factor. As in this case, one changed their designation to an item that is not subject to the halakhot of misuse and, nevertheless, one is liable for misusing them. You too should not be puzzled about the burnt offering, concerning which even though one changed its designation to an item that is not subject to the halakhot of misuse, the halakha is that one would be liable for misusing it. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, that is no proof, as if you said with regard to offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered in the south of the Temple courtyard, and slaughtered them for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, that one is liable for misusing them, that is reasonable. The reason is that one who slaughtered them changed their designation to an item for which there are both prohibited and permitted elements as offerings of lesser sanctity. Although one is not liable for misuse of their flesh, after the blood is sprinkled one is liable for misuse of the portions consumed on the altar. Would you say the halakha is the same in the case of a burnt offering for which one changed its designation to an item that is permitted in its entirety, i.e., a bird sin offering, which is eaten by the priests and none of it is burned on the altar? With regard to any of those people disqualified from performing the Temple service who pinched the nape of a bird offering, their pinching is not valid, but the offering’s meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat, as would the meat of a kosher bird that was not ritually slaughtered.

If a priest pinched it with the thumbnail of his left hand, or if he pinched it at night, or if he slaughtered a non-sacred bird inside the Temple courtyard or a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard, in all these cases, although it is prohibited to consume these birds, they do not render one ritually impure when they are in the throat, as the halakhic status of pinching is like that of slaughtering. If he pinched with a knife and not with his thumbnail; or if he pinched a non-sacred bird inside the Temple courtyard or a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard; or if he pinched doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not yet arrived, as they are too young to be sacrificed; or if he pinched pigeons whose time of fitness has passed, as they are too old; or if he pinched the nape of a fledgling whose wing was withered, or whose eye was blinded, or whose leg was severed; in all these cases, although the bird’s nape was pinched, it renders one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat. This is the principle: The meat of any bird that was initially fit for sacrifice and whose disqualification occurred in the course of the service in the sacred Temple courtyard does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat. The meat of any bird whose disqualification did not occur in the sacred area, but rather was disqualified before the service began, renders one ritually impure when it is in the throat.

If the priest pinched the nape of the bird’s neck properly and then it was found to be a tereifa, and it was therefore disqualified from being sacrificed and forbidden for consumption by a priest, Rabbi Meir says: An olive-bulk of its meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat, as the pinching prevents it from assuming the status of a carcass. Rabbi Yehuda says: Its status is like any other carcass of an unslaughtered kosher bird, and its meat renders one who swallows it ritually impure. Rabbi Meir said: My opinion can be inferred a fortiori. If an animal carcass transmits impurity to a person through touching it and through carrying it, and nevertheless the slaughter of an animal purifies it, even if it is a tereifa, from its impurity, i.e., its slaughter prevents it from assuming the impurity status of a carcass, then with regard to a bird carcass, which possesses a lesser degree of impurity, as it does not transmit impurity to a person through touching it and through carrying it, but only through swallowing it, is it not logical that its slaughter should purify it, even if it is a tereifa, from its impurity? And once it is established that slaughter renders a bird that is a tereifa pure, it can be inferred that just as we found with regard to its slaughter that it renders a bird fit for consumption and purifies a bird, even if it is a tereifa, from its impurity, so too its pinching, which renders a bird offering fit with regard to consumption, should purify it, even if it is a tereifa, from its impurity. Rabbi Yosei says: Although one can derive from the case of an animal that slaughter renders even a bird that is a tereifa pure, that derivation cannot be extended to pinching. The same restriction that applies to every a fortiori inference, namely, that a halakha derived by means of an a fortiori inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived, applies here: It is sufficient for the halakhic status of the carcass of a bird that is a tereifa to be like that of the carcass of an animal that is a tereifa ; its slaughter renders it pure, but its pinching does not.

Chapter 8

All the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is forbidden, e.g., sin offerings left to die, or with an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, deriving benefit from them all is prohibited and they all must die. If the offerings were intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is forbidden but deriving benefit from them is not, the halakha is different. Examples of this are an ox with which a transgression was performed, which disqualifies it from being sacrificed as an offering, or an ox that is known to have killed a person based on the testimony of one witness or based on the admission of the owner. Had two witnesses testified, deriving benefit from the ox would have been prohibited. Additional examples include when an offering is intermingled with an animal that copulated with a person; or an animal that was the object of bestiality; or with an animal that was set aside for idol worship; or one that was worshipped as a deity; or with an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, as it is written: “You shall not bring the payment of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the house of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19). Additional examples include an offering that was intermingled with an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, e.g., the offspring of a ram and a goat, or with an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ], or with an animal born by caesarean section. In all these cases the animals that are intermingled shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold. And from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them, of the same type of offering that the intermingled offering was. The mishna continues: If sacrificial animals were intermingled with unblemished, non-sacred animals, which, if consecrated, are fit for sacrifice, the non-sacred animals shall be sold for the purpose of purchasing offerings of the same type as the offering with which they were intermingled.

In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with other sacrificial animals, if it was an animal of one type of offering with animals of the same type of offering, one shall sacrifice this animal for the sake of whoever is its owner and one shall sacrifice that animal for the sake of whoever is its owner, and both fulfill their obligation. In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with other sacrificial animals, where an animal of one type of offering was intermingled with animals not of the same type of offering, e.g., two rams, where one is designated as a burnt offering and one as a peace offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold. And from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them as this type of offering, and another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them as that type of offering, and he will lose the additional expense of purchasing two highest-quality animals, when he had sold only one highest-quality animal, from his own assets. In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with a firstborn offering or with an animal tithe offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and they shall both be eaten as a firstborn offering or as an animal tithe offering. All offerings can become indistinguishably intermingled with each other, except for a sin offering and a guilt offering, as the Gemara will explain.

In the case of a guilt offering that was intermingled with a peace offering, Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them should be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, as a guilt offering must be slaughtered in the north while a peace offering may be slaughtered anywhere in the courtyard. And they both must be eaten in accordance with the halakha of the more stringent of them, i.e., the guilt offering, with the following halakhot : They may be eaten only in the courtyard rather than throughout Jerusalem; by male priests and not by any ritually pure Jew; and on the day they were sacrificed and the following night, and not on the day they were sacrificed, the following day, and the intervening night. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: One may not limit the time of the consumption of an offering, as one may not bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness. According to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, the peace offering becomes leftover, notar, the morning after it is sacrificed, and not at the end of that day, as is the halakha concerning peace offerings. Rather, the owner shall wait until these animals become blemished, redeem them, and bring an offering of each type that is worth the monetary value of the higher-quality animal among them. The mishna adds: Even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, if pieces of the meat of one offering were intermingled with pieces of the meat of another offering, e.g., meat from offerings of the most sacred order with meat from offerings of lesser sanctity; or if pieces of meat from offerings eaten for one day and the following night were intermingled with pieces of meat from offerings eaten for two days and one night, since in that case the remedy with regard to offerings that were intermingled cannot be implemented, they both must be eaten in accordance with the halakha of the more stringent of them.

In the case of the limbs of a sin offering, which are eaten by priests and may not be burned on the altar, that were intermingled with the limbs of a burnt offering, which are burned on the altar, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest shall place all the limbs above, on the altar, and I view the flesh of the limbs of the sin offering above on the altar as though they are pieces of wood burned on the altar, and not as though they are an offering. And the Rabbis say: One should wait until the form of all the intermingled limbs decays and they will all go out to the place of burning in the Temple courtyard, where all disqualified offerings of the most sacred order are burned.

In a case where limbs of burnt offerings fit for sacrifice were intermingled with limbs of blemished burnt offerings, Rabbi Eliezer says: Although all the limbs are unfit for sacrifice, if the head of one of them was sacrificed all the heads shall be sacrificed, as the head that was sacrificed is assumed to have been that of the unfit animal in the mixture. Likewise, if one sacrificed the legs of one of them all the legs shall be sacrificed. And the Rabbis say: Even if all the limbs were sacrificed except for one of them, there is a concern that the remaining limb is the unfit limb, which may not be sacrificed. Rather, all of the limbs must go out to the place of burning in the Temple courtyard.

In the case of blood of an offering fit for sacrifice that was mixed with water, if the mixture has the appearance of blood it is fit for sprinkling on the altar, even though the majority of the mixture is water. If the blood was mixed with red wine, one views the wine as though it is water. If that amount of water would leave the mixture with the appearance of blood it is fit for presentation. And likewise if the blood was mixed with the blood of a non-sacred domesticated animal or the blood of a non-sacred undomesticated animal, one considers the non-sacred blood as though it is water. Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, the priest presents the blood of the mixture on the altar.

If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings, there is no remedy. Therefore, the entire mixture shall be poured into the drain running through the Temple courtyard. Likewise, if blood fit for presentation was mixed with blood of exudate, i.e., that exudes from the neck after the initial spurt following its slaughter concludes, which is unfit for presentation, the entire mixture shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. Rabbi Eliezer deems this mixture fit for presentation. Even according to the first tanna, if the priest did not consult the authorities and placed the blood on the altar, the offering is fit.

If the blood of unblemished offerings was mixed with the blood of blemished animals unfit for sacrifice, the entire mixture shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. This is the halakha when the fit and unfit blood were mixed in one vessel. By contrast, if a cup of the blood of a blemished offering was intermingled with cups of blood fit for offering and it is unclear which blood is in the cup, Rabbi Eliezer says: Although it is prohibited to present all the blood due to the uncertainty, if it happened that a priest already sacrificed, i.e., presented, one cup, the blood in all the other cups shall be sacrificed, as the blood that was presented is assumed to have come from the unfit cup in the mixture. And the Rabbis say: Even if the blood in all the cups was sacrificed except for one of them, the remaining blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain.

With regard to blood that is to be placed below the red line circumscribing the altar, e.g., blood of a burnt offering, a guilt offering, or a peace offering, that was mixed with blood that is to be placed above the red line, e.g., blood of a sin offering, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest shall initially place the blood of the mixture above the red line for the sake of the sin offering, and I view the blood that was to be placed below that was in fact placed above as though it is water, and the priest shall again place blood from the mixture below. And the Rabbis say: It shall all be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. Even according to the Rabbis, if the priest did not consult the authorities and placed the blood above the red line, the offering is fit, and he should then place the remaining blood below the red line.

In a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement, e.g., the blood of a firstborn offering with the blood of another firstborn offering or the blood of an animal tithe offering, the blood shall be placed with one placement. In a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements, e.g., the blood of a sin offering with that of another sin offering, or the blood of a burnt offering with that of a peace offering, the blood shall be placed with four placements. If the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements was mixed with the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement, Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood shall be placed with four placements. Rabbi Yehoshua says: The blood shall be placed with one placement, as the priest fulfills the requirement with one placement after the fact. Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: According to your opinion, the priest violates the prohibition of: Do not diminish, as it is written: “All these matters that I command you, that you shall observe to do; you shall not add thereto, nor diminish from it” (Deuteronomy 13:1). One may not diminish the number of required placements from four to one. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: According to your opinion, the priest violates the prohibition of: Do not add, derived from the same verse. One may not add to the one required placement and place four. Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: The prohibition of: Do not add, is stated only in a case where the blood is by itself, not when it is part of a mixture. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: Likewise, the prohibition of: Do not diminish, is stated only in a case where the blood is by itself. And Rabbi Yehoshua also said: When you placed four placements, you transgressed the prohibition of: Do not add, and you performed a direct action. When you did not place four placements but only one, although you transgressed the prohibition of: Do not diminish, you did not perform a direct action. An active transgression is more severe than a passive one.

Blood that is to be placed on three locations inside the Sanctuary, i.e., between the staves, on the Curtain, and on the golden altar, that was mixed with blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary on the external altar in the Temple courtyard, has no remedy, as one may not change the location of the placement of the blood of one to fulfill his obligation with the other type of blood. Therefore, all the blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. If the priest, on his own initiative, placed the mixture of blood outside the Sanctuary and again placed the mixture of blood inside the Sanctuary, the offering is fit. If the priest, on his own initiative, placed the mixture of blood inside the Sanctuary and again placed the mixture of blood outside the Sanctuary, Rabbi Akiva deems the blood placed outside disqualified, and the Rabbis deem it fit. As Rabbi Akiva says: Any blood that is to be presented outside that entered to atone in the Sanctuary is disqualified; but the Rabbis say: That is the halakha with regard to the blood of an external sin offering alone, as it is written: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). Rabbi Eliezer says: The status of a guilt offering is like that of a sin offering as well, as it is stated: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7), i.e., there is one halakha for them. That is not the case with regard to the blood of other offerings.

In the case of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar whose blood the priest collected in two cups, if one of them left the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, the cup that remained inside the courtyard is fit to be presented. If one of the cups entered inside the Sanctuary and was thereby disqualified, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili deems the blood in the cup that remained outside the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, fit to be presented, and the Rabbis deem it disqualified from being presented. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said in support of his opinion: The halakha is that if one slaughters an offering with the intent that its blood be presented outside of the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified, but if his intention was that the blood be presented inside the Sanctuary, the offering is not disqualified. Just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, and yet when some of the blood is taken there it does not render the status of the remaining blood disqualified like that of blood that leaves the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, is it not logical that we will not deem the status of the remaining blood like that of blood that entered the Sanctuary? The mishna continues: If all of the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar entered the Sanctuary to atone through sprinkling, despite the fact that the priest did not actually sprinkle the blood to atone, the offering is disqualified; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Shimon says: The offering is disqualified only when he atones and sprinkles the blood in the Sanctuary. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he took the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit to be presented. With regard to all the blood disqualified for presentation that was placed on the altar, the frontplate effects acceptance only for offerings sacrificed that are ritually impure. Although it is written with regard to the frontplate worn on the forehead of the High Priest: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity committed in the sacred matters” (Exodus 28:38), this does not apply to all disqualifications of offerings. This is because the frontplate effects acceptance for offerings sacri-ficed that are ritually impure but does not effect acceptance for offerings that leave the courtyard.

Chapter 9

Certain unfit items, once they have been placed on the altar, are nevertheless sacrificed. The mishna teaches: The altar sanctifies only items that are suited to it. The tanna’im disagree as to the definition of suited for the altar. Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, e.g., burnt offerings and the sacrificial portions of other offerings, which are burned on the altar, if it ascended upon the altar, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, it shall not descend. Since it was sanctified by its ascent upon the altar, it is sacrificed upon it, as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt offering, which is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend, so too, with regard to any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend. Rabban Gamliel says: With regard to any item that is suited to ascend upon the altar, even if it is not typically consumed, if it ascended, it shall not descend, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar,” from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt offering, which is fit for the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend, so too, any item that is fit for the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend. The mishna comments: The difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is only with regard to disqualified blood and disqualified libations, which are not consumed by the fire but do ascend upon the altar, as Rabban Gamliel says: They shall not descend, as they are fit to ascend upon the altar, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall descend, as they are not burned on the altar. Rabbi Shimon says: Whether the offering was fit and the accompanying libations were unfit, e.g., if they became ritually impure or they were brought outside their designated area, or whether the libations were fit and the offering was unfit, rendering the accompanying libations unfit as well, and even if both this and that were unfit, the offering shall not descend, as it was sanctified by the altar, but the libations shall descend.

These are the items that even if they were disqualified, if they ascended the altar they shall not descend: Blood, sacrificial portions, or limbs of a burnt offering, any of which were left overnight off the altar, or that emerge from the Temple courtyard, or that become ritually impure, or that came from an animal that was slaughtered with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, or an offering that people unfit to perform the Temple service collected and then sprinkled its blood. Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of a sacrificial animal that was slaughtered at night, or one whose blood was spilled on the floor of the Temple without its being collected in a vessel, or one whose blood emerged outside the curtains, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard: Even if it ascended upon the altar it shall descend. Rabbi Shimon says: In all these cases, if it ascended it shall not descend, because its disqualification occurred in sanctity. As Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any unfit offering whose disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., in the course of the Temple service, the sacred area renders the offering acceptable, and if it ascended onto the altar it shall not descend. But with regard to any offering whose disqualification did not occur in sanctity but rather was unfit initially, the sacred area does not render the offering acceptable.

And these are the offerings whose disqualification did not occur in sanctity: An animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality, and an animal that was set aside for idol worship, and an animal that was worshipped as a deity, and an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, and an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, and an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ], and an animal born by caesarean section, and blemished animals. Rabbi Akiva deems blemished animals fit in the sense that if they ascended they shall not descend. Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, says: My father would reject blemished animals from upon the altar.

Concerning those animals that, if they ascended, do not descend, just as if they ascended the altar they shall not descend, so too, if they descended they shall not then ascend. And all of them that if they ascend they do not descend, if they ascended to the top of the altar alive they descend, as an animal is fit for the altar only after it is slaughtered. A burnt offering that ascended to the top of the altar alive shall descend, as one does not slaughter an animal atop the altar ab initio. But if one slaughtered the animal at the top of the altar, he should flay it and cut it into pieces in its place, and it is not removed from the altar.

And these are the items that if they ascended upon the altar they descend, because they are completely unfit for the altar: The meat of offerings of the most sacred order, i.e., a guilt offering and a sin offering, the meat of which is eaten by priests; and the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, which is eaten by the owners; and the surplus of the omer meal offering brought on the second day of Passover after the handful was removed and burned on the altar; and the two loaves meal offering brought on the festival of Shavuot ; and the shewbread; and the remainder of the meal offerings after the handful was removed, which are all eaten by the priests; and the incense that ascended upon the external altar and not the golden altar where it should be burned. With regard to the wool that is on the heads of the sheep brought as burnt offerings, and the hair that is in the beard of goats that were sacrificed, and the bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves: When they are attached to the flesh of the offering they shall ascend upon the altar and be sacrificed with the offering, as it is stated: “And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar” (Leviticus 1:9). If they separated from the flesh of the offering they shall not ascend, as it is stated: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood” (Deuteronomy 12:27), and nothing else.

And all of those disqualified offerings with regard to which it was taught (84a) that if they ascended they do not descend, in a case where they were dislodged from upon the altar, the priest does not restore them to the altar. And likewise, with regard to an ember that was dislodged from upon the altar, the priest does not restore it to the altar. As for limbs of a fit burnt offering that were dislodged from upon the altar, if they were dislodged before midnight, the priest should restore them to the altar and one is liable for misusing them. But if they were dislodged after midnight, the priest does not restore them and one is not liable for misusing them, as one is not liable for misuse of consecrated property after it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was designated.

With regard to unfit items that if they ascended do not descend, just as the altar sanctifies items that are suited to it, so too, the ramp sanctifies items that are suited to it. Just as the altar and the ramp sanctify items that are suited to them, so too, the service vessels sanctify items that are placed in them. The mishna elaborates on the halakha taught in the previous mishna (86a) that service vessels sanctify items placed in them. The service vessels used for liquids sanctify only liquids used in the service, and the service vessels that serve as dry measures sanctify only dry items used in the service. The service vessels used for liquids do not sanctify dry items, and the service vessels used for dry items do not sanctify liquids. With regard to sacred vessels that were perforated, if one continues to utilize them for a use similar to the use for which they would utilize them previously when they were whole, they continue to sanctify their contents. And if not, they do not sanctify their contents. And all of these vessels sanctify items only when they are in the sacred area, i.e., the Temple courtyard.

Chapter 10

Any offering that is more frequent than another precedes the other offering. Therefore, the daily offerings precede the additional offerings, which are sacrificed only on certain days. When Shabbat and the New Moon coincide, the additional Shabbat offerings precede the additional New Moon offerings. Likewise, the additional New Moon offerings precede the additional New Year offerings. The mishna cites the source for the principle that the frequent precedes the less frequent: As it is stated with regard to the additional offerings of the first day of Passover: “Besides the burnt offering of the morning, which is for a daily burnt offering, you shall offer these” (Numbers 28:23). The verse indicates that the daily offering is sacrificed first, and then the additional offerings are sacrificed.

Any offering that is more sacred than another precedes the other offering. The mishna elaborates: If there is blood of a sin offering and blood of a burnt offering to be presented, the blood of the sin offering precedes the blood of the burnt offering because it effects acceptance, i.e., atonement, for severe transgressions punishable by karet. Likewise, if there are limbs of a burnt offering and portions of a sin offering to be burned on the altar, the burning of the limbs of the burnt offering precedes the portions of the sin offering, because the burnt offering is entirely burned in the flames on the altar, whereas only part of the sin offering is burned. Similarly, although both effect atonement, a sin offering precedes a guilt offering due to the fact that its blood is placed on the four corners of the altar and the remnants of its blood are poured on the base of the altar, whereas the blood of the guilt offering is sprinkled on only two corners of the altar. A guilt offering precedes a thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram due to the fact that it is an offering of the most sacred order, and the others are offerings of lesser sanctity. A thanks offering and a nazirite’s ram precede a peace offering due to the fact that they are eaten for one day, like offerings of the most sacred order, whereas a peace offering is eaten for two days, and the thanks offering and nazirite’s ram require loaves to be brought with them, four types with the thanks offering and two types with the nazirite’s ram. Sacrifice of the peace offering precedes sacrifice of the firstborn offering due to the fact that the peace offering requires placing the blood on the altar, in the form of two placements that are four, and placing hands on the head of the offering, and libations, and the wavings of the breast and the thigh by the priest and the owner; none of which is required for the firstborn offering.

The firstborn offering precedes the animal tithe offering because it is sanctified from the womb, i.e., unlike the animal tithe offering it does not require consecration, and it is eaten by the priests, whereas everyone may partake of the animal tithe offering. The animal tithe offering precedes bird offerings due to the fact that it requires slaughtering, whereas the bird’s nape is pinched; and there are two elements of the animal tithe offering that have the status of offerings of the most sacred order: Its blood that is presented on the altar and its portions that are burned on the altar, whereas with regard to bird offerings only the blood is presented on the altar.

The bird offerings precede meal offerings due to the fact that they are types whose blood is presented, and atonement is effected by the blood. The meal offering of a sinner precedes a voluntary meal offering due to the fact that it comes to atone for a sin. For the same reason the sacrifice of the bird sin offering precedes the sacrifice of the bird burnt offering, and likewise with regard to its consecration, the sin offering takes precedence.

All the sin offerings mandated by the Torah take precedence over the guilt offerings, as explained in the previous mishna (89a), except for the guilt offering of a leper, because it comes to render one fit. One who has been cured of leprosy must undergo a process through which he is rendered ritually pure before coming into contact with consecrated items. Although he must also bring a sin offering, his guilt offering is more central to that process of purification and therefore it takes precedence over the sin offering. All the guilt offerings mandated by the Torah come as rams in their second year, and come worth two silver shekels, except for the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper, as they come from sheep in their first year, and do not need to come worth two silver shekels, as they have no fixed value.

Just as the more sacred offerings precede other offerings with regard to their sacrifice, as taught in the previous mishna (89a), they also precede the others with regard to their consumption. If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a peace offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the peace offering from today. If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The sin offering precedes the peace offering, due to the fact that it is an offering of the most sacred order. Likewise, the guilt offering precedes the peace offering, as it is also of the most sacred order.

And with regard to all of the offerings that are eaten, the priests are permitted to alter the manner of their consumption and eat them as they choose. Therefore, the priests are permitted to eat them roasted, or boiled, or cooked, and to place in the cooking pot non-sacred spices or teruma spices. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Meir says: One may not place teruma spices in it, so that he will not bring the teruma to a state of disqualification. Consumption of consecrated foods is permitted only for a limited period, after which they are disqualified and burned. Adding teruma spices might cause those spices to be similarly disqualified.

Rabbi Shimon said: If you saw oil that is being distributed in the Temple courtyard for consumption by the priests and you seek to ascertain its nature, you do not need to ask what it is. Rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offerings of Israelites after they smeared a bit of oil on them, or it is left over from the log of oil of a leper after a small amount of the oil was placed on him. If you saw oil that is placed on the flames of the altar in the manner of an offering, you do not need to ask what it is. Rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offering of priests, or it is the leftover oil from the meal offering of the anointed priest, which requires a great deal of oil and which is burned in its entirety on the altar. The mishna adds: One can-not say that the oil distributed to priests or burned on the altar was brought as a gift offering, as one may not contribute oil as a gift offering. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may contribute oil as a gift offering.

Chapter 11

In the case of the blood of a sin offering designated for presentation that was sprayed on a garment, that garment requires laundering, as is stated with regard to a sin offering: “And when any of its blood shall be sprinkled on a garment, you shall launder that on which it shall be sprinkled in a sacred place” (Leviticus 6:20). Although the verse is speaking only of sin offerings that are eaten and whose blood is presented on the outer altar, as it is stated: “In a sacred place shall it be eaten” (Leviticus 6:19), the principle is not exclusive to eaten sin offerings. With regard to the blood of both the sin offerings that are eaten and the sin offerings that are wholly burned and not eaten and whose blood is presented on the inner altar, garments sprayed with blood from each of these offerings require laundering. As it is stated at the start of that passage: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), it is understood: There is one law for all the sin offerings.

That is the halakha with regard to sin offerings fit for sacrifice. With regard to a disqualified sin offering, its blood does not cause a garment to require laundering whether the offering had a period of fitness when its blood was fit for presentation or whether it did not have a period of fitness. Which offering is the disqualified sin offering that had a period of fitness? It is one that was left overnight and then became disqualified; or it is one that became ritually impure; or it is one that emerged from of the Temple courtyard. Which offering is the disqualified sin offering that did not have a period of fitness? It is one that was slaughtered with the intent to eat it or present its blood beyond its designated time or outside its designated area; or it is one whose blood was collected by people disqualified for Temple service and they sprinkled its blood.

If the blood of a sin offering sprayed from the neck of the animal onto a garment, the garment does not require laundering. If the blood was collected in a vessel and sprinkled on the altar and sprayed from the corner or from the base of the altar onto the garment, the garment does not require laundering, as the blood was already sprinkled and its mitzva was fulfilled. If the blood spilled from the neck onto the floor before it was collected in a vessel, and the priest collected the blood and it sprayed on a garment, the garment does not require laundering. It is only with regard to blood that was received in a sacred vessel and is fit for sprinkling that the garment requires laundering. Apropos laundering the blood of a sin offering from garments onto which it sprayed, the mishna discusses what is considered a garment. If the blood of a sin offering sprayed onto the hide of an animal before it was flayed from the animal, the hide does not require laundering, because its status is not that of a garment, which is susceptible to ritual impurity. If the blood sprayed onto the hide after it was flayed, it requires laundering; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Elazar says: Even if the blood sprayed onto the hide after it was flayed, it does not require laundering until it is crafted into a vessel or garment that is actually susceptible to ritual impurity. This is the principle with regard to laundering: A garment must be laundered only in the place where the blood was sprayed, and only if it is an item that is fit to become ritually impure, and only if it is an item fit for laundering.

With regard to the garment mentioned explicitly in the Torah, and the sackcloth, and the hide, all of these require laundering. And the laundering must be performed in a sacred place, the Temple courtyard, and the breaking of an earthenware vessel in which a sin offering was cooked must be performed in a sacred place, and scouring and rinsing of a copper vessel in which a sin offering was cooked must be performed in a sacred place. With regard to this matter, a stringency applies to a sin offering more than it applies to offerings of the most sacred order.

With regard to a garment upon which the blood of a sin offering was sprayed that went outside the curtains, i.e., the Temple courtyard, before being laundered, the garment reenters the courtyard and one launders it in a sacred place. If the garment became ritually impure outside the curtains, one tears the garment in order to render it ritually pure, enters the courtyard with it, and launders it in a sacred place. With regard to an earthenware vessel in which a sin offering was cooked that went outside the curtains, the vessel reenters the courtyard and one breaks it in a sacred place. If the vessel became ritually impure outside the curtains, one punctures the vessel to render it ritually pure, and one enters the courtyard with it and breaks it in a sacred place.

With regard to a copper vessel in which a sin offering was cooked that went outside the curtains, the vessel reenters the courtyard, and one scours it and rinses it in a sacred place. If the vessel became ritually impure outside the curtains, one breaks the vessel by boring a large hole in it to render it ritually pure and enters the courtyard with it and scours and rinses it in a sacred place.

Whether with regard to a copper vessel in which one cooked the meat of an offering or whether with regard to one into which one poured the boiling meat of an offering, whether the meat is from offerings of the most sacred order or whether it is from offerings of lesser sanctity, such vessels require scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Shimon says: Vessels in which offerings of lesser sanctity were cooked or poured do not require scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Tarfon says: If one cooked a sin offering in a copper vessel from the beginning of the pilgrimage Festival, one may cook in it for the entire pilgrimage Festival; he need not scour and rinse the vessel after every use. And the Rabbis say: One may not continue using it in this manner; rather, one must perform scouring and rinsing before the end of the period during which partaking of the particular cooked offering is permitted. Scouring is like the scouring of the inside of a cup, the cleaning done when wine sticks to the cup, and rinsing is like the rinsing of the outside of a cup. Scouring is performed with hot water, and rinsing with cold water. With regard to the spit and the metal grill [ askela ], one purges them in hot water.

If one cooked in one vessel sacrificial meat and non-sacred meat, or the meat of offerings of the most sacred order and the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, the status of the food depends upon the taste of the stringent substance. If there is enough of the more sacred meat to impart flavor to the less sacred or non-sacred meat, then the lenient components of the mixtures must be eaten in accordance with the restrictions of the stringent components therein, insofar as who may partake of them, as well as the time when and the place where they may be eaten. And the copper vessels in which the lenient components were cooked do not require scouring and rinsing, and the lenient components do not disqualify pieces of meat through contact. With regard to these principles, the lenient components do not assume the status of the stringent components. In the case of a fit wafer that touched an unfit wafer or a piece of sacrificial meat that touched an unfit piece of sacrificial meat, neither all the wafers nor all the pieces of meat are forbidden. No part is forbidden other than that which is in the place where the item absorbed taste from the unfit wafers or pieces.

Chapter 12

A priest who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, and a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, e.g., a zav and a leper who did not bring their requisite atonement offerings, who are not yet permitted to partake of sacrificial meat, do not receive a share of sacrificial meat along with the other members of the patrilineal priestly family serving in the Temple that day, in order to partake of it in the evening after the offerings were sacrificed, even though after nightfall he would be permitted to partake of the offerings. A priest who is an acute mourner, i.e., if one of his relatives for whom he is obligated to mourn died that day, is permitted to touch sacrificial meat, as he is not ritually impure. But he may not sacrifice offerings, and he does not receive a share of sacrificial meat in order to partake of it in the evening. Blemished priests, whether they are temporarily blemished or whether they are permanently blemished, receive a share and partake of the offerings with their priestly brethren, but do not sacrifice the offerings. The principle is: Any priest who is unfit for the service that specific day does not receive a share of the sacrificial meat, and anyone who has no share of the meat has no share in the hides of the animals, to which the priests are entitled as well. Even if the priest was ritually impure only at the time of the sprinkling of the blood of the offering and he was pure at the time of the burning of the fats of that offering, he still does not receive a share of the meat, as it is stated: “He that sacrifices the blood of the peace offerings and the fat, from among the sons of Aaron, shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33). One who cannot sprinkle the blood does not receive a share in the meat.

In the case of any burnt offering for which the altar did not acquire its flesh, e.g., if it was disqualified prior to the sprinkling of its blood, the priests did not acquire its hide, as it is stated with regard to the burnt offering: “And the priest that sacrifices a man’s burnt offering, the priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed” (Leviticus 7:8), indicating that the priest acquires only the hide of a burnt offering that satisfied the obligation of a man. Nevertheless, in a case of a burnt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake but for the sake of another offering, although it did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, its hide goes to the priests. In addition, although the verse states: “A man’s burnt offering,” in the case of both the burnt offering of a man and the burnt offering of a woman, their hides go to the priests.

The hides of offerings of lesser sanctity belong to the owners; the hides of offerings of the most sacred order belong to the priests. The right of priests to hides of offerings of the most sacred order is derived via an a fortiori inference: If for a burnt offering, for which the priests do not acquire its flesh, as it is burned in its entirety, they acquire its hide, then for other offerings of the most sacred order, for which the priests acquire its flesh, is it not right that they should acquire its hide? And there is no room to contend that the altar will prove that this is not a valid inference, as it acquires the flesh of a burnt offering but not its hide, since it does not have the right to the hide of an offering in any place.

If any offerings of the most sacred order were disqualified prior to their flaying, their hides do not go to the priests; rather, they are burned together with the flesh in the place of burning. If they were disqualified after their flaying, their hides go to the priests. Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, said: In all my days, I never saw a hide going out to the place of burning. Rabbi Akiva said: From the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, we learned that in a case where one flays the firstborn offering, and the animal is later discovered to have a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ], the halakha is that the priests may derive benefit [ sheye’otu ] from its hide. And the Rabbis say: The claim: We did not see, is no proof; rather, if after flaying it is discovered that the animal was unfit before it was flayed, the hide goes out to the place of burning.

With regard to bulls that are burned, i.e., the bull of Yom Kippur, the bull of the anointed priest, and the bull brought for an unwitting communal sin, which are burned after their blood is sprinkled and their sacrificial portions burned on the altar, and goats that are burned, i.e., the goat of Yom Kippur and the goat brought for the unwitting communal transgression of the prohibition against idol worship, when they are burned in accordance with their mitzva, they are burned in the place of the ashes (see Leviticus 4:12) outside of Jerusalem, and they render the garments of the priests who tend to their burning impure (see Leviticus 4:25). And if these offerings are not burned in accordance with their mitzva because they were disqualified, and offerings that are disqualified are also burned, they are burned in the place of burning in the bira, and they do not render the garments of the priests who tend to their burning impure.

The priests would carry the bulls and the goats that are burned suspended on poles. When the first priests, carrying the front of the pole, emerged outside the wall of the Temple courtyard and the latter priests did not yet emerge, the first priests render their garments impure, and the latter priests do not render their garments impure until they emerge. When both these and those priests emerged, they render their garments impure. Rabbi Shimon says: They do not render their garments impure, as this halakha applies only to those who burn the offerings. And even then their garments do not become ritually impure until the fire is ignited in the majority of the offerings. Once the flesh is completely scorched, with no moisture remaining, one who then burns the remains does not render his garments impure.

Chapter 13

One who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard and one who offers it up outside the Temple courtyard is liable for the slaughter and liable for the offering up, as each act involves an independent prohibition. If done intentionally, he is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [ karet ] for each act, and if done unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since the moment that he took it outside the courtyard, he thereby rendered it unfit. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.

One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive karet if he did so intentionally and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, this halakha would apply even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, because once he touched it, he thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable. And a pure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as one is liable for eating sacrificial food in impurity only due to the impurity of one’s body, but not due to the impurity of the food.

There is a greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard than with regard to offering up outside, and there is a greater stringency with regard to offering up outside than with regard to slaughtering outside. The mishna elaborates: The greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside is that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard even for the sake of an ordinary purpose, not for the sake of God, is liable. But one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt. The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable. If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering. Rabbi Yosei adds: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up at the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable.

With regard to both fit sacrificial animals, and unfit sacrificial animals whose disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., in the course of the Temple service, and one sacrificed them outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable. One who offers up outside the courtyard an olive-bulk made up of the flesh of a burnt offering and of its sacrificial portions is liable. If there is a meal offering from which a handful was not removed, and one sacrificed it outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt from liability, because until the handful is actually removed it is not fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple. But if a priest took a handful from it and then returned its handful into the remainder of the meal offering, and one sacrificed the entire mixture outside the courtyard, he is liable, as once the handful has been removed it is fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple, and one is liable for offering it up outside even though it is mixed into the remainder. With regard to the handful of a meal offering, the frankincense, the incense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, and the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, in a case where one sacrificed even an olive-bulk from any one of these, which should be sacrificed on the altar, outside the Temple, he is liable, as the burning of an olive-bulk is considered a proper burning. Rabbi Eliezer deems him exempt unless he sacrifices the whole of any one of these items outside the Temple. But Rabbi Eliezer concedes that with regard to any of them that one sacrificed inside the courtyard but left over an olive-bulk from them and then sacrificed that olive-bulk outside the courtyard, he is liable. And with regard to any of these offerings that were lacking any amount, if one sacrifices it outside the courtyard, he is exempt.

One who sacrifices sacrificial meat, which is eaten, and sacrificial portions, i.e., those that are to be burned on the altar, outside the courtyard, is liable for the sacrifice of the sacrificial portions. But he is not liable for sacrificing the meat. If there is a meal offering from which a handful was not removed, and one sacrificed it outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt from liability, because until the handful is actually removed it is not fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple. But if a priest took a handful from it and then returned its handful into the remainder of the meal offering, and one sacrificed the entire mixture outside the courtyard, he is liable, as once the handful has been removed it is fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple, and one is liable for offering it up outside even though it is mixed into the remainder.

The burning of both the handful and the frankincense permits the consumption of the remainder of the meal offering by the priests. With regard to the handful and the frankincense, in a case where one sacrificed only one of them outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts from liability one who burns only one of them until he also sacrifices the second. Since the remainder of the meal offering becomes permitted only once both have been burned, he considers each one alone to be an incomplete offering, and he holds one is not liable for sacrificing only one of them. Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one sacrificed one inside the courtyard and one outside the courtyard, he is liable. The burning of two bowls of frankincense permits the consumption of the shewbread. With regard to the two bowls of frankincense, in a case where one sacrificed only one of them outside the courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts from liability one who burns only one of them until he also sacrifices the second, since the shewbread becomes permitted only once both bowls of frankincense are burned. Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one sacrificed one inside the courtyard and one outside the courtyard, he is liable. One who sprinkles part of the blood of an offering, e.g., one sprinkling instead of four, outside the Temple courtyard is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: So too, one who pours as a libation water consecrated for the libation of the festival of Sukkot, during the Festival, outside the courtyard, is liable. Rabbi Neḥemya says: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and that instead one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable.

One who pinches the nape of a bird offering inside the Temple courtyard and then offers it up outside the courtyard is liable. But if one pinched its nape outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard he is exempt, as pinching the nape of a bird outside the courtyard is not considered valid pinching. One who slaughters, with a knife, a bird offering inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard is exempt, as slaughtering a bird offering in the Temple courtyard disqualifies it as an offering. But if one slaughtered a bird offering outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside, he is liable. Evidently, the manner of its preparation inside the courtyard, i.e., pinching, effects its exemption outside the courtyard, and the manner of its preparation outside the courtyard, i.e., slaughter, effects its exemption inside the courtyard. Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.

With regard to a sin offering where one collected its blood in one cup, if he first placed its blood on an altar outside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on the altar inside the courtyard, or if he first placed its blood on the altar inside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on an altar outside the courtyard, in both cases he is liable for placing the blood outside the courtyard, as the blood in its entirety is fit to be placed on the altar inside the courtyard. If one collected its blood in two cups and placed the blood from both of them on the altar inside the courtyard he is exempt as he acted appropriately. If he placed the blood from both of them on an altar outside the courtyard, he is liable, as both are fit to be placed inside. If he first placed the blood from one cup inside and then placed the blood from the other one outside, he is exempt. By using the blood of the first cup to perform the mitzva of placing the blood on the altar, he thereby rendered the blood in the second cup unfit to be placed on the altar; therefore, there is no liability for placing it on an altar outside. If he first placed the blood from one cup outside and then placed the blood from the other one inside, he is liable for the external placement as that blood was fit to be placed inside, and the internal placement atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought. To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a case where one separated an animal for his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another animal in its place, and thereafter, the first animal was found. In that case, both of them stand before him and he must sacrifice one as his sin offering. If he slaughtered both of them inside the courtyard, he is exempt. If he slaughtered both of them outside the courtyard, he is liable, as each was fit to be slaughtered in the courtyard. If he first slaughtered one inside and then slaughtered the other one outside he is exempt from liability for slaughtering the second, as he has already fulfilled his obligation with the first, thereby rendering the second one unfit for sacrifice. If he first slaughtered one outside and then slaughtered the other one inside he is liable for slaughtering the external animal outside the courtyard, as it was fit to be slaughtered inside, and the internal animal atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought. The mishna adds: In a case where one slaughtered both inside the courtyard, just as placing the blood of the first animal exempts one who consumes its meat from liability for misuse of consecrated property, so too, it exempts one who consumes the meat of its counterpart, the second animal, from liability.

Chapter 14

With regard to the red heifer of purification that one burned outside its pit, the pit being an excavation on the Mount of Olives opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary designated for its slaughter and its burning, and likewise the scapegoat that one sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard rather than casting it off a cliff as prescribed, he is exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of slaughtering and sacrificing outside the Temple courtyard. The source for this is as it is stated with regard to slaughter of sacrificial animals outside the courtyard: “Whatever man…that slaughters outside the camp, and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). From that verse it is derived: For any offering that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting for sacrifice on the altar, e.g., the red heifer and the scapegoat, one is not liable for its slaughter and sacrifice outside its place.

With regard to an animal that actively copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, or an animal that was set aside for idol worship, or an animal that was worshipped as a deity, or an animal given as the price of a dog that was purchased, or an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute, or an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ], or an animal born by caesarean section, any of which one sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt. The source for this is as it is stated: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord.” From this verse, it is derived: For any animal that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting for sacrifice on the altar, one is not liable for its slaughter and sacrifice outside the courtyard. For blemished animals, whether they are permanently blemished or whether they are temporarily blemished, which one sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard, one is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: For permanently blemished animals one is exempt; for temporarily blemished animals one is liable for violation of a prohibition, but it is not the type of prohibition for which he will receive karet, because ultimately the animal will be fit for sacrifice. With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, as they are fit for sacrifice only when they are older, after their wings assume a golden hue; and pigeons whose time of fitness has passed, as they are fit only when they are young and their wings did not yet assume a yellowish tint, that one sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: For pigeons whose time of fitness has passed one is exempt, and for doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived he is in violation of a prohibition. With regard to an animal itself and its offspring that were slaughtered on the same day, where one violates a prohibition for slaughtering the second, and an animal whose time has not yet arrived, if one sacrificed it outside the Temple courtyard he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: For an animal whose time has not yet arrived, that person is in violation of a mere prohibition, as Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any sacrificial animal that is fit to come and be sacrificed after the passage of time, if one sacrificed it outside the courtyard, that person is in violation of a prohibition but there is no liability for karet. And the Rabbis say: In any case in which there is no liability for karet there is no violation of a prohibition. The mishna adds: An animal is defined as one whose time has not yet arrived, whether it is intrinsically premature, e.g., doves whose wings have not yet assumed a golden hue or an animal less than seven days old (see Leviticus 22:27), or whether it is premature for its owner.

Which is the animal whose time has not yet arrived because it is premature for its owner? It is the animal of a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [ zav ], and a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [ zava ], and a woman after childbirth, and a leper whose period of impurity is not yet complete, where these owners, who are ritually impure, sacrificed their sin offerings or guilt offerings outside the Temple courtyard. In this case they are exempt, as they are neither obligated nor permitted to bring those offerings. But if they sacrificed their burnt offerings or their peace offerings outside the courtyard they are liable, as those offerings may be brought as gift offerings even if their owner is ritually impure. One who offers up outside the Temple courtyard a portion of the meat of a sin offering that is eaten; of the meat of a guilt offering; of the meat of other offerings of the most sacred order that are eaten, e.g., the sheep sacrificed on the festival of Shavuot, or of the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, is exempt, as all these are eaten by the priests and not sacrificed on the altar. And for the same reason, one who sacrificed a portion of the surplus of the omer offering, a measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of the Hebrew month of Nisan, after the handful was removed; or the two loaves, i.e., the public offering on Shavuot of two loaves from the new wheat; or the shewbread arranged on the Table each Shabbat in the Sanctuary; or the remainder of meal offerings, is also exempt. And likewise with regard to one who pours oil onto a meal offering; and one who breaks the loaves of a meal offering into pieces; and one who mixes oil into the flour of a meal offering; and one who salts a meal offering or other offerings; and one who waves a meal offering; and one who brings a meal offering to the corner of an altar, if he performs these actions outside the courtyard; and one who arranges shewbread on the table outside the Sanctuary; and one who removes the ashes from the lamps of the Candelabrum; and one who removes a handful from a meal offering; and one who collects the blood of an offering in a vessel, if he did so outside the Temple courtyard: In all of these cases he is exempt. This is because one is liable only if he performs an action similar to sacrifice that completes the sacrificial service, while all of these actions are ones that are normally followed by additional sacrificial rites. And one is likewise not liable for any of these actions, neither due to the prohibition against a non-priest performing the Temple service, nor due to the prohibition against performing the Temple service in a state of ritual impurity, nor due to the prohibition against a priest lacking the requisite priestly vestments while performing the Temple service, nor due to the prohibition against performing the Temple service without washing one’s hands and feet.

Until the Tabernacle was established, private altars were permitted and the sacrificial service was performed by the firstborn. And from the time that the Tabernacle was established, private altars were prohibited and the sacrificial service was performed by the priests. Offerings of the most sacred order were then eaten within the curtains surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle in the wilderness and offerings of lesser sanctity were eaten throughout the camp of Israel.

When the Jewish people arrived at Gilgal private altars were permitted, offerings of the most sacred order were then eaten within the curtains, and offerings of lesser sanctity were eaten anywhere.

When they arrived at Shiloh, private altars were prohibited. And there was no roof of wood or stone there, i.e., in the Tabernacle in Shiloh; rather there was only a building of stone below and the curtains of the roof of the Tabernacle were spread above it. And the period that the Tabernacle was in Shiloh was characterized in the Torah as “rest” in the verse: “For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God has given you” (Deuteronomy 12:9). Offerings of the most sacred order were then eaten within the curtains in the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting, and offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe were eaten in any place that overlooks Shiloh.

When Shiloh was destroyed (see I Samuel 4:18), the Jewish people arrived with the Tabernacle at Nov, and later at Gibeon, and private altars were permitted. Offerings of the most sacred order were then eaten within the curtains in the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting, and offerings of lesser sanctity were eaten in all the cities of Eretz Yisrael.

When the Jewish people arrived at Jerusalem and built the Temple during the reign of Solomon, private altars were prohibited, and private altars did not have a subsequent period when they were permitted. And the Temple in Jerusalem was characterized as “inheritance” in the verse: “For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God has given you.” Offerings of the most sacred order were then eaten within the curtains, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, and offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe were eaten within the walls of the city, whose legal status was that of the Israelite camp in the wilderness.

With regard to all offerings that one consecrated during a period of prohibition of private altars and sacrificed during a period of prohibition of private altars, if he sacrificed them outside their designated area, for these animals he is in violation of both the positive mitzva to sacrifice the offering in the place chosen by God and the prohibition against sacrificing them on a private altar, and he is liable to receive karet for doing it. If one consecrated the animals during a period of permitting of private altars and sacrificed them during a period of prohibition of private altars, outside their designated area, for these animals he is in violation of a positive mitzva and a prohibition, but he is not liable to receive karet for sacrificing them. If he consecrated the animals during a period of prohibition of private altars and sacrificed them during a period of permitting of private altars, outside their designated area, for these animals he is in violation of a positive mitzva for failure to bring it to the Tabernacle, but these animals are not subject to a prohibition, as it is permitted to sacrifice on a private altar.

And these are the sacrificial items that are sacrificed only in the Tabernacle even when private altars are permitted: Sacrificial animals that were presumed to be consecrated for sacrifice in the Tabernacle. Therefore, communal offerings are sacrificed in the Tabernacle, but offerings of an individual may be sacrificed on a private altar. In addition, with regard to offerings of an individual that were consecrated expressly for sacrifice in the Tabernacle, one must sacrifice them in the Tabernacle. But if he sacrificed them on a private altar, he is exempt. And what is the difference between the private altar of an individual and the public altar at the site of the Tabernacle when it was located in Gilgal, Nov, and Gibeon? It is that on a private altar there is no placing of hands on the head of an offering, no slaughter in the north, no placement of blood around all sides of the altar in offerings for which this is required, no waving of meal offerings, and no bringing of meal offerings to the corner of the altar prior to removal of the handful. Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no meal offering sacrificed on an altar outside the Temple. And requiring a member of the priesthood to perform the sacrificial rites, the priestly service vestments, the service vessels, the pleasing aroma to God, the partition for the blood, i.e., the red line dividing the upper and lower halves of the altar, and the priest’s washing of hands and feet before his service all do not apply to sacrifice on private altars, as the service there need not be performed by priests nor follow all the protocols of the Temple service. But the intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, which renders the offering piggul ; the halakha of portions of the offering left over [ notar ] beyond the time it may be eaten; and the prohibition against eating consecrated meat while ritually impure are equal in this, a private altar, and that, a public altar.

Mishnah Menachot

Chapter 1

When one brings a meal offering to the Temple, the priest removes a handful from it, places the handful into a service vessel, conveys it to the altar, and burns it. At that point, the remainder is permitted to the priests for consumption and the owner has fulfilled his obligation. In this context, the mishna teaches: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another meal offering are fit for sacrifice. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who must therefore bring another offering. This is the halakha with regard to all meal offerings except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy, which is brought as part of the rite of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [ sota ]. In those cases, if the priest removed the handful not for its own sake, the offering is disqualified. With regard to the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy from which the priest removed a handful not for their sake, or where he placed a handful from them in a vessel, or conveyed the handful to the altar, or burned the handful on the altar, not for their sake, or for their sake and not for their sake, or not for their sake and for their sake, they are disqualified. The mishna elaborates: How are these rites performed for their sake and not for their sake? It is in a case where one removed the handful with two intentions: For the sake of the meal offering of a sinner and for the sake of a voluntary meal offering. How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? It is in a case where one removed the handful with two intentions: For the sake of a voluntary meal offering and for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner.

Both the meal offering of a sinner and all other meal offerings with regard to which the one who removed their handful was a non-priest, or a priest who was an acute mourner, i.e., whose relative died and was not yet buried, or a priest who was ritually impure who immersed that day and was waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, or a priest lacking the requisite priestly vestments, or a priest who had not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, or a priest who did not wash his hands and feet from the water in the Basin prior to performing the Temple service, or an uncircumcised priest, or a ritually impure priest, or a priest who removed the handful while sitting, or while standing not on the floor of the Temple but upon vessels, or upon an animal, or upon the feet of another person; in all these cases the meal offerings are unfit for sacrifice. If the priest removed the handful with his left hand the meal offering is unfit. Ben Beteira says: He must return the handful to the vessel that contains the meal offering and again remove the handful, this time with his right hand. If a priest removed the handful of flour, and a stone, a grain of salt, or a pinch [ koret ] of frankincense emerged in his hand, the meal offering is unfit due to the fact that the Sages said: The handful that is outsized or that is lacking is unfit. The existence of one of these foreign items in the handful means that the requisite measure of flour is lacking. And which is the outsized handful? It is one where he removed the handful overflowing [ mevoratz ] in a manner in which his fingers do not hold the flour. And which is the lacking handful? It is one where he removed the handful with the tips of his fingers. How does the priest perform the removal of a handful? He extends his fingers onto the palm of his hand.

If one increased its oil, decreased its oil, or decreased its frankincense, beyond the appropriate measures, the meal offering is unfit. With regard to one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder outside the Temple courtyard or to partake of an olive-bulk of its remainder outside the Temple courtyard, to burn its handful outside the Temple courtyard or to burn an olive-bulk of its handful outside the Temple courtyard, or to burn its frankincense outside the Temple courtyard, in all these cases the offering is unfit, but there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of it. If one had the intent to partake of its remainder on the next day or to partake of an olive-bulk of its remainder on the next day, to burn its handful on the next day or to burn an olive-bulk of its handful on the next day, or to burn its frankincense on the next day, the offering is piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for partaking of the remainder of that meal offering. This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, e.g., the remainder, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, e.g., the handful or the frankincense, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet on account of it, provided that the permitting factor, i.e., the handful, was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva. If the permitting factor was not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva, although the meal offering is unfit, the prohibition of piggul does not apply to it. How is the permitting factor considered to have been sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one removed the handful in silence, i.e., with no specific intent, and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder beyond its designated time; or if one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the or burn the handful or frankincense beyond its designated time, and placed it in the vessel, and conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar in silence, with no specific intent; or if one removed the handful and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder beyond its designated time, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva, and one is liable to receive karet for partaking of it due to piggul.

How is the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful or frankincense outside its designated area, or placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder beyond its designated time; or if one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful or frankincense beyond its designated time, and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder outside its designated area; or if one removed the handful and placed it in the vessel, and conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder outside its designated area, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor was not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva. The meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy brought by a sota that one removed their handful not for their sake and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful beyond its designated time; or that one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful beyond its designated time or placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, not for their sake; or that one removed the handful, and placed it in the vessel, and conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, not for their sake, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor was not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva. If one performed one of these rites with the intent to partake of an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. Rabbi Yehuda says that this is the principle: If the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet on account of it. If the intent with regard to the area preceded the intent with regard to the time, the offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. And the Rabbis say: In both this case, where the intent with regard to time was first, and that case, where the intent with regard to area came first, the offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. If one’s intent was to partake of half an olive-bulk of the remainder and to burn half an olive-bulk of it not at the appropriate time or not in the appropriate area, the offering is fit, because eating and burning do not join together.

Chapter 2

In the case of a priest who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder or to burn its handful on the next day, Rabbi Yosei concedes in this instance that it is a case of piggul and he is liable to receive karet for partaking of it. But if the priest’s intent was to burn its frankincense the next day, Rabbi Yosei says: The meal offering is unfit but partaking of it does not include liability to receive karet. And the Rabbis say: It is a case of piggul and he is liable to receive karet for partaking of the meal offering. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei: In what manner does this differ from an animal offering, where if one slaughtered it with the intent to sacrifice the portions consumed on the altar the next day, it is piggul? Rabbi Yosei said to the Rabbis: There is a difference, as in the case of an animal offering, its blood, and its flesh, and its portions consumed on the altar are all one entity. Consequently, intent with regard to any one of them renders the entire offering piggul. But the frankincense is not part of the meal offering.

If one slaughtered the two lambs that accompany the two meal offering loaves sacrificed on Shavuot with the intent to partake of one of the two loaves the next day, or if one burned the two bowls of frankincense accompanying the shewbread with the intent to partake of one of the arrangements of the shewbread the next day, Rabbi Yosei says: That loaf and that arrangement of which he intended to partake the next day are piggul and one is liable to receive karet for their consumption, and the second loaf and arrangement are unfit, but there is no liability to receive karet for their consumption. And the Rabbis say: This loaf and arrangement and that loaf and arrangement are both piggul and one is liable to receive karet for their consumption. If one of the two loaves of Shavuot or one of the two arrangements of the shewbread became ritually impure, Rabbi Yehuda says: Both must be taken to the place of burning like any other disqualified offering, as no communal offering is divided. That is, it is either fit in its entirety or unfit in its entirety. And the Rabbis say: The impure one remains in its state of impurity and the pure one shall be eaten.

The thanks offering renders the accompanying loaves piggul but the loaves do not render the thanks offering piggul. How so? If one slaughtered the thanks offering, which may be consumed only during the day it is slaughtered and the night thereafter, with the intent to partake of it the next day, the offering and the accompanying loaves are rendered piggul. If he slaughtered it with the intent to partake of the loaves the next day, the loaves are rendered piggul and the thanks offering is not piggul. Likewise, the lambs sacrificed with the two loaves meal offering on Shavuot render the accompanying loaves piggul, but the loaves do not render the lambs piggul. How so? If one slaughtered the lambs, which may be consumed only during the day they are slaughtered and the night thereafter, with the intent to partake of them the next day, the lambs and the accompanying loaves are rendered piggul. If he did so with the intent to partake of the loaves the next day, the loaves are rendered piggul and the lambs are not piggul.

The animal offering renders the accompanying libations and meal offerings piggul from the moment that they were consecrated in the vessel, but not before; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The libations do not render the animal offering piggul. How so? In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intent to partake of it the next day, the offering and its libations are rendered piggul. But if one slaughters the offering with the intent to sacrifice its libations the next day, the libations are rendered piggul, while the offering is not piggul.

With regard to the burning of the handful of a meal offering and the frankincense, both of which render the meal offering permitted for consumption: If the priest had an intention that can render the offering piggul during the burning of the handful but not during the burning of the frankincense, or during the burning of the frankincense but not during the burning of the handful, i.e., he burned one of them with the intention to eat the remainder of the offering beyond its designated time, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is piggul and one who eats it is liable to receive karet for its consumption. And the Rabbis say: There is no liability to receive karet in this case unless he renders the offering piggul during the sacrifice of the entire permitting factor, i.e., the burning of both the handful and the frankincense. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir in the case of a meal offering of a sinner and in the case of a meal offering of jealousy of a sota that if one had intent of piggul during the burning of the handful, that the meal offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for its consumption, as here the handful is the sole permitting factor. If one slaughtered one of the two lambs sacrificed with the two loaves on Shavuot with the intent to partake of the two loaves the next day, or if one burned one of the bowls of frankincense with the intent to partake of two arrangements of shewbread the next day, Rabbi Meir says: The meal offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for its consumption, and the Rabbis say: There is no liability to receive karet unless he has intent of piggul during the sacrifice of the entire permitting factor. If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is piggul and the other is a fit offering. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit offerings, as one permitting factor does not render another permitting factor piggul.

Chapter 3

In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, i.e., the handful, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, the meal offering is fit. Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, although it is not piggul, and consuming it is therefore not punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [ karet ]. In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does consume it, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does burn it on the altar, but his intent was to consume or burn improperly less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit. If his intent was both to consume half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, the meal offering is nevertheless fit, because eating and burning do not join together.

If one did not pour the oil onto the meal offering, or did not mix the oil into the meal offering, or did not break the loaves into pieces, or did not add salt, or did not wave the omer meal offering or the meal offering of a sota, or did not bring the meal offering to the altar, or if it happened that the priest broke the meal offerings that require breaking into greater pieces than appropriate, or did not smear oil on the wafers requiring this (see Leviticus 2:4), in all these cases the meal offering is fit. If a handful of one meal offering, which is to be burned on the altar, was intermingled with a handful of another meal offering, or with the meal offering of priests, or with the meal offering of the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, or with the meal offering of libations accompanying burnt offerings and peace offerings, all of which are burned in their entirety on the altar, it is fit for sacrifice, and the mixture is burned on the altar. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the handful was intermingled with the meal offering of the anointed priest, or with the meal offering of libations, the mixture is unfit because with regard to this, the handful from the standard meal offering, its mixture is thick, one log of oil mixed with a tenth of an ephah of flour, and with regard to that, the meal offering of the anointed priest and the meal offering of libations, its mixture is loose, three log of oil mixed with a tenth of an ephah of flour. And the mixtures, which are not identical, absorb from each other, increasing the amount of oil in the handful and decreasing the amount of oil in the meal offering of the anointed priest or the meal offering of libations, thereby invalidating both.

In the case of two meal offerings from which a handful was not removed and that were intermingled with each other, if the priest can remove a handful from this meal offering by itself and from that meal offering by itself, they are fit meal offerings, but if not, they are unfit, as the handful of each meal offering must be taken from its original source. In the case of a handful that was intermingled with a meal offering from which a handful was not removed, the priest should not burn the mixture on the altar. And if he burned it, this meal offering from which the handful was taken satisfies the obligation of the owner and that meal offering from which the handful was not taken does not satisfy the obligation of the owner. If, after it was removed, its handful was intermingled with its remainder or with the remainder of another meal offering, the priest should not burn the mixture on the altar, but if he burned it, it satisfies the obligation of the owner. If the handful became ritually impure and despite this the priest sacrificed it, the frontplate worn by the High Priest effects acceptance of the meal offering, and the remainder is eaten by the priests. If the handful left its designated area and despite this the priest then sacrificed it, the frontplate does not effect acceptance. The reason is that the frontplate effects acceptance for offerings sacrificed when ritually impure and does not effect acceptance for offerings that leave their designated areas.

If after the handful was removed the remainder of the meal offering became ritually impure, or if the remainder of the meal offering was burned, or if the remainder of the meal offering was lost, according to the principle of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that with regard to an animal offering the blood is fit for sprinkling even if there is no meat that can be eaten, the meal offering is fit, and the priest burns the handful. But according to the principle of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that with regard to an animal offering the blood is fit for sprinkling only if there is meat that can be eaten, it is unfit and the priest does not burn the handful, as the handful serves to render permitted the remainder. A handful of a meal offering that was not sanctified in a service vessel is unfit, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit. If the priest burned the handful of a meal offering twice, i.e., in two increments, it is fit.

With regard to the handful, failure to sacrifice the minority of it prevents the majority of it, which was sacrificed, from rendering it permitted for the priests to consume the remainder of the meal offering. With regard to a tenth of an ephah of flour brought as a meal offering, failure to sacrifice the minority of it prevents the majority of it, which was sacrificed, from qualifying as a proper meal offering. With regard to the wine poured as a libation, failure to pour the minority of it prevents the majority of it, which was poured, from qualifying as a proper libation. With regard to the log of oil that is required for the meal offering, failure to add the minority of it prevents the majority of it, which was added, from being a sufficient measure of oil. With regard to the fine flour and the oil, failure to bring each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the handful and the frankincense, failure to burn each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other.

With regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur, the absence of each goat prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the two sheep brought together with the meal offering of the two loaves on Shavuot, failure to bring each of the sheep prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the two loaves brought on Shavuot, failure to bring each of the loaves prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the two arrangements of the shewbread, failure to place each of the arrangements prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the two bowls of frankincense that accompany the shewbread, failure to place each of the bowls prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the arrangements of the shewbread and the bowls of frankincense, failure to bring each of them prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the two types of loaves that accompany the offerings of a nazirite: The bread and wafers (see Numbers 6:15); the three species that are part of the rite of the red heifer: The cedar, hyssop, and scarlet wool (see Numbers 19:6); and the four types of loaves that accompany the thanks offering: The loaves, wafers, loaves soaked in hot water, and leavened bread (see Leviticus 7:12); and the four species of the lulav : The lulav, etrog, myrtle, and willow (see Leviticus 23:40); and the four species that are used in the purification process of the leper: The cedar, hyssop, scarlet wool, and birds (see Leviticus 14:4), failure to bring each of the components prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. With regard to the seven sprinklings of the blood of the red heifer that the priest sprinkles opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary (see Numbers 19:4), failure to sprinkle each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. With regard to the seven sprinklings of the blood of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur that are sprinkled on the Ark between the staves (see Leviticus 16:14–15), the seven sprinklings that are sprinkled on the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and the sprinklings that are sprinkled on the golden altar on Yom Kippur, and from all other inner sin offerings, failure to sprinkle each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others.

With regard to the seven branches of the Candelabrum (see Exodus 25:32), the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. With regard to its seven lamps atop the branches, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. With regard to the two passages that are in the mezuza, which are the first (Deuteronomy 6:1–9) and second (Deuteronomy 11:13–21) paragraphs of Shema, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. Furthermore, the absence of even one letter prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the rest of them. With regard to the four passages that are in the phylacteries, which are the two passages in the mezuza and two additional passages (Exodus 13:1–10, 11–16), the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. Furthermore, the absence of even one letter prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the rest of them. With regard to the four ritual fringes on a garment, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, as the four of them constitute one mitzva. Rabbi Yishmael says: The four of them are four discrete mitzvot, and the absence of one does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the rest.

Chapter 4

The absence of the sky-blue [ tekhelet ] strings does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of ritual fringes with the white strings, and the absence of white strings does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the sky-blue strings. If one has only one, he wears it without the other. Absence of the phylacteries of the arm does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of the phylacteries of the head, and absence of the phylacteries of the head does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of the phylacteries of the arm. If one has only one, he dons it without the other. The mishna returns to discussing the halakhot of meal offerings, which are the central theme of this tractate. The absence of the fine flour and the oil for the meal offering accompanying burnt offerings and peace offerings does not prevent libation of the wine, and the absence of the wine for libation does not prevent sacrifice of the flour and the oil. Failure to perform some of the placements of blood on the external altar does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the other placements, as even if the priest performed only one placement of blood, the offering effects atonement after the fact.

Failure to sacrifice one of the bulls, the rams, the sheep, or the goats of the additional offerings brought on Festivals does not prevent the sacrifice of the others. Rabbi Shimon says: If the Temple treasurers had sufficient funds for the numerous bulls that are required to be sacrificed on that day but they did not also have sufficient funds for the accompanying libations, they should rather bring one bull and its libations, and they should not sacrifice all of them without libations.

On Shavuot there is an obligation to sacrifice burnt offerings, a sin offering, and peace offerings together with the offering of the two loaves. The burnt offerings consists of a bull, two rams, and seven sheep. A goat is brought for the sin offering. Two sheep are brought as peace offerings and waved together with the two loaves. Failure to sacrifice the bull, the rams, and the sheep, which are all brought as burnt offerings, and the goat that is brought as a sin offering, does not prevent the bringing of the two loaves, and they are sacrificed nevertheless. Failure to bring the two loaves does not prevent sacrifice of the accompanying animal offerings. Failure to bring the two loaves prevents sacrifice of the accompanying peace offering of two sheep, but failure to sacrifice the two sheep does not prevent the bringing of the two loaves; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas says: No, rather the opposite is true. Failure to sacrifice the peace offering of two sheep prevents the bringing of the two loaves, but failure to bring the two loaves does not prevent sacrifice of the accompanying peace offering of two sheep. As we found that when the Jewish people were in the wilderness for forty years after the exodus from Egypt, they sacrificed the two sheep as a peace offering on Shavuot without the two loaves, as the two loaves may be brought only from wheat grown in Eretz Yisrael after the Jewish people entered the land. Here too, whenever wheat is unavailable, they should sacrifice the two sheep without the two loaves. However, the two loaves are not sacrificed without the peace offering of two sheep. Rabbi Shimon says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas that failure to sacrifice the two sheep prevents the bringing of the two loaves but failure to bring the two loaves does not prevent sacrifice of the accompanying peace offering of two sheep, but the reason for that ruling is not in accordance with his statement. As all the offerings that must be sacrificed on Shavuot that are stated in the book of Numbers (see 28:27), i.e., two bulls, one ram, and seven sheep as additional offerings and a goat as a sin offering, were sacrificed when the Jewish people were in the wilderness. But all the offerings stated in Leviticus (see 23:18–20), i.e., the offerings accompanying the two loaves, were not sacrificed when the Jewish people were in the wilderness. Not only were the two loaves not sacrificed, but the accompanying offerings, including the peace offering of the two sheep, were also not sacrificed, because it was only when they arrived in Eretz Yisrael that these additional offerings and those offerings accompanying the two loaves were sacrificed. Neither the additional offerings of Shavuot nor the two loaves, and the offerings that accompany them, were sacrificed in the wilderness, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas. Rather, for what reason do I nevertheless say that the sheep should be sacrificed without the loaves, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas? It is due to the fact that the sheep permit themselves, as the sprinkling of their blood and the burning of the portions consumed on the altar renders it permitted to partake of their meat. And why are the loaves not sacrificed without the sheep? It is because there is no item to permit the loaves, as the loaves are permitted only after the sheep are sacrificed.

Failure to sacrifice the daily offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the additional offerings, and likewise, failure to sacrifice the additional offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the daily offerings. And failure to sacrifice some of the additional offerings on a day when more than one is sacrificed, e.g., if it was both Shabbat and the New Moon, does not prevent sacrifice of the other additional offerings. If the priests did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, nevertheless, they should sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering, as failure to sacrifice one daily offering does not prevent sacrifice of the other. In all of these cases, if they failed to sacrifice one offering, they should still sacrifice the other. Rabbi Shimon said: When does this halakha apply? It applies at a time when the failure to sacrifice the daily morning offering was because they were prevented from sacrificing it due to circumstances beyond their control or they failed to sacrifice it unwittingly. But if the priests acted intentionally and did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, they should not sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering. Incense was burned twice a day, half a measure in the morning and half a measure in the afternoon. If they did not burn the half-measure of incense in the morning, they should burn the half-measure in the afternoon. Rabbi Shimon said: And in such a case, the entire measure was sacrificed in the afternoon. The reason for the difference between the daily offerings and the incense is that the daily service on a new golden altar is initiated only with the burning of the incense of the spices in the afternoon, at which time they would burn a full measure. And the daily service on a new altar of the burnt offering, on which the daily offerings were sacrificed, is initiated only with the daily morning offering. And use of a new Table was initiated only with the arrangement of the shewbread on Shabbat, and use of a new Candelabrum was initiated only with the kindling of its seven lamps in the afternoon.

The twelve loaves of matza prepared from a tenth of an ephah of flour of the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest did not come from the house of the High Priest in halves. Rather, the High Priest brings from his house a complete tenth of an ephah of flour (see Leviticus 6:13) and divides it in half, and he sacrifices half in the morning and half in the afternoon. In the case of a High Priest who brings and sacrifices half in the morning and dies, and they appointed another High Priest in his stead, the replacement High Priest should neither bring half of a tenth of an ephah of flour from his house nor sacrifice the remaining half of the tenth of an ephah of his predecessor. Rather, he brings from his house an entire tenth of an ephah and divides it in half, sacrifices half, and the other half is not sacrificed and is lost. Consequently, two halves of a tenth of an ephah are sacrificed, one-half of what was brought by each priest, and the other two halves are lost. If they did not appoint another High Priest in his stead, from whose property was the griddle-cake offering brought and sacrificed? Rabbi Shimon says: It is brought and sacrificed from the property of the community. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is brought and sacrificed from the property of the heirs of the High Priest. And for the duration of the period until a new High Priest was appointed, the griddle-cake offering was sacrificed as a complete tenth of an ephah of fine flour.

Chapter 5

All the meal offerings come to be offered as matza, with care taken to prevent leavening, except for ten loaves of leavened bread among the forty loaves that accompany the thanks offering, and the meal offering of the two loaves that are brought on the festival of Shavuot, as they come to be offered as leavened bread. The Sages disagree as to the manner in which those meal offerings are leavened. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to the leaven added to the dough to facilitate leavening, one separates [ bodeh ] part of the flour for the meal offerings from within the flour of the meal offerings themselves, causes it to become leaven, and leavens the meal offerings with it. Rabbi Yehuda says: That is also not the optimal manner in which to fulfill the mitzva, as aged leaven is a more effective leavening agent. Rather, one brings the leaven from another, aged, dough and places it into the measuring vessel, and then he adds flour until he fills the measuring vessel, to ensure the appropriate measure of a tenth of an ephah of flour. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: That too is inappropriate, as in that manner the meal offering will either be lacking the requisite measure or be greater than the required measure, as the Gemara will explain.

All the meal-offerings that come as matza are to be kneaded with lukewarm water so that the dough will bake well, as only a small amount of oil is added. And one must watch over them to ensure that they do not become leaven while kneading and shaping them, and if a meal offering or even only its remainder becomes leaven, one violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven.

There are four types of meal offerings: Those that require both oil and frankincense, those that require oil but not frankincense, those that require frankincense but not oil, and those that require neither frankincense nor oil. The mishna elaborates: And these are the meal offerings that require both oil and frankincense: The fine-flour meal offering, as it is stated: “And he shall pour oil upon it, and put frankincense thereon” (Leviticus 2:1); the meal offering prepared in a pan (see Leviticus 2:5–6); the meal offering prepared in a deep pan (see Leviticus 2:7–10); and the meal offering baked in an oven, which can be brought in the form of loaves or in the form of wafers (see Leviticus 2:4). Additional meal offerings that require both oil and frankincense are the meal offering of priests; the meal offering of the anointed priest, i.e., the griddle-cake offering brought by the High Priest every day, half in the morning and half in the evening; the meal offering of a gentile; a meal offering brought by women; and the omer meal offering (see Leviticus 23:15). The meal offering brought with libations that accompany burnt offerings and peace offerings requires oil but does not require frankincense. The shewbread requires frankincense but does not require oil. The two loaves brought on the festival of Shavuot (see Leviticus 23:17), the meal offering of a sinner, and the meal offering of jealousy brought by a sota require neither oil nor frankincense. The two loaves do not require oil or frankincense because these additions are not mentioned with regard to it. The meal offering of a sinner does not require them, as it is written: “He shall not put oil upon it, neither shall he give any frankincense upon it; for it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11). With regard to the meal offering brought by a sota, it is similarly written: “He shall pour no oil upon it, nor give frankincense upon it, for it is a meal offering of jealousy, a meal offering of memorial, bringing iniquity to remembrance” (Numbers 5:15).

And if one places oil or frankincense on the meal offering of a sinner or on the meal offering of jealousy brought by a sota, he is liable to be flogged for violating the prohibition against placing the oil by itself, and he is liable to be flogged for violating the prohibition against placing the frankincense by itself, as these are two separate prohibitions. If one placed oil upon the meal offering he has disqualified it, but if one placed frankincense upon the meal offering he should gather the frankincense and remove it. In this manner, the meal offering can be salvaged. Furthermore, one violates the prohibition only by placing oil on the meal offering prior to the removal of the handful; if he placed oil on its remainder he does not violate a prohibition. If one placed a vessel with oil on top of a vessel that contains a meal offering of a sinner or a meal offering brought by a sota he did not disqualify the meal offering, as the oil was not placed on the meal offering itself.

There are four categories of meal offerings: Those that require bringing near, a rite that requires the priests to carry the offering in their hands and bring it near the southwest corner of the altar, but do not require waving; those that require both bringing near and waving; those that require waving but not bringing near; and those that require neither waving nor bringing near. The mishna elaborates: And these are the meal offerings that require bringing near but do not require waving: The fine-flour meal offering; the meal offering prepared in a pan; the meal offering prepared in a deep pan; the meal offering baked in an oven, which can be brought in the form of loaves or in the form of wafers; the meal offering of priests; the meal offering of the anointed priest; the meal offering of gentiles; a meal offering brought by women; and the meal offering of a sinner. Rabbi Shimon says: The meal offering of priests and the meal offering of the anointed priest do not require bringing of the meal offering near to the altar, due to the fact that there is no removal of a handful in their sacrifice, and there is a principle that with regard to any meal offering where there is no removal of a handful in their sacrifice, there is also no bringing near.

These are the items that require waving and do not require bringing near to the altar: The log of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper and his guilt offering itself, as it is written: “And the priest shall take one of the lambs and sacrifice it for a guilt offering, and the log of oil, and wave them for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:12); and the first fruits, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov; and the sacrificial portions of the peace offerings of an individual and their breast and thigh, as it is written: “The thigh of heaving and the breast of waving shall they bring with the offerings of the portions consumed by fire, to wave it for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 10:15). This requirement applies to peace offerings belonging both to men and to women, by male Jews and not by others. The Gemara will explain this seemingly contradictory statement on 61b. In addition, the two loaves and the accompanying peace offering of two lambs brought on Shavuot also do not require bringing near but do require waving, as it is written: “And the priest shall wave them with the bread of the first fruits for a wave offering before the Lord, with the two lambs” (Leviticus 23:20). How does one perform this waving? He places the two loaves on top of the two lambs and places his two hands below the loaves and the lambs, extends the offerings to each of the four directions and brings them back, then raises and lowers them, as it is stated with regard to the waving of the ram of the inauguration of the priests: “Which is waved, and which is heaved up” (Exodus 29:27); i.e., waved back and forth, and heaved up and down. Waving was able to be performed to the east of the altar, but the bringing near of meal offerings had to be done to the west, i.e., the southwest corner of the altar. Also, with regard to all meal offerings, the wavings precede the actions of bringing near. The omer meal offering and the meal offering of jealousy brought by a sota require both bringing near and waving. The meal offering of the omer requires waving, as it is written: “And he shall wave the omer before the Lord” (Leviticus 23:11), and likewise with regard to the meal offering brought by a sota it is written: “And the priest shall take the meal offering of jealousy out of the woman’s hand and shall wave the meal offering before the Lord” (Numbers 5:25). The requirement of bringing near is derived as explained earlier. The shewbread and the meal offering brought with libations require neither bringing near nor waving.

Rabbi Shimon says: There are three types of offerings that require performance of three mitzvot. Two mitzvot are performed on each and every one of them, but the third mitzva is not performed in their sacrifice, meaning that each of these offerings requires two out of the same three mitzvot, but not necessarily the same two as the others. And these are the three offerings: Peace offerings brought as gift offerings by an individual, communal peace offerings, i.e., the two lambs brought with the two loaves on Shavuot, and the guilt offering of a leper (see Leviticus 14:12–14). Peace offerings brought by individuals require placing hands on the head of the animals while the animals are still alive, and waving when they are slaughtered, but there is no obligation of waving them while they are alive. Communal peace offerings require waving both while the animals are still alive and after they are slaughtered, but there is no obligation of placing hands on them. And the guilt offering of a leper requires placing hands and waving while the animal is still alive, but there is no obligation of waving it after it is slaughtered.

One who takes a vow to bring a meal offering to the Temple and says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a maḥavat, may not bring one prepared in a marḥeshet. Similarly, if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a marḥeshet, he may not bring one prepared in a maḥavat. The mishna clarifies: What is the difference between a maḥavat and a marḥeshet? A marḥeshet has a cover, whereas a maḥavat does not have a cover; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: A marḥeshet is deep, and due to the large amount of oil, its product is soft because it moves about [ roḥashin ] in the oil. A maḥavat is flat, as the sides of the pan are level with the pan, and due to the small amount of oil, its product is hard.

If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering baked in an oven, he may not bring a meal offering baked on a small oven [ kupaḥ ], nor a meal offering baked on roofing tiles, nor a meal offering baked in the baking pits of the Arabs. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he so wishes, he may bring a meal offering baked on a kupaḥ. If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a baked meal offering, without specifying loaves or wafers, he may not bring half the required offering in the form of loaves and the other half in the form of wafers; rather, they must all be of one form or the other. Rabbi Shimon deems this permitted, due to the fact that both loaves and wafers are written with regard to this meal offering, which indicates that it is one offering of two possible forms.

Chapter 6

And these are the meal offerings from which a handful is removed and the remainder of the offering is eaten by the priests: The meal offering of fine flour; and the meal offering prepared in a pan; and the meal offering prepared in a deep pan; and the meal offering baked in an oven that is brought entirely of loaves; and the meal offering baked in an oven that is brought entirely of wafers; the meal offering of gentiles; and the meal offering of women; and the omer meal offering, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan; and the meal offering of a sinner; and the meal offering of jealousy, brought by a sota. Rabbi Shimon says: Although its remainder is not eaten by priests, as meal offerings of priests are burned in their entirety, as it is written: “And every meal offering of the priest shall be offered in its entirety; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16), nevertheless, with regard to the meal offering of a sinner brought by one of the priests, a handful is removed. And the handful is sacrificed on the altar by itself, and the remainder is sacrificed on the altar by itself.

The meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, and the meal offering brought with libations that accompany burnt offerings and peace offerings are burned in their entirety on the altar, and there is no part of them for the priests. And in the case of those offerings, the power of the altar is greater than the power of the priests. The two loaves, i.e., the public offering on Shavuot of two loaves baked from new wheat, and the shewbread, i.e., the twelve loaves that were placed on the sacred Table in the Sanctuary each Shabbat, are eaten by the priests, and there is no part of them burned on the altar. And in the case of those offerings, the power of the priests is greater than the power of the altar.

All the meal offerings that are prepared in a vessel, e.g., the offerings prepared in a pan or deep pan, require three placements of oil, listed here in the reverse order of their placement: Pouring oil on the cakes after they have been cooked, and mixing oil into the flour, and placement of oil into the vessel prior to preparation of the meal offerings. In the meal offerings that come as loaves, it is after the flour has been baked into loaves that one breaks them into pieces and mixes them with oil; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: It is with fine flour that one mixes the oil. Although the loaves of the meal offering baked in an oven require mixing of their flour with oil, wafers do not require mixing, but rather a smearing of oil on them after baking. How does one smear oil on them? He does so in a shape similar to the Greek letter chi, Χ, and the rest of the oil remaining after smearing is eaten by priests.

All the meal offerings that are prepared in a vessel require breaking into pieces. In breaking the meal offering of an Israelite into pieces, the priest folds [ kofel ] one into two and two into four and separates it at the folds. In breaking into pieces the meal offering of priests, the priest folds one into two and two into four and does not separate it at the folds. Because no handful is removed, separation is unnecessary. In the case of the griddle-cake meal offering of the anointed priest, he would not fold it. Rabbi Shimon says: In neither the meal offering of priests nor the meal offering of the anointed priest is there breaking into pieces, because in those meal offerings there is no removal of a handful. And any meal offering in which there is no removal of a handful there is no breaking into pieces. And in all meal offerings that are broken into pieces, the priest breaks them into olive-bulk- sized pieces.

All the meal offerings require rubbing three hundred times and striking five hundred times with one’s fist or palm. Rubbing and striking are performed on the wheat kernels to remove their husks prior to grinding them into flour. And Rabbi Yosei says: They are performed on the dough to ensure a smooth product. All of the meal offerings come as ten loaves or ten wafers from each one tenth of an ephah of flour, except for the shewbread and the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, which come as twelve loaves or wafers; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: They all come as twelve loaves except for the four types of loaves that accompany the thanks offering and the two types of loaves that accompany the peace offering of naziriteship, which come as ten each.

The omer offering, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, would come from a tenth of an ephah of flour sifted from three se’a of barley. The two loaves would come from two-tenths of an ephah of flour sifted from three se’a of wheat. The shewbread would come from twenty-four tenths of an ephah of flour sifted from twenty-four se’a of wheat.

The flour of the omer was sifted with thirteen sifters, each finer than its predecessor, and the flour that emerged from the final sifter was sacrificed. The flour of the two loaves was sifted with twelve sifters, and the flour of the shewbread was sifted with eleven sifters. Rabbi Shimon says: They have no fixed number of sifters; rather, it was fine flour that was completely sifted that one would bring for all of these offerings, as it is stated: “And you shall take fine flour and bake it” (Leviticus 24:5), indicating that one does not fulfill his obligation until the flour will be completely sifted.

Chapter 7

The flour for the loaves accompanying the thanks offering would come from a measure of five Jerusalem se’a offering, which are equivalent to six wilderness se’a. The se’a referred to in the Bible when the Jewish people were in the wilderness is smaller than the se’a used later in Jerusalem. This is equivalent to two ephahs, each ephah being three wilderness se’a. These two ephahs are twenty measures of a tenth of an ephah. Ten of these tenths were used to make leavened loaves and ten of these tenths were used to make unleavened loaves, i.e., matza. The mishna elaborates: There are ten tenths for the loaves of leavened bread, a tenth of an ephah per loaf. And there are ten tenths for the loaves of matza. And among the loaves of matza there are three types: Loaves, wafers, and those poached in water, ten loaves of each type. Consequently, there are three-and-one-third tenths of an ephah for each and every type, three loaves per tenth of an ephah. And in the Jerusalem measure there were thirty kav, fifteen kav for the loaves of leavened bread and fifteen for the loaves of matza. The mishna elaborates: There are fifteen kav for the loaves of leavened bread, one and one-half kav per loaf. And there are fifteen kav for the loaves of matza. And among the loaves of matza there are three types: Loaves, wafers, and those poached in water. Consequently, there are five kav for each and every type, two loaves per kav.

The loaves that accompanied the ram of the inauguration of the Tabernacle would come parallel to the three types of matza that accompany the thanks offering: Loaves, wafers, and loaves poached in water and made with oil (see Leviticus 8:26). The loaves of leavened bread that accompany the thanks offering were not brought with the ram of inauguration. The loaves that accompany the offering that the nazirite brings upon completion of his period of naziriteship would come with only two parts of the three types of matza that accompany the thanks offering, namely, loaves and wafers, but there is no matza poached in water (see Numbers 6:15). Consequently, the loaves of the offering of a nazirite are from ten kav of fine flour according to the Jerusalem measure, as taught in the previous mishna that each type of the loaves of matza comes from five kav of flour, which equal six-and-two-thirds tenths of an ephah according to the wilderness measure, as each type of the loaves of matza comes from three-and-one-third tenths of an ephah. From all of the four types of loaves accompanying the thanks offering, one takes one loaf from each set of ten as teruma, to be given to a priest, as it is stated: “And he shall present from it one of each offering as a teruma unto the Lord; to the priest that sprinkles the blood of the peace offerings against the altar it shall be given” (Leviticus 7:14). The verse is analyzed: “One” indicates that one should not take a sliced loaf; “of each offering” indicates that all the offerings should be equal, i.e., that one should not take a loaf from one type of offering for another type; “to the priest that sprinkles the blood of the peace offerings against the altar it shall be given,” and the rest of the loaves are eaten by the owner.

In the case of one who slaughters the thanks offering in its proper place inside the Temple courtyard, and at that time its forty loaves were outside the wall, the loaves were not consecrated. Likewise, if he slaughtered the thanks offering before the surface of the loaves formed a crust in the oven, and even if the surface of all the loaves formed a crust except for one of them, the loaves were not consecrated. If one slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, and the offering was rendered piggul or was disqualified, respectively, the loaves were consecrated and either rendered piggul or disqualified. If one slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it was an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ], the loaves were not consecrated, as the cause of the animal’s disqualification preceded its slaughter. If one slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a blemished animal that may not be sacrificed ab initio but if it ascended the altar it may be sacrificed, Rabbi Eliezer says: He has consecrated the loaves, since if the offering ascends the altar it is sacrificed. And the Rabbis say: He has not consecrated the loaves, since it may not be sacrificed ab initio. If one slaughtered the thanks offering not for its sake but for the sake of another offering, and likewise, if one slaughtered the ram of inauguration not for its sake, and likewise, if one slaughtered the communal peace offering of two sheep that accompany the two loaves on Shavuot not for their sake, the loaves were not consecrated.

In a case where the libations that accompany the offerings were sanctified in a service vessel when the animal was slaughtered and the offering was discovered to be unfit, if there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering; and if not, they should be disqualified by being left overnight, and then burned. With regard to the offspring of an animal designated as a thanks offering, or an animal that is its substitute; or in a case where one separated an animal as a thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, in all three cases, the second animal, i.e., the offspring, the substitute, or the replacement, is sacrificed, but it does not require the bringing of accompanying loaves. This is as it is stated: “If he sacrifices it for a thanks offering, then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour poached” (Leviticus 7:12). The verse indicates that the initial thanks offering requires loaves, but neither its offspring, nor its replacement, nor its substitute requires loaves.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, must bring it and its loaves from non-sacred money in his possession and not second-tithe money. Since he said: It is incumbent upon me, bringing the offering is an obligation, and one may not fulfill an obligation with second-tithe money. If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second- tithe money, he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money. If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second- tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it in that manner. Likewise, if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second- tithe money, he may bring it in that manner. And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money.

From where is it derived with regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, that he may bring it only from non-sacred money? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering to the Lord your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). The verse is difficult: Doesn’t the Paschal offering come only from lambs and goats? If so, why does the verse state: “The flock and the herd”? It is to juxtapose all offerings that come from the flock and from the herd to the Paschal offering, teaching that just as the Paschal offering is a matter of obligation and comes only from non-sacred money, so too any matter of obligation comes only from non-sacred money. Therefore, in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a peace offering, since these offerings come as an obligation due to his vow, they may be brought only from non-sacred money. And libations, in any case, may be brought only from non-sacred money, and not from second-tithe money, because second-tithe money must be used to purchase items eaten by people, while libations are poured out next to the altar.

Chapter 8

All communal and individual meal offerings may come from produce grown in Eretz Yisrael and from outside Eretz Yisrael, from the new crop, i.e., the current year’s crop, and from the old crop from previous years. This is the halakha of all meal offerings except for the omer, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, and the two loaves, i.e., the communal offering brought on the festival of Shavuot, as they come only from the new crop and from Eretz Yisrael. And all meal offerings come only from the optimal- quality grain. And which places have the optimal grain for them? Fields in Makhnis and Zateḥa are the primary [ alfa ] source for fine flour. Secondary to them is Aforayim in the valley. A ll the regions were valid as the source of the grain, but it is from here, the primary and secondary places, that they would bring grain, because it was of optimal quality.

Even when selecting grain for meal offerings from the locations mentioned in the previous mishna, one may not bring as a meal offering grain from a fertilized field, nor from an irrigated field, nor from a field of trees, as such fields do not produce grain of optimal quality. But if one did bring a meal offering of grain from such fields, it is fit. How does one produce optimal-quality grain? He plows the field during the first year, but he does not sow it, and in the second year, he sows it seventy days before Passover, and in that manner it produces grain that will provide an abundance of fine, high-quality, flour. How does the Temple treasurer inspect the flour to determine whether it is of sufficiently high quality? The treasurer inserts his hand into the flour. If, when he removes his hand, flour powder covers it, the flour is unfit, until one sifts it with a fine sifter, so that no powder will remain. And if the flour became wormy, it is unfit for use in a meal offering.

Olive trees in Tekoa are the primary source of oil to be used in meal offerings. Abba Shaul says: Secondary to Tekoa is Regev on the east bank of the Jordan River. All the regions were valid for oil to be brought from them, but it was from here that they would bring it. One may not bring a meal offering containing oil from olives taken from a fertilized olive grove, nor from olives taken from an irrigated olive grove, nor from olives taken from an olive grove where grain was sown between the trees. But if one did bring a meal offering containing oil from such groves, it is valid. One may not bring a meal offering containing oil from unripe olives [ anpiktan ], but if one did bring it, it is not valid. One may not bring a meal offering containing oil from olives that were soaked in water, nor from pickled olives, nor from boiled olives, and even if one did bring it, it is not valid.

There are three harvests of olives each year, and in each of them, three different grades of oils are produced. How is the first olive harvest processed? One picks the ripe olives at the top of the olive tree, as those are the first to ripen, and crushes them in a mortar and places them inside the bottom of a wicker basket that has many small holes in it. The oil will then drip from the olives through those holes into a vessel placed underneath the basket. Rabbi Yehuda says: One positions the olives on the walls, surrounding the basket. This produces more refined oil, as the dregs stick to the walls of the basket. This is the first grade of oil produced from the first harvest. After the oil ceases to seep from the crushed olives, one then presses down with a wooden beam upon them, causing additional oil to flow from the basket into the vessel. Rabbi Yehuda says: The excessive pressure produced by pressing down with a beam would cause some of the flesh of the olives to get mixed in with the oil, compromising its quality. Rather, one applies pressure by placing stones upon the olives. This is the second grade of oil. One then ground the olives with a millstone and pressed down with a beam on those olives to extract any remaining oil; this is the third grade of oil. The first grade is fit for kindling the Candelabrum, which requires: “Refined olive oil” (Leviticus 24:2), and the rest are fit for use in meal offerings. How is the second olive harvest processed? One picks the crop of olives that is accessible while one is standing on the rooftop. This was the second lot of olives to ripen. And one crushes it in a mortar and places those olives into a wicker basket, allowing the oil to drip through the holes into a vessel underneath. Rabbi Yehuda says: One positions the olives on the walls, surrounding the basket. This is the first grade of oil from the second harvest. One then presses down upon those olives with a wooden beam, thereby producing more oil. And Rabbi Yehuda says: One applies pressure only by placing stones upon them. This is the second grade of oil. One then ground the olives with a millstone and pressed down upon them with a beam, thereby extracting any remaining oil; this is the third grade of oil. The first grade is fit for kindling the Candelabrum, and the rest are fit for use in meal offerings. How is the third olive harvest processed? This harvest consists of all the olives that still remain on trees. One packs it into a vat [ oteno ] in the building that houses the olive press [ beit habbad ] where it remains until it softens, and then one raises it up to the roof and dries it on the rooftop to remove the foul-smelling liquid secreted from the olives while in the vat. Then, one crushes the olives in a mortar and places them into a wicker basket, allowing the oil to drip through the holes into a vessel underneath. Rabbi Yehuda says: One positions them on the walls, surrounding the basket. This is the first grade of oil. One then presses down on those olives with a wooden beam, thereby producing more oil. And Rabbi Yehuda says: One applies pressure only by placing stones upon them. This is the second grade of oil. One would then grind the olives with a millstone and press down upon them with a beam, thereby extracting any remaining oil; this is the third grade of oil. The first grade is fit for kindling the Candelabrum, and the rest are fit for use in meal offerings.

Having enumerated the nine grades of oils in the previous mishna, this mishna proceeds to rank them by their quality: As for the first grade of oil that is produced from the first harvest, there is none superior to it. The second grade of oil that is produced from the first harvest and the first grade of oil that is produced from the second harvest are of equal quality; there is no reason to choose one over the other. The third grade of oil that is produced from the first harvest and the second grade of oil that is produced from the second harvest and the first grade of oil that is produced from the third harvest are of equal quality. The third grade of oil that is produced from the second harvest and the second grade of oil that is produced from the third harvest are of equal quality. As for the third grade of oil that is produced from the third harvest, there is none inferior to it. Also, with regard to all the meal offerings, it was logical that they should require the highest quality of refined olive oil, just like the Candelabrum. Because if the Candelabrum, whose oil is not to be consumed on the altar, requires refined olive oil, then meal offerings, which are to be consumed on the altar, is it not logical that they should require refined olive oil? To dispel this notion, the verse states: “Refined pounded olive oil for illumination” (Leviticus 24:2), which indicates that the high-quality, refined, pounded oil is required for the Candelabrum, but there is no need for refined pounded olive oil for meal offerings.

From where would they bring the wine for libations? Keduḥim and Attulin are the primary sources for wine. Secondary to them is Beit Rima and Beit Lavan, located in the mountain, and the village of Signa, located in the valley. All the regions were valid sources for wine; but it was from here, i.e., the aforementioned locations, that they would bring the wine. One may not bring libations of wine that come from a fertilized vineyard, or from an irrigated vineyard, or from a vineyard in which grain was sown between the vines. But if one did bring a libation from such wine, it is valid. One may not bring libations from sweet wine made from sun-dried grapes [ hilyasteyon ], but if one did bring a libation from such wine, it is valid. One may not bring wine aged for one year; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but the Rabbis deem it valid. One may not bring libations from sweet wine, nor from wine produced from smoked grapes, nor libations from boiled wine, and if one did bring a libation from such wine, it is not valid. And one may not bring wine produced from grapes suspended on stakes or trees; rather, one brings it from grapes at foot height, i.e., that rest on the ground, which are superior-quality grapes, and from vineyards that are cultivated, i.e., where one hoes beneath the vines twice a year.

And when producing wine for libations, one should not collect the wine into large barrels, as it causes the wine to spoil; rather, it should be placed in small casks. And one does not fill up the cask until its mouth; rather, one leaves some empty space so that its fragrance will collect there and diffuse when the lid is opened. One should not bring libations from wine that rests at the mouth of the cask due to the flour- like white scum that floats on the surface, nor from the wine at bottom of the cask due to the sediment that collects there. Rather, one brings from the wine in its middle third. How does the Temple treasurer inspect the wine to determine that it is from the middle of the cask? The treasurer sits alongside the cask and has the measuring reed in his hand. The spigot is opened and the wine begins to flow. When he sees that the wine emerging draws with it chalk -like scum [ hagir ], he immediately knocks with the reed to indicate that the spigot should be closed. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Wine in which there is flour- like white scum is unfit for libations, as it is stated with regard to animal offerings: “Unblemished they shall be for you…and their meal offering shall be fine flour mixed with oil…unblemished they shall be for you, and their libations” (Numbers 28:19–20, 31). This indicates that animal offerings, meal offerings, and libations must all be brought from flawless products. Therefore, the presence of flour-like white scum in wine renders it unfit.

Chapter 9

Two sizes of measuring vessels for dry substances were used in the Temple for measuring flour for the meal offerings. One held a tenth of an ephah and the other held one-half of a tenth of an ephah. Rabbi Meir says: There were three measuring vessels; one that held a tenth of an ephah, another one that also held a tenth of an ephah, and a third one that held one - half of a tenth of an ephah. What purpose did the tenth of an ephah measuring vessel serve? It was the vessel with which one would measure flour for all the meal offerings. One would not measure the flour by using a measuring vessel of a size that held the entire volume of flour required at once, i.e., neither with a vessel of three- tenths of an ephah for the meal offering accompanying the sacrifice of a bull, nor with a vessel of two -tenths of an ephah for the meal offering accompanying the sacrifice of a ram. Rather, one measures the flour for them by repeatedly using the tenth of an ephah measuring vessel to measure the required number of tenths. What purpose did the one - half of a tenth of an ephah measuring vessel serve? It was the vessel with which one would measure the flour for the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering. A tenth of an ephah was required each day; he sacrificed half of it in the morning and the other half of it in the afternoon.

There were seven measuring vessels for liquids in the Temple. There was a vessel of one hin, i.e., twelve log. Three vessels were used to measure the oil and wine for the meal offerings and libations that accompanied the sacrifice of an animal. For a bull there was a vessel of one - half of a hin, i.e., six log ; and for a ram there was one of one-third of a hin, i.e., four log ; and for a lamb there was one of one-quarter of a hin, i.e., three log. In addition, there was a vessel that held one log to measure the oil for all standard meal offerings; and another one that held one - half of a log for measuring the water used in the rite of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [ sota ] and also for the oil used in the loaves accompanying the thanks offering (see 88a); and another one that held one-quarter of a log for measuring the water used in the purification of a leper and also for the oil used in the wafers and loaves that the nazirite brings on the day that his term of naziriteship ends. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: It was not necessary to have several vessels of different sizes; rather, there were graduations [ shenatot ] on the vessel that held one hin indicating that until here is the quantity needed for the bull, and until here is the quantity needed for the ram, and until here is the quantity needed for the lamb. Rabbi Shimon says: There was no vessel there in the Temple that held one hin, as what purpose could a one -hin vessel serve? That volume of liquid was never used in an offering. Rather, there was an additional measuring vessel of one and a half log there, in the Temple, which completed the tally of seven vessels, with which one would measure the oil used for the griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest; one and a half log were used in the morning and one and a half log in the afternoon.

What purpose did the quarter- log measuring vessel serve? It was used to measure a quarter- log of water for the purification of the leper, and a quarter- log of oil for the wafers and loaves that the nazirite brings on the day that his term of naziriteship ends. What purpose did the half - log measuring vessel serve? It was used to measure a half- log of water for the rite of the sota and a half- log of oil for the three types of loaves of matza accompanying the thanks offering. And with the vessel of one log, one would measure the oil for all the standard meal offerings. Each tenth of an ephah of flour requires one log of oil. Accordingly, even if one brings a meal offering of sixty tenths of an ephah of flour, one adds to it sixty log of oil. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Each meal offering, irrespective of its volume, even a meal offering of sixty tenths of an ephah of flour, requires only its single log of oil, as it is stated with regard to the offering brought by a poor leper on the day of his purification: “And a tenth of an ephah of fine flour mixed with oil for a meal offering, and a log of oil” (Leviticus 14:21). The juxtaposition of “a meal offering” with “a log of oil” teaches a principle for all meal offerings: Each offering requires only one log of oil. The mishna lists the quantities of oil and wine that were required for the meal offerings and libations that accompanied the sacrifice of an animal. Six log, i.e., one - half of a hin, for those of a bull; and four log, i.e., one-third of a hin, for those of a ram; and three log, i.e., one-quarter of a hin, for those of a lamb. In addition, three and a half log of oil were required for the Candelabrum, as there were seven lamps and a half- log was required for each lamp.

Many animal offerings are brought together with a meal offering and a wine libation. These additions are collectively referred to as libations. One may mix together the libations of bulls with the libations of rams; the meal offerings may be mixed as they both share the same ratio of flour to oil, i.e., two log of oil for each tenth of an ephah of flour. Likewise, one may mix together the libations of lambs with the libations of other lambs, as the meal offerings both share the same ratio of three log of oil for each tenth of an ephah of flour. And one may mix together the libations of the offering of an individual with those of a communal offering. And one may mix together the libations of an offering brought on one day with those of the day before, if the meal offerings have the same ratio of oil to flour. But one may not mix together the libations of lambs with the libations of bulls or the libations of rams, as the meal offerings have different ratios of oil to flour. And nevertheless, if one intermingled the flour and oil of these lamb offerings by themselves and the flour and oil of these bull or ram offerings by themselves, and only then were they mixed together, then they remain fit to be sacrificed. If they were mixed together before the oil and flour of each offering were independently intermingled to form the meal offering, then they are disqualified. With regard to the lamb offering that comes with the omer meal offering, which is accompanied by another meal offering and a wine libation, even though the quantity of flour used in its meal offering is doubled, i.e., one uses twice the amount that is generally used for meal offerings that accompany the sacrifice of a lamb, its oil and wine libations were not doubled; rather, three log of oil and three log of wine were used, per the standard quantities used for a lamb.

All measuring vessels that were in the Temple were such that they held the volume that they measured when their contents were heaped above the rim, except for the measuring vessel used to measure the flour for the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, as its heaped measure, i.e., the quantity of flour held by a tenth of an ephah measuring vessel when heaped, was contained within its walls when the flour was leveled with the rim. This was due to the fact that the measuring vessel for the griddle-cake offering was slightly larger than the tenth of an ephah measuring vessel. With regard to measuring vessels for liquids, their overflows, i.e., that which flows onto the outside of vessel’s walls, are sacred, but with regard to measuring vessels for dry substances, their overflows are non-sacred. Rabbi Akiva says that the reason for this difference is that since the measuring vessels for liquids are themselves sacred, therefore their overflows are sacred, and since the measuring vessels for dry substances are non-sacred, therefore their overflows are non-sacred. Rabbi Yosei says: The difference is not due to that factor. Rather, it is because the overflow of liquid was originally inside the vessel, where it became consecrated, and was then displaced, whereas the overflow of a dry substance was not displaced from inside the vessel, so it had not become consecrated.

All offerings, whether communal or individual, require libations, i.e., a meal offering and a wine libation, except for the firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, the Paschal offering, the sin offering, and the guilt offering, with which libations are not brought. But the exception to this exception is that the sin offering of a leper and his guilt offering do require libations.

For all communal offerings there is no mitzva of placing hands on the head of the offering, except for the bull that comes to atone for a community-wide violation of any one of the mitzvot that was perpetrated due to an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin, where the judges of the Sanhedrin are required to place their hands upon its head (see Leviticus 4:13–21); and the scapegoat brought on Yom Kippur, upon which the High Priest places his hands (see Leviticus, chapter 16). Rabbi Shimon says: Also in the case of the goat that comes to atone for a community-wide perpetration of idol worship that occurred due to an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin, the judges of the Sanhedrin are required to place their hands upon its head (see Numbers 15:22–26). All offerings of an individual require placing hands, except for the firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, and the Paschal offering. The mitzva of placing hands is performed by the owner of the offering. The mishna adds: And if the owner died, then the heir is regarded as the offering’s owner and so he places his hands on the offering and brings the accompanying libations. And furthermore, he can substitute a non-sacred animal for it. Although it is prohibited to perform an act of substitution, if the owner of an offering does this, his attempt is successful to the extent that the non-sacred animal is thereby consecrated, even though the original offering also remains sacred.

Everyone who brings an animal offering places hands upon its head, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind person, a gentile, a Canaanite slave, the agent of the owner of the offering who brings the offering on the owner’s behalf, and a woman. And the requirement of placing hands is a non-essential mitzva; therefore, failure to place hands does not prevent the owner from achieving atonement. The rite of placing hands is performed by leaning on the head of the offering with two hands. And in the same location in the Temple that one places hands, one slaughters the animal. And immediately following the rite of placing hands, the slaughter is performed.

There is an aspect of greater stringency with regard to placing hands than there is with regard to waving, and there is an aspect of greater stringency with regard to waving than there is with regard to placing hands. The stringency with regard to placing hands is that if several people are partners in bringing an offering, one of them waves the offering on behalf of all the other partners, but one cannot fulfill the requirement of placing hands if he alone places hands on behalf of all the other partners; rather, each member must place hands himself. The stringency with regard to waving is that waving is practiced in the cases of both offerings of an individual, e.g., peace offerings, where the breast and thigh and sacrificial portions are waved, and in the cases of communal offerings, e.g., the two lambs sacrificed on Shavuot, which are waved together with the two loaves; and it is practiced both in the cases of offerings when they are alive, e.g., the guilt offering of a leper and the lambs of Shavuot, and in the cases of offerings after they are slaughtered, e.g., the breast and thigh. By contrast, placing hands is practiced with a live animal. A further stringency is that waving is practiced both in the case of an item in which there is a living spirit, i.e., an animal offering, and in the case of an item in which there is not a living spirit, e.g., the omer offering, the sota meal offering, and the loaves accompanying a thanks offering and the ram of the nazirite, whereas placing hands is only ever performed upon living beings.

Chapter 10

Rabbi Yishmael says: When the day of the sacrifice of the omer meal offering would occur on Shabbat, the labors performed that would otherwise be prohibited were kept to a minimum, and the one-tenth of an ephah of flour that was brought as an offering was processed from three se’a of reaped barley. And if it occurred during the week, the flour was processed from five se’a of reaped barley. And the Rabbis say: Both on Shabbat and during the week, the omer offering would come from three se’a of reaped barley. Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, says: On Shabbat the barley was reaped by an individual and with one sickle and with one basket into which the barley was placed; and during the week, it was reaped by three people with three baskets and three sickles. And the Rabbis say: Both on Shabbat and during the week, it was reaped by three people with three baskets and with three sickles.

The mitzva of the omer is to bring the barley reaped for the meal offering from fields proximate to Jerusalem. If the barley did not ripen in the fields proximate to Jerusalem, one brings it from any place in Eretz Yisrael. There was an incident where the omer came from Gaggot Tzerifin and the wheat for the two loaves on Shavuot came from the valley of Ein Sokher.

How would they perform the rite of the harvest of the omer? Emissaries of the court would emerge on the eve of the festival of Passover and fashion the stalks of barley into sheaves while the stalks were still attached to the ground, so that it would be convenient to reap them. The residents of all the towns adjacent to the site of the harvest would assemble there, so that it would be harvested with great fanfare. Once it grew dark, the court emissary says to those assembled: Did the sun set? The assembly says in response: Yes. The emissary repeats: Did the sun set? They again say: Yes. The court emissary next says to those assembled: Shall I reap the sheaves with this sickle? The assembly says in response: Yes. The emissary repeats: With this sickle? The assembly says: Yes. The court emissary then says to those assembled: Shall I place the gathered sheaves in this basket? The assembly says in response: Yes. The emissary repeats: In this basket? The assembly says: Yes. If the sixteenth of Nisan occurs on Shabbat, the court emissary says to the assembled: Shall I cut the sheaves on this Shabbat? The assembly says in response: Yes. The emissary repeats: On this Shabbat? The assembly says: Yes. The court emissary says to those assembled: Shall I cut the sheaves? And they say to him in response: Cut. The emissary repeats: Shall I cut the sheaves? And they say to him: Cut. The emissary asks three times with regard to each and every matter, and the assembly says to him: Yes, yes, yes. The mishna asks: Why do I need those involved to publicize each stage of the rite to that extent? The mishna answers: It is due to the Boethusians, as they deny the validity of the Oral Law and would say: There is no harvest of the omer at the conclusion of the first Festival day of Passover unless it occurs at the conclusion of Shabbat. The publicity was to underscore that the sixteenth of Nisan was the proper time for the omer harvest.

After they harvested the omer and placed it in the baskets, they brought it to the Temple courtyard. And they would singe in the fire the kernels of barley while they were still on the stalks, in order to fulfill the mitzva of parched grain, as it is written: “And if you bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring for the meal offering of your first fruits grain in the ear parched with fire” (Leviticus 2:14). This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Prior to parching the kernels, they would remove them from the stalks by beating them with soft, moist reeds and with cabbage stalks, not with sticks, so that the kernels would not be crushed. They then placed the grain into a hollow vessel [ le’abuv ], and this vessel was perforated so that the fire would take hold of the grain in its entirety. After parching the kernels, they would spread the kernels in the Temple courtyard and the wind would blow upon the kernels, cooling and drying them. They then placed the kernels in a mill used to grind grits, so that the barley would not be ground so fine that the shell would be mixed with the grain. And they produced from the ground barley a tenth of an ephah of barley flour that was sifted through thirteen sifters, and the rest is redeemed and may be eaten by any person. And dough from this barley flour is obligated in the separation of ḥalla, and the grain is exempt from the separation of tithe. Rabbi Akiva deems this flour obligated in having ḥalla and tithes separated from it. After daybreak, the priest sacrificing the omer came to the sifted tenth of an ephah, placed in the vessel in his hand some of its log of oil, and placed its frankincense on the side of the vessel. He then poured some more oil from the log onto the high-quality flour and mixed them together, waved and brought the meal offering to the corner of the altar, and removed the handful and burned it on the altar. And the rest of the meal offering is eaten by the priests.

Once the omer was sacrificed people would emerge and find the marketplace of Jerusalem full of the flour from the parched grain of the new crop that was permitted by the waving and the sacrifice of the omer offering. That filling of the marketplace with the new crop was performed not with the approval of the Sages; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: They would do so with the approval of the Sages. From the moment that the omer offering was sacrificed, the produce of the new crop was permitted immediately. For those distant from Jerusalem, the new crop is permitted from midday and beyond. From the time that the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the day of waving the omer, the sixteenth of Nisan, is entirely prohibited, i.e., one may partake of the new crop only the next day. Rabbi Yehuda said: But isn’t it forbidden by Torah law, as it is stated: “And you shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh grain, until this selfsame day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14)? This means that the new crop is prohibited on the day of the waving unless permitted by sacrifice of the offering. And if so, for what reason is it permitted for those distant to eat the new crop from midday and beyond, when the Temple is standing? It is due to the fact that they know that the members of the court are not indolent in its sacrifice, and certainly by midday the sacrifice of the omer offering has been completed.

Sacrifice of the omer offering would permit consumption of the new crop in the rest of the country outside the Temple, and the two loaves offering would permit the sacrifice of the new crop in the Temple. One may not bring meal offerings, or first fruits, or the meal offering brought with libations accompanying animal offerings, from the new crop prior to the sacrifice of the omer, and if he brought them from the new crop they are unfit. After the omer but prior to the two loaves one may not bring these offerings from the new crop, but if he brought them from the new crop, they are fit.

Wheat, barley, spelt, oats, and rye; these are obligated in the separation of ḥalla, and each one of them joins together with the others to constitute the measure that obligates one to separate ḥalla. And they are prohibited due to the prohibition of partaking of the new crop prior to the Passover Festival, and likewise it is prohibited to reap them prior to the omer offering. If these grains took root prior the omer offering, the omer permits their consumption; and if not, they are prohibited until the next omer is brought and sacrificed the following year.

Even before the omer offering is brought, one may reap a crop that grows in an irrigated field in the valleys, but one may not arrange the reaped stalks in a pile. The residents of Jericho, whose fields were categorized as irrigated fields in a valley, reaped the crops with the approval of the Sages and arranged the crops in a pile without the approval of the Sages, but the Sages did not reprimand them. One may reap crops in any field for fodder and feed it to an animal. Rabbi Yehuda said: When may one do so? At a time when he begins reaping before the crop reaches one-third of its potential growth. Rabbi Shimon says: One may reap and feed the crops to animals even after they reached one-third of their potential growth.

And one may reap crops prior to the omer due to potential damage to saplings growing alongside the crops; and due to the place of mourning, i.e., to create room for those consoling mourners, who would bless them upon their return from the cemetery; and due to the need to create room for students to study, as failure to do so would lead to dereliction of Torah study in the study hall. After reaping the crops for any of these reasons, one may not fashion them into sheaves, but he leaves them unbound. The mitzva of the omer is for the barley to come from standing grain. If one did not find standing grain, he brings from sheaves. Its mitzva is for it to come from fresh, moist grain. If one did not find moist grain, he brings from dry grain. Its mitzva is for one to reap the grain at night, but if it was reaped during the day, it is fit. And reaping the grain for the omer overrides Shabbat.

Chapter 11

The two loaves that are brought on the festival of Shavuot from the new wheat are each made from a tenth of an ephah of fine flour. They are kneaded one by one and they are baked one by one, i.e., each loaf is placed separately in the oven. The loaves of the shewbread are kneaded one by one and baked two by two, i.e., two loaves are placed in the oven at the same time. And the baker would prepare the shewbread in a mold [ defus ] when he made the dough. When he removes the shewbread from the oven he again places the loaves in a mold so that their shape will not be ruined.

In the case of both the two loaves and the shewbread, the kneading of their dough and the forming of their loaves take place outside the Temple courtyard, but their baking takes place inside the Temple courtyard. And their preparation does not override Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: All of the procedures involved in their preparation take place inside the courtyard. Rabbi Shimon says: One should always be accustomed to say that the two loaves and the shewbread are fit if they were prepared in the Temple courtyard and they are also fit if they were prepared in Beit Pagei, outside the Temple Mount, as he maintains that they may be baked outside the Temple courtyard.

With regard to the twelve loaves of the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering, of which six are offered in the morning and six in the evening, their kneading, the forming of their loaves, and their baking take place inside the Temple courtyard, and all types of labor involved in those actions override Shabbat. These labors cannot be performed prior to Shabbat, as once the loaves are consecrated in a service vessel they are disqualified if they are left overnight. Grinding their flour and sifting their flour do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva stated a principle: Any labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat, but one that cannot be performed on Shabbat eve overrides Shabbat.

All preparatory procedures of the meal offerings that take place inside the Temple courtyard, e.g., kneading and forming the High Priest’s griddle cakes, involve the use of a service vessel that consecrates the offerings. But any preparatory procedures that take place outside the Temple courtyard, e.g., kneading and forming the two loaves and the shewbread, do not involve the use of a service vessel. With regard to the two loaves, their length is seven handbreadths, their width is four handbreadths, and they have hornlike protrusions made of dough that is attached to each of their corners, which are four fingerbreadths high. With regard to the loaves of shewbread, their length is ten handbreadths, their width is five handbreadths, and each loaf’s hornlike protrusions is seven fingerbreadths high. Rabbi Yehuda says: The following letters are a mnemonic so that you will not err and forget the dimensions of the two loaves: Zayin, dalet, dalet. The numerical value of the letter zayin is seven and the numerical value of the letter dalet is four. The mnemonic therefore represents the length of seven handbreadths, the width of four handbreadths, and the height of four fingerbreadths, respectively. The following letters are a mnemonic for the dimensions of the shewbread: Yod, heh, zayin, which stand for the length of ten handbreadths, the width of five handbreadths, and the height of seven fingerbreadths, respectively. Ben Zoma says that it is written: “And you shall set upon the Table shewbread [ leḥem panim ] before Me always” (Exodus 25:30). The term leḥem panim indicates that it should have vertical sides [ panim ] rather than a rounded shape.

As for the Table, its length is ten handbreadths and its width is five handbreadths, as the Torah states that the Table is two cubits long and one cubit wide (see Exodus 25:23), and Rabbi Yehuda holds that the cubit used as the unit of measurement for the construction of the Temple vessels was equal to five handbreadths. With regard to the shewbread, its length is ten handbreadths and its width is five handbreadths. The priest places the length of the two shewbread arrangements across the width of the Table, which leaves five handbreadths of each loaf protruding from the Table. And he folds the protruding two and a half handbreadths upward on this side of the Table, and the protruding two and a half handbreadths upward on that side of the Table. One finds, therefore, that the length of the shewbread covers the width of the Table. Similarly, since the width of each loaf is five handbreadths, the width of the two loaves filled the entire length of the Table. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to the Table, its length is twelve handbreadths and its width is six handbreadths, as the measure of a cubit used in the construction of the Temple vessels was equal to six handbreadths. Concerning the shewbread, its length is ten handbreadths and its width is five handbreadths. Rabbi Meir continues: The priest places the length of the shewbread across the width of the Table, which leaves four handbreadths of each loaf protruding from the Table. He folds the protruding two handbreadths upward on this side of the Table, and the protruding two handbreadths upward on that side of the Table. The width of the two arrangements of shewbread occupies only ten of the twelve handbreadths of the length of the Table, and this leaves a space of two handbreadths in the middle, between the two arrangements, so that the wind will blow between them and prevent the loaves from becoming moldy. Abba Shaul says: There, in the space between the two arrangements, the priests would place the two bowls of frankincense that accompany the shewbread. The Sages said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “And you shall place pure frankincense upon [ al ] each arrangement, that it may be for the bread as a memorial part, an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 24:7)? The verse indicates that the frankincense is placed upon the shewbread and not next to it. Abba Shaul said to the Sages in response: Isn’t it already stated: “And next to him [ alav ] shall be the tribe of Manasseh” (Numbers 2:20)? Just as the preposition “ alav ” in this verse means that the tribe of Manasseh pitched camp next to the tribe of Ephraim and not upon it, so too, the preposition “ al ” means that the frankincense was placed next to the arrangements of the shewbread.

The mishna continues to describe the shewbread Table: And there were four panels of gold there, which stood on the ground and rose above the height of the Table, and they split up at their upper ends, above the Table, so that the rods upon which the shewbread was placed could rest upon the panels. In this manner the panels would support the shewbread. There were two panels for this arrangement and two panels for that arrangement, and there were twenty-eight rods, each of which was shaped like half of a hollow reed. There were fourteen rods for this arrangement and fourteen rods for that arrangement. Neither the arranging of the rods for the new shewbread, nor their removal from the arrangement of the old shewbread, overrides Shabbat. Rather, a priest enters the Sanctuary on Shabbat eve, i.e., Friday before sundown, and removes each of the rods from between the loaves. And according to Rabbi Meir he then places each rod in the space between the two arrangements, along the length of the Table. Then, on Shabbat, he places the new shewbread on the Table without the rods, and he inserts the rods between the loaves at the conclusion of Shabbat. The mishna concludes: All the vessels that were in the Temple, including the Table, were placed so that their length was from east to west, along the length of the Temple.

There were two tables in the Entrance Hall, on the inside of the Entrance Hall, next to the entrance to the Temple, i.e., next to the entrance to the Sanctuary. One was of marble and one was of gold. On the table of marble, the priests place the new shewbread that has been baked, before its entrance into the Sanctuary, so that the loaves may cool a little from the heat of the oven and not spoil. And when the old shewbread is removed from the shewbread Table it is placed on the table of gold upon its exit from the Sanctuary, where it remains until the frankincense is burned on the altar. The reason the shewbread is placed on a gold table when it is removed, rather than on a marble or silver table, is that one elevates to a higher level in matters of sanctity and one does not downgrade. Since it is set on the gold shewbread Table all week, it cannot be downgraded to a marble or silver table upon its removal. And there was one Table of gold within the Sanctuary, upon which the shewbread is always found. The mishna describes the manner in which it is ensured that the shewbread is constantly on the Table: And four priests enter, two with the two arrangements of the new shewbread in their hands and two with the two bowls of frankincense in their hands. And four priests precede them, entering the Sanctuary before them, two to take the two arrangements of the old shewbread from the Table, and two to take the two bowls of frankincense. Those bringing the new shewbread into the Sanctuary stand in the north and their faces are to the south, and those removing the old shewbread stand in the south and their faces are to the north. These priests draw the old shewbread from the Table and those priests place the new shewbread on the Table, and for each handbreadth of this old shewbread that is removed from the Table a handbreadth of that new shewbread is placed upon the Table, so that the Table is never without loaves upon it, as it is stated: “And you shall set upon the Table shewbread before Me always” (Exodus 25:30). Rabbi Yosei says: Even if these priests were to remove the shewbread from the Table entirely, and only afterward those priests were to place the new shewbread upon the Table, this too would fulfill the requirement that the shewbread always be on the Table. It is unnecessary to ensure the uninterrupted presence of the shewbread upon the Table, as long as it does not remain a single night without shewbread upon it. The mishna describes the manner in which the shewbread is distributed: The priests who carried the old shewbread loaves came out of the Sanctuary and placed them on the table of gold that was in the Entrance Hall. The priests then burned on the altar the frankincense that was in the bowls. And the loaves were subsequently distributed to the priests. This occurred on Shabbat, the day that the priestly watch that served in the Temple during the preceding week was replaced by the priestly watch that would serve during the following week. The shewbread was distributed to the priests of both watches. If Yom Kippur occurs on Shabbat, the loaves are distributed at night, at the conclusion of the fast, since they may not be eaten during the day. If Yom Kippur occurs on Friday, i.e., when the holy day begins on Thursday evening, the goat sin offering of Yom Kippur is eaten by the priests at night, i.e., on Friday night, as it may be eaten only on the day that it is sacrificed or during the following night, until midnight. And since there is no possibility of cooking the meat, as one may not cook on Yom Kippur or Shabbat, the Babylonians, i.e., priests who had emigrated from Babylonia, eat it when it is raw, due to the fact that they are broad-minded with regard to their food, i.e., they are not particular and will eat meat even when it is not cooked.

If one arranged the bread on the Table on Shabbat but arranged the bowls of frankincense only after Shabbat, then if he subsequently burned the frankincense placed in the bowls on the following Shabbat, the loaves are unfit for consumption, since the frankincense had not been on the Table for the entire week. Since the burning of the frankincense did not render the loaves permitted for consumption, one is not ever liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul or notar, or for partaking of the shewbread when one is ritually impure. One violates these prohibitions only if the frankincense is burned in a manner that permits consumption of the shewbread. If one arranged the bread and the bowls of frankincense on Shabbat but then burned the frankincense that was in the bowls after the following Shabbat, that burning of the frankincense is not valid and the shewbread is unfit for consumption. And since the frankincense was not burned in a manner that permits consumption of the shewbread, one is not ever liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul or notar, or for partaking of the shewbread when one is ritually impure. If one arranged the bread and the bowls of frankincense after Shabbat and burned the frankincense that was in the bowls on the subsequent Shabbat, the burning of the frankincense is not valid and the shewbread is unfit for consumption. How should one act to prevent the shewbread from being rendered unfit? One should not remove the shewbread and frankincense from the Table on the subsequent Shabbat. Rather, he should leave it on the Table until the following Shabbat, so that it remains on the Table for a full week from Shabbat to Shabbat. It is permitted to leave the bread and frankincense on the Table beyond seven days, as even if it is on the Table for many days there is nothing wrong with that, i.e., it is not rendered unfit.

The two loaves that are brought on Shavuot are eaten by the priests no less than two days and no more than three days after they were baked. How so? They are generally baked on the eve of the festival of Shavuot and they are eaten on the day of the Festival, which is on the second day. If the Festival occurs after Shabbat, on Sunday, the loaves are baked on Friday, in which case they are eaten on the third day. The shewbread is eaten no less than nine days and no more than eleven days after it is baked. How so? It is generally baked on Shabbat eve and eaten on the following Shabbat, which is on the ninth day. If a Festival occurs on Shabbat eve the shewbread is baked on the eve of the Festival, on Thursday, in which case it is eaten on the tenth day. If the two festival days of Rosh HaShana occur on Thursday and Friday, the shewbread is baked on Wednesday, in which case it is eaten on the eleventh day. And this is because the preparation of the two loaves and the shewbread overrides neither Shabbat nor a Festival. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy High Priest: Their preparation overrides a Festival but does not override the fast day of Yom Kippur.

Chapter 12

With regard to the fine flour for meal offerings or the wine for libations that became ritually impure, as long as they have not yet been consecrated in a service vessel and assumed inherent sanctity, their redemption is possible. If they are redeemed, their sanctity will be transferred to the redemption money. Once they have been consecrated in a service vessel and have assumed inherent sanctity, their redemption is no longer possible, and they are burned like any other offerings that became ritually impure. With regard to consecrated birds, wood for the altar, frankincense, and service vessels, once they became ritually impure they have no possibility of redemption, as redemption of items consecrated for the altar was stated only with regard to a consecrated animal that developed a blemish, not with regard to other consecrated items.

In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a deep pan instead; or if he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan instead, the meal offering that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his obligation that he undertook with his vow and he must therefore bring another meal offering. If he said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a shallow pan, and he brought it prepared in a deep pan instead; or if he said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a deep pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, this offering is not valid, because he did not fulfill what he had stated concerning that tenth of an ephah of flour. In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring one meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and he divided it and brought it in two vessels, removing a handful from each; or if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring two tenths of an ephah for two meal offerings in two vessels, and he brought one meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel and removed one handful from it, then the meal offering that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his obligation. If he says: These two tenths of an ephah before me are a meal offering in one vessel, and he divided them and brought them in two vessels, removing a handful from each; or if he says: These tenths of an ephah are two meal offerings in two vessels, and he brought them in one vessel, both of these offerings are not valid, because in both cases he deviated from the number of handfuls that he vowed to remove. In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and he divided them and brought them in two vessels, and others said to him: You vowed to bring a meal offering in one vessel, then if he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in two vessels they are not valid even as voluntary meal offerings, and he must bring another meal offering to fulfill his obligation. His failure to respond and explain that it was not his intention to fulfill his vow with this offering indicates that he does intend to fulfill his vow with it. Since he deviated from his vow, the offering is not valid. If he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in one vessel after he was reminded, it is valid, as he fulfilled his vow. Likewise, in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring two meal offerings totaling two tenths of an ephah in two vessels, and he brought it all in one vessel, and others said to him: You vowed to bring meal offerings in two vessels, then if he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in two vessels as he had originally vowed, they are valid. If he placed it all in one vessel, its halakhic status is like that of two meal offerings that were intermingled prior to removal of the handfuls. Therefore, if one can remove a handful from each meal offering in and of itself, they are valid. If not, they are not valid, as the Gemara explained on 23a.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering from barley, should bring the meal offering from wheat, as voluntary meal offerings are brought exclusively from wheat. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering from flour, should bring the meal offering from fine flour, as it is written: “His offering shall be of fine flour” (Leviticus 2:1). If one vows to bring a meal offering without oil and without frankincense, he should bring it with oil and frankincense, as voluntary meal offerings require oil and frankincense. If one vows to bring as a meal offering half a tenth of an ephah, he should bring a complete tenth of an ephah, the minimum measure of a voluntary meal offering. If one vows to bring a meal offering of a tenth and a half an ephah, he should bring two tenths, as there are no partial tenths of an ephah brought in meal offerings. Rabbi Shimon deems one exempt from bringing a meal offering in all these cases. This is because the vow does not take effect, as he did not pledge in the manner of those who pledge.

A person may pledge a meal offering of sixty tenths of an ephah of fine flour, and bring all sixty tenths in one vessel. If he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring sixty tenths of an ephah, he brings it in one vessel. If he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring sixty-one tenths of an ephah, he brings sixty tenths in one vessel and one tenth in another vessel, as the greatest number of tenths of an ephah that the community brings as meal offerings in one day is on the first festival day of Sukkot when it occurs on Shabbat, when sixty-one tenths of an ephah of fine flour are brought. It is sufficient for an individual that the maximum amount he can bring at once is one tenth of an ephah less than that of the community. When the first day of Sukkot occurs on Shabbat, thirteen bulls, two goats, and fourteen lambs are sacrificed as the additional offerings of Sukkot, two lambs are sacrificed as the daily offerings, and two lambs are sacrificed as the additional offering of Shabbat. Three tenths of an ephah are brought for each bull, two tenths for each goat, and a tenth for each lamb. Altogether, that is sixty-one tenths of an ephah. Rabbi Shimon says: What is the relevance of the tenths of an ephah sacrificed on Sukkot that occurs on Shabbat? Aren’t these meal offerings for bulls and those for lambs, and they are not mixed with each other (see 89a)? Rather, the reason that one may not bring more than sixty tenths of an ephah in one vessel is because up to sixty tenths of fine flour can be mixed with one log of oil. The Rabbis said to him: Is it so that sixty tenths of flour can be mixed with a log of oil, but sixty-one tenths cannot be mixed? Rabbi Shimon said to them: All the measures of the Sages are so: For example, in a ritual bath containing forty se’a of water, one immerses for purification, and in a ritual bath with forty se’a less the small measure of a kortov, one cannot immerse in it for purification. One does not pledge a libation of one log, two log, or five log of wine, because there are no existing libations with those measures of wine. But one pledges a libation of three log, which is the measure of wine brought with a lamb, or four log, which is the measure of wine brought with a ram, or six log, which is the measure of wine brought with a bull. And one may pledge a libation of six log and beyond, as any greater amount can be composed of combinations of these three.

One may pledge to bring independent libations of wine, but one may not pledge oil alone; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may pledge oil as well. Rabbi Tarfon said: Just as we found that wine comes as an obligation and comes as a gift offering independent of any offering, so too, we find that oil comes as an obligation and comes as a gift offering. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that this is true with regard to wine, as it is sacrificed with its obligatory offering by itself, shall you also say that this is also the case with regard to oil, which is never sacrificed with its obligatory offering by itself but only mixed with the flour? The mishna concludes with a ruling concerning a voluntary meal offering: Two people do not pledge a meal offering of a tenth of an ephah as partners, but they may pledge a burnt offering and a peace offering. And they may pledge to bring even an individual bird, not only a pair.

Chapter 13

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a tenth of an ephah for a meal offering, must bring a meal offering of one -tenth. If he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring tenths of an ephah, he must bring two -tenths, as that is the minimum plural amount. If he says: I specified several tenths of an ephah but I do not know which number I specified, he must bring sixty-tenths, as that is the maximum amount of a meal offering. The flour beyond the amount that he actually specified is rendered a voluntary meal offering. If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, he may bring whichever meal offering that he wishes, i.e., the fine-flour meal offering, the shallow-pan or deep-pan meal offering, or the meal offering baked in an oven in the form of loaves or wafers. Rabbi Yehuda says: He must bring the fine-flour meal offering, as it is the most notable of the meal offerings.

If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a type of meal offering, he must bring one meal offering. If he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings of a certain type, he must bring two. If he says: I specified a meal offering but I do not know which meal offering I specified, he must bring all five types of meal offerings. If one says: I specified a meal offering of tenths of an ephah but I do not know how many tenths I specified, he must bring a meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: His obligation is satisfied only when he brings meal offerings of all sizes, in increments of tenths of an ephah, ranging from one -tenth of an ephah to sixty -tenths, for a total of sixty meal offerings with a total volume of 1,830 tenths of an ephah, or 183 ephahs. He fulfills his vow with one of the meal offerings, and the rest are rendered voluntary meal offerings.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate pieces of wood as fuel for the altar, must donate no fewer than two logs. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring frankincense, must bring no less than a handful. The mishna states tangentially: There are five halakhot pertaining to handfuls. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering of frankincense, may not bring less than a handful. One who pledges to bring a meal offering must bring with it a handful of frankincense. One who intentionally offers up a handful of a meal offering outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [ karet ]. The two bowls of frankincense that accompany the shewbread are required to have two handfuls of frankincense.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate gold to the Temple treasury, must give no less than a gold dinar. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate silver to the Temple treasury, must give no less than the value of a silver dinar. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate copper to the Temple maintenance, must give no less than the value of a silver ma’a. One who says: I specified the amount of gold, silver, or copper, but I do not know what I specified, must bring the maximum amount of gold, silver, or copper, until it reaches an amount where he says: I am certain that I did not intend to donate that much.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a libation of wine, must bring no less than three log, as that is the minimum amount of wine brought as a libation accompanying an animal offering. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring oil, must bring no less than a log, as the smallest meal offering includes one log of oil. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He must bring no less than three log, as that is the amount of oil in the meal offering that accompanies the sacrifice of a lamb, which is the smallest amount in any of the meal offerings that accompany the sacrifice of an animal. One who says: I specified how many log I vowed to bring but I do not know what amount I specified, must bring an amount of oil equivalent to the amount brought on the day that the largest amount of oil is sacrificed in the Temple.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering, must bring a lamb, which is the least expensive land animal sacrificed as an offering. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: He may bring either a dove or a pigeon, as a bird burnt offering. One who says: I vowed to bring a burnt offering, and I specified that it would be from the herd, but I do not know what animal I specified, must bring a bull and a male calf, as a burnt offering is brought only from male animals. One who says: I vowed to bring a burnt offering and I specified that it would be from the animals but I do not know what animal I specified, must bring a bull and a male calf, a ram, a large male goat, a small male goat, and a male lamb. One who says: I vowed to bring a burnt offering, and I specified what type of burnt offering it would be, but I do not know what I specified, adds a dove and a pigeon to the previous list.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and a peace offering, must bring a lamb, which is the least expensive land animal sacrificed as an offering. One who says: I vowed to bring a peace offering and I specified that it would be from the herd but I do not know what animal I specified, must bring a bull and a cow, and a male calf and a female calf. One who says: I vowed to bring a burnt offering and specified that it would be from the animals, but I do not know what animal I specified, must bring a bull and a cow, a male calf and a female calf, a ram and a ewe, a large, i.e., adult, male goat and a large female goat, a small, i.e., young, male goat and a small female goat, and a male lamb and a female lamb.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a bull as a burnt offering or peace offering, must bring the bull, its accompanying meal offering, and its libations, with the total value of one hundred dinars. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a calf, must bring the calf, its accompanying meal offering, and its libations, with the total value of five sela, which equal twenty dinars. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a ram, must bring the ram, its accompanying meal offering, and its libations, with the value of two sela, which equal eight dinars. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a lamb, must bring the lamb, its accompanying meal offering, and its libations, with the value of one sela, which equals four dinars. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a bull with the value of one hundred dinars as a burnt offering or peace offering, must bring the bull with the value of one hundred dinars excluding its accompanying meal offering and libations. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a calf with the value of five sela as a burnt offering or peace offering, must bring the calf with the value of five sela excluding its accompanying meal offering and libations. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a ram with the value of two sela as a burnt offering or peace offering, must bring the ram with the value of two sela excluding its accompanying meal offering and libations. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a lamb with the value of one sela as a burnt offering or peace offering, must bring the lamb with the value of one sela excluding its accompanying meal offering and libations. If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a bull with the value of one hundred dinars as a burnt offering or peace offering, and he brought two bulls with a combined value of one hundred dinars, he has not fulfilled his obligation. And that is the halakha even if this bull has the value of one hundred dinars less one dinar and that bull has the value of one hundred dinars less one dinar. If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a black bull, and he brought a white bull; or said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a white bull, and he brought a black bull; or said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a large bull, and he brought a small bull, in all these cases he has not fulfilled his obligation. But if he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a small bull, and he brought a large bull, he has fulfilled his obligation, as the value of a small bull is included in the value of a large bull. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He has not fulfilled his obligation, as the offering that he brought did not correspond to his vow.

With regard to one who said: This bull is hereby a burnt offering, and subsequently it became blemished [ venista’ev ] and was disqualified from sacrifice, he should redeem the bull and with that money purchase another bull as an offering in its stead. If he wishes, he may bring two bulls with its redemption money instead of one. If one says: These two bulls are hereby a burnt offering, and subsequently they became blemished, if he wishes he may bring one bull with their redemption money. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems this prohibited, and holds that he must bring two bulls. In a case where one said: This ram is hereby a burnt offering, and it became blemished, if he wishes he may bring a lamb with its redemption money. In a case where one said: This lamb is hereby a burnt offering, and it became blemished, if he wishes he may bring a ram with its redemption money. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems it prohibited for one to bring one type of animal with redemption money from another type of animal. With regard to one who says: One of my lambs is consecrated, or: One of my bulls is consecrated, and he has two lambs or bulls, the larger of them is consecrated. If he has three lambs or bulls, the middle-sized animal among them is consecrated. If one says: I specified the lamb or bull that is to be consecrated but I do not know what animal I specified in my vow, or he says that: My father said to me before his death that he consecrated one of the lambs or the bulls, but I do not know what animal he consecrated, the largest of them is consecrated.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering, must sacrifice it in the Temple in Jerusalem. And if he sacrificed it in the temple of Onias in Egypt, he has not fulfilled his obligation. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering that I will sacrifice in the temple of Onias, must sacrifice it in the Temple in Jerusalem, but if he sacrificed it in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering that I will sacrifice in the temple of Onias, it is not consecrated as a burnt offering; such a statement does not consecrate the animal at all. If one says: I am hereby a nazirite, then when his term of naziriteship is completed he must shave the hair of his head and bring the requisite offerings in the Temple in Jerusalem; and if he shaved in the temple of Onias, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If one says: I am hereby a nazirite provided that I will shave in the temple of Onias, he must shave in the Temple in Jerusalem; but if he shaved in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says that one who says: I am hereby a nazirite provided that I will shave in the temple of Onias, is not a nazirite at all, as his vow does not take effect. The priests who served in the temple of Onias may not serve in the Temple in Jerusalem; and needless to say, if they served for something else, a euphemism for idolatry, they are disqualified from service in the Temple. As it is stated: “Nevertheless the priests of the private altars did not come up to the altar of the Lord in Jerusalem, but they did eat matza among their brethren” (II Kings 23:9). The halakhic status of these priests is like that of blemished priests in that they receive a share in the distribution of the meat of the offerings and partake of that meat, but they do not sacrifice offerings or perform any of the sacrificial rites.

It is stated with regard to an animal burnt offering: “A fire offering, an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:9), and with regard to a bird burnt offering: “A fire offering, an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:17), and with regard to a meal offering: “A fire offering, an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:2). The repetitive language employed concerning all of these different offerings is to say to you that one who brings a substantial offering and one who brings a meager offering have equal merit, provided that he directs his heart toward Heaven.

Mishnah Chullin

Chapter 1

Everyone slaughters an animal, i.e., can perform halakhically valid slaughter, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter because they lack competence. And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid. Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, and the carcass imparts ritual impurity through carrying. In the case of one who slaughters an animal at night, and likewise in the case of the blind person who slaughters an animal, his slaughter is valid. In the case of one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, although he is liable to receive the death penalty, his slaughter is valid.

In the case of one who slaughters an animal with the smooth side of a hand sickle, which has both a smooth and a serrated side, or with a sharpened flint, or with a reed that was cut lengthwise and sharpened, his slaughter is valid. All slaughter [ hakkol shoḥatin ], and one may always slaughter, and one may slaughter with any item that cuts, except for the serrated side of the harvest sickle, a saw, the teeth of an animal when attached to its jawbone, and a fingernail, because they are serrated and they consequently strangle the animal and do not cut its windpipe and gullet as required. In the case of one who slaughters an animal with a harvest sickle, which is serrated with its teeth inclined considerably in one direction, in a forward direction, where the serrations do not tear the flesh, Beit Shammai deem the slaughter not valid and Beit Hillel deem it valid. And they both agree that if they smoothed its serrations so that they do not tear the flesh, its halakhic status is like that of a knife and one may slaughter with it.

With regard to one who slaughters an animal from within the cricoid cartilage that forms a complete ring at the top of the windpipe and left a thread breadth over the surface of the ring in its entirety intact, as the knife did not go beyond the ring toward the head of the animal, his slaughter is valid. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: It is valid even if he left a thread breadth over the majority of the surface of the ring.

One who slaughters from the sides of the throat, his slaughter is valid. One who pinches the neck of a bird offering from the sides, his pinching is not valid.One who slaughters from the nape [ oref ] of the neck, his slaughter is not valid. One who pinches a bird offering from the nape of the neck, his pinching is valid. One who slaughters from the throat, his slaughter is valid. One who pinches a bird offering from the throat, his pinching is not valid, as the entire nape is valid for pinching and the entire throat is valid for slaughter. It is found that that which is valid for slaughter is not valid for pinching and that which is valid for pinching is not valid for slaughter.

It is written with regard to bird offerings: “He shall bring his offering of doves, or of young pigeons” (Leviticus 1:14). The age that is fit for sacrifice in doves, mature birds, is unfit for sacrifice in pigeons, immature birds;the age that is fit for sacrifice in pigeons is unfit for sacrifice in doves. At the intermediate stage of the beginning of the yellowing of its plumage (see 22b), a bird is unfit both as this, a pigeon, and as that, a dove, since it is no longer a fledgling but is not yet a mature bird.

That which is fit in a red heifer is unfit in a heifer whose neck is broken; that which is fit in a heifer whose neck is broken is unfit in a red heifer. There is an element with which priests remain fit and Levites are unfit, and there is also an element with which Levites remain fit and priests are unfit. That which is ritually pure in an earthenware vessel is ritually impure in all the other types of vessels; that which is ritually pure in all the other types of vessels is ritually impure in an earthenware vessel. That which is ritually pure in wooden vessels is ritually impure in metal vessels; that which is ritually pure in metal vessels is ritually impure in wooden vessels. With regard to the obligation of separating teruma and tithes, the stage of development that is obligated in bitter almonds is exempt in sweet almonds; and the stage in development that is obligated in sweet almonds is exempt in bitter almonds.

Temed, a beverage produced from grape residue soaked in water, until it fermented, may not be purchased with second- tithe money to be drunk in Jerusalem, because it is not wine. And if three log of it fall into a ritual bath, its halakhic status is that of drawn water and it invalidates the ritual bath. Once it fermented, it is wine, and therefore it may be purchased with second- tithe money and it does not invalidate the ritual bath. With regard to brothers who are partners in the inheritance of their father, when they are obligated to add the premium [ kalbon ] to their annual half-shekel payment to the Temple, they are exempt from animal tithe; when they are obligated to separate animal tithe, they are exempt from adding the premium. Partners who pay the half-shekel are required to add the premium and are exempt from animal tithe. If they are not true partners, but their inheritance remains the property of the father, the sons are exempt from paying the premium, and they are obligated to separate animal tithe. Any situation where there is sale of one’s daughter as a Hebrew maidservant, i.e., when she is a minor, there is no fine of fifty sela paid to her father if she is raped or seduced, as that fine is paid to her father only when she is a young woman. And any situation where there is a fine paid to the father there is no sale. Any situation where there is the right of refusal for a minor girl married by her mother or brothers, enabling her to opt out of the marriage, there is no ḥalitza, as a minor girl whose husband died without children cannot perform ḥalitza. And any situation where there is ḥalitza, once she has reached majority, there is no right of refusal. Any situation where there is a shofar blast sounded on the eve of Shabbat or a Festival to stop the people from performing labor and to demarcate between the sacred and the profane, there is no havdala recited at the conclusion of the Shabbat or Festival in prayer and over a cup of wine. And any situation where there is havdala recited, there is no shofar blast sounded. How so? On a Festival that occurs on Shabbat eve, one sounds the shofar to stop the people from performing labor that is permitted on the Festival and prohibited on Shabbat and to demarcate between one sacred day and another; and one does not recite havdala, as that is recited only when the transition is from a sacred day to a profane day or from a day of greater sanctity to a day of lesser sanctity. The sanctity of Shabbat is greater than the sanctity of the Festival, and therefore havdala is not recited in this case. On a Festival that occurs at the conclusion of Shabbat, one recites havdala, but one does not sound the shofar. How does one recite havdala in that case; i.e., what is the formula of the blessing? It concludes: Who distinguishes between sacred and sacred, as opposed to the standard blessing at the conclusion of Shabbat: Who distinguishes between sacred and profane. Rabbi Dosa says that the formula is: Who distinguishes between greater sanctity and lesser sanctity.

Chapter 2

In the case of one who slaughters by cutting one siman, i.e., the windpipe or the gullet, in a bird, and two simanim in an animal, his slaughter is valid, and the halakhic status of the majority of one siman is like that of the entire siman. Rabbi Yehuda says: The slaughter is not valid until he cuts the veins [ haveridin ], i.e., the major blood vessels in the neck. If one cut half of one siman in a bird or one and a half simanim in an animal, his slaughter is not valid. If one cut the majority of one siman in a bird or the majority of two simanim in an animal, his slaughter is valid.

With regard to one who slaughters by cutting two animals’ heads simultaneously, his slaughter is valid. If two people are grasping a knife and slaughtering one animal, even if each is holding a knife and slaughtering one above and one below, with each one slaughtering at a different point in the neck, their slaughter is valid.

If one decapitated the animal in one motion and did not slaughter the animal in the standard manner of drawing the knife back and forth, the slaughter is not valid. In a case where one was in the process of slaughtering the animal in the standard manner and he decapitated the animal in one motion, if the length of the knife is equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck, the slaughter is valid. If one was in the process of slaughtering two animals simultaneously, and he decapitated two heads in one motion, if the length of the knife is equivalent to the breadth of an entire neck of one of the animals, the slaughter is valid. In what case is this statement, that one must be concerned about the length of the knife, said? It is when one drew the knife back and did not draw it forth, or drew it forth and did not draw it back; but if he drew it back and forth, even if the knife was of any length, even if he slaughtered with a scalpel [ be’izemel ], the slaughter is valid. If a knife fell and slaughtered an animal, although the knife slaughtered the animal in the standard manner, the slaughter is not valid, as it is stated: “And you shall slaughter…and you shall eat” (Deuteronomy 27:7), from which it is derived: That which you slaughter you may eat, and that which was slaughtered on its own, you may not eat. If, when one was in the middle of slaughtering an animal, the knife fell and he lifted it and then completed the slaughter, or if his garments fell and he lifted them and then completed the slaughter, or if he had honed the knife and grew weary before completing the slaughter and another came and slaughtered the animal, if he interrupted the slaughter in one of these ways or in a different way for an interval equivalent to the duration of an act of slaughter, the slaughter is not valid. Rabbi Shimon says: The slaughter is not valid if he interrupted the slaughter for an interval equivalent to the duration of an examination.

If one cut the gullet in the standard manner of slaughter with a back-and-forth movement, and he severed the windpipe not in the standard manner, or if one severed the windpipe and thereafter cut the gullet, or if one cut one of the simanim and waited until the animal died, or if one cut one siman and concealed the knife beneath the second siman and severed it from below, Rabbi Yeshevav says: The animal is an unslaughtered carcass and imparts ritual impurity through contact with it and carrying it. Rabbi Akiva says: The animal is a tereifa, and although eating it is prohibited, it does not transmit ritual impurity. Rabbi Yeshevav stated a principle in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: Any animal that was rendered unfit during its slaughter because the slaughter was not performed properly is an unslaughtered carcass; any animal whose slaughter was performed properly and another matter caused it to become unfit is a tereifa. And Rabbi Akiva conceded to his opinion.

In the case of one who slaughters a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, and blood did not emerge from them during the slaughter, all of these are permitted for consumption and do not require the ritual washing of the hands as they may be eaten with ritually impure [ mesoavot ] hands, because they were not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity through contact with blood, which is one of the seven liquids that render food susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Shimon says: They were rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by means of the slaughter itself.

In the case of one who slaughters an animal that is in danger of imminent death, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The slaughter is valid only in a case where after the slaughter it convulses with its foreleg and with its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: It is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck. Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: It is valid only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail. This is the halakha with regard to both a small animal, e.g., a sheep, and a large animal, e.g., a cow, that is in danger of imminent death. The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the presumptive status of the animal was that it was in danger of imminent death. But if its presumptive status was that it was healthy, then even if there were none of these indicators, the slaughter is valid.

In the case of a Jew who slaughters the animal of a gentile for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if the Jew slaughtered the animal with the intent to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [ meḥatzar kaved ], its slaughter is not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is to slaughter the animal for idol worship, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case, as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

In the case of one who slaughters an animal for the sake of, i.e., to worship, mountains, for the sake of hills, for the sake of seas, for the sake of rivers, or for the sake of wildernesses, his slaughter is not valid. If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid.

One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow, neither into seas, nor into rivers, nor into vessels, as in all those cases it appears that he is slaughtering the animal in the manner of idolaters. But one may slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a round excavation containing water. And on a ship, one may slaughter an animal onto vessels as it is clear that his objective is to avoid sullying the ship. One may not slaughter an animal and have its blood flow into a small hole in the ground at all, but one may fashion a small hole inside his house so that the blood will enter into it. And in the marketplace one may not do so, so that he will not appear to emulate [ yeḥakkeh ] the heretics.

In the case of one who slaughters an animal and asserts that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a burnt offering, for the sake of a peace offering, for the sake of a provisional guilt offering, for the sake of a Paschal offering, or for the sake of a thanks offering, his slaughter is not valid, as it appears that he is consecrating animals and slaughtering sacrificial animals outside the Temple. And Rabbi Shimon deems his slaughter valid. If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid. With regard to one who slaughters an animal for the sake of a sin offering, for the sake of a guilt offering for a definite transgression, for the sake of the offering of a firstborn, for the sake of the offering of animal tithe, or for the sake of a substitute for a sacrificial animal, his slaughter is valid. All of these offerings may be brought only as obligations and not as gifts. Therefore, there is no concern that he consecrated the animals. This is the principle: For any item, i.e., offering, which is consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is forbidden. And for any offering that is not consecrated as a voluntary vow or gift but is an obligation that is incumbent upon him, in the case of one who slaughters for its sake the animal is permitted.

Chapter 3

These wounds constitute tereifot in an animal, rendering them prohibited for consumption: A perforated gullet, where the perforation goes through the wall of the gullet, or a cut windpipe. If the membrane of the brain was perforated, or if the heart was perforated to its chamber; if the spinal column was broken and its cord was cut; if the liver was removed and nothing remained of it, any of these render the animal a tereifa. Additionally, a lung that was perforated or that was missing a piece renders the animal a tereifa. Rabbi Shimon says: It is not a tereifa unless it is perforated through to the bronchi. If the abomasum was perforated, or the gallbladder was perforated, or the small intestines were perforated, it is a tereifa. It is also a tereifa in a case where the internal rumen was perforated or where the majority of the external rumen was torn. Rabbi Yehuda says: For a large animal, a tear of one handbreadth renders it a tereifa, while for a small animal, it is a tereifa only if the majority of it was torn. And it is a tereifa where the omasum [ hemses ] or the reticulum was perforated to the outside, i.e., to the abdominal cavity, but not if the perforation was between the two. Likewise, if an animal fell from the roof, or if the majority of its ribs were fractured, or if it was clawed by a wolf, it is a tereifa. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was clawed by a wolf in the case of a small animal, i.e., a sheep or goat; or clawed by a lion in the case of a large animal, i.e., cattle; or if it was clawed by a hawk in the case of a small bird; or if it was clawed by a large bird of prey in the case of a large bird, then it is a tereifa. This is the principle: Any animal that was injured such that an animal in a similar condition could not live for an extended period is a tereifa, the consumption of which is forbidden by Torah law.

And these, despite their condition, are kosher in an animal: If its windpipe was perforated or cracked lengthwise. How much can the windpipe be missing and still be kosher? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Until the perforation is the same size as the Italian issar. If the skull was fractured but the membrane of the brain was not perforated, it is kosher. If the heart was perforated and the perforation did not reach its chamber, or if the spinal column was broken but its cord was not cut, or if the liver was removed and an olive-bulk of it remained, it is kosher. Additionally, it is kosher if the omasum or the reticulum was perforated one into the other. If the spleen was removed, or the kidneys were removed, or if its lower jaw was removed, or if its womb was removed, or if its lung shriveled by the hand of Heaven, the animal is kosher. In the case of an animal whose hide was removed, Rabbi Meir deems it kosher, and the Rabbis deem it a tereifa and unfit for consumption.

And these are tereifot in a bird: One with a perforated gullet, or with a cut windpipe that was cut across its width; or if a weasel struck the bird on its head in a place that renders it a tereifa, as one must be concerned that the membrane of the brain was perforated; or if the gizzard was perforated; or if the small intestines were perforated. In a case where a bird fell into the fire and its innards were singed [ neḥmeru ], if they turned green they are unfit, and the bird is a tereifa, but if they are red the bird is kosher. If a person trampled the bird, or slammed it against a wall, or if an animal crushed it and it is twitching, it is a tereifa because its limbs were shattered. But if the bird lasted for a twenty-four-hour period, and then one slaughtered it, it is kosher.

And these are kosher among birds: If a bird’s windpipe was perforated or cracked lengthwise; or if a weasel struck the bird on its head in a place that does not render it a tereifa ; or if the crop was perforated. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is kosher even if the crop was removed. If the bird’s intestines emerged from the abdominal wall but were not perforated, or if its wings were broken, or if its legs were broken, or if the feathers on its wings were plucked, the bird is kosher. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the down covering its body was removed, it is a tereifa and unfit for consumption.

With regard to an animal that is congested with excess blood, or that was smoked, i.e., that suffered from smoke inhalation, or that was chilled and subsequently became sick, or that ate oleander, which is poisonous, or that ate the excrement of chickens, or that drank foul water, although in all these cases the animal is in danger, it is kosher. By contrast, if the animal ate deadly poison, or if a snake bit the animal, with regard to the prohibition of tereifa, consumption of the animal would be permitted, but it is prohibited due to the threat to one’s life if he eats it.

The signs that indicate that a domesticated animal and an undomesticated animal are kosher were stated in the Torah, and the signs of a kosher bird were not explicitly stated. But the Sages stated certain signs in a bird: Any bird that claws its prey and eats it is non-kosher. Any bird that has an extra digit behind the leg slightly elevated above the other digits, and a crop, which is a sack alongside the gullet in which food is stored prior to digestion, and for which the yellowish membrane inside its gizzard can be peeled, is kosher. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: Any bird that splits the digits of its feet when standing on a string, placing two digits on one side of the string and two on the other, is non-kosher.

And with regard to grasshoppers, whose signs were also not stated in the Torah, the Sages stated: Any grasshopper that has four legs, and four wings, and two additional jumping legs, and whose wings cover most of its body, is kosher. Rabbi Yosei says: And this applies only if the name of its species is grasshopper. And with regard to fish, the signs are explicitly stated in the Torah: Any fish that has a fin and a scale is kosher; Rabbi Yehuda says: Two scales and one fin. And these are scales: Those that are fixed to its body; and fins are those with which the fish swims.

Chapter 4

When a pregnant kosher animal is slaughtered, the slaughter also renders the consumption of its fetus permitted. Even if an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and meanwhile the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s womb and then brought it back inside, and then the mother animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if the fetus extended its head outside the womb, even if it then brought it back inside, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, and the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the fetus. Rather, it requires its own slaughter. If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in the womb and leaves those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, then even if those pieces are left inside the animal their consumption is prohibited, because an organ severed from a living being is not permitted by the subsequent slaughter of the animal. This is the principle: An item that is part of an animal’s body that was severed prior to its slaughter is prohibited even after slaughter, and an item that is not part of its body, i.e., its fetus, is permitted by virtue of its slaughter.

Upon its birth, the firstborn male offspring of a domesticated animal is automatically consecrated with firstborn status, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. Furthermore, if it dies, it may not be discarded, but must be buried. If an animal that was giving birth to a firstborn male was encountering difficulty giving birth, and in order to alleviate the difficulty one wishes to terminate the birth, he may cut up the fetus limb by limb and cast it to the dogs. Since the fetus was not born, it is non-sacred and does not require burial. If a majority of the fetus had already emerged, it is considered to have been born and is therefore consecrated; consequently, if one cut it up it must be buried, and the mother animal is exempted from having firstborn status conferred on any future offspring.

With regard to an animal whose fetus died in its womb and the shepherd reached his hand into the womb and touched the fetus, both in the case of a non-kosher animal and in the case of a kosher animal the fetus does not have the status of an animal carcass that imparts ritual impurity, and the shepherd remains ritually pure. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: In the case of a non-kosher animal it is impure, and in the case of a kosher animal it is pure. With regard to a woman whose fetus died in her womb and the midwife extended her hand into the womb and touched the fetus, the midwife is thereby rendered impure with the seven- day impurity imparted by a corpse, and the woman remains ritually pure until the offspring emerges from the womb.

If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother’s womb, and someone severed it and afterward slaughtered the mother animal, the flesh of the fetus is ritually pure. If one first slaughtered the mother animal and afterward severed the foreleg, the flesh of both the mother animal and the fetus are ritually impure due to having been in contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg was not permitted to be consumed through the act of slaughtering, it is regarded as a carcass with the associated ritual impurity. The rest of the flesh, which was permitted to be consumed by the slaughter, was in contact with it and so was rendered ritually impure from it; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The flesh has the ritual impurity of having been in contact with a tereifa that was slaughtered, as the limb is regarded as a tereifa that was slaughtered. By Torah law, although it is prohibited to consume it, it does not impart ritual impurity. Nevertheless, the Sages decreed that a tereifa that was slaughtered, as well as anything that comes in contact with it, is regarded as ritually impure to the extent that it disqualifies sacrificial foods that come in contact with it. The Rabbis explain the rationale behind their opinion: Just as we found in the case of a tereifa that its slaughter renders it ritually pure according to Torah law, i.e., ritual slaughter prevents it from having the ritual impurity of a carcass despite not rendering the animal permitted for consumption, so too, the slaughter of the mother animal should render the limb of its fetus that left the womb ritually pure, despite the fact that its consumption is prohibited. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, if the slaughter of a tereifa renders the body of the animal ritually pure, it is because the slaughter is performed on something that is part of its body, i.e., its throat. Does it necessarily follow that you should also render the limb that left the womb pure, given that it is something that is not part of the mother’s body? Certainly not. The mishna asks: From where is it derived with regard to a tereifa that its slaughter renders it ritually pure, i.e., prevents it from having the ritual impurity of a carcass? The mishna notes there is a reason to say the slaughter should not render it pure, as one can compare a tereifa with a non-kosher animal: A non-kosher animal is prohibited for consumption; so too, a tereifa is prohibited for consumption. Therefore, conclude: Just as with regard to a non-kosher animal, its slaughter does not render it ritually pure, so too with regard to a tereifa, its slaughter should not render it ritually pure. The mishna questions the comparison: No, if you said that slaughtering cannot prevent an animal from having the ritual impurity of a carcass in the case of a non-kosher animal, which is distinct in that it did not have a period of potential fitness when slaughtering it could have rendered its consumption permitted, does it necessarily follow that you should also say this in the case of a tereifa, which did have a period of potential fitness? Perhaps, since the animal had a period of potential fitness its slaughter remains effective in preventing it from having the ritual impurity of a carcass. The mishna rejects this distinction: Take back to yourself this claim that you brought, as it is insufficient. What about a case where an animal was born as a tereifa from the womb, and so it never had a period of potential fitness? For such a case, from where is it derived that its slaughter renders it ritually pure? The mishna reformulates the distinction: No, if you say that slaughtering cannot prevent a prohibited animal from having the ritual impurity of a carcass with regard to a non-kosher animal, which is distinct in that there are no animals of its kind that are permitted through slaughtering, as the Torah states the concept of slaughtering only with regard to kosher animals, does it necessarily follow that you should also say this with regard to a tereifa kosher animal, given that there are other animals of its kind that are permitted through slaughtering, i.e., kosher animals that are not tereifa? Perhaps, since the concept of slaughtering is relevant to that kind of animal it can serve to prevent the animal from having the ritual impurity of a carcass even if the slaughter cannot render it permitted for consumption. The mishna notes: Based on this reasoning, one must conclude that with regard to an eight- month -old fetus that was born alive, slaughter does not render it ritually pure, as there are no animals of its kind that are permitted through slaughtering. The Torah applies the concept of slaughter only with regard to animals that were born full term.

In the case of one who slaughtered an animal and found within it an eight- month -old fetus, i.e., one that was not full term, whether it was alive or dead, or a nine- month -old fetus, i.e., one that was full term, that was dead, that fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother, as it is considered part of its mother. Therefore, its blood is considered part of its mother’s blood and is prohibited, so one must tear the fetus and remove its blood before it may be consumed. If he found within it a live nine- month -old fetus, it requires its own slaughter, as it is considered an independent full-fledged animal, and if one slaughters both the mother and fetus on the same day, one is liable for violating the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring on the same day; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Even when the fetus is nine months old, it is still considered part of its mother, and the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted for consumption. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if the fetus emerged alive and is now five years old and plowing in the field, the earlier slaughter of its mother rendered it permitted and it does not require slaughter before it is eaten. But if one tore an animal, i.e., he killed it without slaughtering it, and inside he found a live nine- month -old fetus, everyone agrees that the fetus requires its own slaughter because its mother was not slaughtered.

With regard to an animal whose hind legs were severed, if they were severed from the leg joint and below, the animal is kosher; from the leg joint and above, the animal is thereby rendered a tereifa and is not kosher. And likewise, an animal whose convergence of sinews in the thigh was removed is a tereifa and is not kosher. If the bone of a limb was broken but the limb was not completely severed, and the animal was then slaughtered, if the majority of the flesh surrounding the bone is intact, the slaughter of the animal renders it permitted; but if not, its slaughter does not render it permitted.

In the case of one who slaughters an animal and finds a placenta in its womb, one with a hearty soul [ nefesh hayafa ], i.e., who is not repulsed by it, may eat it, as its consumption was permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother. Nevertheless, since generally speaking, people do not consume such placentas, it is not regarded as food and so it cannot become impure with the ritual impurity of food even were it to come into contact with a source of impurity. And furthermore, it does not impart the ritual impurity of animal carcasses as it was permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother. But if one intended to eat it, one thereby elevated it to the status of food, and the placenta becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food if it comes into contact with a source of impurity. But even so, it still does not impart the ritual impurity of animal carcasses. With regard to a placenta, part of which emerged from the womb before the mother was slaughtered, its consumption is prohibited even after the mother animal is slaughtered because the emergence of the placenta is an indication of a fetus in a woman and an indication of a fetus in an animal. Accordingly, there is a concern that the head of the fetus might have emerged in that part of the placenta, thereby rendering the fetus as having been born, a status that precludes it from being permitted by the slaughter of its mother. Since the offspring is prohibited, its placenta is likewise prohibited. If an animal that was giving birth to its firstborn expelled a placenta, one may cast it to the dogs, and one does not need to be concerned that the placenta came from a male fetus that has the consecrated status of a firstborn. But in the case of sacrificial animals the placenta must be buried, because it came from a fetus that is assumed to have been sacred. The mishna adds: But one may neither bury it at an intersection, nor may one hang it on a tree, superstitious rites intended to prevent the animal from miscarrying again, due to the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite, which prohibits Jews from practicing the superstitious rites observed by gentiles.

Chapter 5

The prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, both in the presence, i.e., the time, of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and it applies with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals. How so? In the case of one who slaughters an animal itself and its offspring, both of which are non-sacred, and slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard, both of the animals are fit for consumption, but for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs [ sofeg ] the forty lashes for violating the prohibition: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28). If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, then for slaughtering the first animal, one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [ karet ]. For slaughtering the second animal one is not liable to receive karet. The second animal was not fit for sacrifice, since one may not slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day. And both animals are disqualified for use as offerings, and for the slaughter of both of them, one incurs forty lashes apiece: The first being a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard and the second being the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day. If both animals were non-sacred and slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, both of them are unfit to be sacrificed, being non-sacred animals slaughtered in the courtyard. And for slaughter of the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day. If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice, and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. But for slaughter of the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and it is unfit for sacrifice, because one was not allowed to slaughter it on that day.

If the first animal was non-sacred and the second a sacrificial animal, and both were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for consumption and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. But for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice. If the first animal was a sacrificial animal and the second was non-sacred and both were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, for the first animal, one is liable to receive karet for slaughtering a sacrificial animal outside the courtyard, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice. And the second is fit for consumption; and for the slaughter of both of them one incurs forty lashes apiece: The first being a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard and the second being the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day. If the first animal was non-sacred and the second was a sacrificial animal and both were slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, both of them are unfit for sacrifice. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes. If the first animal was a sacrificial animal and the second was non-sacred and both were slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice, as it is non-sacred. If both animals were non-sacred, and one slaughters them, the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for consumption and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice as it is non-sacred. If both animals were sacrificial animals, and one slaughters them, the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside the Temple courtyard, for slaughtering the first animal one is liable to receive karet, and for slaughtering both of them one incurs forty lashes apiece. One set of lashes is given because the first was a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard, and the second set of lashes is given because the second animal is the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day. And both of them are unfit for sacrifice. If both animals were non-sacred, and one slaughters them, the first inside the Temple courtyard and the second outside the Temple courtyard, the first is unfit for sacrifice, as it is non-sacred, and the one who slaughters it is exempt. And for the second, one incurs the forty lashes and the animal is fit for consumption. If both animals were sacrificial animals, and one slaughters them, the first inside the Temple courtyard and the second outside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice and one who slaughters it is exempt. And for the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice because its requisite time has not yet arrived.

With regard to one who slaughters an animal and its offspring and one of them is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ] and may not be eaten, or one who slaughters one of the animals for the sake of idol worship, from which deriving benefit is prohibited, or one who slaughters the red heifer of purification, or an ox that was to have been stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to have been broken, all of which are animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters them exempt from lashes for the slaughter of a mother and its offspring, as in his opinion, slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is not considered slaughter and does not violate the prohibition. And the Rabbis deem him liable, as the slaughter need not render the animal fit for consumption in order to violate the prohibition. All agree that one who slaughters an animal and it becomes a carcass by his hand because the slaughter was invalid, or one who stabs an animal, or one who uproots the windpipe and the gullet, is exempt with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring, as it is written: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), and in these cases, no ritual slaughter was performed. With regard to two people who purchased a cow and its offspring, where each purchased one of the animals, whoever purchased his animal first shall slaughter it first, and the second one must wait until the next day to slaughter his animal, so as not to violate the prohibition of: It and its offspring. But if the second one preceded him and slaughtered his animal first, he benefitted, and the one who purchased the animal first may not slaughter it until the next day. If one slaughtered a cow and thereafter slaughtered its two offspring on the same day, he incurs eighty lashes for two separate actions violating the prohibition against slaughtering the mother and the offspring on the same day. If one slaughtered its two offspring and thereafter slaughtered the mother cow, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. If one slaughtered the mother and its daughter, and, later that day, slaughtered its daughter’s daughter, he incurs eighty lashes, as he has performed the act of slaughtering a mother and its offspring twice. But if one slaughtered the mother and its daughter’s daughter and thereafter slaughtered its daughter, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes for slaughtering the daughter on the same day as its calf and its mother, as that act comprises two separate violations of the prohibition. On four occasions during the year one who sells an animal to another is required to inform him: I sold the mother of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it,or: I sold the daughter of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it. And those four occasions are: The eve of the last day of the festival of Sukkot, the eve of the first day of the festival of Passover, and the eve of Shavuot, and the eve of Rosh HaShana. And according to the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the eve of Yom Kippur in the Galilee is included as well. Rabbi Yehuda said: When must he inform the buyer on those days? He must do so at a time when the seller has no interval between the sale of the mother and the offspring, as they were both sold on that day. But if the seller has an interval between the sales, he does not need to inform the buyer, as presumably each buyer purchased the animal to slaughter it on the day he purchased it. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that in a case where one sells the mother animal to the groom and the offspring to the bride, that even if he did not sell them on the same day, he must inform the buyer, as it is obvious that they are both planning to slaughter their animal on one day, for their wedding feast.

On those four occasions, one compels the butcher to slaughter animals even against his will; even if there is a bull worth one thousand dinars and the buyer has only one dinar worth of meat, i.e., he already paid the butcher for one dinar’s worth of meat, one compels him to slaughter the animal and give him a dinar’s worth of meat. Therefore, if the bull dies before slaughter, although no act of acquisition was performed, it dies at the expense of the buyer, and he loses his dinar. But during the rest of the days of the year it is not so. On other days, until the buyer performs the act of pulling to assume ownership of the portion of the bull that he is purchasing, the bull remains in the butcher’s possession. Therefore, if the bull dies before the transaction is complete, it dies at the expense of the seller, who returns the buyer’s money.

With regard to the phrase “one day” that is stated with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring, the day follows the night. Therefore, one may slaughter an animal during the day and slaughter its offspring that night, but one may not slaughter an animal at night and slaughter its offspring the following day. Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma derived this by means of a verbal analogy. It is stated in the act of Creation: “One day” (Genesis 1:5), and it is stated with regard to the slaughter of an animal itself and its offspring: “One day” (Leviticus 22:28). Just as concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated in the act of Creation, the day follows the night, so too concerning the phrase “one day” that is stated with regard to the slaughter of an animal itself and its offspring, the day follows the night.

Chapter 6

The mitzva of covering the blood after slaughter is in effect both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, both in the presence, i.e., the time, of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple. And it is in effect with regard to non-sacred animals, but it is not in effect with regard to sacrificial ones. And it is in effect with regard to the slaughter of an undomesticated animal and a bird, with regard to animals and birds that are readily available in his home, and with regard to those that are not readily available and are hunted in the wild. And it is in effect with regard to a koy, because it is uncertain whether a koy is a domesticated animal and one is exempt from the covering of its blood or whether it is an undomesticated animal and one is obligated to cover it. And one may not slaughter a koy on a Festival, because covering its blood entails the performance of prohibited labor that is permitted only if there is a definite obligation to cover the blood. And if one slaughtered a koy on a Festival after the fact, one does not cover its blood until after the Festival.

In the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird and it is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ]; and in the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird for the sake of idol worship; and in the case of one who slaughters a non-sacred animal or bird inside the Temple courtyard or a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard; or in the case of one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird that was sentenced to be stoned, e.g., for killing a person; in all these cases, even though it is prohibited to eat any of these animals or birds, Rabbi Meir deems one obligated to cover their blood, and the Rabbis deem one exempt from doing so because, in their opinion, slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted for consumption is not considered an act of slaughter. One who slaughters an animal or bird and it became a carcass by his hand, i.e., the slaughter was performed incorrectly, and one who stabs the animal or bird, and one who tears loose the windpipe and the gullet, are exempt from covering the blood, as no act of slaughter took place, and one is obligated to cover blood only after a valid slaughter.

In the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or a bird, and others saw them and ensured that the slaughter was properly performed, in which case the slaughter is valid (see 2a), one who oversaw the slaughter is obligated to cover the blood. If they slaughtered the animals among themselves without supervision, one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood. And likewise with regard to the matter of slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an undomesticated mother animal and others saw them, it is prohibited to slaughter its offspring after them. If they slaughtered the mother animal among themselves, Rabbi Meir deems it permitted to slaughter its offspring after them and the Rabbis deem it prohibited. And the Rabbis concede that if one slaughtered the offspring thereafter that he does not incur the forty lashes, as it is possible the mother was not properly slaughtered.

If one slaughtered one hundred undomesticated animals in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the animals and there is no obligation to cover the blood of each animal separately. Likewise, if one slaughtered one hundred birds in one place, one covering of the blood suffices for all the birds. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal and a bird in one place, one covering for all of the blood is sufficient. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal, he should cover its blood immediately and only thereafter he should slaughter the bird. If one slaughtered an undomesticated animal or bird and did not cover the blood, and another person saw the uncovered blood, the second person is obligated to cover the blood. If one covered the blood and it was then uncovered, he is exempt from covering it again. If the wind blew earth on the blood and covered it, and it was consequently uncovered, he is obligated to cover the blood.

In a case of the blood of an undomesticated animal or bird that was mixed with water, if there is in the mixture the appearance of blood one is obligated to cover it. If the blood was mixed with wine one views the wine as though it is water, and if a mixture with that amount of water would have the appearance of blood one is obligated to cover it. Likewise, if the blood of an undomesticated animal or a bird was mixed with the blood of a domesticated animal, which one does not have to cover, or with blood of the undomesticated animal that did not flow from the neck and does not require covering, one views the blood as though it is water. Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, even if the undomesticated animal’s blood, which one must cover, is not recognizable in this mixture, he is obligated to cover the mixture nevertheless.

With regard to blood that spurts outside the pit over which the animal was slaughtered, or onto a wall, and blood that remained on the slaughtering knife, one is obligated to cover it. Rabbi Yehuda said: When is this the halakha? When no blood remains there from the slaughter except that blood. But if blood remains there from the slaughter that is not that blood, he is exempt from covering it.

With what substances may one cover the blood and with what substances may one not cover the blood? One may cover the blood with fine granulated manure, with fine sand, with lime, with crushed potsherd, and with a brick or the lid of an earthenware barrel that one crushed. But one may not cover the blood with thick manure, nor with thick, clumped sand, nor with a brick or the lid of an earthenware barrel that one did not crush. Neither may one merely turn a vessel over the blood. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated a principle: With regard to a substance in which plants grow, one may cover blood with it; and with regard to a substance in which plants do not grow, one may not cover blood with it.

Chapter 7

The prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, in the presence of, i.e., the time of, the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals. And it applies to domesticated animals and to undomesticated animals, to the thigh of the right leg and to the thigh of the left leg. But it does not apply to a bird, due to the fact that the verse makes reference to the sciatic nerve as being “upon the spoon of the thigh” (Genesis 32:33), and a bird has no spoon of the thigh. And the prohibition applies to a late-term animal fetus [ shalil ] in the womb. Rabbi Yehuda says: It does not apply to a fetus; and similarly, its fat is permitted. And butchers are not deemed credible to say that the sciatic nerve was removed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They are deemed credible about the sciatic nerve and about the forbidden fat.

Although it is prohibited for Jews to eat the sciatic nerve, a Jewish person may send the thigh of an animal to a gentile with the sciatic nerve in it, without concern that the gentile will then sell the thigh to a Jew and the Jew will eat the sciatic nerve. This leniency is due to the fact that the place of the sciatic nerve is conspicuous in the thigh. One who removes the sciatic nerve must scrape away the flesh in the area surrounding the nerve to ensure that he will remove all of it. Rabbi Yehuda says: Scraping is not required; it is sufficient to excise it from the area above the rounded protrusion in order to thereby fulfill the mitzva of removal of the sciatic nerve.

One who eats an olive-bulk of the sciatic nerve incurs forty lashes. If one eats an entire sciatic nerve and it does not constitute an olive-bulk, he is nevertheless liable to receive lashes, because a complete sciatic nerve is a complete entity. If one ate an olive-bulk from this sciatic nerve in the right leg, and an olive-bulk from that sciatic nerve in the left leg, he incurs [ sofeg ] eighty lashes. Rabbi Yehuda says: He incurs only forty lashes, for eating the olive-bulk from the right leg, and he is exempt for eating the olive-bulk from the left leg.

In the case of a thigh that was cooked with the sciatic nerve in it, if there is enough of the sciatic nerve in it to impart its flavor to the thigh, the entire thigh is forbidden for consumption. How does one measure whether there is enough sciatic nerve to impart flavor to the meat of the entire thigh? One relates to it as though the sciatic nerve were meat imparting flavor to a turnip. If meat the volume of the sciatic nerve would impart flavor to a turnip the volume of the thigh when they were cooked together, then the entire thigh is forbidden.

With regard to a sciatic nerve that was cooked with other sinews, when one identifies the sciatic nerve and removes it, the other sinews are forbidden if the sciatic nerve was large enough to impart flavor. And if he does not identify it, all the sinews are forbidden because each one could be the sciatic nerve; but the broth is forbidden only if the sciatic nerve imparts flavor to the broth. And similarly, in the case of a piece of an animal carcass or a piece of non-kosher fish that was cooked with similar pieces of kosher meat or fish, when one identifies the forbidden piece and removes it, the rest of the meat or fish is forbidden only if the forbidden piece was large enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture. And if he does not identify and remove the forbidden piece, all the pieces are forbidden, due to the possibility that each piece one selects might be the forbidden piece; but the broth is forbidden only if the forbidden piece imparts flavor to the broth.

The prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve applies to a kosher animal and does not apply to a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yehuda says: It applies even to a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yehuda said in explanation: Wasn’t the sciatic nerve forbidden for the children of Jacob, as it is written: “Therefore the children of Israel eat not the sciatic nerve” (Genesis 32:33), yet the meat of a non-kosher animal was still permitted to them? Since the sciatic nerve of non-kosher animals became forbidden at that time, it remains forbidden now. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: The prohibition was stated in Sinai, but it was written in its place, in the battle of Jacob and the angel despite the fact that the prohibition did not take effect then.

Chapter 8

It is prohibited to cook any meat of domesticated and undomesticated animals and birds in milk, except for the meat of fish and grasshoppers, whose halakhic status is not that of meat. And likewise, the Sages issued a decree that it is prohibited to place any meat together with milk products, e.g., cheese, on one table. The reason for this prohibition is that one might come to eat them after they absorb substances from each other. This prohibition applies to all types of meat, except for the meat of fish and grasshoppers. And one who takes a vow that meat is prohibited to him is permitted to eat the meat of fish and grasshoppers. The meat of birds may be placed with cheese on one table but may not be eaten together with it; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel say: It may neither be placed on one table nor be eaten with cheese. Rabbi Yosei said: This is one of the disputes involving leniencies of Beit Shammai and stringencies of Beit Hillel. The mishna elaborates: With regard to which table are these halakhot stated? It is with regard to a table upon which one eats. But on a table upon which one prepares the cooked food, one may place this meat alongside that cheese or vice versa, and need not be concerned that perhaps they will be mixed and one will come to eat them together.

A person may bind meat and cheese in one cloth, provided that they do not come into contact with each other. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Two unacquainted guests [ akhsena’in ] may eat together on one table, this one eating meat and that one eating cheese, and they need not be concerned lest they come to violate the prohibition of eating meat and milk by partaking of the food of the other.

In the case of a drop of milk that fell on a piece of meat, if the drop contains enough milk to impart flavor to that piece of meat, i.e., the meat is less than sixty times the size of the drop, the meat is forbidden. If one stirred the contents of the pot and the piece was submerged in the gravy before it absorbed the milk, if the drop contains enough milk to impart flavor to the contents of that entire pot, the contents of the entire pot are forbidden. One who wants to eat the udder of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its milk, and only then is it permitted to cook it. If he did not tear the udder before cooking it, he does not violate the prohibition against cooking and eating meat and milk and does not receive lashes for it, as the halakhic status of the milk in the udder is not that of milk. One who wants to eat the heart of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its blood, and only then may he cook and eat it. If he did not tear the heart before cooking and eating it, he does not violate the prohibition against consuming blood and is not liable to receive karet for it. One who places the meat of birds with cheese on the table upon which he eats does not thereby violate a Torah prohibition.

It is prohibited to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of any kosher animal, not merely the milk of its mother, and deriving benefit from that mixture is prohibited. It is permitted to cook the meat of a kosher animal in the milk of a non-kosher animal, or the meat of a non-kosher animal in the milk of a kosher animal, and deriving benefit from that mixture is permitted. Rabbi Akiva says: Cooking the meat of an undomesticated animal or bird in milk is not prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21) three times. The repetition of the word “kid” three times excludes an undomesticated animal, a bird, and a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that it is stated: “You shall not eat of any animal carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and in the same verse it is stated: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” This indicates that meat of an animal that is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass is prohibited for one to cook in milk. Consequently, with regard to meat of birds, which is subject to be prohibited due to the prohibition of eating an unslaughtered carcass, one might have thought that it would be prohibited to cook it in milk. Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” excluding a bird, which has no mother’s milk.

The congealed milk in the stomach of the animal of a gentile and of an unslaughtered animal carcass is prohibited. With regard to one who curdled milk by using the skin of the stomach of a kosher animal as a coagulant to make cheese, which may then have the taste of meat cooked in milk, if the measure of the skin is enough to impart flavor to the milk, that cheese is prohibited. In the case of a kosher animal that suckled milk from a tereifa, the milk in its stomach is prohibited, as the milk is from the tereifa. If it was a tereifa that suckled milk from a kosher animal, the milk in its stomach is permitted, as the milk is from the kosher animal. In both cases, the milk that an animal suckles has the status of the animal from which it was suckled, and not that of the animal which suckled, because the milk is collected in its innards and is not an integral part of its body.

Although animal fats and blood are similar in that they are both prohibited by Torah law and punishable by karet, there are elements more stringent in the prohibition of fat than in that of blood, and likewise there are elements more stringent in the prohibition of blood than in that of fat. The elements more stringent in the prohibition of fat are the following: The first is that with regard to fat of an offering, one who derives benefit from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property. And second, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, if it was from an offering that was slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood or partake of it beyond its designated time, and due to the prohibition of notar, if it was from an offering whose period for consumption has expired. And third, if one is ritually impure, he is liable due to the prohibition of partaking of it while impure. This is not so with regard to blood, as one is not liable in these cases for violating the prohibitions of piggul, notar, and partaking of offerings while impure, but rather is liable only for violating the prohibition of consuming blood. And the more stringent element in the prohibition of blood is that the prohibition of blood applies to domesticated animals, undomesticated animals, and birds, both kosher and non-kosher, but the prohibition of forbidden fat applies only to a kosher domesticated animal.

Chapter 9

All foods that became ritually impure through contact with a source of impurity transmit impurity to other food and liquids only if the impure foods measure an egg-bulk. In that regard, the Sages ruled that even if a piece of meat itself is less than an egg-bulk, the attached hide, even if it is not fit for consumption, joins together with the meat to constitute an egg-bulk. And the same is true of the congealed gravy attached to the meat, although it is not eaten; and likewise the spices added to flavor the meat, although they are not eaten; and the meat residue attached to the hide after flaying; and the bones; and the tendons; and the lower section of the horns, which remains attached to the flesh when the rest of the horn is removed; and the upper section of the hooves, which remains attached to the flesh when the rest of the hoof is removed. All these items join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food. Although if any of them was an egg-bulk they would not impart impurity of food, when attached to the meat they complete the measure. But they do not join together to constitute the measure of an olive-bulk required to impart the impurity of animal carcasses. Similarly, there is another item that imparts impurity of food but not impurity of animal carcasses: In the case of one who slaughters a non-kosher animal for a gentile and the animal is still twitching and comes into contact with a source of impurity, the animal becomes impure with impurity of food and imparts impurity of food to other food, but does not impart impurity of animal carcasses until it dies, or until one severs its head. The mishna summarizes: The Torah included certain items to impart impurity of food beyond those which it included to impart impurity of animal carcasses. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to the meat residue attached to the hide after flaying that was collected, if there is an olive-bulk of it in one place it imparts impurity of an animal carcass, and one who contracts impurity from it and then eats consecrated foods or enters the Temple is liable to receive karet. By collecting it in one place, the person indicates that he considers it as meat.

These are the entities whose skin has the same halakhic status as their flesh: The skin of a dead person, which imparts impurity like his flesh; and the skin of a domesticated pig, which is soft and eaten by gentiles, and imparts the impurity of an animal carcass like its flesh. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the skin of a wild boar has the same status. And the halakhic status of the skin of all of the following animals is also like that of their flesh: The skin of the hump of a young camel that did not yet toughen; and the skin of the head of a young calf; and the hide of the hooves; and the skin of the womb; and the skin of an animal fetus in the womb of a slaughtered animal; and the skin beneath the tail of a ewe; and the skin of the gecko [ anaka ], and the desert monitor [ ko’aḥ ], and the lizard [ leta’a ], and the skink [ ḥomet ], four of the eight creeping animals that impart ritual impurity after death. Rabbi Yehuda says: The halakhic status of the skin of the lizard is like that of the skin of the weasel and is not like that of its flesh. And with regard to all of these skins, in a case where one tanned them or spread them on the ground and trod upon them for the period of time required for tanning, they are no longer classified as flesh and are ritually pure, except for the skin of a person, which maintains the status of flesh. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: All eight creeping animals enumerated in the Torah have skins whose halakhic status is not that of flesh.

The halakhic status of the hide of an animal after it was flayed is no longer like its flesh in terms of becoming impure and imparting impurity. Nevertheless, in the case of one who flays either a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal; a ritually pure animal that was slaughtered properly and afterward came in contact with impurity, e.g., the one flaying it is impure, or a ritually impure unslaughtered carcass; a small animal, e.g., sheep, or a large animal, e.g., cattle; and even after flaying the animal’s hide is still partially attached to the flesh, the hide’s halakhic status remains that of flesh in some circumstances. These circumstances are: If he is flaying the animal for the purpose of using the hide as a carpet, a tablecloth, or to drape over a couch, in which case he would cut the hide along the length of the animal from head to tail and then remove the hide from both sides, its halakhic status remains that of flesh until he has flayed the measure of grasping the hide, i.e., two handbreadths. And if he is flaying the animal for the purpose of crafting a leather jug, in which case he cuts a circle near the animal’s neck and removes the hide in a downward movement, its halakhic status remains that of flesh until he flays the animal’s entire breast. In the case of one who seeks to fashion a jug and begins flaying from the legs, until he removes the animal’s hide in its entirety, the entire hide is considered as having a connection with the flesh and its halakhic status remains that of flesh with regard to impurity, i.e., with regard to becoming impure and with regard to imparting impurity. If one removed the entire hide except for the hide over the neck, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: It is not considered to have a connection to the flesh, and the Rabbis say: It is considered to have a connection to the flesh until he removes the animal’s hide in its entirety, including the neck.

In the case of a hide of an unslaughtered carcass upon which there is an olive-bulk of flesh, one who touches a strand of flesh emerging from the flesh or a hair that is on the side of the hide opposite the flesh is ritually impure. Although he did not touch an olive-bulk of the flesh, he is rendered impure with the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass. The reason is that the strand of flesh has the same status as the flesh itself, and the hair is considered protection to the flesh, which also has the same status as the flesh with regard to one who touches it. If upon the hide there were two half olive-bulks, the hide imparts the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass by means of carrying, because one moves them together, but not by means of contact with the flesh, because one touches them separately; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The hide does not impart impurity, neither by means of contact nor by means of carrying. And Rabbi Akiva concedes in the case of two half olive-bulks where one skewered them with a wood chip and moved them that he is impure. And for what reason does Rabbi Akiva deem one ritually pure in a case where he moved both half olive-bulks with the hide, as in that case, too, he moved them together? It is because the hide separates between them and nullifies them.

With regard to the thigh bone of a human corpse, and the thigh bone of a sacrificial animal that was rendered unfit as piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time, or notar, i.e., part of an offering left over after the time allotted for its consumption, whether these thigh bones were sealed and there was no access to the marrow, or whether they were perforated and there was access to the marrow, one who touches them is ritually impure. The reason is that a piece of bone of a corpse the size of a barley grain imparts impurity, and the bone of a sacrificial animal that was disqualified in this manner imparts impurity by rabbinic decree via contact. With regard to the thigh bone of an unslaughtered carcass and the thigh bone of a creeping animal, one who touches them when they are sealed remains ritually pure. If one of these thigh bones was perforated at all, it imparts impurity via contact, as in that case contact with the bone is tantamount to contact with the marrow. From where is it derived that even with regard to impurity transmitted via carrying there is a distinction between sealed and perforated thigh bones? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “One who touches the carcass thereof shall be impure until the evening; and one who carries the carcass thereof shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39–40), indicating: That which enters the category of impurity via contact, enters the category of impurity via carrying; that which does not enter the category of impurity via contact, does not enter the category of impurity via carrying.

The egg of a creeping animal in which tissue of an embryo developed and one who comes into contact with the egg are ritually pure, as the impure creeping animal is hermetically sealed. But if one perforated the egg with a hole of any size, one who comes in contact with the egg is ritually impure. In the case of a mouse that grows from the ground and is half-flesh half-earth, one who touches the half that is flesh is impure; one who touches the half that is earth is pure. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who touches the half that is earth where it is adjacent to the flesh is ritually impure.

The limb of an animal, with flesh, sinews, and bones, and the flesh of an animal, that were partially severed and remain hanging from the animal do not have the halakhic status of a limb severed from a living animal, which imparts impurity like an unslaughtered carcass, or of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure, respectively. If one had intent to eat the limb or the flesh, the limb or flesh becomes impure if it comes in contact with a source of impurity, and they impart impurity as food to other foods and liquids, although they remain in their place attached to the animal. But in order for them to become impure, they need to be rendered susceptible to impurity through contact with one of the seven liquids that facilitate susceptibility. If the animal was slaughtered, although this act of slaughter does not render it permitted for consumption by a Jew (see 73b), the limb and the flesh were thereby rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with the blood of the slaughtered animal, as blood is one of the seven liquids; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: They were not rendered susceptible to impurity through the animal’s own blood; they are rendered susceptible only once they have been wet with another liquid. If the animal died without slaughter, the hanging flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to impurity in order to become impure, as its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure and does not have the status of an unslaughtered carcass. The hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from a living animal but does not impart impurity as the limb of an unslaughtered carcass; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon deems the limb ritually pure.

The limb and the flesh of a person that were partially severed and remain hanging from a person are ritually pure, although there is no potential for healing. If the person died, the hanging flesh is ritually pure, as its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living person. The hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from the living and does not impart impurity as a limb from a corpse; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon deems the flesh and the limb ritually pure.

Chapter 10

The mitzva to give the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw of slaughtered animals to the priests, known as the gifts of the priesthood, applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, in the presence of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and it applies to non-sacred animals, but not to sacrificial animals. It is necessary to emphasize that it does not apply to sacrificial animals, as by right it should be inferred a fortiori : If non-sacred animals, which are not obligated to have the breast and thigh taken from them and given to the priest, are obligated to have gifts of the priesthood given from them, then with regard to sacrificial animals, which are obligated to have the breast and thigh given from them, is it not right that they should be obligated to have gifts of the priesthood given from them? Therefore, the verse states: “For the breast of waving and the thigh of giving I have taken of the children of Israel from the sacrifice of the peace offerings, and have given them to Aaron the priest and to his sons as a due forever from the children of Israel” (Leviticus 7:34), from which it is derived that the priest has only that which is stated with regard to that matter, i.e., the breast and the thigh, and not the foreleg, the jaw and the maw.

All sacrificial animals in which a permanent blemish preceded their consecration do not assume inherent sanctity, and only their value is consecrated. And once they were redeemed, they are obligated in the mitzva of a firstborn, i.e., their offspring are subject to being counted a firstborn, and in the gifts of the priesthood, and they can emerge from their sacred status and assume non-sacred status with regard to being shorn and with regard to being utilized for labor, as it is prohibited to shear animals with sacred status or utilize them for labor. And their offspring and their milk are permitted after their redemption. And one who slaughters these animals outside the Temple courtyard is exempt from karet, and those animals do not render an animal that was a substitute for them consecrated. And if these animals died before they were redeemed, they may be redeemed and fed to dogs. Although typically sacrificial animals that were redeemed may not be fed to the dogs, in this case it is permitted. This is the halakha with regard to all animals except for the firstborn animal and the animal tithe, whose sanctity is inherent, even when a permanent blemish preceded their consecration. With regard to all sacrificial animals whose consecration preceded their blemish, or who had a temporary blemish prior to their consecration and afterward developed a permanent blemish and they were redeemed, they are exempt from the mitzva of a firstborn, and from the gifts of the priestood, and they do not emerge from their sacred status and assume non-sacred status with regard to being shorn and with regard to being utilized for labor. And their offspring, which were conceived prior to redemption, and their milk, are prohibited after their redemption. And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet, and those animals render an animal that was a substitute for them consecrated. And if these animals died before they were redeemed, they may not be redeemed and fed to dogs; rather, they must be buried.

With regard to a blemished firstborn animal, which one may slaughter and eat without being required to give the foreleg, jaw, and maw to the priest, that was intermingled with one hundred non-sacred animals, from which one is required to give those gifts, in a case when one hundred different people slaughter all of them, each slaughtering one animal, one exempts them all from giving the gifts, as each could claim that the animal that he slaughtered was the firstborn. If one person slaughtered them all, one exempts one of the animals for him. One who slaughters the animal of a priest for the priest or the animal of a gentile for the gentile is exempt from the obligation to give the gifts of the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw. And an Israelite who enters into partnership with a priest or a gentile must mark the animal to indicate that it is jointly owned and exempt from the obligation to give the gifts. And if a priest sold his animal to an Israelite and said: The animal is sold except for the gifts with it, the Israelite is exempt from the obligation to give the gifts, as they are not his. If the Israelite said to the one slaughtering the animal: Sell me the innards of a cow, and there were gifts included with it, i.e., the maw, the purchaser gives them to the priest and he does not deduct the value of the gifts from the money that he pays him. If he bought the innards from the slaughterer by weight, the purchaser gives the gifts, i.e., the maw, to the priest and deducts the value of the gifts from the money that he pays him.

In the case of a convert who converted and he had a cow, if the cow was slaughtered before he converted, he is exempt from giving the gifts to the priest. If the animal was slaughtered after he converted, the convert is obligated to give the gifts. If there is uncertainty whether it was slaughtered before or after the conversion, the convert is exempt, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. What is the definition of the foreleg that is given to the priests as one of the gifts? It is the part of the leg from the joint of the lower knee until the rounded protrusion surrounding the thigh bone of the foreleg; and that is the foreleg mentioned in the Torah with regard to the nazirite: “And the priest shall take the foreleg of the ram when it is cooked” (Numbers 6:19). And the parallel in the hind leg is the thigh that is given to the priest from the peace offering, which is also from the joint of the lower knee until the rounded protrusion surrounding the thigh bone. Rabbi Yehuda says: The thigh is from the joint of the lower knee until the upper knee joint, which connects the middle and upper parts of the leg. What is the definition of the jaw? It is from the joint of the lower jaw beneath the temples and downward until the upper ring of the windpipe.

Chapter 11

The mitzva of the first sheared wool that every Jew must give to the priest, as stated in the verse: “And the first sheared wool of your flock [ tzonekha ] shall you give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4), applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, in the presence of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and with regard to non-sacred animals. But it does not apply to sacrificial animals. There are more stringent elements in the mitzva of the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw (see 130a) than in the halakha of the first sheared wool in that the mitzva of the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw applies to cattle and to sheep, as it is written: “Whether it be ox or sheep, that he shall give unto the priest the foreleg, and the jaw, and the maw” (Deuteronomy 18:3); and it applies to numerous animals and to few animals. But by contrast, the mitzva of the first sheared wool applies only to sheep and not to goats and cattle, and applies only to numerous animals.

And how many are numerous? Beit Shammai say: It is at least two sheep, as it is stated: “That a man shall rear a young cow, and two sheep [ tzon ]” (Isaiah 7:21), indicating that two sheep are characterized as tzon ; and the mitzva of the first sheared wool is written using the term “your flock [ tzonekha ].” And Beit Hillel say: It is at least five sheep, as it is stated: “And five sheep [ tzon ] made” (I Samuel 25:18). Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says: When shearing five sheep, the sheared wool of each sheep weighing one hundred dinars each and half [ peras ] of one hundred dinars each, i.e., one hundred and fifty dinars each, are subject to the obligation of the first sheared wool, i.e., they render the owner obligated to give the first sheared wool to the priests. And the Rabbis say: Any five sheep, each of whose sheared wool weighs any amount, render the owner obligated in the mitzva. And how much of the sheared wool does one give to the priest? One gives him sheared wool of the weight of five sela in Judea, which are the equivalent of ten sela in the Galilee, as the weight of the Galilean sela is half that of the Judean sela. Furthermore, although one may give the wool to the priest without laundering it, this must be the weight of the wool once laundered and not when sullied, as is characteristic of wool when sheared. The measure that must be given to the priest is enough to fashion a small garment from it, as it is stated: “Shall you give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4), indicating that the sheared wool must contain enough for a proper gift. If the owner of the shearing did not manage to give it to the priest until he dyed it, the owner is exempt from the mitzva of the first sheared wool, as this constitutes a change in the wool by which means he acquires ownership of it. If he laundered it but did not dye it, he is obligated to give the first sheared wool, as laundering does not constitute a change in the wool. One who purchases the fleece of the sheep of a gentile is exempt from the obligation of giving the first sheared wool to the priest. With regard to one who purchases the fleece of the sheep of another Jew, if the seller kept some of the wool, then the seller is obligated to give the first sheared wool to the priest. If the seller did not keep any of the wool, the buyer is obligated to give it. If the seller had two types of sheep, gray and white, and he sold the buyer the gray fleece but not the white fleece, or if he sold the fleece of the male sheep but not of the female sheep, then this one, the seller, gives the first sheared wool for himself to the priest from the wool that he kept, and that one, the buyer, gives the first sheared wool for himself to the priest from the wool that he bought.

Chapter 12

The mitzva of sending away the mother bird from the nest applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, and in the presence of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple. It applies to non-sacred birds, but it does not apply to sacrificial birds. There are more stringent elements in the covering of the blood than in the sending away of the mother bird from the nest, as the covering of the blood applies to undomesticated animals and birds, to animals and birds that are readily available in one’s home, and to animals and birds that are not readily available and are hunted in the wild; and the sending of the mother bird from the nest applies only to birds, and applies only to birds that are not readily available. What are considered birds that are not readily available? They are any birds, even domesticated, that may fly away at any time, such as geese or chickens that nested in the orchard [ pardes ]. But if geese or chickens nested in the house, and likewise, with regard to domesticated pigeons [ yonei hardisei’ot ], one is exempt from sending away the mother bird.

With regard to the nest of a non-kosher bird, one is exempt from sending away the mother bird. In a case where a non-kosher bird is resting upon the eggs of a kosher bird, or a kosher bird is resting upon the eggs of a non-kosher bird, one is exempt from sending away the bird. With regard to a male pheasant [ korei ], which is known to sit upon the eggs like the female of its species, Rabbi Eliezer deems one obligated to send it away, and the Rabbis deem one exempt from sending it away.

If the mother bird was hovering over the eggs or fledglings in the nest, when its wings are touching the eggs or fledglings in the nest, one is obligated to send away the mother. When its wings are not touching the eggs or fledglings in the nest, one is exempt from sending away the mother. Even if there is only one fledgling or one egg, one is obligated to send away the mother, as it is stated: “If a bird’s nest happens before you” (Deuteronomy 22:6), indicating that one is obligated to send away the mother bird from the nest in any case. If there were fledglings capable of flying, or unfertilized eggs from which a fledgling will not hatch, one is exempt from sending away the mother bird from the nest, as it is stated in the same verse: “And the mother is resting upon the fledglings or upon the eggs.” From the juxtaposition of the fledglings and the eggs one derives: Just as the fledglings are living, so too, the eggs must be capable of producing living fledglings. This excludes unfertilized eggs, which cannot produce a living fledgling. And furthermore, just as the eggs need their mothers to hatch them, so too, the fledglings must be those that need their mothers. This excludes fledglings that are capable of flying. If one sent away the mother bird and it returned to rest on the eggs, even if it returned four or five times, one is obligated to send it away again, as it is stated: “You shall send [ shalle’aḥ teshallaḥ ] the mother” (Deuteronomy 22:7). The doubled verb indicates that one must send away the mother bird multiple times if needed. If one said: I am hereby taking the mother and sending away the offspring, he is still obligated to send away the mother even if he sent away the offspring, as it is stated: “You shall send the mother.” If one sent away the mother and took the offspring and then returned them to the mother’s nest, and thereafter the mother returned and rested upon them, one is exempt from sending away the mother bird.

With regard to one who takes the mother bird with its fledglings, Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged for taking the mother bird, and he does not send away the mother. And the Rabbis say: He sends away the mother and is not flogged, as this is the principle: With regard to any prohibition that entails a command to arise and perform a mitzva, one is not flogged for its violation.

A person may not take the mother bird with the offspring even if he takes the mother for use as part of the ritual to purify the leper. The mishna compares the reward for performing the mitzva of sending away the mother bird from the nest to the reward for performing other mitzvot: And if with regard to the sending away of the mother bird, which is a mitzva whose performance is simple, as it entails a loss of no more than an issar, i.e., the value of the mother bird, the Torah says: “That it may be well with you, and that you may prolong your days” (Deuteronomy 22:7), it may be derived by a fortiori inference that the reward is no less for the fulfillment of the mitzvot in the Torah whose performance is demanding.

Mishnah Bekhorot

Chapter 1

With regard to one who purchases the fetus of a donkey that belongs to a gentile, and one who sells the fetus of his donkey to a gentile although he is not permitted to sell a large animal to a gentile, and one who enters into a partnership with a gentile in ownership of a donkey or its fetus, and one who receives a donkey from a gentile in order to care for it in exchange for partnership in its offspring, and one who gives his donkey to a gentile in receivership, in all of these cases the donkeys are exempt from the obligations of firstborn status, i.e., they do not have firstborn status and are not redeemed, as it is stated: “I sanctified to Me all the firstborn in Israel, both man and animal” (Numbers 3:13), indicating that the mitzva is incumbent upon the Jewish people, but not upon others. If the firstborn belongs even partially to a gentile, it does not have firstborn status. Priests and Levites are exempt from the obligation to redeem a firstborn donkey; this is derived from an a fortiori inference: In the wilderness the firstborn were redeemed in exchange for the Levites, as it is stated: “Take the Levites in exchange for all the firstborn among the children of Israel and the animal of the Levites in exchange for their animals” (Numbers 3:45). If the priests and Levites rendered exempt the firstborn children and donkeys of the Israelites in the wilderness from being counted firstborns, it is only logical that the priests and the Levites should render the firstborn of their own donkeys exempt from being counted firstborns.

A cow that gave birth to a donkey of sorts and a donkey that gave birth to a horse of sorts are exempt from their offspring being counted a firstborn, as it is stated: “And every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 13:13); “and the firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 34:20). The Torah states this halakha twice, indicating that one is not obligated unless both the birth mother is a donkey and the animal born is a donkey. And what is the halakhic status of offspring that are unlike the mother animal with regard to their consumption? In the case of a kosher animal that gave birth to a non-kosher animal of sorts, its consumption is permitted. And in the case of a non-kosher animal that gave birth to a kosher animal of sorts, its consumption is prohibited. This is because that which emerges from the non-kosher animal is non-kosher and that which emerges from the kosher animal is kosher. In the case of a non-kosher fish that swallowed a kosher fish, consumption of the kosher fish is permitted. And in the case of a kosher fish that swallowed a non-kosher fish, consumption of the non-kosher fish is prohibited due to the fact that the host fish is not the place of its development.

In the case of a female donkey that had not previously given birth and now gave birth to two male offspring, as there is no doubt that one of them is firstborn, its owner gives one lamb to the priest in redemption of that firstborn. If it gave birth to a male and a female and it is not known which was born first, he designates one lamb as firstborn in case the male was born first. Nevertheless, since it is merely a monetary debt to the priest, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, in this case the priest. Due to that uncertainty, the priest can offer no proof and the owner keeps the lamb for himself. If an individual has two donkeys, and both of his two donkeys had not previously given birth and they now gave birth to two males, one each, the owner gives two lambs to the priest. If they together gave birth to a male and a female or to two males and a female, he gives one lamb to the priest, as one of the males is certainly a firstborn. If they together gave birth to two females and a male or to two males and two females, the priest receives nothing, as perhaps the two firstborn were females.

If one of his donkeys had previously given birth and one had not previously given birth and they now together gave birth to two males, the owner gives one lamb to the priest as redemption for the firstborn male. If they together gave birth to a male and a female he designates one lamb for himself, as it is uncertain whether or not the male was a firstborn and the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. From where is it derived that the firstborn of a donkey is redeemed with a lamb? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And you shall redeem the firstborn of a donkey with a lamb [ seh ]” (Exodus 34:20). The owner may give a lamb either from sheep or from goats; from males or females, from older or younger animals, and from unblemished or blemished animals. If the priest returns the lamb to the owner, he may redeem firstborn donkeys with it many times. In a case where he designates a lamb due to uncertainty and keeps it for himself, it is his in every sense. Consequently, it enters the pen in order to be tithed with the other non-sacred animals (see Leviticus 27:32), and if it dies, one may derive benefit from its carcass.

One may not redeem a firstborn donkey, neither with a calf, nor with an undomesticated animal, nor with a slaughtered animal, nor with a tereifa, nor with a hybrid of a sheep and a goat, nor with a koy, which is an animal with regard to which it is uncertain whether it is domesticated or undomesticated. And Rabbi Eliezer deems it permitted to redeem a firstborn donkey with a hybrid of a sheep and a goat, because it is a lamb, i.e., that hybrid has the status of a lamb, but prohibits redeeming it with a koy, because its status is uncertain. If one gave the firstborn donkey to a priest, the priest may not keep it unless he first designates a lamb in its stead for redemption.

In the case of one who designates a lamb for the redemption of a firstborn donkey and the lamb dies, Rabbi Eliezer says: The owner bears financial responsibility and must give the priest another lamb in its place. This is like the case of the five sela for redemption of a firstborn son, where if the money is lost before one gives it to the priest, he must give the priest another five sela. And the Rabbis say: The owner does not bear financial responsibility. This is like the case of money designated for redemption of second-tithe produce, where once the owner designates the money for redemption, the produce is desanctified. Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Tzadok testified about a lamb designated for redemption of a firstborn donkey that died, that the priest has nothing here, i.e., in such a case, as the firstborn donkey has already been redeemed, and the owner no longer bears financial responsibility for the dead lamb, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. If after the lamb was designated, the firstborn donkey died, Rabbi Eliezer says: The donkey must be buried, and the owner is permitted to derive benefit from the lamb. And the Rabbis say: It does not need to be buried, and the lamb is given to the priest.

If one did not wish to redeem the firstborn donkey, he breaks its neck from behind and buries it. The mitzva of redeeming the firstborn donkey takes precedence over the mitzva of breaking the neck, as it is stated: “If you will not redeem it, then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). The mishna proceeds to enumerate other mitzvot in which one option takes precedence over another. The mitzva of designating a Hebrew maidservant to be betrothed to her master takes precedence over the mitzva of redeeming the maidservant from her master with money, as it is stated: “If she does not please her master, who has not betrothed her to himself, then he shall let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:8). The mitzva of levirate marriage takes precedence over the mitzva of ḥalitza, which dissolves the levirate bond, as it is stated: “And if the man does not wish to take his brother’s wife” (Deuteronomy 25:7). The mishna adds: This was the case initially, when people would intend that their performance of levirate marriage be for the sake of the mitzva. But now that they do not intend that their performance of levirate marriage be for the sake of the mitzva, but rather for reasons such as the beauty of the yevama or for financial gain, the Sages said that the mitzva of ḥalitza takes precedence over the mitzva of levirate marriage. With regard to a non-kosher animal that was consecrated to the Temple, the mitzva of redemption by the owner who consecrated it takes precedence over redemption by any other person, as it is stated: “And if it is of a non-kosher animal… and if it is not redeemed, it shall be sold according to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:27).

Chapter 2

With regard to one who purchases the fetus of a cow that belongs to a gentile; one who sells the fetus of his cow to a gentile, even though one is not permitted to sell a large animal to a gentile; one who enters into a partnership with a gentile with regard to a cow or its fetus; one who receives a cow from a gentile to tend to it in exchange for partnership in its offspring; and one who gives his cow to a gentile in receivership, so that the gentile owns a share of the cow’s offspring; in all of these cases, one is exempt from the obligation of redeeming the firstborn offspring, as it is stated: “I sanctified to Me all the firstborn in Israel, both man and animal” (Numbers 3:13), indicating that the mitzva is incumbent upon the Jewish people, but not upon others. If the firstborn belongs even partially to a gentile, the sanctity of firstborn does not apply to it. The mishna continues: The priests and the Levites are obligated in the mitzva, i.e., their animals have firstborn sanctity, as they were not exempted from the mitzva of the male firstborn of a kosher animal; rather, they were exempted only from redemption of the firstborn son and from the redemption of the firstborn donkey.

All sacrificial animals in which a permanent blemish preceded their consecration do not assume inherent sanctity and only their value is consecrated, and once they were redeemed, they are obligated in the mitzva of a firstborn, i.e., their offspring are subject to being counted a firstborn, and in the priestly gifts of the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, and they can emerge from their sacred status and assume complete non-sacred status in order to be shorn and to be utilized for labor. And their offspring and their milk are permitted after their redemption. And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is exempt from karet, and those animals do not render an animal that was a substitute for them consecrated. And if these animals died before they were redeemed, they may be redeemed and fed to dogs, and they do not require burial, except for the firstborn and the animal tithe. With regard to these two types of offerings, even if they were blemished before they became consecrated they assume inherent sanctity, like other offerings that were consecrated and subsequently became blemished.

And all sacrificial animals whose consecration preceded their blemish, or who had a temporary blemish prior to their consecration and afterward developed a permanent blemish and they were redeemed, they are exempt from, i.e., their offspring are not counted, a firstborn, and from the gifts of the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, and they do not completely emerge from their sacred status and assume non-sacred status in order to be shorn and to be utilized for labor. And their offspring, which were conceived prior to redemption, and their milk, are prohibited after their redemption. And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet, and those animals render an animal that was a substitute for them consecrated. And if these animals died before they were redeemed, they may not be redeemed and fed to dogs; rather, they must be buried.

With regard to one who receives animals as part of a guaranteed investment from a gentile, i.e., the Jew receives the animals to raise them and commits to pay a fixed price at a later date even if they die or their value decreases, and the offspring born in the interim are divided between the gentile and the Jew, their direct offspring are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn if they give birth to a male, but the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated in the mitzva of the firstborn if they gave birth to a male. If the Jew established their offspring in place of their mothers for collection in case the mothers die, the offspring of their direct offspring are exempt and the offspring of the offspring of their direct offspring are obligated. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even until ten generations, the offspring are exempt, as they all serve as a guarantee for the gentile, because if he does not receive the fixed payment for the animal, he will collect his debt from any offspring born to it or its offspring.

A ewe that gave birth to a goat of sorts and a goat that gave birth to a ewe of sorts are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn. And if the offspring has some of the characteristics of its mother, it is obligated in the mitzva of firstborn.

In the case of a ewe that had not previously given birth, and it gave birth to two males and both their heads emerged as one, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Both of them are given to the priest, as it is stated in the plural: “Every firstborn that you have of animals, the males shall be to the Lord” (Exodus 13:12). And the Rabbis say: It is impossible for two events to coincide precisely, i.e., their births were not at precisely the same time. Rather, one preceded the other, and therefore one of the males is given to the owner and one to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them and the priest takes the leaner of the two, as will be explained in the Gemara. And with regard to the second lamb that remains in the possession of the owner, since he may not partake of it due to its uncertain status as a firstborn, it must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point he may slaughter and eat it. And when he slaughters the animal he is obligated to have the gifts of the priesthood taken from it, i.e., the gifts that one is required to give a priest from a non-sacred animal: The foreleg, the jaw, and the maw. And Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving those gifts. If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If a male and a female offspring were born together, everyone agrees that the priest has nothing here.

If one’s two ewes had not previously given birth and they gave birth to two males, both of them are given to the priest, as each is its mother’s firstborn. If one gave birth to a male and the other to a female, the male is given to the priest, as it is its mother’s firstborn. If they gave birth to two males and a female, one of the males is kept by him and one is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them, and the priest takes the leaner of the two. And the second lamb must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point the owner may slaughter and eat it. And when the owner slaughters the animal, he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, taken from it. Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving the gifts. If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the value of the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If they gave birth to two females and a male or to two males and two females, the priest has nothing here, as perhaps both ewes gave birth to females first.

If one of his ewes had previously given birth and one had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males, one of the males is kept by him and one is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them and the priest takes the leaner of the two. And the second lamb must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point he may slaughter and eat it. And when he slaughters the animal he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it. Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt him from giving those gifts, as Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of a priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts. And Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. If one of the animals died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the value of the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If a male and a female offspring were born together, everyone agrees that the priest has nothing here, as perhaps the one that had already given birth bore the male, and the one that had not given birth bore the female, in which case neither of the animals would have firstborn status.

With regard to an animal born by caesarean section and the offspring that follows it, since there is uncertainty whether each is a firstborn, neither is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: Both of them must graze until they become unfit, and they may be eaten in their blemished state by their owner. Rabbi Akiva says: Neither of them is firstborn; the first because it is not the one that opens the womb (see Exodus 13:12), as this animal did not itself open the womb, and the second because the other one preceded it.

Chapter 3

In the case of one who purchases a female animal from a gentile and does not know whether it had previously given birth or whether it had not previously given birth, and after the purchase the animal gave birth to a male, Rabbi Yishmael says: If the mother was a goat within its first year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest, as it definitely never gave birth previously. From that point forward, i.e., if the mother is older than that, its offspring’s status as a firstborn is uncertain. If it was a ewe within its second year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest; from that point forward an offspring’s status is uncertain. If it was a cow or a donkey within its third year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest; from that point forward the offspring’s status is uncertain. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Were an animal exempted only by giving birth to an offspring and in no other manner the halakha would be in accordance with your statement. But the Sages said: An indication of the offspring in a small animal is a murky discharge from the womb, which indicates the animal had been pregnant, and therefore exempts subsequent births from the mitzva of the firstborn. The indication in a large animal is the emergence of an afterbirth, and the indication in a woman is a fetal sac or an afterbirth. Since these can be produced even within a year, it cannot be assumed that an animal in its first year is definitely subject to the mitzva of the firstborn. Rabbi Akiva continues: Rather, this is the principle: In any case where it is known that the animal had previously given birth, the priest has nothing here. And in any case where it is known that the animal had not previously given birth, that is given to the priest. And if it is uncertain, it may be eaten in its blemished state by the owner. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: In the case of a large animal that expelled a mass of congealed blood, that mass must be buried. The reason is that perhaps there was a male fetus there which was consecrated as a firstborn when it emerged, and the animal is exempt from having any future offspring counted a firstborn.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In the case of one who purchases a nursing female animal from a gentile, he does not need to be concerned, i.e., take into account the possibility, that perhaps it was nursing the offspring of another animal. Rather, the buyer may assume it had previously given birth. In the case of one who enters amid his flock and sees mother animals that gave birth for the first time that were nursing, and also sees mother animals that gave birth not for the first time that were also nursing, he does not need to be concerned that perhaps the offspring of this animal came to that animal to be nursed, or that perhaps the offspring of that animal came to this animal to be nursed.

Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says: Since it is prohibited by Torah law to shear a firstborn, as it states: “And you shall not shear the firstborn of your flock” (Deuteronomy 15:19), one who is slaughtering a firstborn, and must clear hair or wool from the area of the neck in order to facilitate proper slaughter, clears space by uprooting the hair with a cleaver [ bekofitz ] from here and from there, on either side of the neck, although he thereby plucks out the hair. He may clear space in this manner provided that he does not move the plucked hair from its place; it must remain intermingled with the rest of the hair so it will appear that he did not shear the animal. And likewise, one plucks the hair to enable one of the Sages to examine the place of a blemish and thereby determine whether it is permitted to slaughter the firstborn outside the Temple.

With regard to the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that shed from the animal, and which one placed in a compartment for safekeeping, and thereafter he slaughtered the animal; given that after the animal dies he is permitted to derive benefit from the hair the animal had on its body when it died, what is the halakhic status of hair that shed from the animal while it was alive? Akavya ben Mahalalel deems its use permitted, and the Rabbis deem its use prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei said to him: It was not with regard to that case that Akavya ben Mahalalel deemed use of the wool permitted. Rather, it was in the case of the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that shed from the animal which one placed in a compartment and thereafter the animal died. It was in that case that Akavya ben Mahalalel deems use of the wool permitted, and the Rabbis deem its use prohibited even after its death. With regard to wool that is dangling from a firstborn animal, i.e., which was not completely shed, that which appears to be part of the fleece is permitted when the animal is shorn after its death, and that which does not appear to be part of the fleece is prohibited.

Chapter 4

Until when must an Israelite tend to and raise a firstborn animal before giving it to the priest? With regard to a small animal, e.g., a sheep or goat, it is thirty days, and with regard to a large animal, e.g., cattle, it is fifty days. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to a small animal, it is three months. If the priest said to the owner within that period: Give it to me, that owner may not give it to him. And if it is a blemished firstborn and the priest said to him: Give it to me so I may eat it, it is permitted for the owner to give it to him. And at the time that the Temple is standing, if it is unblemished and the priest said to him: Give it to me and I will sacrifice it, it is permitted for the owner to give it to him. The firstborn animal is eaten year by year, i.e., within its first year, whether it is blemished or whether it is unblemished, as it is stated: “You shall eat it before the Lord your God year by year” (Deuteronomy 15:20).

If a blemish developed within its first year, it is permitted for the owner to maintain the animal for the entire twelve months. If a blemish developed after twelve months have passed, it is permitted for the owner to maintain the animal for only thirty days.

In the case of one who slaughters the firstborn animal and only then shows its blemish to an expert to determine whether it is a blemish, and it was established by the expert that it is in fact a blemish that renders its slaughter permitted, Rabbi Yehuda deems it permitted for a priest to derive benefit from the firstborn. Rabbi Meir says: Since it was slaughtered not according to the ruling of an expert, it is prohibited.

In a case involving one who is not an expert, and he examined the firstborn animal and it was slaughtered on the basis of his ruling, that animal must be buried, and the non-expert must pay compensation to the priest from his property. Apropos the previous mishna, which taught that a judge who was an expert for the court and who erred is exempt from payment, this mishna teaches: There was an incident involving a cow whose womb was removed, and when Rabbi Tarfon was consulted he ruled that it is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ], which is forbidden for consumption. And based on the ruling of Rabbi Tarfon, the questioner fed it to the dogs. And the incident came before the Sages of the court in Yavne, and they ruled that such an animal is permitted and is not a tereifa. And Theodosius [ Todos ] the doctor said: A cow or pig does not emerge from Alexandria of Egypt unless the residents sever its womb so that it will not give birth in the future. The breeds of cows and pigs in Alexandria were of exceptional quality and the people of Alexandria did not want them reproduced elsewhere. The fact that these animals lived long lives after their wombs were removed proves that the hysterectomy did not render them tereifot. Upon hearing this, Rabbi Tarfon said: Your donkey is gone, Tarfon, as he believed he was required to compensate the owner for the cow that he ruled to be a tereifa. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Rabbi Tarfon, you are an expert for the court, and any expert for the court is exempt from liability to pay.

In the case of an individual who takes payment to be one who examines firstborn animals to determine whether they are blemished, one may not slaughter the firstborn on the basis of his ruling, unless he was an expert like Ila in Yavne, whom the Sages in Yavne permitted to take a wage of four issar for issuing a ruling concerning a small animal and six issar for issuing a ruling concerning a large animal. They permitted this provided that he would be paid whether it turned out that the firstborn was unblemished or whether it was blemished.

In the case of one who takes his wages to judge cases, his rulings are void. In the case of one who takes wages to testify, his testimonies are void. With regard to one who takes wages to sprinkle the purification waters of the red heifer upon one who contracted impurity imparted by a corpse, and one who takes wages to sanctify those waters, the halakhic status of his water is that of cave water, and the status of his ashes is that of mere burnt ashes. Although taking actual wages is prohibited, if the one examining the firstborn, or the judge, or the witness, was a priest, and the one who requires his services rendered him impure and prevented him from partaking of his teruma, that person must provide the priest with food, drink, and oil for smearing on his body from his own non-sacred property. And likewise if the one examining the firstborn, or the judge, or the witness, was an elderly person, the one who requires his services transports him on a donkey. And in all these cases, although it is prohibited to take wages, the one who requires his services gives him his wages like the wages of a laborer, as he was unable to perform his usual labor that day.

In the case of one who is suspect with regard to firstborn animals of slaughtering them and selling their meat when it is prohibited to do so, one may neither purchase meat from him, including even deer meat, nor may one purchase from him hides that are not tanned. Rabbi Eliezer says: One may purchase hides of female animals from him, as the halakhot of firstborn animals are in effect only with regard to males. And one may not purchase bleached or dirty wool from him. But one may purchase spun thread from him, and all the more so may one purchase garments from him.

In the case of one who is suspect with regard to the Sabbatical Year, i.e., of sowing or engaging in commerce with Sabbatical-Year produce, one may not purchase flax from him, and this applies even to combed flax, in which much labor and exertion was invested. But one may purchase spun thread and woven fabric from such individuals.

In the case of one who is suspect with regard to selling teruma under the guise of non-sacred produce, one may not purchase even water and salt from him; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: One may not purchase from him any item that has relevance to teruma and tithes. However, one may purchase water and salt from him, as teruma and tithes do not apply to them.

One who is suspect with regard to the Sabbatical Year is not suspect with regard to tithes; and likewise, one who is suspect with regard to tithes is not suspect with regard to the Sabbatical Year. One who is suspect with regard to this, the Sabbatical Year, or with regard to that, tithes, is suspect with regard to selling ritually impure foods as though they were ritually pure items. But there are those who are suspect with regard to ritually pure items who are not suspect with regard to this, the Sabbatical Year, nor with regard to that, tithes. This is the principle with regard to these matters: Anyone who is suspect with regard to a specific matter may neither adjudicate cases nor testify in cases involving that matter.

Chapter 5

With regard to all disqualified consecrated animals that were disqualified for sacrifice due to blemishes and were redeemed, all benefit accrued from their sale belongs to the Temple treasury. In order to ensure that the Temple treasury will not suffer a loss, these animals are sold in the butchers’ market [ ba’itliz ] and slaughtered in the butchers’ market, where the demand is great and the price is consequently higher. And their meat is weighed and sold by the litra, in the manner that non-sacred meat is sold. This is the halakha with regard to all consecrated animals except for the firstborn offering and an animal tithe offering. When these become blemished and their slaughter is permitted, they are sold and slaughtered only in the owner’s house and are not weighed; rather, they are sold by estimate. The reason is that all benefit accrued from their sale belongs to the owner, i.e., the priest in the case of the firstborn and the owner in the case of the animal tithe offering. It is not permitted to treat disqualified consecrated animals as one treats non-sacred animals merely to guarantee that the owner will receive the optimal price. This is in contrast to disqualified consecrated animals, where all benefit accrued from their sale belongs to the Temple treasury, and therefore the animal is sold in the market to ensure that the optimal price is received. And although the meat of the firstborn is not weighed and sold by the litra, nevertheless, if one has non-sacred meat weighing one hundred dinars, one may weigh one portion of non-sacred meat against one portion of the meat of the firstborn, because that is unlike the manner in which non-sacred meat is weighed.

Beit Shammai say: An Israelite cannot be counted with the priest to partake of a blemished firstborn. And Beit Hillel deem it permitted for him to partake of it, and they deem it permitted even for a gentile to partake of a blemished firstborn. With regard to a firstborn animal that was congested with excess blood, even if the animal will die if one does not let the excess blood, one may not let its blood, as this might cause a blemish, and it is prohibited to cause a blemish on consecrated animals. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: One may let the blood provided that he will not cause a blemish while doing so, and if he caused a blemish, the animal may not be slaughtered on account of that blemish. Since he was the cause of the blemish, he may not slaughter the animal until it develops a different, unrelated blemish. Rabbi Shimon says: One may let the blood even if he thereby causes a blemish in the animal.

In the case of one who slits [ hatzorem ] the ear of a firstborn offering, that person may never slaughter that animal. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: If another blemish later develops in the firstborn, he may slaughter the animal on account of that second blemish. There was an incident involving an old ram whose hair was long and dangling, because it was a firstborn offering. And one Roman quaestor [ kastor ] saw it and said to its owner: What is the status [ tivo ] of this animal that you allowed it to grow old and you did not slaughter it? They said to him: It is a firstborn offering, and therefore it may be slaughtered only if it has a blemish. The quaestor took a dagger [ pigom ] and slit its ear. And the incident came before the Sages for a ruling, and they deemed its slaughter permitted. And after the Sages deemed its slaughter permitted, the quaestor went and slit the ears of other firstborn offerings, but in these cases the Sages deemed their slaughter prohibited, despite the fact that they were now blemished. One time children were playing in the field and they tied the tails of lambs to each other, and the tail of one of them was severed, and it was a firstborn offering. And the incident came before the Sages for a ruling and they deemed its slaughter permitted. The people who saw that they deemed its slaughter permitted went and tied the tails of other firstborn offerings, and the Sages deemed their slaughter prohibited. This is the principle: With regard to any blemish that is caused intentionally, the animal’s slaughter is prohibited; if the blemish is caused unintentionally, the animal’s slaughter is permitted.

If one’s firstborn offering was pursuing him, and he kicked the animal and caused a blemish in it, he may slaughter the animal on account of that blemish. With regard to all the blemishes that are capable of being brought about by a person, Israelite shepherds are deemed credible to testify that the blemishes were not caused intentionally. But priest-shepherds are not deemed credible, as they are the beneficiaries if the firstborn is blemished. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A priest is deemed credible to testify about the firstborn of another, but is not deemed credible to testify about the firstborn belonging to him. Rabbi Meir says: A priest who is suspect about the matter of causing a blemish may neither adjudicate nor testify in cases involving that matter, even on behalf of another.

A priest is deemed credible to say: I showed this firstborn animal to an expert and he ruled that it is blemished. Everyone is deemed credible to testify about the blemishes of an animal tithe offering, even the owner who is the beneficiary of a ruling that it is blemished. With regard to a firstborn animal whose eye was blinded or whose foreleg was severed or whose hind leg was broken, all of which obviously render the animal permanently blemished, that animal may be slaughtered on the basis of the ruling of three regular Jews who attend the synagogue, and it does not require a ruling by one of the Sages. Rabbi Yosei disagrees and says: Even if there is a court of twenty-three Sages there, it may be slaughtered only on the basis of the ruling of an expert in judging blemishes.

In the case of one who slaughters a firstborn animal and sells its meat, and it was discovered that he did not initially show it to one of the Sages, the halakha is that it was actually prohibited to derive any benefit from the meat. In that case, what the buyers ate, they ate, and the Sages penalized the seller in that he must return the money to them, which they paid for the meat that they ate. And with regard to that which they did not eat, that meat must be buried, and he must return the money that they paid for the meat that they did not eat. And likewise, in the case of one who slaughters a cow and sells it, and it was discovered that it is a tereifa, what the buyers ate, they ate, and what they did not eat, they must return the meat to the seller, who may sell it to a gentile or feed it to the dogs, and he must return the money to the buyers. If the buyers sold it to gentiles or cast it to the dogs, they pay the seller the value of a tereifa, which is less than the value of kosher meat, and the seller refunds the balance to the buyers.

Chapter 6

For these blemishes, one may slaughter the firstborn animal outside the Temple: If the firstborn’s ear was damaged and lacking from the cartilage [ haḥasḥus ], but not if the skin was damaged; and likewise, if the ear was split, although it is not lacking; or if the ear was pierced with a hole the size of a bitter vetch, which is a type of legume; or if it was an ear that is desiccated. What is a desiccated ear that is considered a blemish? It is any ear that if it is pierced it does not discharge a drop of blood. Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam says: Desiccated means that the ear is so dry that it will crumble if one touches it.

For these blemishes of the eye, one may slaughter the firstborn animal outside the Temple: The eyelid that was pierced, an eyelid that was damaged and is lacking, or an eyelid that was split; and likewise, one may slaughter a firstborn animal outside the Temple if there was in his eye a cataract, a tevallul, or a growth in the shape of a snail, a snake, or a berry that covers the pupil. What is a tevallul? It is a white thread that bisects the iris and enters the black pupil. If it is a black thread that bisects the iris and enters the white of the eye it is not a blemish.

Pale spots on the eye and tears streaming from the eye that are constant are blemishes that enable the slaughter of the firstborn. Which are the pale spots that are constant? They are any spots that persisted for eighty days. Rabbi Ḥananya ben Antigonus said: One examines it three times within eighty days. Only if the spots are found during all three examinations are they considered constant. And these are the constant tears, i.e., this is how it is known whether the blemish is temporary or permanent: In a case where the animal ate, for medicinal purposes, moist fodder and dry fodder from a field watered exclusively with rain, or if the animal ate moist fodder and dry fodder from an irrigated field, or even if the animal did not eat them together but ate the dry fodder and thereafter ate the moist fodder, and the condition of constant tears was not healed, it is not a blemish. It is not a blemish unless the animal eats the moist fodder and thereafter eats the dry fodder and is not thereby healed.

For these additional blemishes, one may slaughter a firstborn animal outside the Temple: Its nose that was pierced, or that was damaged and is lacking, or that was split. Likewise, its lip that was pierced, or that was damaged, or that was split is considered a blemish. The mishna lists additional blemishes that permit the slaughter of the firstborn: The external gums that were damaged and lacking or that were scratched, and likewise, the internal gums that were extracted. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: One does not examine from the double teeth, i.e., the large molars that appear like two teeth, and inward, and one does not examine even the place of the double teeth themselves. This is because even if they were extracted, it is a concealed blemish, and it does not permit the slaughter of the firstborn.

The mishna details additional blemishes that enable the slaughter of firstborn animals: If the pouch [ hazoven ] in which the genitals of the firstborn are concealed, or if the genitalia of a female sacrificial animal, were damaged and lacking; if the tail was damaged from the tailbone, but not if it was damaged from the joint, i.e., one of the joints between the vertebrae, because it heals; or in a case where the end of the tail is split, i.e., the skin and the flesh were removed and the bone remained exposed; or in a case where there is a full fingerbreadth of flesh between one joint and another joint; these are all blemishes.

The firstborn animal may be slaughtered if it has no testicles or if it has only one testicle. Rabbi Yishmael says: If the animal has two scrotal sacs, it can be assumed that it has two testicles; if the animal does not have two scrotal sacs, it can be assumed that it has only one testicle. Rabbi Akiva says: The matter can be ascertained: One seats the animal on its rump and mashes the sac; if there is a testicle, ultimately it is going to emerge. There was an incident where one mashed the sac and the testicle did not emerge. Then, the animal was slaughtered and the testicle was discovered attached to the loins. And Rabbi Akiva permitted the consumption of its flesh, as the testicle had not previously emerged, and Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri prohibited its consumption.

An animal with five legs, or one that has only three, or one whose hooves on its legs were closed like those of a donkey and not split, or the shaḥul, or the kasul may be slaughtered. What is a shaḥul? It is an animal with a thighbone that was dislocated. And what is a kasul? It is an animal whose build is asymmetrical in that one of its thighs is higher than the other.

Additional blemishes that permit the slaughter of the firstborn include those where the bone of its foreleg or the bone of its hind leg was broken, even though it is not conspicuous. With regard to these blemishes listed in this chapter, Ila, who was expert in blemishes of the firstborn, enumerated them in Yavne, and the Sages deferred to his expertise. And Ila added three additional blemishes, and the Sages said to him: We did not hear about those. Ila added: An animal whose eye is round like that of a person, or whose mouth is similar to that of a pig, or where most of the segment of its tongue corresponding to the segment that facilitates speech in the tongue of a person was removed. The court that followed them said with regard to each of those three blemishes: That is a blemish that enables the slaughter of the firstborn.

And there was an incident where the lower jaw of the firstborn protruded beyond the upper jaw, and Rabban Gamliel asked the Sages for a ruling, and they said: That is a blemish that enables the slaughter of the firstborn. With regard to the ear of the kid that was doubled and appeared like two ears, the Sages said: When the additional ear is one bone, i.e., it has its own cartilage, it is a blemish; when it does not have its own bone it is not a blemish. Rabbi Ḥananya ben Gamliel says: In the case of the tail of a kid that is similar to that of a pig or one that is so short that it does not have three joints, that is a blemish.

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says that these are blemished animals: One that has a wart in its eyes; and one where the bone of its foreleg or hind leg was damaged; and one where the bone of its mouth, i.e., its jaw, was dislocated; and an animal with one of its eyes large and one small, or one of its ears large and one small where the difference in size is detectable by sight, but not if it is detectable only by being measured. Rabbi Yehuda says: An animal is blemished if with regard to its two testicles, one is as large as two of the other, but the Rabbis did not agree with his opinion.

In the case of the tail of a calf that does not reach the leg joint [ la’arkov ], the Sages said: It is a blemish, because all growth of calves is in this manner: As long as they grow, their tails are extended beneath the leg joint. Which is the leg joint about which the Sages spoke? Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: They are referring to the leg joint that is in the middle of the thigh. For these blemishes enumerated in the previous mishnayot, one slaughters the firstborn outside the Temple and disqualified consecrated animals may be redeemed on their account.

And these are the blemishes that one does not slaughter the firstborn due to them, neither in the Temple nor in the rest of the country: Pale spots on the eye and tears streaming from the eye that are not constant; and internal gums that were damaged but that were not extracted; and an animal with boils that are moist inside and out [ garav ]; and an animal with warts; and an animal with boils [ ḥazazit ]; and an old or sick animal, or one with a foul odor; and one with which a transgression was performed, e.g., it copulated with a person or was the object of bestiality; and one that killed a person. In these latter two cases, the act of bestiality or killing became known on the basis of the testimony of one witness or on the basis of the owner. And one does not slaughter a tumtum, whose sexual organs are concealed, and a hermaphrodite [ ve’anderoginos ], which has both male and female sexual organs, neither in the Temple nor in the rest of the country. Rabbi Shimon says: You have no blemish greater than that, and it may be slaughtered. And the Rabbis say: The halakhic status of a hermaphrodite is not that of a firstborn; rather, its halakhic status is that of a non-sacred animal that may be shorn and utilized for labor.

Chapter 7

Concerning these blemishes which were taught with regard to an animal, whether they are permanent or transient, they also disqualify in the case of a person, i.e., they disqualify a priest from performing the Temple service. And in addition to those blemishes, there are other blemishes that apply only to a priest: One whose head is pointed, narrow above and wide below; and one whose head is turnip-like, wide above and narrow below; and one whose head is hammer-like, with his forehead protruding; and one whose head has an indentation; and one wherein the back of his head protrudes. And with regard to those with humped backs, Rabbi Yehuda deems them fit for service and the Rabbis deem them disqualified.

The kere’aḥ is disqualified from performing the Temple service. What is a kere’aḥ? It is anyone who does not have a row of hair encircling his head from ear to ear. If he has a row of hair from ear to ear, that person is fit for service. If a priest has no eyebrows, or if he has only one eyebrow, that is the gibben that is stated in the Torah in the list of blemished priests (see Leviticus 21:20). Rabbi Dosa says: A gibben is one whose eyebrows are so long that they lie flat and cover his eyes. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: A gibben is one who has two backs and two spines.

The ḥarum is disqualified from performing the Temple service. What is a ḥarum? It is one who can paint both of his eyes as one, with one brushstroke, because he has a sunken nose. If both of one’s eyes are above or both of his eyes are below; or if one of his eyes is above and one of his eyes is below; or if both eyes are in the proper place but he sees both the room on the ground floor and the upper story as one, at the same time; and likewise those unable to look at the sun; and one whose eyes are different; and one whose eyes tear constantly, these are disqualified from performing the Temple service. And one whose eyelashes have fallen out is disqualified from performing the Temple service due to the appearance of a blemish. Unlike the others listed in this mishna, who are disqualified by Torah law, one with this condition is not disqualified by Torah law. Rather, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting a priest with such a condition to perform the Temple service.

The mishna lists additional blemishes that disqualify a priest from performing the Temple service: If a priest’s eyes are large like those of a calf or small like those of a goose; if his body is disproportionately large relative to his limbs or disproportionately small relative to his limbs; if his nose is disproportionately large relative to his limbs or disproportionately small relative to his limbs, he is disqualified. And the tzomem and the tzome’a are also disqualified. What is a tzome’a? It is anyone whose ears are small. And what is the tzomem? It is anyone whose ears are similar to a sponge.

If his upper lip protrudes beyond the lower lip or his lower lip protrudes beyond the upper lip, that is a blemish. And one whose teeth fell out is disqualified due to the appearance of a blemish. The mishna lists additional blemishes that disqualify a priest from performing the Temple service: One who has breasts so large that they sag like those of a woman; or if one’s belly is swollen and protrudes; or if one’s navel protrudes; or if one is an epileptic, even if he experiences seizures only once in a long while; or one who is afflicted with a melancholy temper; or one whose scrotum is unnaturally long; or one whose penis is unnaturally long is disqualified from performing the Temple service. If one has no testicles, or if he has only one testicle, that is the mero’aḥ ashekh that is stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 21:20) among the blemishes that disqualify a priest from Temple service. Rabbi Yishmael says: A mero’aḥ ashekh is anyone whose testicles were crushed. Rabbi Akiva says: It is anyone that has wind in his testicles, i.e., they are swollen. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Mero’aḥ ashekh does not refer to the testicles; rather, the reference is to anyone whose appearance [ marav ] is especially dark [ ḥashukhin ].

The mishna lists additional blemishes that disqualify a priest from performing the Temple service: One whose legs are crooked and bend inward, causing him to knock his ankles or his knees into each other as he walks, and a ba’al happikim, and the ikkel. What is the ikkel? It is anyone who places his feet together and his knees do not knock into each other, i.e., he is bowlegged. A priest with a protuberance emerging alongside the thumb of his hand or the big toe of his foot,or one whose heel emerges and protrudes back from his foot, or one whose feet are wide like those of a goose are all disqualified from performing the Temple service. A priest whose fingers or toes are configured one upon the other, or one whose fingers or toes are attached, is likewise disqualified. But if they were attached from above the palm of the hand or the bottom of the foot only until the middle joint, he is fit. If they were attached below the joint, higher up on the finger or toe, and he cut to separate them, he is fit. In a case where there was an extra finger or toe on his hand or foot and he cut it, if that extra appendage contains a bone, the priest is disqualified even after it was cut, and if there is no bone the priest is fit. If there was an extra appendage on his hands and on his feet, six on each for a total of twenty-four, Rabbi Yehuda deems the priest fit and the Rabbis deem him disqualified. With regard to one who is ambidextrous and has control of both of his hands, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems the priest disqualified, as his halakhic status is like that of one who is left-handed, and the Rabbis deem him fit. Concerning the kushi, the giḥor, the lavkan, the kipe’aḥ, the dwarf, the deaf-mute, the imbecile, the drunk, and those with ritually pure marks, their conditions disqualify a person from performing the Temple service and are valid, i.e., they do not disqualify with regard to being sacrificed, in the case of an animal. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: An imbecile among animals is not optimal for sacrifice. Rabbi Elazar says: Even with regard to those with flesh or skin that hangs from their body, that blemish disqualifies in the case of a person and is valid in the case of an animal.

These flaws do not disqualify a person from performing the Temple service, but they do disqualify an animal from being sacrificed: An animal whose mother or offspring were slaughtered that day, as slaughtering it would violate the prohibition against slaughtering the animal itself and its offspring on the same day; a tereifa ; one born by caesarean section; one with which a transgression of bestiality was performed; and one that killed a person. And a priest who marries women by a transgression, e.g., a divorcée or a woman who underwent ḥalitza, is disqualified from performing the Temple service until he vows not to derive benefit from her. The vow ensures that he will divorce her promptly. And a priest who becomes impure through exposure to corpses is disqualified from performing the Temple service until he accepts upon himself a commitment that he will no longer become impure through exposure to corpses.

Chapter 8

There is a son who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to the requirement of redemption from a priest. There is another who is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest but is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance. There is another who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to redemption from a priest. And there is another who is not a firstborn at all, neither with regard to inheritance nor with regard to redemption from a priest. Which is the son who is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest? It is a son who came after miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus, even where the head of the underdeveloped fetus emerged alive; or after a fully developed nine- month -old fetus whose head emerged dead. The same applies to a son born to a woman who had previously miscarried a fetus that had the appearance of a type of domesticated animal, undomesticated animal, or bird, as that is considered the opening of the womb. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The son is not exempted from the requirement of redemption from a priest unless his birth follows the birth of an animal that takes the form of a person. In the case of a woman who miscarries a fetus in the form of a sandal fish or from whom an afterbirth or a gestational sac in which tissue developed emerged, or who delivered a fetus that emerged in pieces, the son who follows these is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest. In the case of a son born to one who did not have sons and he married a woman who had already given birth; or if he married a woman who gave birth when she was still a Canaanite maidservant and she was then emancipated; or one who gave birth when she was still a gentile and she then converted, and when the maidservant or the gentile came to join the Jewish people she gave birth to a male, that son is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: That son is a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to redemption from a priest, as it is stated: “Whatever opens the womb among the children of Israel” (Exodus 13:2). This indicates that the halakhic status of a child born to the mother is not that of one who opens the womb unless it opens the womb of a woman from the Jewish people. In the case of one who had sons and married a woman who had not given birth; or if he married a woman who converted while she was pregnant, or a Canaanite maidservant who was emancipated while she was pregnant and she gave birth to a son, he is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest, as he opened his mother’s womb, but he is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance, because he is not the firstborn of his father or because halakhically he has no father. And likewise, if an Israelite woman and the daughter or wife of a priest, neither of whom had given birth yet, or an Israelite woman and the daughter or wife of a Levite, or an Israelite woman and a woman who had already given birth, all women whose sons do not require redemption from the priest, gave birth in the same place and it is uncertain which son was born to which mother; and likewise a woman who did not wait three months after the death of her husband and she married and gave birth, and it is unknown whether the child was born after a pregnancy of nine months and is the son of the first husband, or whether he was born after a pregnancy of seven months and is the son of the latter husband, in all these cases the child is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest but is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance. Due to the uncertainty, he is unable to prove he is the firstborn of either father, and therefore he is not entitled to the double portion of the firstborn. Which is the offspring that is a firstborn both with regard to inheritance and with regard to redemption from a priest? In the case of a woman who miscarried a gestational sac full of water, or one full of blood, or one full of pieces of flesh; or one who miscarries a mass resembling a fish, or grasshoppers, or repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, or one who miscarries on the fortieth day after conception, the son who follows any of them is a firstborn with regard to inheritance and with regard to redemption from a priest.

In the case of a boy born by caesarean section and the son who follows him, both of them are not firstborn, neither with regard to inheritance nor with regard to redemption from a priest. Rabbi Shimon says: The first son is a firstborn with regard to inheritance if he is his father’s first son, and the second son is a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest for five sela coins, because he is the first to emerge from the womb and he emerged in the usual way.

With regard to one whose wife had not previously given birth and then gave birth to two males, i.e., twin males, and it is unknown which is the firstborn, he gives five sela coins to the priest after thirty days have passed. If one of them dies within thirty days of birth, before the obligation to redeem the firstborn takes effect, the father is exempt from the payment due to uncertainty, as perhaps it was the firstborn who died. In a case where the father died and the sons are alive, Rabbi Meir says: If they gave the five sela coins to the priest before they divided their father’s property between them, they gave it, and it remains in the possession of the priest. But if not, they are exempt from giving the redemption money to the priest. Rabbi Yehuda says: The obligation to redeem the firstborn already took effect on the property of the father; therefore, in either case the sons, his heirs, are required to pay the priest. If the wife gave birth to a male and a female and it is not known which was born first, the priest has nothing here, as it is possible that the female was born first.

With regard to two wives of one man, both of whom had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males, i.e., each bore one male, and the sons were intermingled, the father gives ten sela coins to the priest even if it is unknown which son was born first, because it is certain that each is firstborn of his mother. In a case where one of them dies within thirty days of birth, if he gave all ten sela coins to one priest, the priest must return five sela to him, because the father was not obligated to redeem the son who then died. And if he gave the redemption payment to two different priests, he cannot reclaim the money from the possession of either priest, as each could claim that the money that he received was for the living child. If one mother gave birth to a male and one gave birth to a female, or if between them they gave birth to two males and one female, and the children were intermingled, the father gives five sela coins to the priest: In the first case because the male might have preceded the female and in the second case because one of the males is certainly firstborn. If the children were two females and a male, or two males and two females, the priest has nothing here, as it is possible the female was born first to each mother. If one of his wives had previously given birth and one had not previously given birth and they gave birth to two males who became intermingled, the father gives five sela coins to the priest, as it is certain that one of them was born to the mother who had not yet given birth. If one of them dies within thirty days of birth the father is exempt from that payment, as it is possible that the one who died was born to the mother who had not yet given birth. In a case of intermingling where the father died and the sons are alive, Rabbi Meir says: If they gave the five sela coins to the priest before they divided their father’s property between them, they gave it, and it remains in the possession of the priest. But if not, they are exempt from giving the redemption payment to the priest. Rabbi Yehuda says: The obligation to redeem the firstborn already took effect on the property of the father. If the wives gave birth to a male and a female the priest has nothing here, as perhaps the female was born to the mother who had not yet given birth.

With regard to two women who had not previously given birth, who were married to two different men, and they gave birth to two males and the sons were intermingled, this father gives five sela coins to a priest and that father gives five sela coins to a priest, as each is certainly firstborn to his mother. In a case where one of them dies within thirty days of birth, if the fathers gave all ten sela coins to one priest, the priest must return five sela coins to them. But if they gave the redemption payment to two different priests they cannot reclaim the money from the possession of either priest, as each could claim that the money that he received was for the living child. If the women gave birth to a male and a female and the children became intermingled, the fathers are exempt, as each could claim that he is the father of the female, but the son is obligated to redeem himself, as he is certainly a firstborn. If two females and a male were born, or two females and two males, the priest has nothing here, as it is possible the female was born first to each mother.

If one woman had previously given birth and one had not previously given birth, and they were married to two men and they gave birth to two males, who then became intermingled, this one whose wife had not previously given birth gives five sela coins to the priest. If the women gave birth to a male and a female the priest has nothing here, as it is possible the female was born to the mother who had not yet given birth. If the firstborn son dies within thirty days of birth, although the father gave five sela to the priest, the priest must return it. If the firstborn son dies after thirty days have passed, even if the father did not give five sela coins to the priest he must give it then. If the firstborn dies on the thirtieth day, that day’s halakhic status is like that of the day that preceded it, as the obligation takes effect only after thirty days have elapsed. Rabbi Akiva says: If the firstborn dies on the thirtieth day it is a case of uncertainty; therefore, if the father already gave the redemption payment to the priest he cannot take it back, but if he did not yet give payment he does not need to give it. If the father of the firstborn dies within thirty days of birth the presumptive status of the son is that he was not redeemed, until the son will bring proof that he was redeemed. If the father dies after thirty days have passed the presumptive status of the son is that he was redeemed, until people will tell him that he was not redeemed. If one had both himself to redeem and his son to redeem, his own redemption takes precedence over that of his son. Rabbi Yehuda says: The redemption of his son takes precedence, as the mitzva to redeem the father is incumbent upon his own father, and the mitzva to redeem his son is incumbent upon him.

The five sela coins of the redemption of the firstborn son, with regard to which it is written: “Five shekels of silver, after the shekel of the Sanctuary” (Numbers 18:16), are calculated using a Tyrian maneh. The silver content of the Tyrian coinage is significantly higher than that of provincial coinage, which is worth one-eighth its value. With regard to the thirty shekels paid to the owner of a Canaanite slave who is killed by an ox (see Exodus 21:32), and the fifty shekels paid by a rapist (see Deuteronomy 22:29) and by a seducer (see Exodus 22:16) of a young virgin woman, and the one hundred shekels paid by the defamer of his bride with the claim that she is not a virgin (see Deuteronomy 22:19), all of them, even those cases where the word shekel is not explicitly written, are paid in the shekel of the Sanctuary, whose value is twenty gera (see Numbers 18:16) and that is calculated using a Tyrian maneh. And all monetary obligations are redeemed, i.e., paid, with coins or with items of the equivalent value of money, except for the half- shekels that are donated to the Temple each year, which must be given specifically as coins.

One may not redeem his firstborn son, neither with Canaanite slaves, nor with promissory notes, nor with land, nor with consecrated items. If the father wrote a promissory note to the priest that he is obligated to give him five sela coins, the father is obligated to give them to him but his son is not redeemed. Therefore, if the priest wished to give back the five sela coins to him as a gift he is permitted to do so. With regard to one who designates five sela coins for redemption of his firstborn son and he lost the coins before he gave them to the priest, the father bears financial responsibility for their loss, as it is stated to Aaron the priest: “Everything that opens the womb in man and animal shall be yours”; and only afterward it says: “You shall redeem the firstborn of man” (Numbers 18:15). This indicates that only after the money shall be in the possession of the priest is the son redeemed.

The firstborn son takes a double portion, i.e., twice the portion taken by the other sons, when inheriting the property of the father, but he does not take twice the portion when inheriting the property of the mother. And neither does he take twice the portion in any enhancement of the value of the property after the death of the father, nor does he take twice the portion in property due the father, as he does in property the father possessed. And neither does a woman take these portions, i.e., any enhancement of the value of the property or the property due the husband, from her husband’s property for payment of her marriage contract upon her divorce or her husband’s death; nor do the daughters take this share of the property for their sustenance, to which they are entitled from their late father’s possessions. Nor does a man whose married brother died childless [ yavam ] receive these portions, even though he acquires his brother’s portion of their shared father’s inheritance after performing levirate marriage with his brother’s wife. The mishna summarizes: And all of them do not take a portion in any enhancement of the value of the property after the death of the owner, nor do they take a portion in property due the deceased, as they do in property in his possession.

And these are the people whose properties, unlike an ancestral field, do not return to their original owners in the Jubilee Year: The firstborn who inherited his father’s property by the right of primogeniture need not return the extra portion for redistribution among the brothers; and one who inherits his wife’s property need not return it to her family; and one who consummates the levirate marriage with the wife of his brother and gains the right to his brother’s property need not return it for redistribution among the brothers. And likewise, a gift of land need not be returned to the original owners in the Jubilee Year; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The halakhic status of a gift is like that of a sale, and it must be returned. Rabbi Elazar says: All these lands return in the Jubilee Year. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Even one who inherits his wife’s property must return the land to the members of her father’s family and should deduct from them the monetary value of the land, as the Gemara will explain.

Chapter 9

The mitzva of animal tithe is in effect both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, in the presence of, i.e., in the time of, the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple. It is in effect with regard to non-sacred animals but not with regard to sacrificial animals. And it is in effect with regard to the herd and the flock, but they are not tithed from one for the other; and it is in effect with regard to sheep and goats, and they are tithed from one for the other. And it is in effect with regard to animals from the new flock and with regard to animals from the old flock, but they are not tithed from one for the other. As by right, it should be inferred: If in the case of animals from the new flock and the old flock, which do not carry the prohibition of mating diverse kinds when mated with each other because they are one species, are nevertheless not tithed from one for the other, then with regard to sheep and goats, which do carry the prohibition of mating diverse kinds when mated with each other, is it not right that they will not be tithed from one for the other? Therefore, the verse states: “And all the tithe of the herd or the flock, whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:32), indicating that with regard to animal tithe, all animals that are included in the term flock are one species.

Animals subject to the obligation of animal tithe join together if the distance between them is no greater than the distance that a grazing animal can walk and still be tended by one shepherd. And how much is the distance that a grazing animal walks? It is sixteen mil. If the distance between these animals and those animals was thirty-two mil they do not join together. If he also had animals in the middle of that distance of thirty-two mil, he brings all three flocks to a pen and tithes them in the middle. Rabbi Meir says: The Jordan River divides between animals on two sides of the river with regard to animal tithe, even if the distance between them is minimal.

One who purchases an animal or has an animal that was given to him as a gift is exempt from separating animal tithe. With regard to brothers and partners, i.e., brothers who are partners in the inheritance of their father, when they are obligated to add the premium [ bakalbon ] to their annual half-shekel payment to the Temple they are exempt from animal tithe. Conversely, those whose halakhic status is like that of sons who are supported by their father and are obligated to separate animal tithe are exempt from adding the premium. The mishna clarifies: If the brothers acquired the animals through inheritance from the property in the possession of their father’s house they are obligated in animal tithe; but if not, they are exempt. How so? If they divided the inheritance between them and then reentered a partnership, they are obligated to add the premium and are exempt from animal tithe.

All cattle, sheep, and goats enter the pen to be tithed, except for an animal crossbred from diverse kinds, e.g., a hybrid of a goat and a sheep; a tereifa ; an animal born by caesarean section; one whose time has not yet arrived, i.e., that is younger than eight days old, which is when animals become eligible for sacrifice; and an orphan. And what is an orphan? It is any animal whose mother died or was slaughtered while giving birth to it and thereafter completed giving birth to it. Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even if its mother was slaughtered but its hide exists at birth, i.e., if the mother’s hide is present after the birth, this is not an orphan.

There are three times during the year designated for gathering the animals that were born since the last date for animal tithe: Adjacent to Passover, and adjacent to Shavuot, and adjacent to Sukkot. And those are the gathering times for animal tithe; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Ben Azzai says the dates are: On the twenty-ninth of Adar, on the first of Sivan, and on the twenty-ninth of Av. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say that the dates are: On the first of Nisan, on the first of Sivan, and on the twenty-ninth of Elul. And why did Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say the twenty-ninth of Elul, and why did they not say the first of Tishrei? It is due to the fact that the first of Tishrei is the festival of Rosh HaShana, and one cannot tithe on a Festival. Consequently, they brought it earlier, to the twenty-ninth of Elul. Rabbi Meir says: The beginning of the new year for animal tithe is on the first of Elul. Ben Azzai says: The animals born in Elul are tithed by themselves, due to the uncertainty as to whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, i.e., that the new year begins on the first of Elul, or in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, which would mean that the new year begins on the first of Tishrei.

According to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, with regard to all animals that are born from the first of Tishrei until the twenty-ninth of Elul, those animals join to be tithed together. If five were born before Rosh HaShana and five after Rosh HaShana, those animals do not join to be tithed together. If five were born before a time designated for gathering and five after that time designated for gathering, those animals join to be tithed together. If so, why were three times stated for gathering the animals for animal tithe? The reason is that until the time designated for gathering arrives it is permitted to sell and slaughter the animals. Once the time designated for gathering arrives one may not slaughter those animals before tithing them; but if he slaughtered an animal without tithing it he is exempt.

In what manner does one tithe the animals? He gathers them in a pen and provides them with a small, i.e., narrow, opening, so that two animals will not be able to emerge together. And he counts the animals as they emerge: One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine; and he paints the animal that emerges tenth with red paint and declares: This is tithe. Even if he did not paint it with red paint, or if he did not count the animals with a rod in accordance with the verse: “Whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:32), or if he counted the animals when they were prone or standing in place and did not make them pass through a narrow opening, these animals are tithed after the fact. But if he had one hundred animals and he took ten as tithe, or if he had ten animals and he simply took one as tithe, that is not tithe, as he did not count them one by one until reaching ten. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: In that case too, it is tithe. If before the owner completed tithing his animals, one of those already counted jumped back into the pen among the animals that had not yet been counted, all those in the pen are exempt from being tithed, as each of them might be the animal that was already counted. If one of those animals that had been tithed, i.e., designated as the tenth, jumped back into the pen among the animals that had not yet been counted, creating uncertainty with regard to all the animals there which was the animal tithe, all the animals must graze until they become unfit for sacrifice, and each of them may be eaten in its blemished state by its owner once it develops a blemish.

If two animals emerged as one, one counts them as twos, i.e., as though they came out one after the other. If he mistakenly counted two of the animals at the beginning or in the middle of the ten as one, and then continued his count, the ninth and the tenth are flawed, as he called the tenth: Ninth, and he called the eleventh: Tenth. If he mistakenly called the ninth: Tenth, and the tenth: Ninth, and the eleventh: Tenth, the three of them are sacred, although each has a different halakhic status. The ninth is eaten in its blemished state; and the tenth is animal tithe, which is sacrificed in the Temple and eaten by its owner; and the eleventh is sacrificed as a peace offering, from which the breast and the thigh are given to the priest. And the eleventh renders a non-sacred animal that is exchanged for the peace offering consecrated as a substitute and he sacrifices it as a peace offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda said: The eleventh animal itself, which he called tenth, is a substitute for animal tithe, and does a substitute render another animal a substitute? Everyone agrees that a substitute is created only in exchange for an originally consecrated animal. The Sages said in the name of Rabbi Meir: The eleventh animal is not considered a substitute for the animal tithe, since if it were a substitute it would not be sacrificed, as the substitute for an animal tithe is not sacrificed. If one called the ninth animal: Tenth, and the tenth: Tenth, and the eleventh: Tenth, the eleventh is not consecrated. This is the principle: In any situation where the name of the tenth was not removed from the tenth animal, the eleventh that was called the tenth is not consecrated.

Mishnah Arakhin

Chapter 1

Everyone takes vows of valuation and is thereby obligated to donate to the Temple treasury the value fixed by the Torah (see Leviticus 27:3–7) for the age and sex of the person valuated. And similarly, everyone is valuated, and therefore one who vowed to donate his fixed value is obligated to pay. Likewise, everyone vows to donate to the Temple treasury the assessment of a person, based on his market value to be sold as a slave, and is thereby obligated to pay; and everyone is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his assessment. This includes priests, Levites and Israelites, women, and Canaanite slaves. A tumtum, whose sexual organs are concealed, and a hermaphrodite [ androginos ], vow, and are the object of a vow, and take vows of valuation, but they are not valuated. Consequently, if one says, with regard to a tumtum : The valuation of so-and-so is incumbent upon me to donate to the Temple treasury, he is not obligated to pay anything, as only a definite male or a definite female are valuated. A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are the object of a vow and are valuated, but neither vow to donate the assessment of a person nor take a vow of valuation, because they lack the presumed mental competence to make a commitment. A child less than one month old is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his assessment, but is not valuated if one vowed to donate his fixed value, as the Torah did not establish a value for anyone less than a month old.

With regard to a gentile, Rabbi Meir says: He is valuated in a case where a Jew says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the fixed value of this gentile. But a gentile does not take a vow of valuation to donate his fixed value or the value of others. Rabbi Yehuda says: He takes a vow of valuation, but is not valuated. And both this tanna, Rabbi Meir, and that tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, agree that gentiles vow to donate the assessment of another and are the object of vows, whereby one donates the assessment of a gentile.

One who is moribund and one who is taken to be executed after being sentenced by the court is neither the object of a vow nor valuated. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya says: He is not the object of a vow, because he has no market value; but he is valuated, due to the fact that one’s value is fixed by the Torah based on age and sex. Rabbi Yosei says: One with that status vows to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and takes vows of valuation, and consecrates his property; and if he damages the property of others, he is liable to pay compensation.

In the case of a pregnant woman who is taken by the court to be executed, the court does not wait to execute her until she gives birth. Rather, she is killed immediately. But with regard to a woman taken to be executed who sat on the travailing chair [ hamashber ] in the throes of labor, the court waits to execute her until she gives birth. In the case of a woman who was killed through court-imposed capital punishment, one may derive benefit from her hair. But in the case of an animal that was killed through court-imposed execution, e.g., for goring a person, deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited.

Chapter 2

One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela, nor can one be charged more than fifty sela. How so? If one gave one sela and became wealthy, he is not required to give anything more, as he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave less than a sela and became wealthy, he is required to give fifty sela, as he has not fulfilled his obligation. If there were five sela in the possession of the destitute person, and the valuation he undertook is more than five sela, how much should he pay? Rabbi Meir says: He gives only one sela and thereby fulfills his obligation. And the Rabbis say: He gives all five. One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela ; nor can one be charged more than fifty sela. If a woman experienced a discharge of blood and is unsure whether it was during her days of menstruation or during the eleven days that would render her a zava, the alleviation of her state of uncertainty does not occur in fewer than seven clean days, nor in more than seventeen clean days, depending on the number of days that she experiences the discharge. There are symptoms of leprosy that a priest will immediately confirm to be ritually pure or ritually impure, and there are others for which the priest quarantines the leper in order to determine his status. With regard to leprous marks, there is no quarantine that is less than one week and none greater than three weeks.

No fewer than four full thirty-day months may be established during the course of a year, and it did not seem appropriate to establish more than eight. The two loaves that are brought to the Temple on Shavuot are eaten by the priests not before the second and not after the third day from when they were baked. The shewbread is eaten not before the ninth day from when it was baked, which is the situation in a regular week when the bread is baked on Friday and eaten on the following Shabbat; and not after the eleventh day, when the two Festival days of Rosh HaShana occur on Thursday and Friday, as the shewbread is baked on Wednesday and not eaten until the following Shabbat. A minor boy is not circumcised before the eighth day after his birth and not after the twelfth day. Normally a newborn is circumcised on his eighth day. If he was born during twilight, which an uncertain period of day or night, he is circumcised on what would be the eighth day of his birth if he is was born at night, which is the ninth day if he was born during the day. If he was born during twilight on Shabbat eve, the circumcision cannot be performed on Friday, as he might have been born on Shabbat and therefore Friday is only the seventh day. And the circumcision cannot be on Shabbat, as perhaps he was born on Friday and only circumcision performed on the eighth day overrides Shabbat. Therefore, it is postponed until after Shabbat. If two days of Rosh HaShana occur on Sunday and Monday, the circumcision is postponed until Tuesday, the twelfth day after birth.

No fewer than twenty-one trumpet blasts are sounded daily in the Temple, as each day three blasts were sounded for the opening of the gates in the morning, nine for the daily morning offering, and nine for the daily afternoon offering, totaling twenty-one. And no more than forty-eight are ever sounded on a single day. This would occur on the Friday of Sukkot, when they would sound an additional twelve blasts during the ritual of drawing the water for the water libation; nine for the additional offerings; three to signal the population to cease their work before Shabbat; and three more to mark the beginning of Shabbat. When accompanying their song with instruments, the Levites do not use fewer than two lyres and do not use more than six. When flutes are played, they do not use fewer than two flutes and do not use more than twelve. And there are twelve days during the year when the flute plays before the altar: At the time of the slaughter of the first Paschal offering, on the fourteenth of Nisan; and at the time of the slaughter of the second Paschal offering, on the fourteenth of Iyyar; and on the first festival day of Passover; and on the festival of Shavuot ; and on all eight days of the festival of Sukkot. And one would not play with a copper flute; rather, one would play with a flute of reed, because its sound is more pleasant. And one would conclude the music only with a single flute, because it concludes the music nicely.

The Temple musicians were slaves of priests; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: The musicians were not slaves, but Israelites from the family of the house of Pegarim and the family of the house of Tzippara from the city of Emaum, and their lineage was sufficiently pure that they would marry their daughters to members of the priesthood. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: They were Levites.

One maintains no fewer than six lambs that have been inspected for blemishes in the Chamber of the Lambs, which are sufficient for the offerings of Shabbat and for the two Festival days of Rosh HaShana that may occur adjacent to it. And one may add inspected lambs up to an infinite number. One plays no fewer than two trumpets and no fewer than nine harps in the Temple, and one may add up to an infinite number. And the cymbal was played alone, and none may be added to it.

In the Temple, there are no fewer than twelve Levites standing on the platform adjacent to the altar and singing, and one may add Levites on the platform up to an infinite number. A minor Levite may enter the Temple courtyard for service only at a time when the Levites are engaging in song, so that he may accompany them. And minors would not engage in playing a lyre and in playing a harp; rather, they would engage in singing with the mouth, in order to provide flavor to the music with their pure, high voices. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Minors are not tallied in the minimum total of twelve Levites, and they do not ascend to the platform; rather, they would stand on the ground and their heads would reach to between the legs of the Levites, and they were called cadets [ tzoarei ] of the Levites.

Chapter 3

There are halakhot with regard to valuations that are lenient and others that are stringent; and there are halakhot with regard to an ancestral field that are lenient and others that are stringent; and there are halakhot with regard to a forewarned ox that killed a Canaanite slave that are lenient and others that are stringent; and there are halakhot with regard to a rapist, and a seducer, and a defamer that are lenient and others that are stringent. There are halakhot with regard to valuations that are lenient and others that are stringent; how so? Both in the case of one who took a vow of valuation to donate the fixed value of the most attractive among the Jewish people and in the case of one who took a vow of valuation to donate the fixed value of the most unsightly among the Jewish people, he gives the fixed payment of fifty sela, shekels, to the Temple treasury (see Leviticus 27:3). And if one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of another to the Temple treasury, he gives the price for that person if sold as a slave, a sum that can be more or less than fifty shekels.

There are halakhot with regard to an ancestral field that are lenient and others that are stringent. How so? Both one who consecrates an ancestral field in the low-quality sands of the areas surrounding the city and one who consecrates the high-quality orchards of Sebastia gives a redemption payment of fifty silver shekels for every area that he consecrated that is fit for sowing a kor of barley (Leviticus 27:16). And with regard to a purchased field that one consecrates, he gives its value as redemption, a sum that can be more or less than fifty shekels for every area required for sowing one kor of barley. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to both a purchased field and an ancestral field, one gives a redemption payment of fifty silver shekels for every area required for sowing a kor of barley that he consecrated. What, then, is the difference between an ancestral field and a purchased field? The difference is that in the case of an ancestral field one gives an additional payment of one-fifth, but in the case of a purchased field one does not give an additional payment of one-fifth.

There are halakhot with regard to a forewarned ox that killed a Canaanite slave that are lenient and others that are stringent; how so? Both in the case of an ox that killed the most attractive among the slaves, whose value is great, and likewise in the case of one that killed the most unsightly among the slaves, whose value is minimal, its owner gives payment of thirty sela, the fine stated in the Torah (Exodus 21:32), to the owner of the slave. If the ox killed a freeman, its owner gives his price as payment to his heirs. This sum can be more or less than thirty shekels. If the ox injured this slave or that freeman, he gives payment of the full cost of the damage as compensation.

There are halakhot with regard to a rapist and with regard to a seducer that are lenient and others that are stringent; how so? Both one who raped or seduced a young woman who is the most prominent in the priesthood and one who raped or seduced a young woman who is the lowliest among the Israelites gives the payment of fifty sela, the fine stated in the Torah (see Deuteronomy 22:29). And the payments for humiliation and for degradation resulting from being raped or seduced are assessed differentially; it is all based on the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated.

There are halakhot with regard to a defamer, who falsely claims that his bride was not a virgin, that are lenient and others that are stringent. How so? Both one who defamed a young woman who is the most prominent in the priesthood and one who defamed a young woman who is the lowliest among the Israelites gives payment of one hundred sela, the fine stated in the Torah (Deuteronomy 22:19). Based on the relative scope of the fines, with the defamer paying twice the sum of the rapist and the seducer, it is apparent that one who utters malicious speech with his mouth is a more severe transgressor than one who performs an action. And this is corroborated, as we found that the sentence imposed on our ancestors in the wilderness was sealed only due to the malicious speech disseminated by the spies, as it is stated at that time: “All those men that have seen My glory, and My signs, which I wrought in Egypt and in the wilderness, yet they have tried Me these ten times and have not listened to My voice” (Numbers 14:22).

Chapter 4

Affordability, which is written in the Torah: “According to the means of him who vowed shall the priest valuate him” (Leviticus 27:8), is determined in accordance with the means of the one taking the vow, and the sum fixed by the Torah based on the years of age is in accordance with the age of the subject of the vow. And the distinction based on sex that is written in the halakhot of valuations is stated with regard to the one valuated, and the different valuation based on the age of the one valuated is determined at the time one takes the vow of valuation. The mishna elaborates: Affordability is in accordance with the means of the one taking the vow; how so? A destitute person who valuated a wealthy person gives the valuation in accordance with the means of a destitute person, as determined by the priest. And a wealthy person who valuated a destitute person gives the valuation in accordance with the means of a wealthy person, the sum of which is fixed in the Torah.

But with regard to offerings that is not so, as one who took a vow and said: It is incumbent upon me to provide the offering of this leper, to a leper who requires it for his purification; if the one undergoing purification was a destitute leper, the one who took the vow brings the offering of a destitute leper, which is one male sheep, a tenth of an ephah of fine flour, and two doves or two pigeons (see Leviticus 14:21–22). If the one undergoing purification was a wealthy leper, the one who took the vow brings the offering of a wealthy leper, which is two male sheep, a ewe, and three-tenths of a ephah of fine flour (see Leviticus 14:10). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say: Even with regard to valuations it is so. He explains: For what reason does a destitute person who valuated a wealthy person give the valuation in accordance with the means of a destitute person? It is due to the fact that the wealthy person is not obligated to pay anything, as the debt was generated by the destitute person who vowed to donate the valuation of a wealthy individual. But in a case similar to that of the offerings of a leper, in the case of a wealthy person who said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and a destitute person heard him and said: It is incumbent upon me to donate that which he said, the destitute person gives the valuation of a wealthy person. If when one took a vow of valuation he was destitute and he became wealthy, or if he was wealthy and became destitute, he gives the valuation in accordance with the means of a wealthy person. Rabbi Yehuda says: This is the halakha not only in a case where one was wealthy either at the time he took the vow or at the time of payment; even if when one took a vow of valuation he was destitute and he became wealthy and again became destitute, he gives the valuation in accordance with the means of a wealthy person.

But with regard to the offerings of a leper that is not so, as the offerings that one brings are determined by his status at the time he brings them. Even if it is common knowledge that his father died and left him an inheritance of ten thousand dinars, or that his ship is at sea and merchandise valued at ten thousand dinars is coming into his possession, the Temple treasury has no share in it. His payment is determined solely by his present situation.

The sum fixed by the Torah based on the years of age is in accordance with the age of the subject of the vow; how so? A youth who valuated an elder gives the valuation of an elder, and an elder who valuated a youth gives the valuation of a youth. And the distinction based on sex that is written in the halakhot of valuations is stated with regard to the one valuated; how so? A man who valuated a woman gives the valuation of a woman, and a woman who valuated a man gives the valuation of a man. And the different valuation based on the age of the one valuated is determined at the time one takes the vow of valuation; how so? If one valuated another when he was less than five years old, when his valuation is five shekels, and before payment to the Temple treasury the subject of the vow became more than five years old, when his valuation is ten shekels; or if one valuated another when he was less than twenty years old, when his valuation is ten shekels, and before payment to the Temple treasury the subject of the vow became more than twenty years old, when his valuation is fifty shekels, in all these cases he gives payment according to the age of the subject of the valuation at the time of the valuation. The Torah provides three age categories that determine the amount of the valuation: From the age of one month until age five, from age five until age twenty, and from age twenty until age sixty. For anyone less than one month old there is no valuation. The halakhic status of the thirtieth day is like that of the period preceding thirty days, and therefore the one who took the vow is exempt. Likewise, the halakhic status of the fifth year and the twentieth year is like that of the period preceding them. As it is stated: “And if it is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), and we derive all the other age categories from the sixtieth year: Just as the halakhic status of the sixtieth year, where upward is written, is like that of the period preceding it, so too, the halakhic status of the fifth year and the twentieth year is like that of the period preceding them. The mishna asks: Is that so? Can one derive a halakha in this manner? If the Torah rendered the halakhic status of the sixtieth year like that of the period preceding it in order to be stringent and require one who valuated a sixty-year-old person to pay his valuation to the Temple treasury, shall we render the halakhic status of the fifth year and the twentieth year like that of the period preceding them in order to be lenient and pay a lower sum? Therefore, the verse states “year” with regard to the fifth and twentieth years (see Leviticus 27:3–6), and “year” with regard to the sixtieth year (Leviticus 27:7), for a verbal analogy. Just as the halakhic status of the year stated with regard to the sixtieth year is like that of the period preceding it, so too, the halakhic status of the year stated with regard to the fifth year and the twentieth year is like that of the period preceding them, both in order to be lenient and in order to be stringent. Rabbi Eliezer says: Their halakhic status remains like that of the period preceding it, until they will be aged one month and one day beyond the fifth, twentieth, and sixtieth years.

Chapter 5

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my weight, gives his weight to the Temple treasury; if he specified silver he donates silver, and if he specified gold he donates gold. There was an incident involving the mother of Yirmatya, who said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the weight of my daughter, and she ascended to Jerusalem and paid her daughter’s weight in gold to the Temple treasury. In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the weight of my forearm, how does he ascertain the weight of his forearm? Rabbi Yehuda says: He fills a barrel with water and inserts his arm up to his elbow into the water. And in order to measure the displacement, he weighs donkey flesh, and bones, and sinews and places it into the barrel until it fills, and the water level reaches the top of the barrel. He then donates the weight of the meat and the bones to the Temple treasury. Rabbi Yosei said: Displacement is according to volume not according to weight, and how then is it possible to match the amount of the donkey flesh with the flesh of a person and the volume of the donkey’s bones with his bones? Rather, the court appraises how much the forearm is likely to weigh.

If one vows: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of my forearm, the court appraises him to determine how much he is worth with a forearm and how much he is worth without a forearm, and he pays the difference. This is a halakha that is more stringent with regard to vows of assessment than with regard to valuations, as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my forearm, is exempt from paying. There are halakhot that are more stringent with regard to valuations than with regard to vows of assessment. How so? In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and then dies, his heirs must give his valuation to the Temple treasury. But one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, and then dies, his heirs need not give his assessment to the Temple treasury, as there is no monetary value for the dead. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my forearm, or: The valuation of my leg, has not said anything, as there are valuations in the Torah only for a complete person. But if one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my head, or: The valuation of my liver, he gives the valuation of his entire self. This is the principle: One who valuates an item upon which the soul is dependent, i.e., without which one will die, gives the valuation of his entire self.

One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate half of my valuation, gives half of his valuation. But one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of half of me, gives the valuation of his entire self. Likewise, one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate half of my assessment, gives half of his assessment; one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of half of me, gives the assessment of his entire self. This is the principle: One who takes a vow with regard to an item upon which the soul is dependent gives the assessment of his entire self.

With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of so-and-so, and both the one who vowed and the object of the vow die, the heirs of the one who vowed must give the valuation of the object of the vow to the Temple treasury. With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of so-and-so, and the one who vowed dies, his heirs must give his assessment to the Temple treasury. If the object of the vow dies, the heirs of the one who vowed need not give his assessment to the Temple treasury, as there is no monetary value for the dead.

In the case of one who says: This bull is consecrated as a burnt offering, or: This house is consecrated as an offering, and the bull died or the house collapsed, he is exempt from paying his commitment. But in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to give this bull as a burnt offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to give this house as an offering, if the bull died or the house collapsed, he is obligated to pay its value.

With regard to those obligated to pay valuations, the court repossesses their property to pay their debt to the Temple treasury. With regard to those obligated to bring sin offerings and guilt offerings, the court does not repossess their property; since one is obligated to bring them for atonement he would not delay bringing them. But with regard to those obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings, the court repossesses their property;since these offerings are not obligatory for atonement, one might delay bringing them. Although one obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings does not achieve atonement until he brings the offering of his own volition, as it is stated: “He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting of his volition” (Leviticus 1:3), nevertheless the court coerces him until he says: I want to do so. And likewise, you say the same with regard to women’s bills of divorce. Although one divorces his wife only of his own volition, in any case where the Sages obligated a husband to divorce his wife the court coerces him until he says: I want to do so.

Chapter 6

One proclaims, i.e., publicly announces, the appraisal of the property inherited by minor orphans, which is being sold to repay their father’s debt, for thirty days, in order to receive the maximal price. And one proclaims the appraisal of consecrated property that is being sold by the Temple treasury for sixty days, and one proclaims it in the morning and in the evening. In the case of one who consecrates his property and there was the outstanding debt of the marriage contract of his wife, for whose repayment one’s property is liened, Rabbi Eliezer says: When he divorces her, he shall vow that benefit from her is forbidden to him. This is to prevent collusion, by which he divorces her, she collects payment from the consecrated property, and he then remarries her. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He need not do so. On a similar note, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Even in the case of the guarantor of a woman for her marriage contract, and her husband was divorcing her and could not pay the debt, the husband shall vow that benefit from her is forbidden to him, lest he and his wife engage in collusion [ kinunya ] and collect payment from the property of that guarantor, and then the husband will remarry his wife.

In the case of one who consecrates his property and there was an outstanding debt of the marriage contract of his wife and of a creditor, the woman may not collect the payment of her marriage contract from the Temple treasury, nor may the creditor collect his debt. Rather, the one who redeems the property redeems it for a cheap price in order to give the woman her marriage contract payment and the creditor his debt. For example, if one consecrated property worth nine thousand dinars and his debt was ten thousand dinars, leaving no property for redemption, the creditor lends an additional dinar to the debtor and the debtor redeems the property with that dinar, in order to give the woman her marriage contract payment and the creditor his debt.

Although the Sages said (21a): With regard to those obligated to pay valuations, the court repossesses their property to pay their debt to the Temple treasury; nevertheless, the treasurer gives him permission to keep food sufficient for thirty days, and garments sufficient for twelve months, and a bed made with linens, and his sandals, and his phylacteries. The treasurer leaves these items for him, but he does not leave items for his wife or for his children. If the one obligated to pay was a craftsman, the treasurer gives him permission to keep two tools of his craft of each and every type, e.g., for a carpenter, the treasurer gives him permission to keep two adzes [ matzadin ] and two saws. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he was a farmer, the treasurer gives him permission to keep his pair of oxen with which he plows the field. If he was a donkey driver, the treasurer gives him permission to keep his donkey.

If one had many tools of one type and few tools of one other type, e.g., three adzes and one saw, he may not say to the treasurer to sell one tool of the type of which he has many and to purchase for him one tool of the type of which he has few. Rather, the treasurer gives him two tools of the type of which he has many and he retains whatever he has of the type of which he has few. In contrast to one whose property is repossessed to pay valuations, from one who consecrates all his property, the treasurer takes his phylacteries, as they are included in the category of all his property.

Both in the case of one who consecrates his property and the case of one who valuates himself, when the Temple treasurer repossesses his property he has the right to repossess neither the garment of his wife nor the garment of his children, nor the dyed garments that he dyed for their sake, even if they have yet to wear them, nor the new sandals that he purchased for their sake. Although the merchants said: Slaves are sold in their garments for profit, as if a fine garment worth thirty dinars would be purchased for him, his sale price appreciates by one hundred dinars; and likewise with regard to a cow, if one waits to sell it until the market [ la’itlis ] day, when demand is high, its sale price appreciates; and likewise with regard to a pearl, if one brings it to sell it in the city, where demand is high, its sale price appreciates; nevertheless, one does not make such a calculation in this case. Rather, the Temple treasury has the right to collect the item based only on its current location and its price at the present time.

Chapter 7

One may neither consecrate an ancestral field, i.e., a field that he inherited, less than two years before the Jubilee Year, nor may one redeem such a field less than one year after the Jubilee Year. When redeeming an ancestral field that has been consecrated, the sum paid to redeem the field is calculated based on the number of years remaining until the Jubilee Year. When performing this calculation, one does not count months of a partial year in order to lower the price to be paid to the Temple treasury; rather, he pays for the entire year. But the Temple treasury may count months in order to raise the price of redemption, as will be explained. In the case of one who consecrates his ancestral field during a period when the Jubilee Year is observed and wishes to redeem it, he gives the Temple treasury fifty sela, a talmudic measure referred to in the Bible as silver shekels, for an area required for sowing a ḥomer, a measure known in talmudic terminology as one kor, of barley seed (see Leviticus 27:16). If there were crevices [ neka’im ] ten handbreadths deep in the field, or if there were boulders ten handbreadths high, then when calculating the redemption price those areas are not measured with the rest of the field. But if the depth of the crevices, or the height of the boulders, was less than that amount, they are measured with the rest of the field. If he consecrated the field two or three years before the Jubilee Year and wishes to redeem it, he gives the Temple treasury a sela and a pundeyon, a pundeyon being one forty-eighth of a sela, per year remaining until the Jubilee Year. And if he said: I will give the payment for each year during that year, one does not listen to him; rather, he must give the entire sum in one payment.

This is the halakha both with regard to a case where the owner redeems the field and a case where any other person redeems the field. What then is the difference between redemption by the owner and redemption by any other person? It is only that the owner gives an extra one-fifth in addition to the payment, and any other person who redeems the field does not give the additional one-fifth.

If one consecrated his ancestral field and then redeemed it himself, it is not removed from his possession to be divided among the priests during the Jubilee Year. If his son redeemed it, the field is removed from the son’s possession and returns to his father during the Jubilee Year. But if another person or one of his other relatives redeemed the field and the owner subsequently redeemed it from his possession, the field is removed from the owner’s possession and given to the priests during the Jubilee Year. If one of the priests redeemed the field and when the Jubilee arrived it was in his possession, he may not say: Since it is removed from the possession of the one who redeemed it and given to the priests during the Jubilee Year, and since it is already in my possession, it is mine. Rather, the field is removed from his possession and is divided among all his brethren, the priests.

If one consecrated his ancestral field and the Jubilee Year arrived and it was not redeemed by the owner or anyone else, the priests enter into the field and give its redemption payment to the Temple treasury; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: They enter into the field, but they do not give its redemption payment to the Temple treasury. Rabbi Eliezer says: The priests do not enter into the field, and they also do not give its redemption payment to the Temple treasury. Rather, the field remains in the possession of the Temple treasury, and it is called: An abandoned field, until the second Jubilee Year. If the second Jubilee arrived and it was still not redeemed, it is called: An abandoned field from among the abandoned fields, meaning one that was abandoned twice, until the third Jubilee. In any case, the priests never enter into a consecrated field during the Jubilee Year until another person redeems it first.

One who purchases an ancestral field from his father, and his father subsequently died and afterward the son consecrated it, its halakhic status is like that of an ancestral field, as he inherited his father’s ancestral rights prior to the consecration. Consequently, the field’s redemption price is calculated on the basis of fifty sela per beit kor, and if another redeems it instead of the son, it is given to the priests during the Jubilee Year. But if the son consecrated the field and afterward his father died, its halakhic status is like that of a purchased field, whose redemption price is based on its monetary value, and which will return to the ancestral owner, i.e., the son, at the Jubilee; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say: Even in a case where the son consecrated the field before his father died, its halakhic status is like that of an ancestral field, as it is stated with regard to a purchased field: “And if he will consecrate unto the Lord a field that he has bought, which is not of his ancestral field” (Leviticus 27:22), indicating that this halakha applies only to a field that is not due to become his ancestral field, thereby excluding this field, which at the time of consecration is due to become his ancestral field in the future, when his father dies. The mishna continues: A purchased field that was consecrated is not removed from the possession of the Temple treasury and given to the priests during the Jubilee Year, as the purchase of the land was valid only until the Jubilee, at which point fields return to their ancestral owners, and a person cannot consecrate an item that is not his. The priests and the Levites may always consecrate their ancestral fields and may always redeem their ancestral fields, both before the Jubilee Year and after the Jubilee Year.

Chapter 8

In the case of one who consecrates his ancestral field during a period when the Jubilee Year is not observed, and therefore the field is not redeemed according to a fixed rate of fifty shekels per beit kor but according to its value, when the treasurer announces the sale of the field he says to the owner: You open the bidding first; how much do you offer for its redemption? This method is advantageous for the Temple treasury, as the owner gives an additional payment of one-fifth of the value of the field, and every other person does not give an additional one-fifth payment. There was an incident involving one who consecrated his field due to its inferior quality. The treasurers said to him: You open the bidding first. He said: It is hereby mine for an issar, a small sum. Rabbi Yosei says: That person did not say he would purchase it for an issar ; rather, he said he would purchase it for an egg, as consecrated items may be redeemed with money or with the equivalent value of money. The treasurer said to him: The field has come into your possession based on your bid. As a result, he loses an issar and his field remains before him in his possession.

If one said: The field is hereby mine for ten sela, and one other person said: It is mine for twenty, and one said for thirty, and one said for forty, and one said for fifty; and then the one who bid fifty reneged on his offer, the treasurer repossesses from his property up to ten sela and the field is redeemed by the one who bid forty. This ensures that the Temple treasury does not lose. If the one who bid forty sela subsequently reneged on his offer, the treasurer repossesses from his property up to ten sela and the field is redeemed by the one who bid thirty. If the one who bid thirty subsequently reneged on his offer, the treasurer repossesses from his property up to ten sela and the field is redeemed by the one who bid twenty. If the one who bid twenty reneged on his offer, the treasurer repossesses from his property up to ten sela and it is redeemed by the one who bid ten. If the one who bid ten reneged on his offer, the treasurer sells the field at its value and collects the remainder from the property of the one who bid ten, to complete the sum of ten sela. If the owner says he will pay twenty sela and any other person says he will pay twenty sela, the offer of the owner takes precedence, due to the fact that he adds one-fifth.

If the owner says he will pay twenty sela and one other person said: The field is hereby mine for a payment of twenty-one sela, the owner gives twenty-six sela and takes the field. He pays the twenty that he initially offered; plus five sela, which is one-fifth of the total future sum, i.e., one-quarter of his initial offer. In addition, he adds one sela, the difference between his initial offer and that of the other person, so that the Temple treasury will not receive less than the twenty-one sela offer proposed by the other person. If the owner says he will pay twenty sela and another person said: The field is hereby mine for a payment of twenty-two sela, the owner gives twenty-seven sela and takes the field. If the owner says he will pay twenty sela and another said: The field is hereby mine for a payment of twenty-three sela, the owner gives twenty-eight sela and takes the field. If the owner says he will pay twenty sela and another said: The field is hereby mine for a payment of twenty-four sela, the owner gives twenty-nine sela and takes the field. If the owner says he will pay twenty sela and another said: The field is hereby mine for a payment of twenty-five sela, the owner gives thirty sela, as the owner adds one-fifth only to the amount that he bid, and does not add one-fifth to the addition of that other person. If the owner said he will pay twenty sela and one other person said: The field is hereby mine for a payment of twenty-six sela, if the owner wished to pay thirty-one sela and a dinar the owner takes precedence; and if not, the treasurer says to the other person: The field has come into your possession based on your bid, as it is more than the Temple treasury can compel the owner to pay.

A person may dedicate, for sacred or priestly use, some of his flock and some of his cattle, and some of his Canaanite slaves and maidservants, and some of his ancestral field. But if he dedicated all that he has of any type of property, they are not dedicated, i.e., the dedication does not take effect; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said: If for the Most High a person may not dedicate all his property, it is all the more so the case that a person should spare his property and not give all of it to others.

In the case of one who dedicates his son or his daughter, or his Hebrew slave or maidservant, or his purchased field, those items are not considered dedicated, as a person may not dedicate an item that is not his. Priests and Levites may not dedicate their property; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: Priests may not dedicate their property, as all dedicated property is theirs; it is one of the priestly gifts, as the verse states: “Everything dedicated in Israel shall be yours” (Numbers 18:14). But Levites may dedicate their property, as dedicated property is not theirs. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears to be correct with regard to land, as it is stated about the land of the Levites: “But the fields of the open land surrounding their cities may not be sold, as that is their perpetual possession” (Leviticus 25:34), and they cannot renounce that land. And the statement of Rabbi Shimon appears to be correct with regard to movable property, which the Levites may dedicate, as dedicated property is not theirs. It is a gift for the priests, not the Levites.

Dedications of property for priests, unlike consecrations of property for Temple maintenance, have no redemption; rather, one gives it to the priests, and it is their property in every sense, like teruma. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Dedications dedicated without specification of their purpose are designated for Temple maintenance, as it is stated: “Every dedicated item is most sacred to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:28). And the Rabbis say: Dedications dedicated without specification of their purpose are designated for priests, as it is stated with regard to one who consecrated a field and did not redeem it: “As a field dedicated; its possession shall be to the priest” (Leviticus 27:21), indicating that a non-specific dedication belongs to the priest. If so, why is it stated: “Every dedicated item is most sacred to the Lord”? This comes to teach that dedication takes effect on offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity. If one consecrated an animal for sacrifice and then dedicated it, the dedication takes effect. Nevertheless, it does not take effect on the body of the animal; rather, it applies to the owner’s financial stake in the offering.

As the Sages delineated: A person may dedicate his sacrificial animals, both offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity. If the offering he dedicated was the object of a vow, e.g., if he said: It is incumbent upon me to sacrifice a burnt offering, since he is obligated to replace such offerings they are considered his property, and therefore he gives their value to the priests. And if the offering he dedicated was a gift offering, e.g., if he said: This animal is a burnt offering, in which case he is not obligated to replace the animal, he gives the monetary benefit that he has in them. For example, if he said: This bull is a burnt offering, one estimates how much money a person would be willing to give in order to sacrifice the animal as a voluntary burnt offering, even though he is not permitted to do so. With regard to a firstborn animal, whether it is unblemished or whether it is blemished, its owner may dedicate it. And how does one assess the payment required to redeem it? One estimates how much an Israelite person would be willing to give in exchange for that firstborn in order to give it to a priest who is his daughter’s son or to a priest who is his sister’s son. Rabbi Yishmael says: One verse states: “All the firstborn males that are born of your herd and of your flock you shall consecrate to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 15:19), and one verse states: “However, the firstborn among animals that is born first to the Lord, a man shall not consecrate it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall consecrate,” as it is already stated: “A man shall not consecrate.” It is likewise impossible to say: “A man shall not consecrate,” as it is already stated: “You shall consecrate.” How, then, can these verses be reconciled? You can consecrate the firstborn animal by a consecration of value, i.e., an individual can donate to the Temple treasury the amount he would be willing to pay for the right to give the firstborn to a specific priest; and you cannot consecrate it by a consecration for the altar, as a firstborn may not be sacrificed for the sake of any other offering.

Chapter 9

One who sells his field during a period when the Jubilee Year is in effect is not permitted to redeem it less than two years after the sale, as it is stated: “According to the number of years of the crops he shall sell to you” (Leviticus 25:15). The plural form “years” indicates a minimum of two years. If one of those years was a year of blight or mildew, or if it was the Sabbatical Year, when the buyer is unable to derive benefit from the field, that year does not count as part of the tally, and the owner must wait an additional year before redeeming the field. If the buyer plowed the field but did not sow it, or if he left it fallow, that year counts as part of his tally, as it was fit to produce a crop. Rabbi Eliezer says: If the owner of the field sold it to the buyer before Rosh HaShana and the field was full of produce, and the owner redeems the field after two years, that buyer consumes from the field’s produce three crops in two years. Although he received the field with its crop, he is not required to return it in the same state.

When the Jubilee Year is in effect, one may sell a field only until the Jubilee Year, at which point the field returns to its original owner. If the owner redeems the field before the Jubilee Year, the payment per annum is calculated by dividing the sale price by the number of years from the sale until the Jubilee Year. The owner returns the per annum payment multiplied by the number of years remaining until the Jubilee Year. If the owner of a field sold it to the first buyer for one hundred dinars and the first buyer then sold it to the second buyer for two hundred dinars, when the original owner redeems the field he calculates the payment only according to the price that he set with the first buyer, as it is stated: “And he calculates the years of its sale, and he returns the remainder to the man to whom he sold it” (Leviticus 25:27). If the owner of a field sold it to the first buyer for two hundred dinars and the first buyer then sold it to the second buyer for one hundred dinars, when the original owner redeems the field, he calculates the payment only according to the price that was paid by the last buyer, as it is stated: “And he calculates the years of its sale, and he returns the remainder to the man to whom he sold it.” The superfluous term “to the man” indicates that the verse is referring to the man who is currently in possession of the field. One may not sell his ancestral field that is located in a distant area and redeem with the proceeds a field that he sold in a nearby area. Likewise, he may not sell a low-quality field and redeem with the proceeds a high-quality field. And he may not borrow money and redeem the field, nor may he redeem the field incrementally, half now and half at a later date. But with regard to redeeming a field from the Temple treasury, it is permitted to redeem the field in any of these ways. This is a halakha where greater stringency applies with regard to redeeming a field from an ordinary individual than with regard to redeeming it from the Temple treasury.

One who sells a house from among the houses of walled cities may redeem the house immediately, even without the consent of the buyer, and he may redeem the house during the entire twelve months following the sale, but not after that. When he redeems the house within the twelve-month period, he returns the sale price to the buyer, and this is ostensibly like a form of interest, as the buyer has effectively resided in the house for free in exchange for the fact that the buyer’s money was in the possession of the seller. It is not considered interest, because the buyer owned the house during the period in which he resided in it. If the seller died, his son may redeem the house from the buyer. If the buyer died, the seller may redeem it from the possession of the buyer’s son. If the buyer sold the house to another, one calculates the year only from the time that the owner sold the house to the first buyer, as it is stated: “And if it is not redeemed until the passage of a full year for him, then the house that is in the walled city shall stand in possession of the one who bought it in perpetuity” (Leviticus 25:30). The term “for him” indicates that the year is calculated from when the initial owner sold the house. When it says: “A full year,” this serves to include the intercalated month in the year calculated from the sale, if it was a leap year. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The word “full” serves to give the seller a year and its addition, i.e., the year during which the house may be redeemed is not the 354-day lunar year, but the 365-day solar year.

If the final day of the twelve-month period arrived and the house was not redeemed, the house has become the property of the buyer in perpetuity. This is the halakha with regard to both one who buys a house in a walled city and one to whom it is given as a gift, as it is stated: “Then the house that is in the walled city shall stand in possession of the one who bought it in perpetuity” (Leviticus 25:30). At first, the buyer would conceal himself on the final day of the twelve-month period, in order to ensure that it would become his in perpetuity. Hillel instituted that the seller would place [ ḥolesh ] his money in the chamber of the court and that he will break the door and enter the house, and when the other individual, i.e., the buyer, will wish to do so, he may come to the chamber and take his money.

The halakhic status of any area that is located within the city wall is like that of the houses of walled cities in terms of its redemption, except for the fields located therein. Rabbi Meir says: Even the fields are included in this category. With regard to a house that is built in the wall itself, Rabbi Yehuda says: Its halakhic status is not like that of the houses of walled cities. Rabbi Shimon says: The outer wall of the house is considered the city wall, and therefore it has the status of a house in a walled city.

The halakhic status of a house in a city whose houses are attached and their rooftops constitute the top of its wall, and likewise, the status of a house in a city that is not surrounded by a wall from the era of Joshua, son of Nun, even if a surrounding wall was constructed during a later period, is not like that of the houses of walled cities. And these are the houses of walled cities: Any city in which there are at least three courtyards, each containing two houses, and which is surrounded by a wall from the era of Joshua, son of Nun, e.g., the ancient fort [ katzra ] of Tzippori, and the fortress [ ḥakra ] of Gush Ḥalav, and ancient Yodfat, and Gamla, and Gedod, and Ḥadid, and Ono, and Jerusalem, and likewise other similar cities.

With regard to the houses of the unwalled courtyards mentioned in the Torah (see Leviticus 25:31), i.e., houses in villages that are not surrounded by walls, one accords them the exceptional provisions that apply to houses of walled cities and the exceptional provisions that apply to fields. Therefore, they are redeemed immediately and for the entire twelve months following the sale, like in the sale of houses of walled cities, and not like fields, which may be redeemed only after two years. And they leave the possession of the buyer during the Jubilee Year or with a per annum deduction from the money of the sale price, like the sale of fields. By contrast, houses of walled cities become the possession of the buyer in perpetuity after one year, and if they are redeemed within the year, one pays the full sale price. And these are the houses of the unwalled courtyards whose halakha was taught in the previous mishna: Any city in which there are two courtyards each containing two houses, although it is surrounded by a wall from the era of Joshua, son of Nun, their halakhic status is like that of the houses of the unwalled courtyards.

An Israelite who inherited a house in a walled city from his mother’s father who was a Levite does not redeem the house in accordance with this procedure delineated in the previous mishnayot ; rather, if he sold the inherited house, he may redeem it always, like a Levite. And likewise, a Levite who inherited a house in a walled city from his mother’s father who was an Israelite does not redeem the house in accordance with this procedure delineated in the previous mishnayot. The mishna provides the source for these halakhot : As it is stated: “And if a man purchases from the Levites, the house that was sold in the city of his possession shall go out during the Jubilee Year; as the houses of the cities of the Levites are their possession among the children of Israel” (Leviticus 25:33). The verse indicates that the ability to always redeem the house of a Levite does not apply unless the one selling the house will be a Levite and the house is located in the cities of the Levites. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: These matters are stated only with regard to a house in the cities of the Levites, even if the owner was not a Levite. The Levites received two thousand cubits surrounding their cities, one thousand cubits of empty lots and one thousand cubits for fields and vineyards. One may neither render a field an empty lot nor an empty lot a field. Similarly, one may neither incorporate an empty lot into a city nor render part of a city an empty lot. Rabbi Elazar said: In what case is this statement said? It applies in the cities of the Levites. But in the cities of the Israelites one may render a field an empty lot but not an empty lot a field, and one may incorporate an empty lot into a city but not render part of a city an empty lot, in order to ensure that they will not thereby destroy the cities of Israel. The priests and the Levites may sell their fields and houses always and may redeem them always, as it is stated: “The Levites shall have a perpetual right of redemption” (Leviticus 25:32). Priests are also members of the tribe of Levi.

Mishnah Temurah

Chapter 1

Everyone substitutes a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal, both men and women. That is not to say that it is permitted for a person to effect substitution; rather, it means that if one substituted a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal, the substitution takes effect, and the non-sacred animal becomes consecrated, and the consecrated animal remains sacred. And the one who substituted the non-sacred animal incurs the forty [ sofeg et ha’arba’im ] lashes. The priests substitute for their own offerings and Israelites substitute for their own offerings. The priests substitute neither for a sin offering, nor for a guilt offering, nor for a firstborn offering that they received from an Israelite, as those animals are not their property, and one does not substitute an animal that is not his. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: For what reason can priests not substitute for a firstborn offering that they received from an Israelite? Does it not belong to them? Rabbi Akiva said to him: A sin offering and a guilt offering are a gift to the priest, and the firstborn offering is likewise a gift to the priest. Just as in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, priests that receive one of them from an Israelite cannot substitute for it, so too with regard to a firstborn offering, priests that receive it from an Israelite cannot substitute for it. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: What is this comparison for him? If a priest does not substitute for a sin offering and a guilt offering, which priests do not acquire during the animals’ lifetimes, will you say the same with regard to a firstborn, which priests do acquire during the animal’s lifetime? Rabbi Akiva said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “Then both it and its substitute shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10), which juxtaposes the consecration of the consecrated animal with that of its non-sacred substitute? Where is the consecrated animal imbued with sanctity? It is in the house of the owner. So too, the substitute animal is consecrated in the house of the owner. Therefore, the priest cannot substitute for the firstborn that he received because he is not the owner that initially consecrated it. It is written: “He shall neither exchange it, nor substitute it, good for bad, or bad for good; and if he substitutes an animal for an animal, then both it and its substitute shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10). The mishna enumerates the consecrated and non-sacred animals this verse applies to.

One substitutes for consecrated animals from the flock of sheep or goats, and the sanctity takes effect upon animals from the herd of cattle, and one substitutes from the herd and the sanctity takes effect upon animals from the flock. And one substitutes from the sheep and the sanctity takes effect upon the goats, and from the goats upon the sheep; and from the males upon the females, and from the females upon the males; and from the unblemished animals upon the blemished animals, and from the blemished animals upon the unblemished animals. The source for this is as it is stated: “He shall neither exchange it, nor substitute it, good for bad, or bad for good” (Leviticus 27:10). And which is the case of good for bad where the substitution takes effect? It is a case where one substitutes for blemished animals whose consecration preceded their blemish. But if an animal was consecrated after it was blemished, substitution for it does not take effect. One substitutes one non-sacred animal for two consecrated animals and two non-sacred animals for one consecrated animal, and one substitutes one non-sacred animal for one hundred consecrated animals and one hundred non-sacred animals for one consecrated animal. Rabbi Shimon says: One substitutes only one non-sacred animal for one consecrated animal, as it is stated: “Then both it and its substitute shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:10). Just as “it” indicates one specific animal, so too, its substitute can be only one specific animal.

One does not substitute non-sacred limbs for consecrated fetuses, i.e., if one says that a certain limb of a non-sacred animal is substituted for a fetus in the womb of a consecrated animal, it is not consecrated. And likewise, one does not substitute non-sacred fetuses for consecrated limbs. And one substitutes neither non-sacred limbs nor fetuses for whole consecrated animals nor non-sacred whole animals for consecrated limbs or fetuses. Rabbi Yosei says: One substitutes non-sacred limbs for whole consecrated animals, but not whole animals for consecrated limbs. Rabbi Yosei said: But isn’t it so with regard to sacrificial animals, that if one says: The hind leg of this animal is a burnt offering, the entire animal is a burnt offering? So too, when he says: The non-sacred hind leg of this animal is in exchange for that animal, the entire animal is a substitute in exchange for it.

If teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, was intermingled with non-sacred produce, and it is impossible to distinguish between them, if the ratio of non-sacred produce to teruma was less than one hundred to one, the teruma is not nullified and all the produce is forbidden to those for whom teruma is forbidden. If the mixture was then intermingled with other non-sacred produce, that mixture renders it a mixture of teruma only according to the calculation of the percentage of the original teruma produce in the entire mixture. And dough that was leavened with a teruma leavening agent is forbidden to those for whom teruma is forbidden even if the ratio between the non-sacred and the teruma is greater than one hundred to one. If a portion of that dough was intermingled with non-sacred dough, it leavens only according to the calculation of the percentage of the original leavening agent in the entire dough, and the second dough is forbidden only if the quantity of the original teruma leavening agent inside it is sufficient to leaven it. And if three log of drawn water were poured into a ritual bath with less than forty se’a to complete the requisite forty se’a, the ritual bath is invalidated. But drawn water invalidates the ritual bath only according to calculation, as explained in the Gemara.

And the water of purification of the red heifer becomes water of purification only with the placement of the ashes into the water, but not by placement of water onto the ashes. And one beit haperas does not create another beit haperas. The Sages decreed ritual impurity on a field in which a grave was plowed, scattering the bones throughout the field. This field is called a beit haperas. That impurity extends to the area of one hundred cubits surrounding the grave. Nevertheless, they did not decree impurity on the second field if one plowed from that field into another field. And there is no teruma after teruma. Once one designates produce from his crop as teruma, if he then designates additional produce from that crop as teruma, it is not teruma. And a substitute animal that was consecrated when it was substituted for a consecrated animal does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute; rather, it remains non-sacred. And the offspring born of a consecrated animal that was not consecrated itself does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. Rabbi Yehuda says: The offspring renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. The Sages said to him: A consecrated animal renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, but the offspring does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute.

The birds sacrificed as offerings, i.e., doves and pigeons, and the meal offerings do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes, as only the term “an animal” is stated with regard to substitution, in the verse: “And if he substitutes an animal for an animal” (Leviticus 27:10). A consecrated animal belonging to the community or to partners does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, as it is stated in the same verse: “He shall neither exchange it nor substitute it.” One derives from the singular pronoun in the verse that an individual renders a non-sacred animal a substitute, but the community and partners do not render a non-sacred animal a substitute. Items consecrated for Temple maintenance do not render non-sacred items exchanged for them substitutes. Rabbi Shimon said: The fact that animals belonging to the community or partners do not render animals exchanged for them substitutes is derived as follows: The animal tithe was included in the category of all offerings, and why was it singled out in the verse: “And all the tithe of the herd or the flock, whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred unto the Lord. He shall not inquire whether it is good or bad, neither shall he substitute for it; and if he substitutes it, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:32–33)? Rabbi Shimon explains: It was singled out to juxtapose substitution to the animal tithe, to tell you: Just as the animal tithe is brought exclusively as an individual offering, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred are individual offerings, excluding communal offerings and the offerings of partners from the halakha of substitution. And just as the animal tithe is an offering sacrificed on the altar, so too, all offerings that render their substitutes sacred are offerings sacrificed on the altar, excluding items consecrated for Temple maintenance from the halakha of substitution.

Chapter 2

There are halakhot in effect with regard to offerings of an individual that are not in effect with regard to communal offerings; and there are halakhot in effect with regard to communal offerings that are not in effect with regard to offerings of an individual. The mishna elaborates: There are halakhot in effect with regard to offerings of an individual that are not in effect with regard to communal offerings, as offerings of an individual render a non-sacred animal exchanged for the offering a substitute, and communal offerings do not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for the offering a substitute. Offerings of an individual apply to, i.e., can be brought from, both males and females, but communal offerings apply only to males. If offerings of an individual were not brought at the appropriate time, one is obligated to bring their compensation and compensation for their accompanying meal offering and libations at a later date, but if communal offerings were not brought at the appropriate time, one is obligated to bring neither their compensation nor compensation for their accompanying meal offering and libations at a later date. But one is obligated to bring compensation for their accompanying meal offering and libations once the offering is sacrificed. There are halakhot in effect with regard to communal offerings that are not in effect with regard to offerings of an individual, as communal offerings override Shabbat, in that they are sacrificed on Shabbat, and they override ritual impurity, i.e., they are sacrificed even if the priests are impure with impurity imparted by a corpse; and offerings of an individual override neither Shabbat nor ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: But aren’t the High Priest’s griddle-cake offerings and the bull of Yom Kippur offerings of an individual, and yet they override Shabbat and ritual impurity. Rather, this is the principle: Any offering, individual or communal, whose time is fixed overrides Shabbat and ritual impurity, whereas any offering, individual or communal, whose time is not fixed overrides neither Shabbat nor ritual impurity.

There is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai that there are five sin offerings that are unfit for sacrifice on the altar and have no remedy and are therefore left to die. They are: The offspring of a sin offering; the substitute for a sin offering; a sin offering whose owner died; a sin offering whose owner achieved atonement with another sin offering, when the original sin offering was lost or stolen and later recovered; and a sin offering whose year has passed. The mishna continues the discussion of the distinction between individual and communal offerings. An individual sin offering whose owner achieved atonement with another sin offering after it was lost is left to die, but in the case of a communal sin offering it is not left to die. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even a communal sin offering shall be left to die. Rabbi Shimon says: Just as we found with regard to the offspring of a sin offering, and with regard to the substitute for a sin offering, and with regard to a sin offering whose owner died, that these matters apply to an individual sin offering and not to a communal sin offering, so too, in the cases of a sin offering whose owner achieved atonement with another sin offering, and a sin offering whose first year has passed, the matters are stated with regard to an individual sin offering, and not with regard to a communal sin offering.

There is greater stringency with regard to sacrificial animals than there is with regard to a substitute, and greater stringency with regard to a substitute than there is with regard to sacrificial animals. The Mishna explains: There is greater stringency with regard to sacrificial animals than there is with regard to a substitute, as sacrificial animals render a non-sacred animal exchanged for them a substitute, but a substitute does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. Furthermore, the community and the partners consecrate animals as offerings, but they do not substitute non-sacred animals for their offerings. And one consecrates fetuses in utero and one can consecrate an animal’s limbs, but one cannot substitute non-sacred animals for them. There is greater stringency with regard to a substitute than there is with regard to sacrificial animals, as, if one substituted a non-sacred blemished animal for an unblemished sacrificial animal, then the animal with a permanent blemish is imbued with inherent sanctity, which is not the case with regard to consecration. And in addition, those blemished animals consecrated through substitution do not emerge from their consecrated status to assume non-sacred status by means of redemption, in terms of it being permitted to shear its wool and to perform labor with it. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says that there is an additional stringency that applies to substitution but not to consecration: The Torah rendered the status of one who acts unwittingly like that of one who acts intentionally with regard to substitution, as in both cases the substitute is consecrated. But it did not render the status of one who acts unwittingly like that of one who acts intentionally with regard to consecrated items, since unwitting consecration is ineffective. Rabbi Elazar says: An animal crossbred from diverse kinds, and a tereifa, and an animal born by caesarean section, and a tumtum animal, and a hermaphrodite animal are not sacred through consecration, and if they were sacred beforehand, e.g., one consecrated an animal and it subsequently became a tereifa, they do not sanctify non-sacred animals by means of substitution.

Chapter 3

These are the sacrificial animals for which the halakhic status of their offspring and substitutes is like their own halakhic status: The offspring of peace offerings, and their substitute animals, and even the offspring of their offspring or their substitute animals, and even the offspring of their offspring, until the end of all time [ ad sof kol ha’olam ]. They are all endowed with the sanctity and halakhic status of peace offerings, and therefore they require placing hands on the head of the animal, and libations, and the waving of the breast and the thigh in order to give them to the priest. Although the previous mishna stated plainly that the offspring of a peace offering is itself sacrificed as a peace offering, its status is actually subject to a dispute between the tanna’im. Rabbi Eliezer says: The offspring of a peace offering is not sacrificed on the altar as a peace offering; rather it is sequestered and left to die. And the Rabbis say: It is sacrificed as a peace offering. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis do not disagree with regard to the status of the offspring of the offspring of a peace offering or with regard to the status of the offspring of the offspring of the substitute of a peace offering. In those cases, they all agree that the animal is not sacrificed on the altar as a peace offering. With regard to what case do they disagree? They disagree about the case of the offspring of a peace offering itself. Rabbi Eliezer says: It is not sacrificed as a peace offering, whereas the Rabbis say: It is sacrificed. Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Pappeyas testified about the offspring of a peace offering that it is sacrificed as a peace offering. Rabbi Pappeyas said: I testify that we ourselves had a cow that was a peace offering, and we ate it on Passover, and we ate its offspring as a peace offering on a different Festival.

The offspring of a thanks offering and the substitute of a thanks offering, and the offspring of the offspring and its substitute, and the offspring of their offspring until the end of all time, they are all like thanks offerings, with the only difference being that they do not require the accompanying loaves, unlike the thanks offering itself. With regard to the substitute of a burnt offering, the offspring of the substitute, e.g., if one substituted a female animal for a burnt offering, and it gave birth to a male, and the offspring of the offspring of its offspring until the end of all time, they are all like burnt offerings and therefore they require flaying and cutting into pieces and must be burned completely in the fire.

In the case of one who designates a female animal as a burnt offering, which may be brought only from males, and that female gave birth to a male, although it is a male, it is left to graze until it becomes unfit [ sheyista’ev ] and then it is sold, and he brings a burnt offering with the money received for its sale. Rabbi Elazar says: The male offspring itself is sacrificed as a burnt offering. In the case of one who designates a female animal for a guilt offering, which may be brought only from males, it is left to graze until it becomes blemished and then it is sold, and he brings a guilt offering with the money received for its sale. And if in the interim, he designated a male animal and his guilt offering was already sacrificed, so that a guilt offering is no longer needed, the money received for the sale of the blemished female is allocated for communal gift offerings. Rabbi Shimon says: Since a female is unfit to be sacrificed as a guilt offering, its halakhic status is like that of a blemished animal in the sense that it does not become inherently sacred; rather, its value alone becomes sacred. Therefore, it may be sold without a blemish, and a guilt offering is purchased with the money received for its sale. With regard to the substitute of a guilt offering, the offspring of that substitute, their offspring and the offspring of their offspring, until the end of all time, they are all left to graze until they become unfit, and then they are sold, and the money received for the sale is allocated for communal gift offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: These animals are not left to graze; rather they are left to die. And Rabbi Elazar says: Communal gift offerings are not purchased with the money from the sale; rather, the owner should bring an individual burnt offering with the money received for its sale. These tanna’im similarly disagree about the following case: A guilt offering whose owner died, and a guilt offering that was lost and its owner gained atonement with another animal, graze until they become unfit, and then they are sold, and the money received for the sale is allocated for communal gift offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: These animals are left to die. Rabbi Elazar says: The owner must bring an individual burnt offering with the money received for its sale.

The mishna objects: But even according to the Rabbis, isn’t a gift offering also a burnt offering? And what then is the difference between the statement of Rabbi Elazar and the statement of the Rabbis? Rather, the Rabbis are referring to a communal burnt offering and Rabbi Elazar is referring to an individual burnt offering, and there are several differences between these two offerings: When the animal comes as an individual burnt offering, the owner places his hands upon it and brings the accompanying meal offering and libations, and its libations come from his own property. If the owner of the animal was a priest, the right to perform its Temple service and the right to its hide are his. And when it is a communal gift offering, the owner of the animal that was sold does not place his hands upon it, as there is no placing of hands for communal offerings, and he does not bring its libations; rather, its libations are brought from the property of the community. Furthermore, although the owner of the animal that was sold is a priest, the right to perform its Temple service and the right to its hide are divided among the members of the priestly watch serving in the Temple that week.

With regard to the substitute of a firstborn offering and the substitute of an animal tithe offering, and the offspring of those substitutes and the offspring of their offspring until the end of time, the halakhic status of these animals is like that of a firstborn offering and like that of an animal tithe offering in that they must be treated with sanctity: They graze until they become blemished, and at that point they may be eaten in their blemished state, the substitute of the firstborn by the priests and the substitute of the animal tithe by their owners. They are not sacrificed upon the altar like the original firstborn and animal tithe offerings. What is the practical difference between a firstborn offering and an animal tithe offering and all the other sacrificial animals? The difference is that all the other sacrificial animals that were blemished and redeemed are sold in the butchers’ market [ ba’itliz ], and slaughtered in the butchers’ market, and weighed and sold by the litra, in the manner that non-sacred meat is slaughtered and sold. This is the case with regard to all consecrated animals except for the firstborn and animal tithe offerings, which are sold only from the home and not by the litra. And in addition, all sacrificial animals that became blemished are subject to redemption through sale, at which point the money becomes sacred and the animal becomes non-sacred, and their substitutes are also subject to redemption through sale.This is true for all consecrated animals, except for the firstborn and animal tithe offerings, which are not subject to redemption. And all sacrificial animals come to be sacrificed in the Temple even from outside of Eretz Yisrael, except for the firstborn and animal tithe offerings, which should not be brought from outside Eretz Yisrael ab initio. But if they came unblemished, they are sacrificed in the Temple like a regular firstborn or animal tithe offering coming from Eretz Yisrael; and if they are blemished animals, they may be eaten in their blemished state, the firstborns by the priests and the animal tithes by their owners. Rabbi Shimon says: What is the reason for this last difference between them? It is that the firstborn and animal tithe offerings have a remedy in their place outside Eretz Yisrael, as they can graze until they become blemished and then can be eaten there. It is not necessary to bring them to Eretz Yisrael in order to eat them. But with regard to all other sacrificial animals, even if a blemish develops in them, these animals remain in their sanctity, and one must redeem them and bring another offering with the money of their redemption. Therefore, when they are unblemished it is proper to bring these animals themselves to Eretz Yisrael.

Chapter 4

The offspring of a sin offering and the substitute for a sin offering, and a sin offering whose owner has died shall be sequestered and left to die. And with regard to a sin offering that is unfit for sacrifice because its first year from birth has passed, and a sin offering that was lost and when it was found, it was blemished, if it was after the owner achieved atonement through sacrifice of another animal as a sin offering, the blemished animal shall die, and it does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute. Furthermore, one may not derive benefit from any of these sin offerings ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them, after the fact, he is not liable to bring a sin offering for misuse of consecrated items. And if the lost animal was found and discovered to be unfit before the owner achieved atonement for his sin with a different animal, it shall graze until it becomes blemished, and then it shall be sold. And he must bring another sin offering with the money received from the sale. And this animal renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and one who derives benefit from this animal is liable for misusing it.

In the case of one who designates a sin offering, and the animal was lost, and he designated another in its stead and sacrificed it, and thereafter the first animal was found; that is a sin offering whose owner achieved atonement with another animal, and it shall be left to die. In the case of one who designates money for purchase of his sin offering, and the money was lost,and he designated an animal as a sin offering in its stead, and he sacrificed it, and thereafter, the money was found, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the money, as the money attains the halakhic status of the sin offering that was to be purchased with it, and that sin offering would be left to die because the owner achieved atonement with another animal. Therefore, he must take the money and cast it into the Dead Sea, from where it cannot be recovered.

In the case of one who designates money for purchase of his sin offering, and the money was lost, and he designated other money in its stead, and he did not manage to purchase a sin offering with that money before the original money was found, he should bring a sin offering from a combination of this original money and that money designated in its stead, and the remainder shall be allocated for communal gift offerings. In the case of one who designates money for purchase of his sin offering, and the money was lost, and he designated an animal as a sin offering in its stead, and he did not manage to sacrifice the animal before the money was found, and the animal that he designated as a sin offering is blemished, the animal shall be sold; and he brings a sin offering from a combination of this original money and that money received for the sale of the blemished animal, and the remainder shall be allocated for communal gift offerings. In the case of one who designates a sin offering and the animal was lost, and he designated money in its stead, and he did not manage to purchase a sin offering with that money before his sin offering was found, and the animal is blemished, the animal shall be sold; and he brings a sin offering from a combination of this money that he designated and that money received for the sale of the blemished animal, and the remainder shall be allocated for communal gift offerings. In the case of one who designates his sin offering and the animal was lost, and he designated another animal in its stead, and he did not manage to sacrifice the sin offering before the first sin offering was found, and both of the animals are blemished, the animals shall be sold; and he brings a sin offering from a third animal that he buys with a combination of the money from the sale of this animal and from the sale of that animal, and the remainder shall be allocated for communal gift offerings. In the case of one who designates his sin offering and the animal was lost, and he designated another animal in its stead, and he did not manage to sacrifice the sin offering before the first sin offering was found, and both of the animals are unblemished and fit for sacrifice, one of them shall be sacrificed as a sin offering and the other shall be left to die; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: A sin offering is not left to die unless it was found after its owner achieved atonement; and the money is not taken to the Dead Sea unless it was found after its owner achieved atonement.

In the case of one who designates a sin offering and the animal is blemished, he sells the animal and must bring another sin offering with the money received in its sale. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: If the second animal is sacrificed before the first is slaughtered for non-sacred consumption, the first animal shall be left to die. Although it was sold and rendered non-sacred, its status is now that of a sin offering whose owner already achieved atonement with another animal.

Chapter 5

How may one employ artifice to circumvent the obligation to give the firstborn to the priest and utilize the animal for a different offering that he is obligated to bring? The owner approaches an animal that is going to give birth to its firstborn while that animal was still pregnant, and says: That which is in the womb of this animal, if it is male, is designated as a burnt offering. In that case, if the animal gave birth to a male, it will be sacrificed as a burnt offering. And in a case where he says: If it is female, it is designated as a peace offering, if the animal gave birth to a female, it will be sacrificed as a peace offering. In a case where the owner says: If it is male it is designated as a burnt offering, and if it is female it is designated as a peace offering, and the animal gave birth to a male and a female, the male will be sacrificed as a burnt offering and the female will be sacrificed as a peace offering.

If the animal gave birth to two males, one of them will be sacrificed as a burnt offering and the second will be sold to those obligated to bring a burnt offering, who will sacrifice it as a burnt offering; and the money received from its sale is non-sacred. If the animal gave birth to two females, one of them will be sacrificed as a peace offering and the second will be sold to those obligated to bring a peace offering, who will sacrifice it as a peace offering, and the money received from its sale is non-sacred. If the animal gave birth to a tumtum, whose gender is unknown, or a hermaphrodite, which has both male and female sexual organs, both of which are unfit for sacrifice, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: They are not imbued with sanctity.

One who says: The offspring of this non-sacred animal is a burnt offering and the animal itself is a peace offering, his statement stands, i.e., is effective. If he says: The animal itself is a peace offering and its offspring is a burnt offering, then since consecration of the mother preceded consecration of the offspring, it is the offspring of a peace offering, whose halakhic status is that of a peace offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei said: If that was his intent from the outset, to designate the offspring as a burnt offering when he designated the mother as a peace offering, then since it is impossible to call it by two designations simultaneously, his statement stands, and the mother is a peace offering and the offspring a burnt offering. And if it was only after he said: This animal is hereby a peace offering, that he reconsidered and said: Its offspring is a burnt offering, that offspring is a peace offering, as before he reconsidered, the offspring had already assumed the status of the offspring of a peace offering.

If one had two animals standing before him, one a burnt offering and the other a peace offering, and he said with regard to a third, non-sacred animal: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, the substitute of the peace offering, that animal is the substitute of the burnt offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Once he designated it as the substitute of the burnt offering, his initial statement takes effect and the animal assumes the sanctity of the burnt offering. Rabbi Yosei said: If that was his intent from the outset, when he said that the animal is the substitute of the burnt offering, to state that the animal is also the substitute of the peace offering, then since it is impossible to call two designations simultaneously, i.e., one must first say one designation and then the other, his statement stands, and the animal is half a burnt offering and half a peace offering. And if it was only after he said: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, that he reconsidered and said: The substitute of the peace offering, that entire animal is the substitute of the burnt offering.

This mishna discusses the language that serves to effect substitution. If one said: This non-sacred animal is hereby in place of that consecrated animal, or if he said: It is the substitute of that consecrated animal, or if one said: It is the exchange for that consecrated animal, that non-sacred animal is a substitute. If he said: This consecrated animal is desacralized, with its sanctity transferred to that non-sacred animal, that non-sacred animal is not a substitute. And if the consecrated animal was blemished, and he said: This consecrated animal is desacralized, with its sanctity transferred to that non-sacred animal, the consecrated animal is desacralized and assumes non-sacred status, by Torah law. By rabbinic law, the owner is required to conduct an appraisal to ascertain the relative value of the two animals. If the consecrated animal was worth more than the non-sacred animal, he must pay the difference to the Temple treasury.

If one said: This non-sacred animal is hereby in place of a burnt offering, or: It is in place of a sin offering, he has said nothing, as he did not say that it was in place of a specific offering. If he said: It is in place of this sin offering, or: It is in place of this burnt offering, or if he said: It is in place of a sin offering that I have in the house, or: It is in place of a burnt offering that I have in the house, and he had that offering in his house, his statement stands, i.e., is effective. If he said with regard to a non-kosher animal and with regard to a blemished animal: These animals are hereby designated as a burnt offering, he has said nothing. If he said: These animals are hereby designated for a burnt offering, the animals should be sold, and he brings a burnt offering purchased with the money received from their sale.

Chapter 6

With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, if they are intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is permitted, they prohibit the entire mixture of animals in any amount, regardless of the ratio of permitted to prohibited animals. These are the animals whose sacrifice is prohibited: An animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality, and the set-aside, and one that was worshipped, and an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or an animal crossbred from a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ], or an animal born by caesarean section. Which is the animal that is set-aside? It is an animal that is set aside for idol worship. The animal itself is prohibited, but that which is upon it, e.g., its jewelry and garments, is permitted to be sold in order to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And which is the animal that was worshipped? It is any animal that a person worships as an object of idol worship. In this case, the sacrifice of both the animal itself and an animal purchased using the money from the sale of that which is upon it is prohibited. And the consumption of both this, the animal designated for idol worship, and that, the animal worshipped, is permitted.

And which is the case of an animal used as payment to a prostitute, which is prohibited as a sacrifice? It is the case of one who says to a prostitute: Here is this lamb as your fee. Even if they were one hundred lambs that he gave her, all of them are considered as payment to a prostitute and are prohibited. And likewise, in the case of one who says to another: Here is this lamb and in return your maidservant will lie with my slave and engage in intercourse with him, Rabbi Meir says: Its halakhic status is not that of payment to a prostitute, and the Rabbis say: Its halakhic status is that of payment to a prostitute.

And which is the case where an animal has the halakhic status of the price of a dog, and it is therefore prohibited to sacrifice the animal on the altar? It is the case of one who says to another: Here is this lamb in place of a dog. And likewise, this prohibition applies in the case of two partners who divided their common property, which included nineteen lambs and one dog, and one took ten lambs and the other one took nine lambs and a dog. Sacrifice of the ten lambs taken by the partner in exchange for the nine lambs and the dog is prohibited, and sacrifice of the nine lambs that were taken by the partner with the dog is permitted. With regard to lambs given as payment to another for engaging in intercourse with his dog, or as the price of a prostitute to purchase her as his maidservant, their sacrifice is permitted, as it is stated: “As both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19), from which it is inferred: Two are prohibited, payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog, and not four, i.e., the additional two cases of payment for intercourse with a dog and the price of a prostitute, which are permitted. Furthermore, with regard to the two prohibited cases of payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted, as it is stated “them,” and not their offspring.

If one gave money to a prostitute as her payment, it is permitted to purchase an offering with that money, as the money itself is not sacrificed. If he paid her with wine, or oil, or flour, or any other item the like of which is sacrificed on the altar, sacrifice of those items is prohibited. If he gave her consecrated items for her services, their sacrifice is permitted. Since they were already consecrated, they do not belong to him, and one cannot prohibit an item that is not his. If he paid her with non-sacred birds, their sacrifice is prohibited. The mishna elaborates: As, by right, it should be inferred a fortiori : If in the case of consecrated items, which a blemish disqualifies, the prohibition of payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog do not take effect with regard to them; with regard to a bird, which a blemish does not disqualify, is it not right that the prohibition of payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog should not take effect with regard to them? Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God for any vow” (Deuteronomy 23:19). This serves to include the bird in the prohibition.

The mishna adds a principle: With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted. Rabbi Eliezer says: The offspring of an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [ tereifa ]shall not be sacrificed on the altar. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: A kosher animal that suckled from a tereifa is disqualified from sacrifice on the altar. With regard to all sacrificial animals that became tereifot, one may not redeem them and render them non-sacred, as their consumption is forbidden and one does not redeem sacrificial animals to feed them to dogs, as this is considered a degradation of sacrificial animals.

Chapter 7

There are elements that apply to animals consecrated for the altar that do not apply to items consecrated for Temple maintenance, and there are elements that apply to items consecrated for Temple maintenance that do not apply to animals consecrated for the altar. One element exclusive to animals consecrated for the altar is that animals consecrated for the altar render an animal exchanged for them a substitute, and items consecrated for Temple maintenance do not render an animal exchanged for them a substitute. In addition, if one slaughters an animal consecrated for the altar with the intention to eat it beyond its designated time, or if he ate the offering after its designated time, or if he ate the offering while ritually impure, he is liable to receive karet for eating it due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, notar, and eating while ritually impure, respectively. If animals consecrated for the altar became pregnant and then became blemished and gave birth after redemption, their offspring and their milk are forbidden after their redemption. And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive karet. And the Temple treasurer does not give compensation to craftsmen from money designated for purchasing animals consecrated for the altar. And in all these instances, that is not so with regard to money consecrated for Temple maintenance.

There are elements that apply to items consecrated for Temple maintenance that do not apply to animals consecrated for the altar, in that unspecified consecrations are designated for Temple maintenance; consecration for Temple maintenance takes effect on all items; and one is liable to bring a guilt offering and pay an additional payment of one-fifth for misuse of consecrated property, not only for the items themselves, but for their by-products, e.g., milk of a consecrated animal or eggs of a consecrated chicken; and there is no benefit for the owner from items consecrated for Temple maintenance, in contrast to some animals consecrated for the altar, e.g., a peace offering, from which there is benefit for the owner.

While the previous mishna enumerated differences between consecration for the altar and consecration for Temple maintenance, this mishna enumerates halakhot that apply to both. With regard to both animals consecrated for the altar and items consecrated for Temple maintenance, one may not alter their designation from one form of sanctity to another form of sanctity. But one may consecrate animals already consecrated for the altar by a consecration of their value, and that value is donated to the Temple treasury for maintenance. And one may dedicate them for the purpose of giving their value to the priests. And if animals consecrated either for the altar or for Temple maintenance died, they must be buried. Rabbi Shimon says: Although that is the halakha with regard to animals consecrated for the altar, if animals consecrated for Temple maintenance died, they can be redeemed.

And these are the items that are buried from which deriving benefit is forbidden: In the case of a sacrificial animal that miscarried, the fetus shall be buried. If the animal miscarried a placenta, the placenta shall be buried. And the same halakha applies to an ox that is stoned for killing a person; and a heifer whose neck is broken when a corpse is found between two cities and the killer is unknown; and the birds brought by a leper for purification; and the hair of a nazirite who became ritually impure, who shaves his head before beginning a new term of naziriteship. And the same halakha applies to the firstborn of a donkey that, if it is not redeemed with a sheep, has its neck broken; and a forbidden mixture of meat cooked in milk; and non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Shimon says: Non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard shall be burned, like sacrificial animals that were disqualified in the courtyard. And likewise, an undomesticated animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, although it is not similar to the animals sacrificed in the Temple, shall be burned by rabbinic decree.

And these are the items that are burned: Leavened bread on Passover shall be burned. And the same halakha applies to ritually impure teruma. And with regard to the fruit that grows on a tree during the three years after it was planted [ orla ], and diverse kinds of food crops sown in a vineyard, those items whose appropriate manner of destruction is to be burned, e.g., foods, shall be burned; and those items whose appropriate manner of destruction is to be buried, e.g., liquids, shall be buried. And one may ignite a fire with bread and with oil of impure teruma, even though the priest derives benefit from that fire.

And with regard to all sacrificial animals that were slaughtered with the intent to sacrifice or consume them beyond their designated time or outside their designated place, those animals shall be burned. With regard to a provisional guilt offering brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that renders him liable to bring a sin offering, if he discovers that he did not sin, the offering shall be burned, as its legal status is like that of an unfit offering. Rabbi Yehuda says: It shall be buried. A sin offering of the bird that comes due to an uncertainty, e.g., in the case of a woman who miscarried and she is uncertain whether it was a fetus, shall be burned, as it may not be eaten due to the uncertainty and because the nape of its neck was pinched and it was not slaughtered. Rabbi Yehuda says: One should cast it into the Temple courtyard drain, as the young bird will decompose and be drawn into the stream outside the Temple. The principle is: All items that are buried shall not be burned, and all items that are burned shall not be buried. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one wished to impose a stringency upon himself by burning items that are to be buried, he is permitted to burn them. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: One is not permitted to change the method of destruction, as this could lead to a leniency, since it is permitted to derive benefit from the ashes of items that require burning, whereas it is not permitted to derive benefit from the ashes of items that require burial.

Mishnah Keritot

Chapter 1

There are thirty-six cases in the Torah with regard to which one who performs a prohibited action intentionally is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [ karet ]. They are: One who engages in sexual intercourse with his mother; or with the wife of his father, even if she is not his mother; or with his daughter-in-law. The same punishment is imposed on a man who engages in intercourse with another male [ hazekhur ], or who copulates with an animal; and a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality. The same punishment is imposed on one who engages in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, or with a married woman. The same punishment is imposed on one who engages in intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with the wife of his father’s brother, or with the wife of his mother’s brother, or with a menstruating woman. And these too are liable to receive karet : One who blasphemes the name of Heaven, and one who worships an idol, and one who gives of his children to Molekh (see Leviticus 20:1–5), and a necromancer, and one who desecrates Shabbat. And the same is the punishment of one who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food; and one who enters the Temple while ritually impure; and one who eats forbidden fat, or consumes blood, or eats meat left over from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption [ notar ], or eats meat of an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [ piggul ]; and one who slaughters offerings and offers them up outside the Temple. And these too are liable to receive karet : One who eats leavened bread on Passover, and one who eats or performs prohibited labor on Yom Kippur. And the same is the punishment of one who blends the anointing oil according to the specifications of the oil prepared by Moses in the wilderness (see Exodus 30:22–33); and one who blends the incense according to the specifications of the incense used in the Temple service for purposes other than use in the Temple; and one who applies the anointing oil to his skin. And one is liable to receive karet for failure to fulfill the mitzva of bringing the Paschal offering and the mitzva of circumcision, which unlike the cases of prohibitions enumerated in the mishna, are positive mitzvot.

For any of these prohibitions, one is liable to receive karet for its intentional violation and to bring a sin offering for its unwitting violation. And for their violation in a case where it is unknown to him whether or not he transgressed, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, which provides provisional atonement until he discovers whether or not he transgressed. This is the halakha for all of the transgressions listed above except for one who defiles the Temple, i.e., he enters the Temple while ritually impure, or partakes of its consecrated items while ritually impure. In these cases he does not bring a provisional guilt offering because he is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering for a definite transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The halakha is the same even with regard to the one who blasphemes, as it is stated with regard to the sin offering: “You shall have one law for him who performs the action unwittingly” (Numbers 15:29), excluding one who blasphemes, as he does not perform an action but sins with speech.

There are some women who bring a sin offering of a woman after childbirth and the offering is eaten by the priests. And there are some women who bring a sin offering but it is not eaten. And there are some women who do not bring a sin offering at all. The mishna elaborates: The following women bring a sin offering and it is eaten by the priests: One who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to a domesticated animal, one who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to an undomesticated animal, or one who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to a bird; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She does not bring a sin offering unless the fetus has the form of a person. With regard to a woman who miscarries a sandal fetus, i.e., one that has the form of a flat fish; or if she miscarries the placenta; or an amniotic sac in which tissue developed; or a fetus that emerged cut, i.e., in pieces; and likewise a Canaanite maidservant, owned by a Jew, who miscarried; in all these cases she brings a sin offering and it is eaten by the priests.

And these women bring sin offerings but their sin offerings are not eaten: One who miscarries and does not know the nature of what she miscarried; and two women who miscarried, in a case where one miscarried a fetus of a type for which a woman is exempt from bringing an offering and the other one miscarried a fetus of a type for which a woman is liable to bring an offering, and they do not know which miscarried which type. Rabbi Yosei said: When is their sin offering not eaten? It is when both women went to different places within the Temple to bring their offerings, e.g., this woman went to the east and that woman went to the west. But if both of them were standing together, both of them together bring one sin offering, and it is eaten.

These women do not bring a sin offering: A woman who miscarries an amniotic sac full of water, or one full of blood, or one full of different colors; and likewise a woman who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to fish, or grasshoppers, or repugnant creatures, or creeping animals; and a woman who miscarries on the fortieth day of her pregnancy; and a woman who gives birth by caesarean section. Rabbi Shimon deems a woman liable to bring a sin offering in the case where she gives birth by caesarean section.

A woman who gives birth to a daughter counts fourteen days during which she is ritually impure. That is followed by sixty-six days during which she remains ritually pure even if she experiences a flow of blood. The Torah obligates a woman to bring her offering on the eighty-first day (see Leviticus 12:1–6). If the woman miscarries another fetus before that day, she is not required to bring an additional offering. In the case of a woman who miscarries a fetus on the night of, i.e., preceding, the eighty-first day, Beit Shammai deem her exempt from bringing a second offering and Beit Hillel deem her liable to bring a second offering. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: What is different between the night of the eighty-first and the day of the eighty-first? If they are equal with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity, i.e., the blood flow of this woman on the eighty-first night renders her ritually impure and all the standard strictures of ritual impurity apply to her, will the two time periods not be equal with regard to liability to bring an additional offering as well? Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: No, there is a difference between that night and the following day. If you said with regard to a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that she is obligated to bring an additional offering, this is logical, as she emerged into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering. Would you say the same with regard to a woman who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first day, where she did not emerge into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering, as offerings are not sacrificed at night? Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: But let the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat prove that this distinction is incorrect, as she did not emerge into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering because individual offerings are not sacrificed on Shabbat, and nevertheless she is obligated to bring an additional offering. Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: No, there is a difference between these cases. If you said this ruling with regard to a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat, the reason is that although Shabbat is unfit for the sacrifice of an individual offering, it is fit for the sacrifice of a communal offering whose time is fixed, e.g., the daily offering. Would you say the same with regard to a woman who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first day, as the night is completely unfit, since neither an individual offering nor a communal offering is sacrificed at night? Beit Shammai add: And as for the ritual impurity status of the blood, i.e., Beit Hillel’s opinion that the two time periods are equal with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity, this does not prove what the halakha should be with regard to offerings, as with regard to a woman who miscarries before the completion of the term of eighty days, her blood is impure like the blood of a woman after childbirth, and nevertheless she is exempt from bringing the offering.

With regard to a woman who has in her case uncertainty concerning five births, and likewise a woman with regard to whom there is uncertainty concerning five irregular discharges of blood from the uterus [ ziva ], she brings one offering, and then she may partake of the meat of offerings. And the remaining offerings are not an obligation for her. If she experienced five definite discharges of a zava or five definite births, she brings one offering, and then she may partake of the meat of offerings. And the remaining offerings are an obligation for her. There was an incident where the price of nests, i.e., pairs of birds, stood in Jerusalem at one gold dinar, as the great demand for birds for the offerings of a woman after childbirth and a zava led to an increase in the price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: I swear by this abode of the Divine Presence that I will not lie down tonight until the price of nests will be in silver dinars. Ultimately, he entered the court and taught: A woman who has in her case five definite discharges of a zava or five definite births brings one offering, and then she may partake of the meat of offerings. And the remaining offerings are not an obligation for her. And as a result, the price of the nests stood that day at one-quarter of a silver dinar, as the demand for nests decreased.

Chapter 2

There are four individuals whose halakhic status is defined as: Lacking atonement [ khappara ], which means they had been in a state of ritual impurity and underwent rituals to purify themselves, but since they have not yet brought the requisite atonement offering to complete the purification process, they may not partake of sacrificial meat. And there are also four individuals who bring an offering for an intentional transgression in the same manner as they do for an unwitting transgression. And these are the four individuals who lack atonement: The man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [ zav ], the woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [ zava ], the woman after childbirth, and the leper. In all four of these cases, although the individual has completed all of the other steps of the purification process, the process is not complete until the atonement offering has been brought. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: A convert also lacks atonement, even after he has been circumcised and has immersed in a ritual bath, until the priest sprinkles the blood of his offering on the altar on his behalf. A nazirite also lacks atonement with regard to his permission for drinking wine, and cutting his hair, and his exposure to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, until his offerings are sacrificed.

These individuals bring an offering for an intentional transgression in the same manner as they do for an unwitting transgression: One who engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant, who is liable to bring a guilt offering (see Leviticus 19:20–22); and a nazirite who became ritually impure, who is required to bring a sheep as a guilt offering and two doves or two pigeons, one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering (see Numbers 6:9–12); and one who falsely takes the oath of testimony, asserting that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue (see Leviticus 5:1); and one who falsely takes the oath on a deposit, asserting that an item belonging to another is not in his possession (see Leviticus 5:21–26).

There are five individuals who bring one offering for several transgressions, i.e., for violating the same transgression several times; and there are five individuals who bring a sliding-scale offering, which is determined based on the financial status of the sinner. These are the five individuals who bring one offering for several transgressions: First, one who engages in several acts of intercourse with an espoused maidservant, and second, a nazirite who became ritually impure due to several instances of contact with ritual impurity. The mishna continues to list the five situations in which one offering is brought to atone for several transgressions: Third, one who issues a warning to his wife declaring himself jealous with regard to several different men with whom he suspects her of committing adultery, and forbidding her to be alone with them. If the wife was then found separately in seclusion with each of the men, he brings her to the Temple with one single meal offering of jealousy. And fourth, a leper who was afflicted with several instances of leprosy, meaning that he was purified from his leprosy, and before he brought his offerings, he suffered a relapse of the leprosy. When he is finally purified, he brings only one set of offerings. If a leper brought the two requisite birds on the first day of his purification (see Leviticus 14:4–7), and prior to bringing his offerings on the eighth day of his purification he was afflicted with a relapse of leprosy, those birds do not satisfy his obligation until he brings his sin offering. Rabbi Yehuda says: Until he brings his guilt offering.

The mishna continues with the last of the five situations in which one offering is brought to atone for several transgressions: A woman who gave birth to several offspring. This is a case where a woman gave birth to a daughter, after which she is ritually impure for fourteen days and then enters a period of sixty-six days of ritual purity, even if she experiences uterine bleeding. Nevertheless, during this interim period, she is still somewhat impure, and it is therefore prohibited for her to enter the Temple or to partake of consecrated food, and at the end of the period she must bring an offering. And during those days of ritual purity, she became pregnant again and then miscarried a female fetus within the eighty days, and then became pregnant again and miscarried another female fetus within eighty days of the first miscarriage. In this situation, when she ultimately completes her process of purification, she brings one single offering for all the births and miscarriages. And a similar halakha applies to a woman who miscarries multiple fetuses from a single pregnancy at different points in time, miscarrying each fetus before completing the purification period of forty days for a male or eighty days for a female for the previous fetus. When she finally completes her process of purification, she brings one single offering for all of the miscarriages. Rabbi Yehuda says: In these cases, a single offering does not suffice for all the births or miscarriages. Rather, she brings an offering for the first birth or miscarriage and does not bring an offering for the second miscarriage, as it took place before the completion of the purification period for the first. She then brings an offering for the third miscarriage and does not bring an offering for the fourth fetus, as it was miscarried before the completion of the purification period for the third fetus. These are the five situations mentioned in the mishna (9a) in which one brings a sliding-scale offering: For hearing the voice of an oath, i.e., where one took a false oath that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue; and for the utterance of the lips, which is a case where one took a false oath about a different matter; and for the defiling of the Temple, by entering it while ritually impure, or defiling its sacrificial foods, by partaking of them while ritually impure; and a woman after childbirth; and a leper at the end of his purification process. What are the differences between an espoused maidservant and all those others with whom relations are forbidden? The difference is that the status of the maidservant is not equal to their status, neither with regard to punishment nor with regard to an offering, as one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden is liable to bring a sin offering, and by contrast, one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant is liable to bring a guilt offering. One who unwittingly engages in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden brings a female animal, and one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant brings a male animal, as a sin offering is a female and a guilt offering is a male. Furthermore, with regard to engaging in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden, both the man and the woman are equal with regard to liability to receive lashes if they were forewarned, and with regard to liability to bring an offering if they did so unwittingly. And in the case of one who engages in intercourse with a maidservant, the Torah did not equate the man with the woman with regard to lashes, as she alone is flogged, as will be explained, and the Torah did not equate the woman with the man with regard to bringing an offering, as she does not bring an offering. With regard to intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden, the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one who engages in the initial stage of intercourse [ hame’areh ] to be like that of one who completes the act, and one is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act of intercourse that he performs unwittingly. By contrast, in the case of relations with an espoused maidservant, one is liable only for completing the act of intercourse, and the man brings a single offering for several transgressions. This is a stringency that the Torah imposed with regard to the maidservant relative to other individuals with whom relations are forbidden: That the Torah established her status so that the one who engages in intercourse with her intentionally is like the one who does so unwittingly, as both are liable to bring a guilt offering, whereas one who engages in intercourse with those with whom relations are forbidden is liable to bring a sin offering only when he does so unwittingly.

Who is the espoused maidservant in question? It is any woman who is half-maidservant half-free woman, i.e., a maidservant who belonged to two masters, one of whom liberated her, as it is stated: “And she was redeemed and not redeemed” (Leviticus 19:20), which means that she was partially but not completely redeemed. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yishmael says: An espoused maidservant is a full-fledged maidservant whose status is certain, as the language of the verse does not mean redeemed and not redeemed; it is simply a way of stating that she was not redeemed. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: All those with whom relations are forbidden are enumerated in the Torah, and we have no exception other than one who is half-maidservant half-free woman.

This mishna cites an additional difference between the status of an espoused maidservant and the status of forbidden relatives. In all cases of intercourse with those with whom relations are forbidden, if one is an adult and one is a minor, the minor is exempt; if one is awake and one is sleeping, the sleeping one is exempt; if one commits the act unwittingly and one does so intentionally, the one who did so unwittingly is liable to bring a sin offering and the one who did so intentionally is liable to be punished with karet. By contrast, in a case of intercourse with an espoused maidservant, the man is liable to bring a guilt offering only if the woman is flogged, and that is the case only if she was an adult, awake, and committed the sin intentionally.

Chapter 3

If witnesses said to a person: We saw that you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a sin offering if he did so unwittingly. If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and a witness says: He did not eat forbidden fat, or if a woman says: He ate forbidden fat, and a woman says: He did not eat forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, he is exempt. If two witnesses say: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, Rabbi Meir deems him liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Meir said: This conclusion can be derived a fortiori : If two witnesses could have brought him liability to receive the severe punishment of death, can they not bring him liability to sacrifice an offering, which is relatively lenient? The Rabbis said to him: Witnesses are unable to render another person liable to bring an offering contrary to his statement, as what if he wishes to say: I did so intentionally, in which case he would be exempt from bringing an offering?

If one unwittingly ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat and then ate another olive-bulk of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness, i.e., in a case where he did not discover in the interim that fat is forbidden, or that the food he is eating is forbidden fat, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. If one ate forbidden fat, and blood, and piggul, and notar in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one of them. This is a stringency that applies to one who eats several types of forbidden food and does not apply to one who eats one type of forbidden food. And a stringency that applies to one who eats one type of forbidden food and not to one who eats several types of forbidden food is that if one ate half an olive-bulk and then ate another half an olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness, in a case where they were both from one type of forbidden food, he is liable to bring a sin offering. If they were from two types, he is exempt, because he did not eat an olive-bulk of any specific forbidden food.

How much time can one expend while eating an olive-bulk of forbidden food and still be liable for violating the prohibition? The duration is calculated as though he were eating toasted grain, which one eats one kernel at a time. If he eats the olive-bulk of forbidden food within the amount of time it would take to eat an olive-bulk of toasted grain, he is liable. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Unless the amount of time he expends from beginning to end is more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf [ peras ] of bread, he is liable. Likewise, one who ate a quarter-loaf of ritually impure foods or drank a quarter- log of ritually impure liquids within the amount of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread is rendered unfit to partake of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for priests, until he becomes pure. Similarly, if one drank a quarter - log of wine and entered the Temple, and he remained there for the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: If he interrupted his drinking of the quarter- log of wine or if he placed any amount of water into the wine, he is exempt.

There is a case where one can perform a single act of eating an olive-bulk of food and be liable to bring four sin offerings and one guilt offering for it. How so? This halakha applies to one who is ritually impure who ate forbidden fat, and it was left over from a consecrated offering after the time allotted for its consumption [ notar ], on Yom Kippur. He is liable to bring sin offerings for eating forbidden fat and notar, for eating the meat of an offering while impure, and for eating on Yom Kippur. He is also liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Meir says: If it was Shabbat and he carried it out from a private domain to a public domain while eating it, he would be liable to bring an additional sin offering for performing prohibited labor on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to him: That liability is not from the same type of prohibition, as it is not due to the act of eating, and therefore, it should not be counted.

There is a case where one can engage in a single act of intercourse and be liable to bring six sin offerings for it. How so? It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter to be liable due to having violated the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman. It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter’s daughter to be liable to bring sin offerings due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his daughter’s daughter, and his daughter-in-law, and the wife of his brother, and the wife of his father’s brother, and his wife’s sister, and a married woman, and a menstruating woman. Rabbi Yosei says: If the elder, i.e., the man’s father, who is the woman’s great-grandfather, transgressed and married her, the man would also be liable for engaging in intercourse with her due to the prohibition of intercourse with the wife of his father. And likewise, it is possible for one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of his wife to be liable to bring six sin offerings, similar to one who engages in intercourse with his own daughter, for violating the prohibitions against engaging in intercourse with his wife’s daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman. And it is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his wife’s daughter’s daughter to be liable to bring seven sin offerings, similar to one who engages in intercourse with his own daughter’s daughter, for violating the following prohibitions: Engaging in intercourse with his wife’s daughter’s daughter, his daughter-in-law, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, his wife’s sister, a married woman, and a menstruating woman.

It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law to be liable to bring seven sin offerings for doing so, due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law, and his daughter-in-law, and the wife of his brother, and the wife of his father’s brother, and his wife’s sister, and a married woman, and a menstruating woman. And likewise, the same applies with regard to one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law or with the mother of his mother-in-law. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law to be liable due to the unwitting violation of the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The Rabbis said to him: Those three prohibitions are all one category of prohibition, derived from the same verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter” (Leviticus 18:17). Consequently, one is not liable to bring separate sin offerings for violating these prohibitions.

Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market [ itlis ] in Emmaus, where they went to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of the son of Rabban Gamliel: In the case of one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his sister, and the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all three prohibitions, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of the prohibitions? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We did not hear a ruling from our teachers about that case, but we heard the following ruling: One who engages in intercourse with each of his five wives while they are menstruating, during one lapse of awareness, we heard that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of them. And it appears to me that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If he is liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with five menstruating women, who are forbidden by one prohibition, he should certainly be liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with his sister, the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, who are forbidden by three separate prohibitions.

And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus: What is the status of a dangling limb of an animal? Does it impart ritual impurity like a severed limb? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case, but we have heard with regard to a dangling limb of a person that it is ritually pure. And in this manner would the people afflicted with boils, whose limbs were dangling due to their affliction, act in Jerusalem: Each of them would go on Passover eve to the doctor, who would cut the affected limb almost completely until he would leave it connected by a hairbreadth of flesh, so that neither the doctor nor the afflicted would be rendered ritually impure by a severed limb. Then, the doctor would impale the limb on a thorn attached to the floor or the wall, and the afflicted would pull away from the thorn, thereby completely severing the limb. And that person afflicted with boils would perform the rite of his Paschal offering, and the doctor would perform the rite of his Paschal offering, as neither had come into contact with the limb once it was severed. In any case, as long as it was dangling, the limb did not impart impurity. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference. If a person’s limb, the impurity of which when amputated is severe, does not impart impurity when it is dangling, it is all the more so logical that an animal’s limb, the impurity of which when amputated is lenient, does not impart impurity when it is dangling.

And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua: With regard to one who unwittingly slaughters five offerings outside the Temple during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring five sin offerings, one for each and every act of slaughter, or is he liable to bring one sin offering for all the acts of slaughter? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats meat from one offering from five different pots in which they were prepared, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable to bring five guilt offerings, which are for the meat prepared in each and every pot, due to misuse of consecrated property. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If one is liable to bring five guilt offerings for one offering prepared in five pots, all the more so is he liable to bring five sin offerings for slaughtering five offerings outside the Temple. Rabbi Shimon said: It was not that question that Rabbi Akiva asked them. Rather, it was with regard to one who eats notar from five offerings during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all the offerings from which he ate notar, or is he liable to bring five sin offerings, one for each and every one of the offerings from which he ate notar? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I have heard with regard to one who eats meat from one offering that was prepared in five different pots, during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable to bring separate guilt offerings for the meat prepared in each and every pot, due to misuse of consecrated property. And I consider that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If one is liable to bring five guilt offerings for one offering prepared in five pots, all the more so is he liable to bring five sin offerings for eating the notar of five separate offerings. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yehoshua: If you are reporting a halakha that you received from your teachers with regard to one who eats notar from five offerings, we will accept it, but if it is based merely on the a fortiori inference from misuse of consecrated property, there is a response that refutes the inference. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Akiva: Respond. Rabbi Akiva said: And no; one cannot derive the halakha of notar through an a fortiori inference from misuse of consecrated property: If you said with regard to misuse of consecrated property that one is liable to bring five guilt offerings, perhaps that is because there are additional stringent elements unique to misuse. As, with regard to misuse, the Torah established that the status of one who feeds another person sacrificial meat is like that of one who eats sacrificial meat, and the status of one who gives benefit to another from consecrated property that is not food is like that of one who derives benefit himself, in that each is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. In addition, the Torah joined the misuse of consecrated property that was performed over an extended period, i.e., if one derived benefit worth half a peruta one day and half a peruta the next, he is liable to bring a guilt offering for misuse. Would you say the same with regard to notar, which has none of these halakhot?

Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who performs multiple prohibited labors on several Shabbatot, and all those labors were subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of prohibited labor, and he performed them during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for unwitting performance of all these labors or is he liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors? Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in transgression and that result in multiple sin offerings, but rather only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her, and nevertheless one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of his acts of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor that result in transgression and that result in multiple death penalties or sin offerings, is it not right that he will be liable to bring a sin offering for performance of each and every one of the prohibited labors? Rabbi Akiva continues: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the inference is not valid: If you said one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with him, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid, as in that case there is only one prohibition, because the minor is exempt from the mitzvot, and nevertheless the man is liable to bring a separate sin offering for intercourse for each and every one of the acts of intercourse. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the cases of Shabbat and minor menstruating girls are not comparable. If you said in the case of minor girls that although it is not prohibited for them at present it is prohibited for them after the passage of time, when they reach majority, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are neither two prohibitions at present, nor will there be after the passage of time? Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who copulates with an animal will prove this refutation is not valid, as there are never two prohibitions in that case, and nevertheless the person is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that no proof can be cited from the case of an animal, as in my opinion the case of the animal is like that of Shabbat; there is uncertainty with regard to both cases.

Chapter 4

If there is uncertainty whether one ate forbidden fat and uncertainty whether one did not eat forbidden fat, or even if one ate forbidden fat and there is uncertainty whether there is the measure that determines liability in the piece he ate and uncertainty whether there is not the measure that determines liability in the piece he ate, he must bring a provisional guilt offering. If one has a piece of permitted fat and a piece of forbidden fat before him and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate; or if his wife and his sister were with him in the house and he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with one of them and he does not know with which of them he unwittingly engaged in intercourse; or if he confused Shabbat and a weekday and he performed labor prohibited on Shabbat on one of the days and he does not know on which of them he performed the labor, in all of those cases he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering.

Just as in a case where one unknowingly ate a piece of forbidden fat and then another piece of forbidden fat in a single lapse of awareness he is liable to bring only one sin offering, so too, in a case where their status is unknown to him and he ate them both unwittingly during a single lapse in awareness, he is liable to bring only one provisional guilt offering. But if he had gained knowledge between the first and second instance of eating that there is a possibility the fat might be prohibited, then the halakha is different: Just as he would be liable to bring a sin offering for each and every piece when he gained knowledge of their prohibited status in between each act of consumption, so too, he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every instance in which he consumed food that might be forbidden after learning of their uncertain status in between each unwitting act of consumption. Just as in a case where one ate forbidden fat, and blood, and piggul, and notar in one lapse of awareness he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, with regard to a case where their status is unknown to him and he ate them unwittingly during one lapse of awareness, he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every item. If one has pieces of forbidden fat and notar before him and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate; or if his menstruating wife and his sister were with him in the house and he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with one of them and he does not know with which of them he unwittingly engaged in intercourse; or if Shabbat and Yom Kippur occurred adjacent to one another and he performed prohibited labor during the intervening twilight period and he does not know on which of the days he performed the labor, in all of these cases, Rabbi Eliezer deems the transgressor liable to bring a sin offering, as he certainly sinned, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems the transgressor exempt, as he does not know the nature of his sin. Rabbi Yosei said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to one who performs prohibited labor during the intervening twilight period because they concur that he is exempt, as I say: He performed part of the labor today, and he performed part of the labor the following day. With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to the case of one who performs prohibited labor in the midst of the day, and he does not know whether it was on Shabbat that he performed the labor or whether it was on Yom Kippur that he performed the labor; or with regard to one who performs a prohibited labor and he does not know which labor he performed. As, in those cases Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yehoshua would deem him exempt even from bringing a provisional guilt offering.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from one category, e.g., he picked a grape from a vine on Shabbat and does not know which vine it was, as in that case they both agree that he is liable, since he knows the nature of his sin. With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from two categories, e.g., he picked fruit from a tree on Shabbat and does not know whether it was from a vine or from a fig tree. As, in that case Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering, since he certainly sinned, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt, as he does not know the nature of his sin. Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if one intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, or to pick grapes and he picked figs, or to pick black figs and he picked white figs, or to pick white figs and he picked black figs, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda added: I wonder if Rabbi Yehoshua deemed him exempt in that case, as even in his opinion the person intended to perform a prohibited labor. The mishna asks: If it is so, that he is not exempt according to Rabbi Yehuda, why is it stated: “If his sin, wherein he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:23), from which it is derived that one is liable only if the object of the sin was the one that he intended? The mishna answers: This serves to exclude one who acts unawares and does not intend to perform a prohibited action at all.

Chapter 5

If one consumed an olive-bulk of blood that spurted during the slaughter of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird, whether it is a kosher or non-kosher species; or if one consumed blood that flowed after stabbing an animal or killing it in a manner other than by ritual slaughter, or blood that spurted after ripping the animal’s windpipe or gullet, or blood that spurted during bloodletting with which the soul departs, one is liable to receive karet for consuming it intentionally or to bring a sin offering for consuming it unwittingly. But with regard to blood of the spleen, blood of the heart, blood of eggs, blood of grasshoppers, or blood of exudate [ tamtzit ], i.e., that oozes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes, one is not liable for consuming it. Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable in the case of blood of exudate.

This mishna resumes discussion of the provisional guilt offering addressed in the previous chapter. Rabbi Akiva deems one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for a case where he is uncertain whether he is guilty of misuse of consecrated property, a transgression that renders one liable to bring a definite guilt offering (see Leviticus 5:15). And the Rabbis deem him exempt, as one brings a provisional guilt offering only in a case of uncertainty as to whether he is liable to bring a sin offering, not a guilt offering. And Rabbi Akiva concedes that one does not bring payment for his misuse until it becomes definitely known to him that he is guilty of misuse, as then he will bring a definite guilt offering with his payment. Rabbi Tarfon said: For what purpose does that person bring two guilt offerings, one provisional and one definite? Rather, at the outset one brings the payment for misuse of consecrated property and its additional payment of one-fifth, as mandated by Torah law, and he will then bring a guilt offering worth two sela and say: If it is certain that I misused consecrated property, this is payment for my misuse and this is my definite guilt offering. And if it is uncertain whether I misused consecrated property, the money is a contribution to the Temple fund for the purchase of communal offerings and the guilt offering is provisional, as from the same type of animal that one brings a guilt offering for a case where it is known to him that he is guilty of misuse, he likewise brings a guilt offering for a case where it is unknown to him.

Rabbi Akiva says: The statement of Rabbi Tarfon appears correct in the case of minimal misuse, but in a case where he is confronted with a case of uncertainty with regard to misuse valued at ten thousand dinars, would it not be preferable for him that he will now bring a provisional guilt offering valued at two sela and he will not bring payment now for uncertain misuse valued at ten thousand dinars? The mishna concludes: Apparently, Rabbi Akiva concedes to Rabbi Tarfon in the case of minimal misuse. He agrees that at the outset one brings payment for misuse and its additional payment of one-fifth, and conditionally brings a guilt offering. Apropos the previous case in which one brings the same type of animal when liability is certain as when liability is uncertain, this mishna teaches: With regard to a woman who brought a bird sin offering in a case of uncertainty whether she miscarried a fetus that would have rendered her liable to bring a sin offering or whether what she expelled would not render her liable to bring an offering, in which case this sin offering may not be eaten by priests, the halakha is as follows: If before the nape of the neck of the bird was pinched it became known to her that she certainly gave birth, i.e., miscarried, in a manner that obligates her to bring a sin offering, she should render the offering a definite sin offering, as from the same type of animal that she brings a sin offering for a case where it is known to her that she miscarried, she brings a sin offering for a case where it is unknown to her.

The mishna resumes discussion of the provisional guilt offering. If one had a piece of non-sacred meat and a piece of sacrificial meat, and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he is exempt from the obligation to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Akiva deems him liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, in accordance with his opinion in the previous mishna that one brings a provisional guilt offering even in a case of uncertainty with regard to misuse. If he then ate the second piece, he brings a definite guilt offering, as it is certain that he ate the sacrificial meat. If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this first person brings a provisional guilt offering and that second person brings a provisional guilt offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring one definite guilt offering as partners, and they stipulate that the one who ate the non-sacred meat grants his share of the animal to the one who ate the sacrificial meat, and the guilt offering is sacrificed on his behalf. Rabbi Yosei says: Two people do not bring one guilt offering, as one may not sacrifice atonement offerings conditionally.

If one had a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of non-sacred meat, and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a provisional guilt offering, as perhaps he ate the forbidden fat. If he then ate the second piece, he brings a sin offering, as it is certain that he ate the fat. If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this person brings a provisional guilt offering and that person brings a provisional guilt offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring one sin offering as partners, and they stipulate that the sin offering should be credited to the one who ate the fat. Rabbi Yosei says: Two people do not bring one sin offering.

If one had a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of sacrificial permitted fat and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a provisional guilt offering, as perhaps he ate the forbidden fat. If he then ate the second piece, he brings a sin offering, as he certainly ate the fat, and a definite guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this person brings a provisional guilt offering and that person brings a provisional guilt offering. Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring a sin offering and a guilt offering as partners, and they stipulate that each offering should be credited to the one who is liable to bring it. Rabbi Yosei says: Two people do not bring one sin offering and one guilt offering.

If one had a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of sacrificial forbidden fat and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a sin offering as he certainly ate forbidden fat. Rabbi Akiva says: He also brings a provisional guilt offering, as perhaps he ate the sacrificial fat, in accordance with his opinion that one brings a provisional guilt offering even in the case of uncertainty with regard to misuse of consecrated property. If he then ate the second piece, he brings two sin offerings, as he ate two pieces of forbidden fat, and a definite guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this person brings a sin offering and that person brings a sin offering. Rabbi Akiva says: This person and that person each bring a provisional guilt offering as well, due to the uncertainty as to which of them ate the sacrificial fat. Rabbi Shimon says: This person brings a sin offering and that person brings a sin offering and both of them bring one guilt offering as partners, and they stipulate that the offering should be credited to the one who ate the sacrificial fat. Rabbi Yosei says: The two of them do not bring one guilt offering.

If one had a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of forbidden fat that is notar, an offering whose designated time has passed for which one is liable to receive karet if he ate it intentionally and liable to bring a sin offering if he ate it unwittingly, and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he brings a sin offering, as he certainly ate forbidden fat, and a provisional guilt offering, due to the possibility that he ate the notar. If he then ate the second piece, he brings three sin offerings, two for the forbidden fat and one for the prohibition against eating notar. If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this person brings a sin offering and a provisional guilt offering, as he certainly ate forbidden fat and it is uncertain whether he ate the notar, and that person brings a sin offering and a provisional guilt offering. Rabbi Shimon says: This person brings a sin offering and that person brings a sin offering and both of them bring one additional sin offering as partners, and they stipulate that the offering should be credited to the one who ate the notar. Rabbi Yosei says: Two people do not bring any sin offering that comes as atonement for a sin.

Chapter 6

In the case of one who brings a provisional guilt offering due to uncertainty as to whether he sinned, and it became known to him that he did not sin, if he made that discovery before the ram was slaughtered, it shall emerge and graze with the flock as a non-sacred animal, since its consecration was in error. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Its status is not that of a non-sacred animal; rather it is that of a guilt offering that was disqualified for sacrifice. Therefore, it shall graze until it becomes blemished; and then it shall be sold, and the money received for it shall be allocated for the purchase of communal gift offerings by the Temple treasury. Rabbi Eliezer says: It shall be sacrificed as a provisional guilt offering, as if it does not come to atone for this sin that he initially thought, it comes to atone for another sin of which he is unaware. If it became known to him that he did not sin after the ram was slaughtered and its blood collected in a container, the blood shall be poured into the canal that flows through the Temple courtyard, and the flesh shall go out to the place of burning, like any disqualified offering. If the blood was sprinkled before he discovered that he did not sin, and the meat is intact, the meat may be eaten by the priests like any other sin offering, as from the moment that its blood was sprinkled the meat is permitted to the priests. Rabbi Yosei says: Even if the blood was still in the cup when he discovered that he did not sin, the blood shall be sprinkled and the meat may be eaten.

In the case of a definite guilt offering, it is not so, i.e., the halakha is different than with regard to a provisional guilt offering. If he made the discovery that he did not sin before the ram was slaughtered, it shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated. If it became known to him that he did not sin after the ram was slaughtered, it shall be buried like a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, and its blood is poured. If he discovered that he did not sin after the blood was sprinkled, the flesh shall go out to the place of burning, like any disqualified offering. In the case of an ox that is sentenced to be stoned (see Exodus 21:28–32), e.g., for killing a person, it is not so, i.e., it also does not have the same halakhic status as a provisional guilt offering. If it is discovered that the testimony with regard to the ox was false before it was stoned, it shall go out and graze among the flock as it never had the status of an ox sentenced to be stoned. If this was discovered after the ox was stoned, its halakhic status is as though it had not been sentenced, and therefore deriving benefit from its carcass is permitted. In the case of a heifer whose neck is broken, when a corpse is found between two cities and the identity of the murderer is unknown (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9), it is not so i.e., the halakha is different than with regard to a provisional guilt offering. If the identity of the murderer is discovered before the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated. But if the identity of the murderer was discovered after the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall be buried in its place, like any other heifer whose neck is broken. The reason is that from the outset the heifer whose neck is broken comes to atone for a situation of uncertainty. Once its neck was broken before the identity of the murderer was revealed, its mitzva was fulfilled, as it atoned for its uncertainty and that uncertainty is gone.

Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day and at any time that he chooses, even if there is no uncertainty as to whether he sinned, and this type of offering was called the guilt offering of the pious, as they brought it due to their constant concern that they might have sinned. They said about Bava ben Buta that he would volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day except for one day after Yom Kippur, when he would not bring the offering. Bava ben Buta said: I take an oath by this abode of the Divine Presence that if they would have allowed me, I would have brought a guilt offering even on that day. But they would say to me: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty. And the Rabbis say: One brings a provisional guilt offering only in a case where there is uncertainty as to whether he performed a sin for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering.

Those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring them after Yom Kippur. By contrast, those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur. With regard to one who encountered uncertainty as to whether he performed a sin on Yom Kippur, even if it was at nightfall at the end of the day, he is exempt, as the entire day atones for uncertain sins.

A woman upon whom it is incumbent to bring a bird sin offering due to uncertainty, e.g., uncertainty with regard to whether or not her miscarriage obligated her to bring the sin offering of a woman who gave birth, for whom Yom Kippur has passed, is liable to bring it after Yom Kippur. This is because the offering does not come as atonement for a sin; rather, it renders her eligible to partake of the meat of offerings. With regard to this bird sin offering that is brought due to uncertainty, if it became known to her that she was exempt from bringing the offering after the nape of the neck of the bird was pinched, the bird must be buried.

With regard to one who designates two sela, which is the minimal value of a guilt offering, to purchase a ram for a guilt offering,and he purchased two rams for a guilt offering with the two sela, if one of them is now worth two sela, he shall sacrifice it for his guilt offering. And the second ram that he purchased with the money he designated does not become non-sacred. Rather, it shall graze until it becomes blemished; and then it shall be sold, and the money received for it shall be allocated for communal gift offerings. If he purchased two rams for non-sacred use with those two sela designated for a guilt offering, he has misused consecrated property. He is therefore liable to bring a guilt offering and to compensate the Temple treasury for those two sela and add one-fifth to the sum for a total of ten dinars, as there are four dinars in a sela. If one of the rams is now worth two sela, and the other one is now worth ten dinars, i.e., two and a half sela, the one that is worth two sela shall be sacrificed as his guilt offering for misuse of the two sela, and the second one shall be sacrificed for his initial misuse, as it is worth two sela plus one-fifth. In a case where he purchased two rams with those two sela designated for a guilt offering, one for a guilt offering and one for non-sacred use, if the ram for the guilt offering is now worth two sela, it shall be sacrificed for his initial guilt offering. And with regard to the second ram that he purchased for non-sacred use, if it is now worth two sela, it shall be sacrificed as a guilt offering for his present misuse, and he brings with it the sum of one sela and one-fifth to the Temple treasury as payment for his misuse.

In the case of one who designates a sin offering for his performance of an unwitting sin and dies, his son shall not bring it in his stead, neither on behalf of his father nor for his own unwitting sin, even if it was the same transgression. Likewise, one may not bring a sin offering by reassigning it from the sin for which it is designated to atone and sacrificing it for atonement of another sin. Even if he designated a sin offering as atonement for forbidden fat that he unwittingly ate yesterday, he may not bring it as atonement for forbidden fat that he unwittingly ate today, as it is stated: “And he shall bring his sin offering, an unblemished female goat, for his sin that he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:28), indicating that he does not satisfy his obligation until his offering is brought for the sake of the sin for which he designated it.

One may bring a female goat from money consecrated for a sin offering of a female lamb, and a female lamb from money consecrated for a sin offering of a female goat. And likewise, one may bring doves and pigeons from money consecrated for a sin offering of a female lamb and a female goat; and one-tenth of an ephah of fine flour from money consecrated for a sin offering of doves and pigeons. How so? If one unwittingly performed a sin for which he is liable to bring a sliding-scale sin offering, which varies based on economic status (see Leviticus 5:1–13; see also 9a), and he designated money to purchase a female lamb or for a female goat and then became poorer, he may bring a bird, and the remaining money is non-sacred. If he became yet poorer, he may bring one-tenth of an ephah of fine flour. Likewise, if he designated money to purchase one-tenth of an ephah of fine flour and became wealthier, he shall bring a bird. If he became yet wealthier, he shall bring a female lamb or a female goat. If one designated a female lamb or goat as an offering and it developed a blemish, he must redeem the animal and bring another offering with the money. If he became poorer, he may bring a bird with its money. But if one designated a bird as an offering and it developed a blemish, he may not bring one-tenth of an ephah of fine flour with its money, as there is no possibility of redemption for birds.

Rabbi Shimon says: Lambs precede goats almost everywhere in the Torah that they are both mentioned, as in the verse: “You shall take it from the lambs or from the goats” (Exodus 12:5). One might have thought that it is due to the fact that sheep are more select than goats. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall bring for his offering a goat” (Leviticus 4:28), after which it is written: “And if he bring a lamb as his offering for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:32), which teaches that both of them are equal. Similarly, doves precede pigeons almost everywhere in the Torah, as in the verse: “And he shall bring his guilt offering…two doves, or two pigeons” (Leviticus 5:7). One might have thought that it is due to the fact that doves are more select than pigeons. Therefore, the verse states: “And a pigeon or a dove for a sin offering” (Leviticus 12:6), with the usual order reversed, which teaches that both of them are equal. Likewise, mention of the father precedes that of the mother almost everywhere in the Torah, as in the verse: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12). One might have thought that it is due to the fact that the honor of the father takes precedence over the honor of the mother. Therefore, the verse states: “Every man shall fear his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), with the order reversed, which teaches that both of them are equal. But the Sages said: Honor of the father takes precedence over honor of the mother everywhere, due to the fact that both the son and his mother are obligated in the honor of his father. And likewise with regard to Torah study, if the son was privileged to acquire most of his Torah knowledge from studying before the teacher, honor of the teacher takes precedence over honor of the father, due to the fact that both the son and his father are obligated in the honor of his teacher, as everyone is obligated in the honor of Torah scholars.

Mishnah Meilah

Chapter 1

Offerings of the most sacred order that were disqualified before their blood was sprinkled on the altar, e.g., if one slaughtered them in the south of the Temple courtyard, and not in the north as required, are subject to the following halakha : One is liable for misusing them, i.e., one who derives benefit from them must bring a guilt offering and pay the principal and an additional one-fifth of their value. If he improperly slaughtered them in the south of the courtyard and properly collected their blood in the north, or even if he properly slaughtered them in the north of the courtyard but improperly collected their blood in the south, although the more significant rite was performed improperly, one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from the animals. The same halakha that applies if the location of the sacrificial rites was altered likewise applies if the time of those rites was altered. Accordingly, if one properly slaughtered them during the day and improperly sprinkled their blood at night, or if he improperly slaughtered them at night and properly sprinkled their blood during the day, one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from the animals. Or in a case where one slaughtered them with the intent to partake of their meat or sprinkle their blood beyond its designated time, rendering it piggul, or outside its designated area, disqualifying the offering, he is liable for misusing them if he derives benefit from the animals. Rabbi Yehoshua stated a principle with regard to misuse of disqualified sacrificial animals: With regard to any sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness to the priests before it was disqualified, one is not liable for misusing it. Misuse applies specifically to items consecrated to God, which are not permitted for human consumption at all. Once the offering was permitted for consumption by the priests, it is no longer in that category. And with regard to any sacrificial animal that did not have a period of fitness for the priests before it was disqualified, one is liable for misusing it if he derives benefit from it, as it remained consecrated to God throughout. Which is the sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness for the priests? This category includes a sacrificial animal whose meat remained overnight after its blood was presented on the altar and therefore came to have the status of notar and was therefore disqualified, and one that was disqualified when it became ritually impure, and one that left the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified. All of these disqualifications transpired after consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted, and therefore one who derives benefit from these offerings is not liable for misuse. And which is the sacrificial animal that did not have a period of fitness for the priests? It is a sacrificial animal that was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, or outside its designated area, or one that those unfit for Temple service collected and sprinkled its blood. All of these disqualifications took effect before consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted. The offerings therefore remain consecrated to God, and one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from them.

The mishna presents a dispute with regard to the status of offerings of the most sacred order, which normally are not subject to the halakhot of misuse once their blood has been sprinkled and they have been permitted to the priests. The case of the mishna is the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, whose consumption is permitted from the moment their blood was sprinkled, that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, and then reentered the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer says: The sprinkling of this blood does not permit its consumption by the priests. Consequently, one is liable for misusing it. And he is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, if he partook of it after it was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, or of notar, if he partook of the meat after it remained overnight, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva says: The sprinkling is effective despite the fact that the meat left the Temple courtyard and was disqualified, and therefore one is not liable for misusing it. Likewise, other halakhot that apply to offerings whose blood was sprinkled apply to it, and consequently one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibitions of partaking of meat that is piggul, or notar, or remained overnight, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva said, in support of his opinion: But there is the case of one who designated an animal as his sin offering and it was lost, and he designated another animal in its stead, and thereafter the first sin offering was found and both of them are standing fit for sacrifice. If he slaughtered both animals at the same time and sprinkled the blood of one of them, which means that the second was disqualified as a leftover sin offering, the question arises as to the status of the meat of the second animal with regard to the halakhot of misuse. Is it not the case that just as the blood of the animal whose blood was sprinkled exempts its meat from liability for its misuse, so too it exempts the meat of the other animal? Since he could have chosen to sprinkle the blood of either animal, they are considered as though they were one offering. If so, one may learn from there by an a fortiori inference with regard to the case of sprinkling the blood of meat that left the courtyard and returned: If the sprinkling of its blood exempted the meat of the other animal from the halakhot of misuse, it is only right that it should exempt its own meat that left the courtyard.

The mishna adds that just as Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree as to whether the sprinkling of blood exempts meat that left the courtyard from liability for its misuse, so too, they disagree with regard to the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity consumed on the altar that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood. The dispute is whether the subsequent sprinkling of the blood generates liability for misuse of those portions. Rabbi Eliezer says: The sprinkling of the blood is completely ineffective in rendering those portions consecrated to the Lord. Consequently, one is not liable for misusing them. And similarly, one is not liable for their consumption due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, notar, or of partaking of meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva says: The sprinkling is effective, and therefore one is liable for misusing them. And likewise, one is liable for its consumption due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, notar, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure.

With regard to establishing liability for misuse of consecrated items, there is an aspect of leniency and an aspect of stringency in the act of sprinkling the blood of offerings of the most sacred order. But with regard to the sprinkling of the blood in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity, it contains in its entirety aspects of stringency, i.e., there are only aspects of stringency. How so? The status of offerings of the most sacred order is that before the sprinkling of blood, one is liable for misusing their sacrificial portions that are to be burned on the altar, and for misusing the meat that is to be eaten by the priests. Since the meat is prohibited prior to sprinkling the blood, it is in the category of items consecrated to God, which are subject to the halakhot of misuse. After the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of the most sacred order, one is still liable for misuse of their sacrificial portions, as they remain prohibited to be eaten and are in the category of items consecrated to God, but one is not liable for misuse of the meat, as it is now permitted for consumption by the priests. This explains how there is an aspect of leniency in the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of the most sacred order. By contrast, for consumption of both this, the sacrificial portions, and that, the meat, after the sprinkling of the blood, one is liable to receive karet due to violation of the prohibition against consumption of piggul, and the prohibition against consumption of notar, and the prohibition against consumption of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. Consequently, the act of sprinkling blood of offerings of the most sacred order is found to contain an aspect of leniency and an aspect of stringency. But with regard to the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of lesser sanctity, all of their aspects are of stringency. How so? The status of offerings of lesser sanctity is that before the sprinkling of the blood, one is not liable for misuse, not for their sacrificial portions nor for the meat. After the sprinkling of the blood, one is liable for misuse of their sacrificial portions, but one is not liable for misuse of the meat. This explains how the sprinkling of the blood in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity causes a stringency in terms of the halakhot of misuse. And for consumption of both this, the sacrificial portions, and that, the meat, after the sprinkling of the blood, one is liable to receive karet due to violation of the prohibition against consumption of piggul, and of the prohibition against consumption of notar, and of the prohibition against consumption of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. Consequently, in the act of sprinkling the blood of offerings of lesser sanctity, it is found that all of their aspects are of stringency.

Chapter 2

One who derives benefit from a bird sin offering is liable for misuse of consecrated property from the moment that it was consecrated. Once the nape of its neck was pinched, it was rendered susceptible to disqualification for sacrifice through contact with one who was ritually impure who immersed in a ritual bath that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete his purification process, e.g., a zav and a leper, who are not yet permitted to partake of sacrificial meat; and through its blood being left overnight, i.e., if its blood was not sprinkled before sunset. Once its blood was sprinkled, one is liable to receive karet for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, and the prohibition of notar, and the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. But there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, because after the blood is sprinkled it is permitted for priests to partake of its meat and it is no longer consecrated exclusively to God.

One is liable for misusing a bird burnt offering from the moment that it was consecrated. When the nape of its neck was pinched, it was rendered susceptible to disqualification for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed in a ritual bath that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through its blood being left overnight. Once its blood was squeezed out, one is liable to receive karet for eating it, due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, and the prohibition of notar, and the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. And as it may not be eaten, one is liable for its misuse until it leaves to the place of the ashes, where it is burned.

One is liable for misuse of bulls that are burned and goats that are burned from the moment that they were consecrated. Once they were slaughtered, they were rendered susceptible to disqualification for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through its blood being left overnight. Once its blood was sprinkled, one is liable to receive karet for eating it, due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, and the prohibition of notar, and the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. And one is liable for its misuse even when it is in the place of the ashes, until the flesh has been completely scorched.

One is liable for misuse of the burnt offering from the moment that it was consecrated. Once it was slaughtered it was rendered susceptible to disqualification for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through its blood being left overnight. Once its blood was sprinkled, one is liable to receive karet for eating it, due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, and the prohibition of notar, and the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. And one is not liable for misuse of the hides, but one is liable for misuse of the flesh until it leaves to the place of the ashes.

One is liable for misuse of a sin offering, and a guilt offering, and communal peace offerings from the moment that they were consecrated. Once they were slaughtered they were rendered susceptible to disqualification for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through its blood being left overnight. Once their blood was sprinkled, one is liable to receive karet for eating them, due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, and the prohibition of notar, and the prohibition of partaking of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. One is not liable for misuse of the flesh, but one is liable for misuse of their sacrificial portions, i.e., the portions that are to be consumed on the altar, until they leave to the place of the ashes.

One is liable for misuse of the two loaves brought on the festival of Shavuot from the moment that they were consecrated. Once they formed a crust, they were rendered susceptible to disqualification for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through its blood being left overnight, and they are rendered eligible to slaughter with them the accompanying offering of the two lambs. Once the blood of the lambs is sprinkled, one is liable to receive karet for eating the loaves, due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, and the prohibition of notar, and the prohibition of partaking of consecrated food while ritually impure. And they are not subject to the halakhot of misuse, as at that point their consumption is permitted.

One is liable for misuse of the shewbread, which is arranged on the Golden Table in the Sanctuary each Shabbat, from the moment that it was consecrated. Once it formed a crust in the oven it assumes the status of bread and its halakhic status is like that of offerings of the most sacred order after the animal was slaughtered, in that it was rendered susceptible to disqualification through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and it is rendered eligible for arrangement upon the Table in the Sanctuary. Once the bowls of frankincense brought with the shewbread of the previous week were sacrificed, one is liable to receive karet for eating the loaves due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, and the prohibition of notar, and the prohibition of partaking of consecrated food while ritually impure. But it is not subject to the halakhot of misuse, as at that point its consumption is permitted.

One is liable for misuse of the meal offerings from the moment that they were consecrated. Once they were consecrated through placement of the flour in a service vessel, they were rendered susceptible to disqualification for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through its blood being left overnight. Once the handful taken from the meal offering was sacrificed, one is liable to receive karet for eating the meal offering due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, and the prohibition of notar, and the prohibition of partaking of consecrated food while ritually impure. And one is not liable for misuse of the remainder of the meal offering, which is eaten by the priests, but one is liable for misuse of the handful that is sacrificed, until it leaves to the place of the ashes.

The mishna lists sacrificial items that are consumed in their entirety on the altar and of which the priests have no share. One is liable for misuse of the handful taken from the meal offering, and the frankincense burned with the handful on the altar, and the incense burned each day on the golden altar in the Sanctuary, and the meal offering of priests, from which a handful is not taken but which is burned in its entirety, and the meal offering of the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, and the meal offering sacrificed with the libations that accompany offerings. In all these cases, one is liable for misuse from the moment that they were consecrated through declaration. Once one consecrated them by placing them in the appropriate service vessel, each was rendered susceptible to disqualification for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed in a ritual bath that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through its blood being left overnight, and one is liable to receive karet for eating it, due to violation of the prohibition of notar, and due to the prohibition of partaking of it while ritually impure; but there is no liability for piggul in each of these cases. This is the principle that applies to piggul : With regard to any consecrated item that has permitting factors, i.e., there is another item whose sacrifice renders it permitted for consumption by the altar or by an individual, one is not liable due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, and the prohibition of notar, and the prohibition of partaking of it while ritually impure, until they sacrifice the permitting factors. And with regard to any item that does not have permitting factors, e.g., the handful and the frankincense, as they render other items permitted whereas no other items are needed to render them permitted, once one sanctified them in the appropriate service vessel, one is liable to receive karet for eating it, due to violation of the prohibition of notar, and the prohibition of partaking of it while ritually impure; but there is no liability for piggul in those cases.

Chapter 3

This mishna, which also appears in tractate Temura, deals with the five sin offerings left to die. It is cited here because of its relevance to the halakhot of misuse. The mishna first mentions three of those offerings: The offspring of a sin offering, and an animal that is the substitute for a sin offering, whether or not the owners achieved atonement by means of another offering, and a sin offering whose owners have died before the offering was sacrificed, shall die. And the other two sin offerings left to die are the sin offering whose year since birth passed and is therefore unfit for sacrifice, and a sin offering that was lost and when it was found it was blemished, with regard to which the halakhot are as follows: If the sin offering was found after the owner achieved atonement through the sacrifice of another animal as a sin offering, then the blemished animal shall die, and it does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, as it is has neither inherent sanctity, which would make it fit for sacrifice on the altar, nor sanctity that inheres in its value. And one may not derive benefit from the found animal ab initio, but if he derived benefit from the animal he is not liable for its misuse. And if the animal whose year passed was found before the owner achieved atonement, the found animal shall graze until it becomes blemished [ shetista’ev ], at which point it may not be sacrificed; and it shall be sold and the owner shall purchase another animal with the money received from its sale. The animal that was found blemished may be sold immediately, and the owner shall purchase another animal with the money received from its sale. In both cases, the animal renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and one who derives benefit from it is liable for misusing it.

In the case of a nazirite who designated money for the three offerings he is obligated to bring upon completion of his naziriteship, a sin offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering, but he did not specify which money was designated for which offering, since it is not clear what the money is intended for, one may not derive benefit from the money ab initio, but if he derived benefit from the money he is not liable for its misuse. This is due to the fact that all the money is fit for purchase of the peace offering, for which one is liable for misuse only after its blood is sprinkled, and therefore there is no liability for its misuse. If the nazirite died and he had undesignated funds, meaning he did not specify which money was for each of the three offerings, all the money will be allocated for purchase of communal gift offerings. If the nazirite died and he had specified money, the money specified for purchase of the sin offering shall go to the Dead Sea for disposal, because one may not derive benefit ab initio from the money of a sin offering whose owner has died. But if it was not disposed of, and one derived benefit from the money, he is not liable for its misuse. With the money specified for purchase of the burnt offering, one shall bring a gift burnt offering, and one is liable for misusing the funds. With the money specified for purchase of the peace offering, one shall bring a gift peace offering. Although it is a gift offering, the restrictions of the peace offering of the naziriteship apply, and therefore it is eaten for one day and that same night, not the standard two days and one night of a regular peace offering. And nevertheless the peace offering does not require the bringing of the loaves that accompany the peace offering of naziriteship, as it is written with regard to the loaves: “And shall place them on the hands of the nazirite” (Numbers 6:19), and in this case the nazirite is dead.

Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to misuse of the blood of offerings that is to be sprinkled on the altar, the halakha is lenient with regard to the status of the blood at the outset and stringent at its conclusion. With regard to misuse of the wine of the libations that accompany the offerings, the halakha is stringent with regard to the status of the wine at their outset and lenient at their conclusion. The mishna explains: With regard to blood, at its outset, before it is sprinkled on the altar, one is not liable for misusing it; but once its remainder has been poured on the base of the altar and it emerges via the canal that runs through the Temple to the Kidron Valley at the foot of the Temple Mount, one is liable for misusing it. With regard to libations, at their outset, from the moment they were consecrated, one is liable for misusing them, but once they have descended to the drainpipes built into the altar and which extend beneath it, through which the libations flowed out of the Temple, one is no longer liable for misusing them, as their mitzva was fulfilled and therefore their sanctity has ceased.

With regard to the removal of ash from the inner altar to the place where the ashes lifted from the outer altar are deposited, and similarly with regard to the wicks of the Candelabrum, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio ; but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. In the case of one who consecrates anew the ash that has been removed, he is liable for misusing it. With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, as they are too young, and pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, as they are too old, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio ; but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. mishna The previous mishna teaches that one may not derive benefit from doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived and from pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, but one who derived benefit from them is not liable for their misuse. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this ruling and says: With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, one is liable for misusing them. With regard to pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, one may not derive benefit ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse.

With regard to the milk of sacrificial animals and the eggs of sacrificial doves, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them after the fact he is not liable for their misuse. In what case is this statement, that if one derived benefit from the eggs or milk of sacrificial animals, he is not liable for their misuse, said? It is stated in the case of sacrificial animals offered on the altar, as their eggs and milk are not brought to the altar and therefore they are considered distinct from the offerings themselves. But this is not the halakha in the case of animals that are not sacrificed and are consecrated only for Temple maintenance. For example, if one consecrated a hen he is liable for misusing it and for misusing its egg; if one consecrated a donkey he is liable for misusing it and for misusing its milk, as the animal and its milk, and likewise the hen and its eggs, are both consecrated for Temple maintenance and are deemed a single unit.

With regard to any consecrated item that is fit for sacrifice on the altar but is not fit for Temple maintenance, or if it is fit for Temple maintenance but not for sacrifice on the altar, or fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance, nevertheless one is liable for misusing it. The mishna clarifies each of these categories: Fit for Temple maintenance but not for sacrifice on the altar, how so? In a case where one consecrated a cistern full of water, the water is not fit for sacrifice on the altar, as only water from the Siloam pool is used for the altar. Nevertheless, it is fit for Temple maintenance, e.g., to knead clay with it for use in reinforcing the walls of the Temple. What is the case of an item fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance? If one consecrated garbage dumps full of manure, the place and its contents are fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance. Rather, they are sold and the money received from the sale is donated to the Temple. What is the case of an item fit for sacrifice on the altar but not fit for Temple maintenance? If one consecrated a dovecote full of pigeons, the pigeons are fit for the altar while the dovecote is not fit even for Temple maintenance. Or if one consecrated a tree full of fruit, as the fruit is fit for the altar whereas the tree is not fit even for Temple maintenance. For example, grapes are fit for the altar as wine, but the vines are not fit for Temple maintenance, as they are too flimsy for construction. Another case where the consecrated item is fit for neither the altar nor Temple maintenance is a field full of grass. In all those cases, one is liable for misusing both them and that which is within them, as those that are unfit for use in the Temple will be sold and their money will be used for the altar or for Temple maintenance. But if one consecrated an empty cistern and it was subsequently filled with water, or if one consecrated an empty garbage dump and it was subsequently filled with manure, or an empty dovecote and it was subsequently filled with pigeons, or a tree without fruit and it was subsequently filled with fruit, or an empty field and it was subsequently filled with grass; in all these cases one is liable for misusing them but one is not liable for misusing that which is within them. There is no misuse with regard to enhancements that developed in consecrated property. Rabbi Yosei disagrees in two of the above cases and says: In the case of one who consecrates the empty field in which grass grew or the empty tree on which fruit grew, he is liable for misusing both them and their growth, because these are growths of consecrated property, despite the fact that they grew there only after the property was consecrated. Apropos the growths of consecrated property, the mishna states that an offspring born to a tithed animal before it was tithed may not be given to suckle from the tithed mother, as it is a non-sacred animal that may not be allowed to derive benefit from consecrated property. And there are others who stipulate in this manner, i.e., that the consecration does not apply to the milk. The same is true of the offspring of sacrificial animals born to them before their consecration; they may not suckle from the sacrificial animal. And in this case as well, there are others who stipulate in this manner, i.e., to enable the offspring to suckle. The laborers, who are generally permitted to eat the food of their employer, may not eat from consecrated dried figs, if they work with Temple produce. Rather, they can buy food with the money they are paid. And likewise, a cow working with consecrated property, e.g., threshing Temple produce, may not eat from consecrated vetch [ mikarshinei ].

With regard to the roots of the non-sacred tree of an ordinary person that enter into consecrated land, and the roots of a consecrated tree that enter into the non-sacred land of an ordinary person, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if he derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. With regard to water of a spring that flows in a non-sacred field but which emerges from that field and flows into a consecrated field, when it is in the consecrated field one may not derive benefit from it ab initio, but if one derived benefit from it he is not liable for its misuse. Once the spring emerges outside the consecrated field one may derive benefit from the water. With regard to the water that was drawn from the Siloam pool into the golden jug, which was not consecrated as a service vessel, to bring it to the altar for libation on the festival of Sukkot, one may not derive benefit from the water ab initio, as it was drawn for use in the Temple service. But if one derived benefit from it he is not liable for its misuse, since it was not consecrated in a service vessel. Once one places the water from the jug for libation into the flask, which is a service vessel, the water is consecrated and he is liable for misusing the water. With regard to the willow branches that are placed on the sides of the altar on the festival of Sukkot, before their placement one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if he derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. After their placement their mitzva has been fulfilled, and therefore at that time one may derive benefit from the willow branches ab initio. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: The elders were accustomed to derive benefit from the willow branches even before their placement on the sides of the altar, by cutting small branches for use in their lulav, in fulfillment of the mitzva of the four species.

With regard to a bird’s nest that is atop the consecrated tree, one may not derive benefit from it ab initio, but if one derived benefit from it he is not liable for its misuse. In order to acquire a bird’s nest that is atop a tree worshipped as idolatry, from which one may not derive benefit even by climbing it, one should dislodge the nest from its place by striking it with a pole. In the case of one who consecrates his forest, one is liable for misusing everything in the entire forest. In the case of the Temple treasurers who purchased non-sacred logs to use for repairs in the Temple, one is liable for misusing the wood itself, but one is not liable for misusing the sawdust, nor is he liable for the leaves [ baneviyya ] that fall from the log, as the treasurers purchased for the Temple only those materials fit for use in its construction.

Chapter 4

All items consecrated to be sacrificed on the altar join together to constitute the measure with regard to liability for misuse of consecrated property, which is deriving benefit equivalent to one peruta. And they join together to constitute an olive-bulk, which is the measure that renders one liable due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, or notar, or partaking of the item while ritually impure. All items consecrated for Temple maintenance join together to constitute the measure with regard to liability for misuse. Both items consecrated to be sacrificed on the altar and items consecrated for Temple maintenance join together to constitute the measure with regard to liability for misuse.

Five items in the burnt offering and the accompanying meal offering and libation join together to constitute the one peruta measure with regard to liability for misuse, and the olive-bulk measure with regard to liability for piggul, notar, and partaking of sacrificial foods while ritually impure. They are: The flesh; the fat of the burnt offering that is sacrificed on the altar; the fine flour of the accompanying meal offering; the wine of the accompanying libation; and the oil of the accompanying meal offering. And there are six items in the thanks offering that join together: The flesh, the fat, the fine flour, the wine, the oil, and the loaves accompanying the thanks offering. Teruma, and teruma of the tithe, and teruma of the tithe of doubtfully tithed produce [ demai ], and ḥalla, and first fruits all join together with one another to constitute the requisite measure to prohibit a mixture with non-sacred produce, and to form the requisite measure of an olive-bulk that serves to render one obligated for their consumption in payment of an additional one-fifth over and above the principal.

All the pieces of sacrificial meat that are piggul join together with one another to constitute the olive-bulk measure for liability, and all sacrificial meat that is notar joins together with one another to constitute the olive-bulk measure for liability. All animal carcasses, whose consumption is prohibited and which transmit impurity through contact with them and through carrying, join together with one another to constitute the requisite olive-bulk measure. And all repugnant creatures join together with one another to constitute the requisite olive-bulk measure to render one who consumes it liable to receive lashes. The eight creeping animals enumerated in the Torah join together to constitute the measure of a lentil-bulk, which transmits impurity through contact, and to render one who consumes it liable to receive lashes. The blood of one of the eight creeping animals listed in the Torah and their flesh join together to constitute the lentil-bulk measure to impart impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua stated a principle: With regard to any items whose impurity, in terms of degree and duration, and measure to impart impurity, are equal, e.g., two halves of an olive-bulk from two corpses or two animal carcasses or two halves of a lentil-bulk from two creeping animals, they join together to constitute the requisite measure. Rabbi Yehoshua continued: By contrast, with regard to items whose impurity is equal but their measure is not equal, e.g., a creeping animal and an animal carcass, each of which renders one impure until the evening, but the measure of a creeping animal is a lentil-bulk, whereas that of an animal carcass is an olive-bulk; or items whose measure is equal but whose impurity is not equal, e.g., a corpse and an animal carcass, with regard to which the measure of each is an olive-bulk, but the duration of the impurity imparted by a corpse is one week and the duration of the impurity imparted by an animal carcass is until the evening; or items that are equal neither in terms of their impurity nor in terms of their measure, they do not join together to constitute the requisite measure.

Sacrificial meat that is piggul and sacrificial meat that is notar do not join together to constitute the requisite measure of an olive-bulk, due to the fact that they belong to two separate categories of prohibition. The flesh of the carcass of the creeping animal and the flesh of the animal carcass, and likewise the flesh of the animal carcass and the flesh of the corpse, do not join together to transmit ritual impurity, not even for the more lenient of the two impurities, i.e., the impurity that requires the greater measure. The food that became ritually impure through contact with a primary source of ritual impurity, thereby assuming first-degree ritual impurity, and the food that became ritually impure through contact with a secondary source of ritual impurity, thereby assuming second-degree ritual impurity, join together to constitute the requisite measure of an egg-bulk to transmit impurity in accordance with the more lenient of the two, i.e., second-degree ritual impurity.

All the ritually impure foods join together to constitute the requisite measure to disqualify the body [ hageviyya ] of one who eats half of a half-loaf-bulk [ peras ] of the impure foods from partaking of teruma. Likewise, all foods join together to constitute the requisite measure of food sufficient for two meals, to establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries; and to form the requisite measure of an egg-bulk, to render an item impure with the ritual impurity of food; and to form the measure of a dried fig-bulk, which establishes liability for carrying out food on Shabbat; and to form the volume of a large date, which establishes liability for eating on Yom Kippur. All the liquids join together to constitute the requisite measure to disqualify the body of one who drinks a quarter- log of ritually impure liquid from partaking of teruma ; and to constitute the measure of a cheekful, which establishes liability for drinking on Yom Kippur.

The fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [ orla ] (see Leviticus 19:23), and diverse kinds, i.e., grain sown in a vineyard (see Deuteronomy 22:9) join together to constitute the requisite measure to prohibit a mixture that they are mixed into. This applies when the volume of the permitted produce is less than two hundred times the prohibited produce. Rabbi Shimon says: They do not join together. A garment must be at least three by three handbreadths in order to become a primary source of ritual impurity, by means of ritual impurity imparted by the treading of a zav. A sack made from goats’ hair must be at least four by four handbreadths, while an animal hide must be five by five, and a mat six by six. The garment and the sack, the sack and the hide, and the hide and the mat all join together to constitute the requisite measure to become ritually impure in accordance with the material of the greater measure. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason that they join together, despite the fact that their requisite measures are not equal? Because all the component materials are fit to become ritually impure through the ritual impurity imparted to a seat upon which a zav sits, as they can each be used to patch a saddle or saddlecloth. Since the measure of all these materials is equal in the case of a zav, they join together for other forms of ritual impurity as well.

Chapter 5

One who derives benefit equal to the value of one peruta from a consecrated item, even though he did not damage it, is liable for its misuse; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: With regard to any consecrated item that has the potential to be damaged, one is not liable for misuse until he causes it one peruta of damage; and with regard to an item that does not have the potential to be damaged, once he derives benefit from it he is liable for misuse. The mishna elaborates: How so? If a woman placed a consecrated gold chain [ ketala ] around her neck, or a gold ring on her hand, i.e., her finger, or if one drank from a consecrated gold cup, since they are not damaged through use, once he derives benefit equal to the value of one peruta from them, he is liable for misuse. If one wore a consecrated robe, covered himself with a consecrated garment, or chopped wood with a consecrated ax, he is not liable for misuse until he causes them one peruta of damage. One who derives benefit from a sin offering while it is alive is not liable for misuse until he causes it one peruta of damage. When it is dead, once he derives benefit equal to the value of one peruta from it, he is liable for misuse.

If one derived benefit equal to half of a peruta from a consecrated item and caused it half of a peruta of damage, or if he derived benefit equal to the value of one peruta from a consecrated item that has the potential to be damaged and caused damage of the value of one peruta to another consecrated item but derived no benefit from it, he is exempt. The reason is that one is not liable for misuse until he derives benefit of the value of one peruta from a consecrated item and causes damage of the value of one peruta to one, i.e., the same item.

One is liable for misuse after misuse in consecrated items only in the case of an animal and in the case of service vessels.How so? If one rode upon a sacrificial animal, and another person came and rode upon that animal, and yet another came and rode upon it as well, all of them are liable for misuse of the animal. In the case of service vessels, if one drank from a gold cup, and another came and drank from that cup, and yet another individual came and drank from it, all of them are liable for misuse of the cup. If one removed wool from a sin offering, and another came and removed wool from that animal, and yet another person came and removed wool from it, all of them are liable for misuse of the animal. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to any consecrated item that is not subject to redemption, there is liability for misuse after misuse with regard to it.

In a case where one took for his use a consecrated stone or a beam, that person is not liable for its misuse. If he gave the stone or the beam to another, he is liable for its misuse and the other person is not liable for its misuse. If he built the stone or the beam into his house, he is not liable for its misuse until he resides beneath it and derives benefit equal to the value of one peruta from it. If one took for his use a consecrated peruta, that person is not liable for its misuse. If he gave the peruta to another, he is liable for its misuse and the other person is not liable for its misuse. If he gave the peruta to a bathhouse attendant [ levallan ], although he did not bathe, he is liable for misuse of the peruta. The reason is that at the moment he receives the peruta, the attendant in effect says to the owner of the peruta : The bathhouse is open before you, enter and bathe. The benefit derived from that availability is worth one peruta.

One’s consumption of half of a peruta of consecrated food and another’s consumption of half of a peruta of consecrated food that the first person fed him; and likewise one’s benefit of half of a peruta derived from a consecrated item and another’s benefit of half of a peruta derived from a consecrated item that the first person provided him; and similarly one’s consumption and another’s benefit derived or one’s benefit derived and another’s consumption, all these join together to constitute the requisite measure of one peruta for liability for misuse, and that is the halakha even if much time has passed between these various acts of consumption and deriving of benefit.

Chapter 6

With regard to an agent who performed his agency properly, if he was tasked to make use of a particular item, and the one who appointed him forgot that it was a consecrated item, the homeowner, who appointed him, is liable for misuse of the consecrated item, as the agent acted on his behalf. Contrary to other cases of agency, where the guiding principle is that there is no agency in the performance of a transgression, and the agent is liable, in this case there is agency, and the homeowner is liable for the action of the agent. But if he did not perform his agency properly, the agent is liable for misuse of the consecrated item, as once the agent deviates from his agency, he ceases to be an agent, and his actions are attributable to him. How so? If the homeowner said to the agent: Give meat to the guests, and he gave them liver; or if he said: Give them liver, and he gave them meat, the agent is liable for misuse of the consecrated item, as he deviated from his agency. If the homeowner said to the agent: Give them meat, a piece for this guest and a piece for that guest, and the agent says: Each of you take two pieces, and each of the guests took three pieces, all of them are liable for misuse. The homeowner is liable for their consumption of the first piece of meat, as with regard to that piece his instructions were fulfilled. The agent is liable for the second piece, which he added to the instructions of the homeowner. Finally, the guests are liable for the third piece, which they took at their own initiative beyond the instructions of the agent. If the homeowner said to the agent: Bring me this item or this money from the window in the wall or from the chest [ hadeluskema ], and the agent obeyed and brought it to him from the place that he instructed him, even though the homeowner said: In my heart, my desire was only that he should bring me the item from that other place, and as he brought it from this place he did not fulfill my instructions, nevertheless the homeowner is liable for misuse if the item or money is consecrated, as the agent did in fact fulfill his instructions. But if the homeowner said to the agent: Bring me this item or this money from the window in the wall, and the agent brought it to him from the chest; or if the homeowner said to the agent: Bring me this item or this money from the chest, and the agent brought it to him from the window, the agent is liable for misuse.

In a case where the homeowner sent consecrated money in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, who lack halakhic competence and cannot be commissioned as agents, in order to purchase an item from a storekeeper, if they performed his agency, the homeowner is liable for misuse, as his instructions were fulfilled. If they did not perform his agency but purchased a different item from the storekeeper, the storekeeper is liable for misuse. If the homeowner sent the money in the hand of a halakhically competent person and the homeowner remembered that the money was consecrated before the agent reached the storekeeper, the storekeeper is liable for misuse when he spends the money for his personal use. The homeowner is exempt from liability for misuse, because once he remembers that the money is consecrated his misuse is no longer unwitting, and one is liable to bring an offering for misuse only for unwitting misuse of consecrated property. What shall the homeowner do in a case where he remembers that the money is consecrated, in order to prevent the storekeeper from liability for misuse? He takes one peruta or a vessel and says: The consecrated peruta, wherever it may be, is desacralized with this peruta or vessel. The peruta is thereby desacralized, as a consecrated item is desacralized with money and with an item that has the equivalent value of money. The result is that the storekeeper spends non-sacred money.

If the homeowner gave the agent one consecrated peruta and said to him: Bring me lamps [ nerot ] with one-half of it and wicks with one-half of it, and the agent went and brought him wicks with the entire peruta, or lamps with the entire peruta ; or in a case where the homeowner said to the agent: Bring me lamps with the entire peruta or wicks with the entire peruta, and the agent went and brought him lamps with one-half of it and wicks with one-half of it, both of them are not liable for misuse of the peruta. In both cases, the homeowner is exempt because his instructions were fulfilled only with regard to half of a peruta, and the agent is exempt as he spent only half of a peruta on his own initiative. But if the homeowner said to the agent: Bring me lamps from such and such place with one-half of the peruta and wicks from such and such place with one-half of the peruta, and the agent went and brought him lamps from the place that he designated for wicks, and wicks from the place that he designated for lamps, the agent is liable for misuse, as he deviated from the homeowner’s instructions by the sum of an entire peruta.

If the homeowner gave the agent two consecrated perutot, and said to him: Go and bring me an etrog, and he went and brought him an etrog with one peruta and a pomegranate with one peruta, both of them are liable for misuse. The homeowner is liable because his agency was performed with the sum of one peruta, and the agent is liable because he deviated from the homeowner’s instructions with one peruta. Rabbi Yehuda says: The homeowner is not liable for misuse, as he can say to the agent: I was seeking a large etrog worth two perutot, and you brought me a small, inferior etrog worth one peruta. If the homeowner gave the agent a consecrated gold dinar, which is worth twenty-five silver dinars, as four silver dinars constitute a sela ; and said to the agent: Go and bring me a robe, and the agent went and brought him a robe with three sela and a cloak with three sela, both of them are liable for misuse. The homeowner is liable because his agency was performed with the purchase of the robe for three sela, and the agent is liable because he deviated from the homeowner’s instructions by purchasing the cloak. Rabbi Yehuda says: The homeowner is not liable for misuse, as he can say to the agent: I was seeking a large robe worth a gold dinar and you brought me a small, inferior robe worth three sela, i.e., twelve silver dinars.

With regard to one who deposits consecrated money with a money changer, if the money is bound, the money changer may not use it. Therefore, if the money changer spent the money, he is liable for its misuse. If the money was unbound he may use it, and therefore if the money changer spent the money, he is not liable for its misuse. By contrast, if one deposited money with a homeowner, whether it is bound or whether it is unbound, the one with whom it was deposited may not use it, and therefore if he spent the money, he is liable for misuse. In this regard, the halakhic status of a storekeeper is like that of a homeowner; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The halakhic status of a storekeeper is like that of a money changer.

If a consecrated peruta fell into one’s purse, in which there were non-sacred perutot, or in a case where one said: One peruta in this purse is consecrated, once he spent the first peruta from the purse for non-sacred purposes, he is liable for its misuse. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: He is not liable for misuse until he spends all the perutot in the entire purse, as only then is it certain that he spent the consecrated peruta. And Rabbi Akiva concedes to the Rabbis in a case where one says: One peruta from the coins in this purse is consecrated, that he may continue spending the perutot in the purse for non-sacred purposes and becomes liable for misuse only once he spends all the perutot in the entire purse. His formulation indicates that his desire was that the final remaining peruta in the purse would be consecrated, and therefore one is liable for misuse only when he spends that peruta.

Mishnah Tamid

Chapter 1

The priests would keep watch in three places in the Temple courtyard, in honor of the Temple, like guards in royal courtyards: In the Chamber of Avtinas, which is the Chamber where the incense was prepared, and on the two sides of the northern section of the courtyard: In the Chamber of the Spark, where there was a small, perpetual fire, from which the fire of the altar would be lit if it went out; and in the Chamber of the Hearth, where there was also a fire, by which the priests would warm themselves when it was cold. In the Chamber of Avtinas and in the Chamber of the Spark there were upper stories, and the young priests, who were not yet eligible to serve in the Temple, would keep watch there. In the Chamber of the Hearth, there was no upper story, as its ceiling was round like a cupola. And it was a large hall, surrounded by rows of stone that protruded from the walls and that served as benches. The elders of the patrilineal priestly family that would serve in the Temple the following day would sleep there, and the keys to the Temple courtyard were in their possession. The young men of the priesthood, who were old enough to serve in the Temple, would also sleep in the Chamber of the Hearth. They would not sleep on benches, but instead each of the priests would sleep with his garment on the ground. Furthermore, they would not sleep dressed in the sacred vestments; rather, they would remove them and fold them up. And then they would place their vestments on the floor beneath their heads, and cover themselves with their own non-sacred garments. If a seminal emission befell one of the priests, rendering him ritually impure and unfit for service, he would leave the Chamber of the Hearth, and he would walk through the circuitous passage that extended beneath the Temple, as he could not pass through the Temple courtyard, due to his impurity. And there were lamps burning on this side and on that side of the passage. He would walk through the passage until he reached the Chamber of Immersion. And there was a fire burning there to warm the priests after they had immersed, and also a bathroom of honor, so that the priests could urinate before immersion. This was the manifestation of its honor: If one found the door closed, he would know that there was a person there, and he would wait for him to exit before entering. If one found the door open, it was known that there was no person there, and he could enter. In this manner, the one using it was afforded privacy. After the priest descended and immersed in the ritual bath, he ascended and dried himself with a towel, and warmed himself opposite the fire. He then came back to the Chamber of the Hearth and sat with his brethren the priests until dawn, when the gates of the Temple courtyard would be opened. He would then leave the Temple and go on his way. Since the purification process of one who immerses is not complete until sunset, by rabbinic law he could not remain in the Temple during the daytime.

The mishna describes the commencement of the daily service in the Temple: Among the members of the priestly family who are to serve in the Temple that day, whoever wants to remove the ashes from the altar rises early and immerses himself in a ritual bath, as required of anyone who enters the Temple courtyard. He must immerse before the appointed priest arrives, as the appointed priest oversees the lottery that determines which priests perform the various rites of the Temple service, and the first of those lotteries determines who will be charged with the removal of the ashes. And at what time does the appointed priest arrive? The times of his arrival are not all the same. There are times that he comes at the call of the rooster [ hagever ], or he might come at an adjacent time, either before the call of the rooster or after it. The appointed priest arrived at the Chamber of the Hearth, where the priests of the patrilineal family were assembled, and he knocked on the gate to alert them to open the gate for him. And when they opened the gate for him, he said to them: Whoever immersed in the ritual bath may come and participate in the lottery. They then conducted the lottery, and whoever won that lottery won the privilege to perform the rite of the removal of the ashes.

At some time near dawn the appointed priest took the key that was kept beneath a marble tablet set in the floor of the Chamber of the Hearth and opened with it the wicket [ hapishpesh ] in the gate of the Chamber of the Hearth. And he entered through the wicket from the Chamber of the Hearth to the Temple courtyard; and the priests of the patrilineal family entered after him, and two torches of fire were in their hands, to light the way. The priests divided into two groups; these priests would walk along the portico that surrounded the Temple courtyard, starting in the direction of east, and those priests would walk along the portico starting in the direction of west. The priests would ensure that all the service vessels were in place, ready for use in the daily service. Both groups would continue inspecting the vessels until they reached the place where the Chamber of the Preparer of the High Priest’s daily Griddle-Cake Offering was located. When they reached that place, these priests and those priests said to each other: It is well; all is well, and all the vessels are in place. They then set the preparer of the griddle-cake offering to prepare the griddle-cake offering.

The priest who won the lottery to remove the ashes from the altar shall then remove the ashes. And the other priests say to him: Be careful that you do not touch the vessel with which you perform the rite until you sanctify your hands and your feet from the Basin, as a priest may not perform any service in the Temple before sanctifying his hands and feet. The priests would continue their reminders: The coal pan with which the ashes are removed is placed in the corner between the ramp and the altar, on the western side of the ramp. No person would enter with the priest who was removing the ashes, as it was permitted to enter the area between the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary and the altar only when performing the Temple service. And there was no lamp in his hand when he went to fetch the coal pan. Rather, he would walk by the light of the arrangement of wood on the altar, upon which the portions of the offerings sacrificed the previous day were burned during the night. The other priests would not see him, as the altar hid him from their sight, nor could they hear the sound of his steps. They were therefore unaware of his progress until they heard the sound of the wood that ben Katin crafted into a mechanism [ mukhani ] of pulleys that was used to sink the Basin into flowing water during the night, so that its water would not be disqualified by remaining overnight. When the priests heard the sound of the pulleys raising the Basin from the water, they said to each other: The time for sanctifying hands and feet has come. The priest sanctified his hands and his feet with water from the Basin after he raised it. He then took the silver coal pan from the corner between the ramp and the altar, and ascended to the top of the altar. The priest cleared the upper layer of coals to this side and to that side and scooped into the coal pan the inner coals that were completely consumed. He then descended the ramp. When he reached the floor, in the southeast of the Temple courtyard, he turned his face toward the north. He would walk along the east side of the ramp toward the south side of the altar, walking a distance of about ten cubits from the bottom of the ramp, which was twenty cubits from the altar. He then heaped the coals upon the floor in a location three handbreadths distant from the ramp, in the place where the priests would place the crop of the bird burnt offering, the ashes removed from the inner, golden altar, and the ashes removed from the Candelabrum.

Chapter 2

The previous mishna described the performance of the removal of the ashes by the priest who was selected to perform this task. This mishna continues: The brethren of the priest who removed the ashes, i.e., the other members of the patrilineal family, saw that he had descended from the altar with the coal pan, and they would run and come to the Basin. They made haste and sanctified their hands and their feet with the water in the Basin, and then they took the shovels and the forks and ascended with them to the top of the altar. The shovels were for shoveling the ashes to the center of the altar, while the forks were required to remove from the altar those limbs that had not been consumed. With regard to the limbs of burnt offerings and the fats of other offerings that had not been consumed and burned to ashes during the time from the previous evening, the priests would clear them to the sides of the altar. If the remaining limbs and fats were so abundant that the sides of the altar were unable to hold them, the priests would arrange them on the ramp, opposite the surrounding ledge of the altar.

The priests then began raising the ashes onto the circular heap upon which the ashes were piled. The circular heap was in the middle of the altar. Sometimes there was as much as three hundred kor of ashes upon it. When the heap of ashes became excessively large, the priests would remove the ashes and pour them outside the city. But during the Festivals they would not remove the ashes from the altar, as the ashes were considered an adornment to the altar, since they were a sign of the great number of offerings that were sacrificed on it. In all the days of the altar, even when there was an abundance of ashes upon it, the priest tasked with removing the ashes from the circular heap was never indolent in removing the ashes.

After the ashes were cleared to the middle of the altar, the priests began raising logs onto the altar in order to assemble the arrangement of wood on which the offerings were burned. The tanna asks: And is wood from all the trees fit for the arrangement? The tanna replies: Wood from all the trees is fit for the arrangement, except for wood from the vine and from the olive tree, but the priests were accustomed to assemble the arrangement with wood from these trees: With young branches of the fig tree, of the nut tree, and of pinewood.

The priest who removed the ashes then assembled the large arrangement of wood upon which the daily offering and the sacrificial portions of the other offerings are burned. It was assembled on the eastern side of the altar, and its opening was on the eastern side of the altar, and the inner end of the logs would touch the circular heap of ashes. And there was space between the logs, in which the priests placed twigs, as they would ignite the kindling [ ha’alita ] from there, so that the fire would spread to the logs.

The priests selected from among the logs that were there fine logs from fig trees, as when this type of wood was burned it would become coals rather than ashes. The priest who removed the ashes then assembled the second arrangement of wood, from which the coals were taken to the golden altar in the Sanctuary for the burning of the incense. The second arrangement was assembled next to the southwestern corner of the altar and was removed from the corner toward the north side of the altar by a distance of four cubits. The second arrangement was assembled of an amount of wood estimated to produce five se’a of coals. And on Shabbat, it was assembled of an amount of wood estimated to produce eight se’a of coals, as there the priests would place the two bowls of frankincense that accompanied the shewbread and that were burned on the altar on Shabbat. With regard to the limbs and the fats that were not consumed during the time from the previous evening, the priests would return them to the large arrangement to be burned. And the priests kindled those two arrangements with fire and descended from the altar. And they then came to the Chamber of Hewn Stone, where they would conduct the second lottery in order to determine who would perform the subsequent rites.

Chapter 3

Four lotteries were conducted in the Temple each day in order to determine which priests would perform which of the Temple rites. After describing the first of the lotteries, for removal of the ashes, the tanna describes the second lottery. The priest appointed to oversee the lotteries said to the priests: Come and participate in the lottery to determine who is the priest who will slaughter the daily offering; and who is the priest who will sprinkle its blood; and who will remove the ashes from the inner, golden altar; and who will remove the ashes from the Candelabrum; and who will take the limbs of the daily offering up to the ramp to be burned afterward. The limbs of the daily offering taken up to the ramp were divided among the priests in the following manner: One priest took the head and the right hind leg up to the altar; and a second took the two forelegs; a third the haunch, including the lower spine and the tail, and the left hind leg; a fourth the breast and the cud, i.e., the neck and appended internal organs, including the windpipe, liver, and heart; and a fifth the two flanks; a sixth the innards; and a seventh the fine flour from the accompanying meal offering; and an eighth the griddle-cake offering; and a ninth the wine for the libation. They conducted the lottery to determine the thirteen tasks, i.e., slaughtering, carrying the nine items or pairs of items, sprinkling the blood, removing the ashes from the inner altar, and removing the ashes from the Candelabrum. And whoever won that lottery won the right to perform the slaughter, and the twelve priests standing to his right won the other privileges.

The appointed one said to the priests: Go out and observe if it is day and the time for slaughter has arrived. If the time has arrived, the observer says: There is light. Matya ben Shmuel says that the appointed priest phrased his question differently, saying: Is the entire eastern sky illuminated as far as Hebron? And the observer says: Yes.

The appointed priest said to the priests: Go out and bring me a lamb from the Chamber of the Lambs, where lambs that had been examined and found to be unblemished were kept. And the Chamber of the Lambs is located in the northwestern corner of the building of the Chamber of the Hearth. There were four chambers there, in that building: One was the Chamber of the Lambs; and one was the Chamber of the Seals, located in the northeastern corner, where the priest stored receipts given to those seeking to purchase animal offerings; and one was the Chamber of the Hearth, where there was a fire burning to warm the priests; and the last one was the chamber in which the priests prepared the shewbread.

The priests entered the Chamber of the Vessels, where the service vessels required for the daily Temple service were stored. They took out from there ninety-three silver vessels and gold vessels. They then gave the lamb selected for the daily offering water to drink in a cup of gold. Although the lamb was examined and deemed unblemished earlier in the evening, the priests examine it now by the light of the torches.

The priest who won the lottery to slaughter the daily offering pulled the lamb, and he would go to the slaughterhouse to slaughter it as the daily offering. And the priests who won the right to take the limbs up to the ramp would go with him. The slaughterhouse was to the north of the altar. Adjacent to it there were eight low stone pillars. And cedarwood squares were affixed upon them, and iron hooks were fixed in the wooden squares. And there were three rows of hooks on each and every one of those wooden squares, upon which the priests would suspend the animal after it was slaughtered. And they would flay the animal’s hide onto marble tables that were positioned between the pillars.

The priests who won the privilege of the removal of ash from the inner altar and of the removal of ash from the Candelabrum would precede the other priests and would hold four vessels in their hands: The basket, and the jug, and the two keys. The basket is similar to a large gold vessel with a capacity of three kav [ letarkav ], but it holds only two and a half kav. And the jug is similar to a large flask [ lekitton ] of gold. And as for the two keys, with one of them the priest would lower his arm to his armpit through a small opening in the door and open the lock that was at the bottom of the door on the inside, and he would pass through that door into a compartment. And the other one is the key with which the priest opened the lock on the inner door of the compartment, through which he entered the Sanctuary, and that lock he opened directly.

The priest came to the northern wicket. There were two wickets for the large gate, one in the northern part of the gate and one in the southern part. Through the wicket that was in the southern part, no person entered. In its regard, the wicket’s status is clarified by the prophet Ezekiel, as it is stated: “Then he brought me back the way of the outer gate of the Sanctuary, which looks toward the east; and it was shut. And the Lord said unto me: This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, neither shall any man enter in by it, for the Lord, the God of Israel, has entered in by it; and it shall be shut” (Ezekiel 44:1–2). The priest took the key, opened the wicket north of the gate, and entered the compartment. He went from the compartment to the Sanctuary and continued until he would reach the large gate. Once he reached the large gate, which was locked from the inside, he moved the bolt and the locks fixing the bolt in place and opened the gate. The priest who slaughters the daily offering would not slaughter the animal until he would hear that the large gate had been opened.

From Jericho the people would hear the sound indicating that the large gate had been opened. From Jericho the people would hear the sound produced in the Temple by the instrument that had the form of a shovel. From Jericho the people would hear the sound of the wood that ben Katin crafted into a mechanism of pulleys for the Basin. From Jericho the people would hear the voice of Gevini the Temple crier, who would proclaim in the Temple each day: Arise, priests, to your service, and Levites to your platform, and Israelites to your non-priestly watch. From Jericho the people would hear the sound of the flute that was played in the Temple twelve days each year. From Jericho the people would hear the sound of ben Arza clashing the cymbals in the Temple. From Jericho the people would hear the sound of the song of the Levites in the Temple. From Jericho the people would hear the sound of the shofar that was sounded several times each day in the Temple. And some say that in Jericho the people would hear even the voice of the High Priest at the moment that he mentioned the ineffable name of God on Yom Kippur. From Jericho the people would smell the fragrance emanating from the preparation of the incense in the Temple. Rabbi Elazar ben Diglai said: There were goats belonging to my father that grazed in the cities of Mikhvar, located at a distance from Jerusalem, and they would sneeze from the fragrance of the preparation of the incense that they smelled.

The priest who won the right of the removal of ash from the inner altar entered through the Sanctuary gate, and he took the basket with him and placed it before him on the floor between him and the altar. And he would take handfuls of ashes from upon the altar and place them in the basket. Ultimately, when only a small amount of ashes remained on the altar, the priest swept the rest into the basket, and placed the basket back on the Sanctuary floor, and emerged from the Sanctuary. The priest who won the right of the removal of ash from the Candelabrum entered the Sanctuary. And if he found in the Candelabrum the two easternmost lamps, the second of which is called the western lamp, still burning, he would first remove the ashes and the burned wicks from the rest of the lamps and place them in the jug, and place new wicks and oil in those lamps. And he would leave these two lamps burning in their own place. If he found that the two easternmost lamps were extinguished, he would remove the ashes and the burned wicks from them and kindle them from the lamps that were still burning. If none were still burning, he would kindle them from the fire on the outer altar. And afterward, the priest would remove the ashes and the wicks from the rest of the lamps. And there was a stone in front of the Candelabrum and in it there were three stairs upon which the priest would stand and prepare the lamps for kindling. Since the Candelabrum was eighteen handbreadths high, it was necessary for the priest to stand on an elevated surface to reach the lamps. And after he placed the ashes and the wicks from the five westernmost lamps in the jug, he would place the jug on the second stair of that stone, and then he emerged from the Sanctuary. When the priest later returned to prepare the two easternmost lamps for kindling, he would remove the jug with the ashes from the Candelabrum, and together with the priest removing the basket with the ashes from the inner altar would pour the ashes from the jug and the basket at the side of the altar.

Chapter 4

In preparing the lamb of the daily offering for sacrifice, the priests would not tie the lamb by fastening all four of its legs together; rather, they would bind it by fastening each hind leg to the corresponding foreleg. The priests who won the right to take the limbs up to the ramp would hold the lamb in place while it was being slaughtered. And this was the manner of its binding: The animal would be stood in the northern part of the courtyard while its head would be directed to the south, toward the altar, and its face would be turned to the west, toward the Sanctuary. And the slaughterer would stand to the east of the animal, and his face would be to the west. Twenty-four rings were affixed to the courtyard floor north of the altar, designated for placement of the animal’s neck during its slaughter. The daily offering of the morning was slaughtered at the northwest corner of the altar, at the second ring. The daily offering of the afternoon was slaughtered at the northeast corner of the altar, at the second ring. After the slaughterer has slaughtered the lamb and the receiver has received its blood in a vessel to sprinkle on the altar, the priest comes to the northeast corner of the altar and places the first sprinkling in such a manner that the blood will reach the eastern and northern sides of the altar. Next, the priest comes to the southwest corner of the altar and places a second sprinkling in a manner such that the blood will reach the western and southern sides of the altar. With regard to the remainder of the blood, the priest would pour it at the southern base of the altar, at its southwest corner.

When the priest flayed the hide of the daily offering after its slaughter, he would not break the animal’s leg in the typical manner of flaying an animal; rather, he punctures the leg from within each knee of the hind leg and suspends the animal by placing these holes on two hooks, in order to flay the animal’s hide. The priest began flaying from the top of the inverted animal, descending until he would reach the hide of the breast. Once he reached the breast, he severed the lamb’s head and gave it to the priest who won the right to take it up to the ramp. Next he severed the four legs below the knee and gave them to the priest who won the right to take them up to the ramp. He completed the flaying of the remaining hide from the breast down, and then the priest cut the heart and drained its blood. Next the priest severed the remaining upper parts of the forelegs and gave them to the priest who won the right to take them up to the ramp. Afterward he moved up to the remaining upper part of the right hind leg, severed it, and gave it to the priest who won the right to take it up to the ramp; and the animal’s two testicles were cut along with the right leg, leaving the animal suspended by its left hind leg. Then the priest tore open the animal’s midsection, resulting in the innards of the entire animal being exposed before him. He took the fats and placed them on the place of slaughter on the animal’s head above it, to conceal the place where it was severed while the priest would take the head to the altar. Then the priest took the innards and gave them to the priest who won the right to take them up to the ramp, in order to rinse them first. And with regard to the stomach, in which there is a significant amount of waste, the priests would rinse it in the rinsing site located in the south of the courtyard, east of the Gate of the Water, and they rinsed it as much it required. And with regard to the innards, the priests would rinse them three times at a minimum, on the marble tables that were positioned between the pillars in the slaughterhouse.

The priest then took the knife and separated the lung from the liver, and the finger- like protrusion from the lower edge of the liver, also known as the lobe of the liver, from the liver. And he would not move any one of the organs from its place. He would leave the lung attached to the neck, the lobe attached to the haunch, and the liver attached to the right flank. The priest would puncture around the breast, separating it from the flanks and the ribs, and he gave it to the priest who won the right to take it up to the ramp. He then moved up to the right flank and would cut it and separate it from the animal’s body. And he would continue to cut, descending until he would reach the spinal column, and the priest would not touch the spinal column, leaving the spine intact and attached to the left flank. He would continue cutting until he reached the space between the two narrow ribs near the neck, leaving them in place. The priest cut the right flank, separating it from the body of the animal, and gave it to the priest who won the right to take it up to the ramp. And the liver was suspended from it. The priest then came to the cud. He left attached to it, in their entirety, the two narrow ribs from here, the right side, and the two narrow ribs from there, the left side. He cut the cud and gave it to the priest who won the right to take it up to the ramp; and the windpipe, the heart, and the lung were suspended from it. He came to cut the left flank of the body and left attached to it two narrow ribs above, near the haunch, as the animal was suspended upside down, and two narrow ribs below, near the cud. And he also did that with its counterpart, the right flank, resulting in two narrow ribs in each flank above and two narrow ribs in each flank below. He cut the left flank and gave it to the priest who won the right to take it up to the ramp, and the spinal column was with it, and the spleen was suspended from it. And the left flank was greater, i.e., the larger of the two, because it included the spine, but they referred to the right flank as the greater one, as in addition to the flank itself, the liver was suspended from it. He came to the haunch, cut it, and gave it to the priest who won the right to take it up to the ramp. And the tail, and the finger- like protrusion of the liver, and the two kidneys were with it. He took the remaining upper part of the left hind leg, cut it, and gave it to the priest who won the right to take it up to the ramp. This resulted in all of the nine priests who won the rights to take the limbs up to the ramp standing in line, and the limbs were in their hands. The first priest stood with the head and with the right hind leg of the animal. Since it was more significant, the head was in his right hand, and its nose was turned toward the priest’s arm. Its horns were between his fingers, and the place of its slaughter was above, and the fats were placed upon it, to conceal the bloody place of slaughter. The right hind leg was in his left hand, and the outer side of the leg, from which its hide was flayed, rather than the side on which the incision was made, was facing out. The second priest stood with the two forelegs. He held the right foreleg in his right hand and the left foreleg in his left hand, and the outer side of the leg, from which its hide was flayed, was facing out. The third priest stood with the haunch and the left hind leg. He held the haunch in his right hand, and the tail was hanging between his fingers, and the finger- like protrusion of the liver and the two kidneys were with it. He held the left hind leg in his left hand, and the outer side of the leg, from which its hide was flayed, was facing out. The fourth priest stood with the breast and with the cud, with the breast in his right hand and the cud in his left hand, and its two ribs were attached to the cud between his two fingers. The fifth priest stood with the two flanks; the right flank was in his right hand and the left flank in his left hand, and the outer side was facing out. The sixth priest stood with the innards, which were placed in a vessel, and the lower legs were placed atop them from above. The seventh priest stood with the fine flour of the meal offering that accompanies the daily offering. The eighth priest stood with the griddle-cake offering sacrificed daily by the High Priest, half in the morning and half in the evening. The ninth priest stood with the wine for the libations that accompany the daily offering. The nine priests went and placed the items they were carrying on the area from halfway up the ramp and below, in the lower portion of the ramp, on the west side of the ramp, and they salted the limbs and the meal offering. And they descended and came to the Chamber of Hewn Stone to recite the morning Shema and the other texts that they would recite, as explained at the beginning of the next chapter.

Chapter 5

After the priests completed laying the parts of the daily offering on the ramp, they went to the Chamber of Hewn Stone to recite Shema. The appointed priest who oversaw the lotteries in the Temple said to the priests: Recite a single blessing of the blessings that accompany Shema. And the members of the priestly watch recited a blessing, and then they recited the Ten Commandments, Shema (see Deuteronomy 6:4–9), VeHaya im Shamoa (see Deuteronomy 11:13–21), and VaYomer (see Numbers 15:37–41), the standard formula of Shema. Additionally, they blessed with the people three blessings. These blessings were: True and Firm, the blessing of redemption recited after Shema ; and the blessing of the Temple service, which is also a blessing recited in the Amida prayer; and the Priestly Benediction, recited in the form of a prayer, without the lifting of hands that usually accompanies that blessing ( Tosafot ). And on Shabbat, when the new priestly watch would begin its service, the priests would add one blessing recited by the outgoing priestly watch, that love, fraternity, peace, and friendship should exist among the priests of the incoming watch.

The appointed priest said to them: Let only those priests who are new to burning the incense come and participate in the lottery for the incense. Whoever won that lottery won the privilege to burn the incense. The appointed priest said to them: Those new priests, i.e., those who had never performed the service, together with those old priests, i.e., those who had already performed it, may come and participate in the lottery to determine who takes the limbs from the bottom half of the ramp, where they had been placed earlier, up to the altar. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: The priest who takes the limbs up to the ramp is the one who takes them up from the ramp and places them upon the altar.

The priests who did not win a lottery were still dressed in the priestly vestments that they were required to don when entering the lottery, so that if they won they would be prepared for immediate service. The appointed priest handed over these priests to the care of the attendants [ laḥazanim ]. The attendants would undress these priests and remove their garments, and they would leave only their trousers on them. After the priests donned their non-sacred garments, they would remove the priestly trousers and don their non-sacred trousers. And there were four storage compartments there in the Temple for the storage of priestly vestments for each priestly watch, and on each of them was written the use of the garment stored there: Trousers, tunic, belt, and mitre.

The priest who won the lottery to burn the incense would take the spoon used for carrying the incense. And the spoon was similar to a large gold vessel that held three kav, and the smaller vessel was placed inside the spoon. The vessel was filled to overflow with incense. And it had a cover to prevent spillage of the incense, and there was a type of cloth placed upon it from above, to preserve the fragrance of the incense.

The priest who won the right to bring the coal pan with the coals from the outer altar to the incense altar in the Sanctuary took the silver coal pan, ascended to the top of the outer altar, and cleared the extinguished coals from the perimeter of the flame to here and to there. Then he shoveled four kav from the consumed inner coals, which were burned in the depths of the flame, into the coal pan. He descended from the altar and emptied the coals into the coal pan made of gold. Approximately one kav of coals from it was spilled and scattered on the courtyard floor, as the capacity of the gold pan was only three kav. And a priest would sweep the scattered coals into the Temple courtyard drain that passed through the courtyard to drain the waste outside the Temple. And on Shabbat, when it is prohibited to extinguish fire, the priest would not sweep the coals into the canal; rather, he would overturn a pesakhter upon them. And the pesakhter was a large vessel that held a half-kor. And since the pesakhter was a very heavy vessel, there were two chains on it, to facilitate its standard use, removal of ashes from the altar: One chain with which a priest would pull the vessel filled with ashes down the ramp, and one chain that another priest would grasp from above, so that the vessel would not roll down the ramp and the ashes would not spill. And the pesakhter would serve three purposes: The priests would overturn it upon the coals that scattered in the Temple during the transfer from the silver to the gold coal pan on Shabbat, and they would overturn it upon the carcass of a creeping animal found in the Temple on Shabbat, and they would take the ashes down from atop the altar in it.

The priest with the spoonful of incense and the priest with the gold coal pan filled with coals reached the place between the Entrance Hall to the Sanctuary and the outer altar, on their way to the Sanctuary. One of them took the shovel and threw it between the Entrance Hall and the outer altar. No person could hear the voice of another speaking to him in Jerusalem, due to the sound generated by the shovel. And that sound would serve three purposes: Any priest who hears its sound knows that his brethren the priests are entering to prostrate themselves in the Sanctuary at that time, and he would run and come to prostrate himself with them. And any Levite who hears its sound knows that his brethren the Levites are entering the courtyard to stand on their platform to recite the psalm accompanying the libation, and he would run and come to sing with them. And the head of the non-priestly watch, which stands in the courtyard as the agents of the Jewish people, would position the ritually impure priests and singers at the eastern gate of the courtyard, to make it clear that those priests were not performing the Temple service due to their ritual impurity.

Chapter 6

The priest with the panful of incense and the priest with the gold coal pan filled with coals began ascending the twelve stairs of the Entrance Hall. The priests who won the rights of the removal of ash from the inner altar and the removal of ash from the Candelabrum would precede them, to remove the vessels that remained in the Sanctuary. The priest who won the right of the removal of ash from the inner altar entered the Sanctuary and took the basket that he had left there after removing the ashes from the altar. And when he completed his tasks, he prostrated himself with his hands and feet spread and emerged from the Sanctuary. The priest who won the right of the removal of ash from the Candelabrum entered the Sanctuary, and if he found the two western lamps, i.e., the easternmost and the one immediately to its west, of the Candelabrum burning, he would remove the ash from the easternmost lamp and prepare it anew. But he would leave burning the lamp immediately west of the easternmost lamp, as from that lamp he would kindle the lamps of the Candelabrum in the afternoon. If he found that the lamp west of the easternmost lamp was extinguished, he would remove the ashes and kindle it from the fire on the altar of the burnt offering. He then took the jug in which he had placed the ashes and wicks of the Candelabrum from the second stair of the stone before the Candelabrum and prostrated himself and emerged from the Sanctuary.

The priest who won the right to bring the coal pan filled with coals to the inner altar for the burning of the incense first piled the coals on the inner altar and then flattened them, distributing them evenly on the altar with the bottom of the coal pan. And when he finished distributing the coals, he prostrated himself and emerged from the Sanctuary.

The priest who won the right to burn the incense would take the smaller vessel containing the incense from within the spoon, and would give it to a priest who is his friend or his relative, whom he designated to assist him, and enter the Sanctuary with him. If the incense was scattered from the smaller vessel into the spoon, the priest accompanying him would give the incense to the priest burning the incense in his handfuls. And the experienced priests would teach the priest burning the incense: Be careful, because if you are not careful you might begin scattering the incense on the side of the altar that is before you; rather, start scattering on the far side of the altar, so that you will not be burned by the burning incense when you are scattering it. The priest began flattening it, distributing the incense evenly on the coals on the altar, and when the Sanctuary would become filled with the smoke of the incense, he would emerge from the Sanctuary. The priest burning the incense would not burn it until the appointed priest would say to him: Burn the incense. And if it was the High Priest who was burning the incense, the appointed priest would say to him deferentially: My master, the High Priest, burn the incense. It is derived from the verse: “And there shall be no man in the Tent of Meeting when he goes in to make atonement in the Sanctuary, until he comes out” (Leviticus 16:17), that no one may be standing between the Entrance Hall and the outer altar when the priest burns the incense. Therefore, the people, i.e., the priests, left that area. And the priest burned the incense on the inner altar and prostrated himself and emerged from the Sanctuary.

Chapter 7

After the priests concluded sacrificing the daily morning offering, they would enter the Sanctuary to prostrate themselves. On occasions when the High Priest would enter the Sanctuary to prostrate himself, he would enter before the other priests. When the High Priest enters the Sanctuary, three priests hold him to assist him and support him, in order to distinguish the service of the High Priest from that of the other priests entering the Sanctuary. One priest held his right hand and one priest held his left hand, and one priest stood behind the High Priest, holding onto the two precious onyx stones located on the shoulders of the High Priest, on the ephod. And once the appointed priest heard the sound from the feet of the High Priest, produced by the bells attached to the bottom of his robe, he knew that the High Priest was emerging from the Sanctuary, and he lifted the curtain suspended at the opening of the Entrance Hall for him, to facilitate his exit. After the High Priest entered and prostrated himself and emerged from the Sanctuary, his brethren the priests entered, prostrated themselves, and emerged from the Sanctuary.

After the priests emerged from the Sanctuary, they came and stood on the twelve stairs before the Entrance Hall. The first five priests stood to the south of their brethren, the priests, who had taken the limbs of the daily offering up to the altar. And those five priests had five vessels in their hands: The basket with the ashes from the inner altar was in the hands of one priest; and the jug with the ashes from the Candelabrum was in the hands of one priest; and the coal pan was in the hands of one priest; and the smaller vessel, the bowl that held the incense, was in the hands of one priest, who had burned the incense; and the spoon and its cover were in the hands of one priest, the friend or relative of the one who burned the incense. The priests placed their vessels on the ground and then blessed the people, reciting one blessing. The Priestly Benediction was recited outside the Temple as well, but in the Temple, it was recited differently, as in the rest of the country the priests would recite it as three blessings, and the listeners would answer amen after each blessing. But in the Temple they would recite it as one blessing, and the listeners would not respond to each blessing. Rather, at the conclusion of the entire Priestly Benediction they would answer: Blessed are You Lord, God of Israel, from everlasting to everlasting. In the Temple, the priests would recite the name of God as it is written, with the letters yod, heh, vav, heh, whereas in the rest of the country the priests would recite the name of God by His appellation, alef, dalet, nun, yod. Furthermore, in the rest of the country, while reciting the Priestly Benediction the priests lift their hands opposite their shoulders, and in the Temple they raise them above their heads. That is the halakha with regard to all priests in the Temple, except for the High Priest, who does not raise his hands above the frontplate on his forehead, as the name of God is written on the frontplate. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the High Priest would raise his hands above the frontplate while reciting the Priestly Benediction in the Temple, as it is stated with regard to the Priestly Benediction recited by Aaron the High Priest: “And Aaron lifted his hands toward the people and blessed them” (Leviticus 9:22).

The High Priest is entitled to sacrifice any offering brought to the Temple, at his discretion. When the High Priest wishes to burn the limbs of the daily offering and the accompanying meal offering, he would ascend the ramp to the altar, and the deputy High Priest would walk to his right. When he reached half the height of the ramp, the Deputy would hold his right hand and take him up to the altar at the top of the ramp. And the first of the nine priests who took the limbs up to the altar handed the High Priest the head and the hind leg of the offering, and the High Priest placed his hands upon them and then threw them onto the altar fire. Next the second of the nine priests handed the two forelegs of the offering to the first priest. He gave them to the High Priest, who placed his hands upon them and then threw them onto the altar fire. At that point, the second priest slipped away and left. And in that manner the priests would hand the High Priest the rest of all the limbs, and he would place his hands upon them and then throw them onto the altar fire. And when he wishes, he places his hands and others throw the limbs onto the fire. When the High Priest, who was at the top of the ramp on the south side of the altar, came to circle the altar to reach the southwestern corner, where he would pour the libation of wine, from where does he begin? He begins from the southeastern corner and continues to the northeastern corner, then to the northwestern corner, and ultimately reaches the southwestern corner. At that point, the priests gave him wine to pour. The Deputy stands at the High Priest’s side at the corner of the altar and the cloths are in his hand, so that he can wave them to signal to the Levites to begin singing when the High Priest pours the libation. Two priests stand at the marble table of the fats, where the limbs and fats were placed before being taken to the altar, and there were two silver trumpets in their hands. These two priests sounded a tekia, a long continuous blast; they then sounded a terua, a series of staccato blasts; and lastly they sounded another tekia to alert the Levites to prepare to recite the psalm. The priests with the trumpets came and stood near ben Arza, the title given to the person who was tasked with striking the cymbals, one to his right and one to his left. Then the High Priest stooped to pour the libation, and the Deputy waved the cloths, and ben Arza struck the cymbals, and the Levites recited the psalm of that day of the week. Each psalm was divided into three sections. Whenever the Levites reached the end of one section of the psalm, the priests sounded a tekia, and the people in the courtyard prostrated themselves. At the end of each section there was a tekia, and for every tekia there was a prostration. That is the procedure for the sacrifice of the daily offering in the service of the House of our God; may it be His will that it will be speedily rebuilt in our day, amen.

The following is a list of each daily psalm that the Levites would recite in the Temple. On the first day of the week they would recite the psalm beginning: “A psalm of David. The earth is the Lord’s and all it contains, the world and all who live in it” (Psalms, chapter 24). On the second day they would recite the psalm beginning: “A song; a psalm of the sons of Korah. Great is the Lord and highly to be praised in the city of God, on His sacred mountain” (Psalms, chapter 48). On the third day they would recite the psalm beginning: “A psalm of Asaph. God stands in the divine assembly; among the judges He delivers judgment” (Psalms, chapter 82). On the fourth day they would recite the psalm beginning: “O Lord God, to Whom vengeance belongs, God to Whom vengeance belongs, shine forth” (Psalms, chapter 94). On the fifth day they would recite the psalm beginning: “For the leader; upon the Gittith, a psalm of Asaph. Sing for joy to God, our strength; shout aloud to the God of Jacob” (Psalms, chapter 81). On the sixth day they would recite the psalm beginning: “The Lord reigns: He is robed in majesty; the Lord is robed, girded with strength” (Psalms, chapter 93). On Shabbat they would recite the psalm beginning: “A psalm, a song for Shabbat day” (Psalms, chapter 92). This is interpreted as a psalm, a song for the future, for the day that will be entirely Shabbat and rest for everlasting life.

Mishnah Middot

Chapter 1

In three places the priests keep watch in the Temple: in the chamber of Avtinas, in the chamber of the spark, and in the fire chamber. And the Levites in twenty-one places: Five at the five gates of the Temple Mount; Four at its four corners on the inside; Five at five of the gates of the courtyard; Four at its four corners on the outside; One at the offering chamber; One at the chamber of the curtain, And one behind the place of the kapporet.

The officer of the Temple Mount used to go round to every watch, with lighted torches before him, and if any watcher did not rise [at his approach] and say to him, “Shalom to you, officer of the Temple Mount, it was obvious that he was asleep. Then he used to beat him with his rod. And he had permission to burn his clothes. And the others would say: What is the noise in the courtyard? It is the cry of a Levite who is being beaten and whose clothes are being burned, because he was asleep at his watch. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: once they found my mother's brother asleep, and they burnt his clothes.

There were five gates to the Temple Mount: The two Huldah gates on the south were used both for entrance and exit; The Kiponus gate on the west was used both for entrance and exit. The Taddi gate on the north was not used at all. The Eastern gate over which was a representation of the palace of Shushan and through which the high priest who burned the red heifer and all who assisted with it would go out to the Mount of Olives.

There were seven gates in the courtyard: three in the north and three in the south and one in the east. In the south: the Gate of Kindling, and next to it the Gate of the First-borns, and then the Water Gate. In the east: the Gate of Nicanor. It had two chambers, one on its right and one on its left. One was the chamber of Pinchas the dresser and one the other the chamber of the griddle cake makers.

On the north was the Gate of the Sparks which was shaped like a portico. It had an upper chamber built on it, and the priests used to keep watch above and the Levites below, and it had a door opening into the Hel. Next to it was the Gate of the Sacrifice and next to that the fire chamber.

There were four chambers inside the fire chamber, like sleeping chambers opening into a hall, two in sacred ground and two in non-holy, and there was a row of mosaic stones separating the holy from the non-holy. For what were they used? The one on the southwest was the chamber of sacrificial lambs, The one on the southeast was the chamber of the showbread. In the one to the northeast the Hasmoneans deposited the stones of the altar which the kings of Greece had defiled. Through the one on the northwest they used to go down to the bathing place.

The fire chamber had two gates, one opening on to the Hel and one on to the courtyard. Rabbi Judah says: the one that opened on to the courtyard had a small opening through which they went in to search the courtyard.

The fire chamber was vaulted and it was a large room surrounded with stone projections, and the elders of the clan [serving in the Temple] used to sleep there, with the keys of the Temple courtyard in their hands. The priestly initiates used to place their bedding on the ground.

There was a place there [in the fire chamber] one cubit square on which was a slab of marble. In this was fixed a ring and a chain on which the keys were hung. When closing time came, the priest would raise the slab by the ring and take the keys from the chain. Then the priest would lock up within while the Levite was sleeping outside. When he had finished locking up, he would replace the keys on the chain and the slab in its place and put his garment on it and sleep there. If one of them had a seminal emission, he would go out by the winding stair which went under the Birah, and which was lighted with lamps on both sides, until he reached the bathing place. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: he descended by the winding stair which went under the Hel and he went out by the Taddi gate.

Chapter 2

The Temple Mount was five hundred cubits by five hundred cubits. The greater part of it was on the south; next to that on the east; next to that on the north; and the smallest part on the west. The part which was most extensive was the part most used.

All who entered the Temple Mount entered by the right and went round [to the right] and went out by the left, save for one to whom something had happened, who entered and went round to the left. [He was asked]: “Why do you go round to the left?” [If he answered] “Because I am a mourner,” [they said to him], “May He who dwells in this house comfort you.” [If he answered] “Because I am excommunicated” [they said]: “May He who dwells in this house inspire them to draw you near again,” the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose to him: you make it seem as if they treated him unjustly. Rather [they should say]: “May He who dwells in this house inspire you to listen to the words of your colleagues so that they may draw you near again.”

Within it was the Soreg, ten handbreadths high. There were thirteen breaches in it, which had been originally made by the kings of Greece, and when they repaired them they enacted that thirteen prostrations should be made facing them. Within this was the Hel, which was ten cubits [broad]. There were twelve steps there. The height of each step was half a cubit and its tread was half a cubit. All the steps in the Temple were half a cubit high with a tread of half a cubit, except those of the Porch. All the doorways in the Temple were twenty cubits high and ten cubits broad except those of the Porch. All the doorways there had doors in them except those of the Porch. All the gates there had lintels except that of Taddi which had two stones inclined to one another. All the original gates were changed for gates of gold except the gates of Nicanor, because a miracle happened with them. Some say: because their copper gleamed like gold.

All the walls that were there [in the Temple] were high except the eastern wall, for the priest who burned the red heifer would stand on the top of the Mount of Olives and direct his gaze carefully to see the opening of the Sanctuary at the time of the sprinkling of the blood.

The courtyard of the women was a hundred and thirty-five cubits long by a hundred and thirty-five wide. It had four chambers in its four corners, each of which was forty cubits. They were not roofed, and so they will be in the time to come, as it says, “Then he brought me forth into the outer court, and caused me to pass by the four corners of the court, and behold in every corner of the court there was a court. In the four corners of the court there were keturot courts” (Ezekiel 46:21-22) and keturot means that they were not roofed. For what were they used? The southeastern one was the chamber of the Nazirites where the Nazirites used to boil their shelamim and shave their hair and throw it under the pot. The northeastern one was the wood chamber where priests with physical defects used to pick out the wood which had worms, every piece with a worm in it being unfit for use on the altar. The northwestern one was the chamber of those with skin disease. The southwestern one: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: I forget what it was used for. Abba Shaul says: they used to store there wine and oil, and it was called the chamber of oil. It [the courtyard of the women] had originally been smooth [without protrusions in the walls] but subsequently they surrounded it with a balcony so that the women could look on from above while the men were below, and they should not mix together. Fifteen steps led up from it to the courtyard of Israel, corresponding to the fifteen [songs of] ascents mentioned in the Book of Psalms, and upon which the Levites used to sing. They were not rectangular but circular like the half of a threshing floor.

There were chambers underneath the Court of Israel which opened into the Court of Women, where the Levites used to keep lyres and lutes and cymbals and all kinds of musical instruments. The Court of Israel was a hundred and thirty-five cubits in length by eleven in breadth. Similarly the Court of the Priests was a hundred and thirty-five cubits in length by eleven in breadth. And a row of mosaic stones separated the Court of Israel from the Court of the Priests. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: there was a step a cubit high on which a platform was placed, and it had three steps each of half a cubit in height. In this way the Court of the Priests was made two and a half cubits higher than that of Israel. The whole of the Court was a hundred and eighty-seven cubits in length by a hundred and thirty-five in breadth. And thirteen prostrations were made there. Abba Yose ben Hanan says: they were made facing the thirteen gates. On the south beginning from the west there were the upper gate, the gate of burning, the gate of the firstborn, and the water gate. And why was it called the water gate? Because they brought in through it the pitcher of water for libation on the festival. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: in it the water welled up, and in the time to come from there it will come out from under the threshold of the Temple. Corresponding to them in the north beginning in the west were the gate of Yehoniah, the gate of the offering, the women's gate, the gate of song. Why was it called the gate of Yehoniah? Because Yehoniah went forth into captivity through it. On the east was the gate of Nicanor; it had two doors, one on its right and one on its left. There were further two gates in the west which had no special name.

Chapter 3

The altar was thirty-two cubits by thirty-two. It rose a cubit and went in a cubit, and this formed the foundation, leaving thirty cubits by thirty. It then rose five cubits and went in one cubit, and this formed the surround, leaving twenty-eight cubits by twenty-eight. The horns extended a cubit in each direction, thus leaving twenty-six by twenty-six. A cubit on every side was allowed for the priests to go round, thus leaving twenty-four by twenty-four as the place for the wood pile [for the altar fire]. Rabbi Yose said: Originally, the complete area [occupied by the altar] was only twenty-eight cubits by twenty-eight, and it rose with the dimensions mentioned until the space left for the altar pile was only twenty by twenty. When, however, the children of the exile returned, they added four cubits on the north, and four on the west like a gamma, since it is said: “Now the hearth shall be twelve cubits long by twelve broad, square” (Ezekiel 43:16). Is it possible that it was only twelve cubits by twelve? When it says, “With four equal sides” (ibid), this shows that he was measuring from the middle, twelve cubits in every direction. A line of red paint ran round it in the middle to divide between the upper and the lower blood. The foundation ran the whole length of the north and of the west sides, and it took up one cubit on the south and one on the east.

At the southwestern corner [of the foundation] there were two openings like two small nostrils through which the blood which was poured on the western side of the foundation and on the southern side flowed down till the two streams became mingled in the channel, through which they made their way out to the Kidron wadi.

On the floor beneath at that corner there was a place a cubit square on which was a marble slab with a ring fixed in it, and through this they used to go down to the pit to clean it out. There was an ascent on the south side of the altar, thirty-two cubits [long] by sixteen broad. It had a square window in its western side where disqualified sin-offerings of birds were placed.

The stones both of the ascent and of the altar were taken from the valley of Bet Kerem. They dug into virgin soil and brought from there whole stones on which no iron had been lifted, since iron disqualifies by mere touch, though a flaw made by anything could disqualify. If one of them received a flaw, it was disqualified, but the rest were not. They were whitewashed twice a year, once at Pesah and once at Hag, and the Sanctuary was whitewashed once a year, at Pesah. Rabbi says: they were whitewashed every Friday with a cloth on account of the blood stains. The plaster was not laid on with an iron trowel, for fear that it might touch and disqualify. Since iron was created to shorten man's days and the altar was created to prolong man's days, and it is not right therefore that that which shortens should be lifted against that which prolongs.

There were rings to the north of the altar, six rows of four each. And some say, four rows of six each. Upon them they used to slaughter the sacrificial animals. The slaughter house was to the north of the altar, and on it were eight small pillars on top of which were blocks of cedar wood, in which were fixed hooks of iron, three rows in each, upon which they would hang [the sacrifice] and they would strip its hide on tables of marble that stood between the pillars.

The laver was between the porch and the altar, a little to the south. Between the porch and the altar there were twenty-two cubits. There were twelve steps there, each step being half a cubit high and a cubit broad. There was a cubit, a cubit and a level space of three cubits, then a cubit, a cubit and a level space of three cubits, then at the top a cubit, a cubit and a level space of four cubits. Rabbi Judah says that at the top there was a cubit, a cubit and a level space of five cubits.

The doorway of the porch was forty cubits high and its breadth was twenty cubits. Over it were five main beams of ash [wood]. The lowest projected a cubit on each side beyond the doorway. The one above projected beyond this one a cubit on each side. Thus the topmost one was thirty cubits long. There was a layer of stones between each one and the next.

There were poles of cedar wood stretching from the wall of the Sanctuary to the wall of the Porch to prevent it from bulging. There were chains of gold fixed in the roof beams of the Porch by which the priestly initiates used to ascend and see the crowns, as it says, “And the crowns shall be to Helem and to Toviyah and to Yedaya and to Hen the son of Zephaniah as a memorial in the Temple of the Lord” (Zechariah 6:14). A golden vine stood at the door of the Sanctuary trained on poles, and anyone who offered a leaf or a grape or a bunch used to bring it and hang it there. Rabbi Eliezer bar Zadok said: on one occasion three hundred priests were commissioned [to clear it].

Chapter 4

The doorway of the Hekhal was twenty cubits high and ten broad. It had four doors, two on the inner side, and two on the outer, as it says, “And the Hekhal and the Sanctuary had two doors” (Ezekiel 41:23). The outer ones opened into the interior of the doorway so as to cover the thickness of the wall, while the inner ones opened into the Temple so as to cover the space behind the doors, because the whole of the Temple was overlaid with gold except the space behind the doors. Rabbi Judah says: they stood within the doorway, and they resembled folding doors. These were two cubits and a half [of the wall] and these were two cubits and a half, leaving half a cubit as a doorpost at the one end and half a cubit as a doorpost at the other end, as it says, “And the doors had two leaves apiece, two turning leaves, two leaves for the one door and two leaves for the other” (Ezekiel 41:24).

The great gate had two small doors, one to the north and one to the south. By the one to the south no one ever went in, and concerning it was stated explicitly be Ezekiel, as it says, “And the Lord said to me: this gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, neither shall any man enter in by it, for the Lord God of Israel has entered in by it; therefore it shall be shut” (Ezekiel 44:2). He [the priest] took the key and opened the [northern] door and went in to the cell, and from the cell he went into the Hekhal. Rabbi Judah says: he used to walk along in the thickness of the wall until he came to the space between the two gates. He would open the outer doors from within and the inner doors from without.

There were thirty-eight cells there, fifteen on the north, fifteen on the south, and eight on the west. On the north and on the south there were five over five and five again over these; On the west there were three over three and two over these. Each had three openings, one to the cell on the right and one to the cell on the left and one to the cell above. In the [one at the] northeastern corner there were five openings, one to the cell on the right, one to the cell above, one to the mesibbah, one to the door, and one to the Hekhal.

The [chamber] of the lowest [story] was five cubits wide and at the ceiling six cubits. The [chamber] of the middle [story] was six cubits wide and at the ceiling of seven. The [chamber] of the top [story] was seven cubits wide, as it says, "The lowest story was five cubits wide, the middle one 6 cubits wide and the third 7 cubits wide" (I Kings 6:6).

The mesibbah (a winding walkway) went up from the north-east corner to the north-west corner by which they used to go up to the roofs of the cells. One would ascend the messibah facing the west, traversing the whole of the northern side till he reached the west. When he reached the west he turned to face south and then traversed whole of the west side till he reached the south. When he reached the south he turned to face eastwards and then traversed the south side till he reached the door of the upper chamber, since the door of the upper chamber opened to the south. In the doorway of the upper chamber were two columns of cedar by which they used to climb up to the roof of the upper chamber, and at the top of them was a row of stones showing the division in the upper chamber between the holy part and the Holy of Holies. There were trap doors in the upper chamber opening into the Holy of Holies by which the workmen were let down in baskets so that they should not feast their eyes on the Holy of Holies.

The Hekhal was a hundred cubits by a hundred with a height of a hundred. The foundation was six cubits, then it rose forty, then a cubit for the ornamentation, two cubits for the guttering, a cubit for the ceiling and a cubit for the plastering. The height of the upper chamber was forty cubits, there was a cubit for its ornamentation, two cubits for the guttering, a cubit for the ceiling, a cubit for the plastering, three cubits for the parapet and a cubit for the spikes. Rabbi Judah says the spikes were not included in the measurement, but the parapet was four cubits.

From east to west was a hundred cubits: The wall of the porch five cubits, the porch itself eleven, the wall of the Hekhal six cubits and its interior forty, a cubit for the space between, and twenty cubits for the Holy of Holies, the wall of the Hekhal six cubits, the cell six cubits and the wall of the cell five. From north to south was seventy cubits: The wall of the mesibbah five cubits, the mesibbah itself three, the wall of the cell five and the cell itself six, the wall of the Hekhal six cubits and its interior twenty, then the wall of the Hekhal again six and the cell six and its wall five, then the place of the water descent three cubits and its wall five cubits. The Porch extended beyond this fifteen cubits on the north and fifteen cubits on the south, and this space was called the House of the slaughter-knives where they used to store the knives. The Hekhal was narrow behind and broad in front, resembling a lion, as it says, "Ah, Ariel, Ariel, the city where David encamped" (Isaiah 29:1): Just as a lion is narrow behind and broad in front, so the Hekhal was narrow behind and broad in front.

Chapter 5

The whole of the courtyard was a hundred and eighty-seven cubits long by a hundred and thirty-five broad. From east to west it was a hundred and eighty-seven. The space in which the Israelites could go was eleven cubits. The space in which the priests could go was eleven cubits. The altar took up thirty-two. Between the Porch and the altar was twenty-two cubits. The Hekhal took up a hundred cubits, and there were eleven cubits behind the kapporet.

From north to south was a hundred and thirty-five cubits.The ascent and the altar took up sixty-two; From the altar to the rings was eight cubits. The rings took up twenty-four cubits. From the rings to the tables was four cubits, From the tables to the dwarf pillars four, And from the dwarf pillars to the wall of the courtyard eight cubits, And the remainder was between the ascent and the wall and the space occupied by the dwarf pillars.

There were six chambers in the courtyard, three on the north and three on the south. On the north were the salt chamber, the parvah chamber and the washer's chamber. In the salt chamber they used to keep the salt for the offerings. In the parvah chamber they used to salt the skins of the animal-offerings. On its roof was the bath used by the high priest on Yom Kippur. In the washers’ chamber they used to wash the entrails of the sacrificial animals, and from it a winding way went up to the roof of the parvah chamber.

On the south were the wood chamber, the chamber of the exile and the chamber of hewn stones. The wood chamber: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: I forget what it was used for. Abba Shaul says: It was the chamber of the high priest, and it was behind the two of them, and one roof covered all three. In the chamber of the exile there was a fixed cistern, with a wheel over it, and from there water was provided for all of the courtyard. In the chamber of hewn stone the great Sanhedrin of Israel used to sit and judge the priesthood. A priest in whom was found a disqualification used to put on black garments and wrap himself in black and go away. One in whom no disqualification was found used to put on white garments and wrap himself in white and go in and serve along with his brother priests. They used to make a feast because no blemish had been found in the seed of Aaron the priest, and they used to say: Blessed is the Omnipresent, blessed is He, for no blemish has been found in the seed of Aaron. Blessed is He who chose Aaron and his sons to stand to minister before the Lord in the Holy of Holies.

Mishnah Kinnim

Chapter 1

A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.

If a hatat becomes mixed up with an olah, or an olah with a hatat, were it even one in ten thousand, they all must be left to die. If a hatat becomes mixed up with [unassigned] obligatory [bird] offerings, the only ones that are valid are those that correspond to the number of hatats among the obligatory offerings. Similarly, if an olah becomes mixed up with [unassigned] obligatory [bird] offerings, the only ones that are valid are those that correspond to the number of olot among the obligatory offerings [This rule holds true] whether the [unassigned] obligatory offerings are in the majority and the freewill-offerings in the minority, or the freewill-offerings are in the majority and those that are obligatory in the minority, or whether they are both equal in number.

When is this so? When obligatory offerings [get mixed up] with voluntary offerings. When, however, obligatory offerings get mixed up one with another, with one [pair] belonging to one [woman] and the other pair to another [woman], or two [pairs] belonging to one and two [pairs] to another, or three [pairs] to one and three [pairs] to another, then half of these are valid and the other half disqualified. If one [pair] belongs to one [woman] and two pairs to another, or three pairs to another, or ten pairs to another or one hundred to another, only the lesser number remains valid. Whether they are of the same denomination or of two denominations, or whether they belong to one woman or to two.

What is meant by one "name"? For a birth and a birth, or for zivah and zivah, that is one name. And "two names"? For a birth, [and the other] for a zivah. What is meant by "two women"? [When] one [woman] brings [her offering] for a birth and the other for a birth, or [when one brings] for a zivah and the other for a zivah this is "of one name". And a case "of two names"? When one brings for a birth and the other for a zivah. Rabbi Yose says: when two women purchased their kinnim in partnership, or gave the price of their kinnim to the priest [for him to purchase them], then the priest can offer whichever one he wants as a hatat or as an olah, whether they are of one name or of two names.

Chapter 2

If from an unassigned pair of birds a single pigeon flew into the open air, or flew among birds that had been left to die, or if one [of the pair] died, then he must take a mate for the second one. If it flew among birds that are to be offered up, it becomes invalid and it invalidates another bird as its counterpart [in the pair]; for the pigeon that flew away is invalid and invalidates another bird as its counterpart [in the pair].

How is this so? Two women, this one has two pairs and this one has two pairs, and one bird flies from the [pair of] one to the other [woman's pair], then it disqualifies by its escape one [of the birds from which it flew]. If it returned, it disqualifies yet another by its return. If it flew away again and then returned, and again flew away and returned, no further loss is incurred, since even if they had all become mixed together, not less than two [pairs would still be valid].

If one [woman] had one pair, another two, another three, another four, another five, another six and another seven pairs, and one bird flew from the first to the second pair, [and then a bird flew from there] to the third, [and then a bird flew from there] to the fourth, [and from there a bird flew] to the fifth [and from there a bird flew] to the sixth, [and from there a bird flew] to the seventh, and then a bird returns [in the same order as they flew away] it disqualifies at each flight and at each return. The first and second [women] have none left, the third has one pair, the fourth two, the fifth three, the sixth four, and the seventh six pairs. If again [one from each group] flew away and returned [in the same order as above], it disqualifies at each flight and return. The third and fourth woman have none left, the fifth has one pair, the sixth two pairs, and the seventh woman five pairs. If again one [from each group] flew away and returned [in the same order as above], it disqualifies at each flight and return. The fifth and sixth women have none left, and the seventh has four pairs. But some say that the seventh woman has lost nothing. If [a bird] from those that are left to die escaped to any of all the groups, then all must be left to die.

An unassigned pair and an assigned pair: if one bird from the unassigned [pair] flew to the assigned [pair], then a pair must be taken for the second [bird]. If one bird flew back, or if in the first place a bird from the assigned pair flew [to the other pair], then all must be left to die.

Hatat [birds] are on one side, and olot [birds] are on the other and an unassigned [pair] is in the middle: If from the middle pair one bird flew to this side, and one bird flew to this side, then he has not lost anything, because he [the priest] says that the bird that flew [from the middle] towards the hataot is a hatat and the bird that flew towards the olot is a olah. If one [from each side] returns to the middle, then [all] those in the middle must be left to die, but those [left on either side] can be offered up as hataot or as olot respectively. If again a bird [from the middle] returned and flew away to the sides, then all must be left to die. One cannot pair turtle-doves with pigeons or pigeons with turtle-doves. How is this so? If a woman has brought a turtle-dove as her hatat and a pigeon as her olah, she must then bring another turtle-dove as her olah; If her olah had been a turtle-dove and her hatat a pigeon, then she must bring another pigeon as her olah. Ben Azzai says: we go after the first [offering]. If a woman brought her hatat and then died, her heirs must bring her olah; [But if she first brought] her olah and then died, her heirs need not bring her hatat.

Chapter 3

When are these words said? When the priest asks advice. But in the case of a priest who does not seek advice, and one [pair] belongs to one [woman] and one to another, or two [pairs] to one and two to another, or three [pairs] to one and three to another, and he offered all of them above [the red line], then half are valid and half are invalid. [Similarly], if [he offered] all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. If [he offered] half of them above and half of them below, then of those [offered] above, half are valid and half are invalid, and also of those [offered] below, half are valid and half are invalid.

If one [pair] belonged to one woman and two [pairs] to another, or [even] three [pairs] to another, or [ten] pairs to another or a hundred to another, and he offered all of them above, then half are valid and half are invalid. [Similarly], if he offered all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. [If he offered] half of them above and half below, then the [number of birds as there is in the] larger part are valid. This is the general principle: whenever you can divide the pairs [of birds] so that those belonging to one woman need not have part of them [offered] above and part [offered] below, then half of them are valid and half are invalid; But whenever you cannot divide the pairs [of birds] without some of those belonging to one woman being [offered] above and some below, then [the number as there is in] the larger part are valid.

If the hatats belonged to one and the olot to another, and the priest offered them all above, then half are valid and half disqualified. If he offered them all below, half are valid and half disqualified. If he offered half of them above and half below, then all of them are disqualified, because I can argue that the hatats were offered above and the olot below.

If a hatat, an olah, an unassigned pair of birds and an assigned pair [became mixed up], and he offered them all above, then half are valid and half are invalid. [Similarly] if he offered all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. If he offered half of them above and half below, none is valid except the unassigned pair, and that must be divided between them.

If hataot birds were mixed up with [unassigned birds that were] obligatory offerings, only the number of hataot among the obligatory offerings are valid. If the [unassigned] obligatory offerings are twice as many as the hataot, then half are valid and half invalid; But if the hataot are twice as many as the [unassigned] obligatory offerings, then the number [of hataot] among the obligatory offerings are valid. So, too, if [birds assigned as] olot were mixed up with [unassigned] obligatory offerings, only the number of olot among the obligatory offerings are valid. If the [unassigned] obligatory offerings are twice as many as the olot, then half are valid and half invalid. But if the olot are twice as many as the [unassigned] obligatory offerings, then the number [of olot] among the obligatory offerings are valid.

If a woman says: "I vow a pair of birds if I give birth to a male child," and she does give birth to a male child, then she must offer up two pairs one for her vow and one for her obligation. If [before she assigned them] she gave them to the priest, and the priest who ought to offer three birds above and one below does not do so, but offers two above and two below, and does not seek guidance, she must she bring another bird and offer that above. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring two others. If she had expressly defined her vow, then must she bring three other birds. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring four others. If she made a definite fixture at the time of her vow, then must she bring another five birds. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring six others. If she gave them to the priest and it is not known what she gave, and the priest performed the sacrifice, but it is not known how he performed it, then she must bring four other birds for her vow, and two for her obligation and one for her hatat. Ben Azzai says: [she must bring] two hatats. Rabbi Joshua said: This is what it meant when they said: "When [the beast] is alive it possesses one sound, but when it is dead its sound is sevenfold." In what way is its sound sevenfold? Its two horns [are made into] two trumpets, its two leg-bones into two flutes, its hide into a drum, its entrails for lyres and its large intestines for harp strings; and there are some who add that its wool is used for the blue [pomegranates.] Rabbi Shimon ben Akashiah says: ignorant old people, the older they become, the more their intellect gets befuddled, as it is said: "He removes the speech of men of trust and takes away the sense of the elders." But when it comes to aged scholars, it is not so. On the contrary, the older they get, the more their mind becomes composed, as it is said: "With aged men comes wisdom, and understanding in length of days."

Mishnah Kelim

Chapter 1

The fathers of impurity are a: sheretz, semen, [an Israelite] who has contracted corpse impurity, a metzora during the days of his counting, and the waters of purification whose quantity is less than the minimum needed for sprinkling. Behold, these convey impurity to people and vessels by contact and to earthenware by presence within their airspace, But they do not convey impurity by being carried.

Above them are nevelah and waters of purification whose quantity is sufficient to be sprinkled, for these convey impurity to a person [even] by being carried so that he in turn conveys impurity to clothing by contact. Clothing, however, is free from impurity where there was contact alone.

Above them is one who had intercourse with a menstruant, for he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. Above them is the issue of a zav, his spit, his semen and his urine, and the blood of a menstruant, for they convey impurity both by contact and by carrying. Above them is an object on which one can ride, for it conveys impurity even when it lies under a heavy stone. Above the object on which one can ride is that on which one can lie, for contact is the same as its carrying. Above the object on which one can lie is the zav, for a zav conveys impurity to the object on which he lies, while the object on which he lies cannot convey the same impurity to that upon which it lies.

Above the zav is the zavah, for she conveys impurity to the man who has intercourse with her. Above the zavah is the metzora, for he conveys impurity by entering into a house. Above the metzora is a [human] bone the size of a barley grain, for it conveys impurity for seven days. More strict than all these is a corpse, for it conveys impurity by ohel (tent) whereby all the others convey no impurity.

There are ten [grades of] impurity that emanate from a person:A person before the offering of his obligatory sacrifices is forbidden to eat holy things but permitted to eat terumah and [second] tithe. If he is a tevul yom he is forbidden to eat holy things and terumah but permitted to eat [second] tithe. If he emitted semen he is forbidden to eat any of the three. If he had intercourse with a menstruant he defiles the bottom [bedding] upon which he lies as he does the top [bedding]. If he is a zav who has seen two discharges he conveys impurity to that on which he lies or sits and is required to undergo immersion in running water, but he is exempt from the sacrifice. If he saw three discharges he must bring the sacrifice. If he is a metzora that was only enclosed he conveys impurity by entry [into an ohel] but is exempt from loosening his hair, from rending his clothes, from shaving and from the birds offering. But if he was a confirmed metzora, he is liable for all these. If a limb on which there was not the proper quantity of flesh was severed from a person, it conveys impurity by contact and by carriage but not by ohel. But if it has the proper quantity of flesh it conveys impurity by contact, by carriage and by ohel. A "proper quantity of flesh" is such as is capable of healing. Rabbi Judah says: if in one place it has flesh sufficient to surround it with [the thickness of] a thread of the woof it is capable of healing.

There are ten grades of holiness: the land of Israel is holier than all other lands. And what is the nature of its holiness? That from it are brought the omer, the firstfruits and the two loaves, which cannot be brought from any of the other lands.

Cities that are walled are holier, for metzoras must be sent out of them and a corpse, though it may be carried about within them as long as it is desired, may not be brought back once it has been taken out.

The area within the wall [of Jerusalem] is holier, for it is there that lesser holy things and second tithe may be eaten. The Temple Mount is holier, for zavim, zavot, menstruants and women after childbirth may not enter it. The chel is holier, for neither non-Jews nor one who contracted corpse impurity may enter it. The court of women is holier, for a tevul yom may not enter it, though he is not obligated a hatat for doing so. The court of the Israelites is holier, for a man who has not yet offered his obligatory sacrifices may not enter it, and if he enters he is liable for a hatat. The court of the priests is holier, for Israelites may not enter it except when they are required to do so: for laying on of the hands, slaying or waving.

The area between the porch (ulam) and the altar is holier, for [priests] who have blemishes or unkempt hair may not enter it. The Hekhal is holier, for no one whose hands or feet are unwashed may enter it. The Holy of Holies is holier, for only the high priest, on Yom Kippur, at the time of the service, may enter it. Rabbi Yose said: in five respects the area between the porch and the altar is equal to the Hekhal, for those afflicted with blemishes or with a wild growth of hair, or who have drunk wine or whose hands or feet are unwashed may not enter there, and the people must keep away from the area between the porch and the altar when the incense is being burned.

Chapter 2

Vessels of wood, vessels of leather, vessels of bone or vessels of glass: If they are simple they are clean If they form a receptacle they are unclean. If they were broken they become clean again. If one remade them into vessels they are susceptible to impurity henceforth. Earthen vessels and vessels of sodium carbonate are equal in respect of impurity: they contract and convey impurity through their air-space; they convey impurity through the outside but they do not become impure through their backs; and when broken they become clean.

As regards the smallest earthen vessels, and the bottoms and sides [of the larger but broken vessels] that can stand unsupported: The prescribed size is a capacity to hold oil sufficient for the anointing of a little finger of a child [if their former capacity] was that of a log. If [their former capacity] was from one log to a se'ah [their present capacity] must be a quarter of a log. If it was from a se'ah to two se'ah it must be half a log. If from two se'ah to three se'ah or as much as five se'ah it must be a log, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: I do not prescribe any size for the unbroken vessels, rather: as regards the smallest earthen vessels, and the bottoms and sides [of larger but broken ones] that can stand unsupported: The prescribed size is a capacity to hold enough oil to anoint the little finger of a child. [This size is prescribed for pots] that are not bigger than the small cooking-pots. For small cooking-pots and for those between these and the jars from Lydda the prescribed capacity is a quarter of a log. For those which have a size between that of Lydda jars and Bethlehem jars the capacity must be that of half a log. For those between Bethlehem jars and large stone jars the capacity must be that of a log. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai says: [the prescribed capacity for the fragments] of large stone jars is two logs, and that for the bottoms of broken Galilean flasks and small jars is any whatsoever, but the fragments of their sides are not susceptible to impurity

The following are not susceptible to impurity among earthen vessels: A tray without a rim, A broken incense-pan, A pierced pan for roasting corn, Gutters even if they are bent and even if they have some form of receptacle, A cooking vessel that was turned into a bread-basket cover, A bucket that was turned into a cover for grapes, A barrel used for swimmers, A small jar fixed to the sides of a ladle, A bed, a stool, a bench, a table, a ship, and an earthen lamp, behold these are no susceptible to impurity. The following is a general rule: any among earthen vessels that has no inner part is not susceptible to impurity on its outer sides.

A lantern that has a receptacle for oil is susceptible to impurity, but one that has none is not susceptible. A potter's mould on which one begins to shape the clay is not susceptible to impurity, but that on which one finishes it is susceptible. A funnel for home use is not susceptible to impurity, but that of merchants is susceptible because it also serves as a measure, the words of Rabbi Judah ben Batera. Rabbi Akiva says: because he puts it on its side to let the buyer smell it.

The covers of wine jars and oil jars and the covers of papyrus jars are not susceptible to impurity But if he adapted them for use as receptacles they are susceptible. The cover of a pot: When it has a hole or it has a point, it is not susceptible to impurity, But if it does not have a hole or a pointed top it is susceptible because she drains the vegetables into it. Rabbi Eliezer bar Zadok says: because she turns out the contents [of the pot] on to it.

A damaged jar found in a furnace: Before its manufacture was complete it is not susceptible to impurity, But if after its manufacture was complete it is susceptible. A sprinkler: Rabbi Eliezer bar Zadok holds it is not susceptible to impurity; But Rabbi Yose holds it to be susceptible because it lets the liquid out in drops only.

The following among earthen vessels are susceptible to impurity:A tray with a rim, An unbroken fire-pan, And a tray made up of dishes, If one of them was defiled by a [dead] creeping thing they do not all become unclean, But if it had a rim that projected above the rims of the dishes and one of them was defiled all are unclean. Similarly with an earthen spice-box and a double ink-pot. If one container was defiled from a liquid, the other is not unclean. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: its thickness is divided and that side which serves the unclean one is unclean while that which serves the clean one remains clean. If its rim projects above the others and one of them contracted impurity the other is unclean.

A torch is susceptible to impurity. And the reservoir of a lamp contracts impurity through its air- space. The comb of a tzartzur: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is not susceptible to impurity, But the sages say that it is susceptible.

Chapter 3

The size of a hole that renders an earthen vessel clean:If the vessel was made for food, the hole must be big enough for olives [to fall through]. If it was used for liquids it suffices for the hole to be big enough for liquids [to go through it]. And if it was used for both, we apply the greater stringency, that olives must be able to fall through.

A jar: the size of the hole must be such that a dried fig [will fall through], the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Judah said: walnuts. Rabbi Meir said: olives. A stew-pot or a cooking pot: such that olives [will fall through]. A bucket and a pitcher: such that oil [will fall through]. A tzartzur: such that water [will fall through]. Rabbi Shimon says: in the case of all three, [the hole] must be such that seedlings [will fall through]. A lamp: the size of the hole must be such that oil [will fall through]. Rabbi Eliezer says: such that a small perutah [will fall through]. A lamp whose nozzle has been removed is clean. And one made of earth whose nozzle has been burned by the wick is also clean.

A jar that had a hole and was mended with pitch and then was broken again: If the fragment that was mended with the pitch can hold a quarter of a log it is unclean, since the designation of a vessel has never ceased to be applied to it. A potsherd that had a hole and was mended with pitch, it is clean though it can contain a quarter of a log, because the designation of a vessel has ceased to be applied to it.

If a jar was about to be cracked but was strengthened with cattle dung, although the potsherds would fall apart were the dung to be removed, it is unclean, because the designation of vessel never ceased to apply. If it was broken and some of its pieces were stuck together again, or if he brought other pieces of clay from elsewhere, and it was also lined with cattle dung, even though the potsherds hold together when the dung is removed, it is clean, because the designation of vessel ceased to apply. If it contained one potsherd that could hold a quarter of a log, all its parts contract impurity by contact, but that potsherd contracts impurity through its air-space.

One who lines a sound vessel: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon say: [the lining] contracts impurity. But the sages say: a lining over a sound vessel is not susceptible to impurity, and only one over a cracked vessel is susceptible. And the same dispute applies to the hoop of a pumpkin shell.

As to dog's tooth which which they line large jars: anything that touches it becomes unclean. The plug of a jar is not regarded as connected. That which touches the lining of an oven is unclean.

A cauldron which was lined with mortar or with potter's clay: That which touches the mortar is unclean; But that which touches the potter's clay is clean. A kettle which was punctured and the hole was stopped with pitch: Rabbi Yose rules that it is clean since it cannot hold hot water as cold. The same ruling he also gave concerning vessels made of pitch. Copper vessels which were lined with pitch the lining is clean, But if they are used for wine, it is unclean.

A jar which which was pierced and the hole stopped up with more pitch than was necessary: That which touches the needed portion is unclean, But that which touches the unneeded portion is clean. Pitch which dripped upon a jar, that which touches it is clean. A wooden or earthen funnel which was stopped up with pitch: Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says that it is unclean. Rabbi Akiva says that it is unclean when it is of wood and clean when it is of earthenware. Rabbi Yose says that both are clean.

Chapter 4

A potsherd that cannot stand unsupported on account of its handle, or a potsherd whose bottom is pointed and that point causes it to overbalance, is clean. If the handle was removed or the point was broken off it is still clean. Rabbi Judah says that it is unclean. If a jar was broken but is still capable of holding something in its sides, or if it was split into a kind of two troughs: Rabbi Judah says it is clean But the sages say it is unclean.

If a jar was cracked and cannot be moved with half a kav of dried figs in it, it is clean. If a damaged vessel (gistera) was cracked and it cannot hold any liquid, even though it can hold foodstuffs, it is clean, since remnants do not have remnants.

What is meant by a "damaged vessel" (gistera)? One whose handles were removed. If sharp ends projected from it: Any part of it which can contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while any impurity opposite an end conveys impurity to the vessel through its air-space, But any part of it which cannot contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while an impurity opposite an end does not convey impurity through its air-space. If it was leaning on its side like a kind of cathedra, Any part of it which can contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while any impurity opposite an end conveys impurity to the vessel through its air-space, But any part of it which cannot contain olives contracts impurity by contact, while an impurity opposite an end does not convey impurity to the vessel through its air-space. Bowls with Korfian [bottoms], and cups with Zidonian bottoms, although they cannot stand unsupported, are susceptible to impurity, because they were originally fashioned in this manner.

An earthenware vessel that has three rims: If the innermost one projects above the others, all outside it is not susceptible to impurity. If the outermost one projects above the others all within it is susceptible to impurity; And if the middle one projects above the others, that which is within it is susceptible to impurity, while that which is without it is not susceptible to impurity. If they were equal in height: Rabbi Judah says: the middle one is deemed to be divided. But the sages ruled: all are not susceptible to impurity. When do earthenware vessels become susceptible to impurity? As soon as they are baked in the furnace, that being the completion of their manufacture.

Chapter 5

A baking oven originally must be no less than four handbreadths [high] and what is left of it four handbreadths, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: this applies only to a large oven but in the case of a small one it originally can be [any height] and what is left is the greater part of it. [Its susceptibility to impurity begins] as soon as its manufacture is completed. What is regarded as the completion of its manufacture? When it is heated to a degree that suffices for the baking of spongy cakes. Rabbi Judah says: when a new oven has been heated to a degree that sufficed for the baking of spongy cakes in an old one.

A double stove: its original height must be no less than three fingerbreadths and what is left of it three fingerbreadths. [Its susceptibility to impurity begins] as soon as its manufacture is completed. What is regarded as the completion of its manufacture? When it is heated to a degree that suffices for the cooking of the lightest of eggs when scrambled and put in a saucepan. A single stove: if it was made for baking its prescribed size is the same as that for a baking-oven, and if it was made for cooking its prescribed size is the same as that for a double stove. A stone that projects one handbreadth from a baking-oven or three fingerbreadths from a double stove is considered a connection. One that projects from a single stove, if it was made for baking, the prescribed size is the same as that for a baking-oven, and if it was made for cooking the prescribed size is the same as that for a double stove. Rabbi Judah said: they spoke of a ‘handbreadth’ only where the projection was between the oven and a wall. If two ovens were adjacent to one another, they allot one handbreadth to this one and one to the other and the remainder is clean.

The crown of a double stove is clean. The fender around an oven: if it is four handbreadths high it contracts impurity by contact and through its air-space, but if it was lower it is clean. If it was joined to it, even if only by three stones, it is unclean. The place [on the stove] for the oil cruse, the spice-pot, and the lamp contract impurity by contact but not through their air-space, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Ishmael rules that they are clean.

An oven that was heated from its outside, or one that was heated without the owner's knowledge, or one that was heated while still in the craftsman's house is susceptible to impurity. It once happened that a fire broke out among the ovens of Kefar Signah, and when the case was brought up at Yavneh Rabban Gamaliel ruled that they were unclean.

The additional piece of a householder's oven is clean, but that of bakers is unclean because he rests the roasting spit on it. Rabbi Yohanan Hasandlar said: because one bakes on it when pressed [for space]. Similarly the additional part of the boiler used by olive cookers is susceptible to impurity, but that of one used by dyers is not susceptible.

If an oven was half filled with earth, the part from the earth downwards contracts impurity by contact only while the part from the earth upwards contracts impurity [also] from its air- space. If he put the oven over the mouth of a cistern or over that of a cellar and he put a stone at its side: Rabbi Judah says: if when heated below it becomes also heated above it is susceptible to impurity. But the sages say: since it was heated, no matter how, it is susceptible to impurity.

If an oven contracted impurity how is it to be cleansed? He must divide into three parts and scrape off the plastering so that [the oven] touches the ground. Rabbi Meir says: he does not need to scrape off the plastering nor is it necessary for [the oven] to touch the ground. Rather he reduces it within to a height of less than four handbreadths. Rabbi Shimon says: he must move it [from its position]. If it was divided into two parts, one large and the other small, the larger remains unclean and the smaller becomes clean. If it was divided into three parts one of which was as big as the other two together, the big one remains unclean and the two small ones become clean.

If an oven was cut up by its width into rings that are each less than four handbreadths in height, it is clean. If he subsequently plastered it over with clay, it becomes susceptible to impurity when it is heated to a degree that suffices for the baking of spongy cakes. If he distanced the plastering, and sand or gravel was put between it and the oven sides of such an oven it has been said, "A menstruant as well as a clean woman may bake in it and it remains clean."

An oven which came cut up in sections from the craftsman's house and he made for it hoops and put them on it, it is clean. If it contracts impurity, and then he removed its hoops it is clean. If he put them back on, it is still clean. If he plastered it with clay, it becomes susceptible to impurity and there is no need to heat it since it was once heated.

If he cut the oven up into rings, and then he put sand between each pair of rings, Rabbi Eliezer says: it is clean. But the sages say: it is unclean. This is the oven of Akhnai. As regards Arabian vats, which are holes dug in the ground and plastered with clay, if the plastering can stand of itself it is susceptible to impurity; Otherwise it is not susceptible. This is the oven of Ben Dinai.

An oven of stone or of metal is clean, But the latter is unclean as a metal vessel. If a hole was made in it, or if it was damaged or cracked, and he lined it with plaster or with a rim of clay, it is unclean. What must be the size of the hole [for it to be pure]? It must be big enough for the flame to come through. The same applies also to a stove. A stove of stone or of metal is clean. But the latter is unclean as a metal vessel. If a hole was made in it or if it was damaged or cracked but was provided with props it is unclean. If it was lined with clay, whether inside or outside, it remains clean. Rabbi Judah says: if [the lining was] inside it is unclean but if outside it remains clean.

Chapter 6

If he put three props into the ground and joined them [to the ground] with clay so that a pot could be set on them, [the structure] is susceptible to impurity. If he set three nails in the ground so that a pot could be set on them, even though a place was made on the top for the pot to rest, [the structure] is not susceptible to impurity. One who made a stove of two stones, joining them [to the ground] with clay: It is susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Judah says that it is not susceptible to impurity, unless a third stone is added or [the structure] is placed near a wall. If one stone was joined with clay and the other was not joined with clay, [the structure] is not susceptible to impurity.

A stone on which he placed a pot, [on it] and on an oven, or on it and a double stove, or on it and on a stove, is susceptible to impurity. [If he set the pot] on it and on another stone, on it and on a rock, or on it and on a wall, it is not susceptible to impurity. And such was the stove of the Nazirites in Jerusalem which was set up against a rock. As regards the stove of the butchers, where the stones are placed side by side, if one of the stoves contracted impurity, the others do not become unclean.

If one made two stoves of three stones and one of the outer ones was defiled the half of the middle one that serves the unclean one is unclean but the half of it that serves the clean one remains clean. If the clean one was removed, the middle one is regarded as completely transferred to the unclean one. If the unclean one was removed, the middle one is regarded as completely transferred to the clean one. Should the two outer ones become defiled, if the middle stone was large, each outer stone is allowed such a part of it as suffices for the support of a pot and the remainder is clean. But if it was small all of it is unclean. Should the middle stone be removed, if a big kettle can be set on the two outer stones they are unclean. If the middle stone is returned they all become clean again. If it was plastered with clay it becomes susceptible to impurity when it is heated to a degree that suffices for the cooking of an egg.

If two stones were made into a stove and they became defiled, and a stone was set up near the outer side of the one and another stone near the outer side of the other, [the inner half] of each [inner stones] remains unclean while [the outer] half of each [of these stones] is clean. If the clean stones are removed the others revert to their impurity.

Chapter 7

The fire-basket of a householder which was lessened by less than three handbreadths is susceptible to impurity because when it is heated from below a pot above would still boil. If [it was lessened] to a lower depth it is not susceptible to impurity. If subsequently a stone or gravel was put into it, it is still not susceptible to impurity. If it was plastered over with clay, it may contract impurity from that point and onwards. This was Rabbi Judah's reply in connection with the oven that was placed over the mouth of a cistern or over that of a cellar.

A hob that has a receptacle for pots is clean as a stove but unclean as a receptacle. As to its sides, whatever touches them does not become unclean as if the hob had been a stove, But as regards its wide side: Rabbi Meir holds it to be clean But Rabbi Judah holds it to be unclean. The same law applies also where a basket was inverted and a stove was put upon it.

A double stove which was split into two parts along its length is clean. Through its breadth is unclean. A single stove which was split into two parts, by its length or by its width, it is not susceptible to impurity. As to the extension around a stove, whenever it is three fingerbreadths high it contracts impurity by contact and also through its air-space, but if it is less it contracts impurity through contact and not through its air- space. How is the air-space determined? Rabbi Ishmael says: He puts a spit from above to below and opposite it contracts impurity through the air-space. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if the stove contracted impurity the extension is also unclean, but if the fender contracts impurity the stove does not become unclean.

If it [the extension] was detached from the stove, whenever it was three fingerbreadths high it contracts impurity by contact and through its air-space, If it was lower or if it was smooth it is clean. If three props on a stove were three fingerbreadths high, they contract impurity by contact and through their air-space. If they were lower, all the more so they contract impurity, even where they were four in number.

If one of them [i.e. the props] was removed, the remaining ones contract impurity by contact but not through air-space, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says that they are clean. If originally he made two props, one opposite the other, they contract impurity by contact and through air-space; the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says that they are clean. If they were more than three fingerbreadths high, the parts that are three fingerbreadths high and below contract impurity by contact and through air-space but the parts that are more than three fingerbreadths high contract impurity by contact and not through air-space; the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says that they are clean. If they were withdrawn from the rim [of the stove], the parts which are within three fingerbreadths contract impurity by contact and through air-space, and those parts that are removed more than three fingerbreadths contract impurity by contact but not through air-space, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says that they are clean.

How do we measure them? Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: he puts the measuring-rod between them, and any part that is outside the measuring-rod is clean while any part inside the measuring-rod, including the place of the measuring-rod itself, is unclean.

Chapter 8

An oven which they partitioned with boards or hangings, and in it was found a sheretz in one compartment, the entire oven is unclean. A hive which was broken and its gap was stopped up with straw and was suspended within the air-space of an oven while a sheretz was within it, the oven becomes unclean. If a sheretz was within the oven, any food within the hive becomes unclean. But Rabbi Eliezer says that it is clean. Rabbi Eliezer said: if it affords protection in the case of a corpse which is more consequential, should it not afford protection in the case of an earthenware vessel which is less consequential? They said to him: if it affords protection in the case of corpse impurity, this is because tents are divided, should it also afford protection in the case of an earthenware vessel which is not divided?

If the hive was complete, and so too in the case of a basket or a skin-bottle, and a sheretz was within it the oven remains clean. If the sheretz was in the oven, any food in the hive remain clean. If a hole was made in it: A vessel that is used for food must have a hole large enough for olives to fall through, If it is used for liquids the hole must be large enough for liquids to pass into it, And if it is used for either it is subjected to the greater restriction: the hole need only be large enough for liquids to pass into it.

Netting placed over the mouth of an oven and slightly sinking into it, and having no frame: If a sheretz was in it, the oven becomes unclean; If the sheretz was in the oven, the food in the netting becomes unclean, since only vessels afford protection against an impurity in an earthen vessel. A jar full of pure liquids placed beneath the bottom of an oven, and a sheretz in the oven – the jar and the liquids remain clean. If it was inverted, with its mouth projecting into the air-space of the oven, and a sheretz was in the oven, the liquid that clings to the sides of the jar remains clean.

A pot which was placed in an oven if a sheretz was in the oven, the pot remains clean since an earthen vessel does not impart impurity to vessels. If it contained dripping liquid, the latter contracts impurity and the pot also becomes unclean. It is as if this one says, "That which made you unclean did not make me unclean, but you have made me unclean."

If a rooster that swallowed a sheretz fell within the air-space of an oven, the oven remains clean; If the rooster died, the oven becomes unclean. If a sheretz was found in an oven, any bread in it contracts second degree impurity since the oven is of the first degree.

A leavening pot with a tightly fitting lid which was put in an oven, and there was some leaven and a sheretz within the pot, but there was a partition (of inedible bread) between them, the oven is unclean but the leaven is clean. But if it was an olive's bulk of corpse, both the oven and the house are unclean, and the leaven remains clean. If in the partition there was an opening of one handbreadth, all become unclean.

A sheretz which was found in the eye-hole of an oven or of a double stove or of a single stove: If it was outside the inner edge, it is clean. If it [the oven] was in the open air, even if it was an olive's bulk of corpse it is clean. If there was [in the eye-hole] an opening of one handbreadth, it is all unclean.

If a sheretz was found in the [place in a stove] where wood is put: Rabbi Judah says: if it was within the outer edge, [the stove] becomes unclean. But the sages say: if it was outside the inner edge [the stove] remains clean. Rabbi Yose says: if it was found beneath the spot where the pot is placed and inwards, the stove becomes unclean, but if beneath the spot where the pot is set and outwards, it remains clean. If it was found on the place where the bath-keeper sits, or where the dyer sits, or where the olive-boilers sit, the stove remains clean. It only becomes unclean only [when the sheretz] is found in the enclosed part and inwards.

A pit which has a place on which a pot may be set is unclean. And so also an oven of glass-blowers, if it has a place on which a pot may be set, it is unclean. The furnace of lime-burners, or of glaziers, or of potters is clean. A purna: If it has a frame is unclean. Rabbi Judah says: if it has coverings [for compartments.] Rabban Gamaliel says: if it has edges.

If a person who came in contact with one who has contracted corpse impurity had (food liquids in his mouth and he put his head into the air-space of an oven that was clean, they cause the oven to be unclean. If a person who was clean had food or liquids in his mouth and he put his head into the air-space of an oven that was unclean, they become unclean. If a person was eating a pressed fig with impure hands and he put his hand into his mouth to remove a small stone: Rabbi Meir considers the fig to be unclean But Rabbi Judah says it as clean. Rabbi Yose says: if he turned it over [in his mouth] the fig is unclean but if he did not turn it over the fig is clean. If the person had a pondion in his mouth, Rabbi Yose says: if he kept it there to relieve his thirst it becomes unclean.

If milk [of an impure woman] dripped from a woman's breasts and fell into the air-space of an oven, the oven becomes unclean, since a liquid conveys impurity regardless of whether one wanted it there or not. If she was sweeping it out and a thorn pricked her and she bled, or if she burnt herself and put her finger into her mouth, the oven becomes unclean.

Chapter 9

If a needle or a ring was found in the ground of an oven, and they can be seen but they don't stick out into the oven, if one bakes dough and it touches them, the [oven] is unclean. Regarding which dough did they speak? Medium dough. If they are found in the plaster of an oven with a tightly fitting lid: If the oven is unclean, they are unclean, If the oven is clean, they are clean. If they are found in the stopper of a jar: If on the sides, they are unclean. If opposite the mouth, they are clean. If they can be seen in it, but they do not enter its airspace, they are clean. If they sink into it, and there is [plaster] underneath them as thick as garlic peel, they are clean.

A jar that was full of clean liquids, with a siphon in it, and it had a tightly fitting cover and was in a tent in which there was a corpse: Bet Shammai says: both the jar and the liquids are clean but the siphon is unclean. And Bet Hillel says: the siphon also is clean. Bet Hillel changed their mind and ruled in agreement with Bet Shammai.

If a sheretz was found beneath the bottom of an oven, the oven remains clean, for I can assume that it fell there while it was still alive and that it died only now. If a needle or a ring was found beneath the bottom of an oven, the oven remains clean, for I can assume that they were there before the oven arrived. If it was found in the wood ashes, the oven is unclean since one has no ground on which to base an assumption of cleanness.

A sponge which had absorbed unclean liquids and its outer surface became dry and it fell into the air-space of an oven, the oven is unclean, for the liquid would eventually come out. And the same with regard to a piece of turnip or reed grass. Rabbi Shimon says: the oven is clean in both these cases.

Potsherds that had been used for unclean liquids which fell into the air-space of an oven, if the oven was heated, it becomes unclean, for the liquid would eventually come out. And the same with regard to fresh olive peat, but if it was old, the oven remains clean. If it was known that liquid emerges, even after the lapse of three years, the oven becomes unclean.

If olive peat or grape skins had been prepared in conditions of cleanness, and unclean persons trod upon them and afterwards liquids emerged from them, they remain clean, since they had originally been prepared in conditions of cleanness. If a spindle hook was sunk into the spindle, or the iron point into the ox goad, or a ring into a brick, and all these were clean, and then they were brought into a tent in which was a corpse, they become unclean. If a zav caused them to move they become unclean. If they then fell into the air-space of a clean oven, they cause it to be unclean. If a loaf of terumah came in contact with them, it remains clean.

If there was netting placed over the mouth of an oven, forming a tightly fitting lid, and a split appeared between the oven and the colander, the minimum size [to allow impurity to enter] is that of the circumference of the tip of an ox goad that cannot actually enter it. Rabbi Judah says: it must be one into which the tip can actually enter. If a split appeared in the netting, the minimum size is the circumference of the tip of an ox goad that can enter it. Rabbi Judah says: even if it cannot enter. If the split was curved it must not be regarded as straight, and still the minimum size must be the circumference of the tip of an ox goad that can actually enter.

If there was a hole in the "eye" of an oven, the minimum size [for it to leave the category of being tightly closed] is the circumference of a burning spindle staff that can enter and come out [without being extinguished]. Rabbi Judah says: one that is not burning. If the hole appeared at its side, the minimum size must be that of the circumference of a spindle staff that can enter and come out while it is not burning. Rabbi Judah says: while burning. Rabbi Shimon says: if the hole is in the middle its size must be such that a spindle staff can enter it, but if it was at the side it need only be such as the spindle staff cannot actually enter. And similarly he used to rule concerning the stopper of a jar in which a hole appeared: the minimum size is the circumference of the second knot in an oat stalk. If the hole was in the middle the stalk should be able to enter, and if at the side it need not be able to enter. And similarly he used to rule concerning large stone jars in the stoppers of which appeared a hole. The minimum size is the circumference of the second knot in a reed. If the hole was in the middle the reed must be able to enter it, and if it was at the side the reed need not be able to enter it. When is this so? When the jars were made for wine, but if they were made for other liquids, if they have even the smallest hole, they are unclean. When is this so? When the holes were not made by a person, but if they were made by a person, if they have even the smallest hole, they are unclean. If a hole appeared [in other vessels its prescribed size ] is as follows: if the vessel was used for food, [the hole must be one] through which olives can fall out; if for liquids, one that lets out liquids; If for either, the greater restriction is imposed [even with regard to the issue of] a tightly fitting cover [the size of the hole need only be] one that admits a liquid.

Chapter 10

The following vessels protect their contents when they have a tightly fitting cover: those made of cattle dung, of stone, of clay, of earthenware, of sodium carbonate, of the bones of a fish or of its skin, or of the bones of any animal of the sea or of its skin, and wooden vessels that are always clean. They protect whether the covers close their mouths or their sides, whether they stand on their bottoms or lean on their sides. If they were turned over with their mouths downwards they afford protection to all that is beneath them to the nethermost deep. Rabbi Eliezer declares this unclean. These protect everything, except that an earthen vessel protects only foods, liquids and earthen vessels.

How may it be tightly covered? With lime or gypsum, pitch or wax, mud or excrement, crude clay or potter's clay, or any substance that is used for plastering. One may not make a tightly fitting cover with tin or with lead because though it is a covering, it is not tightly fitting. One may not make a tightly fitting cover with swollen fig-cakes or with dough that was kneaded with fruit juice, since it might cause it to become unfit. If he did make a tightly fitting cover [from such material] it protects.

A stopper of a jar that is loose but does not fall out: Rabbi Judah says: it protects. But the sages say: it does not protect. If its finger-hold was sunk within the jar and a sheretz was in it, the jar becomes unclean. If the sheretz was in the jar, any food in it, become unclean.

If a ball or coil of reed grass was placed over the mouth of a jar, and only its sides were plastered, it does not protect unless it was also plastered above or below. The same is true with regard to a patch of cloth. If it was of paper or leather and bound with a cord, if he plastered it from the sides, it protects.

If [the outer layer] a jar had been peeled off but its pitch [lining] remained intact, And similarly if pots of fish brine were sealed up with gypsum at a level with the brim: Rabbi Judah says: they do not protect. But the sages say: they do protect.

If a jar had a hole in it and wine lees stopped it up, they protect it. If one stopped it up with a vine shoot [it does not protect] until he plasters it at the sides. If there were two vine shoots, [it does not protect] unless he plastered it at the sides and also between the one shoot and the other. If a board was placed over the mouth of an oven, it protects if he plastered it at the sides. If there were two boards [it does not protect] unless he plastered at the sides and also between the one board and the other. If they were fastened together with pegs or with bamboo joints there is no need for them to be plastered in the middle.

An old oven was within a new one and netting was over the mouth of the old [new] one: If [it was placed such that if] the old one were to be removed the netting would drop, all [the contents of both ovens] are unclean; But if it would not drop, all are clean. A new oven was within an old one and netting was over the mouth of the old one if there was not a handbreadth of space between the new oven and the netting, all the contents of the new one are clean.

If [earthenware] pans were placed one within the other and their rims were on the same level, and there was a sheretz in the upper one or in the lower one, that pan alone becomes unclean but all the others remain clean. If [they were perforated] to the extent of admitting a liquid, and the sheretz was in the uppermost one, all become unclean. If in the lowest one, that one is unclean while the others remain clean. If the sheretz was in the uppermost one and the lowest projected above it, both are unclean. If the sheretz was in the uppermost one and the lowest projected above it, any one that contained dripping liquid becomes unclean.

Chapter 11

Metal vessels, whether they are flat or form a receptacle, are susceptible to impurity. On being broken they become clean. If they were re-made into vessels they revert to their former impurity. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: this does not apply to every form of impurity but only to that contracted from a corpse.

Every metal vessel that has a name of its own [is susceptible to impurity,] Except for a door, a bolt, a lock, a socket under a hinge, a hinge, a clapper, and the [threshold] groove under a door post, since these are intended to be attached to the ground.

If vessels are made from iron ore, from smelted iron, from the hoop of a wheel, from sheets, from plating, from the bases, rims or handles of vessels, from chippings or filings, they are clean. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: even those made of pieces of vessels. From [vessels that are made] of fragments of vessels, from pieces of old vessels, or from nails that were known to have been made from vessels, are unclean. [If they were made] from ordinary nails: Bet Shammai says: they are unclean, And Bet Hillel says that they are clean.

If unclean iron was smelted together with clean iron and the greater part was from the unclean iron, [the vessel made of the mixture] is unclean; If the greater part was from the clean iron, the vessel is clean. If each was half, it is unclean. The same law also applies to a mixture of cement and cattle dung. A door bolt is susceptible to impurity, but [one of wood] that is only plated with metal is not susceptible to impurity. The clutch and the crosspiece [of a lock] are susceptible to impurity. A door-bolt: Rabbi Joshua says: he may remove it from one door and hang it on another on Shabbat. Rabbi Tarfon says: it is like all other vessels and may be carried about in a courtyard.

The scorpion [-shaped] bit of a bridle is susceptible to impurity, but the cheek-pieces are clean. Rabbi Eliezer says that the cheek-pieces are susceptible to impurity. But the sages says that the scorpion-bit alone is susceptible to impurity, When they are joined together it is all susceptible to impurity.

A metal spindle-knob:Rabbi Akiva says it is susceptible to impurity But the sages say it is not susceptible. If it was only plated [with metal] it is clean. A spindle, a distaff, a rod, a double flute and a pipe are susceptible to impurity if they are of metal, but if they are only plated [with metal] they are clean. If a double flute has a receptacle for the wings it is susceptible to impurity in either case.

A curved horn is susceptible to impurity but a straight one is clean. If its mouthpiece was covered with metal it is unclean. If its broad side [is covered with metal]: Rabbi Tarfon says it is susceptible to impurity But the sages say it is clean. While they are joined together the whole is susceptible to impurity. Similarly: the branches of a candlestick are clean. And the cups and the base are susceptible to impurity, But while they are joined together the whole is susceptible to impurity.

A helmet is susceptible to impurity but the cheek-pieces are clean, But if they have a receptacle for water they are susceptible to impurity. All weapons of war are susceptible to impurity: a javelin, a spear-head, metal boots, and a breastplate are susceptible to impurity. All women's ornaments are susceptible to impurity: a golden city (a tiara), a necklace, ear-rings, finger-rings, a ring whether it has a seal or does not have a seal, and nose-rings. If a necklace has metal beads on a thread of flax or wool and the thread broke, the beads are still susceptible to impurity, since each one is a vessel in itself. If the thread was of metal and the beads were of precious stones or pearls or glass, and the beads were broken while the thread alone remained, it is still susceptible to impurity. The remnant of a necklace [is susceptible] as long as there is enough for the neck of a little girl. Rabbi Eliezer says: even if only one ring remained it is unclean, since it also is hung around the neck.

If an earring was shaped like a pot at its bottom and like a lentil at the top and the sections fell apart, the pot-shaped section is susceptible to impurity because it is a receptacle, while the lentil shaped section is susceptible to impurity in itself. The hooklet is clean. If the sections of an ear-ring that was in the shape of a cluster of grapes fell apart, they are clean.

Chapter 12

A man's ring is susceptible to impurity. A ring for cattle or for vessels and all other rings are clean. A beam for arrows is susceptible to impurity, but one for prisoners is clean. A prisoner's collar is susceptible to impurity. A chain that has a lock-piece is susceptible to impurity. But that used for tying up cattle is clean. The chain used by wholesalers is susceptible to impurity. That used by householders is clean. Rabbi Yose said: When is this so? When it attaches to one door, but if it attaches to two doors or if it had a snail[-shaped] piece at its end it is susceptible to impurity.

The beam of a wool-combers’ balance is susceptible to impurity on account of the hooks. And that of a householder, if it has hooks is also susceptible to impurity. The hooks of porters are clean but those of peddlers are susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Judah says: in the case of the peddlers' [hooks], [the hook] that is in front is susceptible to impurity but that which is behind is clean. The hook of a couch is susceptible to impurity but that of bed poles is clean. [The hook of] a chest is susceptible to impurity but that of a fish trap is clean. That of a table is susceptible to impurity but that of a wooden candlestick is clean. This is the general rule: any hook that is attached to a susceptible vessel is susceptible to impurity, but one that is attached to a vessel that is not susceptible to impurity is clean. All these, however, are by themselves clean.

The metal cover of a basket of householders: Rabban Gamaliel says: it is susceptible to impurity, The sages say that it is clean. But that of physicians is susceptible to impurity. The door of a cupboard of householders is clean but that of physicians is susceptible to impurity. Tongs are susceptible to impurity but stove-tongs are clean. The scorpion [-shaped] hook in an olive-press is susceptible to impurity but the hooks for the walls are clean.

A blood-letters’ nail is susceptible to impurity. But [the nail] of a sundial is clean. Rabbi Zadok says that it is susceptible to impurity. A weaver's nail is susceptible to impurity. The chest of a grist-dealer: Rabbi Zadok says: it is susceptible to impurity, But the sages say that it is clean. If its wagon was made of metal it is susceptible to impurity.

A nail which he adapted to be able to open or to shut a lock is susceptible to impurity. But one used for guarding is clean. A nail which he adapted to open a jar: Rabbi Akiva says that it is susceptible to impurity, But the sages say that it is clean unless he forges it. A money-changer's nail is clean, But Rabbi Zadok says: it is susceptible to impurity. There are three things which Rabbi Zadok holds to be susceptible to impurity and the sages hold clean: The nail of a money-changer, The chest of a grist-dealer And the nail of a sundial. Rabbi Zadok rules that these are susceptible to impurity and the sages rule that they are clean.

There are four things which Rabban Gamaliel says are susceptible to impurity, and the sages say are not susceptible to impurity.The covering of a metal basket, if it belongs to householders; And the hanger of a strigil; And metal vessels which are still unshaped; And a plate that is divided into two [equal] parts. And the sages agree with Rabban Gamaliel in the case of a plate that was divided into two parts, one large and one small, that the large one is susceptible to impurity and the small one is not susceptible to impurity.

If a dinar had been invalidated and then was adapted for hanging around a young girl's neck it is susceptible to impurity. So, too, if a sela had been invalidated was adapted for use as a weight, it is susceptible to impurity. How much may it depreciate while one is still permitted to keep it? As much as two denars. Less and he must be cut it up.

A pen-knife, a writing pen, a plummet, a weight, pressing plates, a measuring-rod, and a measuring-table are susceptible to impurity. All unfinished wooden vessels also are susceptible to impurity, excepting those made of boxwood. Rabbi Judah says: one made of an olive-tree branch is also clean unless it was first heated.

Chapter 13

The sword, knife, dagger, spear, hand-sickle, harvest-sickle, clipper, and barbers’ whose component parts were separated, are susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Yose says: the part that is near the hand is susceptible to impurity, but that which is near the top is clean. The two parts of shears which were separated: Rabbi Judah says: they are still susceptible to impurity; But the sages say that they are clean.

A koligrophon whose spoon has been removed is still susceptible to impurity on account of its teeth. If its teeth have been removed it is still susceptible on account of its spoon. A makhol whose spoon is missing is still susceptible to impurity on account of its point; If its point was missing it is still susceptible on account of its spoon. A stylus whose writing point is missing is still susceptible to impurity on account of its eraser; If its eraser is missing it is susceptible on account of its writing point. A zomalister whose spoon is lost is still susceptible to impurity on account of its fork; If its fork is missing, it is still susceptible on account of its spoon. So too with regard to the prong of a mattock. The minimum size for all these instruments: so that they can perform their usual work.

A harhur that is damaged is still susceptible to impurity until its greater part is removed. But if its shaft-socket is broken it is clean. A hatchet whose cutting edge is lost remains susceptible to impurity on account of its splitting edge. If its splitting edge is lost it remains susceptible on account of its cutting edge. If its shaft-socket is broken it is clean.

An ash-shovel whose spoon was missing is still susceptible to impurity, since it is still like a hammer, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages rule that it is clean. A saw whose teeth are missing one in every two is clean. But if a hasit length of consecutive teeth remained it is susceptible to impurity. An adze, scalpel, plane, or drill that was damaged remains susceptible to impurity, but if its steel edge was missing it is clean. In all these cases if it was split into two parts both remain susceptible to impurity, except for the drill. The block of a plane by itself is clean.

A needle whose eye or point is missing is clean. If he adapted it to be a stretching-pin it is susceptible to impurity. A pack-needle whose eye was missing is still susceptible to impurity since one writes with it. If its point was missing it is clean. A stretching-pin is in either case susceptible to impurity. A needle that has become rusty: If this hinders it from sewing it is clean, But if not it remains susceptible to impurity. A hook that was straightened out is clean. If it is bent back it resumes its susceptibility to impurity.

Wood that serves a metal vessel is susceptible to impurity, but metal that serves a wooden vessel is clean. How so? If a lock is of wood and its clutches are of metal, even if only one of them is so, it is susceptible to impurity, but if the lock is of metal and its clutches are of wood, it is clean. If a ring was of metal and its seal of coral, it is susceptible to impurity, but if the ring was of coral and its seal of metal, it is clean. The tooth in the plate of a lock or in a key is susceptible to impurity by itself.

If Ashkelon grappling-irons were broken but their hooks remained, they remain susceptible to impurity. If a pitch-fork, winnowing-fan, or rake, and the same applies to a hair-comb, lost one of its teeth and it was replaced by one of metal, it is susceptible to impurity. And concerning all these Rabbi Joshua said: the scribes have here introduced a new principle of law, and I have no explanation to offer.

A flax-comb: if the teeth were missing but two remained, it is still susceptible to impurity. If only one remained it is clean. As regards all the teeth, each one individually is susceptible to impurity. A wool-comb: if one tooth out of every two is missing it is clean. If three consecutive teeth remained, it is susceptible to impurity. If the outermost tooth was one of them, the comb is clean. If two teeth were removed from the comb and made into a pair of tweezers, they are susceptible to impurity. Even if only one was removed but it was adapted to be used for a lamp or as a stretching-pin, it is susceptible to impurity.

Chapter 14

What is the minimum size of [broken] metal vessels [for them to be susceptible to impurity]? A bucket must be of such a size as to draw water with it. A kettle must be such as water can be heated in it. A boiler, such as can hold selas. A cauldron, such as can hold jugs. Jugs, such as can hold perutahs. Wine-measures, such as can measure wine; and oil-measures, such as can measure oil. Rabbi Eliezer says: the size for all these is such as can hold perutahs. Rabbi Akiva says: a vessel that lacks trimming is susceptible to impurity, but one that lacks polishing is clean.

A staff to the end of which he attached a nail like an axe is susceptible to impurity. If the staff was studded with nails it is susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Shimon ruled: only if he put in three rows. In all cases where he put them in as ornamentation the staff is clean. If he attached a tube to its end, and so also in the case of a door, it is clean. If it was once an independent vessel and then it was fixed to the staff, it remains susceptible to impurity. When does it become pure? Bet Shammai says: when it is damaged; And Bet Hillel says: when it is joined on.

A builder's staff and a carpenter's axes are susceptible to impurity. Tent-pegs and surveyors’ pegs are susceptible to impurity. A surveyor's chain is susceptible to impurity, but one used for wood is clean. The chain of a big bucket [is susceptible to impurity to a length of] four handbreadths, and that of a small one [to a length of] ten handbreadths. A blacksmith's jack is susceptible to impurity. A saw whose teeth were made in a hole susceptible to impurity, but if they were turned from below upwards it is clean. All covers are clean except that of a boiler.

The parts of a wagon that are susceptible to impurity: the metal yoke, the cross-bar, the side-pieces that hold the straps, the iron bar under the necks of the cattle, the pole-pin, the metal girth, the trays, the clapper, the hook, and any nail that holds any of its parts together.

The clean parts of a wagon are the following: the yoke that is only plated [with metal], side-pieces made for ornamentation, tubes that give out a noise, the lead at the side of the necks of the cattle, the rim of the wheel, the plates and mountings, and all other nails, all of these are clean. Metal shoes of cattle are susceptible to impurity but those made of cork are clean. When does a sword become susceptible to impurity? When it has been polished. And a knife? When it has been sharpened.

A metal basket-cover which was turned into a mirror: Rabbi Judah rules that it is clean. And the sages rule that it is susceptible to impurity. A broken mirror, if it does not reflect the greater part of the face, is clean.

Metal vessels remain unclean and become clean even when broken, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Joshua says: they can be made clean only when they are whole. How so? If they were sprinkled upon and on the same day they were broken and then they were recast and sprinkled upon on the same day, they are clean, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Joshua says: there can be no effective sprinkling earlier than on the third and the seventh day.

A knee-shaped key that was broken off at the knee is clean. Rabbi Judah says that it is unclean because one can open with it from within. A gamma-shaped key that was broken off at its shorter arm is clean. If it retained the teeth and the gaps it remains unclean. If the teeth were missing it is still unclean on account of the gaps; if the gaps were blocked up it is unclean on account of the teeth. If the teeth were missing and the gaps were blocked up, or if they were merged into one another, it is clean. If in a mustard-strainer three holes in its bottom were merged into one another the strainer is clean. A metal mill-funnel is unclean.

Chapter 15

Vessels of wood, leather, bone or glass: those that are flat are clean and those that form a receptacle are susceptible to impurity. If they are broken they become clean again. If one remade them into vessels they are susceptible to impurity henceforth. A chest, a box, a cupboard, a straw basket, a reed basket, or the tank of an Alexandrian ship, that have flat bottoms and can hold a minimum of forty se'ah in liquid measure which represent two kor in dry measure, are clean. All other vessels whether they can contain the minimum or cannot contain it, are susceptible to impurity, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: the tub of a wagon, the food chests of kings, the tanners trough, the tank of a small ship, and an ark, even though they are able to contain the minimum, are susceptible to impurity, since they are intended to be moved about with their contents. As to all other vessels, those that can contain the minimum are clean and those that cannot contain it are susceptible to impurity. There is no difference between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah except a baking trough which belongs to a householder.

Bakers’ baking-boards are susceptible to impurity, but those used by householders are clean. But if he dyed them red or saffron they are susceptible to impurity. If a bakers’ shelf was fixed to a wall: Rabbi Eliezer rules that it is clean And the sages rule that it is susceptible to impurity. The bakers' frame is susceptible to impurity but one used by householders is clean. If he made a rim on its four sides it is susceptible to impurity, but if one side was open it is clean. Rabbi Shimon says: if he fixed it so that one can cut the dough upon it, it is susceptible to impurity. Similarly, a rolling-pin is susceptible to impurity.

The container of the flour-dealers’ sifter is susceptible to impurity, but the one of a householder is clean. Rabbi Judah says: also one that is used by a hairdresser is susceptible to impurity as a seat, since girls sit in it when their hair is dressed.

All hangers are susceptible to impurity, except for those of a sifter and a sieve that are used by householders, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: all hangers are clean, excepting those of a sifter of flour-dealers, of a sieve used in threshing-floors, of a hand-sickle and of a detective's staff, since they aid when the instrument is in use. This is the general rule: [a hanger] that is intended to aid when the instrument is in use is susceptible to impurity and one intended to serve only as a hanger is clean.

The grist-dealers’ shovel is susceptible to impurity but the one used in grain stores is clean. The one used in wine- presses is susceptible to impurity but that used in threshing- floors is clean. This is the general rule: [a shovel] that is intended to hold anything is susceptible to impurity but one intended only to heap stuff together is clean.

Ordinary harps are susceptible to impurity, but the harps of Levites are clean. All liquids are susceptible to impurity, but the liquids in the Temple slaughtering house are clean. All scrolls convey impurity to the hands, excepting the scroll of the Temple courtyard. A wooden toy horse is clean. The belly-lute, the donkey-shaped musical instrument and the erus are susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Judah says: the erus is susceptible to sitting impurity since the wailing woman sits on it. A weasel-trap is susceptible to impurity, but a mouse- trap is clean.

Chapter 16

A wooden vessel that was broken into two parts becomes clean, except for a folding table, a dish with compartments for [different kinds of] food, and a householder's footstool. Rabbi Judah says: a double dish and a Babylonian drinking vessel are subject to the same law. When do wooden vessels begin to be susceptible to impurity? A bed and a cot, after they are sanded with fishskin. If the owner determined not to sand them over they are susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Meir says: a bed becomes susceptible to impurity as soon as three rows of meshes have been knitted in it.

Wooden baskets [become susceptible to impurity] as soon as their rims are rounded off and their rough ends are smoothed off. But those that are made of palm-branches [become susceptible to impurity] even though their ends were not smoothed off on the inside, since they are allowed to remain in this condition. A basket [of reed-grass becomes susceptible to impurity] as soon as its rim is rounded off, its rough ends are smoothed off, and its hanger is finished. A wicker basket flasks or for cups [is susceptible to impurity] even if the rough ends were not smoothed off on the inside, since these are allowed to remain in this condition.

Small reed baskets and baskets [become susceptible to impurity] as soon as their rims are rounded off and their rough ends are smoothed off. Large reed baskets and large hampers, as soon as two rows have been made round their sides. The container of a sifter or a sieve and a cup of the balances, as soon as one circling band has been made round their sides. A willow basket, as soon as two twists have been made around its wide sides. And a rush basket, as soon as one twist has been made round it.

When do leather vessels become susceptible to impurity?A leather pouch, as soon as its hem has been stitched, its rough ends trimmed and its straps sewn on. Rabbi Judah says: so soon as its ears have been sewn on. A leather apron [becomes susceptible to impurity] as soon as its hem has been stitched, its rough end trimmed and its strings sewn on. Rabbi Judah says: as soon as its loops have been sewn on. A leather bed cover [becomes susceptible] as soon as its hem has been stitched and its rough ends trimmed. Rabbi Judah says: as soon as its straps have been sewn on. A leather cushion or mattress [becomes susceptible] as soon as its hem has been stitched and its rough ends trimmed. Rabbi Judah says: as it has been sew up and less than five handbreadths remained open.

A basket [for figs] is susceptible to uncleanness but a basket for wheat is clean. Small baskets made of leaves are clean, but those made of branches are susceptible to uncleanness. The palm wrapping [in which dates are left] and into which they can be easily put and from which they can easily be taken out is susceptible to uncleanness, but if this cannot be done without tearing it or undoing it, it is clean.

The leather glove of winnowers, travelers, or flax workers is susceptible to uncleanness. But the one for dyers or blacksmiths is clean. Rabbi Yose says: the same law applies to the glove of grist dealers. This is the general rule: that which is made for holding anything is susceptible to uncleanness, but that which only affords protection against perspiration is clean.

The dung bag of a bull and its muzzle, a bee shelf, and a fan are clean. The cover of a small box is susceptible to uncleanness; The cover of a clothes chest is clean. The cover of a box, the cover of a basket, a carpenter's vice, a cushion under a box or its arched cover, a reading-desk for a book, a bolt-socket, a lock-socket, a mezuzah case, a lyre case, a violin case, the block of the turban-makers, a wooden musical toy horse, the clappers of a wailing woman, a poor man's parasol, bed posts, a tefillin mould, and the mould of string makers all these are clean. This is the general rule which Rabbi Yose stated: all objects that serve as a protection to objects that a man uses, both when the latter are in use and when they are not in use, are susceptible to uncleanness; but those that serve them as a protection only when the latter are in use are clean.

The sheath of a sword, a knife or a dagger, the case for scissors, or shears or a razor, the case of make-up and the make-up box, the stylus case, the compass case, the tablet case, the case for a board, a quiver and a javelin case all these are susceptible to uncleanness. The case for a double flute is susceptible to uncleanness if the instrument is put in from above, but if it is put in from the side it is clean. A case for flutes Rabbi Judah says it is clean because these are put in from the side. The covering of a club, a bow or a spear is clean. This is the general rule: that which serves as a case is susceptible to uncleanness, but that which is merely a covering is clean.

Chapter 17

All [wooden] vessels that belong to householder [become clean if the holes in them are] the size of pomegranates. Rabbi Eliezer says: [the size of the hole depends] on what it is used for. Gardeners’ vegetable baskets [become clean if the holes in them are] the size of bundles of vegetables. Baskets of householders [become clean if the holes in them are] the size of [bundles] of straws. Those of bath-keepers, if bundles of chaff [will drop through]. Rabbi Joshua says: in all these the size is that of pomegranates.

A skin bottle [becomes clean if the holes in it are of] a size through which warp-stoppers [can fall out]. If a warp-stopper cannot be held in, but it can still hold a woof-stopper it remains unclean. A dish holder that cannot hold dishes but can still hold trays remains unclean. A chamber- pot that cannot hold liquids but can still hold excrements remains unclean. Rabban Gamaliel rules that it is clean since people do not usually keep one that is in such a condition.

Bread-baskets [become clean if] the size [of their hole is such] that loaves of bread [would fall through]. Papyrus frames through into which reeds were inserted from the bottom upwards to strengthen them, are clean. If he fixed walls to it, they are susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Shimon says: if it cannot be lifted up by these walls it is clean.

The pomegranates of which they have spoken--three attached to one another. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in a sifter or a sieve [the size of the hole must be such that a pomegranate will drop out] when one picks it up and walks about with it. In a basket it must be such [as would allow a pomegranate] to fall through while one hangs it behind him. And all other vessels which cannot hold pomegranates as, for instance, the quarter kav measure and the half quarter kav measure, and small baskets, the size [of their holes must be] such as would extend over the greater part of them, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: [the size of their hole must be such that] olives [could fall through]. If their sides were broken [the size of their hole must be] such as olives would drop through. If they are worn away the size must be such as would allow the objects which are usually kept in them [to drop through].

The pomegranate of which they spoke refers to one that is neither small nor big but of moderate size. And why did they mention the pomegranates of Baddan? That whatever their quantity they cause [other pomegranates] to be forbidden, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: to use them as a measure for holes in vessels. Rabbi Akiva said: they were mentioned for both reasons: that they are to be used as a measure for holes in vessels and that whatever their quantity they cause [other pomegranates] to be forbidden. Rabbi Yose said: the pomegranates of Baddan and the leeks of Geba were mentioned only to indicate that they must be tithed everywhere with certain tithe.

The egg of which they spoke it is one that is neither big nor small but of moderate size. Rabbi Judah says: the largest and the smallest must be brought and put in water and the displaced water is then divided. Rabbi Yose says: but who can tell me which is the largest and which is the smallest? Rather, it all depends on the observer's estimate.

The dried fig of which they spoke--- it is one that is neither big nor small but of moderate size. Rabbi Judah says: the biggest in the land of Israel is like one of medium size in other lands.

The olive of which they spoke it is one that is neither big nor small but of moderate size the egori. The barleycorn of which they spoke it is one that is neither big nor small but of moderate size the midbarit The lentil of which they spoke it is one that is neither big nor small but of moderate size--the egyptian kind. "Any movable object conveys uncleanness if it is of the thickness of an ox goad" it is one that is neither big nor small but of moderate size. What is meant by "one of moderate size?" One whose circumference is just a handbreadth.

The cubit of which they spoke is one of medium size. There were two standard cubits in Shushan Habirah, one in the north-eastern corner and the other in the south-eastern corner. The one in the north-eastern corner exceeded that of Moses by half a fingerbreadth, while the one in the south-eastern corner exceeded the other by half a fingerbreadth, so that the latter exceeded that of Moses by a fingerbreadth. But why were there a larger and a smaller cubit? Only for this reason: so that craftsmen might take their orders according to the smaller cubit and return their finished work according to the larger cubit, so that they might not be guilty of any possible trespassing of Temple property.

Rabbi Meir says: all cubits were of the moderate length except that for the golden altar, the horns, the surround and the base. Rabbi Judah says: the cubit used for the building was one of six handbreadths and that for the vessels one of five handbreadths.

Sometimes they stated a smaller measure: Liquid and dry measures were measured with the Italian standard which was the one that was used in the wilderness. Sometimes they stated a measure that varied according to the individual concerned: One who takes the handful of a minhah, One who takes both hands full of incense, One who drinks a cheek full on Yom Kippur, And the two meals for an eruv, The quantity being the food one eats on weekdays and not on Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: as on Shabbat and not as on weekdays. And both intended to give the more lenient ruling. Rabbi Shimon says: two thirds of a loaf, when three [loaves] are made of a kav. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: not less than a loaf that is purchased for a pundium when the price of wheat is four se'ah for a sela’.

And sometimes they stated a large measure:A ladleful of corpse mould refers to the big ladle of physicians; The split bean in the case of skin disease refers to the Cilician kind; One who eats on Yom Kippur a quantity of the bulk of a large date, refers to the size of the date and its pit; In the case of skins of wine and oil [the holes] must be as big as their large stopper; In the case of a light hole that was not made by man's hands the prescribed size of which is that of a large fist, the reference is to the fist of Ben Batiah Rabbi Yose said: and it is as big as a large human head. And in the case of one made by human hands the prescribed size is that of the large drill in the Temple chamber which is the size of the Italian pondium or the Neronian sela or like the hole in a yoke.

All that live in the sea are clean, except the sea-dog because it seeks refuge on dry land, the words of Rabbi Akiba. If one made vessels from what grows in the sea and joined to them anything that grows on land, even if only a thread or a cord, if it is susceptible to uncleanness, they are unclean.

The laws of uncleanness can apply to what was created on the first day. There can be no uncleanness in what was created on the second day. The laws of uncleanness can apply to what was created on the third day. No there can be no uncleanness in what was created on the fourth day and on the fifth day, except for the wing of the vulture or an ostrich-egg that is plated. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: why should the wing of a vulture be different from all other wings? The laws of uncleanness can apply to all that was created on the sixth day.

If one made a receptacle whatever its size it is susceptible to uncleanness. If one made a couch or a bed whatever its purpose it is susceptible to uncleanness. If one made a wallet from untanned hide or from papyrus it is susceptible to uncleanness. A pomegranate, an acorn and a nut which children hollowed out to measure dust or fashioned them into a pair of scales, are susceptible to uncleanness, since in the case of children an act is valid though an intention is not.

The beam of a balance and a leveler that contain a receptacle for metal, carrying-stick that has a receptacle for money, a beggar's cane that has a receptacle for water, and a stick that has a receptacle for a mezuzah and for pearls are susceptible to uncleanness. About all these Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Oy to me if I should mention them, Oy to me if I don't mention them.

The base of the goldsmiths’ anvil is susceptible to uncleanness, but that of the blacksmiths is clean. A whetting-board which has a receptacle for oil is susceptible to uncleanness, but one that has none is clean. A writing-tablet that has a receptacle for wax is susceptible to uncleanness, but one that has none is clean. A straw mat or a tube of straw: Rabbi Akiva rules it is susceptible to uncleanness; But Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri rules that is it clean. Rabbi Shimon says: the hollow stalk of colocynth is subject to the same law. A mat of reeds or rushes is clean. A reed-tube that was cut for holding anything remains clean until all the pith has been removed.

Chapter 18

A wooden chest: Beth Shammai says: it is measured on the inside; And Bet Hillel says: on the outside. Both agree that the thickness of the legs and the thickness of the rim are not included in the measurement. Rabbi Yose says: both agree that the thickness of the legs and the thickness of the rim are included in the measurement, but the space between them is not included. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri ruled: if the legs are one handbreadth high the space between them is not included in the measurement, otherwise it is included.

Its carriage: if it can be slipped off, is not regarded as connected, nor is it included in its measurement, nor does it afford protection together with it in the tent of a corpse, nor may it be drawn along on Shabbat if it contains money. If it cannot be slipped off, it is regarded as connected, it is included in its measurement, it affords protection together with it in the tent of a corpse, it may be drawn along on Shabbat even if it contains money. Its arched top, if it is fixed [to the box], is considered connected and is measured with it, but if it is not fixed it is not connected and is not measured with it. How is it measured? As an ox-head. Rabbi Judah says: if it cannot stand by itself it is clean.

If one of the legs was missing from a chest, a box or a cupboard, even though it is still capable of holding [things], it is clean, since it cannot hold [things] in the usual manner. But Rabbi Yose says: it is susceptible to impurity. The poles of a bed, its base, and [its] covering are clean. Only the bed itself and its rectangle [frame] are susceptible to uncleanness. The rectangle frames of the Levites are clean.

A bed frame that was put on props: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah say it is susceptible to uncleanness. But Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say that it is clean. Rabbi Yose said: Why is this different from the rectangle frames of the Levites which are clean?

A bed that had contracted midras uncleanness: If a short side was removed and its two legs still remains it is unclean. But if a long side and two legs were removed it becomes clean. Rabbi Nehemiah says: it is unclean. If two props at opposite corners were cut off, or if two legs at opposite corners were cut off, or if the bed was reduced to a level of less than a handbreadth, it becomes clean.

A bed that had contracted midras impurity:If a long side of it was broken and then he repaired it, it still retains its midras impurity. If the second side was also broke and then he repaired it, it becomes pure from midras impurity but is unclean by virtue of contact with midras. If before one could manage to repair the first side the second one broke, the bed becomes clean.

If a [bed] leg that had contracted midras uncleanness was joined to a bed, all the bed contracts midras uncleanness. If it was subsequently taken off, it retains its midras uncleanness while the bed is unclean from contact with midras. If a bed leg that was subject to a seven-day uncleanness was joined to a bed, all the bed contracts seven-day uncleanness. If it was subsequently taken off it remains subject to seven-day uncleanness while the bed is only subject to evening-uncleanness. If a leg that was subject to evening uncleanness was joined to a bed, all the bed contracts evening uncleanness. If it was subsequently taken off it is still subject to evening uncleanness while the bed becomes clean. The same law applies also to the prong of a mattock.

A tefillin box consisting of four vessels: if the first compartment was unloosed, and then he mended it, it retains its corpse uncleanness. So is it also the case with the second and the third. If he unloosed the fourth it becomes free from corpse uncleanness but it is still unclean from contact with corpse uncleanness. If he went back to the first compartment and unloosed and mended it, it remains unclean from contact. So also in the case of the second compartment. If he then unloosed the third compartment and mended it becomes clean, since the fourth is unclean from contact, and what is unclean from contact cannot convey uncleanness by contact.

A bed half of which was stolen or lost, or one which brothers or joint owners divided between themselves, becomes clean. If it was restored it is susceptible to uncleanness henceforth. A bed may contract uncleanness and be rendered clean when all its parts are bound together, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: it can contract uncleanness and is rendered clean in single parts.

Chapter 19

One who dismantles a bed in order that he might immerse it and [while doing so] touches the ropes remains clean. When does the rope begin to constitute a connective with the bed? As soon as three rows of meshes of it have been knotted. And [if another rope was tied to this one] and a person touches it: If from the knot inwards he becomes unclean; But if from the knot outwards he remains clean. As to the loose ends of the knot, any one that touches that part which is needed for it becomes unclean. And how much is needed for it? Rabbi Judah says: three fingerbreadths.

A rope that hangs out from a bed:If it is shorter than five handbreadths, it is clean, If it is from five to ten handbreadths long, it is unclean. From ten handbreadths and longer is clean; For it is with [this rope] that paschal lambs were tied and beds were lowered down.

If a part of a mattress hangs over, it is unclean whatever its length, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: only that which is shorter than ten handbreadths. The remnant of a mattress remains unclean if the length is at least seven handbreadths from which a donkey's covering can be made.

If a zav was carried on a bed and on its mattress, the latter causes an uncleanness of two grades and an unfitness of one grade, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: if a zav was carried on a bed and on its mattress the part that is shorter than ten handbreadths causes an uncleanness of two grades and an unfitness of one grade, but that which is over the ten handbreadths causes only an uncleanness of one grade and an unfitness of one grade. If he was carried on the mattress, [on the overhanging part] that was shorter than ten handbreadths, it becomes unclean, but if on the part that was longer than ten handbreadths it remains clean.

If around a bed that had contracted midras uncleanness one wrapped a mattress, the whole becomes subject to midras uncleanness. If it was removed, the bed remains subject to midras uncleanness but the mattress is unclean only from contact with midras. If around a bed that had contracted seven-day uncleanness one wrapped a mattress, the whole becomes subject to seven-day uncleanness. If it was removed, the bed remains subject to seven-day uncleanness but the mattress is unclean until the evening. If the bed was subject to evening uncleanness and around it he wrapped a mattress, the whole becomes subject to evening uncleanness; If it was removed, the bed remains subject to evening uncleanness but the mattress becomes clean.

If a mattress was wrapped around a bed and a corpse touched them, they are subject to a seven-day uncleanness; If they are taken apart they are still subject to a seven-day uncleanness. If a sheretz touched them they are subject to an evening uncleanness; If they are taken apart they are still subject to evening uncleanness. A bed from which the two longer sides were removed and two new ones were prepared for it but the original sockets were not changed: If the new sides were broken the bed retains its uncleanness, But if the old ones were broken it becomes clean, since all depends on the old ones.

A box whose opening is at the top is susceptible to corpse uncleanness. If a piece fell out above it is still susceptible to corpse uncleanness. If it was damaged below, it becomes clean. The compartments within it remain unclean and are not regarded as a connected to it.

If a shepherd's bag was damaged, the pocket within it retains its uncleanness and is not regarded as a connected to it. A skin whose testicle bags serve also as receptacles and they were damaged, they become clean, since they will no longer serve their original purpose.

A box whose opening is at the side is susceptible to both midras uncleanness and corpse uncleanness. Rabbi Yose said: When does this apply? When it is less than ten handbreadths in height or when it does not have a rim one handbreadth deep. If it was damaged above it is still susceptible to corpse uncleanness. If it was damaged below: Rabbi Meir rules that it is susceptible to uncleanness. But the sages rule that it is clean because if the primary function ceases the secondary one also ceases.

A dung-basket that was so damaged that it will not hold pomegranates: Rabbi Meir says is still susceptible to uncleanness, But the sages say that it is clean because if the primary function ceases the secondary one also ceases.

Chapter 20

Pillows, bed coverings, sacks and packing cases that were damaged are still susceptible to midras uncleanness. A fodder-bag that can hold four kav, a shepherd's bag that can hold five kav, a traveling bag that can hold a se'ah, a skin that can hold seven kav, Rabbi Judah adds: also a spice-bag, and a food wallet that can hold the smallest quantity are susceptible to midras uncleanness. If any of them was damaged it becomes clean, since if the primary function ceases the secondary function also ceases.

A bagpipe is not susceptible to midras uncleanness. A trough for mixing mortar: Bet Shammai says: it is susceptible to midras uncleanness, And Bet Hillel says it is susceptible to corpse uncleanness only. If a trough of a capacity from two log to nine kav is split, it becomes susceptible to midras uncleanness. If he left it out in the rain and it swelled it is susceptible to corpse uncleanness alone. [If he left it out] during the east wind and it split, it is susceptible to midras uncleanness. In this respect the law is stricter in the case of remnants of wooden vessels than in [that of such vessels] in their original condition. It is also stricter in regard to the remnants of wicker vessels than [to such vessels] as are in their original condition, for when they are in their original condition they are insusceptible to uncleanness until their rim is finished, but after their rim has been finished, even though their edges fell away leaving only the slightest trace of them, they are unclean.

If a stick was used as a handle for a hatchet, it is regarded as connected for uncleanness at the time of use. A yarn winder is regarded as connected for uncleanness at the time of its use. If it was fixed to a pole it is susceptible to uncleanness, but it is not considered connected to it. If the pole itself was converted into a yarn winder, only that part which is needed for use is susceptible to uncleanness. A seat that was fixed to the pole is susceptible to uncleanness, but the latter is not regarded as connected to it. If the pole itself was turned into a seat, only the place of the seat is susceptible to uncleanness. A seat that was fixed to the beam of an olive-press is susceptible to uncleanness, but it is not connected to it. If the end of a beam was turned into a seat it remains clean, because people would tell him, "Get up and let us do our work."

If a large trough was so damaged that it could no longer hold pomegranates and he fixed it to be used as a seat: Rabbi Akiva says that it is susceptible to uncleanness, But the sages say that it remains clean unless its rough parts have been smoothed. If it was turned into a feeding bowl for cattle, even if it was fixed to a wall, it is susceptible to uncleanness.

A wood block that was fixed to a row on a wall, whether he fixed it and did not built upon it or built upon it but did not fix it, it is susceptible to uncleanness. If he fixed it and also built upon, it is clean. Matting that was spread over the roof-beams, whether he fixed it but did not put on the plasterwork or whether he put on the plasterwork but did not fix it, it is susceptible to uncleanness. If it was fixed and he laid plasterwork over it, it is clean. A dish that was fixed to a chest, box or cupboard: If in such a manner as to hold its contents in the usual way, it is susceptible to uncleanness, But if it was in a manner that it cannot hold its contents in the usual way it is clean.

If a sheet that was susceptible to midras uncleanness made into a curtain, it becomes clean from midras uncleanness but it is still susceptible to corpse uncleanness. When does it become insusceptible to [midras] uncleanness? Bet Shammai says: when the loops have been tied to it.. Bet Hillel says: when it has been attached. Rabbi Akiva says: when it has been fixed.

A mat whose reeds stretched lengthwise is insusceptible to uncleanness; But the sages rule: only if they lay in the shape of [the Greek letter] chi. If they were laid along its width and there was a distance of less than four handbreadths between the two reeds, it is insusceptible to uncleanness. If it was divided along its width, Rabbi Judah rules that is clean. So also, where the end-knots are untied, it is clean. If it was divided along its length but three end-knots remained intact across a stretch of six handbreadths, it is susceptible to uncleanness. When does a mat become susceptible to uncleanness? When its rough ends are trimmed, this being the completion of its manufacture.

Chapter 21

One who touches the upper beam, the lower beam, the harnesses, the sley, the thread that is drawn over purple material, or a spool which is not to be shot back, remains clean. If he touches the woof, the standing warp, the double thread that is drawn over purple material or a spool which is to be shot back, he becomes unclean. If one touches the wool that is on the distaff, or on the spool, he remains clean. If he touches the spinner: Before it was uncovered he is unclean, After it was uncovered he remains clean.

One who touches the yoke, the crossbar, the collar-piece, or the thick ropes, even when they are being used, he remains clean. If he touched the tail piece, knee or handle, he becomes unclean. If he touched the metal rings, the guides, or the flanks, he becomes unclean. Rabbi Judah says that he remains clean if he touched the guides since they only serve to increase the soil.

One who touches the handle of a saw at either end becomes unclean; [If he touched] its string, cord, cross-piece or side-pieces, a carpenter's vice, or the bow-handle of a bow-drill, he remains clean. Rabbi Judah says: so too he who touches the frame of a large saw remains clean. One who touches the bow-string or the bow, even though it was stretched, he remains clean. A mole-trap is clean. Rabbi Judah says: when it is stretched, the separate parts are [regarded as] connected.

Chapter 22

If a table or a side-board was damaged or he covered them with marble but room was left for cups to be set, it is unclean. Rabbi Judah ruled: there must be room enough for pieces of food.

A table one of whose legs was removed is clean. If a second leg was removed it is still clean. But if a third was removed it becomes unclean where the owner has the intention of using it. Rabbi Yose says: no intention is necessary. The same law applies also to the side-board.

A bench, one of whose legs was removed, is clean. If its second leg also was removed it is still clean. If it was one handbreadth high it is unclean. A footstool one of whose legs was removed is unclean. The same applies to the stool in front of a cathedra.

A bride's stool which lost the coverings for the seatboards: Bet Shammai rules that it still susceptible to uncleanness, And Bet Hillel rules that it is clean. Shammai rules: even the frame of the stool is susceptible to uncleanness. A stool which was fixed to a kneading-trough, Bet Shammai rules that it susceptible to uncleanness, And Bet Hillel rules that it is clean. Shammai rules: even one made out of it is susceptible to uncleanness.

A chair whose seat boards did not project and then they were removed, it is still susceptible to uncleanness, for it is usual to turn it on its side and to sit on it.

A chair whose middle seat board was removed but the outer ones remained, it is still susceptible to uncleanness. If the outer ones were removed and the middle seat board remained it is also susceptible to uncleanness. Rabbi Shimon says: only if it was a handbreadth wide.

A chair, of which two seat boards were removed, this one next to this one: Rabbi Akiva says: it is susceptible to impurity; And the sages say that it is clean. Rabbi Judah said: so too if the seat boards of a bride's chair were lost, though the receptacle under remained, it is clean, since where the primary function has ceased, the secondary one also ceases.

A chest whose top part was removed is still susceptible to uncleanness on account of its bottom; If its bottom was removed it is still susceptible to uncleanness on account of its top part. If both the top part and the bottom part were removed: Rabbi Judah says that it is susceptible to uncleanness on account of its sides, But the sages rule that it is clean. A stonecutter's seat is subject to midras uncleanness.

A [wooden] block which was painted red or saffron, or was polished: Rabbi Akiva says that it is susceptible to uncleanness, But the sages say that it remains clean unless [a seat] was carved out. A small basket or a big one that was filled with straw or other soft material remains clean [even] if it was prepared as a seat. But if it was plaited over with reed-grass or with a cord it becomes susceptible to uncleanness.

A toilet is subject to both midras and corpse uncleanness. If the leather seat was separated, the leather is subject to midras uncleanness and the iron is subject only to corpse uncleanness. A folding stool whose cover is of leather is subject to both midras and corpse uncleanness. If it was taken apart, the leather is subject to midras uncleanness while the stool is altogether clean. A bath-house bench that has two wooden legs is susceptible to uncleanness. If one leg was of wood and the other of stone it is clean. Boards in a bath-house which were joined together: Rabbi Akiva says that they are susceptible to [midras] uncleanness; But the sages say that they are clean, since they are made only for the water to flow under them. A fumigation-cage that contains a receptacle for garments is susceptible to uncleanness, But one that is made like a bee-hive is clean.

Chapter 23

If a ball, a mould, an amulet or tefillin were torn, one that touches them becomes unclean, But one that touches what is inside them remains clean. If a saddle was torn, one that touches its contents unclean, because the stitching joins them.

The following are susceptible to uncleanness as objects that are fit for riding upon (merkav): an Ashkelon donkey belt, a Medean saddle, a camel's pillow, and a horse-cloth. Rabbi Yose says: a horse-cloth is susceptible to uncleanness as a seat, since people stand on it in the arena. But a saddle of a female camel is susceptible to [sitting] uncleanness.

What is the practical difference between [the uncleanness of an object used for] riding upon and [one used for] sitting upon? In the case of the former the effect of contact with it is different from the effect of carrying it, but in the case of the latter there is no difference between the effect of coming in contact with it or carrying it. The pack-frame of a donkey on which a zav sat is clean; But if the size of the spaces has been changed or if they have been broken one into another it is susceptible to uncleanness.

A bier, the mattress and the pillow of a corpse are susceptible to the uncleanness of midras. A bride's stool, a midwife's stool, and a launderer's stool on which he piles the clothes: Rabbi Yose says: it is not regarded as a seat.

A fishing net is susceptible to uncleanness on account of its bag. Nets, snares, bird-traps, slings and fishermen's skeins are susceptible to uncleanness. A fish-trap, a bird-basket and a bird-cage are not susceptible to uncleanness.

Chapter 24

There are three different types of shields:A bent shield is susceptible to midras uncleanness; A shield used in the arena is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And the Arabian toy shield is pure from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of wagons:The one made like a cathedra is susceptible to midras uncleanness; The one made like a bed is susceptible to corpse uncleanness, And the one for [the transport of] stones is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of baking-troughs:If a baking-trough of a capacity from two log to nine kav was split it is susceptible to midras uncleanness; If it was whole it is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And if it holds the prescribed measure it is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of boxes:A box whose opening is at the sides is susceptible to midras uncleanness; If it is on the top it is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And if it holds the prescribed measure it is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of leather covers:That of barbers is susceptible to midras uncleanness; That on which people eat is susceptible to corpse uncleanness. And that for [spreading out] olives is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of bases:One which lies before a bed or before a scribe is susceptible to midras uncleanness; One for a side-table is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And one for a cupboard is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of writing tablets:That of papyrus is susceptible to midras uncleanness; That which had a receptacle for wax is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And that which is smooth is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of beds:One that is used for lying upon is susceptible to midras uncleanness; One used by glass makers is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And one used by weavers is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of baskets:The one for dung is susceptible to midras uncleanness; The one for straw is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And a camel's rope bag is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of mats:One used for sitting upon is susceptible to midras uncleanness; One used by dyers is susceptible to corpse uncleanness. And one used in wine-presses is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of water skins and three different types of shepherds' wallets:Those that can hold the prescribed quantity are susceptible to midras uncleanness; Those that cannot hold the prescribed quantity are susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And those made of fish skin are free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of hides:That which is used as a rug is susceptible to midras uncleanness; That which is used as a wrapper for vessels is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And that which is intended for straps and sandals is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of sheets:One used for lying upon is susceptible to midras uncleanness; One used as a curtain is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And one used as a mural decoration is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of napkins:One used for hands is susceptible to midras uncleanness; One used for books is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And the one used as a shroud or a covering for the harps of the Levites is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of hip-boots:Those used by the hunters of animals and birds are susceptible to midras uncleanness; Those used by locust gatherers are susceptible to corpse uncleanness. And those used by fig-pickers are free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of hair nets:A girl's is susceptible to midras uncleanness; An old woman's is susceptible to corpse uncleanness; And [the hair net] of a woman who "goes out" is free from all uncleanness.

There are three different types of baskets: If a worn-out basket is patched on to a sound one, all is determined by the sound one; If a small basket is patched on to a large one all is determined by the large one; If they are equal all is determined by the inner one. Rabbi Shimon says: if the cup of a balance was patched on to the bottom of a boiler on the inside, the latter becomes unclean; but if on the outside it remains clean. If it was patched on to the side, whether on the inside or the outside, it remains clean.

Chapter 25

All vessels have [different laws] for outer and inner sides, as for instance, cushions, coverings, sacks and packing-bags, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: any vessel that has loops has [different laws] for inner and outer sides but one that has no loops does not have different laws for outer and inner sides. A table and a side-board have [different laws] for outer and inner sides, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: they do not have a different law for their outer sides. The same applies to a frame.

An ox-goad has different laws for its outer and inner parts, [The outer part is] the seven handbreadths from the broad blade and four handbreadths from the point, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: it is not to [subject to such distinction], the four and the seven handbreadths were mentioned only in regard to its remnants.

Measures of wine or oil, a fork-ladle, a mustard-strainer and a wine-filter have an outer and inner side, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: they do not have. Rabbi Shimon says: they do have, for if their outer parts contracted uncleanness that which is inside remains clean, and immersion is required.

If [in a measure consisting of] a quarter [of a log] and half a quarter [of a log] the quarter measure contracted uncleanness, the half-quarter measure does not become unclean, and if the half-quarter contracted uncleanness the quarter does not become unclean. They argued before Rabbi Akiva: since the half quarter measure is the outer part of the quarter measure, should not the outer side of the vessel whose inner side contracted uncleanness become unclean? He answered them: Are you sure that it belongs to the category [of vessels] that have inner [and outer] parts? Perhaps the quarter is to be regarded as the outer side of the half quarter and, surely, the inner side of a vessel does not become unclean if the outer side contracted uncleanness.

If the [inside of the] quarter contracted uncleanness, the quarter and its outer side are unclean, but the half quarter and its outer side remain clean. If the [inside of the] half quarter contracted uncleanness, the half quarter and its outer side are unclean, but the quarter and its outer side remain clean. If the outer side of the quarter contracted uncleanness,the outer side of the half quarter remains clean, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the outer side cannot be divided. When he immerses the vessel, he must immerse the whole thing.

The bases, rims, hangers or handles of vessels that have a receptacle upon which an unclean liquid fell, one dries them and they remain clean. But [if unclean liquid fell] on any part of any other vessel which cannot hold pomegranates (or in which no distinction is made between its outer and inner sides), the whole becomes unclean. If the outer side of a vessel contracted uncleanness from a liquid, only its outer side is unclean but its inner side, rim, hanger and handles remain clean. If its inner side contracted uncleanness the whole is unclean.

All vessels have outer and inner sides and have a part by which they are held. Rabbi Tarfon says: this applies only to a large wooden [kneading] trough. Rabbi Akiva says: it applies to cups. Rabbi Meir says: it applies to unclean and clean hands. Rabbi Yose says: they said this only concerning clean hands.

How so?If one's hands were clean and the outer side of a cup was unclean, one may hold it by its holding-place and need not be concerned lest his hands have contracted uncleanness from the outer side of the cup. If one was drinking from a cup whose outer side was unclean he need not be concerned lest the liquid in his mouth contracted uncleanness from the outer side of the cup and that it then conveyed uncleanness to the cup. If a kettle was boiling one need not be concerned lest liquid should come out from it and touch its outer side and return again within it.

Holy vessels do not have outer and inner sides or a part by which they are held. One may not immerse vessels within one another for sacred use. All vessels become susceptible to uncleanness by intention, but they cannot be rendered insusceptible except by a change-effecting act, for an act annuls an earlier act as well as an earlier intention, but an intention annuls neither an earlier act nor an earlier intention.

Chapter 26

An Imki sandal and a laced-up bag, Rabbi Judah says: also an Egyptian basket; Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: also to a Lattakian sandal can be made susceptible to uncleanness and again be made insusceptible without the aid of a craftsman. Rabbi Yose said: But can't all vessels be made susceptible to uncleanness and again insusceptible without the aid of a craftsman? Rather, these, even when they are unlaced are susceptible to uncleanness since a layman is able to restore them. They spoke only of an Egyptian basket which even a craftsman cannot [easily] restore.

A laced-up bag whose laces were removed is still susceptible to uncleanness; But if it was made flat it is pure. If a strip of cloth has been put on it below, it is susceptible. If a bag was within another bag and one of them became unclean from a liquid, the other does not become unclean. A pearl pouch is susceptible to uncleanness. A money pouch: Rabbi Eliezer says that it is susceptible to uncleanness, But the sages say that it is pure.

The hand-coverings of thorn-pickers are pure. A belt and leg guards are susceptible to uncleanness. Sleeves are susceptible to uncleanness. But hand-coverings are pure. All finger-coverings are pure except that of fig-pickers, since the latter holds the sumac berries. If it was torn, if it cannot hold the greater part of a sumac berry it is pure.

A sandal, one of whose holes was broken but was then fixed, retains its midras uncleanness. If a second hole was broken and it was fixed, it is free from midras uncleanness but is unclean from contact with midras. If the second hole was broken before the first could be mended, it is clean. If its heel was torn off, or if its toe-piece was removed, or if it was torn in two, it becomes clean. A heel-less slipper that was torn anywhere becomes clean. A shoe that was damaged becomes clean if it cannot contain the greater part of the foot. A shoe that is still on the last: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is insusceptible to uncleanness, But the sages say that it is susceptible. All water skins whose holes have been tied up are insusceptible to uncleanness, except for Arabian ones. Rabbi Meir says: if they are tied up for a while, they are clean; but if they are tied with a permanent knot they are unclean. Rabbi Yose says: all tied up water skins are clean.

The following hides are susceptible to midras uncleanness: A hide which he intended to use as a rug, A hide used as an apron, A hide used as the lower covering of a bed, A hide used by a donkey-driver, A hide used by a flax-worker, A hide used by a porter, A hide used by a doctor, A hide used for a crib, A hide put over a child's chest, A hide for a cushion. A hide for a covering. All these are susceptible to midras uncleanness. A hide for wrapping up combed wool and a hide worn by a wool-comber: Rabbi Eliezer says it is susceptible to midras, But the sages say that it is susceptible to corpse uncleanness only.

A bag or wrapper for garments is susceptible to midras. A bag or wrapper for purple wool: Bet Shammai says: it is susceptible to midras, But Bet Hillel says: it is susceptible only to corpse uncleanness. A hide which was made to be a covering for vessels is not susceptible to uncleanness, but for weights it is susceptible. Rabbi Yose says in the name of his father that it is pure.

Whenever no act is lacking, intention alone causes a vessel to be susceptible to uncleanness, But whenever an act is lacking, intention alone does not render it susceptible to uncleanness, except for a fur cover.

The hides of a householder become susceptible to uncleanness by intention, but those that belong to a tanner do not become susceptible by mere intention. Those taken by a thief become susceptible by intention, but those taken by a robber do not become susceptible by mere intention. Rabbi Shimon says: the rule is to be reversed; those taken by a robber become susceptible by mere intention, but those taken by a thief do not become susceptible by intention, since in the latter case the owner does not abandon hope for recovery.

If a hide had contracted midras uncleanness and its owner then intended it to be used for straps or sandals, it becomes clean as soon as he put the knife to it, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages say: it does not become clean until he has reduced its size to less than five handbreadths. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says: even if one made a napkin from a hide it remains unclean, But if [he made one from] a covering it becomes clean.

Chapter 27

Cloth is susceptible to five categories of uncleanness; Sack-cloth is susceptible to four; Leather to three; Wood to two; And an earthenware vessel to one. An earthenware vessel is susceptible to uncleanness [only] as a receptacle; any earthen vessel that has no inner part is not susceptible to uncleanness from its outer part. Wood is subject to an additional form of uncleanness in that it is also susceptible to uncleanness as a seat. Similarly a tablet which has no rim is susceptible to uncleanness if it is a wooden object and insusceptible if it is an earthenware one. Leather is susceptible to an additional form of uncleanness in that it is also susceptible to the uncleanness of a tent. Sack-cloth has an additional form of uncleanness in that it is susceptible to uncleanness as woven work. Cloth has an additional form of uncleanness in that it is susceptible to uncleanness when it is only three by three fingerbreadths.

Cloth is susceptible to midras uncleanness when it is three handbreadths by three handbreadths, and to corpse uncleanness when it is three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths. Sack-cloth when it is four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Leather, five handbreadths by five handbreadths. And matting, six handbreadths by six handbreadths. [All of these] are equally susceptible to both midras and corpse uncleanness. Rabbi Meir says: what remains of sack-cloth is susceptible to uncleanness if it is four handbreadths, but when in its first condition [it becomes susceptible only after its manufacture] is completed.

If one made up a piece of material from two handbreadths of cloth and one of sack-cloth, or of three of sack-cloth and one of leather or four of leather and one of matting, it is not susceptible to uncleanness. If the piece of material was made up of five handbreadths of matting and one of leather or four of leather and one of sack-cloth, or three of sack-cloth and one of cloth it is susceptible to uncleanness. This is the general rule: if the material added is subject to greater restrictions it is susceptible to uncleanness, but if the material added was subject to lesser restrictions it is not susceptible.

If one cut off from any of these a piece one by one handbreadth it is susceptible to uncleanness. [If one cut off a one by one handbreadth piece] from the bottom of a basket it is susceptible to uncleanness. If one cut off from the sides of the basket: Rabbi Shimon says that it is not susceptible to uncleanness, But the sages say one who cuts off a square handbreadth from anywhere, it is susceptible to uncleanness.

Worn-out pieces of a sifter or a sieve that were adapted for use as a seat: Rabbi Akiva rules that they are susceptible to uncleanness, But the sages rule that they are not susceptible unless their rough ends were cut off. A child's stool that has legs, even though it is less than a handbreadth high, is susceptible to uncleanness. A child's shirt: Rabbi Eliezer rules it is susceptible to uncleanness at any size. But the sages rule: it is susceptible only if it is of the prescribed size, and it is measured when doubled over.

The following are measured when doubled: Felt socks, long stockings, pants, a cap and a money-belt. As regards a patch sewn on the hem, if it was simple it is measured simple, but if it was doubled it is measured when doubled.

If a piece of cloth was woven to the size of three by three handbreadths, and then it contracted midras uncleanness, and then he completed the rest of the piece, and then one removed a single thread from the original part, it is free from midras uncleanness but is still unclean from contact with midras uncleanness. If he removed a thread from the original part and then he finished the whole cloth, it is still unclean from contact with midras uncleanness.

Similarly, if a piece of cloth was woven to the size of three [fingerbreadths] square, and it contracted corpse uncleanness, and afterwards he finished the entire piece, and then he removed a single thread from its original part, it is free from corpse uncleanness but is still unclean from contact with corpse uncleanness. If a thread was removed from the original part and then all the cloth was finished it remains clean, for the sages have ruled: if a piece of three [fingerbreadths] square is lessened it becomes clean. But if one of three handbreadths square is lessened, even though it is released from midras, it is still susceptible to all other forms of uncleanness.

If a sheet that had contracted midras uncleanness was made into a curtain, it is pure from midras uncleanness but is still unclean from contact with midras uncleanness. Rabbi Yose said: but what midras uncleanness has this touched! Only if a zav had touched it is it unclean from contact with a zav.

If a piece of cloth three [handbreadths] square was divided, it is pure from midras uncleanness but is still unclean from contact with midras uncleanness. Rabbi Yose said: but what midras uncleanness has this touched! Only if a zav had touched it is it unclean from contact with a zav.

If a piece of cloth three [handbreadths] square [was found] in a rubbish heap it must be both sound and capable of wrapping up salt; But [if it was found] in the house it need only be either sound or capable of wrapping up salt. How much salt must it be capable of wrapping up? A quarter of a kav. Rabbi Judah says: this refers to fine salt, But the sages stated: it refers to coarse salt. Both intended to be lenient. Rabbi Shimon says: the law concerning a piece of cloth three [handbreadths] square found in a rubbish heap is the same as that for a piece of cloth that was three [fingerbreadths] square in a house.

[A piece of cloth] three [handbreadths] square that was torn: if he put it on a chair, and his skin touches the chair, it is pure; And if not, it remains impure. [A piece of cloth] three [fingerbreadths] square one thread of which was worn away, or in which a knot was found, or in which two threads ran alongside each other, is pure. [A piece of cloth] three [fingerbreadths] square that was thrown on the rubbish heap becomes pure. If he brought it back, it it becomes susceptible to uncleanness. Throwing it away always renders it pure and taking it back renders it susceptible to uncleanness, except when it is of purple or fine crimson. Rabbi Eliezer says: a patch of new cloth is also subject to the same law. Rabbi Shimon says: all these materials become pure; they were mentioned only in connection with the return of lost property.

Chapter 28

[A piece of cloth] three [fingerbreadths] square that was stuffed into a ball or was itself made into a ball is clean. But [a piece of cloth] three [handbreadths] square that was stuffed into a ball remains unclean. If he made it into a ball itself, it is clean because the sewing reduces its size.

[A piece of cloth] less than three [handbreadths] square that was adapted for the purpose of stopping up a hole in a bath house, of emptying a cooking-pot or of wiping with it the mill stones, whether it was or was not kept in readiness for any such use, is susceptible to uncleanness, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Joshua says: whether it was or was not kept in readiness it is pure. Rabbi Akiba ruled: if it was kept in readiness it is susceptible, and if it was not kept in readiness it is pure.

If a bandage is made of cloth or leather it is pure. (Rabbi Yose says: with leather it is pure.) A poultice is pure if it is on cloth, but if on leather it is susceptible. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if it was on cloth it remains susceptible to uncleanness because it can be shaken off.

Covers of scrolls, whether they are decorated or not, are susceptible to uncleanness according to the view of Bet Shammai. Bet Hillel says: those that are decorated are pure, but those that are not decorated are susceptible. Rabban Gamaliel says: both the former and the latter are pure.

If a head-wrap that had contracted midras uncleanness was wrapped around a scroll, it is released from midras uncleanness but it remains susceptible to corpse uncleanness. A skin that was made into a rug or a rug that was made into a skin becomes clean. A skin that was made into a [shepherd's] wallet or a [shepherd's] wallet that was made into a skin; Or a cushion cover that was made into a sheet or a sheet that was made into a cushion cover; Or a sheet cover that was made into a plain sheet or a plain sheet that was made into a sheet cover, remains unclean. This is the general rule: any object that has been changed into one of the same class remains unclean, but if into one of another class it becomes clean.

If a patch was sewn on to a basket, it conveys one grade of uncleanness and one of unfitness. If it was separated from the basket, it conveys one grade of uncleanness and one of unfitness, but the patch becomes clean. If it was sewn on to cloth it conveys two grades of uncleanness and one of unfitness. If it was separated from the cloth, it conveys one grade of uncleanness and one of unfitness, while the patch conveys two grades of uncleanness and one of unfitness. The same law applies to a patch was sewn on to sacking or leather, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says that it is clean. Rabbi Yose says: if [it was sewn] on leather it becomes clean; but if on sacking it remains unclean, since the latter is a woven material.

The three (fingerbreadths) square of which they have spoken do not include the hem, the words of Rabbi Shimon. But the sages say: exactly three [fingerbreadths] square. If a patch was sewn on to a cloth by one side only, it is not considered as connected. If it was sewn on by two opposite sides, it is considered connected. If it was sewn on the shape of a gamma: Rabbi Akiva says that the cloth is unclean, But the sages say that it is clean. Rabbi Judah stated: When does this apply? To a cloak, but in the case of an undershirt the patch is regarded as connected if it was sewn by its upper side, but if by its lower side it is not connected.

Poor men's clothes, though made up of pieces none of which is three [fingerbreadths] square are susceptible to midras uncleanness. If a cloak began to be torn, as soon as its greater part is torn [the pieces] are not regarded as connected. Exceptionally thick or thin materials are not governed by the prescribed minimum of three [fingerbreadths] square.

A porter's pad is susceptible to midras uncleanness. A wine filter is not susceptible to uncleanness as a seat. An old woman's hair-net is susceptible to uncleanness as a seat. A prostitute's shirt which is woven like a net is not susceptible to uncleanness. A garment made of fishing net is not susceptible to uncleanness, but one made of its bag is susceptible. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if a garment is made out of a fishing net but is made double it is susceptible to uncleanness.

A hair-net that one began to make from its upper hem remains pure until its bottom section is finished. If one began from its bottom section, it remains pure until its hem is finished. Its head band is susceptible to uncleanness in itself. Its strings are susceptible to uncleanness because they are connected. A hair-net that is torn becomes pure if it cannot contain the greater part of the hair.

Chapter 29

The fringe strings of a sheet, a scarf, a head-wrap and a felt cap [are regarded as connected] up to a length of six fingerbreadths; Those of an undergarment up to ten [fingerbreadths]. The fringes of a thick wool cloak, a veil, a shirt, or a light cloak [are regarded as connected] up to a length of three fingerbreadths. The fringes of an old woman's head-wrap, of Arabian face wraps, of Cilician goat's-hair clothing, of a money-belt, of a turban or of a curtain are regarded as connected whatever their length may be.

Three woolen pillow-covers, six linen ones, three sheets, twelve handkerchiefs, two pant-sleeves, one shirt, one cloak, or one winter-cloak, can be regarded as connected in respect of both uncleanness and sprinkling. If they exceed this number they are regarded as connected in respect of uncleanness but not in respect of sprinkling. Rabbi Yose says: not even in respect of uncleanness.

The string of a [common] plumb-line is regarded as connected up to a length of twelve [cubits]; That of the carpenters’ plumb-line, up to eighteen [cubits]; And that of the builders’ plumb-line up to fifty cubits. The parts that exceed these lengths, even if it was desired to retain them, are pure. The plumb-line of plasterers or moulders is regarded as connected whatsoever its length.

The cord of the balances of goldsmiths or the weighers of fine purple cloth is regarded as a connective up to a length of three fingerbreadths, The handle of an axe behind the grip, up to a length of three fingerbreadths. Rabbi Yose says: if the length behind the grip is no less than one handbreadth the entire handle is unsusceptible to uncleanness.

The cord of the balances of shopkeepers or householders is regarded as connected up to a length of one handbreadth. The shaft of an axe in front of the grip, up to one handbreadth. The projection of the shaft of a compass, up to one handbreadth. That of the shaft of the stone-masons’ chisel, one handbreadth.